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Civil Society: Adventures of the Concept before and after 1989*

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Abstract: Respecting the perspective that 'civil society' has recently been revived not by academics as a purely theoretical concept but rather by social and political actors as a practical political idea, the article seeks to follow the metamorphoses that the idea's content and meaning have undergone in changing historical circumstances over the past two decades, especially as reflected in the Czech (and Slovak) discussion. In a historical sequence, it identifies three different political and social contexts that have endowed the idea with specific contents and meanings, and it distinguishes these as three major stages of the metamorphoses. It labels the stages as 'moral defence before the state' (before 1989), 'mobilising the polity' (1989-1991), and 'balancing the state's institutional arrangement' (since 1994). As it is the last meaning that is contested today in the Czech discussion, some typical problematic points of this case are raised. Finally, a way is suggested in which critical social theory could reflect upon some deficits of the notion of civil society as employed today, so that the latter can still be retained as a normative idea.

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Whether or not we deem the term 'civil society' adequate for labelling certain social and political practices in our contemporary societies, the fact is that it has been frequently employed by theorists and political actors over the past decade. We can even say – without much exaggeration – that the revitalisation of the idea of civil society has become one of the most significant events in reflecting on what is at stake in public life today.

The story is well-known. Initiated by the shifting trends in social and political participation in the West – especially in connection with the rise of "new social movements" in the 1970s – the revitalisation process was accelerated by the historical events of transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes of political rule in Latin America and East Central Europe.[1]

The variety of historical (social-political) contexts within which this event has taken place suggests that the concept of civil society has not been endowed with just one fixed meaning. At the same time, the names of those who have come to participate in the theoretical revival of the concept in the West – ranging from Norberto Bobbio and John Keane, through Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, Michael Walzer and Charles Taylor, to Edward Shills and Daniel Bell[2] – indicate that the notion in question has been appropri-

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1) For a detailed account of the concept's revival in this very context see for example Chapter I.1 of [Cohen and Arato 1992].

2) Recent literature on civil society has already grown abundant. With reference to these authors, see for example [Bobbio 1988, Keane 1988b, Cohen and Arato 1992, Walzer 1992, Taylor 1990, Bell 1988, Shills 1991].

ated by more than one theoretical tradition. This also testifies to both the concept's attraction as well as its elasticity. It is the latter quality – i.e. the concept's elasticity (though understood in specific ways) – that I want to focus on in what follows.

Regardless of the historical or theoretical contexts from which the concept of civil society draws its meaning and content, the concept's recent usage bears one common feature. It is at the same time both a descriptive term and a normative idea. It reflects the character of a certain social and political practice, serving as a conceptual means of its theoretical analysis, and it is employed as a criterion of acceptability or desirability of that practice. In other words, it evokes not only something that in a way already exists, but also something which is worth maintaining and nurturing – something which is wanted, and which is often wanted on a larger scale, more perfectly, on more solid ground.[3]

As such, the notion of civil society – an intellectual heritage of early modernity – has not been brought back into the game by a purely academic concern with the history of ideas. As noted above, its reappearance occurred in intimate relation to concrete social and political struggles: as their theoretical reflection and self-reflection by participating actors. It is the character of our time alone and the tasks we face in public life that seem to give us reasons to resuscitate the classical concept of modern political and social philosophy.

My intention here is not, however, to present our contemporary situation as catching up with what has been lost in the course of historical time from the original modern promise (the promise of enlightenment).[4] What I want to stress here is that the character of our time has made it possible for the concept of civil society to appear as a vivid idea and become a mobilising political slogan. It has often been through this very concept that political and social actors have tended to understand and interpret their public conduct – i.e. goals they seek and ways to achieve them, conflicts in which they are involved, attitudes they take to various public issues, and so forth.[5]

Yet, as I attempt to show here, different historical contexts attach the concept of civil society to specific patterns of public conduct in different manners. As each context determines the practical stakes of civil society, the latter's descriptions also require specific languages in order to correspond with the historically specific experience of social actors. In other words, filling the phrase civil society with some content and especially determining the ways in which it is employed as an interpretative means is not a purely intellectual or theoretical business. The concrete historical circumstances of the action

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[3]) It is the strong normative connotations that distinguishes the concept of civil society from an ideal type in Max Weber's sense. Its normativity does not however preclude the term from becoming a useful means of theoretical analysis of concrete social and political practices. It rather works as a barrier to reaching a basic agreement on what civil society actually represents. It renders the term a politically contested idea. This shifts the concept to a somewhat different position compared to that in which we today find concepts like the state, capitalism, family, science, religion, bureaucracy, the market and others.

[4]) This is how Jürgen Habermas interprets the political changes of 1989 in East Central Europe. See [Habermas 1990a, b].

[5]) I discuss the idea of civil society as a cognitive and normative symbol in a more detailed way in my article [Marada 1996]. The study presented here draws on that article and it develops some ideas outlined there.

that is to be interpreted also play a significant role here. The recent East Central European experience provides us with good evidence of this.

Speaking of the fate of the idea of civil society in this region – with particular attention paid to the Czechoslovak and Czech case – we may observe a three-stage metamorphosis which the idea's meaning has undergone over the last decade or so. In the following, I will attempt to provide the basic characteristics of each of these three stages, presenting the major differences among them as they have been reflected in the changing styles of theoretical language.

Civil society as a sphere of authentic conduct

This notion was first reinvented in connection with the activities of either semi-independent movements, such as the Polish 'Solidarity,' or the dissident movement, as with former Czechoslovakia's Charter 77. More precisely, the concept had already been used for some time within the Polish context before it was appropriated by the Czechoslovak dissident writers. And even then it did not acquire as central a position in the self-reflection of the Czechoslovak opposition movement as it did for the Polish one (represented, besides Solidarity, especially by the Committee in Defence of Workers – KOR). This was not just a matter of literary taste or preference. It also reflected some differences in the situations in which these two movements found themselves, and which affected their activities in styles and objectives.

Jacques Rupnik [1992], tracing the change in character of the reform movement in East-Central European countries after 1968, labels the change as a shift from Marxist revisionism to the idea of civil society. Definitively parting company with Marxism and the leading communist parties as prospective agents of democratic political reforms, the former reformists joined other opponents of the regimes, and the thus-formed dissent started to practice "the 'anti-politics' of emancipation of civil society by its own potential" [Ibid.: 239, 240]. At this point, Rupnik speaks for the Central European region as one whole. Yet at other places he also observes the varying actual historical circumstances that determined the different stakes of the opposition movements in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, in the late 1970s and the 1980s.

In short, while in especially the Polish case the concept of civil society was bound to Adam Michnik's idea of 'new evolutionism', a moral conception of citizenship became the horizontal vision of the Czechoslovak dissent. New evolutionism meant a gradual self-organisation of society – no longer under the guidance of an enlightened avant-garde but on the ground of shared experience of deprived common interests or rights. This kind of living experience was to mobilise a spontaneous co-operative social practice. In Czechoslovakia, however, there was rather the tendency to formulate the problem on the individual level. What was at stake was the possibility and capacity of an individual to act and speak in concert with his or her own conscience and will.[6]

This appeal went in both directions: it was addressed to the state authorities as well as the social actors themselves. For it was recognised that the sphere of moral public conduct had shrunk to the extent to which the regime had succeeded in corrupting peo-

[6]) The initial declaration of Charter 77 also focused predominantly on basic individual civil rights such as freedom of speech, religious faith, freedom of conscience, freedom from fear, the right to choose one's profession, etc.

ple's conscience and will. The major battle line between the bureaucratised state and most of society was not marked by outright oppression, which could have kept the moral realms of good and evil or right and wrong distinct and effective. Neither was it based on any clear class division, though many may have profited from their positions within the system. The bureaucratic-ideological colonisation of society, the latter's inclusion into the former, was more effectively achieved through a network of non-violent sanctions – formal and informal – that made loyal and docile public conduct normal and void of moral meaning. What was the dominant issue in the appeal of civil society, then, was the revitalisation of the moral dimension of citizenship, rather than an instrumentally understood and politically relevant public activism.

