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CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

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Scope and Mission

The *Czech Sociological Review* is a scholarly review open to discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, and at the same time strives to be useful for solving the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

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The editors require an original and two easily readable copies, which do not contain the name or workplace of the author, in order that the reading process will be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the CSR is regarded as unethical.

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Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within one month from the date your manuscript is received at the CSR office. If your manuscript is accepted you will be asked to submit your final version both on paper and on a microcomputer floppy disk, either in ASCII or Microsoft Word for Windows, MS-Word 5.0, or 5.5. IBM disks are acceptable. The final version should also include a twenty-line abstract and an eighty-line summary, an alphabetized bibliography and basic information about the author.

Introduction

With this issue, we start a regular publication of the Czech Sociological Review. Along with four issues in the Czech language, two issues in English will be published each year. The first (special) issue appeared already in August 1992 with articles about the transition in Czechoslovakia, perceptions of the labor market, educational inequalities and others. Interests from foreign scholars encouraged us to continue this endeavor and to regularly bring you an English edition of our journal.

The purpose of the Czech Sociological Review is to aid the dissemination of Czech sociology, to inspire comparative research on transformation processes and also to encourage our authors to share their results with the international public. From the Czech version of the journal, we select articles of broader relevance and focus on big changes which occur in the Czech society and Central Europe as a whole. The information section will report on the main comparative projects and documents published, among other projects.

Several articles of this issue stem from the No. 1/1993 of the Czech version of the Sociological Review, which was dedicated solely to the Czech/Slovak separation. This pitiful process is worth not only political, but also sociological attention. The contributions we select reveal its historical background and differences in the populations' perceptions of the ongoing changes. In fact, quick changes developing after 1989 show, that after 40 years of planned and partly even forced rapprochement, Czech and Slovak societies are much less alike than one could figure out.

Jiří Musil's comparative article of the Czech and Slovak societies displays the asynchronicity of their modernization processes and offers two other explanatory models: a model of internal economic dependency and a model of mobilization. Eva Broklová offers a historical analysis of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks as a problem of Slovakia's positioning in the Czechoslovak Republic. Like Musil, she stresses the role of the elite but shows that when the Slovak intelligentsia finally came of age and wished to participate in public administration, the existence of the Czechoslovak state was broken.

Jadwiga Šanderová used several sociological surveys to demonstrate differences between the Czech and Slovak perceptions of the economic transformation. As a sort of counterbalance to hitherto mostly historical interpretations of the divergence in Czech and Slovak survey data, she states that the dissimilar perceptions of the transformation might stem from their different rates of change toward market economies. Zora Bútorová displays the elements of the population's political awareness which played an important role in the process of the Czechoslovak dissolution. She pays special attention to the images of the political parties during the pre-election period and to the reactions of the population to the division of the country.

Remaining articles belong to stratification and social policy research.

In his "Revolution for Whom?", Petr Matějů and Blanka Řeháková test a popular hypothesis about the manipulation of east-european revolutions by and for ancient cadres. Using the data of a longitudinal study, they show that membership in the Communist Party as well as membership in the "cadres" group in 1989, did significantly increase the chances for downward mobility. But these characteristics only very slightly affected chances for upward mobility. Precisely these two groups had far greater chances to enter the group of entrepreneurs.

Zdeněk Konopásek's theoretical analysis about the welfare "mix" on the way to welfare universalism argues that as a consequence of the coming "chaotic" post-modern era, modern welfare institutional regimes cease to be appropriate "representations" of the most urgent welfare conflicts. He discusses two fundamental ways of mixing two statuses - "citizen" and/or "employee" status - both aimed to ensure institutional universalism.

In the information section, we bring information about unemployment, income and social stratification comparative projects and about teaching sociology in the Czech Republic.

The transformation of Central Europe surfaces compelling social topics. We hope this issues will help interested researchers and that it is enjoyable for the curious as well - so read on.

Jiří Večerník

Czech and Slovak Society

Outline of a Comparative Study

JIŘÍ MUSIL*

The Central European University, Prague

Abstract: According to data on social, demographic and, to some extent, on urban structures at the beginning of the nineties, the Czech and Slovak societies had become very similar. This was the result of economic policies as well as the application of the unifying Soviet model. Nevertheless, at the very time when they appear most similar from a macrostructural point of view, they are moving apart. The processes leading to the resemblance between Czech and Slovak societies are an interesting example of asynchronical modernization. The process components of modernization, e.g. economic transformation, demographic revolution, urbanization, the growth of literacy and democratization, were going on in each part of Czechoslovakia at different times, i.e. also in different political and societal contexts and at differing paces. The study contains basic information of this asynchronicity and points out the effects of Slovakia's modernization during the socialist regime. The model of asynchronous modernization is, however, not able to explain the division of Czechoslovakia. Two other explanatory models must be added: a model of internal economic dependency and a model of mobilization. Without the existence of a mobilizing Slovak elite, the division would not have happened.

Czech Sociological Review, 1993, Vol. 1 (No. 1: 5-21)

The following study is concentrated on comparative structural analysis and deliberately does not pay attention to the definition of situation in its sociological meaning. The study explicitly assumes that in Czechoslovakia there have existed two societies and tries to clarify the differences and the analogies between them. The hypothesis scrutinized in the text assumes that the division of Czechoslovakia has occurred, in particular, because of the fact the "Czechoslovak society" has not been established thus far, even though from the structural point of view both societies were, at the moment of splitting up, substantially more similar than at the time of Czechoslovakia's formation. There exists the view, which we want to verify, that during the decline of the federation the following participated in concrete terms:

1. The differences in economic, social, cultural and dispositional structures;
2. The asynchronous and differing processes of modernization in both societies;

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Author thanks anonymous reviewers for their exceptionally valuable observations.

3. The different consequences of the formation of societies of Soviet type in the Czech Lands and in Slovakia;
4. The differing processes for rectification of political, economic and cultural institutions in both republics after November, 1989.

The methodological approach used in our study is based on the concept proposed by Anthony Giddens in the preamble of his contribution to the first Conference of European Sociologists in Vienna, in August 1992. He stressed the fact that to understand the evolution of Europe in the future it is necessary to perform *structural analysis* of the main socio-cultural changes of European societies.

The methodological starting points of the following outline emphasize that we may speak, in the 19th and 20th centuries, of "the society" not only from a macrosocial point of view demonstrated by the evolutionary typologies of K. Marx, H. Spencer, E. Durkheim, F. Tönnies and of contemporary authors such as R. Aron, E. Gellner, D. Bell, G. Lenski and numerous others, but also in the narrower sense of the word. An example of this narrower conceptual sense of a society is, e.g., Gellner's concept of "the Muslim's society." An even more strict concept of society was used by, e.g., Johan Goldsblom in his book "The Dutch Society" when he wanted to describe one of the sub-types of contemporary industrial societies based on the principle of "pillarization." Historical literature that deals with nations without a state sometimes uses conceptual interpretation of society as well, such as our authors, e.g., O. Urban, Jan Křen, Jiří Kořalka.

This outline summarizes the results of the comparison of the population's demographic and nationality structure according to their relationship to economic sectors, to social structure, to education, to the population structure, to the size of their settlements and forms of living, and finally to some indicators of the living standard. A part of this outline is a summary of data comparisons on the development of the national economies in both parts of Czechoslovakia, an all-inclusive view of the main economic divisions and of the overall economic structure of both republics and of their mutual relationship. The essay will evaluate, too, the development of migration between both parts of Czechoslovakia and the degree of their mutual openness and closedness, respectively.

All these structural cuts will be analyzed, where data permits, *in term of evolution* so that it will be obvious that both examined societies become:

1. more alike or more different or...
2. the interaction in between them is getting more intensive or they mutually are getting more separated.

The Applied Comparative Models of Structural Changes

Most of the present studies on the division of Czechoslovakia are principally descriptive. Historical methods for identifying particular *events* that led to the decline of the federation appear to prevail in them. In some socio-political studies, more general facts which do not depict only the character of events and which are labelled by terms such as "Czech paternalism" and "Slovak separatism," etc., are assumed to be the cause of the Czechoslovak failure. But even in this instance, the

sociological and long-standing causes of this separation, with exceptions, are not investigated. Even though the historical analysis and the socio-political interpretations are essential, they are not sufficient to explain the impossibility of maintaining a common state. This is not, under any circumstances, to underestimate the importance of explicit single events or even of accidental events. It would be inappropriate, just as well, not to state the role of certain political attitudes and movements. An interpretation of Czechoslovakia's division can not avoid an analysis of the role of social structures and of cultures and, in particular, of their differing nature in the Czech and Slovak society. It is not enough, either, to do sociological comparisons of both societies. Such a comparison has its meaning if it is carried out within the context of *theory of modernization*, which we now understand as a change of whole societies caused by the long-standing impact of what Eric Hobsbawm called "the double revolution" i.e. the combination of industrial and political revolutions.

The theory of modernization as it has been defined by T. Parsons, A. Inkeles, W. Moore, W. W. Rostow and by other authors, on the one hand, deals with the changes in particular social institutions, the size and structure of particular social groups, the nature of mutual social relations (types of social bonds) and, on the other hand, the change of values, of ways of behavior. The first group of changes can be labelled as *social structural* features of modernization and the second one then as *social cultural* modernization.

One of the basic hypotheses of our study is the view that processes of modernization in the Czech and Slovak societies proceeded not only asynchronously but also, in some respect, differently. Modernization of the Czech society has been implemented, to a considerable extent, within the frame of the capitalist system and had, except for some specific features as, e.g., a low degree of urbanization along with a relatively high degree of industrialization, standard features of modernization processes in Western Europe. The overall process of modernization in Slovakia started later than in the Czech Lands. The main parts of modernization processes in Slovakia took place not only later than in Czech lands, i.e. practically after 1918 with a rapid growth of the educational system, but mainly during the socialist era and according to a Soviet model. This different systemic context was not without significance.

In this context it is necessary to stress the fact (compare also [Amersfoort 1991]) that the theory of modernization applied to questions of ethnic relationships existing in the one common state assumes that the interaction and communication amongst inhabitants of a territory once controlled by some state administration is going to have positive impact. Their interaction, caused by economic development, urbanization, literacy, etc., would lead towards cultural homogeneity which, apart from other things, implies that the differences decrease and as a consequence, would lead to a kind of amalgamation of ethnically different societies. Both in their Marxist and non-Marxist form, modernization theories have their own latent optimistic evolutionist hidden meaning. There is no doubt that the theory of modernization is one of the bases for a policy of integration in Western Europe. It is expected that a certain extent of economic and social similarities is the necessary

condition for political integration. From this point of view, high-quality sociological analysis of the Czechoslovak experiences might have even more of a common significance.

The Economic Transition in the Czech Lands and in Slovakia

A simple way to describe economic transition processes is to analyze the population structure according to three general economic sectors [Clark 1940; Fourastié 1949; Friedrichs 1985], i.e.:

- 1) agriculture, forestry, fishery;
- 2) industry and building industry;
- 3) services.

If we are to follow up on Friedrichs [1985] three economic transition periods we may distinguish:

- 1) *A period before the transition* during which more than 50% of the population belongs to the primary sector and during which proportions of secondary and tertiary sectors increase;
- 2) *A period of actual economic transition* during which the proportion of the primary sector decreases, the secondary sector reaches its maximum and the proportion of the tertiary sector increases;
- 3) *A post-transitional period* during which proportions of both primary and secondary sectors decrease and the proportion of the tertiary sector exceeds 50% and continues to increase.

Table 1. The beginning and the end of economic transition in chosen European Countries

Country	year of the beginning of the transition	year of the end of the transition	duration of the transition (in years)
England	1841*	1932	91*
France	1869	1974	105
Germany	1876	1981	105
Austria	1884	1980	96
Czech Lands	1900	1991*	91*
Soviet Union	1946	1980*	34*
Slovakia	1950	1991*	41*
Hungary	1951	1980*	29*
Poland	1957	1980*	23*

*) The time series is not closed.

Data regarding the Czech Lands and Slovakia have been taken from the Handbook of Demography. For other countries, they are taken from [Friedrichs 1985].

Table 2. The peak of the industrial period and indexes of the economic transition intensity

Country	Maximum of the secondary sector		Intensity of the transition		
	year	share in %	I.	II.	III.
England	1880	52.5	.16	.12	.22
France	1970	40.6	.38	.13	.26
Germany	1971	49.0	.42	.16	.29
Austria	1961	43.5	.42	.19	.29
Czech Lands	1980	55.9	.45	.28	.32
Soviet Union	1980	39.0	.88	.40	.48
Slovakia	1980	51.4	.97	.87	.55
Hungary	1974	44.0	1.07	.88	.44
Poland	1980	39.9	1.00	.48	.44

Sources: see Table 1.

Indexes of transition intensity have been calculated in the following manner: The index for the primary sector is defined as the difference between the proportion of the primary sector at the beginning and at the end of the transition divided by the number of years for the transition. The indexes for the tertiary sector are calculated similarly. The indexes for the secondary sector are defined as the difference between the greatest proportion of the secondary sector and its proportion in the last year of the transition. This difference is then divided by the number of years between the height and the end of the transition. This means, in general, the higher the index value, the faster the transition.

Data for the Czech and Slovak territories based upon data about an economically active population testify to the fact that the Czech Lands finished the first period soon after the year 1900, while Slovakia finished only after 1950. In other words, the Czech lands ceased to be an agricultural society by early in the 20th century, whereas Slovakia did so only in the middle of this century. Both societies, however, are now in the second period of economic transition according to the results of the 1991 census. Still the proportion of the tertiary sector has not yet exceeded 50% (CR - 43.5%; SR - 43.7%). (compare tables 1 and 2).

From data on the development of the economically active population in regard to their division into the three sectors, we can deduce further differences within the process of the economic transition:

1. While Slovakia, before the First World War, belonged to the category of agrarian countries, the Czech Lands, by that time, ranked amongst considerably industrialized territories and the differences between both parts of Czechoslovakia during the interwar period of 1918-1939 increased even more in this respect.
2. The years of socialism caused a swift loss of the primary sector in Slovakia, and similar yet more moderate processes occurred in the Czech Lands.
3. Socialism experienced an unusual phenomenon: a loss of the tertiary sector. This was somewhat more dramatic in the Czech part of the state, and the Czech

Republic did not reach its standard of 1930 even in the year 1980. Slovakia, on the contrary, achieved already in 1961 a higher proportion of the tertiary sector than it had in 1930.

4. The Slovak economic transition proceeded substantially faster compared to the Czech Lands and was accomplished during the years of socialism.
5. Considering its sector structure, Slovakia caught up with the Czech Lands in 1991 retaining, at the same time, a slightly higher proportion in agriculture. The swiftness of such "levelling" between both parts of the state is, in the modern history of Europe, something of quite special significance (see [Mihailovič 1973]).

Slovak industrialization proceeded not only unusually fast but also with further features that we can mention just in a brief outline. Typical for this process was the establishment of rather large industrial plants placed, in numerous cases, in relatively small localities (Detva, Senica, Turzovka). The location of these plants depended upon the large resources of labour in each particular place, according to the labour precincts' survey. These enterprises often have a position as sole employers in those locations. The settlements' dependance upon such a monopoly industry, both in the economic sense and in the social and political sense, appears to be a considerable one. The structure of Slovak industry has been, most probably, designed according to the economic as well as strategic targets of the Federation and, likely, of the Soviet bloc. This has led to a well-known one-sidedness of the new Slovak industry and today, consequently, to a high rate of unemployment in many of its branches. On the contrary, Czech industry, characterized from its very origin in the 19th century by its notoriously widespread network and relatively diversified structure and proportionally high contribution from the consumer-goods industry, has maintained, despite the fact of radical interferences from 1945 up to the middle of the fifties, its *network* character of many enterprises located in small and middle-sized towns with relatively short distances in between them. (This applies particularly to East and North Bohemia and partially to West Bohemia.) The bond of workplace and residence was in those old structures of settlements with old industries much more flexible than in regions that have been industrialized or re-industrialized (Ostrava region, the North Bohemia coal basin).

In conclusion, it is necessary to add that the concept of Slovak industrialization being implemented on the basis of new large enterprises, upon a network of surviving agrarian settlements with limited sources for building houses and for the technical and social components of urban infrastructure, has led to a phenomenon which Iván Szelenyi calls "*insufficient urbanization*." This is the situation when the state opens many working opportunities but has not got enough resources for house building close to the work locations and thus, in fact, forces new industrial employees to commute from the surrounding municipalities and, further, forces them to build private housing themselves in the localities of their residence. In Slovakia, the statistics on proportions of the construction of private houses and on commuters prove that hypothesis. Both these phenomena have occurred more frequently in the Slovak Republic than in the Czech Republic. Out of the total number of apartments built during the period 1946-1985, in Slovakia,

40% of them were located in private family houses while in Bohemia and Moravia only 22.7% of them were.

Demographic Transition and Family Changes

Changes in a population's reproductive behavior which are, in summary, depicted by the concept of "demographic revolution" [Landry 1934] or "demographic transition" [Notestein 1945], see also [Thompson 1930] belong to an important component of modernization in European communities. Demographic transition is a process caused by reduced mortality, namely of children, to which a population reacts, in shorter or longer intervals, by deliberate fertility restriction.

The demographic transition began, in the Czech Lands, sometime around 1870, and its first phase ended around the year 1900. The second phase ended around the year 1930. According to some studies [Fialová, Pavlík, Vereš 1990], in the Czech Republic (CR) the gross fertility index had been declining already after the year 1820 (from 42 births down to 38 per 1000 inhabitants). This change was the result of postponing marriages to an older age and of fertility changes. A notable fertility decline came about after the year 1890, and then a radical change came after 1900. In the year 1900, the general fertility index showed that 140 out of 1000 married women were at a reproductive age and, within a period of 10 years, it declined down to 117. It then kept falling until the forties. In the Czech Lands, the demographic transition therefore proceeded relatively slowly and recalled the Anglo-French type. In Slovakia, first signs of declining fertility were registered after the year 1900. Its index decreased considerably during the First World War, then afterwards increased substantially only to considerably fall again after the year 1930. In Slovakia, the demographic transition was completed after the year 1950. The interesting moment, however, is evident by the fact that during the period of Czech and Slovak rapprochement, i.e. during the decade of 1920-1929, the fertility differences between both parts of the new state appeared larger than at the beginning of the century and appeared even larger in subsequent stages.

As result of a late coming of the demographic transition, and the sustaining of a relatively high fertility level, the Slovak society, in comparison with the Czech one, is younger from the demographic point of view. In the year 1991, the average age of a woman in the CR was 38.0, of a man, 34.6; in Slovakia of a woman, 34.9, of a man, 32.1. These differences are quite considerable.

A consequence of differing population processes i.e. of natural exchange and migration is the fact that from 1921 to 1991, the percentage of those living in Slovakia out of the total number of Czechoslovak inhabitants has increased from 23% to 34%. This is even from the point of view of European regional changes, an extraordinarily fast growth, which indicates dynamic economic and social development in Slovakia.

In a historical context as well, the Slovak society differed structurally from the Czech society according to family models and property relations. This regards primarily agricultural families in which some basic features of social organization of both societies took form in the past. The Slovak family belonged in the past, according to the Hajnal's [1982] classification, to the so-called "East European"

type. In such families a high correlation between a low marriage age, a low number of domestic staff and a higher fertility index (contrary to the West European type) is distinctive. This all is connected with the fact that the inheritance of a father's land was universally enjoyed by the majority of brothers and sisters while no primogeniture had been applied. This led to the splitting of agricultural land and to the origin of very small farming units and therefore to stagnant technical progress in agriculture and, at the same time, to limited industrial exchanges to and from towns (comp. [Švecová 1989] and bibliography). In Western Europe and in the Czech lands, the property was acquired by one sole heir who postponed his marriage until he would receive the respective farmstead. This directly causes a minor breaking up of lands and a higher male migration from villages to towns. In Slovakia extended families and patriarchal families prevailed while Czech families, on the contrary, were smaller, the father's position not being so strong, yet even there prevailed the patriarchal type. These traditions changed swiftly as a result of Slovak industrialization and urbanization, yet they remained although reduced and modified in the country with a new migration' movement to towns up to the present time. They led to different types of social cohesion in both societies, to differing interpretations of roles, of social status and of relations between individuals and groups. There is no doubt that legal, political and economic unification launched by the First Republic and the hard line of processes of homogenization and of "leveling" pursued by the centralized communist regime and industrialization and urbanization processes, as well, started to wipe out the differences between both parts of the Federation. Nevertheless, all the sociological research regarding family relations, the importance of neighborhoods and localities, social structure, household structure, etc., (compare, etc., [Roško, Podolákova, Jančovičová 1969] and, the latest, [Machonin 1992]) refer to the variances in structuration and in the functioning of both societies.

Urbanization as the Change of the Socio-Spatial System of Society

Processes of urbanization have led, since the beginning of this century, towards the gradual assimilation of both parts of Czechoslovakia, yet this rapprochement started during a phase of considerable difference between the two lands. It is necessary to stress that the rate of urbanization in Slovakia has been, in the last decades, constantly higher than in the Czech Lands. This applies even to the last decade when the percentage of people living in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants (according to preliminary and not quite accurate estimations) has increased only by 2% in the Czech Republic whereas in Slovakia by 22%. This corresponds with the fact that the Czech Republic is already in a phase of a slow urbanization, whereas Slovakia was just in the middle of a steady and rapid process of population concentration in cities during the eighties. A whole range of inevitable and correlated phenomena corresponds to the fact that the Slovak Republic was still in the middle of a fast urbanization process. With respect to the living standard, to the rate of industrialization and urbanization and to the way of life, the regional differences within Slovakia are larger than in the Czech Republic, which is in the final phase of its urbanization transition and is, as a whole, socially

more homogeneous. From what has been said so far, the conclusion is that the geographic mobility of the Slovak population should theoretically have been higher during the period of socialism and particularly in its last decade than the mobility of the Czech population. Statistical data, however, say that this holds only for daily commuting, while from the point of view of migration, the Slovak population is less mobile than the Czech one.

We can not afford to dwell in detail on problems that cities in both republic will have to face. We may only concisely point out the fact that many Czech towns, and especially those with unique historical centers and relatively extensive quarters from the 19th century, face the problem of dilapidated and desolate old parts, which I have already referred to in a different context as "atrophy of inner parts of town" [Musil 1989]. The problem of Slovak towns, including Bratislava, remains paradoxically their swift expansion and the devastation of many of their old parts under Slovakia's uncontrolled expansion. From the sociological point of view, serious problems pertain to the ruralization of cities, including Bratislava and, on the contrary, to swift suburbanization by numerous municipal agglomerations.

Literacy and Change of the Structure of Education

The high level of literacy of the Czech population under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy has been described in detail many times in the literature. Similarly, the descriptions of the state of the Slovak educational system by the end of 19th, and at the beginning of 20th century and of the relatively high proportion of illiterates in Slovakia abound. All this still existed during the taking of a census in 1921. Amongst the population over 14 years of age, 15% of them were illiterate. It is necessary to mention the fact that by the end of the 1860's there were in Slovakia 1,800 primary schools which until the beginning of the war in 1914 declined to 250, out of which 233 were just single-class schools. Only 17% of 256,000 children whose mother language was Slovak were able to visit primary schools [Štefánek 1944]. Much worse was the situation from the point of view of secondary education. After the year 1874/75 when three existing grammar schools were closed, anybody wanting to acquire secondary education had to visit a Hungarian secondary school. There Slovak students formed only 3.2% out of the total number of all students. At university or at other educational institutions in Hungary, Slovak students represented just 1.4% of students at the Hungarian universities or colleges. The social and professional consequences of such a situation have been described many times (comp. e.g., [Holotík 1980] and the respective bibliography). In regard to our hypothesis on the fast process of Slovak modernization, a more important fact is that during the existence of the First Republic illiteracy in Slovakia had been virtually eliminated and the foundations for a secondary and higher educational system had been laid down. The dynamic process of modernization in the field of education continued even during the period of the Communist regime. Nowadays, indexes of educational structure are even slightly superior to those in the Czech Republic. It is necessary to note, in the background of educational dynamics, numerous tensions within contemporary Slovak society. This issue requires

painstaking research which would show how the new elites have formed and how the national goals of Slovakia have been formulated.

Democratization of Society

The differentiation of political movements and the formation of political parties is an element of the modernization process as well. The creation of a pluralist structure of political interests may be considered an integral aspect of modernization.

More favorable political settings, highly developed capitalism (even though of Austrian type) and the differentiated structure of the Czech Lands towards the end of 19th century (comp. [Urban 1982]) in comparison with the Slovak situation after the year 1867 became evident also within the political structures. During the 1890's and during the years before the First World War when in the Czech Lands there was already a widely developed structure of political parties, in Slovakia there existed quite a different situation. A. Štefánek [1933] has characterized it as follows:

In Slovakia, political activity before the formation of Czechoslovakia did not show any deeper differentiation. Since the beginning of a national consciousness it is nationalist and, more or less, autonomistic, otherwise conservative and panslavistic. Slovaks actually had, until the upheaval, just one single party, the so-called Slovak National Party.

Štefánek emphasizes the fact that there existed considerable differences among the nationalists, but during elections and any political action, the particular trends act together and unified.

The Czech situation, as is generally known, was quite different, for political parties had already entered into completely open competition, which turned gradually into serious conflicts. The political life of the First Republic in the Czech area of the new state was, in regard to the parties' structure and to a certain extent to political culture, a resumption of prewar life. Radicalization occurred both of the Left and of the Right. Eight political parties took part in the first Slovak elections in 1920. By 1925, there were already 18 of them. Slovakia unusually swiftly took advantage of the structure of political parties in Czech Lands and completed it with the Hlinka's People's Party, the Slovak National Party and with Hungarian parties. The transition from a simple prewar structure to a complicated one was realized in a relatively short period of time. In this respect, the integration of both sections of the Republic proceeded quickly, and from a structural point of view there were not any substantial differences between the Czech Lands and Slovakia. The political pluralism both of the Czech Lands and of Slovakia was, afterwards, suspended during the war and then, obviously, during the period 1948 - 1989. The political culture of both areas, however, remained traditionally different.

Sociocultural Modernization

Modernization has not got only structural features. In theories of modernization, there is also heavy emphasis on the importance of changed attitudes towards work, towards labouring motivation, towards the restriction of tradition's influence,

towards strengthening of the importance of individual determination, towards a rational orientation for behavior, towards a strengthening of secondary motives in treating people and a whole range of sociopsychological and sociocultural elements of behavior. The study comparing the Czech Lands and Slovakia in these aspects, which would grasp the mutual relations between both societies, has not been carried out yet. (For our purposes, we utilize knowledge provided by P. Machonin's [1992] research on the transformation of the Czechoslovak social structure carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic and by the Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University.

The Slovak population, contrary to the Czech, was less satisfied with political, economic and social changes that came after November, 1989 and had a "qualitatively a lower degree of confidence in the proceeding social transformation" [Machonin 1992]. Partial dissatisfaction of the Slovak population is, according to Machonin, tied with the idea of excessive deepening of the social differences and of the growth of social injustice. The Czech population attaches a considerably greater importance to efficient and effective circumstances for success such as one's own education, one's own endeavors, talent, diligence and willingness to risk. The Slovak population, on the contrary, attaches greater importance to ascriptive circumstances such as extraction, family, coincidence, but never to the efficiency of an individual. Those factors also include the parents' wealth and education, social contacts, political connections, national and racial origin, one's religion, place of birth, etc. The Slovak population, when evaluating itself on the left-to-right scale, aligns itself more to the left. Slovaks, often substantially less than Czechs, rank themselves as "Liberals" (18.1% to 40.4%) and as "Conservatives" (13.1% to 25.4%).

From the quoted research results, one can see that a lower degree of urbanization, the way of living in Slovakia and other circumstances led to the divergent life styles of both populations. In Slovakia evidently there is greater population sociability, a greater emphasis on family and on neighborhoods. This corresponds with older surveys of R. Roško [1986], who stressed the great importance of "a local working radius" in Slovakia. To use the known differentiations and classifications for populations designated either as "locals" or as "cosmopolitans," thus introduced by M. Stacey [1960], Slovaks are more as "locals" whereas Czechs, on the contrary, are more as "cosmopolitans." Slovak society is more solidaristic and more communal (*Gemeinschaft*), the Czech society is a more associative one (*Gesellschaft*).

It is necessary to add to this observation that Slovak society consists of a population that is not secularized to such a degree as the Czech population and Bohemia in particular. It is a well-known fact that the Czech population, along with the Swedish one and some others, belongs to the most secularized populations in Europe.

Therefore, it is possible to claim, without risking a mistake, that the Czech Lands, from the sociocultural points of view, may be seen in a more developed phase of modernization than Slovakia. It is possible to state, too, that in this

respect the difference between both parts of the past Federation is larger than simply the chief structural characteristics such as the stage of industrialization, of urbanization, of educational advancement, of the standard of living, of the gross national income, etc. This fact, of course, has important sociological as well as political consequences.

Some Features of Social Interaction Between Both Societies

The rate of integration among societies and their components depends on the exchange of people, information, capital, commodities and other mobile elements between societies. There exists a whole range of indicators that measure those features of integration. Among the indirect ones, we may also find migration: the number of students studying in the "foreign" Czech Lands, then the number of graduates returning to their land or, on the contrary, remaining in the "foreign" land.

The majority of such sociological indicators, aside from the economic ones such as exchange of goods, enterprises' cooperation, capital flow, etc., indicate the fact of a mutual long-term closure of the Federation by both parts. Migration movements between Slovakia and the Czech Lands appear to be a very important symptom of this closure.

At the beginning of the fifties, 37,000 to 40,000 people migrated annually from Slovakia to the Czech regions. A great migration at that time was caused, apart from other things, by the additional settlement of Bohemian and Moravian border areas. This number started to decrease already in the second half of the fifties and ranged around 21,000 on average. The relatively high index of migration from Slovakia to the Czech Lands was connected with the expansion of the mining industry, the metallurgy in the Ostrava region and in other Czech regions. In the sixties, migration decreased further down to the level of 13,000 to 19,000. The decline continued further and in the eighties the annual number of migrants decreased below the level of 10,000. A similar trend is found when regarding migration from the Czech Lands to Slovakia. Both parts of the Republic became more withdrawn and their interaction continuously declined. The political decision of the Slovak administration to restrict migration into the Czech Republic appears to be one of the factors of this development. But there were other causes, too. The decline in the volume of migration from Slovakia into the Czech Lands appears to be a reflection of the industrial development and, in general, of the economy of Slovakia. The more developed Slovakia became and the more labour opportunities arose there, the less necessary it was to migrate to Bohemia and Moravia. Considering the migration from the Czech Lands to Slovakia, the leverage worked there too. The migration from the Czech Lands also declined rapidly, especially that of more qualified workers. The greater the number of Slovak technical as well as humanitarian intelligentsia, the less the number of people from Bohemia and Moravia where needed to cover the demand of the Slovak developing industry and other sectors. The important thing in interpreting the mutual relationship of both parts of the state is the fact that the degree of qualification of the migrating population from Slovakia into Czech regions was, especially before the formation

of the Federation, lower than the degree of qualification of the Czech migrants moving to Slovakia. From Slovakia unskilled workers and agricultural workers moved to the Czech regions at greater volume than vice versa.

The process of withdrawing of both parts of the state is described also by an analysis of data about persons mentioned in the publication called "Who's who in Czechoslovakia," the first volume of which was published by Václav Brož in 1969. The number of Slovaks who acquired their education in Bohemia from the time of the First Republic up to the formation of the Federation was gradually decreasing. Further, the number of young Slovaks working in Slovakia while acquiring their education at Czech schools had decreased. On the contrary, the proportion of Slovaks acquiring their education in Slovakia and working there at the same time was gradually growing (comp. [Skalnik Leff 1988: 289-291]). It is obvious from this analysis that along with the development of the Slovak educational system, which proceeded simultaneously with the growth of labour opportunities, the population's circulation between both parts of the state continuously declined. It is possible to agree then with the opinion of the geographer K. Kühnl [1982] when he says that Czechoslovakia consists of two "relatively closed" migratory subsystems: the Czech Lands and Slovakia.

The penetration or the closing of both societies should also be investigated with the help of further data on: the number of concluded Czecho-Slovak marriages, tourism, the allocation of soldiers in military service, the volume of cultural contacts, and the mutual knowledge of language, culture and history. From the structural point of view, the alienation of both societies from each other seems to be quite plausible.

Summary, Discussion and Alternative Interpretation

There is no doubt that for the whole period of the common state there existed two relatively separated societies. A similar historical development, starting points and courses of their perspective processes of modernization resulted in strong social differences. Both societies, from certain points of view, converged and from other standpoints, however, remained permanently different.

A great part of the modernization processes proceeded in Slovakia more quickly although at a later time than in the Czech Lands. This obviously did not follow only from the analysis of industrialization, urbanization and from the demographic transition but also from the pace of education and democratization. In addition to that, processes of Czech modernization based on Austrian capitalism were imposed on a system full of feudal elements and attained the form of liberal democratic capitalism only in the First Republic. A considerable part of Slovakia's swiftly realized modernization, however, proceeded in the context of socialism. To a certain extent, it should be stressed that Slovakia modernized with such speed because of external pressures. It was not the so called "organic growth" as in the case of the Czech Lands.

In addition to that, some processes in Slovakia were split and they did not proceed simultaneously. This is true, in particular, for the relationship between industrialization and urbanization. Slovakia is probably the case that has confirmed

the Szelenyi theory of insufficient urbanization. The process of concentrating labour opportunities in towns proceeded essentially faster than the concentration of inhabitants in towns. This insufficient urbanization meant, at the same time, indirect exploitation of the newly originating social stratum of workers and minor service staff, which consisted of a country population who were forced to build up their homes in the country and to commute to towns. In Slovakia there also existed, to a lesser extent, time interval between industrial processes and changes in demographic behavior. Slovak demographic behavior kept, for quite a long time, features of reproduction in agrarian-industrial or even in agrarian societies.

What this analysis implies so far is the fact that, unlike in the Czech society, within the process of Slovak social modernization a wide gap existed between technical and economic features of modernization, on the one hand, and cultural and social processes of modernization, on the other.

Slovakia, unlike the Czech Lands, secularized itself more slowly, and it is well known that religion remained an important component of the life of the whole society. Some historically conditioned facts such as family structure, the great importance of neighborhoods and communal bonds, living in the country with a small home farming for a relatively high number of households and finally, great emphasis placed on socialist society and on collective forms of life (the transition from non-industrial and late pre-industrial living evolved straight into socialist collectivism) caused a situation in which new industry and even towns existed in a society that lacked the standard features of modern industrial societies.

The fact that the speed with which technical as well as economic modernization proceeded was swift while the social and cultural structures of the Slovak society moved at a much slower pace, created tension and discordance among subsystems of the Slovak society. The Czech society, on the contrary, suffered from a syndrome of social stagnation, from a certain introversion and from self-satisfaction. Here numerous features of anomie and of disintegration of social cohesion also appeared. This was, in any case, a different form of anomie from that found in Slovakia.

Despite the variance in the respective courses of modernization processes, from the macrostructural point of view, both societies became more and more alike. The analysis of our data points to the fact that Czechoslovakia had originated during a period in which these macrostructural differences, differences in demographic behavior and a whole range of other parameters, were the largest ones. Czechoslovakia split up during the period in which the mentioned differences were the smallest.

In the post-war period, the Czech Lands, along with Slovakia, developed, despite the growing technical and economic integration, towards the formation of two separate geo-demographic and migratory regions. They were more and more alien to each other. This was caused essentially by the leveling of the dissimilarities between the Czech Lands and Slovakia and by the industrial and economic development in Slovakia. The development of Czecho-Slovak relations challenged the modernization theory, which emphasized that similar standards of living,

similar socioeconomic structure of population and similar or identical systems of social security and law were the most reliable factors to suppress ethnic tensions and lead to social integration.

In order to interpret the sociological separation of both societies and the failure of the Federation, it is not even enough to refer to the Slovak society as unsteady because of its internal tension caused by the asynchronous processes of modernization of the respective Slovak social subsystems. This asynchronicity probably resulted from societal disruptions experienced by the Slovaks and from the fact that the Czechs have not been able to interpret correctly social and cultural processes occurring in Slovakia. However, it is obvious that traditional modernization theory tries to explain the separation of Czechs and Slovaks by pointing to the fact that Slovakia has been a "retarded" society, which has not been easily able to converge with the more developed Czech society. This implies a certain degree of sociological arrogance. The modified modernization theory refers to an internal asynchronism of Slovak modernization and to an unsteady and indefinite element of Slovak society. Both theories have not been able to explain what has really happened.