Charter 77 never gained the character of a mass movement, despite its initial ambition of rousing up the normalised society from apathy, docile resignation, and disinterested servility to the regime. Even though its activity was never suppressed completely, it was from the very beginning safely isolated from the wider social environment. It started its career with the silent sympathies of society, on the one side, and officially advertised counter-acts – for example, denouncing petitions from artists or workers – arranged and enforced by the political authorities, on the other side. This basic feature – i.e. secret sympathy and manifest distance – accompanied the movement's existence almost continually until November 1989. It was only in 1988, the year of the 20th anniversary of the Soviet invasion, when the isolated oppositional activities were joined by a remarkable, though still limited move from outside.[7]

Václav Havel's essay 'Anti-Political Politics'[8] (1984) – which has often been referred to as a literary example of striving for civil society in this situation – targeted the very schizophrenia that marked people's attitudes to the dissident movement, and which affected, to various extents, public behaviour in general. In his essay, Havel addresses the demoralising effects of such a 'loyalty game,' in which both sides knew that it was just a game. The ritualisation of the manifestations of loyalty to the regime – which were incorporated in various kinds of social practices, ways of behaviour and speaking – made them devoid of any deeper moral commitment they could possibly express. By the same virtue, however, the immorality of these seemingly innocent rituals of loyalty to the 'bad' regime disappeared from sight as well, which made it easier for people to practice them. The rituals became individual tools to cope with and get rid of the fatal burden of the political environment, in order to save at least some space for 'normal private life.' In other words, public behaviour largely lost its moral dimension, and became almost purely instrumental in the above sense. Havel places this kind of behaviour in contrast to action,

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[7]) The petition 'A Few Sentences' – calling on the regime authorities to respect basic human rights – was perhaps the most remarkable oppositional action of this time. Initiated by dissident circles, it became big enough to make the regime reluctant to persecute the petitioners, yet the number of the latter still remained not much more than 10,000. The large majority of sympathisers once again confined themselves to discussing the growing list of famous people (mostly artists) – announced regularly by Radio Free Europe – who had signed the petition. As a matter of fact, the signatures of famous personalities alone made this action *attractive* (which is not the same value as outright support or mobilising for action) as well as keeping the regime back from a radical repressive response. Some educational and appealing effect, however, can hardly be denied either.

[8]) [Havel 1988]. The original Czech title of this essay written in 1984 is 'Politics and Conscience' [see Havel 1990: 41-59].

the rationality or rightness of which is to be measured by values of humanity and truth – and not by calculated bureaucratic efficiency or ideological correctness. His appeal demonstrates the sense in which the 'anti-political' spirit of the idea of citizenship coalesced with the moral appeal the idea was to convey before 1989.

Havel finds a space for moral conduct outside politics as understood in the conventional sense of the word, i.e. as exercised by the state authorities. This space outside state politics, however, was not to be imagined as an area distinct and separated from it, to be entered and left by individuals. It was to be created by the kind of conduct that applies to itself the above mentioned criteria of rightness alone. In this sense Havel insists in his essay that "we need first and foremost to help ourselves" [Ibid.: 391]. It was a task for every single person to look for and test possible enclaves in everyday conduct in which these criteria could be employed. In the anti-political everyday dimension, Havel concludes, "it is becoming evident that politics by no means need remain the affair of professionals (...)." [Ibid.: 398].[9]

What Havel also alludes to in this phrase, though somehow unwittingly, is a peculiar politicisation of everyday life under and by the communist regime. In this world, even seemingly innocent personal choices – like artistic taste, dressing, lifestyle, circles of friends, religious faith, withdrawal from public life, and so on – *might* be interpreted in political terms, i.e. as an expression of one's attitude towards the regime. One did not have to make the effort to attach political meaning to one's behaviour. The political environment itself did the job[10] – not systematically and in an ideologically consistent way, but selectively and instrumentally. Thus the schizophrenia at the level of individual conduct and attitudes found its parallel in the way the state gained the loyalty of citizens. On the one side, no sincere ideological commitment was really expected to underpin the manifestations of loyalty, on the other side, the door was still kept open for exercising effective pressure against any individual.

Paradoxically, the situation that allowed for the political interpretation of one's behaviour also provided a relatively safer space for the expression of political resistance. One did not have to be explicit in one's opposition to the regime. It could be expressed in other, more implicit ways. The famous grocer from Havel's *Power of the Powerless* could always defend himself before the authorities by saying that he had just forgotten to put the communist symbols in his shop window. He might not have avoided some troubles by acting this way, and he could have hardly repeated this omission next time without getting into more serious trouble. The point is, however, that while his inner motive for not expressing symbolic support to the regime could be authentic without necessarily leading to an open conflict with the authorities, an authentic explanation of his act could already mean an existential threat.[11] Quarrels with bureaucratic authorities over the inter-

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[9]) "I favour politics as practical morality, as service to the truth, as essentially human and humanly measured care for our fellow-humans" [Ibid.: 397].

[10]) This is a rather too impersonal view. It was of course real people who were able and did assign political meaning to other people's conduct. Perhaps the capacity to assign political meaning to other people's action was one of the social signs of the presence of power relations.

[11]) It must have been a tough job for the political interpreters to decipher the real motives of a toy-shop merchant in Brno who in 1986, following the rule, put the slogan in his shop window saying 'We Greet the Delegates of the Regional Conference of the Communist Party' – leaving this surrounded by dozens of teddy bears.

pretation of one's behaviour was a common conflict experienced by people who at the same time did not explicitly express their opposition to the regime, but who did not behave exactly as was expected. Ironically, this sometimes made ignoring formal manifestations of loyalty – i.e. authentic behaviour – easier for those who were on more friendly terms with these authorities or their representatives.

My intention is not to ironise the concept of authenticity. What I seek to point out is some of the ambivalence that it contains. In the situation described above, people could feel as if they were not succumbing to the impersonal power of the regime – as if they were not playing its game – in more than just one dimension of their public conduct. If they felt the need to express their disloyalty, they tended to do it either indirectly (i.e. implicitly in the above sense) or negatively (i.e. they abstained from expressing loyalty, rather than expressed their disloyalty). What is even more important is that in both cases they did it in individual ways.[12] Generally, then, in order to retain some degree of moral integrity, people sought to avoid public situations in which they were forced to express their attitude to the regime clearly and explicitly. As this was not always possible, people had to calculate the costs of a strictly authentic, moral stance in this kind of situation. It not only could put one into open opposition to the communist state. It also threatened to exclude one from society in a significant sense.[13]

This shows how the politicisation of society contributed not to its uniting but to its segmentation. It was difficult for Charter 77 to cross its borders and spread the spirit of civil society[14] in a wider social environment. In a sense, these were two societies with two somewhat different moral codes. This is not to say that the openly and uncompromisingly resistant stance, represented by the dissident movement, was completely alien and impenetrable for the rest of society. It was just inappropriate for their world, if this world of relative security without public freedom was not to be destroyed completely. Charter 77's status was that of a moral memento, rather than of a leading or mobilising force. Standing often as moral idols, the dissidents remained in a sense as much removed from ordinary people as the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.[15]

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[12]) Individual acts expose the actor's motives to political interpretation much less than acting in concert with other people. This sociological tenet was felt strongly, if intuitively, by people.