It is obvious that even a modified form of modernization theory should be complemented with other interpretive theories. We should apply to our passing history a model of "internal dependence," which was formulated by M. Hechter [1975] while analyzing the development of Celtic territories in Great Britain. This theory, in essence, refers to a more sophisticated structural analysis, which pays attention not only to macrosocial quantities such as GNP or the substitution of the big Fourastié's sectors of a national economy, etc., but also to concrete relations within the industry in various parts of the same state inhabited, however, by various ethnic groups. For example, it addresses the effects of enterprises producing industrial semifinished products concentrated in one part of the country while in other part of the country there are enterprises processing those semifinished products, as in the sphere of mechanical engineering or the food industry, etc. With such an arrangement, hierarchic integration may be spoken of. The social structure of migration is important as well. The migration of a less qualified labour force from one part of the state to another also appears to be an indicator of "internal dependence."

The development of such a dependence may come either deliberately or unintentionally. This may also be the consequence of an external influence as has happened, according to our opinion, in the case of Czechoslovakia. Only a detailed history of the allocation of industry and other economic activities, of the role of military strategic views related to industry's allocation and analysis of the role of other factors may show whether these external influences have played any decisive part. Simplified socioeconomic analyses that have been carried out from both the Czech and Slovak sides can not stand the test when it comes to more sophisticated and profound interpretive principles of the unsuccessful attempt to create a common Czecho-Slovak state.

Apart from the internal dependence theory, it is still necessary to point out the fact that modernization theories must be complemented both by the theory of

ethnic socialization and, in particular, by the *elite mobilization* theory. In conclusion, the author would like to voice his opinion that this theory, connected today with the name of J. McKay [1982], in combination with the internal dependence theory may explain, to a considerable extent, the separation of the Czechoslovak Federation. The theory of the mobilization of the elite assumes that a movement leading towards the separation of ethnic groups from a common state must have some mobilized elite to interpret both ethnic background, i.e. essentially cultural background such as language, cultural patterns of behavior, etc., and various forms of economic inequalities, possibly dependence, through politics. Without the existence of such an elite, which connects ethnic background with a political interpretation of internal dependence, the separation could not have come. The connection of all those factors comes, however, only after some great systemic shock, as happened in our case with the collapse of the communist regime.


The test of this multifactorial theory on the division of the state will require, of course, other forms of information than we have at our disposal. That which we have used in our attempt to explain the decline with the help of the asynchronous modernization theory has enabled us, nevertheless, to at least refute a simple interpretation based only on the theory of modernization. This has opened the door to the more sophisticated interpretations resulting from the connection of the internal dependence theory with elite mobilization theory.

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**I THINK THE MOMENT HAS ARRIVED, YOUR MAJESTY: THE MAJORITY OF OUR CITIZENS BELIEVE THAT
DEMOCRACY IS A KIND OF RUBBISH.**

Czechs and Slovaks 1918-1938

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Abstract: This article analyzes the relations between Czechs and Slovaks as a problem of the position of Slovakia in the Czechoslovak Republic, that is, as a solution to the decentralization of administration and autonomy, which are underscored by the issues of the Pittsburgh Agreement, Prague centralism and "Czechoslovakism". A revision of the place of Slovakia in the Czechoslovak Republic was accepted in regard to the requirements of Slovakia (the absence of its own intelligentsia and the presence of the Magyar element in the civil service) and the conditions in the democratic state. When the Slovak intelligentsia finally came of age and wished to participate in public administration, the existential conditions of the Czechoslovak state had changed (Hitler's rise to power, the birth of the Henlein movement in the Czechoslovak Republic). The situation got worse socially as a result of the world-wide depression. Without the Munich Agreement and Germany's share in the birth of the Slovak State, the conditions for the break-up of the Czechoslovak Republic would not have been present. The population formed a consensus in favour of the state, as is clear from the electoral returns, especially the success of Slovenská jednota za Česko-slovenskú republiku a demokraciu [Slovak unity for the Czecho-Slovak Republic and democracy] in the local elections of May 1938.

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"If Czechs mean well towards us then let them help us to build up our own Slovak state along with a Slovak constitution, Slovak Parliament and Slovak government. The state will itself be an independent part, with equal rights, of a Czecho-Slovak Republic."

J. Hušek, February 12, 1919

Problems of mutual Czecho-Slovak relations have been, and still are, treated, for the most part, from the political as well as the ideological point of view. This has been, to a large extent, given to the fact that this question depends upon a principle political variable both in time and for those who have formulated it. In order to assert scientific aspects of the question, not only knowledge of historical materials, knowledge of the functioning of a democratic national society, and knowledge of international circumstances of the formation and the build up of a common Czech and Slovak state were missing,¹ but also the need to present the problem this way.

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1) Some good work has been done during the past couple of years by research workers of the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Nevertheless, for historians, an

Among the fundamental problems of Czecho-Slovak relations in the field of political systems, we consider the decentralization of the administration, the autonomy, the tension between them and the way to solve it. Thematically, problems inherent in the Pittsburgh Agreement, in Prague centralism and in Czechoslovakism are all part of it. Through those spheres pervades the question of Slovak political representation and its lawfulness as an upholder of the common will manifested in the elections and, consequently, the urgency for a solution to the question of the Slovak position. We may state this problem also as a question which depends upon the society's consent, or at least upon the consent of the majority of the state and system. This article describes the elections' results if Czechoslovakia with its democratic political system was a viable organism.

The Decentralization of Administration and Self-Administration

The question of administration, decentralization and of self-administration, regarding the twenty years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, proves to be the most significant one immediately after the problem of political partyism. This is true not only from the point of view of the Czecho-Slovak relationship but also from the standpoint of a democratic society's structure and its functioning [Táborský 1945: 23]. The bond between decentralization and the autonomy of nations as well as of national minorities made this fundamental democratic question even more urgent. The problem of self-administration "casted its shadow on our public life... until, during the last years before Munich, it finally became a straight danger" for the Republic. "...this was not so much a question of a self-administration of citizens themselves." Slogans for autonomy became a power tool for many politicians in their political struggle. This was admitted by German politician K. Henlein and further confirmed by politicians in Slovakia when they had broke loose and abrogated even a limited self-administration provided by the so-called pre-Munich Republic and took the road not only towards Bratislava's centralism but even towards a totalitarian regime [Táborský 1945: 21-22; Kamenec 1991: 13-23]. The real objective of those politicians, into which they projected both efforts to gain power and to gain other's interests, was not a democracy nor a broader self-administration but an elimination of the Czechoslovak state. When reviewing the so called 'centralists' and 'autonomists' conflict, the relativity of the meaning of both concepts in a given context is omitted: so called 'centralists' were supporters of a more democratic regional system, while 'autonomists' were supporters of provincial centralization.

Prague Centralism

After the First World War, the peace conference invited the representatives for the formation of a new state and took up "a standpoint about the monolithism of our state. The only exception was allowed regarding Sub-Carpathian Russia" [Hoetzel 1920: 3]. This enabled politicians and constitution formulators to insist

unbiased and non-political opinion on Czech participation in the development of the Slovak nation and vice versa, along with the evaluation of results from the existence of the common state are all still expected.

upon the necessity of a consistent and inseparable state. The problem of integration had, for them, an imperative appearance with regard to a complicated national structure (whether given by objectivity or just felt as such). This was not only a question of Slovakia's position but also of an initial effort by the Sudeten provinces to break loose as well as centrifugal trends of other Silesian national minorities. In order to form and maintain an independent state, Masaryk stated a policy of having respect for the democratic principle internally as well as externally. The new state's regime should only evolve to be close to its Swiss model through its extreme liberalism and not through its structure.² From the international perspective, the new peaceful state was, within a short time, jeopardized by attempts to review the existing status quo.

We may judge the extent of centralization according to the range of self-administration. A successful democracy cannot, theoretically, correspond with an administrative institution for the existing officialdom dependent upon a central government but only through local self-administration.

In the field of administration, in 1918, it was possible either to stand up for the basis of self-administrative authorities and, through their reconstruction, build up a democratic administration or to dissolve the self-administrative authorities and to create, from the bureaucratic offices of former Austria, a new administrative system. They chose the second variant. The acts 1919 and 1921 started to change the content with the concept of municipal self-administration. The difference between state administration and self-administration by definition is not the only existing divergence the Slovak system. The Slovak government was based on a different form of organization and on the original standing of the members of authority. Democratic trends, historical traditions, and reasons for administrative effectiveness were setting the boundaries. The decentralization of the implemented public administration may have been an advantage, particularly for remote territories holding respect for local customs and interests. This decentralization could well be the first step to an independent public administration of the territorial districts. The administrative authority decides on particular questions only in the most complicated instances. Centralized government is usually mentioned when power, which regulates public interests, is concentrated at one single place or with limited individuals. The concentration of local interest regulation from one particular place may be considered a centralized administration.

The so-called Regional Act (February 29, 1920) restricted provincial autonomy by withdrawing legislative activities from the then existing Provincial Assemblies of the Czech Provinces. The Regional Act was a follow up to an effort to make the rise of Slovak separatism more difficult. Its opposition finally brought a compromise solution into play: regions for particular provinces formed Provincial Regional Unions (Czech, Moravian-Silesian and Slovak), all of which were allowed

²) Archives of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further, FMFA), Paris' Archives (further, PA), No. 340.

very insignificant responsibility. Slovak deputies considered the Regional Union in Slovakia as a kind of compensation for autonomy.³

With the realization of a self-administrated Slovakia with elected officials, during discussions of the Constitutional Committee of the Revolutionary National Assembly and on the Regional Act, the Deputy I. Déer stood up on behalf of the Slovak Club. He referred to the Slovak experience with Hungary:

These fields of the state administration where the principle of appointment had been applied and worked much better... while in the sphere of public administration where the principles of eligibility had been applied this all had led to an anarchy... I believe a democratic spirit should be applied more in the jurisdictional administration and then in the administration in the strict sense of the word...⁴

With his views Déer encouraged and strengthened the opinions of Mr. Švehla, Minister of the Interior, who was, in this respect, criticized by Social Democrats. This alternative solution would also accommodate the complete absence of Slovak bureaucrats because two-thirds of the administrative posts were in the hands of Hungarians.

When a regional system was introduced in Slovakia in 1923, administrative dualism was simultaneously being established, and then progressively eliminated only after launching an administrative reform in 1927. Regions were cancelled and four provincial districts established. Provincial political administrations and provincial committees resigned the exact same amount of power to and were replaced by newly formed provincial offices. The possibility to unite the state administration with autonomy was justified as a consequence of the Republic's democratic system:

...today that we have proportional representation,... parliamentary government that can be overthrown any time just by not giving an answer to whatever parliamentary question, that the state administration cannot be an administration over the parliament... the autonomy cannot be considered as a state defence anymore but it may only be considered as an integrative part of a democratic public administration that is supposed to have the equivalent presence of elements of an autonomy, brought up to the standard of a true democracy...⁵

Posts for self-administration bureaucrats were limited to the district and the provincial boards of representatives. Two-thirds of the personnel were elected, one-third was nominated by the minister of Internal Affairs.

This problem was in the form of a duel between parliamentarism and professionalism, hence, the Parliament and the bureaucracy were also mentioned by T. G. Masaryk in his Jubilee Address on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Republic. He wanted this dualism, inherent in the functioning of the government, to be in harmony. In regard to the national as well as cultural

3) From the letter to American Slovaks, Document No. 45 [Falt'an 1968: 25-26].

4) Archives of the Federal Assembly (further, AFA) f. RNS, Card 32, shorthand minutes 122 b., a session of the Constitutional Committee, p. 22.

5) AFA, Print No. 831/1927, Message of justification to the law, quoted by [Klapka 1928: 9].

heterogeneity of the population, he stuck to the requirements of self-administration and territorial autonomy but emphasized that "...a state, and, particularly a modern state, can't relinquish organizational centralism - harmony, centralization and autonomization are the aim of the modern democratic state. Democratic centralization is not absolutism, democratic autonomization is not atomization..." The need for "well-thought-out centralization" he considered to be very urgent considering the fact that "...the society is splitting into states, classes and various corporations..." As "...the new state... takes the administrative functions in the economic and social development..." he saw a source for strong centralization [*Národní* 1928: xix].

"The old Austrian bad habit to centralize everything..."⁶ on Czech territory and the "Calvinist regime of Budapest" against which Slovaks always fought, and "the rights of our Slovak language" [*První* 1931: 483] give evidence of the prevailing tendencies in governments of modern states, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of the fact that Czechs and Slovaks met in a centralist system before they joined into a corporate state. "Prague centralism" as an excessive concentration of power on one single spot is usually comprehended as a result of some arbitrary rule or of some malevolence. Aside from this is the argument that centralization is a necessary procedure for the formation of every state, even Czechoslovakia's specific conditions. (And we have already mentioned the introduction of the decentralized public administration.)

In the field of creation of power, the source of centralism in Czechoslovakia, despite predicted effects, was the principle of proportional voting and, in relation to this, the multi-party system. The theory itself promised that proportional representation in the Parliament would represent on a small scale all the more important trends within the society. The proportional principle in Czechoslovakia was supposed to ensure the representation of national minorities.⁷ At the same time, it was necessary to limit, by some provisions of electoral legislation, the power of that principle which led after all to the shattering of political parties and to the devaluation of electoral votes. The disadvantage of small parties lies also in Hare's method of calculation of the electoral number. All these measures meant that small parties, and also some parties of national minorities, could hardly reach their representation in the Parliament. The proportional election thus, paradoxically and against the will of its legislators (to a certain extent) made the representation of minorities more difficult. Small parties thus had to join other parties which often had quite different programs.

We may find that centralization caused the strict obligation of listing candidates in the electoral system in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the fact that the candidacy of a group of representatives of political parties can be promoted to a certain level means appointment on the principle of elitism substitutes democratic

⁶) AFA, f. RNS, Card 28, No. 1157, shorthand minutes No. 33, the session of the Constitutional Committee, of April 2, 1919, p. 1.

⁷) It does not specifically cite ethnic groups. Makers of the Constitution meticulously avoided any terminology encouraging the feeling of inferiority.

appointment on the principle of election. The oligarchic features of political parties, too, were creating discrepancies in the role of parties in a democratic society: from a factor facilitating election, they were gradually changing into struggling organizations for power. Therefore, their programs, too, aimed to follow "the higher objectives" and did not reflect the needs of their electors. This trend won recognition even in programs of communal election in which a struggle took place against "Magyarone clericalism". Elections were "Czechoslovak and under constitutional law," etc.

The state was forced, because of the predominant positioning of political parties, to unite the bureaucracy, i.e. to restrict the influence of political parties on the administration and this was, consequently, another cause of centralization. Among the positive effects of this process is the influence of non-politicized state authorities on the stability and the continuity of the democratic state regime.

The postulate of state power and authority in the social field and in the field of the economy was significant among centralization effects. Pressure upon the parliament and upon the government was exerted not only by masses of those who were losing because of economic liberalism, but also by power and business groups in efforts to promote and to force their interests which were insufficiently represented in the parliament, i.e.; representation did not correspond with the economic power of each individual capital group. All this raised the request for the state to take over leadership and for the elimination of all blights, already mentioned by T. G. Masaryk in the Jubilee Address. Social care for the needy thus became a priority of the state. Evidence of all requirements and their fulfillments may be found in Czechoslovakia in all periods of crisis between the First and the Second World War. The Slovak People's Party, as resulted from its first program, also shifted the majority of problems and their solution onto the government [Bartlová 1991: 55]. These requirements didn't correspond much with the requirements for autonomy. This pressure, on a worldwide scale, increased in strength in the context of the world economic crisis and, at the same time, enlivened autonomistic trends.

Only in comparison with the decentralization and the self-administration taking place in other countries may we come to the valid judgement of the degree of centralism during inter-war Czechoslovakia. This task is still waiting for historians to carry it out. We may still come, in general, to an important conclusion: Czechoslovakia was a democratic state and the unity of state and civic interests and the limitation of self-administration in the name of functionalism are always more acceptable in democratic regimes for they enable to verify, in election, the common will of electors. In addition to that, the decentralization in the field of public administration was sufficiently extensive and the two-third participation of elected members was significant as well.

The Pittsburgh Agreement

The request that was not fulfilled and included in the Pittsburgh Agreement, namely Slovak autonomy, was considered a part of the centralization efforts.

Problems with the Pittsburgh Agreement have not been solved and so far remain, even after more than seven decades of the Czechoslovak Republic. The last time the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement was referred to by Slovak deputies was the spring of 1990, in a so called controversy regarding the hyphen.⁸ With regard to the persistence of varying conclusions about its validity and various prejudices existing even among foreign historians, we consider it useful to clarify its meaning and its position.

In a general interpretation, the Pittsburgh Agreement was concluded before the formation of Czechoslovakia, on May 30, 1918, in Pittsburgh PA, between representatives of Czech and Slovak organizations in the United States, i.e. the Slovak League, the Czech National Association and the Union of Czech Catholics, in the presence of the chairman of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, Prof. Masaryk. The Agreement approved the political program aimed at the unity of Czechs and Slovaks in an independent state. According to the Agreement, "...Slovakia will have its own administration, own Parliament and own law courts... the Slovak language will be the official language at school, in the office and in public life in general... The detailed regulation of the establishment of the Czecho-Slovak state will be up to liberated Czechs and Slovaks and their legally binding representatives." It was signed by Albert Mamatey, T. G. Masaryk and others [*Idea* 1936].

The source of misunderstanding was the last statement mentioned. Supporters for the realization of the Pittsburgh Agreement concealed the last statement in compliance to their needs. It was not considered, anyway, that those who concluded the Agreement were not "legally binding representatives" either of the Czech or Slovak nations. Slovak historians consider it as improbable as the fact that participants of negotiations in Turč. Sv. Martin would not know about the Pittsburgh Agreement.⁹

⁸) In a text of the Pittsburgh Agreement they tried to find support for properly writing the name of the state Czecho-Slovakia, possibly the Czecho-slovak Republic. But the Agreement doesn't justify their views. The text itself proves a fickleness of orthography (the use of capital letters and utterly illogical use of quotation marks). According to the orthographical standard of the Czech language, the composed adjectives are written with hyphens only while their components had proportional independence. The hyphen is not written in the case of both components forming a tight semantic unity. After the formation of the state, according to the mentioned standard, it was decided to write "československý" (Czechoslovak) as one word (without hyphen), the same way we wrote "angloamerická armáda" (Anglo-American army) without a hyphen. Slovak orthographical standard differs in this respect from Czech and all the misunderstandings thus were, in a way, unnecessary. In autumn 1938, the problem received the different interpretation.

⁹) Symposium "Slovakia in the Political System of Czechoslovakia, 1918 - 1938", November 11-13, 1992, a discussion. There exist, of course, a version that Slovak politicians learnt about the Pittsburgh Agreement not until the beginning of 1919 [Bartlová, 1991: 63]. This would correspond with a visit by Hlinka and Kmeťko to T. G. Masaryk. The president took the position that once they want the autonomy, let them have it. But when Kramář, also present to those negotiations, raised the straight question, Hlinka abandoned the requirement of autonomy considering it premature with regard to the fact that in Slovakia there was still a

I. Dérer, however, maintained that the title "Czecho-Slovak Agreement..." was added afterwards and that nobody knows who did it. He drew our attention to the fact that, actually, this concerned the minutes from a meeting about the political program. Masaryk was not consequently mentioned as a party but only as a person present. The resolution was adopted by representatives of the organizations. This was clearly confirmed by the text of the minutes:

"Representatives of Slovak and Czech organizations in the United States - of the Slovak League, the Czech National Association and the Union of Czech Catholics

"Negotiated in the presence of the chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council, Prof. Masaryk, the Czechoslovak question and our program's manifestations up to now, and decided as follows:

"We sanction the political program aiming at the unity of Czechs and Slovaks in the independent state that will consist of Czech Provinces and Slovakia." (Highlighting of text E. B.)

The additional text has been already mentioned above.

Regardless of whether somebody added the title or not, the text of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement lacks the character of a treaty agreement¹⁰ and is only a resolution of representatives of Czech and Slovak organizations in the United States and an approval of a possible political program. As such, it had for Masaryk no obligatory character [Dérer 1938: 62].

This, of course, substantially changes the assessment of this "document" as the pillar for an autonomistic movement leanted upon for decades. The whole affair proves the evidence of stereotypes and inertia in its interpretation. In the case of the Pittsburgh Agreement this is almost inexcusable, especially when we take into consideration the malaise that the "Agreement" has stirred between the Czechs and the Slovaks.

It is worth mentioning that apart from the Pittsburgh Agreement there were several other attempts during the war to coordinate the aspirations of both foreign and native Slovaks. But as they had their own unambiguous "Czechoslovak" opinions they stayed out of the circles of autonomistic politicians. This regards, e.g., The Record of Principles of the Czechoslovak Campaign, of August 29, 1916, the author of which was M. R. Štefánik. This dealt with the resolution of one of the Kiev meetings, participants of which were both native Slovaks and legionnaire Slovaks, who fought for the freedom of Slovakia. American Slovaks also attached

lack of intelligentsia. He wanted to be sure, however, that when his nation grew stronger it would obtain its rights [Prezident 1923].

¹⁰) T. G. Masaryk also writes about the Pittsburgh Agreement as a resolution, an agreement, and not a treaty [1925: 262]. In a preface he notes the fact (p. 7) that he was not able to keep the complete diary and, therefore, he mentioned "only main and general points." But in regard to the Agreement, he stated full particulars; especially a passage which explains that details of the Slovak political program will be decided by legally bound representatives of the Slovak nation. He wrote, too, that the Agreement was signed by others as well and in an illicit manner. The agreement he assesses as a retreat of excessive ideas on the Slovak independence.

great importance to the resolutions from Kiev meetings. The Record of Principles was signed by an envoy from the American-Slovak League in Russia.¹¹ Similarly, confidential and secret meetings in Vienna in 1916, 1917 and 1918, of native people who had been persecuted and imprisoned during the war, firmly maintained the idea of the state and national Czechoslovak unity. Among the participants, we may find names as M. Hodža, K. Stodola, A. Štefánek, V. Šrobár, M. Dula, I. Dérer and others. Under the influence of those meetings the most important public Slovak manifestations during the war were realized as, for example, The Resolution of the 1st May, 1918, in Liptovský Mikuláš, where Slovaks made it obvious that they wanted to live in the future as part of a Czechoslovak national union. The same regards the Martin Declaration [Dérer 1938: 60]. These manifestations stand, unfortunately, aloof from the interests of historians, despite the fact that they are well comparable with the so called Pittsburgh Agreement.

The Martin Declaration of October 30, 1918, is interpreted as a mark of an idea that, at that time, on the Slovak part prevailed. Namely, it was necessary to declare the Czechoslovak union. They spoke, therefore, about the "Slovak branch of the united Czechoslovak nation." The Martin Declaration is considered to be an act under constitutional law [Dějiny 1967: 449-450].¹² On the basis of it Slovakia was incorporated into the forming Czechoslovak state that was, according to the constitution, united and integral.¹³

In particular, T. G. Masaryk was reproached for the unfulfillment of the so called Pittsburgh Agreement. Masaryk as the president, however, had neither constitutional nor any other possibility of enforcing whatever he would have had considered necessary. Hlinka's journey to Paris in autumn, 1919, reopened in the Revolutionary National Assembly the question on Slovakia and the possibility of its autonomy. Dr. V. Šrobár, the minister with full power to administer Slovakia, gave his opinion on Slovak autonomy. He said that autonomy meant "...to leave Slovakia again at the mercy of Magyars."¹⁴

A possibility to include the Pittsburgh Agreement into the constitution was discussed on February 6, 1920, for the last time during a meeting of the Slovak Club with Prof. A. Mamatey, then the chairman of the Slovak League in the U.S.A. On this occasion, Dr. Juriga had worked out a new proposition for autonomy, the supporters of which were deputies of the People's Party. Despite this fact, the Slovak Club disapproved of the proposition. In a letter to American Slovaks, this decision is justified by the argument that "...Slovakia is, by former Magyar regime,

¹¹) In the conclusion of this record, it says: "Czechs and Slovaks being aware of the fact that they are closely linked both by living conditions and by culture and, particularly, related by blood, wish to grow into a united, politically integral and free nation..." [Dérer 1938: 59].

¹²) An interpretation has occurred that participants simply assumed that they were preparing documents for the session of the Peace Conference [Chaloupecký 1936].

¹³) This regards also the autonomous territory of Sub-Carpathian Russia.

¹⁴) AFA, Shorthand minutes of RNA, the session, p. 2268. Apart from other things he described a catastrophic state of schools in Slovakia and states that the elementary schools have about 300 teachers at their disposal while the secondary schools have roughly 20 professors.

culturally and materially so weakened it wouldn't be possible to build up and to preserve the autonomy without Czech support. The autonomy would bestow upon the Slovak nation an enormous financial burden. Slovakia still has not got enough professional workers to fill up the offices and the teacher's desks." Further, they explained that in exchange for autonomy there was to be a Provincial Regional Union in Slovakia and that this was a kind of autonomous institution but not a Parliament "...that would be to Slovakia, under the present circumstances, definitively a damage". The Slovak Club hoped for brotherlike sentiments from the Czech nation that would have sufficiently stood up for the interests of Slovakia. Representatives of the People's Party had their reservations on that point but, nevertheless, gave to Mamatey their certificate in which they stated a request for autonomy which did not imply to separate Slovakia from Czechoslovakia.¹⁵

During a general debate over the constitutional documents, deputy Dr. Markovič delivered a speech in the spirit of a unitary Czechoslovak state. He stated that the Club of Slovak Deputies unanimously decided to accept the constitution. For him, the self-administration of Slovakia was ensured by the acts which created a complexity within the constitution, especially in regard to the responsibilities of the regional institution.¹⁶ The People's Party, along with coalition, voted for a constitutional document that did not contain regulations on Slovak autonomy.

Propositions of autonomistic constitutional changes that followed shortly after the constitutional document had been approved (1921, 1922) testified not only about the political immaturity of those who had submitted it (because conditions in Slovakia could not have simply changed within such a short period), but also about straight efforts to destabilize the status quo and thus to harm the state in the eyes of an international public. The approval of Czechoslovakia or its ratification by the Peace Conference was not that easy and obvious as it may now appear. Numerous requests from Dr. E. Beneš during the period of October 1918 and the first half of 1919, which had not been taken into consideration may prove this fact.¹⁷ During the Peace Conference in Paris on March 14, 1919, K. Kramář asked Masaryk,¹⁸ in the interest of the future, not to undermine or to weaken the position of the nation in a moment when a decision regarding the integrity of the territory and when the future of our borders was expected. The American president Wilson considered it fair and reasonable to eliminate first elements of disturbance as well as any threat to world peace. Only then would super-power countries guarantee the division of territories. A later attempt of the ex-Emperor Charles to seize St. Stephan's crown didn't contribute much to the consolidation of

¹⁵) Quoted extracts are, in the original, in the Slovak language [Falt'an 1968: 25-26]. Author doesn't mention the sources.

¹⁶) AFA, Shorthand minutes, the 125th session of the RNS, p. 3718-3722.

¹⁷) AFMFA, PA. English and American governments recognized the Czechoslovak National Council, before the formation of Czechoslovakia, as the Sovereign over the Czechoslovak allied armies, i.e. legions, based on the fact that, "Czechoslovakia lead the war". This, however, didn't mean the acknowledgement of precisely demarcated state territory.

¹⁸) Ibidem, No. 12270.

the situation either. We may say, without exaggeration, that it was necessary to struggle hard for the state on many front-lines (December's events towards the end of 1920 included).

At the same time, continuous new propositions for autonomy serve as proof that autonomists did not consider the Pittsburgh Agreement as an agreement whatsoever and, therefore, not as a program to be supported or as an obligation to be fulfilled. Autonomists only used it for their own propaganda. This so-called Agreement even became a part of the German anti-Czechoslovak propaganda before the Second World War. Dérer's warning, his lecture "About The So Called Pittsburgh Agreement" was published in Prague, in 1938 [Dérer 1938], and probably vanished in the turmoil of requests in that period.

If we are to take the Agreement as a program under constitutional law we may observe that it is fairly vague, far more than the Declaration of Independence which Masaryk claimed just as an attempt to characterize the future constitution [Masaryk 1925: 263]. In particular, a detailed account of the functionings and responsibilities of the Parliament was missing. This allows, to a considerable extent, to claim that requirements of the period of the First Republic were, for the most part, fulfilled. At the heads of the Provincial Regional Unions existed Provincial Committees and, in 1927, Provinces as administrative units were established. This thankfully happened according to the requirements of the People's Party. Two-thirds of the provincial officials were elected. In regard to courts of law, the judiciary branch of the First Republic was sufficiently independent of state power: a judge was independent of the majority in the Parliament and of the government. The problem in the 1930s was the inability to fill respective posts in the judiciary branch and the administration branches with Slovak professional workers. After the formation of the Czechoslovak state and with the absence of Slovak professionals, these posts were held mostly by Czechs. The official position of the Slovak national language was granted by the constitution and therefore corresponded with the request for it in the Pittsburgh Agreement.

The Czechoslovakism

The most usual interpretation of Czechoslovakism suggests that Masaryk (and, according to Hitler, Beneš) conceived of it so that he could form the Czechoslovak state. Politicians, historians, ideologists in the role of historians or whoever else, according to their natural disposition and intention, placed into this idea contents that, more or less, caused harm to the intentions of our state's founders, both in regard to the formation of the state itself and, especially, in regards to the fate of Slovakia. For the purpose of our article it is neither purposeful nor necessary to go into the destiny of this term, which was thought out by members of the Slovak People's Party [Budování 1990: 8] probably after the Munich Treaty. It went through its original development even in the interpretation of the Communist Party. It has caught on and so we have to cope with it. In accordance with ideas supportive of the formation of the Czechoslovak state, we may thus define Czechoslovakism as a concept which considers Czechs and Slovaks as ethnically

close and divided by historical development and whose co-existence will form one single political nation. This interpretation encompasses Krofta's Czechoslovak patriotism, along with patriotism of Czechs and Slovaks, and finally Beneš's appeal for the incorporation of Slovaks into the whole state [Krofta 1936: 636; *Edvard* 1937: 331-334]. Czechoslovakism included, in this interpretation, good relations towards the national minorities in Czechoslovakia as well.

To call the beginning of the Czechoslovak state a lie as declared by its enemy A. Hitler on the eve of the Second World War [Mackenzie 1947: 9], means to refuse to respect the genesis and historical conditionality for the origin of the concept of the Czechoslovak nation and the Czechoslovak language in which participated both Czech and Slovak cultural and political representatives. So called Czechoslovakism in the 19th century got through the period of Czecho-Slovak mutuality and also through the period of the Slovak struggle for a "Czechoslovak" language and literary unity in the complicated and unclear situation of Slovak national movement.¹⁹ The Slovak national situation in Hungary called for the creation of a Czechoslovak national ideology. The former Czechoslovak split was, during the First World War, revised by Slovak politicians Štefánek, Hodža, Šrobár and Hušek when they sought redemption for the Slovaks in connection with the Czechs. European statesmen acknowledged the fact of the Czechoslovak national existence and adapted their political actions in this respect (Clémenceau, Poincaré, Lansing, Wilson, etc.).

By designating the Czechoslovak language as a national language, the official Slovak language was placed on par with the Czech language:²⁰

"By using the language as official and national, offices on that territory of the Republic that, before October 28, 1918, belonged to Kingdoms and Provinces represented in the Imperial Council or to the Prussian Kingdom use, for the most part, the Czech language and in Slovakia, for the most part, the Slovak language.

Official matters submitted to the attention of other parties will be attended to in the language of the submitter."²¹

As regards the actual term "the Czechoslovak nation," it is necessary to say that by this conception, from a formal point of view, Czechs are not superior to Slovaks but Czechs and Slovaks are declared to be branches of one and a single nation. The same is to be the interpretation of the Czechoslovak language as a language of Czechs and Slovaks.

The first decade of Czechoslovak existence was an important stage for the development of the Slovak nation and ended by the beginning of the 1930s when

¹⁹) The lingual unity, at that time, failed on the reluctance of Czech linguists to accept, for the united language, elements that were either archaic or were not considered as organic. Only for this price, the language unity could had been preserved.

²⁰) According to the St. Germain's Peace Treaty just one single language could be designated as "official." Therefore, the term "Czechoslovak language" was used (see [Broklová 1992, Doc. Nos. 5, 6, 17]).

²¹) The Act of February 29, No. 122 Dg. [*Ústava* 1920: 207-208].

Slovakia already felt it possible to take the administration into its own hands. Concurrently, however, consequences of the economic crisis had arisen and, across the border, the threat of German fascism was more and more evident. Germans in the Sudeten, once satisfied with the economic situation in Czechoslovakia, began, with admiration, to keep their eyes on the growth of the German economy enlivened by armament. Hitler promised prosperity while, in regions inhabited mostly by Germans, effects of the economic crisis, due to a predominantly light industry with export difficulties, became more evident than elsewhere. This was no longer a favorable time to make substantial changes in the political system.

In common knowledge and in the predominant parts of historical treatises, even of the most recent period, a view is consistently held that the idea which sparked the formation of the Czechoslovak state was the idea of Czechoslovakism. In this connection, Masaryk's conception of nations being kept by those ideas under which they emerged is often quoted. Therefore Czechoslovakia owes its foundation to the "idea" of Czechoslovakism and because the idea of the united Czechoslovak nation failed, its fall was thus inevitable. It is the fact that the formation of the state was accompanied by a feeling of rapprochement between Czechs and Slovaks, but the idea of a co-existence of nations and national minorities on the Czechoslovak territory in a democratic and civic society, which we consider as the fundamental ideal of the Czechoslovak Republic, had a more common and broader validity.

Czechs and Slovaks in the Common State

According to M. S. Ďurica, Slovak political representatives accepted the formation of the Czecho-Slovak state "...according to the proverb 'a drowning man grasps at a straw.'" Despite this fact they believed that "...whatever solution that disengages Slovaks from Hungary will mean the saving of the Slovak nation [Ďurica 1990: 20].

A letter from a signatory of the Cleveland and the Pittsburgh Agreement, J. Hušek,²² to a Czech priest, O. Zlámal, dated February 12, 1919, probably best grasped the contradiction involved in the anticipation of the Slovak representation in respect to the independent Czechoslovak state. We can hardly imagine, from the point of view of the constitutional law, a more controversial formulation of the objective. But it seemed that the life of that conception had more perseverance than the existence of the Czechoslovak state.

The formulation of ČSR was for Slovaks when one considers Hušek's wish or Ďurica's contention. And what did the Czechs expect? And how was it regarded by the authorities in Slovakia and the Slovak nation, Dr. Karel Kálal? He wrote: "The whole nation rejoiced over the liberation of Slovakia. Slovakia was the motto of

²²) Ys. 1880-1947. A journalist, an associative functionary amongst Slovaks in the U.S.A. He was expelled from high school for Pan-Slavism. In 1903, he left for the U.S.A., became a bank clerk, an editor of "The Slovak" in America and chairman of the Slovak League in the U.S.A. His orientation had been sort of autonomistic. In 1938, he visited Slovakia with a delegation led by the chairman of the Slovak League that then supported the Slovak People's Party separatism. Before America entered the war, he supported the Slovak regime, after the war he then helped the emigration of People's Party's members.

that time..." [Kálal 1930: 6]. Kálal, of course, did not promise "...the full Czechoslovak conformity neither in a decade nor in five decades" [Kálal 1930: 5]. His reasoning for this was both ideological disunity, a different degree of culture, and, in particular, a different degree of democratism [Kálal 1930: 107]. This all, of course, is dependent on the condition of development for both nations in the common state.