[13]) This ranged from troubles with finding jobs (dissidents were typically isolated from society as window-cleaners, stokers, etc.) to imprisonment as a permanent physical exclusion.

[14]) It was for example Jan Urban who saw an 'element of civil society' in Charter 77, as well as in the Polish KOR [Urban 1990].

[15]) Petr Pithart and Ludvík Vaculík were two outstanding figures of the Czechoslovak dissent who critically pointed to the centrifugal effects of the maximalist moral appeal launched by Charter 77. The sense of moral elitism, aroused by this appeal, separated and effectively isolated the dissident movement from the rest of society. The strict moral code of the dissident world stood as a barrier between this world and the sympathetic outside one.

Later in the 1980s, nevertheless, there were attempts at a somehow more differentiated view of Czechoslovak society. Martin Bútora [Bútora, Krivý and Szomolányiová 1990] coined the term 'islands of positive deviation' for activities that escaped normality by their independence – both organisational and moral – of the regime. Even though this term was to cover a wider spectrum of activities than only those by Charter 77 (like ecological or artistic), the term 'deviation' is symptomatic and was not chosen accidentally. The activities described by this term did not deviate from

The bureaucratisation and ideologisation of everyday public life forced people to look for a sphere of authentic conduct outside this space. Whether they played the regime's game and took a disengaged part in manifestations of loyalty or were reluctant to do so, in any case they largely found the space for authenticity in their private lives. Havel's life-world – the sphere of concrete experience and personal responsibility, and the sought after equivalent of a truly civil society – did not expand into public life. On the contrary, the sphere of practised morality shrank to the sphere of intimate relations, and the whole concept of morality was radically 'privatised.' Dichotomies such as good and bad, right and wrong, truth and lies were, more than elsewhere, recognisable in and applicable to intimate personal relations on the one hand, and/or they became a matter of the internal spiritual life of a person, on the other. Ironically, as Ludvík Vaculík has pointed out, the peculiar consequence of this atmosphere was that the heroic moral stances of the narrow circle of dissidents were deprived of their public status, and were perceived "still more as just their personal business" [Vaculík 1990: 30].

Civil society as a way of political democratisation

What was especially at stake at the first stage was – should we employ the language of space – a certain minimal level of independence of and protection from the all-penetrating state (administrative-ideological machinery). The simple distinction between the state and (civil) society was central. The two poles were to be strictly distinguished and set against one another in order to gain or defend a protected public space for state-independent activities. The idea of civil society in relation to the state stood for an essentially defensive project.

This changed radically after the political break of 1989. Unlike Czechoslovak oppositional activities before 1989, the Polish Solidarity movement can be seen as a transitional case. Already before 1989, this movement bore some elements of the kind of open political engagement that marks the second stage in my sketch of metamorphoses of the idea of civil society.[16] But it was not before 1989 that the idea, as it entered a quite different political constellation, definitely acquired a completely new meaning. While referring to civil society before 1989 meant seeking protection from the state, now the state alone – the thoroughly disturbed political and ideological power structure – was to be penetrated by something like 'public spirit' supplied by the whole of society. Now the civilised politics was to be conducted within and through the conventional political institutions of the state.

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rules posed by the regime. The term pointed to the status these activities had in a wider society, however respected or even admired they might have been by the majority of the population.

Jiřina Šiklová [1990] added another segment to those two social worlds – the 'grey zone.' She saw the 'grey zone' as a growing and socially heterogeneous segment of the population that still may have played the 'loyalty game' but which was also close to the dissent by its attitudes, and which, most importantly, was still more interested in a regime change as it could not consummate its non-political skills.

Similarly Ivo Možný [1990] provides a sociological explanation of the 1989 political change by pointing out the interest of a widening segment of population in withering away the political and economic regime that prevented it from realising its social, cultural, and also economic capital.

[16]) For a more detailed account see [Marada 1996: 45, note 7].

The new phase came along with the establishment of the leading revolutionary agent – Civic Forum/Public Against Violence[17] – and its rapidly growing political role in the first months following November 1989. The Forum's spokesmen also tended to present Civic Forum as an institutional base or agent of civil society – as the broadest possible ground on which various opinions were to be discussed and refined as to how to shape the new political life of the country.[18] Within this context – i.e. as bound to institutions like Civic Forum – the concept of civil society became radically politicised: civil society turned into a catchword for a truly political democratisation.

It is an interesting lesson to trace the transition of Civic Forum from the originally rather (ideologically and organisationally) amorphous political subject to a set of distinct political platforms, out of which several independent political parties eventually arose. In general, the event of the rise and fall of Civil Forum replants the discourse of civil society from the language of authenticity, moral autonomy and integrity, politics as conscience, the struggle for basic human rights and freedoms, political manipulation of public space, mechanisms of resistance (against the regime) or escape (to privacy), to the language of sovereignty, decision-making, legitimacy, representation, political mobilisation and participation, organization and communication (or strategic and communicative action).

Inspired especially by the Polish development from the early 1980s (the experience of Solidarity and KOR) and by Gorbacov's reforms in Soviet Union in the second half of the decade, the Czechoslovak oppositional movement before 1989 – however paralysed in its actional potential – did not completely neglect the question of prospective strategic behaviour in the case of a fundamental political upheaval. Yet in November 1989, Civic Forum was not established according to a detailed strategic plan, neither did it arise out of an intensive and co-ordinated organisational effort. It emerged rather spontaneously as a response to events that had gradually revealed a growing willingness of ever larger parts of the population to stand up openly to the ever weaker (i.e. paralysed or inactive in its repressive functions) regime.

In the West, Civic Forum has sometimes been mistaken for Charter 77 or taken as its successor. Yet although there were many people connected with Charter 77 who played an important role in forming Civic Forum, the two institutions were linked rather loosely to one another. No doubt there was a strategic reason behind diminishing this linkage. It had to do with the legacy of the exclusive character or position within society that Charter 77 had acquired before 1989. This legacy could have represented a barrier to the mobilisation of a massive and active support in this situation that posed new challenges before the opposition movement. Openness was one of the most important im-

[17]) The Public Against Violence was formed as Civic Forum's Slovak equivalent and closest partner. Their common or co-ordinated activity from the first months after November 1989 was later replaced by shifts towards greater independence of one another. Here I will concentrate upon the Czech part of this dual body.

[18]) This strategy was in a sense natural, regarding the lack of procedural (legal) legitimacy as well as of political experience on the part of the new political leadership.

peratives of the new movement, and the way in which Civic Forum came into being corresponded to this imperative.[19]

Upon the declaration of a group of intellectuals in a small Prague theatre, Civic Forum, as it came into being, had nothing of a formally organised institution but its name. It had no members, only acting sympathisers. The spontaneous and informal way in which the first Civic Forum had arisen became a pattern for the emergence of hundreds or thousands local Civic Forums. They were not established by any predetermined rules, only by acting in certain ways under the same label. And everyone could sympathise, everyone could act under that label, at least in principle. Members of the Communist Party were often quite active in establishing and working for local Civic Forums, whatever the reasons they did it for. There were no rules or pre-set binding criteria for the selection and adoption of Civic Forum's members. There was no formally established higher authority with the power of excluding those deemed unsuitable. In theory, even the Central Committee of the Communist Party could form its own Civic Forum, however absurd this may sound.

In the first months after November 1989, there emerged a symptomatic confusion: the movement was understood and labelled both in the singular, as the Civic Forum, and in the plural, as Civic Forums. This confusion reflected a double role the movement was to play in that period. It stood as a spontaneously acknowledged representation of popular opposition in the face of the political representation of the decaying regime; and it was a shield and ground for the mobilisation of active popular participation in and support for the revolutionary changes. It was especially the latter function that rendered the movement the paramount agent of a politically activized civil society. The proponents of the idea of radical democracy found here an empirical example, however imperfect, of their visions.

Those who tend to equate the notion of civil society with the republican ideal of active citizenship in the political sense often go back to Hannah Arendt's praise of self-organised bodies of concerted action which periodically emerge at revolutionary times. In her *On Revolution*,[20] Arendt finds these kinds of activities in self-appointed councils as agents of autonomous collective action, among which the elements of hierarchy and formal organisation are largely suppressed. At the same time, however, she points out that these typical fruits of great revolutions are later regularly replaced by another kind of collective body: political parties as large bureaucratic and hierarchical organisations. At this point, she expresses the basic polarity that marked the manner in which the notion of civil society was understood in the post-revolutionary period: civil society was no longer pitted against the alienated state as a whole but against the particular institution of the political party. And the former was contrasted with the latter not just as a parallel sphere or way of public conduct but as a viable substitute for the party in its very political func-

[19]) The word 'Forum' in the movement's name was to symbolise this very openness. It was not chosen accidentally. The movement was to stand as a platform open to all who wanted to speak and act as sovereign citizens in confrontation with the state power.

[20]) Hannah Arendt [1965]; esp. the chapter 'The Revolutionary Tradition and its Lost Treasure'.

tions.[21] What was at stake was the way in which the political process itself – i.e. the state and its decision-making procedures – was to be organised.

The conflict between the movement (as an agent of civil society) and the political party contains a fundamental ambivalence that affected the character and practice of Civic Forum from the very beginning of its existence. The two mutually related dimensions of this ambivalence have already been mentioned: besides the confusion about the unity or plurality of the movement, it was especially the tension between representation and participation as two sorts of political functions for which the movement was to provide a ground. "The conflict between the two systems, the parties and the councils, came to the fore in all twentieth-century revolutions. The issue at stake was representation versus action and participation. The councils were organs of action, the revolutionary parties were organs of representation (...)." [Arendt 1965: 277]. The problem was that Civic Forum found itself in a position in which the Forum was expected to act simultaneously as both the systems that Arendt contrasts with one another.

The movement's dual character brought about practical difficulties that stimulated its gradual shift towards a hierarchically organised large-scale organisation of the party type. In the initial phase of the formation of local initiatives, for example, there were cases that two competing Civic Forums were formed in one and the same place. The problem of authenticity came back into the game in a quite different context. Later we saw that the same thing could happen to established political parties as well. But in the early post-revolutionary period, there was no higher body to decide authoritatively which of the competing Forums – which activity or which persons – were more authentic than the other. Needless to stress how such conflicts undermined trust in and legitimacy of the movement that at the same time sought to represent the main stream of the revolutionary process at the national level. Here the sense of unity had to be maintained, all the more so given the fact that before the June 1990 parliamentary elections Civic Forum could not rely on any legally anchored democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the spontaneous implicit but strongly-felt unity and popular support for the representatives of Civic Forum in play at the end of 1989, gradually lost its intensity as the first controversial issues emerged before the reconstructed executive and legislative bodies in Spring 1990. It became necessary to set clear rules as to who was to represent the movement even at lower levels. Especially so if stable and efficient channels of communication and co-operation were to be established between the local and the national levels of the movement.[22]

In Arendt's text, we can also read about the main 'external' circumstance that makes the replacement of local self-organised bodies of collective action by large-scale bureaucratic institutions of political parties virtually unavoidable in modern societies. She reminds us that modern politics has its core at the state level. The latter is where the most important decision-making processes take place and political power finds its locus. Political problems are typically formulated as problems of the state: be it legislation or

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[21]) This is why we cannot introduce here Cohen's and Arato's well elaborated conception of civil society [Cohen and Arato 1992] as a corresponding theoretical account. For all its explicit radical democratic inspiration, this conception is grounded in a more differentiated picture of society, and it retains a legitimate room for institutions of political parties as well.

[22]) Jiří Honajzer [1996: 40] points to the troubles with nominating delegates at and for the movement's conferences in the situation where there was no formal membership and the selection of representatives was thus exposed to possible manipulations from 'outside'.

international politics, social policy or the administration of the economy. Thus "the spectacular success of the party system and the no-less spectacular failure of the council system were both due to the rise of the nation-state, which elevated the one and crushed the other (...)." [Arendt 1965: 251].

In short, when the revolutionary upheaval was over, it was still more difficult to find a proper field of action for local Civic Forums as autonomous political agents. The network of established Forums followed the pattern of political organisation characteristic of the former regime. They gathered and were organised predominantly at places of work: factories, offices, schools, and so on. Before 1989, it was the workplace that was not only the locus of social integration, but also the major arena and basic level of political integration and control. Therefore, this way of organising Civic Forums seemed natural at the end of 1989, as it was here where the closest agencies of the old regime's political power were to be faced. The institutional establishment of the Civic Forum movement thus in a sense protracted the tradition of a systematic politicisation of the workplace practised by the previous regime. Once the old political structures at places of work had been abolished, however, the existence of these Civic Forums largely lost their *raison d'être*. Moreover, as the depoliticisation and privatisation of the economy soon became one of the major objectives of the transformation, the existence of local Forums came into conflict with the very substance of the central Forum's politics.[23] The more the practice of Civic Forum at the state level acquired the character of a party activity (with an intensive factional life), the more it became difficult to retain the existence of local Civic Forums in their privileged positions. It was impossible for just one part of the country's political scene to have its own exclusive agents as paramount organs of popular power at the local level. Thus even before the central Civic Forum was transformed into several political parties in early 1991, local Forums began to give way to conventional institutions such as trade unions (in representing social and economic interests) and newly elected or appointed local governments (in administering the public life of local communities). As a matter of fact, local Civic Forums had never fully replaced these institutions. They just formed parallel power structures at the local level, and they took them over to various extents.

Even Arendt did not expect that a movement-type body could stand as an organ of truly democratic participatory politics at the national level. Practical difficulties with non-transparent opinion formation and articulation as well as complicated and heavy-going mechanisms of decision-making in and through such large-scale organisations are obvious. We need not share Arendt's harsh criticism of mass social movements as proto-totalitarian in order to be able to detect some of the practical troubles in Civic Forum's political functioning. Founded on the idea of wide consensus, for example, the movement never developed efficient mechanisms of reconciling internal conflicts. Therefore the formation of different factions within the movement – quite natural as the country's transformation required fundamental and also specific political conceptions – did not

[23]) Illustrative enough in this respect was the controversy between representatives of local Civic Forums in the district of Hodonín and the prime minister of the Czech government and leading figure of the national Civic Forum Petr Pithart, in 1991. The former felt helpless in face of the old communist functionaries taking high positions in the local economy but they had no longer the power to effectively impede this trend. Pithart, when asked for help, simply referred them to the legal framework that was to be respected.

stimulate discussion. At the top level, it rather brought about the political style of factional conspiracy instead of that of open discussion. As Civic Forum played the role of political opposition to itself, every open conflict also effectively weakened the movement in relation to external political competitors, and was therefore felt as a threat. This is not to say that the split of Civic Forum in the beginning of 1991 was unavoidable. Yet keeping these difficulties in mind makes the movement's transformation into several independent political parties more understandable. No doubt this split was a crucial step and major event in changing the character of political life in the country.