Controversial standpoints pertaining to relations with Bohemia were formulated only after the formation of the state. During this period between the wars, Andrej Hlinka himself shifted reference frames. The unconditional pre-war friendship encouraged Hlinka to espouse the standpoint of the proponents of Czechoslovak unity at a meeting in Turč. St. Martin where attachment to the Czechoslovak state had been declared and where the Slovak National Council was proclaimed the representative of "the Slovak branch of the united Czechoslovak nation." At the beginning of the year 1919, Hlinka was received by President Masaryk in the presence of K. Kramář. He requested a guarantee for the rights to create strong Slovak nation. In autumn of 1919, he set out on a journey, with anti-Czechoslovak orientated F. Jehlička,²³ to Paris to take part in the Peace Conference where he demanded the implementation of provisions of the Pittsburgh Agreement. He was convinced that the co-existence of both nations in a common state meant the best solution for both Czechs and Slovaks; while at the same time, he agreed with the need of each nation to be an independent state. He was the author of the slogan 'It has been enough of Prague, forever!' His efforts reveal the paradoxes of Slovak politics, linked both to a struggle for independence and, at the same time, to recognizing the necessity and the benefits of the common state. From the start Hlinka claimed autonomy only for the Church, and still yet only for the Catholic one, while the other problems were shifted onto the state authorities' shoulders, as already mentioned above.²⁴

After the formation of the state, Slovakia looked a bit complicated and rather unconsolidated. The caretaker government of Šrobár undertook, in the middle of November, 1918, the task of consolidating the state. In a short time, V. Šrobár became head of the Ministry with full powers over Slovakia, the aim of whom was not to achieve the autonomy but the integration of Slovakia.

According to M. S. Ďurica "...broad strata of the Slovak nation could hardly identify themselves with the 'Czech state' that soon, by a constitutional act, sanctioning a fictional 'Czechoslovak nation' and proclaiming as the official language some non-existing language, 'Czechoslovak language'. This was the first time that Slovaks experienced a profound disappointment [Ďurica 1990: 21].

²³) In 1938, Dérer describes him as Jehlicska.

²⁴) Complication of Slovak autonomy by religious matters has, however, another side: against granting autonomy to Slovaks stood, e.g., Monsignore Jan Šrámek because he was afraid that, by this act, Catholic Moravia would suffer. With restricted self-administration granted to all Provinces, two Catholic Provinces, Slovakia and Moravia, stood against the one, atheistic, Bohemia.

We have already touched upon these problems. In this single case Ďurica and others are omitting a home source of "Czechoslovakism": the declaration under constitutional law of the Czech deputies on the Imperial Diet, in May 1917. Šrobár's proposition to annex Slovakia to Czech Provinces with the aim to unify all the branches of the Czechoslovak nation was incorporated into the mentioned declaration. In those days, there was less than two million Slovaks who could very well have acquired their education, until then, at Magyar schools only. A broad strata of the Slovak nation were just slightly aware of their Slovak national heritage. It had come about as a self-consciousness only during the twenties.

Because of ahistorical approaches to facts and even deliberate concealment, truth and fallacy can stretch political platforms' boundaries to the point where they cannot be deciphered. (This is true for the excesses from the part of Czechs functioning in Slovakia, too).

The Nation and its Representation

A very important aspect of Czech and Slovak relations in the pre-Munich Republic, reduced by us, to a certain extent, to the question of self-administration, is that the success of a party in an election, for the most part, represented the autonomous efforts, i.e. of the Slovak People's Party. Their electoral success corresponds with the provision in the Pittsburgh Agreement which shifts "...the detailed provisions of... establishment... of the state" onto the legal Czech and Slovak representatives. Thus we try to explain the answer to the question who were these winners of elections in Slovakia and, consequently, who were these legal representatives?

The question of representational ability as a justification to represent the Slovak nation is raised already with the evaluation of the historic roles of politicians who joined the Czech resistance movement, both abroad and home, and thus linked the destiny of Czechs and Slovaks together. The basis of their activities is supported, to a considerable extent, by the absence of other trends before the formation of Czechoslovakia which would change the position of the Slovak nation that had been exposed to persistent pressure lasting for decades, i.e., from the Hungarians.²⁵

Czechoslovakists, as a group of politicians who had linked together the lots of Czech and Slovak nation into one single state, were called and who, as we have already pointed out, A. Hlinka belonged to and who were not, of course, supporters of centralism. Most of them, on the contrary, preferred a regional institution which meant, with respect to provincial autonomy, considerable decentralization.²⁶ Representational ability of those so called centralists was very

²⁵) Only one Slovak Deputy in the Hungarian Diet, F. Juriga, requested before the end of the war the self-determination of Slovakia.

²⁶) [Dérer 1938: 55]. The author points out that a considerable difference exists even among the so called autonomists. The Slovak National Party, e.g., requests just the specific extension of the valid Provincial institution: this is true also of a part of Hlinka's Party. Hungarian autonomistic parties aimed for, by the autonomistic institution of Slovakia, a weakening of the

frequently questioned from indications that autonomists prevailed among Slovak politicians. When scrutinizing their representational power and, consequently, justifying the unified state we must refer to the results of the Parliamentary elections and to the ratification of the Constitutional Document by the Parliament.

To unambiguously evaluate the electoral results complicates the incongruity of parties' programs in a multi-party system where we may expect a disunity of ideologies consisting of a search for the fundamental endeavors of their activities to which others are subordinated. Stratification of citizens/electors does not correspond, according to the political parties, with the principles and shared areas of interest involved. In particular, evaluating electors of the People's Party might concern electors of a confessional party even though it seemed that this group was rather invariable and there was an increasing or decreasing number of those who were or were not supporters of autonomy. Simplification, incidentally, involves also the question of autonomy, the contents of which had changed as well.

I. The Approval of the Constitution

The constitution is considered to be the first manifestation of Slovak politicians' consent to a unified state. When approving the Constitutional Instrument all the Slovak deputies voted, i.e. deputies of the People's Party, as well, for the governmental coalition. In the same way, they accepted the Constitutional Language Act and the so called Regional Act, which regarded the public administration arrangement and self-administration.

II. The Parliamentary Elections 1920²⁷

In the first Czechoslovak Parliamentary elections, the People's Party stood candidate in Slovakia as part of the Czechoslovak People's Party. It received, in Slovakia, 190,506 votes but not as an autonomistic party. The Hungarian Agrarian Party received 40,302 votes and the Hungarian-German Christian Social Party 100,658 votes.

The Czechoslovak parties received: the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party of Labour 497,981 votes, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party 5,697 votes, the Slovak National and Agrarian Party (Hodža/Šrobár) 181,289 votes, and the United Jewish Parties 36,251 votes.

The election thus ended with the victory of the Czechoslovak parties.

III. The Parliamentary Elections 1925

The number of votes for the Slovak People's Party, which ran separately, increased in those elections to 489,111 votes. German and Hungarian autonomistic parties received, in all, 207,972 votes.

Czechoslovak state. On the contrary, Slovak autonomistic groups, under the guidance of Hlinka and of "Patriots," presumed that the autonomy of Slovakia would strengthen the positions of the Czechoslovak state [Dérer 1938: 56].

²⁷) We are presenting only the results of elections in the Chamber of Deputies. We skip over smaller parties. To have a full picture, we also present the number of votes received in elections by more important non-Slovak parties.

The Slovak National Party received 35,435 votes, the Agrarian Party received in Slovakia 248,034 votes, the Czechoslovak People's Party 18,036 votes, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party 60,635 votes, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party 36,909 votes, the Tradesmen's and Businessmen's Party 11,576 votes, candidates affiliated with the National Democratic Party 24,954 votes, and the National Party of Labour 13,608 votes.

Jewish parties received 38,442 votes. The Communist Party received 198,111 votes.

The results of these elections joined the Slovak People's Party with the governmental coalition. On this occasion, the typical disunity of the Slovak representation arose. The Slovak Agrarians hindered the representatives of the People's Party from joining the government.²⁸ One of the conditions of its participating in the government was to dissolve the Ministry holding full power in Slovakia. This was put into effect by the Government Decree of June 28, 1928, when the responsibilities of the Ministry were handed over to the Regional Council in Bratislava. The governmental coalition accommodated the People's Party, too, by a reform of the public administration, a part of which included the establishment of four Provincial Districts, including Slovakia. On October 28, 1928, the People's Party declared loyalty to the Republic.

IV. The Parliamentary Elections 1929

In these Parliamentary elections, the People's Party's votes decreased to 403,683 votes. For this reason they mentioned Tuka's speech on an alleged ten-year validity term given to the Martin Declaration.

The German Electoral Community received 14,704 votes, Hungarian and Spiš-German parties 226,917 votes.

In Slovakia, the Agrarians received 278,979 votes, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party 135,506 votes, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party 43,968 votes, the Czechoslovak People's Party 35,548 votes, the National Democratic Party 53,745 votes, the Tradesmen's and Businessmen's Party 30,134 votes, the Association of Polish and Jewish Parties received 33,679 votes.

The Communist Party received 152,242 votes.

V. The Parliamentary Elections 1935

Parties standing against political autonomy received as follows: the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party 286,739 votes, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party 184,389 votes, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party 51,924 votes, the Czechoslovak Tradesmen's Party 41,996 votes, the Czechoslovak National Union 24,490 votes, the Czechoslovak People's Party 37,515 votes, the Communist Party 210,490 votes, the German Social Democratic Party 5,409 votes, the National Fascist Community 33,609 votes.

²⁸) Contrary to this, the motive of Hlinka's decision to participate in the election of E. Beneš was fear for the strengthening of the Agrarians headed by Hodža.

Autonomistic parties received the following votes: the Autonomistic Bloc of Hlinka's People's Party, the Slovak National Party and the Carpatho-Ukrainian Parties 489,641 votes in all, the Regional Christian Social Parties and the Hungarian National Parties 230,719 votes in all, the Henlein's Party 27,651 votes.

We may deduce from that constellation that most of the voters in Slovakia did not speak out for autonomy. The Autonomistic Bloc was, moreover, incoherent and had broken up. The People's Party supported in the same year the election of E. Beneš as president.

VI. The Communal Elections in May 1938

The very revealing results of the elections in May 1938²⁹ will help us to judge the context of the formation of the Slovak state and the development of a common will towards cooperation with the Czechoslovak state. The most successful parties were Slovak political movements runnings on a platform of Slovak Unity for a Czecho-Slovak Republic and Democracy (the Agrarian Party, the Social Democratic Party, the National Socialist Party, the Tradesmen's Party, Slovak members of the People's Party, the Slovak National Party and the Czechoslovak National Union Party). They received 43,93 % of the total votes while Hlinka's Slovak People's Party received 26,93 % (in 1935, 30,12 % of votes). Even in 1938, Hlinka's Slovak People's Party was the biggest political party. It did not represent, however, a majority of voters in Slovakia and, consequently, it did not have their support.

Epilogue

When considering the creation of a Slovak population consensus, the First Republic regarded those results differently from how they are thought about today. This was apparently caused by methodological inaccuracy in analyses and the fact that results were not split according to separate elections in Slovakia and Czechoslovakia. Hlinka's Slovak People's Party was the only one presented separately. The votes of Slovaks drowned among the Czechoslovak parties and, subsequently, the strongest party in Slovakia appeared to be the People's Party.³⁰ This greatly distorted the overall view on the creation of a consensus and on the possibility of creating a Czechoslovak political nation. Thus, the more evident became the assumption that the decisive moment of disintegrating Czechoslovakia would be under speculation of outside nations as well as any foreign assistance during the actual split.

In a democratic society, political representation has the right to force through its program only in the case that it has the support of the majority of voters or in the case that it will succeed to form a coalition with other parties with similar programs in order to win support in the Parliament. In spite of the events we have reexamined, history probably has developed much like political representation forcing through a program which leaders declare to be in the

²⁹) The newest results of this research are present in [Bartlová 1991: 106].

³⁰) This circumstance was stressed out by I. Dérer [1938].

interest of the nation, even while voters had not accepted it. The political representatives often make steps which do not correspond with the will of the voters. Obviously, they have not always been aware of the consequences of their actions. Sometimes, political representatives took steps which were subsequently approved by the nation. The evolution of history points to the fact that the necessity for the self-determination of a nation is somehow connected with the origin of a national intelligentsia, which requested for itself the commensurate position in society comparable with the position of the same group in other nations. Such a program is always formulated in an adverse situation of the nation, whether it is the economy, foreign policy or other political issues. Nevertheless, the results of the elections in inter-war Slovakia justifies the view, to a considerable extent, that Munich and the following dissolution of the state broke the respective evolution that had, itself, all the relevant preconditions to create a harmonic, democratic society in which the national ambitions of Slovaks, too, would have been accomplished.

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Differences Between the Czech and Slovak Perceptions of the Economic Transformation

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Abstract: All the surveys that have been carried out in the Czech and Slovak Republic since November 1989 present large differences between the Czech and Slovak perceptions of the economic transformation and its consequences. Analyzing the survey data "Transformation of Social Structure" (carried out in October 1991) the author points out that besides differences in the distribution of viewpoints, there are also important differences in the structure of their interrelationships. Different assessments of effective strategies for life success are analyzed. As a sort of counterbalance to hitherto mostly historical interpretations of the divergence in Czech and Slovak survey data, the author states that the dissimilar perceptions of the transformation might stem from their different rates of change toward market economies. Several methodological questions are raised in the conclusion.

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It is evident today that the Czech and Slovak populations differ significantly in their views about the hitherto realized political and economic changes and about the societies' further development. According to the data of most of published research up to now, differences among the Czech and Slovak respondents are striking (e.g. the researches of the Center for Empirical Research, of the Public Opinion Research Institute, and of the Association for Independent Social Analysis; see also [Machonin 1992]). Leaving aside the problems of state legislation (the question whether to preserve the federation, to constitute the confederation or to split the CSFR), it is possible to summarize the observed differences in the statement that Slovak inhabitants are generally less satisfied, have greater fears for the future and accept the character and proceedings of the economic transformation less.

These differences are often interpreted, especially in the mass media, as the Czechs, Moravians, and Silesians belonging to the political right and the Slovaks belonging to the left. In connection with this, we can understand that there was an improvement in living standards during the last 40 years in Slovakia and that the period of so called "Normalization" was less oppressive in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. The indisputable progress in terms of life standards in Slovakia is allegedly seen there as an outcome of socialist economics, which is considered to be reformable by many inhabitants.

I find such explanations too simple and perhaps also misleading. Undoubtedly, if we reflect upon the different attitudes belonging to the Czech and

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Slovak populations toward the contemporary changes, it is necessary to bear in mind the character of the latest developments. However, it is not possible to neglect the purely contemporary factors. I would take the above mentioned illusory success of the Slovak socialist economy more as a certain catalyst for the influences of factors closely connected with the present day.

Quite a number of the research data (see e.g. [Šanderová 1992]) point to the fact that the Czech and Slovak populations differ not only in their responses to individual questions, i.e. in the distribution of answers, but with also the character of their reciprocal relationships, i.e. in the character of their structures. As an illustration we can view the presented data analysis "Transformation of Social Structure"¹ on the basis of a hypothetical explanation for the different evaluations of the post-November changes in the Czech and Slovak parts of the former CSFR. As a certain counterbalance or supplement to the hitherto prevailing historical interpretation, I stress the influence of the contemporary situation. A brief methodological reflection concludes the article.

I. The problem analyzed

Two batteries of questions, the wording of which (together with the respective analyses results) are analyzed in Chapter II. They were constructed to verify whether people perceive the contemporary changes as aiming at a meritocratic ideal and if yes, on which level. In this sense the data has already been analyzed and interpreted [Matějů, Řeháková 1992].

First, whether relations between individual items of the mentioned batteries form consistent and meaningful configurations reflecting the respondents' notions about strategies which they consider effective for living a successful life and what changes have come about in this respect after November 1989 are investigated. The second issue posed is whether the notions of potentially effective strategies leading to life success are affected by the respondents' satisfaction with the general economic situation of the society, the living standard and social security at the time of the investigation, the estimation for further developments in these regards and whether the changes in our society have brought and continue to bring more or less justice. The wording of these questions as well as the results of the analysis are introduced in Chapter III.

¹) The research project was worked out by a research team in the Institute of Social and Political Sciences of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and of the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Financially the investigation was covered by the 20 percent grant of ČSAV (82801 "Social Stratification") and by the funds afforded by the Federal Ministry of Work and Social Affairs. The Center for Empirical Research (STEM) of the Institute of Sociology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences collected the data in September and October 1991. The sample was carried out from the Register of inhabitants using a combination of quota and random sampling. The final sample includes 2829 persons over the age 18 years (the Czechs form two thirds of the sample, and the Slovaks form one third of it; such a structure agrees with the representation of the republic's population in CSFR). The selection structure as to age and sex agrees with the structure of the basic sample (population over 18 years of age).

In both cases I analyzed the Czech and the Slovak samples separately, aiming to compare their reciprocal relationships according to the mentioned variables and to offer a more dynamic discussion about the differences between the Czech and Slovak perceptions of the economic transformation.

II. Strategies for life success

My first step was to define, using factor analysis, the basic strategies considered by the respondents as leading to life success. The following two batteries of questions were analyzed:

A: What - according to your opinion - is important for a man to be successful in our country in order to assert himself?

B: What is the change - according to your opinion - in the significance of the mentioned circumstances of life success compared to the situation two years ago.

The respondents were given the following quoted list of items and asked to choose one of these answers:

- 1. not a significant circumstance/change;*
- 2. a circumstance/change of certain significance;*
- 3. a quite important circumstance/change ;*
- 4. the most important circumstance/change.*

Items to questions A and B:

In tables:

To come from a rich family	wealth
To have educated parents	parent's educ.
To have high education	education
To exert one's effort to be prominent	effort
To be gifted or have	abilities
Willingness to work	hard work
To know the right people	connections
To have political contacts	pol. contacts
What race or nationality one is	nationality
What religious confession one is	religion
The locality where one was born	locality
Whether one is a man or a woman	sex
Political beliefs	polit. beliefs
To have good luck	luck
Ability to conform	conformity
Willingness to take risks	risk

The results of factor analyses performed separately for the Slovak and the Czech sample are introduced in Tables 1 and 2 together with Box's M indicating that the structures of the analyzed correlation matrixes significantly differ.

Table 1. Strategies for life success - question A
(Rotated factor matrix - factor loadings)

A: Czech Republic

Factor:	ASCRPTION1	ACHIEVEMENT		
		ARTFULNESS1		SOC.ORIGIN1
wealth		0.17		0.72
parents' educ.	0.16	*)	0.31	0.64
education			0.61	0.41
effort		0.21	0.58	0.21
abilities		0.21	0.72	
hard work		0.17	0.68	-0.32
connections	0.17	0.55		
pol. contacts	0.34	0.33		0.51
nationality	0.65			
religion	0.77			
locality	0.77			
sex	0.54	0.15		
polit. beliefs	0.50	0.21		0.32
luck		0.66		
conformity		0.68		
risk		0.60	0.26	
% of explained variance	19	15	8	7

B: Slovak Republic

Factor:	ASCRPTION1	ACHIEVEMENT		POLITICS1	
		ARTFULNESS		SOC.ORIGIN1	
wealth		0.27	0.16	0.63	
parents' educ.				0.81	
education			0.28	0.70	
effort			0.57	0.30	0.32
abilities			0.80		
hard work		0.18	0.75		-0.23
connections		0.46	0.32		
pol.contacts					0.78
nationality	0.63				0.32
religion	0.75				
locality	0.81				
sex	0.64				0.31
polit.beliefs	0.31				0.68
luck		0.74		0.19	
conformity		0.74			
risk		0.59	0.21		0.26
% of explained variance	20	14	9	8	7

*) factor loading under 0.15.

Box's M = 419.31 significant at < 0.000

A. The situation in October 1991: commentary to Table 1

Factor analysis results from battery A questions are quite similar in the Czech and Slovak samples. Practically the same variables define the factors ASCRIPTION1, ARTFULNESS1 and ACHIEVEMENT1 explaining roughly the same percentage of variance in both samples. A certain similarity can be seen in the fourth factor (SOC.ORIGIN1) which is defined only by the "wealth" and "parent's education" items in the Czech sample, while "education" (meaning education of the person striving for success) more prominently joins these items in the Slovak sample. To reach success in life (in October 1991) is possible, in the opinion of the respondents, partly by means of one's own efforts (achievement), partly on the basis of a favorable family background (social origin), or by other ascriptive items: the benefit of nationality, place of residence, sex, religious confession, political conviction. However, the road to success today also moves through various connections, luck, ability to conform, and willingness to risk (ARTFULNESS1 factor).

This is the opinion of respondents from both republics. One more factor was extracted only from the Slovak sample which consists of the items "political connections" and "political beliefs" (POL.CONTACTS1). The Slovak respondents therefore can see one more road to life success, which leads through political contacts and not surprisingly coheres with political beliefs. To be exhaustive, it is necessary to add that in the Czech sample the independent strategy of political connections (i.e. the distinct factor saturated by "political" items) was not extracted even in the five-factor result.

B. The post-November 1989 changes: commentary to Table 2

According to the results of the analysis related to the post-November 1989 changes, the differences between the considered samples are more prominent than in the former case which was also analyzed by higher values of Box's M statistics. In both samples we find only the ASCRIPTION2 factor and SOC.ORIGIN2 factor defined especially by "parents' education" and "education" - only in Slovakia was the "wealth" item more prominently applied to this factor.

The most prominent factor for life success in the Czech sample is defined by the same variables as the ACHIEVEMENT1 factor in the former analysis. In addition, however, there is the "risk" item. In comparison with the situation before November 1989, the Czech respondents have added the willingness to risk and abilities. In my opinion, a more fitting denotation of this factor is ENTREPRENEUR. Similarly to the previous analysis, we find the distinct factor ARTFULNESS as well.

The denotation ENTREPRENEUR is also in the Slovak sample, namely for the factor qualified by items defining ACHIEVEMENT1 in the former analysis. In this case even those items defined in the former analysis as the ARTFULNESS1 factor are connected with it. Also, in this analysis, we find the POL.CONTACTS2 factor only in the Slovak sample.

Table 2. Post-November changes - question B
(Rotated factor matrix - factor loadings)

A: Czech Republic

Factor:	ENTREPRENEUR		ARTFULNESS2	
		ASCRPTION2		SOC.ORIGIN2
wealth	*)	0.24		0.42
parents' educ.				0.76
education	0.18			0.74
effort	0.59			0.39
abilities	0.77			0.27
hard work	0.77			0.17
connections			0.63	0.26
pol. contacts	-0.57	0.21	0.50	0.27
nationality	-0.15	0.74		
religion	-0.24	0.72	0.17	
locality		0.85		
sex		0.77		
polit. beliefs	-0.53	0.34	0.44	0.18
luck	0.25		0.67	
conformity			0.76	
risk	0.65		0.39	
% of explained variance	22	18	10	8

B: Slovak Republic

Factor:	ENTREPRENEUR		SOC.ORIGIN2	
		ASCRPTION2		POLITICS2
wealth	0.21	0.19	0.53	
parents' educ.			0.80	
education			0.78	0.17
effort	0.58		0.43	
abilities	0.69		0.27	-0.23
hard work	0.64			-0.28
connections	0.57		0.46	0.37
pol. contacts			0.17	0.82
nationality		0.77		0.22
religion		0.76		0.22
locality		0.83		
sex		0.81		
polit. beliefs		0.37		0.73
luck	0.67			0.26
conformity	0.70			0.27
risk	0.71	0.17		-0.16
% of explained variance	20	14	9	8

*) factor loading under 0.15.

Box's M = 534.21; significant at < 0.000

C. Interpretation of Factors

Similar to the second step in which factor scores representing individual factors are considered, it is necessary to pay more detailed attention to the interpretation of individual factors because this is inevitably projected on the interpretation of the following analyses results.

In all four analyses we find two types of ascriptive factors. Except for the SOC.ORIGIN factors introducing social background status as closely connected with achieved education, there are those factors I call ASCRIPTION introduced by a certain determining or fatalistic variant of the social structure's ascriptive perception. They express the conviction that life success depends on circumstances one cannot, or only with difficulties, change: sex, nationality, place of birth, religious confession, and possibly, political beliefs. Unequal accents on individual components of these two types of factors only differ from sample to sample.

Considering the evaluation of the acquired state in October 1991, in both samples we find, aside from those factors mentioned above, the strategy of achievement (ACHIEVEMENT1 factor). This strategy consists of conformity and willingness to risk and that one should know the right people and have a bit of luck (ARTFULNESS1 factor).

When questioned about what has changed in our country since November 1989, the Czech respondents see a growth in the significance of being enterprising in the traditional conception (greater chances for success than before are supposed with the person who is gifted, hard-working, who wishes to assert himself and is willing to take a risk) on the one hand. However, on the other hand, respondents see a growth in the significance of a certain "fitness" (to be able to conform, to be a little lucky and to know the right people). The Slovak respondents take these two strategies - comparing their significance with the time before November 1989 - as one. Compared with the past it is more important whether one is able, hard-working and willing to take a risk, but at the same time he/she must be lucky, have the ability to conform and know the right people. It is obvious that the Slovak respondents' viewpoint, the enterprising strategy is not so completely "fair" and is growing significantly.

The most striking difference between the Czech and the Slovak population remains with the introduction of the items "to have political connections" and "political beliefs," which in both analyses form a distinct factor found only in the Slovak sample. Though (looking at the amount of these items' factor loading for all individual factors) in both samples the items of a "less distinguished" character are in question (they saturate more than one factor), in the Slovak sample these items are more closely related. It seems that considering what is today most important for a successful life, political connections and beliefs are understood as a certain attachment to social origin and other ascriptive advantages in the Czech countries, while in Slovakia political contacts are perceived as an independent strategy whose significance has even increased, in comparison with the past.

III. The strategy for life success and justice and contentment

The following analyses² have been obtained by entering scores of the above described factors as dependent variables (computed by means of regression method), and the answers to the questions quoted below as independent variables:

Do you think that the change in our society has brought more justice, or less justice?
(Question 110)

As far as the near future is concerned (3 to 5 years), do you think that it will bring more justice, or less justice? (Question 111)

Responses: 1. *definitely more*; 2. *rather more*; 3. *rather less*; 4. *definitely less*.

Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the development since November 1989 of:

the general situation in society (Question 121a)

the Czechoslovak economy (Question 121d)

the life standard (Question 121f)

the social security (Question 121g)

Responses: 1. *very satisfied*; 2. *quite satisfied*; 3. *rather dissatisfied*; 4. *very dissatisfied*.

What kind of development do you expect in the near future of:

the general situation in society (Question 122a)

the Czechoslovak economy (Question 122b)

the life standard (Question 122c)

the social security (Question 122d)

Responses: 1. *a fast improvement*; 2. *a gradual improvement*; 3. *small changes*; 4. *a gradual aggravation*; 5. *a fast aggravation*.

It is possible to say that the evaluation of life strategies and of the latest changes in this regard analyzed in the proceeding chapter are strongly connected with both the feeling of satisfaction with the developments and the assessments of justice, i.e. with responses to the above given questions. In the Czech sample, however, there are more significant connections between factors, though not always giving evidence about the same conclusion in the two samples (they differ in the direction or meaning of dependence).

A. Successful life strategies and justice: commentary to Tables 3 and 4

When looking at the correlation matrix given in Table 3, it is obvious that in both samples the conviction that the success of the ARTFULNESS strategy correlates with opinions of justice and its development after November 1989. Those respondents who are of the opinion that changes in our society have brought less justice (and in the near future will bring still less) think that today for life success it is important to be able to conform, to know the right people, etc., and simply "to know the ropes." This relationship is stronger in Slovakia.

²) Analysis of variance (software SPSSX version 4.1).

Table 3. Life success factor and justice
(Coefficients eta)

Question No.:	Czech Republic		Slovak Republic	
	110	111	110	111
<i>Factors:</i>				
ASCRPTION1	0.10	0.11	*	
ARTFULNESS1	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.15
ACHIEVEMENT1	0.20	0.20		
SOC.ORIGIN1		0.16		
ENTREPRENEUR	0.12	0.13		
ASCRPTION2			0.10	0.14
ARTFULNESS**	0.14	0.13		
SOC.ORIGIN1				0.10

*) Non-significant at < 0.05 .

**) Factor was extracted from the Czech subgroup only.

Table 4. ASCRIPTION factors and justice assessment
(Average values of factor scores)

	Czech Republic		Slovak Republic	
	mean	% resp.	mean	% resp.
<i>Question 110 (have changes brought justice?)</i>				
surely more	-0.01	16.8	-0.05	9.5
rather more	-0.06	44.4	0.08	33.1
rather less	-0.00	29.6	0.02	41.2
surely less	0.30	9.2	-0.20	16.1

In the Czech Republic only, these people (i.e. who are skeptical about justice development) consider where one was born, which sex he or she is etc. (a high score of ASCRIPTION1 factor) to be an important condition for life success. In Slovakia, the opinions on justice development are connected with the evaluations of changes in effective life strategies (a significant connection was proved in ASCRIPTION2). Yet the character of dependence here is different from the Czech sample.

The respondents who think that the changes have brought less justice, or will bring less of it, differ from all others in terms of the amount of ASCRIPTION factors scored in both samples (ASCRPTION1 in the Czech sample and ASCRIPTION2 in the Slovak one). However, in the Czech sample, the feeling that there is and will be less justice goes hand in hand with the conviction that ascriptive advantages are very important for achieving a successful life. In the Slovak sample it is the opposite: the statement that there is and will be significantly less justice flags the conviction that after November 1989, the significance of ascriptive advantages decreases (see table 4).

It seems that in the Czech sample ascription is seen more as discrimination (the other side of the ascriptive advantages of some people is the discrimination of others), which means an obstacle rather than an effective route to life success. In the Slovak sample, there is obviously a different interpretation of the ASCRPITION2 factor. It can be, for example, the opinion that after November 1989 a rectification of former discrimination occurs. Similarly, those who in the Slovak sample tend to believe that the future will bring more justice, more often feel that the significance of social origin has strengthened (SOC.ORIGIN2).

In the Czech sample we find a greater number of significant connections than in the Slovak one. This leads us to the judgement that the views on the development of justice are bound here with the views of effective life strategies more strongly than in Slovakia. Remarkably strong connections have been proven especially between the ACHIEVEMENT and ENTREPRENEUR factors and especially between the respondents who see in the hitherto changes a contribution to justice, and in the future expect still more of it and those who are convinced that life success today builds on individual efforts and abilities, more than before November 1989. In Slovakia, no relation type of such significance has been proven in any case.

B. Successful life strategies and contentment: commentary to Tables 5 and 6

A number of differences between the Czech and the Slovak samples is also found in the relations between the opinions of the effective life success strategies and contentment (table 5). More prominent important relations were proven again in the Czech sample. Contentment is connected with a high score of ACHIEVEMENT1 factor, which implies a conviction that achievement is today an important instrument for life success. At the same time, in close connection with a high score of ARTFULNESS1 factor we find discontentment and fears for the future in both samples (in the Czech one we find a prominent relation of this type also in connection with the ARTFULNESS2 factor).

In both samples we also find strong and significant correlations between contentment and the ENTREPRENEUR factor. But the meaning (or subjective content) of this relationship in the Czech population is different from that in the Slovak one. In the same way that the Czech concept of a successful enterprising strategy differs from the Slovak one, there differs also the nature of the connection between the evaluation of enterprising strategies and contentment with the reached state or expectations for the future, as far as life standards and social security are concerned (table 6). With the Czech respondents, contentment and positive expectations for the future reflect the conviction that after November, 1989 the ENTREPRENEUR strategy has been of greater importance. But in the Slovak sample, dissatisfaction and expectation of a further aggravation is connected with a high score of the ENTREPRENEUR factor.

And finally, in the Slovak sample discontent and fears for the future are also connected with a higher score of POL.CONTACTS factors. As far as the ACHIEVEMENT factor is concerned, in the Slovak sample no significant relationship has been proven.

Table 5. Life success factors and contentment
(Coefficients eta)*A: Czech Republic*

Question No.:	121A	121D	121F	121G	122A	122D	122F	122G
<i>Factors:</i>								
ASCRPTION1	*)	0.08			0.09	0.09	0.07	
ARTFULNESS1	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.12
ACHIEVEMENT	0.13	0.17	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.15	0.12	0.13
SOC.ORIGIN1	0.13	0.13	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.20	0.18
ASCRPTION2						0.09	0.10	
ENTREPRENEUR	0.10	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.09	
ARTFULNESS2	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.18	0.14	0.18	0.15	0.14
SOC.ORIGIN2	0.09			0.07				

B: Slovak Republic

Question No.:	121A	121D	121F	121G	122A	122D	122F	122G
<i>Factors:</i>								
ASCRPTION1					0.11		0.13	
ARTFULNESS1	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.10		0.11	
ACHIEVEMENT								
SOC.ORIGIN1						0.11		
POLITICS1						0.13		
ASCRPTION2			0.12	0.08	0.11			
ENTREPRENEUR		0.11			0.13	0.15	0.19	0.17
SOC.ORIGIN2							0.12	0.11
POLITICS2		0.10	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10		

*) Non-significant at < 0.05 .**IV. Interpretation of the discovered differences**

Summarizing the established differences in the answers of the Czech and the Slovak respondents we can assert that the consequences of the changes are not (or to be exact: in October 1989 were not) perceived in the same way.

The respondents in both republics have agreed that ACHIEVEMENT (to be gifted and hard working) is a successful strategy and ARTFULNESS (to know the ropes) leads to one's goals. In this respect also various ascriptive advantages are regarded as powerful. In the Czech sample, however, the respondents mentioned the achievement strategy more often, while in Slovakia the ascriptive advantages and knowing the ropes were mentioned more frequently.³

³) The analysis of the questions concerning the state in September 1991 and dealing with the Czech and Slovak respondents together, the result of which I do not present here for reasons of space, have shown that in the ASCRPTION and ARTFULNESS factors the Slovak respondents score more, while the Czechs score significantly more in ACHIEVEMENT1 factor.

Table 6. ENTREPRENEUR factor and current changes assessment
(Average values of factor score)

	Czech Republic		Slovak Republic	
	mean	% resp.	mean	% resp.
<i>Question 121D (contentment with economy)</i>				
very satisfied	0.19	1.9	-0.09	0.4
quite satisfied	0.12	26.5	0.25	8.6
rather dissatisfied	0.01	49.6	-0.10	51.2
very dissatis.	-0.18	22.0	0.06	49.0
<i>Question 122A (future: in general)</i>				
fast improvement	0.10	1.7	0.34	1.3
gradual improvement	0.07	51.2	-0.02	33.2
small changes	-0.02	36.7	-0.05	46.0
gradual aggravation	-0.28	9.4	0.04	17.9
fast aggravation	-0.26	1.0	0.96	1.0
<i>Question 122D (future: economy)</i>				
fast improvement	0.27	2.9	0.67	2.9
gradual improvement	0.09	47.1	0.05	28.1
small changes	-0.05	31.0	-0.10	34.5
gradual aggravation	-0.13	16.0	-0.04	32.0
fast aggravation	0.59	4.5	-0.57	3.0
<i>Question 122F (future: life standard)</i>				
fast improvement	0.11	1.7	-0.62	1.5
gradual improvement	0.11	39.3	0.01	23.0
small changes	-0.03	32.1	-0.06	31.8
gradual aggravation	-0.11	24.2	-0.03	39.3
fast aggravation	-0.18	2.8	0.82	4.4
<i>Question 122G (future: social security)</i>				
fast improvement	0.05	1.6	-1.33	0.3
gradual improvement	0.06	32.3	-0.09	18.3
small changes	-0.03	34.6	-0.01	31.9
gradual aggravation	-0.08	27.0	-0.04	41.9
fast aggravation	-0.19	4.5	0.55	7.6

There is a still a more prominent difference between the Czech and Slovak respondents' opinions about the quality of change since November 1989. The questioned persons in the Czech Republic find both positive and negative sides of the development. In their opinion, the entrepreneur strategy's significance has increased, namely in an almost idealistic conception, yet also based on various connections, and the like. The respondents in Slovakia have seen only negative changes. The effort to assert oneself and willingness to work hard stopped being sufficient. One must also have useful connections and a bit of luck. The people in Slovakia probably quite often connect strategy building with acquaintances in the political world and they consider it negative for further economic development.

In other words, although the people in the Czech Republic are aware of the complexity of problems involved with the transformation (which is beneficial not

only to those who are skillful and competent, but also to those who can make use of the often not so clear arrangements), they recognized an improved situation (to the higher significance of achievement) before anything else. The people in Slovakia, on the other hand, tend to see the significance of strengthening non-achievement strategies only.

A question now arises: Why is there such a prominent disparity between Czech and Slovak assessments of the current changes? In my opinion, the most logical answer is: different things have occurred in each republic. In my introduction to this study I mentioned the fact that the Slovak inhabitants - compared with the Czech ones - are allegedly "disposed" as Leftist. This characteristic is, among other things, deduced from the finding that the Slovak respondents assess the former regime more positively than the Czech respondents. But even if a considerable part of the Slovaks hold the opinion that life was better in the former regime (see [Lépe 1992]), it does not necessarily signify that they consider the socialist economy better than the market economy. Strictly speaking, this estimation does not mean anything for a number of people other than the fact, that "what was" is better than "what is now" (namely what was in October 1991).