The paradox of a state-built civil society

As soon as a competitive party system was established, and representative parliamentary democracy was taken as a model for normal politics, a new ground was to be sought for the idea of civil society. Now a new boundary between the state and civil society was to be drawn, and a new meaning and role for both in their mutual relationship was to be found.

Although the latest metamorphosis of the notion of civil society took a more gradual path than the previous one, there still exists a distinct event we can refer to as the point of full inception of the new stage. It was Václav Havel's 1994 New Year's speech as President of the country, in which he accelerated the new phase of discussion as for what civil society is, why we need it, and how to get it. Having admitted that the basic institutions of parliamentary democracy and the market economy had already been established, he pleaded – under the slogan of civil society – for political support for institutions that should mediate not only between these two spheres, but especially between each of them on the one side, and society on the other.

Havel's plea for civil society was explicitly directed to two specific areas of institutionalised public activity for which he sought political support: first, the so-called third or non-profit sector; and second, the local level of public administration. Somewhat later, higher bodies of competence for corporate institutions such as professional chambers, associations, and trade unions were sought, constituting another component of his plea for a more developed civil society. Soon these three issues – reflecting the practical problems faced in shaping the character of the state and society – became among the major clashing points of recent political discussion. Along with them, political stances have been refined and their ideological backgrounds revealed.[24] Moving in this direction, on the other hand, the conceptual framework that characterized the previous stage was modified and enriched by the language of functional differentiation and mediation of interests.

Of course, Havel was not the first in the Czech political discussion to promote the above-mentioned institutional spheres and their development. They already had their proponents before he came up with his appeal. He only put these demands on common ground by connecting them clearly and explicitly to the vision of building a viable civil

[24]) Even though Havel himself does not speak explicitly for any political party or doctrine, the major clash has obviously been between liberals, on the one side, and (neo-) corporatists or associationalists, on the other. The dispute has been closely tied to practical political issues, with arguments often representing stances of concrete political parties, yet it has also produced more theoretically-based reflections. Perhaps the most consistent theoretical defence of the corporatist and associationalist conception of civil society is [Šamalík 1995].

society. As an intellectual and political authority, Havel has played an important role in rendering civil society a catchword for these demands which are often raised in political terms – a catchword that in the course of time has been adopted by a large number of proponents.

Out of the three spheres – i.e. the non-profit sector, local administration, and unions or professional chambers – it is the first one that has gradually acquired a prominent place as an institutional core and representative of civil society. Unsurprisingly, it is at least intuitively felt that it is here that the ethos of civil society may find a space more open to its expression and realisation than in the other two. More specifically, it is here that independent initiative and individual responsibility may better be allied with the sense of public good and civic competence, with associating freely for a common purpose, and still remain relatively shielded from instrumental and functional imperatives imposed by the political-legal-bureaucratic system, or from the constraints imposed by clashing partial interests of the polity.

In the other two cases, it would not be difficult to point out the undesirable consequences or ignored aspects of the institutionalized activities in question. On the one side, one could highlight the inflation of bureaucratic practices that may accompany decentralisation of public administration; on the other side, problems could arise in the intervention of organised partial interests in the process of political decision-making, which could make the whole process even less transparent, leave out the unorganised and the weaker, and confuse the concept of political representation itself. To be sure, the sphere of non-profit social, cultural, educational, service-providing or productive activities is by no means completely free of these or similar dangers. In this case, however, the interactions and interdependencies between, on the one hand, the character of given institutions, the goals they pursue, and the principles that are to guide their activities and, on the other hand, the constraining imperatives of the legal-bureaucratic system, are much more subtle and puzzling – but also more theoretically interesting by the same virtue.

There are two aspects involved in the relation between the non-profit sector and its environment that particularly distinguish this sphere from the other two. First, the sphere claims independence from the state not only in respect to the state's refraining from intervention in the activities taking place within the sector, but also in the sense of the sphere's limited or complete lack of intervention in the process of political decision-making on any level. In short, this sphere is exposed much less than the other two to imperatives of the political system in the determination and pursuit of its goals. It may flourish in parallel to similar state-run activities without a permanent (if often latent) tug of war with the state regarding the competence for decision-making.

Second, besides the state (the sphere of politics and administration) on 'the opposite side,' a new pole enters the game: the sphere of the market economy. In delineating the areas and character of the third sector's activity, a distinct line is to be drawn between the non-profit sphere and that of profit-oriented market activities and relations. It is on this distinction that the practical desirability of the third sector is based, as well as on its moral superiority. In Havel's appeal, we find both. On the one hand, he pleads for the support of public initiatives in areas that are commonly held to be beneficial for society, but which provide little or no profit as economic activities based on market relations (and in which the state often tends to be ineffective or even detrimental). On the other hand, he stresses the ethical dimension and educational role of these kinds of initiatives as ex-

pressive of and nurturing a sense of solidarity and mutual support. In this respect, too, we may remain with Havel's appeal as sufficiently representative for the whole discussion. He explicitly and consistently transplanted the idea of civil society into a new context within which it was to be discussed and contested.

For now, I will leave aside the question of distinguishing non-profit and profit-oriented activities as guided by two different moral codes.[25] This is not to suggest, however, that the moral aspects of the distinction are of no or only little importance. Yet it is equally important to realise that the problem cannot be reduced to its moral dimension. For reducing the distinction to a mere moral judgement would amount to limiting the possible use of the idea of civil society as a specifically political appeal – i.e. either as an appeal addressed to political actors or as connected to a certain political programme. One has to formulate the question of civil society as a question of state politics in order to be able to employ the idea of civil society as a political appeal. And it was in his 1994 New Year's speech that Havel clearly demonstrated that he was no longer content with the role of mere ethical authority, launching moral appeals that may be politically relevant but still remain neutral to practical political alternatives at hand. His speech carried an unambiguous message concerning concrete steps he wanted to see taken by the legislative and executive political representation of the state.

In this way, the locus of the struggle for civil society was replanted into the political arena. In other words, the prospect of building civil society has become a task for practical politics – i.e. a task for the state as represented by its legislative and executive bodies. The state comes back into the game through the back door, and it returns in a new role of constructor. It is no longer expected to retreat from certain areas of public life so as to empty some space for civil society. Now the state is asked to create the institutional (legal, material, etc.) space.

It is necessary here to reiterate the peculiar consequences that the changes in contexts have had for understanding civil society's relation to its environment. At the first stage – before 1989 – civil society was expected to burst out and flourish naturally as soon as the state retreated from certain areas of social life. In the second phase – at the time of Civic Forum – civil society was even conceived of as something that was already present, and which only had to be given the opportunity to affect and thus democratise the political process of decision-making. At the present (third) stage, contrary to both previous stages, civil society stands for something that needs external (political) help to develop – as something that has to be nurtured and cultivated by the conscious and purposeful activity of political and administrative authorities.

Assigning the task of establishing civil society to the state presupposes that it is sufficiently clear what civil society is, i.e. what kinds of practices and/or institutions represent or embody it. The point is that civil society may become an object of political 'constitutive' intervention only when understood in an accordingly specific way. Expecting an agent (the state) to purposefully influence the process of formation of civil society requires the ability to understand the latter in terms of institutions and/or practices that can be created or shaped or maintained by the purposeful activity of the state. In short, it is precisely the picture of civil society as institutionalised in a network of so-

[25]) For a thorough contemporary discussion of this problem see [Wolfe 1989].

called non-profit organisations (the third sector) that makes it possible to hold the state responsible for civil society and its development.