A lot of statistical data and information in mass media lead to the conclusion that there has been a smaller shift towards the market economy in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. The state's influence has been weakened concerning former social protections (namely job security) but private enterprise has been developing slowly and the influx of foreign capital has also been slow. In short, a competitive milieu has not been developed in Slovakia (or has been developing much less than in the Czech Republic). The novelty which people in Slovakia meet daily, be it directly or by means of a mediator, is rather a loss of job security than any marks of market economy development (which is more evident in the Czech lands).

The result of the above mentioned analyses suggest that as far as strategies for life success are concerned, everything in Slovakia has more or less remained in the past, if there has not been a shift to the worse. In "real" socialism, life success depends on such factors which one cannot influence. It is still impossible to reach life success without connections, even if one is competent and hard working. Further, the importance of political connections for life strategies (so typical of the recent past) has been increasing.

I do not assume the Slovak population to be dreaming of a return to socialism. They are only more dissatisfied with the contemporary state of things, because they are facing uncertainty without seeing any suggestion of positive development. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that a number of people have arrived (possibly rather implicitly) at the following conclusion: it is better to have any form of state paternalism than a socialist regime without job security. With this in mind, I fully agree with the opinion [Tymowsky, Petrusek 1992] that it is more suitable to evaluate the differences between the attitudes of the Czech and Slovak respondents, let us say between the inhabitants of the individual republics, on the scale of liberalism - paternalism than on the scale of Right-Left. I hold that the whole problem of Czech-Slovak divergence need not be that the "Czech

reform" does not fit the "Slovak specificity", but rather that the reform has been performed inconsistently, or only as a hint, in Slovakia.

V. Methodological skepticism

The explanation for the dissimilar results of the presented analyses, however, can be more prosaic. It can be, for instance, argued that the structure of the questionnaire and the wording of the questions were made to the Czech population's reference. No significant differences between the pattern of the Czech and the Slovak respondents' experience and way of thinking were assumed. Nevertheless, the chosen context could have been more obscure for the Slovak respondents than for the respondents in the Czech Lands. Questions about the state-legislature establishment could more likely be stimulating for the Slovak population even if there were not any other problems. I am inclined to this hypothesis because there is a lower coherence of opinions on effective life success strategies on the one hand, and of contentment and opinions on justice, on the other hand, in the Slovak sample than in the Czech one.

The dissimilar results can also be a consequence of the fact that individual items in the analyzed batteries are interpreted differently in the Czech and the Slovak Republics. The ASCRIPTION factors can serve as an example of divergent approaches to the same problem (see the commentary to table 4). Neither are we sure whether life success is viewed as the same thing by both the Czech and Slovak populations (whether in this respect there is not a less striking but systemic difference).

Finally, there is the question whether it is altogether possible to draw a more general conclusion on the basis of attitude questions. The expression of contentment, or the evaluating of changes, etc., are undoubtedly influenced by the political climate changing every day. The hypothesis (interpretation) introduced in the previous chapter could then be supported or rejected only by means of checking whether in October 1991 Slovakia was really closer to "real socialism" than the Czech Republic.

Lastly, the conclusions based on multidimensional analyses without differentiating between Czech and Slovak data should be undoubtedly questioned. The subjects of observation could be, in a number of cases, artificially structured Czechoslovaks, whose opinions agree by two thirds with the experiences and feelings of Czech respondents and by one third with Slovak respondents, while the patterns of these experiences and feelings are not always compatible. It is therefore unrealistic to analyze them within a uniform analytical and interpretative framework.

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I'D REALLY LIKE TO TELL YOU MY OPINION, BUT I DON'T WANT TO CAUSE A GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS...

A Deliberate "Yes" to the Dissolution of the ČSFR?

The Image of the Parties and the Split of Czecho-Slovakia in the Eyes of the Slovak Population

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Abstract: Based on the data from repeated sociological surveys conducted in post-Communist Slovakia in the years 1990-1992, this study describes the elements of the political awareness of the population that played an important role in the process of the dissolution of Czecho-Slovakia. Special attention is paid to the image of the political parties in the pre-election period and to the reactions of the population to the division of the country.

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The milk is spilt: Czecho-Slovakia has split. Ideas about the possible benefits from the Czecho-Slovak coexistence based on a new partnership that some Czech and Slovak sociologists formulated in October 1990 at the Alšovice seminar [Budúcnosť 1990] did not come to life in the context of a single state.

At the turn of 1993 the freely elected surgeons on both sides of the Czecho-Slovak border put down their scalpels and congratulated one another on a successful surgery; the stitches on the divorce velvet still look elegant, almost imperceptible. The surgery went on uneventfully; the town squares were empty rather than swarming with crowds of protesters appealing for preservation of the common state or voicing support for the referendum which failed to evoke a response.

Slovakia's population thus did not say its decisive civic "no" to the breakup of the country. This came not only as a surprise to more than one observer from the outside, but also to a number of direct participants: for, as late as shortly before the 1992 election, the surveys were concordant in reporting that the desire to safeguard the common state in Slovakia prevailed with a great deal of inertia over the will for independence [Slovensko 1992]. The centrifugal force of the "election vector" further reinforced by the resignation of President Havel started to act literally overnight.

But neither did nor does a vocal "yes" sound for the Slovak statehood. Instead of lightning flashing over the Tatra Mountains, there is silence. Euphoria over the newly acquired independence definitely did not overcome the wide masses of the population. Not even the sporadic bonfires lit to mark the sovereignty or the champagne corks shooting forth at the meetings on the day "zero" of the Slovak statehood did much to ease the lethargy. Joy over the "nation's coming of age," largely organized from the top, is waning and attention is turning more to the worries and problems of the citizens in the new state [Krivý 1992, Šoucová 1993].

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Until recently most citizens of the ČSFR and even a number of domestic and foreign politicians and political scientists trusted the ability of Czecho-Slovakia to hold fast in the presence of tendencies to disintegrate and obsessions with national emancipation which were gradually holding fast to the multinational or multiethnic post-communist countries. But today two new independent states are lying next to one another whose creation took place with a dizzying irreversibility which provokes thought and analyses.¹ The aim of the present article is to characterize some typical elements of the political or broader social consciousness in post-communist Slovakia and to outline those of them with special significance toward the dissolution of the country - be it in the form of collective perceptions or misperceptions. We shall leave aside the "objective reality" of historical facts, political events and interactions or of the real economic and social situation. Instead, we shall focus more on how people in Slovakia constructed the actual sociopolitical world surrounding them, how they were charting their course in this world and which ideas or underlying motives determined their electoral preferences. This may help us shed light on the torpor of the "silent majority" which, until not so long ago, was silently supporting the Czecho-Slovak coexistence and then was taken by surprise by the declining relevance of their opinions and passively but ultimately accepted the impossibility of influencing the dismantling process of the common state.

Let us have a look into the rear-view mirror represented by surveys conducted by the Center for Social Analysis in Bratislava.²

1. Disturbing Signals

According to some commentators, during the second parliamentary election the citizens of Slovakia gave an affirmative answer to the question of ending the Czecho-Slovak statehood as a precondition for completing the process of national emancipation. But survey results do not seem to corroborate this view.

The pre-election climate in Slovakia was in marked contrast to the euphoria of the November days. An almost universal distrust rooted itself among the population against the new power elite, represented primarily by the political parties, the Public against Violence and the Christian-Democratic Movement. It was fed by disappointments with the work of the new parliaments and weariness from lengthy and difficult-to-read talks on constitutional issues. An authoritarian nostalgia was gaining ground with widespread yearning for a strong hand policy

1) There are several possible frameworks of interpretation. We have also made an attempt at interpreting some underlying reasons for this process e.g. in [Bútora, Bútorová 1992; Bútora, Bútorová, Gyarfášová 1993].


2) Center for Social Analysis is an independent research organization. Since the spring of 1990, the C.S.A. team has conducted eleven representative surveys of the attitudes of the Slovak population to current social, economic and political problems; two of them had the Czecho-Slovakia wide coverage. The sample surveyed was always representative and, as a rule, it never comprised less than 1,200 respondents from the Slovak Republic. Research carried out in April 1992, to which reference is made in the present text, was comprised of as many as 2,890 respondents.

and decisive action for installing order and doing away with chaos and anomie [Výzkum 1991, Aktuálne 1992, Slovensko 1992, Výsledky 1992].

The feeling of alienation from the power elite had a different background in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. In Slovakia it was nurtured by general dissatisfaction with the post-November developments; frustration over the threat of weakening social securities; declining support for the new regime, more conciliatory attitudes to communists; less frequent stress on personal accountability; more frequent state paternalistic orientations; more deeply embedded egalitarianism; distrust in entrepreneurs; privatization; and more frequent anti-Western attitudes [Výzkum 1991, Aktuálne 1992, Slovensko 1992, Výsledky 1992, Krivý 1993].

As Figure 1 suggests, the issues which became most prominent in the hierarchy of social problems as experienced by the Slovak population were unemployment and endangered social securities; this was largely due to more severe social implications of the economic reform.³ These issues weighed so heavily on the minds of the population that they pushed the problems of the country's constitutional structure into the background [Slovensko 1992].

Which of the Problems Do you Consider to Be the Most Urgent?
(According to the Citizens of Slovakia – C.S.A.; April 1992)




The study of the Czecho-Slovak relations expose certain paradoxes. On the one hand, the partisans of the common state could, until the last moment, get

³) The respondents were instructed to select from among the problems specified in the Figure 1 three problems that they consider to be the most urgent. Percentages shown in the Figure apply to all the answers.

confidence from the poll results according to which the numerical prevalence of common state supporters over their opponents continued to hold fast in Slovakia.⁴

At that time most people in both republics were convinced about the redeeming values of the coexistence of the Slovak and Czech people: in April 1992, 77% of the respondents from Slovakia agreed with the statement that the ties binding the Slovaks with the Czechs should not be broken. Support for the common state prevailed among partisans of all the parties with the exception of the Slovak National Party. Those who were in favour of the common state prevailed, prior to the election, even among supporters for the future victorious movement, the HZDS (59%). Twenty-two percent of them supported the programme for the creation of a confederation while only 19% supported the demand for Slovak state sovereignty [Slovensko 1992].



On the other hand, several disturbing signs started to signal a change in the perception of the Czecho-Slovak coexistence. First, throughout the entire series of intensive constitutional negotiations, very important misperceptions about the problem of constructing a constitutional structure persisted. Only a small part of the population had a coherent idea about the attributes of individual constitutional


⁴ According to the C.S.A. research [Slovensko 1992], one month before the elections there was a 20% support for the unitarian state, 7% for the Länder organization, 27% for a two-component federation, 8% for a three-component federation. As for the confederation, it was supported by 14%, and the independent state by 17% of the Slovak citizens; 6% of the respondents were undecided. The Prague IVVM survey of April 1992 indicated a different, almost double percentage (28%) of the advocates for a confederation in Slovakia. This may be due to a much too small sample for Slovakia but especially to the fact that the IVVM questionnaire does - unlike all other forms - explain this form of constitutional set-up and the commentary to it is relatively favorable and unproblematic; the respondent is to judge a "confederation of two independent republics with a common president and defense".

forms [*Aktuálne* 1991; *Aktuálne* 1992; *Slovensko* 1992; Frič, Bútorová, Rosová 1992; Krivý 1993]. The cognitive helplessness of the population was far from being limited only to the constitutional "mist" and received its full reflection in the 1992 elections. As reported by V. Krivý and I. Radičová, in comparison with the Czech population of that period, the Slovak one was characterized by greater atomization and lacked consistency in its perception of the individual aspects of social life [*Aktuálne* 1992, Krivý 1993].

Second, and even more significant, was the fact that the Slovak Republic inhabitants failed to recognize the significance of the interconnection between the desire for economic prosperity and the conviction that it can be best achieved if the economic reform scenario continues. On the contrary, convictions toward the opposite were growing stronger. In May 1991, 43% of the Slovak population were worried that the reform would weaken national interests of the Slovaks and 57% expected the gap between the Czech and the Slovak economies to grow [*Aktuálne* 1991]. In January 1992, 53% of the respondents anticipated the Czech economy to grow more rapidly at the expense of the Slovak economy [*Aktuálne* 1992]. More and more people started to believe that the Czechs felt themselves superior to the Slovaks; while in October 1990 61% of the respondents thought that the Czechs did not consider Slovaks to be equal partners; by January 1992 that percentage grew to 81%. An increasingly large number of people started to believe that the Slovaks had a losing relationship with the Czechs: in October 1990 this opinion was held by 43% of the population, in January 1992 this proportion grew to 55% and by April 1992 to 62% [*Slovensko* 1992].

These data indicate that in the period between the first and second parliamentary elections the feelings of injustice were gaining ground in the minds of the Slovak population. The demand for modifying the economic reform to be more sensitive to social issues and more responsive to the specific situation and national interests of Slovakia was finding greater and greater support. It may be legitimately assumed that it was the very ability to take advantage of this combination of arguments and demands in order to create a popular image for individual parties seeking electorate support which won the power struggle in Slovakia.⁵

⁵) For information on the development of the political scene in Slovakia after 1989 see, e.g. [Bútorová, Bútorová, Gyrafášová 1993]. Concerning other attributes of the political parties such as the social and demographic structure of their supporters, their value backgrounds, regional distribution of political preferences, etc. see [*Aktuálne* 1991, *Aktuálne* 1992, *Slovensko* 1992].



2. Image of the political parties and movements in the eyes of the voters: who promotes the interests of Slovakia?

One month before the election, in April 1992, the C.S.A. conducted an extensive study which made it possible to characterize the image individual parties had in the eyes of potential voters. The party image was drawn using several dimensions and methods: e.g., using pairs of contradictory statements expressing the political orientations of individual parties, their potential and the means they would use. Respondents were instructed to answer to each statement by indicating the parties or movements (maximum three) to which the given statement is most fitting. The following image dimensions and statement pairs were used.

a. Guarantee for economic prosperity:

positive: Their victory at the elections would bring economic prosperity to the country.

negative: Their victory at the elections would bring economic decline for the country.

b. Social sensitivity:

positive: They show their concern for ordinary people.

negative: They do not care about ordinary people.

c. Democratic attitudes:

positive: Their victory at the elections would guarantee democracy.

negative: If they win the election they will try to introduce a totalitarian regime.

d. Defending the interests of Slovakia:

positive: They defend the interests of Slovakia.

negative: They act against the interests of Slovakia.

e. Position on the common state:

positive: They are really concerned about safeguarding the common state.

negative: They pretend to be in favour of the common state, but the reality is different.

f. Tolerance to national minorities:

positive: They are tolerant to national minorities.

negative: They incite ethnic tensions.

g. Political means used:

positive: They tell the truth and are honest even if it may harm them.

negative: In the name of their power interests they do not hesitate to lie and to use improper political tactics.

h. Human potential of the party:

positive: They have enough capable politicians among them.

negative: They do not have enough capable politicians among them.

Which parties, in the eyes of the respondents, were viewed as the most typical holders of individual positive and negative characteristics? The following two tables outline the answer to this question.⁶

⁶) Positive and negative characteristics are represented by letters a - h in the above order where a = guarantee of economic prosperity, b = social sensitivity, etc. Percentages in brackets express the proportion of the respondents who relate the given statement to a specific party.

Explanation of abbreviations:

HZDS - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, formerly a part of the VPN (Public against Violence);

MOS - Hungarian Civic Party, formerly MNI (Hungarian Independent Initiative);

KDH - Christian Democratic Movement;

ODÚ - Civic Democratic Union, formerly VPN (Public against Violence);

SDĽ - Party of the Democratic Left, formerly KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia);

SDSS - Social Democratic Party of Slovakia;

SKDH - Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, formerly a part of KDH;

SNS - Slovak National Party;

Együttélés - Co-existence.

Table 1. Positive party image - parties with highest percentage

Characteristics	Order of the parties		
	1.	2.	3.
a.	HZDS (44)	SDL (19)	SDSS (15)
b.	HZDS (44)	SDL (28)	SDSS (19)
c.	HZDS (43)	SDL (21)	SDSS (21)
d.	HZDS (57)	SNS (44)	SKDH (22)
e.	ODU (20)	SDL (19)	SDSS (19)
f.	HZDS (21)	KDH (15)	SDSS (13)
g.	HZDS (38)	SDL (24)	SNS (17)
h.	HZDS (55)	SDL (30)	SNS (22)


Table 2. Negative party image - parties with highest percentage

Characteristics	Order of the parties		
	1.	2.	3.
a.	KDH (30)	ODÚ (22)	Együt. (21)
b.	KDH (34)	ODÚ (27)	SKDH (10)
c.	KDH (35)	SDL (20)	SNS (17)
d.	Együt. (34)	MOS (33)	KDH, ODÚ (23)
e.	KDH (35)	HZDS (16)	SKDH (14)
f.	SNS (37)	Együt. (36)	MOS (32)
g.	KDH (40)	ODÚ (27)	SKDH, SNS (15)
h.	KDH (22)	ODÚ (18)	Együt., MOS (16)

Let us have now a closer look at the image of individual parties (movements) which are listed according to the position they obtained in the election.

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS):

The victorious political movement represented primarily by the robust figure of its chairman, Vladimír Mečiar, attracted the voters with its argumentation containing elements of social demagogy and appealing emancipation rhetorics which aptly blurred the constitutional issue. The HZDS was unrivalled in gaining a positive image, although only 17% of the respondents considered the movement a guarantee for safeguarding the common state. This in no way scathed the widespread belief that the HZDS was the best defender of the Slovak interests. This finding gives clear evidence that already before the election the HZDS sympathizers did not see the survival of the common state any longer as a condition for the favorable economic, political and social development of Slovakia.




Party of the Democratic Left (SDL):

According to the respondents the greatest aspects of the SDL were seen in its social orientation and in its strong foundation of political personalities and specialists. By proposing a model of a "loose federation with elements of confederation," the SDL representation managed not to raise suspicion of holding extreme positions either in the direction of Czechoslovakism or Slovak nationalism. The SDL image changed beyond recognition during the last two years. Let us just remember that before the 1990 election the KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia), its predecessor, was the most strongly criticized and the most widely rejected party. [Bútorová, Rosová 1990].

Image of the SDL in the Eyes of the Slovak Population

(positive and negative characteristics – C.S.A., April 1992)




Slovak National Party (SNS):

The SNS pursued very straightforwardly the idea of an independent Slovakia practically since its formation and presented almost Janus-like opposite faces to the population: on the one hand, it projected the image of a defender of Slovak interests, on the other hand, it was considered to fuel ethnic tensions. The SNS image reflects the fact that throughout its existence it had a "monothematic" attitude - national and/or nationalistic - and its other features were much less distinct and recognizable for the population.


Image of the SNS in the Eyes of the Slovak Population

(positive and negative characteristics – C.S.A., April 1992)



Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH):

The KDH came to be recognized in the minds of people by its "moderate separatism": it was the first to come up with the concept "of a Slovak chair and star". The KDH declared its intention to divorce from the Czechs which, however, should be postponed to a more propitious moment. This idea, instead of coloring the image of the movement as a defender of Slovak interests, harmed its image. The KDH, personified by the Prime Minister J. Čarnogurský, carried the burden of the population's greatest aversion. A considerable number of people perceived the movement to be non-democratic (stirring wide and spread concern about "black totalitarianism" and objections to the abortion law) and to be incapable of guaranteeing economic prosperity or bearing the interests of the common people in mind.




Co-existence (Együttélés):

In accordance with the prevailing support for a Czecho-Slovak statehood among members of the Hungarian ethnic minority [Rosová, Bútorová 1992], the political leadership of these parties took a consistent pro-ČSFR stance. Citizens of Slovak nationality viewed the party as "Hungarian" and, consequently, as not to be trusted. Dominant among negative allegations was that the party acts against the interests of Slovakia. In this respect the Hungarian parties - just like before the first parliamentary election [Bútorová, Rosová 1990] - aroused more negative emotions than any other party.

Civic Democratic Union (ODÚ):

This party was the most consistent advocate for the common state and radical economic transformation. It was, however, deeply distrusted by the population. The most common objections included: lack of interest for ordinary people, the use

of illicit tactics, inadequate defense for the interests of Slovakia, and inability to secure economic prosperity. The ODÚ image is in sharp contrast with the unambiguously positive expectations connected to its predecessor, The Public against Violence [Bútorová, Rosová 1990] before the first parliamentary election. In the second parliamentary election it suffered a defeat and did not even obtain enough votes to gain a seat in the parliament.



3. Worries and hopes in the period of a crumbling federation


It seems as if ages have gone by since the pre-election poll had been taken. The pre-election prediction, by 32% of the Slovak population, that the common state would not survive was fulfilled; while the expectations of that such a possibility is completely ruled out, held by 46% of the Slovak population, proved to be false [Slovensko 1992].

In contrast to the accelerated pace that took the grand party politics, the rank-and-file Slovak citizens seemed to have frozen in a kind of entranced anticipation. The dismantling of the common state soon became *fait accompli*. As late as one month after the election, in July 1992, the IVVM survey indicated that 55% of the respondents called for the continuation of talks designed to safeguard the common state. In the eyes of the Slovak citizens, the responsibility lied with the politicians who should be brought to their senses; 79% of the respondents felt that "ordinary people would find a consensus if the politicians did not set people against each other". One month after the election 86% of the respondents were in favour of the referendum as the only possible and legitimate way of way of splitting the federation. But this wish remained unfulfilled [Signálne 1992].

And thus, only two months later, in September 1992, the research done by the Institute of Central European Studies, Comenius University, indicated that

only 18% of the respondents admitted it is possible to create a common federal state which would meet the expectations of both the Czech and the Slovak sides. At that time, the steps taken towards the SR's state independence were supported by 57% of the respondents, only 27% of whom had considered them as appropriate right from the beginning. The other 30% simply did not see any other possibility. In Slovakia 34% of the citizens verbally rejected action taken toward Slovak state independence.

Although the division of the ČSFR was taking place without any expressions for revolt or collective dissatisfaction, it was not greeted enthusiastically. According to ISS FM UKo data in September 1992, this process evoked an unambiguously positive response among only 27% of the respondents. Thirty six percent clearly had negative feelings, 22% mixed feelings and 15% were indifferent [Krivý 1992].



The way in which the supporters of the parliamentary parties experienced the breakup of the country essentially coincided with the distribution of their views concerning the best constitutional arrangement prior to the election, as represented in Figure 2. Positive feelings were observed most often among supporters of SNS and HZDS; on the contrary, negative feelings were found especially among the sympathizers for MKDH, Co-existence and KDH (the SDL sympathizers being close to the latter) [Krivý 1992].

The cheerless mood accompanying the split of the country is motivated by fears of social and economic difficulties. Compared to the pre-election period, the climate is palpably more pessimistic. Shortly before the election, 38% of the respondents hoped that the decline of the living standard would stop and 37% expected the unemployment rate to lower [Slovensko 1992]. Five months later, in September 1992, only one third of those optimists expected positive developments with respect to the standard of living and unemployment in the near future [Krivý

1992]. During the last month of the ČSFR existence, only 5% of the SR citizens expected an improvement in their social situation [Šoucová 1993]. This shift is probably due to the change in tone of the media and the leading HZDS figures; the latter, after having received power, abandoned their pre-election rhetorics and started to stress the need for sacrifice in the interest of building a new state. Appeals for unity and loyalty to the new state started to be voiced with increasing urgency. Warnings about "endangering the interests of the country" and "enemies of the Slovak people" grew increasingly louder. Unmistakable evidence of the violation of democratic principles appeared.

This may be one of the reasons for increased pessimism in relation to the prospects for political democracy, although the HZDS representatives adamantly deny to the media the occurrence of any signs of antidemocratic development. While in April 1992, 47% of the SR population expected the strengthening of democracy after the election [Slovensko 1992], in September less than 30% of the SR citizens predicted that the first year of Slovak independence would bring more freedom to the citizens and better TV and radio information [Krivý 1992].

It must be stressed however, that in spite of the growing pessimism in assessing the outlook for the independent Slovakia, practically no change has taken place in the Slovak population's affiliations with individual parties during the period between the election and the last days of the ČSFR. According to an investigation of the Slovak Bureau of Statistics, 82% of the former HZDS voters, and 79%, 76%, 74% of the former SNS, SDL, KDH voters, respectively, would have repeated their June decisions. It is therefore impossible to speak at this point about disappointed voters with HZDS. Rather, the HZDS leaders seem to have strengthened their image as pragmatic and determined professionals in the eyes of their voters because of their cooperation with the Civic Democratic Party during the split of the ČSFR.

A great many people have thus probably abandoned any possible critical evaluation of the victorious movement and supportive parties for the Slovak independence. It will be a period when many voters will be compelled to weigh their recent lack of anticipative thinking with their personal experience. The question as to where the confrontation of pre-election promises and expectations with post-election actions and realities will lead - to what political interpretations and political acts - remains open.

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Revolution for Whom?

Analysis of Selected Patterns of Intragenerational Mobility in 1989-1992

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Abstract: The question "*Who gets ahead and why?*" is one of the most frequent in sociology. It takes on special significance during periods of deeper social change, which are expected to alter the criteria of allocation of individuals to social positions and distribution of rewards. Post-communist transformation undoubtedly is a process evoking such kind of expectations. While in the long-term view, the question of "winners" and "losers" of post-communist transformation is more of a question of the *character* of social change and its general direction, from a short-term view more concrete question becomes more important: Who are those who have taken the process of transformation into their own hands, and who are those who used this process to their advantage in the transformation of their life chances? This paper is an attempt to shed more light on this issue with the analysis of recent survey data. The analyzed data comes from the first (1989) and second (1992) wave of the longitudinal study, "Family '89." Our analysis confirms the assumption that the greatest circulation occurs in the group of higher professionals, especially among those who were members of the Communist Party in 1989 or were in positions qualifying them as "cadres." Both of these attributes, i.e., membership in the Communist Party as well as membership in the "cadres" group in 1989, did significantly increase the chances for downward mobility, but these characteristics only very slightly affected chances for upward mobility. Despite this, it was precisely these two groups (especially the cadres) that had, in comparison with others, far higher chances to enter the group of entrepreneurs.

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1. Introduction

The question "*Revolution for whom?*" asked in connection with developments in Eastern Europe could evoke the idea that the authors plan to discuss widely the meaning and historical significance of political, economic and social changes started by the collapse of totalitarian regimes. As analytically oriented sociologists, we do not want to ask a rhetorical question that opens a wide area for noncommittal discussion of an undoubtedly attractive theme. Rather we wish to contribute to the understanding of one of the relevant and relatively clearly defined phenomena of post-communist transformation: intragenerational mobility prompted by changes in the political and economic system. From this standpoint it is obvious that the question asked in the title actually is an attempt at a more

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attractive formulation of an elementary question that stands behind the study of mobility and social stratification: "*Who gets ahead and why?*"

The question "*Who gets ahead and why?*" is one of the most frequent in sociology, at least from the time when Sorokin [Sorokin 1927] formulated it as a question of the functions of mobility and regularities of its development. Regardless of whether we are willing to accept a functionalist interpretation of social stratification and mobility, we can - we believe - agree with Sorokin in that the significance of "channels for vertical circulation" in society is comparable with the significance of "channels for blood circulation in the body" [Sorokin 1927: 180].

The question "*Who gets ahead and why?*" takes on special significance during periods of deeper social changes, which are expected to bring not only higher rates of mobility but also changes in the *criteria* of allocation of individuals to social positions, in other words a change in the stratification system. Post-communist transformation undoubtedly is a process bringing such kind of expectations. Sociologists view post-communist transformation above all as a process with the goal of renewing the vital but deeply eroded connections among abilities, performance, position and reward, a linkage that forms the foundation of the stratification systems of modern industrial and post-industrial societies and the foundation for the motivation of social behavior.

The question "*Who gets ahead during the period of post- communist transformation and why?*" therefore is a question whose legitimacy is rooted not only in general sociological theory but also in current discussion of the nature of the process of social transformation under way in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The answer to this question is neither universal nor simple. It is true that the countries in which this process is taking place had one strong, if not dominant, social denominator, i.e., a totalitarian political regime linked to egalitarian ideology. But at the same time it is evident that behind this common denominator were hidden a considerable number of economic, cultural and social differences with deeper historical roots - differences that come to the fore during a period of post-totalitarian transformation, when the bonds of the common denominator have loosened. Therefore, there is no doubt that any attempt at a simple interpretation of the transformation of the stratification system in Eastern Europe and the mobility linked to it would be incompatible with the nature of this process. An attempt by some sociologists to generalize observations of the post-totalitarian transformation of one specific social system (nation) to the entire post-communist "East" and/or derive the interpretation of social transformation from macro-economic theories of transition can only end in failure (see for example [Nee 1989, 1991]).¹

The interpretation of mobility and transformation of the stratification system in Eastern Europe is not and cannot be simple and "mono-paradigmatic." It is not possible simply to derive it from macro-economic theories (even if we are dealing

1) We mean above all macroeconomic theories of a transition from a model of centrally planned (redistributive) economy or from an economy of scarcity toward a free-market model (see for example [Kornai 1990]).

with theories undoubtedly robust and generally accepted). Complications arise because unlike "economic *transition*," "social *transformation*" is the combination of many - often conflicting - processes with different timing and temporality. All of these processes at any given moment form not only the objective state of social structure and stratification but also the ways this structure and its transformation are perceived and interpreted by various social groups. From a long-term perspective, post-communist transformation is a kind of social change during which a renewal of devastated universalism and deeper linkage of the stratification process with meritocratic principles of allocation and distribution occurs (see for example [Machonin 1992, Matějů 1991, 1993]). In the context of Sorokin's theory of mobility, post-communist transformation could be understood and analyzed as a process of gradual return from a situation of social disorder, indicated by, among other things, very low status consistency (Lenski) and low economic effectiveness to an economically more effective and modern social order, in which the processes of allocation, selection and distribution are based more on meritocratic principles and on principles of universalism. At the same time, however, it is possible to understand and analyze post-communist transformation as a process of disintegration of a relatively consistent system, regardless of the fact that its legitimacy was nearly exclusively of an ideological nature.

It seems that consensus as to the principal aim of the transformation process exists only in that it creates the basis for a new system legitimized by political democracy and by the effectiveness of the economy. The development of inequalities, social mobility, transformation of social structure and changes in the stratification system are questions either not addressed or taken as superfluous. This neglect corresponds with the idea that the answer to these questions is contained in the answer to questions related to the development of political and economic system. It is unwise to disregard the changes in mobility and social stratification during the critical time of post-communist transformation. To do so underestimates the fact that transformation of a social system and a change in the nature of social stratification are quite autonomous processes whose temporality is different from the temporality of transformation in a political and economic system, where the time between cause and effect often is much shorter. At the same time, both theory and history demonstrate that the relationship between an economic system and its effectiveness on the one hand, and the character of a stratification system, on the other, is complex but extremely close.

Three years that have passed since the collapse of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe is a too short period for results of sociological research to provide sufficiently reliable evidence in support of any general hypothesis about the development of mobility or the transformation of a stratification system. Nevertheless, there is certain evidence supporting of the hypothesis that post-communist transformation is widely understood as a process of increasing inequalities linked with departure from the "principles of equality of outcomes" (supported by redistribution) to the principle of "equality of opportunity" (linked with the principle of open competition). In other words, the transformation is generally interpreted as a process of the revitalization of consistency of

socioeconomic status, i.e. as the strengthening of ties between abilities, positions, productivity, reward and prestige. Analysis of data from several surveys carried out in Czechoslovakia in late 1991 [Matějů and Řeháková 1992] showed that despite a marked persistence of a low level of income differentiation and a certain opacity of emerging criteria of income differentiation [Večerník 1992], it was possible to draw a very distinct line between "winners" and "losers" of the transformation. In line with a popular understanding of the process of post-communist transformation, position of "winners" is held by individuals with social attributes which will increase positive life chances only in the event that the social system will evolve in the direction of more universalism and meritocracy.

However, if in the long-term perspective, the general question of "winners" and "losers" of post-communist transformation is more of a question of the *character and deep nature* of social change taking place in these societies, from a short-term view a number of specific questions arise: Who are those who have taken the process of transformation into their own hands, and who are those who used this process to their advantage in the significant improvement of their life chances? Mink and Szurek [1992] ask this question in two ways. First, they ask *"which social class was the revolution for?"*. And second, *"who has profited most from it so far?"* [Mink and Szurek 1992: 1-2]. For the first question, the answer is straightforward. The revolution was conducted in the first place in the name of a entrepreneurial class that did not exist at the time [Ibid.: 2]. The answer to the second question is then consequential: Profiting from the revolution are above all those who gradually constitute the entrepreneurial class, or - better said - those who have the best chance of getting into it.

Regarding recruitment of a class of entrepreneurs, one general and quite widespread hypothesis predicts a tendency for the former political elite to undergo a "reincarnation," e.g., a tendency to successfully transform the embodiment of political power into the embodiment of economic power. This issue is actually one of the few sociological hypotheses that receives journalistic treatment and thus also publicity. Basically, there exist two different, but not contradictory, methods of operationalization of this thesis and thus two approaches to their testing and verification. It can be expected that political scientists, in the interest of verifying the hypothesis about the presence and the success of the reconversion strategy, will narrow down the former elite to the very top of the pyramid of totalitarian political power. That will naturally boost the "contrast" of the results, but at the same time it will dramatically narrow the area for application of a quantitative approach to the analysis of this phenomenon and for a possible generalization of the results. On the contrary, sociologists oriented to the study of social stratification and mobility will be, in the interest of the application of traditional statistical procedures, less rigid in their definition of the elite. That undoubtedly will reduce the contrast of the obtained results and their monographic potential, but it will substantially strengthen the link of the hypothesis concerning reconversion strategies to more general theoretical hypotheses about the social role of various forms of capital, and their convertibility [Bourdieu 1986, Treiman and Szélenyi 1991, Matějů 1993].

This paper is an attempt to shed more light on this issue, with the help of analyses of recent survey data. Regarding theoretical context, we classify this paper among those exploring more general questions of development of a stratification system rather than questions that are the focus of political scientists studying the circulation of elites. In agreement with hypotheses formulated by Treiman and Szelenyi [1991] and with results arrived at by Matějů [1993], we will attempt to answer the following questions: To what extent is the intragenerational mobility characteristic of the first phase of post-communist transformation linked to political and especially social capital accumulated during a communist regime? Whether and with what mechanisms does conversion of capital occur? And how much do the specific mobility chances of those who possess various assets accumulated in the past differ from the mobility chances of individuals who lack these assets during a critical period of transformation.

Methodologically, however, this paper moves roughly through the center of the two abovementioned directions. This is not because we aim to move away from the claims that "stratificators" traditionally lay on quantitative analysis and methods of testing hypotheses, but rather because the empirical material we have at our disposal is specific and in this area of research rather unique. We verify the thesis of the conversion of capital (political and social to economic), that was formulated as a hypothesis about the significantly higher chances of former cadres and holders of political capital to enter the entrepreneurial class. This hypothesis will be tested on the data from a longitudinal study that was begun in Spring, 1989, before the collapse of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. It was continued on the same individuals in Spring, 1992, after two and a half years of post-communist transformation.² It is specifically the longitudinal nature of analyzed data and the speed of changes during the period of post-communist transformation that moves this paper into a specific position of quantitative analysis of individual biographies.

This analysis relies on two main concepts: the concept of various forms of capital and their convertibility, and a specific approach to the concept of vertical mobility. The concept of capital we are using is in agreement with an attempt to generalize the theory of capital for its use in sociology [Bourdieu 1986], primarily with one of its constitutive theses involving convertibility as one of the fundamental attributes of capital. This theoretical interpretation is implicitly contained even in hypotheses formulated by Szelenyi and Treiman [1991] for the study of the development of social stratification in Eastern Europe. Certain evidence in support of this theory was already found through analysis of data from the longitudinal research "Family 1989" [Matějů 1993], which showed that the position of former "cadres" in the "income space" does not worsen during transformation. It has been proved that members of this group are able to maintain, or even improve, the relatively advantageous position built in the past. Regarding the question of what tools former cadres of the socialist regime use to maintain their advantageous

² A closer characterization of the research project and data file is listed in the section "Data, Variables and Method."

standing in the income space, this analysis provided an answer, which is also in agreement with theoretical expectations. Former top cadres of a redistribution regime more often than others become members of the group of entrepreneurs, which is a strategy in which the social and political capital accumulated during the former regime is one of the things prominently evaluated.

As to vertical mobility, we believe that the post-communist transformation is fundamentally a process that forms or significantly modifies the vertical axis of social differentiation. One of the legacies of the past is that the answer to the question of who is "on top" and who "on the bottom" can differ significantly, depending on who is answering it and from what angle that person views the society, which criteria of success he or she applies, etc. This "schizophrenia" in understanding success and social verticals [Matějů 1991] will weaken in connection with the strengthening of value universalism, without which it is difficult to imagine an effectively functioning stratification system. For these reasons we supplemented *objective* indications of vertical mobility (movement between groups defined by the traditional classification EGP and movement along the axis of the hierarchy of formal authority and management) with some *subjective* dimensions of mobility (perceived change of one's position as "significant," personal testimony about functional ascent or descent, etc.). For our own analysis of mobility chances, we chose to examine the following five relevant categories: upward mobility, downward mobility, stability (actually no change in a given period of time), start of entrepreneurial activity as a parallel source of income, and move to the group of entrepreneurs (self-employment). The choice of these non-traditionally defined analytical categories reflects not only the specificity of the social situation in post-communist countries, but also limitations of a statistical nature that we will discuss later.

2. Data, Variables, Method

The analyzed data come from the first and second wave of the longitudinal research project, "Family '89," [Matějů, Tuček, and Rezler 1991]. At the beginning of 1989, when this project was launched, a survey of parents (i.e., people 40-50 years old) of 3,917 8th-graders was conducted.³ In this first wave of the longitudinal study in 1989, information was obtained about 2,709 families (response rate 73%). In Spring of 1992 a follow-up survey of parents was conducted, on a sub-sample of 2,518 families. The total response rate of the first follow-up reached 76%. For the purpose of analysis of adult respondents (individuals), the analytical sample was reduced in such a way that the proportion of men and women at least roughly corresponded to their proportion in the given age cohort. The reason for the reduction was the marked predominance of women among respondents during the

³ The sample was made in two stages: In the first step communities were chosen (in Prague also quarters), in the second step elementary schools within the communities were picked. In selected schools a survey all 8th grade students was conducted. Given the limited number families, the selection of communities went by criteria of proportional representation of various types of municipal and rural communities, or various types of municipal environments (working-class areas, housing estates, traditional higher status residential areas, etc.)

first wave of study in 1989.⁴ The reduction, by which the analytical data file of individuals (respondents in both 1989 and 1992) was created, was made by decreasing a number of women by additional random sampling. The resulting analytical file counts 1,298 cases. This group is limited by age: the average age is 44 years (mode 43 years) with a standard deviation of 5 years (75 percent of the group is within the interval of 40-50 years old). As for the social profile of the sample, we did not find any important deviations from the profile of the population of that age.

The questionnaire applied in 1989 contained a series of questions related to the social standing of both parents of a child (i.e., the respondent and partner), the social standing of the child's grandparents (parents of the respondent and partner) and intergenerational mobility of the parents (respondents). Further, membership and function of parents (respondents) in political parties and other organizations was recorded, as was their income, material standard of living, the extent of their involvement in the networks of contacts and informal exchange ("social capital"), etc. With regard to possibilities for analysis of intragenerational mobility, the questionnaire applied in 1992 was constructed largely symmetrically, which means it was oriented primarily to determining changes that occurred during the three-year period between the first wave and the 1992 follow-up.

The types of mobility were defined along the lines of so called EGP class schema [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992]. For substantive and statistical reasons (limited number of cases for higher order cross-tabulations) we worked from a somewhat reduced class schema: 1. higher professionals; 2. lower professionals - technicians; 3. routine non-manual workers; 4. skilled workers; 5. unskilled workers; 6. farm workers. In the first step we considered mobility as any kind of change in the respondent job that occurred between spring of 1989 and spring of 1992 in terms of the above classification, if the respondent qualified the change as significant or important change in his/her job or occupation. Considering the fact that the categories above can be considered as ordered (both in terms of socioeconomic status and prestige), upward or downward movement was clearly defined.

In the second step, we added to the group under mobility study also individuals who remained stable in terms of the above-listed categories but stated that significant change occurred in their placement in the hierarchy of formal authority or management (being named to a management position, transferred to a higher management function, complete loss of management position, descent to a lower management function, etc.)

⁴) At the time the first wave, it was not expected that parents would join their children in the follow-up surveys. Because the goal was to determine the main characteristics of families, no special emphasis was placed on proportional representation of men and women. Logically then, there were more women, because they were the easier part of the population to "catch." It was not until the end of 1989 when, prompted by the events of that period, the decision was made to conduct a follow-up survey of even the adult population.

In the third step, two special categories describing specific forms of mobility during the period of post-communist transformation were defined: the beginning of the parallel entrepreneurial activity, and entry into the group of entrepreneurs (self-employed). Given the goal of the analysis, these two attributes had clear precedence over others, which means they were used for "extraction" of cases regardless whether they were placed in one of the categories in the first two steps.

Variable "TYPMOB" defined by the procedure described above was our main dependent variable, with five values (1. downward; 2. no change; 3. upward; 4. parallel (part-time) entrepreneurship; 5. "full" entrepreneurship).

Other variables used in the analysis were defined in the following manner:

CADRE89: 1 = respondent in 1989 did not occupy a managerial position at all or did occupy such position at the lowest level; 2 = respondent in 1989 occupied a managerial position at the middle or highest level (i.e., from a managerial position on the level of heading a smaller plant or firm and higher, including a managerial position on the level of a district or county National Committee, at a university, in a hospital, in a larger research institution, on the level of a regional National Committee, directorship of a large state firm, on the level of a deanship of a university or on the level of other central organs, etc.).

CLASS_3: "class" - a special variable created for logit models: 1 = higher professional; 2 = lower professional; 3 = other.

PARTY: 1 = respondent was not a member of the Communist Party in 1989; 2 = respondent was a member of the Communist Party in 1989.

With respect for the goals of the analysis and the nature of the data we applied logit models. Because the dependent variable (TYPMOB) was not dichotomous, a general multinomial logit model was chosen as the most appropriate analytical tool. Odds of downward or upward mobility, odds of parallel entrepreneurship and "full" entrepreneurship were defined as ratios of the probability that the respective event occurred to the probability that respondent remained stable.⁵ All calculations were performed by the procedure **LOGLINEAR** (a generalized logit model with the contrasts **SIMPLE[2]** for variable **TYPMOB** and **REPEATED** for variables **CADRE89**, **CLASS_3** and **PARTY**) within the statistical package **SPSS**. Descriptions of the models and applied equations are provided in the appendix.

3. Results of the analyses

From 1,300 analyzed cases (men and women), 68% were stable, 8% underwent downward mobility, 10% experienced upward movement, 6% declared parallel entrepreneurship and 8% declared a shift to full entrepreneurship. As for marginal frequencies of "strategic" independent variables, the data from 1989 identify 26% of respondents as members of the Communist Party and 10% as "cadres" (individuals holding in 1989 managerial position at the middle and high levels of

⁵) Reader should not confuse this meaning of "odds" defined for the purpose of logit analysis with its usage to mean just a probability of a particular event.

state administration and "redistributive" bureaucracy). These relatively small marginal frequencies posed serious limitations on testing more complex (multidimensional) logit models. For this reason, instead of testing just one complex model, which would have had a very low or even zero frequencies in a number of cells of a hypothetical classification, we had to create a final picture of different chances for certain types of mobility from results obtained from several rather simple models, which provided more reliable (stable) parameter estimates.

All of the tested models assumed that for the first phase of post-communist transformation, intragenerational mobility is more likely for members of upper status groups (service class, professionals, etc.) than for middle and lower status individuals. This assumption proved to be justified. The first model tested (MODEL I), with two independent variables: "class" (CLASS_3 and membership in the Communist Party (PARTY), confirmed that indeed there is a certain "line of calmness," that is, a boundary separating rather mobile from rather stable part of the population. In line with our expectations, this line is located between higher professionals and others (table 1).

Table 1. Probability of selected mobility patterns by class (reduced classification) and party membership in 1989. Estimated percentages from MODEL I

CLASS_3	PARTY	Type of mobility				
		downward move	stable	upward move	part-time entre- preneur	full-time entre- preneur
higher professions	no	12.36	56.97	8.70	8.69	13.28
	yes	26.55	42.76	6.53	14.20	9.97
lower professions	no	4.55	73.57	11.24	3.81	6.84
	yes	11.53*	65.13*	9.95	7.35	6.05
other	no	4.55	73.57	11.24	3.81	6.84
	yes	11.53*	65.13	9.95	7.35	6.05

*) Adjusted residual for this cell exceeded value ± 1.96

Statistics of model fit: $\chi^2 = 15.791$, $df = 15$, $p = .396$


Source: Longitudinal project "Family '89"

While in the group of professionals the given model predicts only 53% of those who remained stable, with lower professionals (as with "others") the predicted proportion of stable exceeds 71%. In agreement with laymen's expectations is the fact that former party members generally are more mobile than non-party members. The presented model predicts, for example, that among higher professionals, nonparty members 57% were stable, whereas among party members only 43% remained at the positions they held in 1989. Also not surprising is the finding that higher professionals, especially if they were members of the party, have an unusually strong tendency to descend. The preferred model predicts 27% downwardly mobile in the group of higher professionals - party members and only



12% descending among higher professionals who were not members of the party. The odds of downward move was 3.5 times greater for higher professionals than for others. However, in contrast with general belief and even in contrast with some analyses conducted in other countries [Kolosi and Rona-Tas 1992] is the finding that party membership has not been a significant barrier to upward intragenerational mobility between 1989 and 1992. That applies even to the group of higher professionals (where - according to the definition - belong not only professionals but also managers, directors and their deputies, chiefs of departments, etc.). The tendency to upward mobility (obviously in higher professionals represented only by "functional" ascent) is not significantly different for former party members and nonparty members. Our model predicts this tendency as identical for all groups considered (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Mobility chances (logits): higher professionals and party members



The reference category for logits is "stability"
For description of logit model see Appendix 1.



Tendency toward entrepreneurship dominates among higher professionals. The odds of entrepreneurship are 2.5 times greater for members of this class than for others. However, it is interesting that former party members more often choose parallel entrepreneurship (i.e., entrepreneurship with "insurance" in the form of a continuing employee status). The odds of parallel entrepreneurship is 2.2 times greater for former party members than for others, whereas entrepreneurship without this "insurance" doesn't show this difference.

It is generally believed that communist-party membership in itself functioned more as a certain "protection" than a reliable tool of success, defined either by holding a position in the power structure or a position endowed with significant redistribution power. To what extent the membership in the former group of

"cadres" (regardless of party membership) was a source of different life chances during transformation is shown by parameters of a second model (MODEL II). Dependent variables remained the same as in the first model ("chances" of individual types of mobility), whereas for independent variables the membership in the group of former "cadres"⁶ was added alongside the variable "class." The plausibility of the above assumption was confirmed by an overall test of the model as well as estimated parameters (table 2, figure 2).

Table 2. Probability of selected mobility patterns by class (reduced classification) and "cadre" membership in 1989. Estimated percentages from MODEL II

CLASS_3	CADRE	Type of mobility				
		downward move	stable	upward move	part-time entre- preneur	full-time entre- preneur
higher professions	no	15.86	56.67	8.00	9.56	9.91
	yes	20.93	30.11	9.63	14.68	24.65
lower professions	no	6.03	73.76	10.42	4.35	5.45
	yes	9.95	49.04	15.69	8.35	16.97
other	no	6.03*	73.76	10.42	4.35	5.45
	yes	9.95	49.04	15.69	8.35	16.97

*) Adjusted residual for this cell exceeded value -1.96

Statistics of model fit: $\chi^2 = 10.823$, $df = 13$, $p = .626$


Source: Longitudinal project "Family '89"

It is again evident that odds of downward move for higher professionals who simultaneously can be qualified as members of the group of former cadres are clearly the highest. The model predicts in this special group only 30% stable and more than 20% descending. But the model also demonstrates that for former cadres, the way up was not blocked any more than for others. On the contrary, their odds of ascent were 2.3 times greater than for others, regardless of membership in the group of higher professionals or others. In addition a former higher professional today has a 2.4 times greater chance of appearing in the group of private entrepreneurs than does someone else. The odds of becoming entrepreneur for a former "cadre" is nearly five times (4.7) higher than for "non-cadre" (regardless of whether he/she was a higher professional or not). This finding is very close to the general belief of the significant flexibility of representatives of the former regime, and their ability (even the appropriate

⁶) It is necessary to explain how it is possible that the group of "cadres" is not completely contained in the group "higher professionals." The definition of variable CADRE allows that an individual held a managerial position at the highest level (e.g., on the level of a regional National Committee), but he/she was not classified among the top professionals nor among the top management personnel. We worked from the assumption that redistributive power and thus also social capital of certain officials was higher than in the case of some top professionals in management positions.

"equipment") to "make their own" even a system growing from the ruins of the one in which they formerly ruled. The general tendency of this group toward entrepreneurship is evident even from the odds of parallel entrepreneurship, which for former cadres is again nearly three times higher than for others.

Figure 2: Mobility chances (logits): professionals and cadres



The reference category for logits is "stability"
For definition of logit model see Appendix 1.



The greater importance of being a "cadre" rather than a normal member of the Communist Party for mobility in all relevant directions is also apparent from the last tested model (MODEL III), in which we placed side by side among independent variables membership in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1989 and membership in the group of cadres. The odds of downward movement were about the same for party members as for cadres (2.7 and 2.1 times higher, respectively, than for individuals without these attributes), but upward mobility was far more likely for former cadres (2.2 times higher in relation with others) than for "common" party members, who in this respect did the same as nonparty members (see figure 2). As far as the entrepreneurship is concerned, parallel as well as pure, it is a far more likely strategy for cadres than for regular party members. The odds of becoming an independent entrepreneur (full time) were roughly the same for party members and nonmembers, but nearly five times higher (4.8) for cadres than for others.


Table 3. Probability of selected mobility patterns by party and "cadre" membership in 1989. Estimated percentages from MODEL III

PARTY	CADRE	Type of mobility				
		downward move	stable	upward move	part-time entre- preneur	full-time entre- preneur
no	no	5.42	73.27	10.54	4.34	6.43
	yes	7.48	48.94	15.66	7.35	20.56
yes	no	13.01	64.52	9.28	7.52	5.66
	yes	17.01	40.78	13.05	12.04	17.13

Statistics of model fit: $\chi^2 = 3.756$, $df = 6$, $p = .710$

Source: Longitudinal project "Family '89"

Figure 3: Mobility chances (logits): cadres and party members.



The reference category is "stability"
For definition of logit model see Appendix 1



4. Discussion

The analysis focused on mobility patterns generally considered characteristic for the first period of post-communist transformation. Our look at these mobility patterns focused particularly on differences in mobility chances between groups that are for a number of reasons the focus of political scientists and sociologists studying development in post-communist countries. Most importantly, under observation are former "nomenklatura cadres," regular members of the Communist Party and also higher professionals - groups in which one can expect the greatest circulation mobility.

Our analysis confirmed the hypothesis that the greatest circulation prompted by the transformation of society occurs in the group of higher professionals and especially those members of the group who were members of the Communist Party in 1989 or were in positions qualifying them as "cadres." Both of these attributes, i.e., membership in the Communist Party as well as membership in the "cadres" group in 1989, did significantly heighten the chances for downward mobility (and that practically regardless of what group the individual belonged to), but these characteristics only very slightly affected chances for upward movement. It cannot be said, therefore, that former party members or former cadres face significantly bigger obstacles than others on their "way up." Despite this, it was precisely these two groups (especially the cadre group) that had, in comparison with others, far higher chances to enter the group of entrepreneurs. The difference between regular party members and cadres stemmed from the fact that the regular party members - apparently in the spirit of their "safeguarding" life strategy - tended to choose rather "parallel entrepreneurship," while "cadres" moved to the new entrepreneurial class as its "full time" members. Membership in the group of cadres (regardless of membership in the party) turned out to be a far more important factor in this particular strategy for getting ahead than just membership in the Communist Party.

The question of how to interpret these facts remains open. It seems that Djilas' "new class" of the old regime or the class of "redistributors" in the interpretation of Szelényi accumulated sufficient capital (economic, social, cultural, etc.), which is now promptly being converted to advantageous positions that enable extensive reproduction of this accumulated capital. Our analysis, similar to analysis of strategies of economic success based on the same data [Matějů 1993] significantly supports Treiman's and Szelényi's theory of the role of various assets and their convertibility during post-communist transformation and gives further arguments in support of rejecting Nee's simplifying theory of "market transition" [Nee 1989, 1991].

When applying a simple causal interpretation of complex social phenomena and historical processes, there is always the danger of false correlations. That is why we must always consider the possibility of the existence of a third common cause of two phenomena, whose strong relations tempt a causal interpretation. One of the clues, which we should not lose sight of in connection with this, is the possibility of certain specific dispositions toward success as part of a personality profile, dispositions "correctly" ruling what tools of success to choose under what conditions. That which can appear as convertibility of capital, whose analysis is recommended by Treiman and Szelényi [1991], or as the success of "reconversion" strategies, which Mink and Szurek discuss [1991], could be the result of certain predispositions and strong motivations to always be on top. Predispositions of this type at the same time could have strong intergenerational ties, and they could be stronger than moral imperatives, which might block the use of certain mobility channels under certain conditions. If so, the difference between the "circulation" and "reproduction" hypothesis about the changes of elites during post-communist

transformation [Treiman and Szelenyi 1991] might not be as great as their authors presume. That is a question we are not yet able to answer.

For reasons discussed in the introduction, we cannot yet formulate general conclusions about the nature of the transformation of the stratification system in post-communist countries, nor about generally true answers to questions about processes of the circulation of elites in Eastern Europe. The meaning of a given factor of mobility can seldom be reliably judged from the perspective of a short period of time. So far it is not possible for objective reasons (the short duration of a such profound social change, the lack of large data sets, etc.) to conduct even routine analyses of the development of mobility. Despite this, we believe that the results we present in this paper can contribute to the understanding of the process of social transformation occurring in eastern Europe, or at least a more precise formulation of questions for further analysis.

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Appendix: Specification of logit models

In this section symbols i, j, k are related to the categories of the variables CLASS_3, CADRE and PARTY respectively. The scores x_i, y_j, z_k in the equations are equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} x_i &= \begin{aligned} &2, \quad i = 1 \text{ (CLASS_3 = higher professional)} \\ &-1, \quad i = 2 \text{ (CLASS_3 = lower professional)} \\ &-1, \quad i = 3 \text{ (CLASS_3 = other)} \end{aligned} \\ y_j &= \begin{aligned} &1, \quad j = 1 \text{ (CADRE = no)} \\ &-1, \quad j = 2 \text{ (CADRE = yes)} \end{aligned} \\ z_k &= \begin{aligned} &1, \quad k = 1 \text{ (PARTY = no)} \\ &-1, \quad k = 2 \text{ (PARTY = yes)} \end{aligned} \end{aligned}$$

MODEL I:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(n_{1ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -1.83935 + 0.41842x_i - 0.52593z_k \\ \ln(n_{3ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -1.87904 \\ \ln(n_{4ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -2.21092 + 0.35972x_i - 0.38900z_k \\ \ln(n_{5ik}/n_{2ik}) &= -2.06945 + 0.30665x_i \end{aligned}$$

All coefficients in the equations are statistically significant. The model returns three significant adjusted residuals in the following three cells: "downward * lower professional * member of the Communist Party," "downward * others * member of the Communist Party," and "no change * lower professional * member of the Communist Party". We examined two additional models that added two effects to the first equation: first there was the effect that distinguished between lower professionals and "others" and second there was a combination between this effect and the effect of the membership in the Communist Party. Both models improve fit and decrease the adjusted residuals in question, but the coefficients of the additional effects are not statistically significant. Consequently, we chose the simplest model that was acceptable.

MODEL II:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(n_{1ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.63927 + 0.41039x_i - 0.45481y_j \\ \ln(n_{3ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.54839 - 0.40893y_j \\ \ln(n_{4ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.95018 + 0.35054x_i - 0.53071y_j \\ \ln(n_{5ij}/n_{2ij}) &= -1.54625 + 0.28711x_i - 0.77200y_j \end{aligned}$$

All coefficients in the equations are statistically significant. The model returns one significant adjusted residual in the cell "downward * others * cadre = no". The competing model evokes another effect in the first equation that distinguishes odds between lower professionals and "others." This significantly improves fit and decreases the adjusted residual in question, but the coefficient of the added effect is not significant. Consequently, we again chose the simpler model.

MODEL III:


$$\ln (n_{1jk}/n_{2jk}) = -1.73956 - 0.36330y_j - 0.50165z_k$$

$$\ln (n_{3jk}/n_{2jk}) = -1.53909 - 0.39965y_j$$

$$\ln (n_{4jk}/n_{2jk}) = -2.02261 - 0.46478y_j - 0.33788z_k$$

$$\ln (n_{5jk}/n_{2jk}) = -1.65027 - 0.78277y_j$$

All coefficients are statistically significant, and the model returns no significant adjusted residual.



I'VE BEEN ON THE ROAD TO EUROPE FOR ALREADY THREE YEARS, BUT I DIDN'T KNOW IT WAS THE
BALKAN ROAD.

The Welfare "Mix" on the Way to Welfare Universalism

Socialist and Non-Socialist Institutional Regimes

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Abstract: This paper is an attempt at theorizing on institutional welfare state regimes. It is argued that now, as a consequence of the coming "chaotic" post-modern era, a simultaneous growth of mass character and individualized social lives will occur, once modern welfare institutional regimes cease to be appropriate "representations" of most urgent welfare conflicts. The way to institutional universalism has become complicated. Social security claims based on the status of a "citizen" on the one hand and on the status of an "employee" on the other hand need to be reconciled in a way. Two fundamental ways of mixing these two statuses and related technologies (social assistance and social insurance principles) - i.e. two ways of keeping the universal character of basic social security schemes - are discussed.

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Perhaps it is not by chance that state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe has fallen just in the period of "new uncertainty" for welfare states in the West. It seems socialism has its own "global history" and this history is related to the history of industrialization. But while the crisis of the industrial institutional regime in the West is something which is concerned to particular institutional systems (and welfare schemes are probably those of the most important examples), then in communist Europe the societal instrumentality was affected by this crisis as a whole.

i.

Peter Abrahamson [1989] labels the welfare state form of today as a time of "new uncertainty". He also mentions other definitions correlating to the debate about welfare in the eighties which describe, basically, the same phenomenon: "the new dis-transparency", "the new interminability", "non-synchronism", and generally, "post-modernism" (see also [Williams 1992]). What does this mean?


The vision of the linear development of society, particularly of the welfare state, is being discredited [Flora 1986]. The welfare state is not regarded merely as a "problem solver" anymore - it has become a "problem creator" as well (see [Heidenheimer, Heclo, Adams 1990]). Doubt is cast upon traditional labour-

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market views [Boje 1990] and the role of the labour market in constituting welfare institutions. The same can be said about the view of the state and its role. Instead of a "welfare state", we often now talk about "welfare society" [Wiman 1987]. Each welfare regime offers its own concept of welfare citizenship, i.e. the concept of access to participation in community life or in the state [Taylor-Gooby 1991]. Discussions are being held about the harmonization between the public and the private sectors [Olsson 1988; Kangas, Palme 1990, 1991; Ireland 1990], the layman and professional principles and the participative and paternalistic principles [Titterton 1992]. The relativist principle of justice and absolute samaritan principle of the welfare state are also discussed [Pemberton 1990]. The citizen's rights concept is balanced by the citizen's responsibility principle - as introduced by the New Right and discussed by many others (see e.g. [Piachaud 1991]). The ambitious New Right has been discovered as, in fact, the "old" one [Taylor-Gooby 1989]. The New Left is criticized for being too "new", i.e. disloyal to the "good old" statist ideals [De Deken 1992]. The fall of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe only crowned this "uncertainty" and added to the general doubts about established concepts.

De-bureaucratization, pluralization, de-centralization, privatization, flexibility, diversity, complexity, reciprocity, subsidiarity (as a hierarchically ordered solidarity) are becoming the mottoes of the day at the same time as social citizenship, harmonization, universality (see [Abrahamson 1989; Flora 1990; Olsson 1988; Spicker 1991; Stoesz 1989; Williams 1992] and many others). A kind of "welfare mix" comes out victorious: everything is permitted, or rather recommended - the best solution is to pick a piece from every system. The evolution is based on a maximal combination of different sides of the issues. It is no wonder the models of different welfare regimes resemble each other more and more, as suggested by many people. Abrahamson [1991] draws attention to the contraction of the welfare triangle:



[Abrahamson 1991]

These three concepts are correlating more and more closely with regards to welfare, bringing the European "North", "South", "East" and "West" closer together. In a similar way the "three worlds of welfare capitalism" by Esping-Andersen [1990] are brought closer together. The concepts of social insurance (the conservative "German" model), of social assistance (the "U.S." liberally residual model) and of social democracy (the "Swedish" universal model) are increasingly combined [Esping-Andersen, Micklewright 1991].

If that is not enough, in the framework of such a great "confusion" Europe also gets "Americanized" at the same time as a "Brazilianization" of the U.S. social structure can be seen stemming from its welfare policy. In essence this means that a totally unaware Europe gets "Americanization" the Latin way [Navarro 1987]. West-European countries suddenly become disturbed when they realize that outside of the "West to East" export there is also a kind of "East to West" invasion and that the "colonialization" goes both ways. When the representatives of E.C. countries got together, two years before the final market unification, to set down basic principles for future social policy in Europe, the result was hesitancy over a lack of ideas [Pieters 1991] - what a nice example of post-industrialization breaking down Great Ideas! What lies behind the pressures that induce such an evolution?

ii.

Our once standardized industrial society has developed step-by-step such "technologies" so that a wide array of individual variations has become comparatively "cheap" and possible. A new incongruence of life-styles and individual destinies has come into mass practice and cloaked such differences between people that can be defined in terms of abstract "absolutely relative" states (institutionalized positions, situations or stages). In this way, people are becoming rather "relatively absolute"; the relativity by which the institutions are related to the world-life gradually becomes more refined and complicated.

In terms of social structure, the situation has been described as "fragmentation of stratification" [Clark, Lipset 1991]. Emphasis is now placed on the perspective of an individualized life-course projection ([Alan 1989; Kohli 1986; Rowland 1991] and others). Hugues de Jouvenel [1988] put it concisely when he said:

...we are witnessing a rapid diversification of forms and status of jobs, and a no less rapid diversification of family models, and, to complicate things, each individual during his or her lifetime will increasingly often change jobs, and family models.

Such a post-industrial reality understandably creates a crisis for the industrial institutional regime. The institutional road to universality has become complicated.

What is the matter then in contemporary societies?

- 1) We live more and more in an "abstract" way; we use more and more impersonal institutions. What I have in mind, among other, things are various artificial "languages", formalized labour and commodity market systems, mass media, or just social security schemes. These institutions are, at least formally, more and more universally accessible, irrespective of age, sex, family type, race, etc.
- 2) We live increasingly in a "cheaper" way, too. It is more and more inexpensive to manage our own destiny: it is increasingly easier to divorce or to have children out of marriage, or to keep a regular sexual life and, at the same time, not have children at all, or to marry twice or three-times. It is increasingly easier to apply for some educational degree even after 50 years of age or, even as a child, to gain, in principle, universal access to various information and to the patterns of communication uncontrolled by parents. People, nearly "without notice", control

their life styles more and more in such a way that their life courses are more and more individualized and varied in regard to content, succession order and timing of individual situations.

- 3) However, perhaps most importantly, all this is happening simultaneously: we are moving personally, "privately", more and more freely - toward an impersonal universality (to the universality of institutes and institutions of modern societies). We are moving (in a certain sense more and more personalized within the time of our private lives) toward the impersonality of "states" and measures we are gauged, rewarded, protected and also "socially secured" as "children", "parents", "women", "men", "employees", "citizens", "poor" or "rich" [Konopásek et al. 1992]. Compared with the heydays of industrialism, we have stronger claims on the specificity of our way of life; we want to do and to live as we, personally, like. At the same time, however, we ask the world to hold together thanks to the cheapest, simplest, universally accessible and non-discriminative institutions. The question of "universality" of institutions is approached in this sense: how to make all of us, in our variability and diversity, equal before the institutions but - note! - only according to them.

iii.

In a society starting to wrench out of the standardized parameters of industrial expansion, both basic statuses of "citizen" and "employee" (as main "access-statuses" to, or "claim-bases" for the basic social security schemes) start to erode under the pressure of the contradictions mentioned above. A traditional institutional regime built on citizenship or, on the other side, on formal participation in the labour market have ceased to be sufficient for the demands for variable and flexible criteria:

- 1) Quite a number of people get in a situation during their lives, mostly temporarily, when they are excluded from the status of an "employee", either formally or informally, against their will or on purpose. While it is often difficult to predict when exactly, quite a number of people get, sometimes as "employees", in a weakened, disadvantageous position, where they are excluded from the universality of claims, following from this status. (Brose [1989], for instance, provides a nice analysis of some employment-deviations that can no longer be called "marginal".)
- 2) On the other hand, it is difficult to relate the status of a "citizen" to an individualized project like one's life course. The "citizen" has no unique career, unlike the "employee". "Citizen" inevitably remains an absolutely-relative category. Only the life career of the "employee" can bring a "private" time dimension into the basic institutional concept of a beneficiary.

I would like to emphasize once more that, in this sense, today both statuses fail to a certain degree. Both the "employee" and the "citizen" status are inadequate, though many western specialists in the welfare field often place so much hope in the latter concept ([Balbo 1990; Dahrendorf 1988, 1990; De Deken 1992; Lister 1990], generally all followers of "basic income", Social Democrat social policy experts etc.). Nevertheless, these same authors usually realize very well how both statuses

are interconnected and bound together genealogically and structurally. Their interdependence is well-demonstrated e.g. in the recent short paper on market and democracy by Myles [1990].

iv.

On the other hand, however, it seems as if the need for both status-bases is increasingly urgent.

1) In accordance with an increasing control over their life courses and styles, people put greater stress on such aspects of social security schemes which, above all, help to keep the income standard they are used to individually. The source of this kind of standard is generally the status of a participant in the labour market - as an "employee". Social security then works as a public service that helps individuals and their families to control the arbitrariness of the course of events. The technological principles of "social insurance/earnings related" benefits correspond to this dimension.

2) Besides, it is also necessary to ensure some basic minimal standard for all. The source of this kind of standard is generally the status of "citizen". In such a case, "social assistance/means-tested" ("need" related) benefits represent the most used technological principle - within E.C. countries it is usually G.M.I.

According to Jallade [1990], one way to a new legitimacy for the welfare state consists of the technological reconciliation of just these two requirements. And, the way to such a reconciliation is often seen in various forms of "mixing" both fundamental claim-bases of welfare redistribution and corresponding criteria related to "private standards" on the one hand or to "public minima" on the other.

v.

The combination of these basic criteria is not something new, of course. When assessing someone's situation within an everyday-life perspective, we usually consider both of these "dimensions of poverty" (i.e. both deprivation in relation to a previous "private standard" and to the generally recognized "public minimum") spontaneously together, as one. Sometimes the former prevails, sometimes the latter; nevertheless, we usually do not strictly distinguish, in a purely abstract way, one from another. In the same way as the two basic points of view that relate to these abstract dimensions cross in everyday perception, they also cross and merge to a certain level even within traditional benefit schemes. "Social insurance" often takes some features of "social assistance". Dealing with a typology of social security benefits Berghman [1991] writes:

Because of social, solidaristic aims, (social insurance type, in principle a contribution, or earnings related - Z. K.) benefits are to some extent made subject to guaranteed minimum levels and to upper ceilings and are calculated in ways that are partially or entirely independent of contribution levels and records and of the individual or categorical risk.

This way the social insurance benefits are also partly related to ensuring some target state, some "purpose" (accordingly to Hayek's [1973] distinction between the principle- and purposefulness-based criteria). In other words, at the same time as

the principle "for the reason that..." functions, the principle "in order to..." is considered as well. "Social assistance", on the other hand, sometimes has a tendency to become similar to an individualized contingency-based aid of the social insurance type.

Now, the "mixing" of both criteria is becoming an explicit requirement and even a hope for the future. At each particular step, an "employee" should always be simultaneously and immediately secured, at least partly, even as a "citizen" and vice versa.

vi.

The concept of "universal" (e.g. [Esping-Andersen, Micklewright 1991]), or "demogrant" type [Berghman 1991] benefits represents one of the definitely formed results of this trend. This type of benefit embodies the total confusion of both already-defined traditional types. It is now commonly mentioned with the benefits of the social assistance type and the social insurance type. As such, it is generally accepted as a desirable way to universality and it represents one of the main characteristics of the Social Democrat welfare model. The character of the "universal" benefit is designated as a "combination" of social assistance and social insurance principles, as Berghman [1991], for example, writes:

In schemes of the demogrant type a combination of the insurance and assistance approach is worked out. Financed by public money, as social assistance schemes are, schemes of this type grant benefits when a particular social contingency occurs. Yet, in line with what happens in social insurance schemes no testing of need, c.q. of income or means, takes place. This particular combination accounts for the fact that demogrant aim at a minimum level of protection, are flat rate and are set up for social contingencies the victims of which beyond all doubt are considered to be deserving...

Thus, when providing "universal" benefits neither the situation of the total family income in relation to the "public minimum" concept nor the changes within the "private standard" of the family are directly taken into account. Again, the final consequence is that a "universal" benefit is given as if "for the reason that (...a contingency occurred and the situation worsened)" but at the same time "in order to (...make the situation better)". They are neither means-test-based nor "targeted" in the sense of social insurance. The two basic traditional criterial perspectives are mixed, confused.

Simply, certain "contingencies" in themselves are taken as starting points and declared as universal situations of "need", without any actual regard to whether a standard of this or that type is really endangered. The principle behind this benefit type is that every citizen who gets in a certain situation will receive a unified, flat-rate benefit, regardless of anything else. It is simply supposed that certain contingencies lead to endangering the income situation.

The inadequacy of such an approach for contemporary societies lies in the above-mentioned fact: people form their life course projects more and more individually, making it less and less adequate to use overall presuppositions for

answering questions as: "what will become of the family standard of living if he/she...?"

An interesting point is that such "mixing" of both statuses strengthens even more their inherent individualistic logic, or even better, does not weaken it. How does this come about? Generally, there are two possibilities of how to, at least partly, involve the "family" concept in formulating the principal "addressee" of basic social security benefit schemes and in that way lower their atomizing effect:

- 1) the "family" can be seen as a "situation set of citizens" - when regarding the "public minimum" dimension of need, as in the case of G.M.I.
- 2) When regarding the need for stabilization of the "private standard", i.e. in the case of social insurance technology, the "family" can be seen as a "set of individual life courses", and then, each of the life courses involved can separately and independently represent a "family" in all particular cases of family income deprivation.

However, considering the "addressee" concept with regard to the "universal" (demogrant) type of benefit, neither the former nor the latter view of the family can strictly be taken into account. What remains as a criterion basis is a sole individual and his or her atomized present situation. Thus, not only the weaker "states" or people's "situations" are discriminated against but also everything that does not fit into the industrial logic "of the attack against the concept of indivisibility" [Toffler 1981]. Hence, everything that resists the logic of an absolutely-relative individual - "industrial man".

It should be emphasized that, in practice, all fixed-minimum components of social insurance (in principle, earnings-related) generally benefits work in a very similar way as "pure" demogrant-type benefits. Both these "minimums" and demogrant benefits are guaranteed to all, or nearly all, on the same level, regardless of what receiver's present "private standard" is. On the other hand, neither is the household/family-unit perspective of assessing "need" taken into account.

vii.

In contrast to these attempts at "mixing" the "citizen" and "employee" bases together in constructing particular benefits, another tendency is evident: the tendency to make clear-cut and to define more precisely the two statuses and relating technological principles. As an example, we can use not only the explicit emancipation of the "citizen" status within current social security conceptions, or, in Europe the almost generally introduced scheme of Guaranteed Minimum Income (see [Abrahamson 1991]). One can also look, on the other hand, at an expansion of private social insurance schemes as a reaction to the unwillingness and inability of the public sector to take clients' personal income standards into account [Esping-Andersen, Micklewright 1991]. There is no doubt that such a parallel crystallization of both statuses is, in its final general effects, a sort of "welfare-mixing" as well.