In this regard, it is quite symptomatic that in the present Czech political debate about civil society the question of social movements is largely left out of the picture. The theme of the social movement as an institutionalised form of civil society occasionally arises when a movement's function of political mobilisation and its intervention in the process of political decision-making are at issue. This is especially the case of the environmental movements. But we would hardly find the theme conceptualised in this way having in mind the function of social integration, the question of the self-reflection and self-understanding of social actors and practices.[26] The willingness or ability to picture social movements in terms of the idea of civil society only when they present themselves as formal organisational structures, in explicit programmes, and through organised forms of collective action points to the tendency to instrumentalise the concept of civil society itself.

What is more important here, however, is that movements seem to represent too diffuse social phenomena to be imagined as possible subjects of the state's politically 'constructive' intervention. In other words, the social movements are too independent – in how they emerge and function – of that which the practical politics of the state can directly influence. Regarding this, we can even better come to see that focusing on the third sector as an institutional core of civil society corresponds to the tendency to understand civil society not so much in its political function as in its political origin. At the same time, however, it is the case of the non-profit, third sector that we can perhaps best document some blindspots in the vision of a state-built civil society. This is especially because the processes of bureaucratisation, 'legalisation' (Verrechtlichung), and monetarisation that accompany the third sector's expansion under the patronage of the state contrast stunningly with the ethos on which the sector is supposed and expected to be based.[27]

The problem – if we want to see it as a problem at all – is not just that the state becomes an arbiter in evaluating society's moral preferences by favouring (through legislative and economic means) one sort of activity and relatively disadvantaging others. The issue of the state as a moral agent might take us further into the political theory, and therefore it will be skipped here. Sociologists would rather address another kind of question: how the conception of a state-built civil society affects the picture of the latter in terms of what Robert Putnam [1993] calls *institutional performance*. Putnam studies the institutions of local administration in latter-day Italy, yet his conclusions undoubtedly bear relevance to the problem of third sector institutions as well. Instead of observing an educational effect of institutions of local democracy in those parts of Italy where civic culture has been rather underdeveloped, he finds there a malfunctioning system. It is also

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[26]) Here I am alluding to Alberto Melucci's understanding of social movements as practices, rather than as agents or characters [Melucci 1989, 1996]. In Cohen and Arato [1992], the distinction between what we may call the instrumental (political) and hermeneutical (social) aspects of the phenomenon of new social movements is described in terms of the difference between the 'politics of influence' and the 'politics of identity.' They, however, want to retain both as relevant for understanding social movements as institutional representatives of an updated idea of civil society.

[27]) I have focused more closely upon the paradoxes of a 'state-built civil society' – with special attention to the third sector – in my article [Marada 1996].

this finding that poses a serious challenge not just before social actors who act through the institutions of civil society, but also before social theory that should avoid appealing to one kind of institutional practice by criticising and looking for flaws in those spheres of action that are seen as the former's competitors.

Civil society as challenge for social theory

The basic dilemma we face is evident, and its formulation in political and social science has over time acquired the character of an evergreen: the development of the third, non-profit sector is dependent on the state's active involvement, yet, at the same time, this involvement threatens to corrode the very ethos that is supposed to motivate the participating social actors. This especially applies to societies that find themselves in transition from one type of political-economic regime to another. Here the dilemma reveals its stakes with an increased clarity.

The question is: what does this mean – first, for social and political actors, and second, for social and political theory? In my concluding remarks, I will try to point out the sense in which the practical consequences of the above-outlined situation for social conduct, on the one side, and critical theoretical reflection, on the other, are closely connected.

The crucial question for social actors is the following: should they refrain from acting through institutions which are necessary for making their activity efficient and transparent to others but which force them at the same time to conform to imperatives incongruent with the ethos that motivates their action?

A positive answer would find its ground in the kind of critical theory that dismisses not only bureaucracy and market economy but also positive law, technology, and science. The formal and instrumental character of these institutions, according to this way of thinking, conceals and effectively reproduces the oppressive character of modern society that functions through them. This radical tradition of critical theory – which found its first systematic expression in Marx and then among various sorts of his followers – teaches us that every activity made effective through those institutions, regardless of its immediate impact, serves in the last instance to those who govern or profit from the system as a whole.[28] In other words, the institutional system poses strict barriers to every action undertaken within it – however good and beneficial for society's members – which could upset the power relations maintained and reproduced by the former. In this view, the oppressive character of the system as a whole eventually reverses the general meaning of every institutionalised activity in favour of the relations of domination, and by this virtue devaluates every particular good.

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[28]) Thus not only prisons and the army but also hospitals and schools are seen as normalising and disciplining institutions, the media as fabricating unified public opinions and destroying independent critical thinking, social welfare policies as corrupting the disadvantageous and potentially dissatisfied, charity as a theatre making the poor grateful and healing the bad conscience of the rich, family as a reified structure reproducing gender inequalities as well as children's oppression, avant-garde art as diverting and dissolving the impetus to revolt, parliaments and trade unions as paralysing political opposition through its inclusion into the system, the judiciary and police as criminalising institutions, and human rights as a shield that separates individuals from each other and protects first of all those who profit from all this.

This certainly is not the kind of critical thinking that is advocated here. At the same time, however, I do not recommend abandoning completely the theoretical claim of perceiving particular activities as constitutive parts or functional elements of a wider societal and institutional context.[29] Rather the claim is to be complemented by the attempt to distinguish between the moral and the institutional dimension of public conduct, and to reflect upon public conduct along this double track. Such an attempt should not only help us keep in mind that a certain portion of bureaucratic skills or economic calculation, observance of legal limits or reliance upon scientific information, (and even a certain degree of ideological simplification or hierarchical disciplinary organisation) – i.e. that which often makes public activity effective and transparent – are not by definition mutually exclusive with public conduct beneficial for society in moral terms. In other words, this view reminds us that acting within and through institutions does not necessarily make it impossible for social actors to act in a civilised manner and pursue goals that morally motivate their action. But it also should help us confront the institutional (bureaucratic, economic, ideological, organisational) costs with the moral value and public desirability of goals to be achieved in order to find a proper balance between these two sides in particular cases.

In short, the task for civil society is not that some kinds of institutions be avoided or abolished altogether. It is only that public conduct cannot succumb to their instrumental and functional imperatives which would deprive such conduct of its ethos, making an empty routine of it in a similar way as happened to the capitalist economy in Max Weber's picture [Weber 1958]. It is in avoiding this very alternative that critical social theory may play an important role – first, as a means of critical analysis of certain kinds of social practices; second, as a theoretical self-reflection of the participating actors.

The tendency to employ the idea of civil society as a tool of political appeal – against the supposedly competing spheres or kinds of action – may well lead to the confusion affecting the current Czech political discussion. One side of the dispute accentuates the moral ethos of the non-profit activities, whereas the other points out the instrumental aspects and functional defects of the institutions through which the activities are to be made effectual. The problem is that neither of the sides makes enough effort to distinguish between the ethical and institutional (instrumental and functional) aspects of the problem. The one side promotes a certain legal-economic form of public activity as embodying the sought-after ethos, the other challenges the ethos's cogency by connecting it with the possibly malfunctional institutional structure. In this way, paradoxically, both sides contribute to discrediting the idea of civil society in one and the same direction. They expose it to the accusation of being a mere illusion that serves to shield the possibly imperfect practices of certain kinds of institutions, an ideological veil that idealises these kinds of institutions and protects them from critical assessment.

The task of a critical assessment cannot be reasonably undertaken from the viewpoint of the theory of the state or that of the market. In a formal sense, a social theory based on the idea of civil society is in a similar position to those other two sorts of theories. Today it is – and it has perhaps always been – more theoretically fruitful to employ the idea of the market as a means of analysis and a measure of critique for the actual eco-

[29]) Disregard of the wider societal and institutional context of action would also deprive the political and social actors of the capacity to define in particular cases the public good or public interest.

nomic relations that we call the market, rather than using it as a protective shield that should defend the clumsy and heavy institutional scaffold of contemporary markets against other forms of social or economic activity.