Hence, the situation is very ambiguous. As one can notice, two peculiarly contradictory ways to solve the described institutional crisis appear: one aims for a new type of benefit (within the old systems), the other for a new type of benefit system using clear-cut traditional forms of benefits. Social insurance criteria and social assistance criteria are becoming in this sense more and more separate from each other, and thus more and more usable as counterparts. They can act as if within only one two-component system without losing their essence. In other words: you have a "welfare mix" which is embodied in every particular tool on the one hand, versus a "welfare mix" as an instrumental system. Taking this into consideration, not all mixes are alike. The former case represents a merger and thus an inner destruction and emptying of both "citizenship" and "employment" bases and corresponding technologies within the construction of a single benefit, establishing a revolutionary new claim-basis. The latter represents a precise distinguishing between both traditional principles and the clarity of their outlines, i.e. a new "parallel" usage.

"Welfare mix" has been usually perceived only in terms of a diversification of social policy subjects, i.e. in terms of state vs. market vs. voluntary sectors, or in terms of combining different political concepts [Evers, Wintersberger 1990]. This paper is an attempt, however, to understand it more generally as a conflict of various bases of universality. Such a conflict involves:

- a) two basic, "relative", institutional bases (the status of an "employee" and the status of a "citizen"), i.e. those that interconnect people impersonally, and indirectly, and differ first of all in the temporal perspective they imply. (This part of the conflict is the actual subject of my paper.),
- b) the "absolute", non-institutional base (the personal dimension of one's life-world) that interconnects people directly and personally by means of a universal understanding of the "first person singular" experience.

With welfare, the "personal" dimension is embodied in such actors as self-help groups, voluntary associations, local initiatives, and in such principles as "participation", "subsidiarity" etc.


viii.

In this sense, one can consider as a "welfare-mix" even some current processes taking place within ("inside") the public social security schemes (and not only, as so far, the processes "outside", "around" the public sphere). As we have shown, this concerns, above all, the increasing influence of the concept of so-called "universal" benefits.

This paper, however, suggests simultaneously another conclusion. All forms of the "welfare-mix" mentioned here can be interpreted as a reaction of the welfare regimes to the new features in social reality. And it is "the way to universality" that we have found as a main frame of reference for such a reaction. In order to keep the universal character of social security provisions even under developing "post-modern" conditions, two fundamental streams of welfare mixing have emerged:

- one is represented by an effort to create a new claim-basis, so called "social citizenship" which is a sort of mutation of the two traditional statuses "employee" and "citizen". In this case, the technologies such as "universal" benefits, basic income or two-tiers pensions are discussed;
- the other is represented by the processes aiming, in fact, at a renaissance and new ways of using the traditional claim-bases. In this respect, the technologies such as private insurance schemes, free from relations to the general "public" standards, and the GMI scheme, free from earnings-related criteria and concerned exclusively with the insurance of "public minimums", are mentioned.

Figure 1. The welfare mix as a "mix" of three bases of universality



Therefore, we have discovered *two* fundamental technological modes of institutional welfare universality (and not, as generally thought, only one represented by "Social Democratic" universalism). All welfare-mix processes identified here aim at the maintenance of welfare universalism in the contemporary changing world and have some differences.

Social democratic, "monolithic" universalism is based on the "welfare-mix" as a total mixture and confusion of traditional institutional forms. What is of particular interest with relation to such a characteristic is the fact that East/Central-European State-socialism can be described in very similar terms. It has been represented by a complete destruction of impersonal instrumentality. "Employee" and "citizen" were a tautology under totalitarian Socialist logic. The difference between totalitarian technologies of State Socialism and technologies of "Scandinavian" social security universalism consists only of different system-hierarchical levels. While speaking about "limited revolution" in the case of "mixed" social democratic social security benefit models, State Socialism can be considered as "unlimited revolutionary mixing".

On the contrary, there is also a sort of "liberal/conservative welfare-mixing", a sort of "non-socialist" way to universality. It is based on a renaissance of

traditional social security claim-bases and their parallel, mutually independent usage. This actually comes to reality not only through the traditional "welfare-mix" concept (i.e. through parallel work of several welfare sectors), but it can also take place even within one precisely instrumental two-level ("binary") public benefit scheme (a detailed version of such a basic social security benefit scheme is presented by Konopásek [1992]).

Figure 2. On the way to institutional universality: certainly a "mix" - but of what kind?

SOCIALIST INCLINATION	NON-SOCIALIST INCLINATION
a) on the general, state level b) on the particular soc. security benefit scheme level	
"MIX" IN TERMS OF: <i>confusion of traditional instrumentality, i.e.:</i> a) particular statuses, legality vs. legitimacy etc. b) "citizen" and "employee" claim-bases	<i>making clear-cut and "digitalization" of particular tools, i.e.:</i>
AN INSTITUTIONAL EXTREME: <i>revolutionary, modernistic solution:</i> a) totalitarian state of a "new type" b) basic income - benefit of a "new type"	<i>aesthetic/traditionalist (post-modern) solution:</i> a) pluralist market economy/democratic society b) binary basic benefit scheme

Certainly, Social Democratic tendencies in welfare instrumentation do not directly represent a classical totalitarian, state-socialist approach. Social Democratic social security concepts are certainly not "bad". They are inevitably part of considering and creating welfare in Europe. However, in a certain sense, state socialism is not "bad" either. Nothing is entirely "bad". And, however it is unpleasant for us today, state socialism has even been an organic part of the whole European story.

What I have only done here is propose an unusual dimension for describing welfare regimes (given by two fundamental modes, currently inevitable, of welfare mixing) and found some formal (technological) similarities between the institutional regimes of the Social Democrat benefit model and East-European State Socialism of the XXth century. Maybe, socialist technologies limited to a clearly defined range of institutional schemes, such as social security, can be benign. Maybe not.

ix.

The presented paper is in fact a reaction to the question: what can be done with a relative concept of social problems in a situation where the "invasive", initially simple course and one-dimensional social relativity (as a corner-stone on the way to institutional universality during the period of massive industrialization) gradually turns refined and complicated, constituting no longer an "interventional" but rather "integral" element of culture? What should one do with institutions that were built on a simple and overall supposition that there is no problem in inter-measuring people when considering each of them to be "absolutely-relative"?

It has been shown that these questions are, in fact, questions related to the phenomena called "welfare mix" and "new uncertainty", both observed generally in the field. To sum up, it seems that it is only the sharpening of contradictions between the two "eroding" industrial types of institutionalized claims on welfare that is behind the current trend toward the various forms of "welfare mix". And, especially the two controversial ideal modes of the "mixing" lay the groundwork for a "new uncertainty" in discussions about welfare regimes.

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Eva Broklová: Československá demokracie. Politický systém ČSR 1918-1938 (Czechoslovak Democracy. Political System of ČSR 1918-1938)

Praha, SLON 1992, 168 p.

As we are informed by "the editorial note" of the authoress, the text presents, to both professional and general public, basic theses that have been formulated as early as the end of 1967 as study material of the interdisciplinary team on "The development of the political system." The fact that the core of Eva Broklová's book is more than 25 years old is meant not as an excuse but, rather, just as a sigh over the observation that political history often proceeds more slowly than intellectual history.

If the present form of this text is already a result of current changes (they can not be, after all, always overlooked) it is still necessary to acknowledge the things that are independent. By this the lasting and to a certain extent, timeless validity and attractiveness of the subject is meant. The necessary and special topics of description and interpretation of the First Republic's political system has an unbiased view of its merits and weaknesses. This gives the book its more stable values. Information and data, either historical or systematic, always have relevance. No doubt this book will be thoughtfully considered not only by experts in the field of political and legal history, social philosophers, sociologists, and others, but also by people that have just a general interest in politics. Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge its subject content given by our contemporary situation. The political changes in our country, transformation of its institutions and orientations, require a more solid ground for interpretation.

The book consists of three relatively independent parts. The first one, entitled "The Czechoslovak Political System: Basic Characteristics," has its focus on a historical and systematic interpretation of basic postulates of the First Republic's constitution and the

resulting establishment of relations between legislative, executive and judicial powers.

The book comes, therefore, from the classic methodological differentiation of three elements of political power, the differentiation that is always partial to a certain "suppression" of the smallest political "units," i.e. citizens themselves, of their rights and, in particular, their duties such as, e.g., their right to vote, their public service and their non-political activities and, above all, the exchange of information and persons within a political, business and academic sphere. This is connected then with the problem of professional politicians and their independence. The system thus remains as though superior to an individual. The definition of political system, therefore, coincides here in principle with the concept of the state and is understood as the structure of all relevant and concrete relations between the upholders and the addressees of power in organized society (comp., e.g., p. 11). The authoress herself is well aware of the asymmetry between the specification of democratic postulates and mechanisms, the concrete course of political events, and possibilities of understanding them. While interpreting the course of political events she includes the democratic system as defined by a constitution and further, a system of political parties, a sphere of democratic culture and last, but not least, a problem of a democracy crisis and possible solutions (to this comp., e.g., p. 160). It thus involves a systematic mediation of what is sometimes called "the governmental system." Greater attention is, naturally, paid to political power (vertical) structures than to communicative consensual (horizontal) structures, which are important not only in legitimative processes but also within the enforcement of concrete power measures. That is why, e.g., problems of caretaker governments and so-called "the five" (later on "the six" and "the eight") are systematically related to questions of their constitutionality and further problematized as, to a certain extent, "anti-parliamentary" (in the case of caretaker

governments) or even as "a mark of tendencies to the oligarchization of democracy" (in the case of "the five"). Yet their virtual role for stabilizing the self-regulation of a system is, at the same time, neither ignored nor underestimated (to this comp., e.g., p. 45).

Even though the presentation of the subject is rather narrative (or "descriptive") than theoretically analytical in the strict sense of the word. (This is made obvious, e.g., in the categorization of democracy, the content of which should coincide with a political system: for a generation of builders of the First Republic this has been a category of democracy, a world view and a philosophical standpoint in everyday manifestations of the way of life). One asset of this work is its attempt to show not only systematic, logically legal mechanisms of the constitution, laws and institutional operation, but also to portray these mechanisms on the background of historical events of the Czechoslovak democratic formation of the pragmatic orientations of their makers. Note, for example, the connection of the emergence of the idea of an independent state to Masaryk's transition from the concept of historical state law, widely acknowledged in prewar Czech politics, to an argumentation of what is naturally legal for the position of the Slovak nation within the framework of Provinces of St. Stephan's Crown (p. 19).

No less important is, furnished by archival documents, the certain inertia in social political relations, and in particular, of "traditions of constitutional conditions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in which Czech politics also participated and from which it could draw upon (p. 22). Often it seems that more attention should be paid to the politically stabilizing potential of regulations and rules of "the old regime," and not only of the post-coup period. A considerable ambiguity in "the acceptance" of post-coup changes, i.e., in the behavior of the lower levels of administration, even when preparing and enforcing constitutionally legal documents. This seems to be important both for the indication of spontaneous political conservatism and for more general conservative interpretations of the relation between

the old and the new, tradition and progress, the system and possibilities of its change and, especially for the interpretation of the conservative conception of the value of social change.

However, it is necessary to see this approach (both on a practical and theoretical level) as a stabilizing power that leads to true state building. For the benefit of interpretation, it is placed in a historically ideal context as a "moral" anticipation of Czechoslovak democracy. This regards, e.g., the conviction of the state formulators and the relevance of long historical time (and evolved Czech mentality)

"a democratic form appears, for the Czech nation, to be the most appropriate one, in a view of the fact of its role in past centuries, of its national history's spirit, of a historical development of this country, of a contemporary structure of the population and of political, social and cultural requirements of the new state" (p.16).

Historically narrative evidence of the cause and effect of ideas, events, facts, decisions and formulations is sometimes, in the book, so strong that it makes its systemic position and synchronous relevance unclear. The authoress remains here too much devoted to her historical guild, sometimes even at the expense of clarity and comprehensibility to the untrained public.

A philosophically systemic legitimization of the new state through abstract democratic postulates such as those "that played a decisive role in the origin of American democracy" (p. 160) and that have, in the republican manner, turned against monarchic regimes of a decayed old world, is thus complemented with historical legitimization. By this, it undoubtably differentiated itself from initially analogic attempts in other successional states of defeated powers. However, it shared with them this ill-stated connection of nationalism and democratic political forms.

The authoress stresses, as the hallmark and the basis of power in Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy during the interwar period, a tension between the executive and the legislative. "The center of political grav-

ity" was located in the parliament, but "...the parliament was, in fact, systematically restricted by the government" (p. 28). The question remains, to what extent can "a superiority of the executive power over the legislative power" may be taken, in "modern states." Some formulations seem to indicate this power hierarchy (e.g., on p. 37) and to what extent it has this state of affairs. It is tied to more fundamental discrepancies such as national ones above all, but possibly also socio-political ones, which space and time have allowed for a new state and which are analogic, to some extent, with the present situation.

What I have in mind is the non-existence of a state-forming opposition, which the authoress seems well aware of. The government needs to resist a strong negation of the old regime from the adversaries, not only "national minorities but also a considerable section of the 'governing nation,' i.e. communists and a part of the People's Party" (p. 43). This opposition has been not only against the government but, above all, anti-democratic.

In this situation, there is an understandable tendency toward both a representation and a political system, arising from elections and which identify themselves with the government and the regime. The effect of that may be a special kind of fear of change. A rotation of the voters' deputies in the legislative body may appear to be something very controversial, something that is going to not only destabilize the regime but also the whole state.

"In the Czechoslovak situation, the actual impossibility of defeating the coalition was influenced also by the existence of numerous non-loyal oppositions (both left and right) and, in the second decade, a non-existence of a loyal opposition. Thus, it was impossible to form any other coalition from the so-called 'general coalition' that had existed there since 1929" (p. 38).

The authoress finds this in a rather different context and shows an imperative solidarity. From the non-existence of alternative solutions, the necessity has arisen to substitute a democratic principle of majority rule by a principle of "unanimity through the help of

mutual compensations" (p. 39), by the seeking of compromise solutions and by the establishment of agreements on the basis of an alliance. The Czechoslovak system of "the only possible majority," thus called in 1927 by Emil Sobota is, so far, something quite different from merely merging legitimacy and legality. The system, as the highest expression of a modern liberal democracy, has been enlightened to various points by, for example, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. This particular analysis of the unmediated separation of the government and the opposition (a reminder of the impossibility of an opposition as well as a danger of defeatist conception of democracy in governmental parties and in the government itself) is among the most interesting, the most topical and the most useful interpretations of this book.

The whole analysis of the First Republic's political system, from the creation of a political will through a system that stabilizes the rights of the president and his control functions; through an independent judicial system and the enforcement of human rights and protection of minorities; through decentralization of public administration (no matter how the full democratic self-administration collides with a complicated national structure or even with a non-loyalty of minorities) finally proves its vitality and its ability to cope with internal systemic crisis.

The second part of this book is devoted to the political party system in Czechoslovakia. The pre-Munich republic is, at the same time, characterized as "the Party State." From a point of view of a plebiscitary democracy it thus represents the most rationalized form because the general public has participated in the establishment of out political will. But, at the same time, according to the authoress, the state has been taken beyond its limits and started, "to a certain extent," to contain "features of the Czechoslovak republic as a parliamentary democracy" (p. 74) and led to some "dictatorship of the parties" in public life. This dictatorship manifested itself as a more disintegrative factor the more the division of parties depended on their nationality. The pluralistic party system has been constantly weakened by a large number of parties whose proliferation con-

tributed to the proportional electoral system. At the same time, the authoress points out the fact that some of the drawbacks of the pluralistic party system, such as slow regeneration of the parliament and party disintegration, influenced negatively an evaluation and an acceptance of the First Republic's political system after the Second World War.

The relative independence of each particular part of this book is clear in the third part called "The Crisis of Democracy," especially in view of the scope of problems of a crisis of democracy that oversteps the bounds of historiography towards political science, sociology and philosophy. In this part, with certain implications, the whole structure of interpretation culminates. It concludes that

"a category of democracy which we, in its general and common sense, understand as controlled power circumstances, appears to be the real reference system of existence and non-existence of the First Republic, i.e. of functional national society, its history and its interpretation" (p. 10).

The question of the failure of the First Republic represents for the Czech political nation its greatest complex of century, and it has been used as the basic background for the interpretation of its history several times. The other issue is how a phenomenon of democratic crisis is interpreted and explained. Here the authoress works with much too broad and abstract a framework, including unwanted side effects of social modernization that might be possibly valid. These effects may also be valid for a majority of industrial states in the first half of this century, but they have not always been accompanied by the same political and structural crisis phenomena.

The idea of the democratic crisis, despite the problems of unmanageable economic growth, is connected here with the problems of a "mass nation." (p. 100). This interpretation was formulated for the first time within the framework of a conservative cultural critique by Ortega y Gasset in his "The Revolt of the Masses" and further exploited in H. Arendt's famous book "The Origins of Totalitarianism," concerned with

the problems of the origins of a mass society. It seems to be a drawback that domestic attempts of that period for reflections on these questions are not more deeply considered in this work, as in the two-volume book "The Crisis of Democracy," of J. L. Fischer. It could have been also interesting to point out Peroutka's small work, towards the end of the twenties, called "Who Has Liberated Us," which has distinctly shown a non-democratic feature of historical political discourse and which has been helpful for the analysis of parties and their relation to the presidency.

The Czechoslovak democracy crisis is revealed, in the first place, from the level of a general crisis of democracy that itself, according to the authoress, was caused by crisis of social structures, by unbalanced economic development, and by a loss of faith in democracy (p. 145). It becomes apparent that this concept concerns primarily forms of political life. Every political intervention of definitions and interests, as, e.g., reflections of "radical democrats" on possibilities for "democratization of property," (This is, by the way, an illusion coming back into Czech liberal and democratic ideas in this very century) actually disintegrate those forms.

Democracy is thus losing its character as a regulative system of political negotiations that is superior to various interests, particular requirements and reactions in the sphere of politics and society. It fails to be something that lives on the reflected tension of its own concrete realization. In a later evolution of political theory, therefore, the concept of democracy has been more and more related to problems of "open society" and to Popper's concept of the superiority of freedom to truth. Often it has been interpreted on the basis of a certain political anthropology. In this context, some of the authoress' explanations of the crisis of democracy seem to be a bit too abstract and indebted to a historical "anatomical formula," in which, on the basis of a unique result of a concrete historic event, a general value is interpreted.

The special question is then a coincidence of internal and external crisis of Czechoslovak statehood and its general crisis of democracy. The possibility to show problems of Czechoslovak inter-war development

as an individual expression of the general crisis of democracy caused by a crisis of social structures and by the establishment of mass society is not sufficient from the point of view of a contemporary experience. This would permit standpoints that are, to a considerable extent, antiquated such that "dictatorships find their sources in the imperfection of parliamentary democratic regimes and, in particular, in their incompetence to overcome any exceptional difficulties... Dictatorships are a reaction to liberal maladies, economic and social ones, in particular" (p. 101).

It seems that the immense regenerative ability of liberal democratic systems is rather neglected. Towards the end of this century, these systems have, after all, won recognition against all the attempts for alternative political and economic solutions. Francis Fukuyama, for example, in his famous essay (and, later on, in his book "The End of History") has tried to emphasize this fact. Furthermore, the dictatorships and totalitarianism regimes, most often, have headed toward situations that have had relatively little, if any, historical experience with democratic solutions to political problems. It seems then that emphasizing external and internal conditions realying of democracy which may stand against its conception (whether it refers to the establishment of a mass society, an unbalanced economic development or national problems) is not as important as the question of a certain spiritual or, if you like, cultural preconditions of democracy and, in

particular, the question of establishing democratic mentalities.


It is therefore possible to agree with the authoress when she says that

"it is necessary to see the imperfections of the democratic governmental system of the First Republic in the context of problems which the establishment of democratic regimes always run into, without exception for its upholders. The opposition of non-Czech nationalities during the formation of the state was followed, immediately afterwards, by a weakening of foreign policy. A short stabilization had been replaced by an economic depression and by a following growth of a direct threat to the state" (p. 114).

But the fact remains, that this actually concerns the reason, "a short time," for the development and expansion of real democratic mentalities which could live through a post-revolutionary disintegration of democratic institutions. The authoress herself formulates it, for that matter, as follows:

"No resolution or, in fact, the actual impossibility to solve fundamental discrepancies, led to the elimination of a democracy without any guarantee from dictatorships or a totalitarian regime, either left or right, that usually replace a democracy, to moderate or to eliminate special problems; they, for the most part, just suppress their existence. In the case of Czechoslovakia, democracy was eliminated from the outside, while the elimination from the inside proceeded as a long-term decline with a peripetia covering whole decades (p. 146).

Miloš Havelka



Attitudes of Czech and Slovak Local Elite towards the Transformation of Society

One of the most controversial questions, for a long time, is going to be on whether the splitting of Czechoslovakia has occurred more as a play of politicians or as a logical result of natural divergence of these two acting peoples, under the democratic circumstances.

Statistical data as well as the results of sociological surveys have long before 1989 documented differences in demographic, socioeconomic and cultural development in both republics. The public opinion polls continuously indicated, and the last elections definitively confirmed, the fact that within the last three years the divergence has acquired political dimensions, as well.

Apart from longitudinal studies of the population's attitudes and analyses of a political elite's behavior, this observation is also supported by the result of an investigation of the actors in a special group of political events, i.e. of the people engaged in local politics. This regards a stratum of politicians who would certainly deserve more attention than what they have so far received. From the point of view of chosen attitudes, this stratum represents both citizens as voters and as members of political parties much more than political notables. The following information is based on data from investigations of members of local as well as town councils, conducted at the turn of 1991/1992 in the Czech Republic (1183 respondents) and in Slovakia (330 respondents). In the Czech Republic, the investigation has been conducted within the framework of a research program called "Sociological Aspects of Local Democracy: Survey of Local Self-Administration," which was carried out by the Institute of Sociology during the years 1991/1992. The survey followed an international comparative project "Local Democracy and Innovation". Financially this was sponsored by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-

ences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and by the Norwegian Research Council for Applied Social Sciences. Members of the research team were then Daniel Hanšpach, Ondřej Hubáček, Michal Illner (co-ordinator of the project), Jiří Patočka and Zdena Vajdová. Dušan Drbohlav and Lenka Pitrová also cooperated. This is a contribution to the widening spectrum of views on the causes of the Czechoslovak disintegration.

The mentioned survey has tried to determine, apart from other things, attitudes towards the actual solutions to problems and towards the cause of the society's transformation. Some of the attitudes clearly portray values or backgrounds of the respondents' political orientation:

1. A question was originally used for the identification of a post-materialistic value orientation. Respondents chose, according to the degree of importance, from four possibilities: (a) "To keep order in the country," (b) "To give the people a greater possibility to contribute to important political decisions," (c) "To stand up to increased prices," (d) "To protect the freedom of speech." In our circumstances, this question, however, rather outlines the preference of either a stabilized democratic system (and only then to follow-up with solutions for contemporary problems by appropriate measures) or an immediate problems' solution by means of the state's administrative intervention. The variable *Paternalism* has been established for this question, and it indicates a possible paternalistic orientation of the respondents in two categories: 1. "No" (either both or just one of the choices b or d) and 2. "Yes" (either both or one of the choices a or c).
2. A question on whether it is right for more wealthy areas to contribute to poorer ones indicates opinions on resource redistribution within the society. From this question the variable *Egalitarianism* has been established in 2 categories: 1. "Yes" (the ap-

- proval of redistribution) or 2. "No" (the refusal of redistribution).
3. Questions relating to whether sexual education should be included in a school's curriculum and whether abortion should be legal indicates the variable *Conservatism*. Social conservatism is recorded in categories: 1. "No" (the approval with both of them) and 2. "Yes" (the refusal of at least one of those).
4. A question on the significance of being well-connected with important people in

order to reach life success indicates the role of connections within the society. The question has been used to find the variable *Clientelism* in 2 categories: 1. "No" (a little importance of connections) and 2. "Yes" (a great importance of connections).

As the first step of analysis, a comparison of those attitudes is given according to the members of the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's councils.

Table 1. Chosen Attitudes of Councils' Members in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. (A ratio of respondents who have stated the respective answer, in%)

	Paternalism Yes*	Egalitarianism Yes	Conservatism Yes*	Clientelism Yes*
Czech Republic	59	29	9	58
Slovakia	75	33	25	75

*) Level of significance of $\chi^2 = 0.00$

The table shows that Slovak council members are more paternalistic, egalitarian and conservative. It also characterizes the society as more clientelistic. Their political orientation is thus distinctively profiled by a combination of the left-wing (paternalism, egalitarianism), Christian (conservatism, paternalism) and traditional and national (clientelism) elements.

What causes this specific combination of attitudes in Slovakia? The fact that there are more members or sympathizers of left-wing, Christian and national parties among them, or the fact that in Slovak culture, in the value system of the Slovak society as a whole, the quoted features are more distinct and strongly influence the opinions of the people regardless of their political convictions?

The answer is implied when comparing attitudes of Czech and Slovak council members inclining to similar political parties. Inclinations towards political parties are de-

picted by asking the respondent which political party he would vote for in case of parliamentary elections. The respondent is placed into one of five groups: 1. "Civic right-wing parties" (the Civic Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Democratic Party); 2. "Christian parties" (the Christian Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union - the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Christian Democratic Movement); 3. "Parties of the center" (The Civic Forum, the Civic Movement, the Civic Democratic Union - the Public Against Violence); 4. "Left-wing parties" (the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Czechoslovak Social Democracy, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, the Party of the Democratic Left, the Green Party); 5. "National parties" (The Movement for Local Authority-Society for Moravia and Silesia, the Slovak National Party, Co-existence Party).

Table 2. Chosen attitudes of council members in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, according to their inclination. (A ratio of respondents that have stated the respective answer, in%)

	Paternalism Yes*	Egalitarianism Yes*	Conservatism Yes*	Clientelism Yes*
ČR - right-wing	53	28	8	52
SR - right-wing	67	38	8	77
ČR - Christian	61	35	41	59
SR - Christian	80	36	75	72
ČR - center	55	38	4	57
SR - center	81	18	17	79
ČR - left-wing	63	34	4	56
SR - left-wing	80	45	9	79
ČR - national	66	48	7	79
SR - national	60	23	15	81

*) Level of significance of $\chi^2 = 0.00$

In some cases political inclination and specific attitudes are doubtlessly strongly connected as, e.g., the conservatism of Christian parties in both republics. The differences are, however, in general and with few exceptions, between Czech and Slovak representatives of similar orientations are quite large.

Looking at the four indicators, attitudes towards paternalism display the greatest divergence of opinions on political and economic reform. The remaining three are less related to the basic principles of a newly formed social system and grasp rather its secondary and derived parameters. The analysis of various factors influencing attitudes towards paternalism thus may testify, above all, about the context which encourages different approaches toward the formation of a new political system and towards the economic reform in both republics. If these resources occur rather in contemporary political orientations of the Czech and Slovak populations or in its cultural specificities, the influence of a political inclination and of the republic's citizenship must be, first of all, investigated.

The results confirm the influence of different political power settings in local Czech and Slovak councils. There is greater support for right-wing parties in the Czech Republic whereas in Slovakia, Christian and national parties are stronger. Data from the

investigation, nevertheless, do not correspond entirely with the contemporary political orientation of the Slovak population which has changed since the communal elections and since the time of investigation. Christian parties lost support and the Movement for Democratic Slovakia has grown with the stronger support for left-wing parties. It shows generally but not fully accurately that the Czech population has a right-wing orientation while the Slovak population is left-wing. The population's non-coexistence, political parties' divergent programs, and non-crystallization of the political scene mean that the application of a standard scale of political orientation used in stabilized democracies would not be reliable here. It is obvious that a political differentiation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is a bit more complicated and can not be presented on such a simple scale. More interesting is the second analysis done during the creation of important attitudes towards political and economic reform. The republic's citizenship plays a more important role than political inclinations. And this particular research supports a hypothesis that the political dimension of the Czech and Slovak population variance is not based only on political orientations but has its deeper cultural roots. Not the present popularity of particular politicians and positioning of political parties in

the parliaments but a different situation and a different climate caused the development of separate Czech and Slovak Republics.

It is thus confirmed that if the introductory question is relieved of its propagandistic touch, the answer remains to be found

primarily in the analysis of long-term existing differences between the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Only afterwards can we begin interpretations of the nature of their political actions.

Table 3. Log-linear model of relations between a republic's citizenship (REP), a political inclination (PARTY) and an attitude towards paternalism (PATERN)

	df	L2	p
<i>Tests of interactions' zero effects</i>			
1	6	937.929	0.0000
2	9	247.679	0.0000
3	4	5.312	0.2567
<i>Tests of partial associations</i>			
REP*PARTY	4	198.477	0.0000
REP*PATERN	1	16.896	0.0000
PARTY*PATERN	4	11.302	0.0234
<i>Estimations of parameters</i>			
ČR - Civic right-wing			1.13*
ČR - Christian			-0.30*
ČR - Center			0.06
ČR - Left-wing			-0.05
ČR - National			-0.84*
ČR - Paternalism			-0.16*
Civic right-wing - Paternalism			-0.17
Christian - Paternalism			0.10
Center - Paternalism			0.04
Left-wing - Paternalism			0.12
National - Paternalism			-0.09

*) Standardized value of coefficient > 1.96

Ondřej Hubáček

What Type of Capitalism Is Expected In the Czech Republic?

In July, 1992, the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, together with the Center for Empirical Research (STEM), carried out the fifth part of the serial empirical survey "Economic Expectations and Attitudes". It investigates the growing attitudes toward passing economic reform and their consequences.

From the various issues covered by the survey, here we focus our attention on the population's perception of the relationships between the state and the market. These relationships can be defined in terms of whether they are liberal, favor a relatively free economy or are social market oriented. The controversial issue shaping peoples' attitudes appears to be; "to what degree should the state directly intervene in the economic and social spheres of life?" "When do people

prefer state intervention in the market?" Answers to these questions will indicate which capitalist route is to be expected in our country.

We proceed in three methodological steps. First, we analyze explicit questions about the preferred form of economic system (see Table 1. for results). Second, we compare the relative frequencies of the explicit answers with the implicit ones, which are based on specific examples of various types of state intervention. The implicit questions are used to examine the consistency in peoples' explicit attitudes concerning the relationship between the state and the market. Cluster analysis is used to analyze the data. And third, in depth examination of differences in attitude types is conducted. Here we focus on satisfaction with current income, the influence of "cultural capital", political orientation, and the estimated value of respondent's private property.

Table 1. Expectation of economies' type (in %)

socialist, as it was before 1989	3.3
social market, high state intervention	45.6
free market, minimal state intervention	51.1

The Basic Patterns of Attitudes

1. The "Liberal" Type (LIB)

The first cluster of people with liberal values, which we have implicitly traced, represents 57% of the Czech population above 18 years of age. Their attitudes are in complete agreement on the term "capitalism". The Czech population has clearly attributed the following features to the term "capitalism":

- private ownership without state restrictions;
- inequality among people as a natural phenomena depending upon the abilities of individuals;
- minimal intervention of the state into the economy;
- poverty as a result of personal inability;
- unemployment as a consequence of individuals' lack of enthusiasm for their occupations; and

- emphasis on a rapid economic transformation and more specifically a rapid privatization process.

These people emphasize the efficiency of the economic performance within a free market and the justice of the system, because of its clearly defined criteria which are obligatory for everybody.

The LIB type display high consistency between explicit and implicit answers.

2. The "Social Market" Type (SOC)

This group of people represents 43% of the Czech population. People who maintain discontent with the idea of unemployment as such and report sentiments of injustice, usually demand a social market economy.

Because of the fact that only a relatively small percentage of our respondents have experienced real unemployment, the fear of losing jobs means the fear of a system which allows unemployment. The nature of the above mentioned opinion consequently overlooks all positive attributes of the free economy and exists as long as people claim that the state's first responsibility is to provide every citizen with a job.

The feelings against a system's injustices and dishonesty create a contemptuous people biased against the development of a market economy. People who prefer a social market economy drew parallels between dishonesty, injustice, and the capitalistic system, and not with the morality of individuals and discrepancies of complex transforming processes.

These people thus prefer:

- direct state intervention into the economy - for instance, decreasing all prices by a state decree;
- state provision of jobs for all people; and
- a vision of poverty as the failure of a system, not of an individual.

According to this attitude, the first necessity in a state is the assurance of social justice. The commanding functions of the state, which firmly encroach on the distribution of market resources, are stressed. The consequences of disturbing market forces and the re-emerging state dirigism are not even considered. The characteristic concept of the state seems to be paternalistic towards its

citizens. The former latent communist rule, "equity of all in poverty" is here subconsciously substituted by a renewed one "wealth, but only for everybody".

The "social market economy" preferred by the SOC type, as reflected in their responses to the survey, is quite similar to the "socialistic" state which assures "socialist amenities". For the Slovaks, we estimate that their opinions are more represented by the SOC type (about 70% of the whole Slovak population) than by the LIB type (about 30% of the population).

Is "Paternalism" the Conviction of People Who Are Not Well-off And "Liberalism" the Conviction Of the Wealthy?

The question can be put in another way: Are the requirements for the establishment of some "social" market economy only normal reactions reflecting a worse social situation of respondents? Is it then possible to predict that the intensity of their responses will decline simultaneously with economic growth? Or are these kinds of socialistic ideas the result of a profoundly "imbedded" ideology whose roots can be discovered in the earlier past? What influences these attitudes?

1. Satisfaction with current income

Satisfaction with current income is subjective and is expected to be evaluated in relation to various expenditures - whether respondents can afford good food or clothing and are able to spend money on culture, sports, etc. In regard to great dissatisfaction with the most basic needs - food, the SOC type of cluster manifests itself in 11% of the cases and the LIB one in 4%. Table 2 also shows that the SOC type of respondents in other types of expenditures experience greater financial troubles than LIB ones. The differences are statistically significant; therefore we con-

cluded that income level significantly determines the attitudes of people.

2. The influence of "Cultural Capital"

"Cultural capital" is defined in terms of empirically observable features. Here we define "cultural capital" as the education of the respondents, the education of their respondents' fathers, and their understanding of the present political situation. Other important differentiations among people are their inner understanding of achievement criteria and the relationship between the individual and the social system. The latter is mostly apparent through the respondents' evaluation of the justice of the system being considered.

Based on our analysis the SOC and LIB types are statistically significantly different in terms of their levels of education and socioeconomic background. The domain of less educated people is in the SOC type; if we consider only the elementary educated population, 60% of these people are in the SOC cluster. If we consider only people with university education, the LIB type contains 81% of these respondents. It is similar case when considering their fathers' education (these result are not presented in tables).

Observed differences between the SOC and LIB types suggest that the intellectual attainment of respondents is as important as income in predicting general opinions. Individual material success as revealed by subjective satisfaction with current income is not a matter of professions, because the SOC and LIB types are not differentiated according to them. We thus derive that the cultural capital of LIB types should be closer to some features which enable their holders to accept the new criteria of achievement and performance more easily. The fact that 76% of all formal, legal licences to run private businesses belong to the LIB types suggest these features allow one to be more independently directed.

Table 2. Social market and liberal type according to some socioeconomic characteristics

	Type		Total
	SOC (100%)	LIB (100%)	(100%)
<i>A. Food</i>			
definitely yes	16.3	33.4	18.5
rather yes	45.7	51.4	45.0
rather not	26.9	11.6	24.4
definitely not	11.1	3.6	12.1
<i>B. Income</i>			
very hard	35.5	16.7	29.1
hard	41.6	39.4	43.0
easy	22.9	43.9	27.9
<i>C. Leisure</i>			
definitely yes	3.2	11.9	8.5
rather yes	16.7	30.1	20.1
rather not	37.5	40.5	39.1
definitely not	42.6	17.5	34.6
<i>D. Education</i>			
elementary	30.9	12.5	24.9
vocational training	40.3	31.8	32.4
secondary school	22.8	39.3	30.8
university, college	5.9	16.2	11.9
<i>E. Fathers' Education</i>			
elementary	34.0	18.0	36.5
vocational training	46.7	43.4	38.4
secondary school	13.9	26.1	17.9
university, college	5.1	12.4	7.2
<i>F. Understanding of Political Scene</i>			
definitely yes	3.2	10.1	7.3
rather yes	21.6	39.5	32.1
rather not	51.1	39.4	45.1
definitely not	24.1	11.0	15.5

Source: "Economic Expectations and Attitudes V." July, 1992.

Questions:

A. Does the money you have in your household provide enough for good food?

B. How do you manage with the present income of your household?

C. Is some money left for culture, recreation, sport, and similar activities and for the purchase of things you need for your activities (books, records, sportswear, equipment)?

F. Would you say that you understand the present political scene?

Table 3. Structure of voters of some political parties according to the SOC and LIB types in the parliamentary elections of 1992 in the Czech republic (in %)

Political Subject	SOC	Type LIB
The Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (Left Side)	73.3	26.7
The Left Block - Communist and Democratic Left Party (Extreme Left)	93.0	7.0
The Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) (Right Side)	16.0	84.0
The Civic Democratic Party - coalition ODS-KDS (Right Side)	19.4	80.6

Source: "Economic Expectations and Attitudes V.", July 1992.

3. The aspect of political orientation

Table 3 reveals the structure of voters of some important political parties according to the SOC and LIB types. Results are presented according to electoral votes in the 1992 election (see Table 3).

If we consider the structure of electoral votes inside clusters' types, the SOC type were more likely to vote for political parties with a leftist orientation (results not shown in the table). In the last elections 45% of the SOC type voters opted for leftist political parties which then entered the Czech parliament; 21% voted for rightist ODS-KDS (Civic Democratic Party in coalition with Christian Democratic Party); and the remaining 38% were dispersed among other political parties which did not enter the Czech parliament.

In the LIB type cluster, 50% voted for ODS-KDS, 14% for (rightist) ODA, and the rest dispersed among other political parties aside from leftist ones.

We consider the results comparing the real political affiliation of respondents with their allocation within one of two clusters to be a sign that there are some potential dynamics, especially on the right side of the political scene. The direction of possible political shifts, mainly among the inconsistently thinking SOC voters for ODA and ODS-KDS, may depend upon whether the living standard will rapidly grow or not. If yes, the respondents' political alignment with ODA

and ODS-KDS will strengthen, if not, it may weaken.

As is seen in Figure 1, 21% of the SOC respondents align themselves with right-oriented people. We interpret this as an indicator of their greater confusion, since this political orientation is inconsistent with their responses to the implicit questions on state intervention. With regard to the left political side, the validity of self-political alignment is not biased. The person who consciously identifies him/herself with the political left, hardly belongs to the right, according to implicit questions. The LIB type of respondents confirmed the positive assumption about their clear awareness of their general political orientation.

4. The scope of private property

The difference between the SOC and LIB type, in regard to their private property, is also seen (Figure 2) but it is not statistically significant. Comparing the LIB and SOC type according to the possession of some specific things, we can not infer that there is a close relationship between property and opinions of the SOC or LIB type respondents. For example 38% of people of the SOC type own a family house (42% of the LIB type); 51% of the SOC type own a private car (68% of LIB); about 1% of the SOC type possess a house open to rent (3% of the LIB); and finally 11% of the SOC type people possess a forest or field (14% of the LIB

type). Thus, we can not say that the LIB type is rich or the SOC type is only poor.

Towards Which Capitalism Do We Aim?

Based on the results of this analysis, it is not possible to say that the discrepancies between the SOC and LIB clusters are only a conflict of "rich" and "poor". SOC standing is not a conviction of inferior social stratum, with incomes hardly sufficient for their family's nutrition. There are other factors, outside of material ones which are obvious and have impact:

- it is possible to assume that the liberal opinion is firstly the conviction of individualistic and active people and only then of successful and materially satisfied people;
- the SOC type attitude can also be the expression of traditional social democratic ideas, not only of a communist past. Today, however, partial misunderstanding of processes and greater confusion intervene;
- while the relationship between the respondents' subjective economic and financial situation and their opinions is undeniable, it seems that this relationship is mediated by something which can be called the "cultural multiplier". This factor is somewhat independent of an individual's economic situation.

With regard to the fact that real restructuring of the state industrial sector has not begun yet, a temperate evaluation of the social situation is proper. The majority of the "risky" population is employed by state or cooperative enterprises which have crucial procedures still in front of them. We will see, whether economic necessity will compel our citizens to accelerate their individual activity or lead them to greater dissatisfaction. The transformation process will be very dynamic. It can move towards capitalism which is really capitalistic (liberal). If it does not move towards an efficient and rich economy, capitalism "without adjectives" will have trouble assuring its legitimacy because of obvious social-democratic roots in the Czech society. As was revealed by our surveys, a great part of the population tends to blame the political and economic system for their individual lifetime failures (about 40% of the Czech population).

The question about our future form of capitalism is still open at this time. We are just now near the turning point of the transformation period. Even though the development toward a free society is close to being irreversible, some latent threats still exist.

LIB/SOC TYPE-COMPARISON OF
POLITICAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION (%)




Figure 1

THE LIB/SOC TYPE-COMPARISON OF
ESTIMATED VALUE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY




Figure 2

A Short Presentation of the CEFRES' Activities

The French Research Center in Social Sciences (CEFRES), located on the third floor of the Emauzy abbey in Prague, was created in late 1991. It stands at the same time as a research institute and as a mediating place of scientific contacts between French, Czech, Slovak and other researchers and academics. Its activity covers all fields of social and human sciences (history, sociology, economy, political science, anthropology, ethnology, philosophy, and so on.)

CEFRES has a specialized library, open to researchers and students. It subscribes at the moment to eighty-four French reviews in the social and human sciences' field and has a collection of approximately 3,000 books.

During its first two years of existence, CEFRES' action mainly took the form of work seminars, round tables, and colloquiums. Two series of lectures have taken place in the course of the year 1992, one of them on the political and economic transition in the Central and East-European countries (including three round tables, one seminar and one colloquium) and the other on the cultural history (including a series of twelve half-day seminars, with the French historians Jacques Le Goff, Jacques Revel, André Burguière, Marc Funaroli, Bartolomé Bennassar, Jean-Claude Schmitt, Jérôme Baschet and Krzysztof Pomian.) In 1991 and 1992, CEFRES and the School of Post-Graduate Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris have organized and led a monthly workshop dedicated to *State of the Art of the Social Sciences*, with the historians Francois Hartog and Bernard Lepetit, the art historian Louis Marin, the sociologist Daniel Pécaut, the philosopher Jacques Derrida, the

anthropologist Jean Bazin, and the linguist Oswald Ducrot.

In 1993, CEFRES has organized lectures within the Prague University, along with the different institutes of the Academy of Science (some of those lectures, for instance from the sociologists Louis Pinto and Daniel Bertaux, took place at the Sociology Institute and at the Social Sciences' Faculty.) Furthermore, a series of meetings on the theme *State, Nation, Ethnicity* has gathered together historians, anthropologists and political scientists of the School of Post-Graduate Studies in Social Sciences (R. Descimon, A. Guéry, J. Bazin, F. Dubet.) Two round tables have been organized at the CEFRES in January and March. The first one, *Ante- and Post-Modernism* was introduced by Petr Král, Petr Wittlich and V. Lahoda. The second one brought together for two days French, Czech and Slovak historians who are currently studying the relationship between memory and history, basing their work on the analysis and perception of the resistance and collaboration movements in the different countries involved in the study. A third round table will take place in June on the theme of the agricultural decollectivization in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

CEFRES has also organized in February 1993, along with the French Institute, a colloquium on the subject of *Revolution and Intelligence* notably with the sociologist Michel Crozier.

CEFRES brings out in French and in Czech a *Bulletin* and a thematic *Journal*, on an irregular basis.

Our address is: CEFRES, Vyšehradská 49, 120 00 Praha 2. Tel/Fax: 29 75 39.

Marie-Elisabeth Ducreux

Supporting Reconstruction of the Social Safety Net: A Working Group Searches for Programmatic Responses to Unemployment in Central Europe

The Problem:

In nearly every country public policy-makers are caught in a three-way squeeze: global competition to produce efficiently is eliminating jobs; low rates of economic growth, high interest rates and global recession are slowing job creation; and increasing claims

for unemployment benefits are straining national budgets.

And, while unemployment may trouble relatively rich and stable countries, it poses particular problems in former Communist countries. Communism did have an employment policy: it avoided unemployment through over-employment and redundant labor. Now, however, global competition is compelling governments to privatize and to streamline state enterprises, thereby forcing managers to reduce their work-forces dramatically. But for much of a population accustomed to a system that guaranteed them not only jobs, but also the associated wages used to buy basics like food, housing and health care, unemployment is confusing and frightening. Newly democratic governments committed to free market economies must respond to unemployment with new institutions, policies and programs. But the problem is exacerbated by several factors: the mis-allocation of labor pending completion of structural change; the loss of traditional trading partners in the East who lack hard currency for purchases; the disappointment of new trading partners in the West who raise trade barriers; and a recessionary drop in investment, aid and trade.

The Project:

In April, 1992 the European Studies Center of the Institute for East-West Studies (the "ESC") organized a conference at Štítn Castle outside of Prague to discuss *Market Economies and Social Safety Nets in Central Europe*. Experts attended from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, as well as from Western Europe and the United States. At the conference's conclusion, the participants recommended formation of a Working Group to focus on Unemployment.

The ESC's Working Group is unusual for several reasons: First, its membership is composed primarily of experts from Poland, Hungary, the Czechlands and Slovakia. In addition, the Group is multi-disciplinary, including economists, sociologists and government-affiliated policy-makers. With such membership, the ESC has strived to cultivate a perspective that is different from groups that focus only on economics, only on one

country or only on academic literature. Yet, while aiming for diversity, the ESC has also kept the Group small in order to encourage the group cohesion and understanding necessary to facilitate open dialogue and debate.

Second, the Group's leadership offers expertise and a strong commitment. Its leader, Stephen Heintz, is the Institute's Executive Vice-President, and has served as Commissioner of both Welfare and Economic Development for the state of Connecticut in the United States. The Group's full-time coordinator, Marcia Greenberg, practiced employment law in the U.S., followed by a degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the ESC Working Group is its search for effective programmatic responses to unemployment. A fundamental understanding of macroeconomic conditions and alternatives is essential. At the same time, however, public policy-makers face decisions at two levels. First, the pain and dislocation caused by unemployment require efforts to reach some societal consensus about the degree and manner of government assistance, both in the short-term and for the long range. Second, it is necessary to design systems which are efficient, effective and responsive to current and anticipated needs of the unemployed.

Obviously it is impossible to design the ideal system. But there are political realities: while governments often lack both the time and the resources to engage in-depth studies, they must still move to establish the best programs they can. The Group will study different prototype programs - be they national, regional or local, and be they governmental, private or voluntary - to recommend measures to prevent long-term unemployment and to assist the re-entry of long-term unemployed into the work-force. Assuming, therefore, that governments must choose among program alternatives, deciding which to support and to fund, the Working Group will try to facilitate informed decision-making.

The Process:

To encourage in-depth analysis, the ESC plans to gather the Group six times over the course of eighteen months. During their first meeting, in June, 1992 at Štířín castle outside of Prague, the Group's members began to learn about one another and to plan the first phase of the project. Given their different national and professional backgrounds, they decided to build a common understanding by commissioning Background Papers.

At the second meeting, in November at Štířín, the members discussed papers on Czechoslovakia by Alena Nešporová, on Slovakia by Pavol Ochotnický, and on Poland by Mieczysław Kabaj. The Group also learned of Jiří Večerník's research on unemployment in Czechoslovakia. In planning their next meeting, the members decided that to ensure first-hand knowledge of conditions, they would rotate future meetings among the countries being studied and would hold the meetings in areas of severe unemployment rather than in prosperous capital cities.

Recognizing the scope of the problem, the nature of their own resources, and the roles of other international organizations, bilateral programs and national institutes, the Group decided to focus on active employment measures that would prevent and respond to long-term unemployment beyond the period of transition.

The Group's latest meeting was in March in Szirák, Hungary. The first day, the group visited employment offices in Nograd County, met with representatives of the unemployed and of new business ventures, and viewed a documentary film about the unemployed. The next day, the Group continued its study of unemployment in Hungary with papers by Endre Sik and Gyula Nagy, and by Katalin Tardos; with a discussion led by Janos Kollo of private and public sector shares in creating and eliminating jobs; and with presentations on the informal economy by Endre Sik and on union activities in Hungary by Tamás Réti. Later, the Group learned from Christine Allison of the World Bank and from Betty Duskin of the OECD about their programs relating to unemployment.

As it adjourned, the Group agreed that it was ready to delve into program analysis. The next meeting will be held in Łódź, Poland, followed by a meeting in Slovakia. Those meetings will focus on understanding programs from the perspectives of both supply and demand. On the supply side, the members will study a range of prototype programs. On the demand side, there will be further public hearings and field visits to ascertain the distinctive characteristics of long-term unemployment and of public expectations in each country.

The Product(s):

The ESC formed this Working Group with two interrelated objectives. The traditional goal is to produce a report by the beginning of 1994 that will promote programs deemed effective responses to long-term unemployment; advocate systems consistent with each country's expectations for the balance between free market principles and social safety nets; and propose a vision of future responses to unemployment that recognizes an increasingly competitive and ever-expanding global labor market.

It is hoped that such recommendations by a group of the region's experts will contribute to decision-making on several levels. First, the Report should help the region's leading policy-makers to assign resources and design programs. Second, if the Group recommends systems that the public advocates, the Report may support their arguments. Third, the Report may help sources of financial and technical assistance, be they governments or international organizations, to target their assistance. Rather than offering the definitive word on any level, the Report should offer a foundation and framework for dialogue and decision-making both among public policy-makers in government, and between government and the organizations and individuals whose interests and preferences play a fundamental role in a civic society.

The ESC's second objective is that the Working Group members should benefit from participating in its investigation, debate and analysis. The members are exchanging cross-national comparisons and cross-disci-

plinary perspectives, while they are also learning about models and ideas which they might not otherwise have considered. From their growing understanding of one another, the Group's members are sharing more information and engaging in more open and constructive criticism. It is hoped that the members' experience with the Group will enhance their future thinking, cooperation and contributions to their societies.

Please work with us:

The ESC Working Group on Unemployment wishes to consider innovative programs, no matter where they are, if they can serve as

models or sources of different conceptual approaches. The Working Group's philosophy is that socio-economic problems like unemployment require cooperation rather than competition. To that end, the Group solicits information about local, national, bilateral and multilateral programs. The Group also welcomes opportunities to share its progress with other individuals and groups engaged in efforts to address unemployment and related problems. To exchange information, please contact the author at the European Studies Center in Prague (tel: 42-2-235-84-35).

Marcia Greenberg

The Luxembourg Income Study and East-West Comparisons

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) has functioned already 10 years as a databank and international center providing researchers with comparative data about incomes and social situations of households. It also gathers an informal community of scholars on income inequality, social redistribution, poverty, and related socio-economic issues.

The LIS project began in 1983 under the joint sponsorship of the Luxembourg government and CEPS/INSTEAD (Center for Populations, Poverty and Policy Studies) in Walferdange, Luxembourg. LIS is funded primarily on a continual basis by CEPS/INSTEAD and national science foundations of the respective countries involved.

Currently, it consists of over 45 datasets spanning one or more years for more than 20 countries. The countries involved are those in Europe, North America, and Australia. Recently, several East Central European countries were included, specifically Poland, the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Negotiations are underway to receive members and data from additional countries including Korea, Taiwan, Finland, Portugal, Spain and also other East European countries.

Objectives of LIS are manifold and include:

1. To test the feasibility for creating a database containing social and economic data collected in household surveys from different countries;
2. To provide a method which allows researchers to use the data under restrictions required by the countries providing the data;
3. To create a system that would allow research requests to be received from and returned to users at remote locations; and
4. To promote comparative research on the social and economic status of various populations and subgroups in different countries.

Among comparative questions the most important are: the distribution of household income and the relative income position of population groups; the distribution of earnings, the changes of income over a worker's life-cycle, including the transition to retirement; the effect of transfers and taxes on unequal social and economic well-being; characteristics of poor populations and effectiveness of various kinds of transfers in reducing the incidence of low income; and studies of the workings of the welfare state and its policies towards the underprivileged population. All these questions are of utmost importance for the countries in transition towards market economy, when income inequality starts to increase and the state withdraws from its previous overprotective functions.

The dataset is globally accessible via electronic mail networks. Documentation on

the technical aspects of the survey data and national social institutions of income provisions in associated countries is available to users.

Reports by LIS project participants have resulted in books, articles, chapters within books, and dissertations. Over 90 papers currently exist in the LIS working paper series. Each summer, a workshop is held in Luxembourg to give scholars experience in using the LIS data as applied to social policy issues. Timothy M. Smeeding (University of Syracuse, Project Director), Lee Rainwater (Harvard University, Research Director) and Gaston Schaber (President, CEPS/INSTEAD) supervise the LIS project.

In the summers of 1991 and 1992, special conferences on East-West Comparisons were held under the auspices of the LIS. The primary aim of the conferences was to ascertain which sources of data available from the East Central European countries could be used to assess the impact of the transition from centrally planned to market economies on households and individuals and for comparisons with Western countries.

The first year's conference included papers on social benefit systems, issues of comparability within the measure of economic well-being, data comparability, and LIS based comparisons for the 1980's. Considerable time was devoted to developing an agenda for research on these topics, which were to be conducted before the next conference. A discussion was conducted on how to systematically work out the problems and progress of emerging East Central European democracies, as they affect the income distribution as a whole and particularly the elderly, the retired, and other socially supported groups (e.g., the poor and vulnerable populations) in these countries.

During the conference, country teams were organized to work with LIS over the next several years in order to research and develop data on the changing income distributions of East Central Europe. Conference participants included representatives of the countries' statistical offices and university and institute researchers. Representatives from the following countries attended: Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hun-

gary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. A summary of the conference proceedings, "Gold Mines and Mine Fields," is available as LIS Working Paper #68. The main suggestions of the conference were, among others, to concentrate on social protection and poverty as guideline issues for exploration in a cross-national context and to monitor changes in social security systems and their impact on various population groups.

The 1992 conference was dedicated primarily to updating the findings from the previous year on the economic and social changes in the East Central European countries. Country studies were presented from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Yugoslavia. Cross-national comparative research and related studies and progress on data comparability were investigated. A paper with results from the Taganrog Study - a 20-year panel data survey on one Russian "Middletown" was used. Results from a German panel survey (for the comparison of western and eastern parts) were also discussed. It was decided that, in anticipation of "new" LIS East Central European data to come with the next year, release of mid-1980's LIS datafiles from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia would be outdated. If funding can be found, Russian data will be added to the LIS database over the next few years. Conference guests were from Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and the United States.

The next East-West Conference is expected to be held in the fall of 1993 in Washington, D. C.

Aside from summer workshops, where students from East European countries are invited to participate, the LIS initiatives are inspirational also in the national framework. LIS country teams work together even between times to spread advanced methods for the study of income distribution to universities and research institutions. By this, the currently lacking empirical research of the socio-economic matters will be stimulated.

Eastern Europe will participate also in the last LIS initiative, which aims to establish a new database from labor force surveys. Luxembourg Employment Study (LES) would complete the perspective of households' well-being with the perspective from their economic participation. LIS/LES base of the statistical microdata would expand comparative analysis of the transformation processes considerably. It could help to cap-

ture the social dimension of an enlarged European integration in some advance as well.

For further information on LIS or to purchase copies of the working papers, interested persons should contact Smeeding via bitnet at "smeeding@suvn" or by fax at (315) 443-1081, or Caroline de Tombeur at "sslisbb@luxcep11" or by fax at (352) 33 27 05.

Thesia I. Gamer and Jiří Večerník

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This **department of sociology** is a part of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Charles University where such famous sociologists as T. G. Masaryk and E. Beneš demonstrated interest in social sciences. Looking back the Department has a long but not always flourishing and easy past. After the Sociological Seminar begun by Masaryk at the end of 19th century, the seminar was closed and then re-opened due to Second World War, unfortunately only until 1948/49. The department (the chair) of sociology was actually established in 1965. The political climate after the 1968 invasion forced a temporary closing of the department in 1970 and its next period was penetrated by strong influences and supervision of political *nomenclature*, of ideological press. After 1989, the "velvet revolution", and following general reconstructions of the department, the present staff tries to continue in the tradition of this classical and academic sociological education to cover the recent need of a global educational program in sociology. Its basic values are the freedom of thought, multiparadigmatical approaches, free and large contacts with the international sphere of sociology. It aims to have high quality teachers and students, representing famous traditions in sociology at the Philosophical Faculty.

The scientific profile of the department is connected with teaching and the education

of students in graduate as well as postgraduate and doctoral programs. In 5 years it is possible to get a M.A. degree in sociology or interdisciplinary in sociology with demography, economics, logic, esthetics or other options. There is a specific advantage to this type of faculty: it is really a faculty of Arts making it possible to study sociology in combination with languages, art history, etc.

The studies are oriented especially towards theoretical sociology, with a deeper, historical-comparative background. However the applied disciplines such as sociology of culture, of life style, of work and organization, of management, of public opinion, of youth and generation are also cultivated. The department ensures the standard practical basics in methodology, statistics, etc.

The department also offers two options of postgraduate programs for the public sector (1 year-long, with a re-qualification or innovative character).

A new program on Industrial Relations will be developed within the TEMPUS program in co-operation with Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. This shows that there are already some important international contacts. A successful student exchange has existed now for two years with George Washington University in the U.S.A.; the department members went as visiting scholars to universities in Boston and Texas, and there are traditionally many contacts with Austria and Germany.

Research Programme

Concerning the research activity, the department has no laboratory or other specialized basis for a larger empirical survey, but uses good contacts with such institutions as

the Public Opinion Research Institute, Academy of Science, Faculty of Social and Political Science at Charles University and some private research organizations or agencies to explore their data and to involve the students in empirical research on such fields as the transformation of social structures, public opinion or marketing. The research activity of the department depends strongly on funding but there are already some projects (supported by grants) concerning recent changes in our society which some of the department members are arranging or participating in.

The general theme of the project is *The Social Change and the Ways of its Sociological Recognition*. In addition to the work of theoretically oriented colleagues (historical comparison in sociology, problems of operationalization, of interpretation in sociology, problems of human potential, power, of national identity and "social timing", etc.) the new empirical project is starting. It concerns criminological aspects of recent developments in Prague. The basis of the project is done with large international collaboration (comparative study of 8 postcommunist metropolis). The name is *Transformation of Social Environment in Metropolis (selected aspects of anomie and social deviation)*. There are also other individual contributions to the empirical study of social change in the field of labour-markets, analysis of incomes, interpersonal relations in organizations, technological changes in enterprises, etc.

Available Courses

The available courses are divided into two parts. They are defined by concrete combination types of main or profiling disciplines.

Part 1 (2-3 years): Introduction to Sociology, General Sociological Theory, History of Pre-sociological Thinking, History of Sociology, Mathematics, Logics, Methods and Technics of Sociological Research, Statistics, Data Processing, Demography, Basics of Economics, Basics of Social Psychology, Philosophy (introduction and history), and foreign language. There are also some optional lectures in applied sociology, special seminars, etc.

Part 2 (2-3 years): Contemporary Sociological Theories, History of Czech Sociology, Sociology of Life Style and Sociology of Management, optional applications on Sociology of Culture and Sociology of Labour, of Enterprise, Public Opinion Research, Social Work and different optional lectures given also by external teachers. In the case of studying exclusively ("pure") sociology, grounding in another discipline (social psychology, politology) is recommended. This part of the *curriculum* is oriented toward the diploma-work. It has an elective character.

The doctoral studies are based individually in respect to personal interests and research topics. The ability of self-developing, scientific work is required. The leading studies are consulting, discussion, and field work. After the required work (in internal or external form, average 3 years) and completed examinations, the Ph.D. degree can be obtained.

Academic staff

Jiří Buriánek, Head of the Department, Assistant Professor

Methodology of Sociological Research, Operationalization, Qualitative Methods, Head of Research Project.

Jan Sedláček, Associate Professor

History of Social Theories and of Sociology (M. Weber, E. Durkheim).

Eduard Urbánek, Associate Professor

General Sociology and Contemporary Sociological Theories, History of Sociology, sociology of ecology, phenomenological sociology and symbolic interactionism.

Visiting scholar at Texas A/M U.S.A., 1 month 1990, Free University Berlin, 2 months 1992.

Jitka Havlová, Assistant Professor

Sociology of Work and Organization, social consequences of technical innovations and social transformation on organizations and professions.

Jana Duffková, Assistant Professor

Sociology of Culture, Sociology of Life-style, futurology.

Aleš Kabátek, Assistant Professor
Introduction to Sociology, Sociology of Generation, Family, and Youth.

Ivana Mazálková, Assistant Professor
Theory and Sociology of Management, Sociology of Organization, economic culture.
Olin Fellow at the Institute of Economic Culture, Boston University (1991/1992).

Vladimír Müller, Assistant Professor
Contemporary Sociological Theory, Sociology of Knowledge, Theory of Power, National Identity.

Jiří Šubrt, Assistant Professor
Sociology of Time, Public Opinion, Sociological Theory.

Visiting scholar at Universität Wien (1991), at Freie Universität Berlin (1992), in Moscow (1990).

Oleg Suša, Assistant Professor
Human Potential, Modernity, Ecology.

Petra Průšová, Doctoral Student
Statistics

Jiří Buriánek

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Staff

Head of the Department: Prof. PhDr. Ivo Možný, CSc., Teaching Faculty: Doc. PhDr. Jan Keller, CSc., Doc. RNDr. Hana Librová, CSc., Doc. Ing. Svatomíra Přadková, CSc., Doc. PhDr. Jaroslav Stránecký, CSc., PhDr. Liliana Nerudová, PhDr. Aleš Burjanek, PhDr. Libor Musil, CSc., PhDr. Ladislav Rabušic, CSc.

Research Staff: Director of the Research Unit: PhDr. Petr Mareš, CSc., Research Associates: JUDr. Petr Fiala, Ing. Libor Čaha.
Visiting Faculty: Ivo Reznicek, DSW, Fulbright Scholar, Catholic University, Washington, DC, Michael Stanley-Jones, CEU Fellow Claremont Graduate School, CA, USA.

Teaching

This Department, in existence since 1927, has been preparing students for theoretical research, administrative and practice oriented work in sociology, social policy and social work.

Sociology is studied as a single subject or in combination with other disciplines offered at the Faculty of Philosophy. Students graduate with a Masters degree in Sociology (*Magistr*

sociologie) after 10 semesters (5 years) of study.

Social Work and Social Policy is studied in combination with sociology. Students graduate with Bachelor degrees in Social Work (*Bakalář sociální práce*) after five semesters (3 years) of study. They can continue sociological studies to receive a Master's degree in Sociology.

Doctoral and post-doctoral study of Sociology is also offered by this Department.

The general disciplines taught in the initial stages of study include Sociological Theory, Social Policy, Social Programs, Fundamentals of Law, Fundamentals of Psychology, Fundamentals of Economics, Research Methods and Techniques, Computer Literacy, Demography, and Social Psychology. Students of social work study its theory and practice, social casework, and do fieldwork.

Specialized subjects taught at later stages of the study include Sociology in the XX Century, Advanced Research Methods and Techniques, Theory of Management, Social Ecology, Gerontology, Social Pathology, Sociology of the Family, Sociology of Settlements, Criminology and Penology, Social Rehabilitation, Social Program Evaluation, Welfare State and Normative Theory, and Ecology of Labor.

Recent Research

Members and teams from the Department have participated in the following research projects in the last three years:

Hopes and Fears (representative survey on public opinion in Southern Moravia concerning economic, political and social development).

Social Change in the Perception of the Czech Population (population survey).

Social Risk Factors in Screening Risk Pregnancy (empirical research underpinning a diagnostic system for predicting spontaneous abortion).

Social Consequences of Economic Transformation (complex study of two localities in Moravia).

Ecologically Favorable Ways of Life (qualitative study of environment-friendly alternative lifestyles).

Long-Term Unemployment (empirical study conducted in the county of Vyškov).

Participation and Change in Property Relations in Post-Communist Societies (international comparative study between the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary for UN Research Institute for Social Development).

Staff Interests

Prof. PhDr. Ivo Možný, CSc.

- graduated from Masaryk University in literature in 1956. He received a doctorate in sociology from the same university for his work on sociology in literature.

He is published widely in the areas of family sociology, sociology of work, community studies and social demography. Recently, he has been interested in the sociology of social change.

In 1987 he spend a term at Vaestoolitoo (Institute for the Family) in Helsinki. The academic year 1990/91, he spent as a Fellow in Residence at the Netherland Institute for Advanced Studies in Wassenaar. He is Vice President of the Czech Sociological Association of T. G. Masaryk, member of the Scientific Council of Masaryk University in Brno, and others. At present, he leads a Czech team in a research project of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, *Participation and Changes in Property Relations of Post-Communist Societies*. At the Department, he teaches Sociology of the Family and Current Czech Sociology.

Doc. PhDr. Jaroslav Strítecký, CSc. (1941)

- is interested in the history of social theories, sociology of culture, and the question of social rationality. During the last five years, he has focused on the analysis of cultural identification processes, particularly nationalist identification.

Doc. RNDr. Hana Librová, CSc. (1943)

- defended her dissertation work, *Sociální potřeba a hodnota krajiny* (Social Need and Value of the Countryside). In recent years, she has focused on questions concerning the relationship of humans toward nature. She published monographs *Sociální potřeba a hodnota krajiny* (Social Need and Value of the Countryside, 1987) and *Láska ke krajině?* (Love toward the Countryside?, 1988). At present, she is interested in the sociological problem of values and lifestyles in environmental contexts, and in the relationship between religion and ecological crisis.

Doc. PhDr. Jan Keller, CSc. (1955)

- has written 6 university textbooks and two books. At present, he is devoting his attention to the problems of bureaucracy and social/political aspects of the ecological crisis. The theme of his work is the topic, *Až na dno blahobytu* (To the Very Bottom of Affluence), which will appear in 1993.

PhDr. Ladislav Rabušic, CSc. (1954)

- obtained his doctoral degree for his work on social fertility determinants. He is interested in social demography, sociology of values and the social and cultural contexts of social change in Czechoslovakia.

PhDr. Petr Mareš, CSc. (1947)

- gained his Candidacy of Science degree by defending his work, *Vliv zaměstnanosti žen a některých dalších socioekonomických faktorů na průběh a výsledky těhotenství* (Influence of Female Employment and Other Socioeconomic Factors on the Process and Outcome of Pregnancy). He is interested in social demography, methods of social research, unemployment, sociology of work and medical sociology.

PhDr. Libor Musil, CSc. (1959)

- wrote his dissertation on *Ekologizace práce* (Ecologization of Work). He is interested in questions of organizational culture,

especially in regard to social problems (environmental crisis, unemployment) and the evolution of corporate culture.

PhDr. Liliana Nerudová, CSc. (1947)

- defended a thesis *Neúplné rodiny v Brně* (Incomplete Families in Brno) and in 1984, she received a postgraduate title for her dissertation *Připravenost velmi mladých snoubeneckých dvojic na manželství* (Readiness of Very Young Engaged Couples for Marriage). She published a monograph *Sociální rizika velmi mladých manželství* (Social Risks in Very Young Marriages). In the last two years, she has focused also on methodology of social work.

PhDr. Aleš Burjanek (1953)

- had focused on social problems of physical culture and, on problems of deprived agricultural regions. At present, he is interested in problems of inner cities and in questions of residential living.

Recent Publications

Members of the Department have recently published the following books, major articles and textbooks:

Keller, Jan: *Až na dno blahobytu* (All the Way to the Bottom of Affluence). Brno: DUHA 1992.

Keller, Jan: *Úvod do sociologie* (Introduction into Sociology). Praha: SLON 1992 (2nd Edition).

Keller, Jan: *Nedomyšlená společnost* (A Society Not Thought Through). Brno: Doplněk 1992.

Keller, Jan: *Současná francouzská sociologie* (Contemporary French Sociology). Praha: SPN 1989.

Keller, Jan: *Sociologie organizace a byrokracie* (Sociology of Organization and Bureaucracy). Praha: SPN 1989.

Librová, Hana: *Láska ke krajině?* (Love toward the Countryside?). Brno: Blok 1988.

Librová, Hana: *Sociální potřeba a hodnota krajiny* (Social Need and Value of the Countryside). Brno: Spisy univerzity 1987.

Mareš, P., P. Baran: *Vliv zařazení sociálních rizikových faktorů do screeningu rizikového těhotenství na jeho kvalitu* (Social Risk Factors in Screening of Risk Pregnancy - A System for Predicting Spontaneous Abortion). Praha: Ministerstvo zdravotnictví ČR 1990.

Možný, I., P. Mareš (eds.): *Nezaměstnanost - nizozemská zkušenost a československá realita* (Unemployment - Dutch Experience and Czechoslovak Reality). Brno: Masarykova univerzita, Hogeschool de Horst Driebergen 1991.

Možný, Ivo: *Proč tak snadno: rodinné důvody sametové revoluce* (Why so Easily: Family Reasons for the Velvet Revolution). Praha: SLON 1992.

Možný, Ivo: *Moderní rodina* (Modern Family). Brno: Blok 1990.

Střítecký, Jaroslav: "Form und Sinn: Zur Vorgeschichte des Prager Formalismus und Strukturalismus. (Form and Meaning: Toward the Prehistory of the Prague Formalism and Structuralism.)" *Bohemia*, Band 33 (1992), Heft 1: 88-100.

Střítecký, Jaroslav: "Spor o postmodernismus a otázka sociální racionality. (Dispute over Postmodernism and the Question of Social Rationality.)" *Spisy Filosofické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity*, řada G13 (1990): 335-341. Ivo Možný

Report On The International Workshop "Ourselves' Selves: Telling Life Story - Making History"

(collective autobiographies: an alternative sociological analysis of Central European past & present)

Prague (Czechoslovakia), December 7-11, 1992

"Ourselves' Selves" is an adventurous research and teaching project following the life-story approach in sociology. The project started a year and a half ago: a group of eight Czech sociologists began - step by step and within an interactive order - to write, discuss, analyze and interpret their own autobiographical narratives. Besides two stages of

theme-free, introductory autobiographical narratives (the second stage inspired by reading others' first accounts) the following topics have been already carried out: *My Life and Communist Party*; *Ourselves' Selves: How did it come about?*; *My Life from 7 to 9 a.m.*; *Family Possessions*; and *The Last Three Years*. In addition, an unusual university course in biographical sociology for undergraduate students, based on similar principles as *Ourselves' Selves*, has been established.

Having collected seven stages of participant's life-story narratives and written first drafts of papers based on such material, *Ourselves' Selves* invited several colleagues from the field to a modest international workshop on the project and its methodological and theoretical foundations. In addition to the *Ourselves' Selves* team, about a dozen guests from Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, U.K. and U.S., mostly social scientists, took part in the meeting.

In the field of theory and methodology two main issues are interconnected in the *Ourselves' Selves* project: a) the life-story approach in sociology; b) the sociologist's own personal (or biographical) experience and its role in her/his analyses. Generally, the life-story research offers a unique opportunity for a sociologist to incorporate explicitly and directly her/his personal experience into analyzed empirical data. Within the *Ourselves' Selves* project, this was made possible in the form of sociologist's autobiographical narratives, produced in the same way as the other subjects involved in the sample. Moreover, the interactive practice of *Ourselves' Selves* strengthens the credibility of obtained interpretations and generalizations.

It was not an ingenious detailed plan of the organizers but rather a favorable coincidence that particular contributions prepared by invited guests touched in many different ways both main methodological aspects of the project. The contributions offered a really colorful variety of views: an ethnomethodological perspective of life-story telling on everyday, "conversational" level (I. Arminen); some notes towards using sociologist's autobiography in his work (B. Jordan); one's autobiography as a tool

for political struggle observed from the literary theory point of view (G. Ricciardi); social anthropology of life-story telling and "unspeakable past" in post-communist societies - with emphasis on language and the concepts of social change, social memory and social amnesia (M. Andrews); a report on life-story research of Slovak intelligentsia descendants (Z. Kusá); and a postmodern discourse about intellectuals' autobiographical writing in the world where the social sciences' interest in the self, human beings and social laws seems as if it is being replaced by the interest in language, texts and aesthetics (J. Staude).

Ourselves' Selves first offered a methodological/theoretical presentation about risks and chances in the project and its place within contemporary sociology, especially with relation to some methodological taboos of the discipline (Z. Konopásek: *Grandmama Sociology*). Secondly, first drafts of papers concerning some aspects of contemporary social change in Czechoslovakia (J. Kabele: *Biography and Societal Transformation - Our Lives After 1989*; O. Šmídová: *Housing Under State Socialism - Family Strategies*) or the communist past of the society (J. Alan: *The Membership of the Communist Party and Family Stories*) were presented. In his summing-up speech Bill Jordan emphasized the uniqueness of the project within the context of contemporary social research. The project's ability to export historical experience in a format comprehensible for another culture was particularly pointed out (M. Disman). Generally, the project showed promise for contributing considerably to the sociological analysis of contemporary societies.