To take another, more concrete example: we do not have to accept Carl Schmitt's anti-democratic position to be able to appreciate his analytical strategy in criticising parliamentarism by confronting the original principles on which modern parliaments had been founded with the way they actually functioned in his time. He hastens to denounce an institution as soon as he realises that it no longer represents the ethos which once legitimised its establishment. Although in Schmitt's case we have reasons to suppose that he looks for and points out incongruities between the legitimising ethos and actual practice *in order to* (i.e. with the intention to) denounce the institution.

This is certainly not the source of motivation recommended for the critical theorists of civil society. The idea of civil society – as a symbol of certain kinds of social or public sensitivity, attitudes, ways of acting and thinking, or moral reasoning – is not here to denounce the institutional base of the non-profit sector. Even less does it serve to denounce the institutions of the state or the market. The latter two occupy their own fields of action, where they operate according to their own imperatives and criteria of rationality. The idea of civil society as a sphere of civilised public conduct of free, moral, and rational individuals may (and perhaps should) pose limits to those spheres. But it is not an imperial vision. The fact that it is aware of its own limits testifies to its own civility. It best serves as a means of critical analysis of public action that is not primarily guided by political goals or economic calculation. As a means of critical analysis, it is designed to be applied to the sphere of civil society itself.

Such an approach may take some illusions from social or political actors. But I do not believe it can disable what motivates them. Civil society is that kind of social life in which motivations do not stem from illusions but from rational and moral judgement. If we do not admit that this distinction – between illusions and rational-moral judgement – is possible at all, we lose the very ground for the articulation of the idea of civil society itself. The symbol then becomes incomprehensible and useless, since it has no basis in a Nietzschean world which blurs that distinction. Therefore also critical theory based on the idea of civil society need not be afraid of nature, which, according to Nietzsche's prophecy, will punish as the cruellest tyrant those who take illusions from people.

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Potentials and Limits of Prague's Future in the Context of Long-Term Development

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Abstract: This article is mainly future oriented, i.e. concerned with the potentials and limits of Prague's future development, and with the most probable developmental trajectories of the city in the coming years. To make such an assessment more realistic, a considerable part of the study pays attention to the past changes in the position of Prague within the system of Central European capital cities. The study proves that the status, political power and economic role of Prague has been closely linked to societal changes and to the changing geopolitical contexts of the Czech community. The evaluation of the so-called endogenous potential of the city shows that the strongest developmental potentials are: cultural, geographic, economic and human potentials. The category of middle ranking potentials include general and municipal, political and infrastructural ones. The weakest potentials, or expressed in another way, the factors Prague's limiting future development are environmental and demographic.

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The aim of the following study** is, on the one hand, to analyse past changes in the position of Prague within the Central European and Czech urban system, and on the other, to find out how this position will be changed by the recent transformations of Central European societies, as well as by the possible integration of Prague into the European urban system. Although the paper is mainly future oriented, i.e. concerned with the potentials and limits of the city which define the possible future developmental trajectories of Prague, a part of this study, however, pays attention also to the past. This part is concerned with the long-term evolution of the Central European capital cities system – i.e. with the positions of Prague, Vienna, Berlin, Budapest, and Warsaw. Such a historical analysis enables a more reliable prediction of Prague's future functions and positions in the Central European and European urban system. To make the prediction of Prague's future more reliable, the paper starts with a review of the most probable changes in European urban futures as estimated by experts.

Until recently, most studies which analysed the consequences of the collapse of state socialism on cities paid attention mainly to the effects of these societal changes on individual large cities or on urban systems of individual Central European countries. There is a lack of comparative sociological studies on urban transformations in this region. Those few analyses which have applied comparative approaches, such as György

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Enyedi's [1992, 1996] studies, have used economic geography or regional science perspectives. Some other studies which have applied comparative methods use the 1990 or 1991 census data, as for example S. Conti [1994]. In other words they surveyed the situation of large Central European cities in the last phase of state socialism and were unable to see the important changes in urban systems as caused by the post-1989 developments. Still other studies – even though using for example explicitly comparative sociological models such as the stimulating books by Jürgen Friedrichs [1978, 1985] on the development of some Western and Eastern European cities – were concerned with the period before 1989 and with the similarities and differences between "capitalist" and "socialist" cities, and not with the effects of the return to market economy and political pluralism on urban systems in post-communist countries.

Our study compares five capital cities of Central Europe, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Berlin and Warsaw, from a sociological perspective, using mainly morphological analysis approaches as defined recently by such authors as Jürgen Friedrichs [1981, 1995], Bernd Hamm [1982, 1996], Jiří Musil [1991], Zdravko Mlinar [1997] and others. Standard *comparative sociology* procedures are used as well. To the comparative and ecological approaches, which form the core of our methodology, are added two other instruments, which enable us to make some tentative predictions as to Prague's future, i.e. the concept of *potential* and the concept of limit. The concept of potential, "endogenous potential" or "developmental potential" has been used mainly by German, Austrian as well as Swiss regional scientists for describing endogenous developmental qualities or conditions of regions (see the studies by Ernst A. Brugger [1984], Rainer Thoss [1984], Hans Elsasser [1984] and others). The term hints at the latent, or even hidden developmental qualities of a region, which can be, however, mobilised and exploited by regional policies. In this study the concept was transferred to urban studies to enable us to see the cities observed here in a future oriented perspective.

1. Changing Patterns of the European Urban System

The following review tries to summarise the main recent as well as future changes in the interurban structure of Europe. The review is based primarily on studies written by Jürgen Friedrichs [1993], Peter Hall [1993], Martin Hampl [1996], Jiří Musil, Michal Illner [1994], Klaus R. Kunzmann [1996], W. F. Lever [1993], Ian Masser, Ove Svidén, Michael Wegener [1992], Martine Meijer [1993], Jiří Musil [1992], Saskia Sassen [1994] and Jan Van Weesep [1993].

The predictions as to the future of Europe's urban system is here used as a frame of reference for our reflections on Prague's future. This means that it is necessary first to operationalise the summary of the predicted urban system changes into a number of concrete statements, and subsequently we shall compare the potentials of Prague with these concrete statements. This will allow a more dynamic and at the same time more realistic assessment of the developmental qualities of the city.

From the perspective of the above-mentioned urban experts, the main future changes in Europe's urban system can be summarised as follows:

– Large cities are becoming more and more *service centres*. This is due to the continuing processes of *tertiarisation* of European economies.

– The capital cities and some large cities are – in a growing measure – becoming decisive *nodes of international co-ordination activities* of trade and finance.