All texts prepared for the workshop were distributed to the participants in advance so that there was time enough for discussions. At the end of the meeting, the participants were asked for additional reflections on the workshop and its main topics. These brief accounts as well as other texts prepared for the workshop or tape-recordings from the sessions will be of use when preparing a workshop volume. We are currently seeking a publisher.

Zdeněk Konopásek

Peroutka Ferdinand: Budování státu 1918-1923 (The building of the state 1918-1923), I-IV.

Praha, Lidové noviny 1991, Third edition.

A four volumes book-legend written by an excellent Czech journalist and political observer. It is considered to be the best source of information on the adjustment of the independent Czechoslovak state and the first 25 years of its' existence. The book gives a detached historical comment on the political events of the First republic. Although first published sixty years ago, it is very topical now. It contains important references on problems, which were suppressed during the communist period and suddenly opened at the end 1989 (crisis of relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, national minorities, position of christian political parties etc.)

Možný Ivo: Proč tak snadno... Některé rodinné důvody sametové revoluce. (Why so easy... Some family reasons of velvet revolution)

Praha, Sociologické nakladatelství SLON 1991, First edition.

I. Možný, one of the best Czech social scientists and author of many professional and popular books on the sociology of family, explains events in eastern Europe in 1989. He puts three questions: Why so late? Why so easy? And so on? and elaborates upon them with theories of Pierre Bourdieu. The main motives of change are found in the untenable dependence of economic capital on social capital.

Bělohradský Václav: Přirozený svět jako politický problém. Eseje o člověku pozdní doby (The natural world as a political problem. Essays about man of the latest period)

Praha, Československý spisovatel 1991, First edition.

Considerations and essays of a post-modern philosopher and social scientist which come into being from 1977 to 1989 and were "an effort to escape from the cage, which was one version of the world". They are an impression of one period of his thinking. Bělohradský masterly elaborates upon many modern topics (banality of evil, legitimacy and legality, natural language, objective view, phenomenon of Central Europe etc.) and creates their importance for the latest period.

Bělohradský Václav: Kapitalismus a občanské ctnosti (Capitalism and the civil virtues)

Praha, Československý spisovatel 1992, First edition.

A book of unique essays from the daily newspaper Mladá Fronta Dnes. It is called a schoolbook of political behaviour. Bělohradský reflects on the period of the post-communist transformation and recommends the spirit of CR's earlier era of capitalism. He offers an orientation in confusing time and explains important issues of today (political decisions, multicultural society, unpolitical politics, illusion of the social state, victory of liberalism and the end of history etc.).

Petrusek Miloslav: Alternativní sociologie (Alternative sociology)

Praha, Klub osvobozeného samizdatu 1992, First edition.

A book on the sociology of sociology written by one of the best Czech social scientists. Petrusek searched during the communist period for an alternative not only for the retarded marxian sociology but also for every institutionalized form of sociology. He felt that every institutionalized form of sociology was not fully independent and only wrote groving old books about processes and factors which create topical forms of modern sociology.

Staněk Tomáš: Odsun Němců z Československa 1945-1947 (Expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia)

Praha, Academia and Naše vojsko 1991, First edition.

The book makes clear one "white place" of Czechoslovak history which is the dark spot on Czechoslovaks' consciences. Staněk gives a complex view on the circumstances of the expulsion supported by historical and demographical data and proposes detached causes and consequences (short time effect on the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks, simplicity of national situation, composition of war losts...) of the Czechoslovak past.

Machonin Pavel: Sociální struktura Československa v předvečer Pražského jara 1968 (The social structure in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Prague spring 1968)

Praha, Karolinum 1992, First edition.

The author was a team leader which collected in 1967 representative sociological and statistical data concerning social stratification and mobility in Czechoslovakia before political events in 1968.

Using the file of dates and considering wide political, economical and cultural conditions, Machonin explains the following political movements.

Kučera Jaroslav: Odsun nebo vyhnání? (A transfer or ejection?)

Praha, Ústav dějin střední a východní Evropy ČSAV 1992, First edition.

Historical and politological essays on a very questionable part of Czechoslovak history. The author looks for historical causes of this event, analyzes the development of Czech and Slovak relationship and discusses the role of E. Beneš and western powers in the evacuation of the Germans. He concludes that this event has not only one name, but two. It started like an ejection and finished like a transfer.

S-OBZOR. Three months' magazine for critical sociology

Prague 1992

The S-OBZOR is a magazine taked up again by the Sociologický obzor published from 1987 to 1989 as a samizdat. It is open not only to social scientists but also philosophers, psychologists, political scientists, anthropologists and others. The magazine dedicated all topical social, political and close issues, discussion essays, theories and sometimes movies, interviews with scientists and book reviews. It also uses a more acceptable language for nonprofessional public.

Klára Vlachová

The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia

A Chronology of Events in 1992

January

1. Minister of Justice of the Czech Republic L. Richter (OH) resigned.
10. An unofficial meeting of the Czech National Council representatives and of the Slovak National Council in Prague during which each party presented its new conception of the agreement between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. President Havel negotiated with the premier of the Slovak government J. Černo-gurský in the Tatras.
14. The Constitutional Legal Committee did not recommend to read, in the Federal Assembly, the president's bills on amending the role of the head of the state over the Parliament and over the establishment of the Federal Council.

February

5. The joint commission of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council negotiated, with participation of ministers from both the Federal and republics' governments, in Milovy. The Slovak party came with the idea of separate central banks in both republics.
6. After a governmental meeting, the Minister of the Economy of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, V. Dlouhý (ODA), announced at a press conference that the Federal Government would withdraw its demand for just one central bank on the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic's territory.
7. Negotiations continue on the National Councils' commission in Milovy. It concerns sharing the responsibility of administrative power in the sphere of the economy and customs.
8. During the negotiation of the Czech and Slovak National Councils' commission, a proposal of the agreement on the arrangement under the constitutional law was formed, which would comply with the demands of both participating parties.
11. ODA, KDU-ČSL, KDS, ODS, HSD-SMS, SDE and SNS have their reservations about the wording of the 1st article in the preamble of the Milovy agreement on a mutual voluntary federal bond of the Czech and Slovak nations.
12. The presidium of the Slovak National Council rejected a proposal for agreement on the constitutional arrangement. A disagreement was voiced not only by the opposition representatives belonging to the SNS, SDE and HZDS but also by a majority of KDH's members. According to S. Moravčík (HZDS), the agreement proposal is in fact, a return back to the year 1970. According to V. Mečiar (HZDS) it goes as far back as to the year 1960.
14. Negotiations between the chairman of the Czech National Council, D. Burešová (OH), and the chairman of the Slovak National Council, F. Mikloško (KDH), over the consequences of a presidium election for the Slovak National Council (against the Milovy agreement) and over the polarization of KDH. One section of KDH, under the leadership of J. Klepáč, voted against this agreement.
18. In the Federal Assembly, the amendment of three heads of the constitution was not ratified (in the Slovak section of the Chamber of Nations, 3 votes were missing), which was also an alternative proposal by president V. Havel.
19. V. Mečiar denied charges by news media that he cooperated with the former State Security Police (the "Doctor" affair).
20. Deputies of SNS, HZDS and SDE prevented by their filibuster to put the resolutions to the report of the fact-finding

committee of the 17. November 1989, to a vote. The same happened with the report of the Attorney General.

22. The leader of KDH and the Premier of the Slovak Government J. Čarnogurský announced after negotiations of KDH's council that so far, would not split. KDH has objections to the wording of the Milovy agreement.
23. The chairman of the Federal Assembly stated that in regard to the "Doctor" affair (the alleged cooperation of Vl. Mečiar with the State Security Police), he did not know Vl. Mečiar until 1990. Negotiations over the proposal of the Milovy agreement are on the agenda for the 22nd session of the Slovak National Council.
27. President V. Havel and the Federal Chancellor of Germany, H. Kohl, signed a treaty of good relations between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

March

2. President V. Havel relieved General Attorney, I. Gašparovič, of his duties and subsequently appointed a new Attorney General, M. Lauk.
3. The Federal Assembly rejected definitively an amendment to the constitution about division of rights between the Czech and Slovak governments.
6. The Federal Assembly negotiates an amendment of constitutional law regarding the Federation and respective responsibilities.
7. The KDH splits and the formation of SKDH under the leadership of J. Klepáč results.
10. The Slovak section of the Chamber of Nations did not approve two amendments of the constitutional law about the federation. The federal government negotiated the conflict of interests.
11. A meeting of the chairman of the Czech National Council, D. Burešová, and the chairman of the Slovak National Council, F. Mikloško resulted in an agreement to abandon constitutional negotiations due to the coming pre-electoral campaign. The proclamation of the Czech Government to observe the anniversary of March 14

(Declaration of independence of the Slovak state), and to March 15 (Occupation of Bohemia and Moravia). All-nation meeting of Slovaks in Bratislava organized by the League for the Advancement of the Slovak Nation with Slovak writer, R. Kaliský, proposed a request to the Slovak National Council to declare Slovak sovereignty.

14. A meeting of nationalist Slovaks organized by the deputy of the Federal Assembly, J. Pánis, on the Martin's cemetery on the anniversary of March 14, 1939 took place.
19. A two-day working stay of president V. Havel in Slovakia. An optimistic prognosis of Slovak development was published by the Independent Association of Slovak Economists. This association advocates a ratification of the Declaration of Independence and the constitution of the Slovak Republic.
20. President's visit to Slovakia continues. The Czech National Council decides to establish the Ministry for International Relations of the Czech Republic.
- 23.-24. The chairman of Defence and chairman of the Security Committee of the Slovak National Council, F. Javorský (KDH), stated that the state security agent with the cover name "Doctor" is Vl. Mečiar (HZDS). The Slovak National Council refused a proposal for the proclamation of an independent Slovakia initiated by J. Prokeš (SNS). A group of deputies unsuccessfully tried to relieve the Minister of Privatization for the Slovak Republic, I. Mikloš (ODÚ-VPN), from his office. The deputy, Szabo (SZ), proposed to adopt a resolution which would request the president to relieve the Minister of Finance for the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, V. Klaus, from his office. The Slovak National Council reviewed a report of the Defence and Security Committee on the "Doctor" affair.
25. The Slovak National Council approved the report of the Defence and Security Committee on the activity of the Slovak Ministry of the Interior after the year 1989, which includes, apart from other things, information on the "Doctor" affair. The appointed Minister of the Interior is L. Pittner (KDH).

28.-29. VI. Mečiar attempted in an announcement to discredit the charges against him for cooperating with the State Security Police. The leader of KDH, J. Čarnogurský, at an irregular meeting of KDH, ruled out a post-electoral coalition with HZDS. The deputy, J. Klepáč (SKDH), said: "It is necessary to approve the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of Slovakia for a more competent Slovakia". A. Dubček was elected chairman of SSDS. The leader of SDL, P. Weiss, announced that a governmental coalition does not observe electoral promises at the 1st convention of the party.

April

1. Minister of the Slovak Government, V. Oberhauser (SKDH), submitted to the Slovak National Council a proposal for the Slovak Declaration of Independence. The premier of the Slovak Government, J. Čarnogurský, declared this proposal as political primitivism. The meeting was postponed to April 24. In Moscow, the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation was signed.
10. The president, V. Havel, visited eastern Slovakia. The premier of the Federal Government, M. Čalfa (ODÚ-VPN), left for the U.S.A. There he was informed about the negative U.S. attitude towards a possible separation of Czechoslovakia. During the coalition's negotiations of ODÚ-VPN, KDH, DS, SKDH, their representatives declared their disapproval of reading the Declaration of Independence in the Slovak National Council.
14. The last sitting of the Federal Assembly in its electoral session at which the President, V. Havel, delivered an address which, apart from other things, announced his candidacy for the presidential office. Minister of Defence, L. Dobrovský, announced in Bratislava that the armed forces will not intervene in constitutional disputes and that a re-dislocation of the army will proceed according to schedule.
15. The Federal Assembly decided about the two-round presidential election.
22. The Federal Assembly ratified the Friendship Treaty between The Czech and

Slovak Federal Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

26. The 2nd Conference of ODÚ-VPN was held, during which an electoral agreement was reached with DS in Slovakia.
27. The General Assembly of the Slovak National Council postponed negotiations about the independence of Slovakia.
28. The Slovak National Council was extended from 21 to 26 members (13 of governmental parties, 13 of the opposition).
30. The Federal Assembly finished its 22nd and last general session.

May

2. A commemoration ceremony took place on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the death of M. R. Štefánik, a co-founder of the common state of Czechs and Slovaks, at the monument in Brezová pod Bradlom.
4. V. Havel received the delegates of the SSDS led by A. Dubček, and the delegates of the HZDS led by VI. Mečiar.
5. The Czech Government approved a bill on the release of the list of citizens registered with the former State Security Police.
6. The summit of the Visegrád Triangle in Prague. In the opinion of the vice-chairman of the Federal Government, P. Rychetský (OH), the ideas of the chairman of HZDS, VI. Mečiar, on the future development of Slovakia presented at the Prague Castle, lead to the inevitable disintegration of the state.
7. The Hungarian government decided to terminate its agreement with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on the construction of hydroelectric power stations on the Danube (Gabčíkovo - Nagymáros). The Slovak National Council did not approve the Declaration of Independence of Slovakia by the required three-fifth majority. The president closed the last session of the Federal Assembly.
11. The standpoint of the Legislative Council of the Federal Government was the common state can only be saved on the basis of a referendum.
12. A speech of President V. Havel on the occasion of launching a pre-electoral campaign.

14. During an interview with selected journalists, V. Mečiar stated that he will not support the present federal government and that after elections he will not assume any federal post.
18. Launching of the coupon privatization.
20. V. Havel visited southern Slovakia.
26. V. Havel released his screening materials. The Independent Commission of the Federal Ministry of the Interior confirmed that V. Havel has never been a deliberate collaborator of the former secret police.
28. V. Havel visited middle and eastern Slovakia.

June

2. The pre-electoral speech of President V. Havel to his fellow citizens and, in particular, to the Slovak voters, called on them to vote as level-headed citizens who wish to communicate with each other.
3. The majority of political parties support the candidacy of V. Havel for the presidential office. V. Mečiar refused to answer, during a press conference, journalists who "write lies about him".
4. The Commission of the U.S. Congress states that the majority of Czechs wish to live in a common state and do not want to use force for its preservation. In the case that Slovaks choose their independence, Czechoslovakia will be separated.
5. At 2 pm, the parliamentary elections were launched. (June 5-6).
7. On the basis of electoral preliminary results, President V. Havel requested V. Klaus (ODS) to form the Federal Government.
8. Negotiations started in Brno, between ODS and HZDS on the possibilities of setting up government. Leaders of the coalition parties negotiated about cooperation with the Czech government in the future. Chairmen of the Slovak Democratic Left and of HZDS agreed upon the revocation of law by which some special conditions are stated for the performance of some posts in the state institutions and organizations of federal and national republics (the so called 'lustration' law), and upon personal changes in the Ministry of Interior and in the Federal Security Information Service.
9. At a press conference, V. Klaus sums up negotiations with V. Mečiar: this party does not want a common state but only a sort of economic defensive community, i.e. two states with the international legal subjectivity. HZDS and SNS share opinions on the Slovak Declaration of Independence, on the approval of the Slovak Constitution and on the referendum for arranging relations with the Czech Republic.
10. A scheduled meeting of V. Havel and V. Mečiar was cancelled by Mečiar's unspecified reservations towards V. Havel. The final sessions of electoral committees. Coalition parties' representatives in Czech Republic discuss the new government.
11. After negotiations of ODS and HZDS, Slovak representatives confirmed they aim for membership in international organizations incl. UNO, and further, they share a negative attitude towards V. Havel. A meeting of V. Mečiar with chairmen of Czech left-wing parties. According to an agreement, a deputy proposed by HZDS should preside over the Federal Parliament. V. Mečiar did not take part in a meeting at the Prague Castle with the president and with V. Klaus, the chairman of ODS, which received a majority of votes in the Czech Republic.
12. A meeting of chairmen of KDS, ODA, KDU-ČSL, ČSSD, LSU, and of HSD-SMS, with the chairman of ODS V. Klaus.

The chairmen of the parties mentioned above voiced out their support for negotiations between ODS and HZDS. V. Mečiar had a press conference with selected journalists only. The HZDS has got a program for confederate co-existence. It is, however, for the preservation of federal institutions as long as Slovak citizens will not decide about the form of the constitutional arrangement. According to President V. Havel, the referendum should be held for the whole of Czechoslovakia. In the opinion of the opposed LB, the results of negotiations between the ODS and the HZDS diverge from the mandate provided for the chairman of the ODS by President

- V. Havel. Both parties thus overstep their duties.
13. HZDS cancelled their meeting with the ODS scheduled on June 14. due to the unexpected prolonged session of the party's presidium, which definitively decided not to support the election of V. Havel for the presidential office. V. Mečiar was empowered to form a new Slovak government.
 14. HZDS rejected a meeting with the ODS during its visit to Prague on June 15 and suggested a meeting on June 17. Fifty prominent personalities of public and cultural life from Bohemia and Moravia declared their support for the new Czech representation and for V. Havel.
 15. Negotiations between Havel - Mečiar about HZDS's view on the course of the coalition's talks.
 16. Negotiations over the appearance of supreme organs in the Slovak National Council were launched by HZDS, SDL, SNS, KDH and by MKDH.
 17. Negotiations of ODS's and HZDS's delegations in Prague: an agreement on the composition of the ten-member Federal Government was reached. In regard to the financial issues of both republics, HZDS likes the principle that each republic would handle its own gross national product only. V. Klaus and V. Mečiar announced their candidacies for Premiers of the republics' governments. During the negotiation with V. Havel, representatives of some Slovak parliamentary parties declared their support for a common state. Meeting of V. Havel with V. Klaus and V. Mečiar: An agreement was reached about parliamentary parties' representatives in the Federal Assembly and about filling the supreme posts in the Federal Assembly.
 18. Political consultations of V. Havel with representatives of KDH, ČSSD, LSU and of KDU-ČSL about the future state.
 19. Negotiations of ODS and HZDS representatives in Bratislava over the programme's announcement of the Federal Government happened.
 20. An agreement between ODS and HZDS was reached in Bratislava about the parity representation of Czechs and Slovaks in the Federal Government and about the principles of its programme. At the same time, a political agreement was accepted by both parties. By September 30, 1992, an agreement should be reached between the National Councils upon the constitutional arrangement.
 22. Negotiations are in progress about the governmental constitution and about the constitution of the presidium of the Czech National Council. According to V. Havel, a referendum is the most democratic and moral basis to split. It is possible, however, to accept other constitutional procedures.
 23. The former attorney general of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (relieved by V. Havel on March 3, 1992), I. Gašparovič (HZDS), is elected chairman of the establishment of the Slovak National Council. Coalition negotiations are in progress regarding the Czech Government.
 24. V. Mečiar is appointed chairman of the Slovak Government, which consists of 11 members of HZDS, 1 member of SNS and one independent general. At the Federal Assembly, the political committee held a meeting and approved a proposal regarding the filling of parliamentary posts.
 25. ODS proposes J. Stráský, (ODS), to be Premier of the Federal Government. ČSFR bishops published a proclamation of support to V. Havel in the Vatican. The opening session of the Federal Assembly, the inaugural speech of V. Havel, M. Kováč (HZDS) elected a chairman, V. Benda (KDS) elected chairman of the People's Chamber, R. Zelenay (HZDS) elected a chairman of the Chamber of Nations.
 26. Resignation of M. Čalfa's (ODÚ-VPN) from the Federal Government. Ministers empowered with only temporary power of their authority until the formation of the new government.
 27. The speaker for HZDS, J. Šucha, announced that Slovak independence is to be proclaimed in July, while in August the Slovak constitution will be approved. According to HZDS, Slovak citizens will demonstrate their will in a referendum.
 29. Candidate proposals for the presidential office: V. Havel is proposed by the ODS/KDS coalition, J. Čop of Košice is

proposed by the SPR-RSČ. M. Uhde was not elected as chairman of the Czech National Council.

July

1. President V. Havel authorized J. Stráský to form the General Government. Negotiations of V. Havel with Vl. Mečiar and V. Klaus in Bratislava. Slovak Premier Vl. Mečiar presented to the president members of his government. Undersigned the coalition agreement of ODS, KDS, ODA, and of KDU-ČSL.
2. The ten-member federal government takes an oath in support of the Constitution. The Czech government resigned and, at the same time, the new Czech government was appointed (V. Klaus, the chairman).
3. V. Havel was not elected president.
4. On the occasion of celebrations of St. Cyril and St. Method in Děvín (Slovak Republic), the Premier of the Slovak Republic announced the ČSFR split.
6. The federal government's premier J. Stráský, voiced out his conviction that Slovakia has no interest in entering Europe as part of Czechoslovakia during celebrations of Master John Hus in Husinec.
9. Czech Minister for Privatization, J. Skalický (ODA) recommended to split the coupon privatization into Czech and Slovak during an interview for the press.
10. The Federal government presented its program to continue processes which began in November 1989 on the preparation of already determined changes in the structure of the federal ministry, of the solution to power and financial problems, of the transformation and the division of responsibilities of the Federal Security Information Service and of the maintenance of the macroeconomic policy stability. A proposal of the Slovak constitution was rendered to the presidium of the Slovak National Council by Vl. Mečiar.
12. V. Havel announced that, under the certain circumstances, he would agree to be a candidate for the Czech presidency.
13. In the Czech National Council, the program of the Czech Government was proclaimed by V. Klaus. According to V. Klaus, the government intends to proceed with a constitutional solution to problems in a legal way even if this, however, is not the only requirement.
14. The Czech Government was rendered a vote of confidence by the Czech National Council. In regard to the opposition, there was a positive vote only for the deputy of LSU. Vl. Mečiar, Premier of the Slovak Government, presented to the Slovak National Council the program of his government, to which, according to J. Kalvoda (ODA), the vice-chairman of the Czech Government, the Czech party has to give a constitutional proposal.
15. The Czech National Council calls on the Slovak National Council to open without delay a negotiation about a state constitutional arrangement. By September 30, a solution to the constitutional crisis should be reached.
16. The Federal Assembly approved the program of the Czech Government. M. Sládek (SPR-RSČ) was not elected president.
17. The Slovak National Council approved the Slovak Declaration of Independence. President V. Havel announced that, by July 20, he would resign from the presidential office.
18. During meeting of the National Councils' chairmen in Brno, I. Gašparovič (HZDS) rendered over to M. Uhde (ODS) the Slovak Declaration of Independence.
22. The National Economy Committee's chairman, H. Kočtúch (HZDS), left for the U.S.A. to negotiate with the International Monetary Fund. Preparatory work had begun an outline for the Czech constitution. The Czech Government suggests indirect representation for the election of the president. The Federal Government worked out a proposal for the constitutional law which assumes the further existence of a common state (federation) on the basis of changed responsibilities, of separate armed forces, of limited international legal subjectivity, and of separate financial circumstances.
23. The fifth round of negotiations of the ODS and the HZDS definitely aims for

the splitting of the state. In the Federal Assembly negotiations have resulted into political agreements in accord with the disintegration of the state and an agreement upon passing an initial bill on the extinction of the federation.

24. I. Andrejčák, Minister of Defence, stated in his interview for the press on July 24 that it is necessary to maintain a common command of forces, e.g., in the form of the alliance.
27. In Bratislava, delegates of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council reached an agreement to establish a commission for the development of issues for the future cooperation of both republics. In the Federal Assembly, Premier Mečiar negotiated with the Czech opposition the possibility of the nation's co-existence in one state.
29. The presidium of the Slovak National Council, received from Premier V. Mečiar by the government, approved the wording of the Slovak constitution. The constitution of the Slovak Republic is to be approved by the end of August, with effect from October 1. The Czech Government worked on an ideological proposal for the Czech constitution and then submitted it through Premier V. Klaus.
30. None of candidates for the presidential office were elected.

August

1. The presidium of the HZDS stated that the agreement between the victorious parties is not, on the part of the ODS, observed.
3. ODS does not agree with the statement of HZDS about the observation of agreements.
4. In the Federal Assembly, negotiations of HZDS are led with the Czech opposition (ČSSD, LSU) about the necessity of mutual co-existence. The supreme representative of the Catholic Church in the ČSFR, cardinal F. Tomášek, died.
5. In the Slovak National Council, Premier V. Mečiar stated: the referendum on the constitutional arrangement of the state is now against the interests of Slovakia. But even if it is realized and citizens will vote for the federation there is still no need for to hold elections again, as HZDS has in its program an additional five solutions to the state constitutional problems.
6. In the Federal Assembly, HZDS, in spite of previous agreements, questioned a candidate of ODS for the post of the Federal Security Information Service control chairman. The sitting of the Federal Assembly was prematurely closed due to the obstruction of the ODS and the KDS deputies.
- 7.-8. The plenary session of the League for the Advancement of the Slovak Nation, during which J. Markuš was elected chairman, considers the Slovak Declaration of Independence as the first step to an independent Slovak state. A further step is to be the approval of the Slovak Constitution.
12. The state's budget was announced to be, in crowns: The Czech Republic: 1.84 billion plus, the Slovak Republic: 1.18 billion deficit, the Federation: 0.71 billion deficit.
20. Negotiations of the National Councils' chairmen: I. Gašparovič (HZDS) was informed about the progress of the Czech constitution.
22. HZDS submitted a proposal for agreement upon the Czecho-Slovak Union.
24. Mečiar refused to meet Klaus.
25. In the Slovak National Council, a discussion about the Slovak constitution was postponed.
26. Representatives of HZDS and of ODS reached an agreement about the schedule of further procedures in solving constitutional problems of the state in order to ensure that by January 1, 1992, two independent states are established. According to that agreement, the president of the Federal Security Information Service is to be proposed by the HZDS.
27. Presidium of the Czech National Council relieved Attorney General, L. Bruner, from his office.
31. The Federal Legislative Council negotiated a law proposal on the extinction of the federation.

September

1. The Slovak National Council solemnly approved the Slovak constitution. A. Dubček, chairman of the SSDS, had a car accident.
2. A meeting of HZDS with the presence of V. Mečiar was held in Bratislava, on the occasion of the Slovak constitution's acceptance.
3. The Federal Government approved the law proposals regarding the extinction of the federation.
7. In the Federal Assembly, the government submitted its law proposal about the extinction of the federation. The general manager of the Czechoslovak Press Agency, P. Uhl, was relieved from his post.
9. The Federal Government decided about the division of wealth of the ČSFR (after the splitting of the federation) on the basis of territorial principle and in the ratio 2:1. According to the program of the Slovak Government, the Slovak Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property worked out a new conception according to which a coupon method of privatization remains only a supplementary method of direct sales.
11. Negotiations of the Federal Assembly about the state's constitutional arrangement: for the Federal Government, a referendum is not the only possibility for the extinction of the federation.
12. Presidium of HZDS suggests additional issues; social, territorial, functional when property is divided.
15. A debate in the Czech National Council over the Czech constitution takes place.
23. The Federal Government changed its decision about the division of wealth: the division will be based only on the territorial principle and population count in the ratio 2:1.
28. The State Defence Council discusses the division of the army's property. V. Mečiar negotiates with the Czech opposition.
- for constitutional law on the transformation of the ČSFR into a Czecho-Slovak Union. The ODS pronounced this as a breach of agreements with HZDS.
3. Irregular sessions of the Czech government in Koloděje discuss 15 agreements with the Slovak Republic. The Slovak party rejected a governmental meeting and requested a meeting of political representatives only.
6. During negotiations between ODS and HZDS, in Jihlava, an accord was reached on the disintegration of the ČSFR as of January 1, 1993, and they made further agreements necessary for the division of the state.
8. The Federal Assembly approved an amendment to the constitutional law of December 12, 1990 (the so called competence law) by which a substantial amount of responsibilities transfers from the federation to the republics.
10. Czech and Slovak Governmental delegates reached agreement upon the Monetary and Customs Union (incl. agriculture) and upon a common market. State citizenship remains a controversial issue in both republics.
15. An assassination threat to V. Mečiar occurs during his visit to Germany.
20. A commission for the preparation of the new constitutional law for the transformation of the ČSFR into a Union could not be formed. ODS, KDS, HZDS, SNS, KDH did not proposed their candidates in this respect. The Czech National Council negotiated the Security Service and approved a law about the Czech Press Agency. In the course of negotiations some political party representatives refused to accept a proposal of the ODA to declare Czech sovereignty.
21. The Czech National Council did not approve the proposal of the ODA's parliamentary club by which the constitutional authorities took over the responsibility for the formation of an independent Czech state. The Czech government approved ČSFR's extinction law to take effect on December 31, 1992. The set of measures regarding security, defence, state administration, foreign policy, is a supplement to

October

1. The Federal Assembly did not approve the governmental law proposal for the methods of splitting the federation, but did approve a proposal by M. Zeman (ČSSD) to establish a commission for the preparation

- the extended governmental program. Experts worked out 8 agreements between the Czech and Slovak Republics about internal security and order.
22. The Czech Government's commission finished the operational model of the Czech Constitution.
24. A proposal for the constitutional law regarding the Czech Republic's emblems was negotiated in the Czech National Council.
25. Czech and Slovak Governmental officials meet in Javorina in the Tatras. The question of state citizenship still remains unsolved. The memorandum of the Czech and Slovak Government to enter the European Community was undersigned.
28. J. Delors suggested to negotiate again, after the division of the ČSFR, the associate agreement with the EC.
29. Eighty deputies of ODS approved in the Federal Assembly a resolution in which their colleagues initiate a declaration of Czech sovereignty in the case that the Slovak Government endangers the position of the Czech Republic by undertaking unilateral action towards the problem of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymáros water dam.
30. Hungary brought action against the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic at the International Court of Justice in the Hague.
14. The funeral of A. Dubček took place without any official speech from the Czech side. Representatives of political parties represented in the National Councils and in the Federal Assembly negotiated the legalities of the federation's extinction.
16. The Slovak Democratic Union stopped its activities. The Czech National Council recommends that the Federal Assembly approve the extinction law of the ČSFR.
17. The Slovak National Assembly recommends that the Federal Assembly approve the extinction law of the federation.
18. The Federal Assembly did not approve the government's proposal of constitutional law about the federation's extinction. This proposal was approved only in the People's Chamber and by the Czech section of the Chamber of Nations. The Czech Government approved the proposal for constitutional laws according to the measures connected with the continuous transition of federal institutions under the administration of the Czech Republic. A law about the division of the railways was approved.
19. The Czech National Council approved the coalition's statement that this council, along with the Czech government, take over the responsibility of state power on the territory of the Czech Republic.
20. A new parliamentary association formed in the Czech National Council.

November

1. The Czech Government commented on the wording of the Czech constitution.
5. The Slovak section of the Chamber of Nations did not approved the extended program of the Federal Government.
7. Due to September's car accident, A. Dubček died. The congress of the ODS was called, at which V. Klaus was again elected chairman of the party.
9. The Czech and Slovak Government reached an agreement in Židlochovice about the methods of the federal wealth's division. Furthermore, a treaty about friendly and mutual relations about the prevention of double taxation and about the protection of investment, was negotiated.
13. The Federal Assembly approved the constitutional law about the division of wealth.
- The Independent Liberal association consisting of deputies of opposed parties (the LSU and the SPR-RSČ), supports a coalition in the Czech National Council when voting upon the new territorial responsibilities of the Czech Republic. The Czech National Council approved a law about health insurance and premium insurance.
23. In Bratislava, the chairman of the Slovak Government, V. Mečiar, and the vice-chairman of the Czech Government, I. Kožárník, signed treaties between both governments. They did not agree on the procedure of implementing a law on the division of wealth.
24. The Czech National Council approved ten treaties between the Czech and Slovak Republics. The Federal Assembly did not constitute a quorum when accepting laws

about the federation's extinction. An absence of deputies was accounted for bad weather conditions.

25. The Federal Assembly approved the ČSFR extinction law.

26. The constitutional court sustained the proposal of 99 deputies belonging to the former Federal Assembly by which a presumed collision of the so called 'lustration' law with the Charter of fundamental rights and civil liberties and with international pacts was criticized. On the day of its implementation some paragraphs of this law therefore ceased to be valid. A decision as to whether this can be adjusted and incorporated into current legislation must depend on the National Council.

27. The Czech Government set up its budget for 1993. The Federal Assembly decided not to hold a further round of presidential elections.

December

2. The Federal Assembly approved the customs law.

3. The Slovak National Council approved the proclamation of the Slovak Republic to the parliaments and nations of the world.

4. In the U.S.A., the ambassador was received by official authorities in connection with the discovery of an eavesdropping device at the US consulate in Bratislava.

5. An unsuccessful attempt to murder the chairman of KSČM, J. Svoboda, took place.

7. Premier V. Klaus submitted a governmental proposal for the constitution at a session of the Czech National Council's commission in Láňy.

10. During the session of the governmental commission in Láňy, the coalition gave in to the opposition on the matter of the charter of fundamental rights and liberties which was to be a section of the constitution. Further, the coalition compromised regarding the legality of the referendum, which was then made possible by constitutional law under certain circumstances. The coalition also gave in about having a three-fifth majority of votes to approve constitutional law.

13. The Czech Government approved a declaration of international recognition of the Czech Republic and to establish diplomatic relations with other states. Further, it approved a law proposal about the army, accepted a memorandum of the International Monetary Fund on the basis of which the Czech Republic, with effect from January 1, 1993, will be a member. The Czech Government negotiated further the incorporation of Federal Assembly members into the Senate.

14. At the Slovak party's request, the Fund of National Property postponed the distribution of shares to participants of the coupon privatization from January to April 1993.

16. The Czech National Council approved the new Czech Constitution. The National Council of the Slovak Republic (former Slovak National Council) approved a legal proposal about the establishment of the Slovak armed forces.

17. The Czech National Council negotiated treaty proposals about the acknowledgment of passports and tax issues. The Federal Assembly stopped its activities.

18. The International Monetary Fund recommended the ratio 2.29:1 when dividing quotes between the Czech and Slovak Republic.

19. The Czech National Council, in a secret ballot, rejected a proposal to transform federal deputies into senators. The Federal Government, which will split up without resignation as there is no authority to accept this resignation, has its last sitting.


27. Premiers of the Czech and Slovak Republic V. Klaus and V. Mečiar announced that in the Slovak Republic the coupon privatization will stop. In the Czech Republic, the second wave is in preparation.

28. The presidium of the Czech National Council was dissolved, which will be replaced by the organization committee, the activity of which was split among bodies of the Czech National Council. The transit gas pipeline will be divided, on the basis of negotiations between the Czech and Slovak Ministers of Commerce, into two national companies, which together will form a third, supranational company.

29. The Czech National Council approved a law about state citizenship.
30. Ministers J. Zieleniec (ODS) and M. Kňažko (HZDS) exchanged notes about the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Czech and Slovak Republic.

* * *

- ČSSD - Československá sociální demokracie (the Czechoslovak Social Democracy)
- DS - Demokratická strana (the Democratic Party)
- HSD-SMS - Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii - Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko (the Movement for Local Democracy - Society for Moravia and Silesia)
- HZDS - Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko (the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia)
- KDH - Kresťansko demokratické hnutie (the Christian Democratic Movement)
- KDS - Kresťanskodemokratická strana (the Christian Democratic Party)
- KDU-ČSL - Kresťanskodemokratická unie - Československá strana lidová (the Christian Democratic Union - the Czechoslovak People's Party)
- KSČM - Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (the Communist Party of Czech Lands and Moravia)
- LB - Levý blok (the Left Bloc)
- LSU - Liberální sociální unie (the Liberal Social Union)
- MKDH - Maďarské kresťansko demokratické hnutie (the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement)
- ODA - Občanská demokratická aliance (the Civic Democratic Alliance)
- ODS - Občanská demokratická strana (the Civic Democratic Party)
- ODÚ-VPN - Občianská demokratická únia - Verejnosť proti násiliu (the Civic Democratic Movement - Public Against Violence)
- OH - Občanské hnutí (the Civic Movement)
- SDE - Strana demokratické ľavice (the Party of the Democratic Left)
- SKDH - Slovenské kresťansko demokratické hnutie (the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement)
- SNS - Slovenská národná strana (the Slovak National Party)
- SPR-RSČ - Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Československa (the Coalition for Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia)
- SSDS - Slovenská sociálno demokratická strana (the Slovak Social Democratic Party)
- SZ - Strana zelených (the Green Party)



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