- A pronounced *hierarchy* of such command and co-ordination cities is being formed. Some of them have a global role, others a continental function or a European sub-regional role.
- The present and future changes of the European urban system are to a great extent influenced by the processes of spatial *specialisation, regionalisation and polarisation.* All of the mentioned processes can be observed to function on a continental, state and regional level. The processes of polarisation between European macro-regions will be intensified by the construction of high-speed railways.
- Due to the three above-mentioned processes, the *differences* and *inequalities* among large European cities and regions will continue to grow.
- European integration processes are already at present *changing the national urban systems* and they will continue to have such an impact in the future as well. Very often cities in the border regions are improving their economic positions, whereas other cities and regions – due to the processes of regional specialisation and differentiation – are becoming peripheral and are losing their status. At present, some European cities which were important in the past are becoming a part of the periphery and are losing contacts with the main growing European urban regions.
- The most difficult is the situation of old *industrial agglomerations* and of smaller cities in isolated or peripheral locations.
- It is generally expected that, in the future, capital and large cities of Central Europe will be *reintegrated* into the European urban system. The concrete, as well as the spatial forms of such a reintegration are as yet, however, not clear.
- The political and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 can be seen as a factor strengthening the position of those western cities which before 1989 belonged to the *peripheral* parts of the European urban system, for example Vienna, Berlin, Copenhagen, and Nuremberg. These cities can regain the role they performed before World War II.
- The European integration processes can enhance the *leading role of the capital cities of the largest European countries*, such as Berlin, and Paris.
- The strengthening of *market economy* systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will *stimulate the growth of their capitals and large cities* due to the fact that it is in these where there are the best conditions for the expansion of services, and also due to the fact that the most modern parts of industry are often concentrated in metropolitan areas of capital cities.
- The quantitative *population growth of European cities*, especially of large cities, *will be slow* in the near future. This is caused by the low natural growth rates of the population in most European countries and also by the restrictive measures leading to the curtailment of immigration from non-European countries.
- The growth of large cities will be stimulated in the future to a growing extent by the increasing role of *cities as culture centres*, such as tourist centres, and as places of international cultural and sporting events. A trend towards a growing *urban boosterism* can be already observed.

– In the future the large *cities will become more and more competitive*, they will compete not only in the sphere of economy, but also of culture, architecture, quality of environment. In Central Europe this trend will be strengthened by the integration of the countries from this region into the European Union.

– Large cities of the former socialist countries will be exposed to *growing competition* from nearby Western European cities in the near future. There will also be growing competition among the large cities of the former socialist countries. Some Western European cities near the borders of the former socialist states, will be exposed to a lesser extent to competition from their eastern neighbours. The whole urban system is thus moving into a phase – to use Robert E. Park's terminology – of symbiotic competition [cf. Park 1926]. Expressed in more historical terms, it is to some extent returning to the situation before World War I.

2. Prague's Position in the Central European and Czech Urban System – A Summary of Historical Trends

Prague, like other cities in Central and Eastern Europe, is marked by considerable historical variations in its position among European cities. In its previous history three periods can be distinguished in which we can speak about Prague's important position in Europe. The most important is the epoch of Charles IV and the era before the Hussite wars; the second is the Rudolfian era. The third is the period of the rapid expansion of the city, the development of the national movement and the restoration of the independent state; the period lasting approximately from 1860 until 1938. Although the population size is a very crude measure of the importance and position of the city, it cannot be entirely discounted.

During Charles' reign Prague was among the ten largest cities in Europe. According to Chandler and Fox [1974] it had around the year 1400 some 95,000 dwellers and was the seventh largest on the continent (only Genoa, Granada, Venice, Bruges, Milan and Paris were more populous at the time). In the 18th and 19th centuries its position sank to around 35th before improving in the late 1930s when Prague was the 25th biggest city in Europe. After 1948 its importance again started to decline rapidly, especially with regard to its international position.

The development of Prague's position in the 19th and 20th centuries can be expressed schematically in the following table:

Table 1. The Development of Prague's Position in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Period	Dimensions of Prague's position: Population growth	Position within the state	International position
1860-1910	xxxx	xx[1]	x
1918-1938	xxx	xxx[2]	xxx
1948-1989	x	xx[2]	x
1989-1992	xx	xx[2]	xx
after 1992	xx	xxx[3]	xxx

Notes: The number of "x" expresses the rate of growth and the position status.
[1]) position within Austro-Hungarian Empire
[2]) position within Czechoslovakia
[3]) position within Czech Republic

The variation in Prague's international position has probably always been greater than the variation in its internal position. This can be seen from Table 1, and later from Table 2 on the growth of population in five Central European capitals.

3. The Period Before World War I

Any serious examination of the interaction between Prague and the neighbouring capitals in the Central Europe of the future should be based on a historical perspective. The starting point of a historical analysis should be the second half of the nineteenth century. Two paradoxically different events mark the start of this period: the emergence of a unified German Reich under Bismarck, and the emancipation of Hungary within the Habsburg monarchy, which was an important step towards the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[1]

The regional status and hierarchy of the five cities after 1870 is quite clear; Vienna and Berlin in very strong positions with a gradual rise in the status of Berlin, Budapest with a medium and rising status, and Prague and Warsaw in relatively low positions. Unlike the situation in countries where the capitals were not important industrial centres (e.g. Madrid, Rome, and to some extent Paris), the economic and industrial functions of all the cities referred to above were well-developed and quite strong. The Central European capitals, particularly Vienna, Budapest and Warsaw, were in their respective countries industrial islands where industrialisation processes had often started. Prague was different in this respect in that it was part of a larger industrialised area of central and northern Bohemia.

The socio-cultural roles of the capitals in question exhibit a different pattern. Vienna played an obviously dominant cultural role in the Empire as a whole, and its influence radiated to other parts of Europe as well. Though Berlin's position was less important at the beginning of this period, it improved rapidly alongside the growing economic and political power of the German Reich.

Budapest and Prague played a less significant socio-cultural role. Budapest was an ethnic centre for Hungarians, and Prague was not only the cultural centre for Czechs, but to some extent for Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes and Lusitz Serbs. The weakest position was

[1]) Cf. the comparative historical study of Vienna, Prague, and Budapest in the period 1867-1918 edited by Gerhard Melinz and Susan Zimmermann [1996].

that of Warsaw, which not only suffered from the division of Poland into three parts but also was confronted with stiff competition from Krakow, another important Polish cultural centre.

The kind of division of labour that played a role between Glasgow and Edinburgh or Rome and Milan was virtually non-existent in the Czech region. Prague was a regional, cultural, industrial and political centre all in one. Brno and Ostrava, the two potential competitors, were predominantly industrial cities with a considerably weaker cultural influence than Prague.[2]

The interaction among the five cities at the start of the twentieth century mainly pertained to symbiotic economic competition and political rivalry based on growing nationalism. A great deal has been written about the economic competition between Vienna and Berlin and the political rivalry between Vienna and Prague [Banik-Schweitzer 1988].

The large cities were an integral part of the growing tendency toward nationalistic particularism, although surprisingly enough, this was also the period when the *Mitteleuropa* idea began to take root. However, the fragmentation processes continued, particularly in the political and cultural spheres. Due to the existing political and economic structures, most importantly the predominance of conservative feudal-aristocratic policies in the Central European states, national differences predominated. The technological changes and economic developments that were to lead to the integration of Europe were taking place at precisely the same time. The disparity between these two processes was tragic. The potential of this period prior to World War I was not exploited.

It should be noted, however, that social interaction among the large cities was confined to contacts among the economic, cultural and political elite groups there [see Urban 1988]. Personal contact in the fields of science or literature were, however, less intensive and frequently took place by way of letters. There was no mass tourism on the part of the middle and lower classes, who continued to spend their holidays in their own countries. Compared with today, there were few conferences where academics of various countries could meet and exchange ideas.

In short, the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century were characterized by a combination of fragmentation and co-operation. To a certain extent, this combination can be described as symbiotic competition.

4. The Period Between the Two World Wars

It has often been claimed, and rightly so, that World War I was one of the most disastrous events in European history, and that World War II was a continuation of the calamity. One of the consequences of the 1914-1918 war was the deepening of the pre-war fragmentation. Cultural and national differences were projected onto political and economic ones. Three old empires, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire all collapsed. Numerous new national states emerged.

If we examine the capitals of Central Europe, it is clear how they differed in the inter-war period. They were either part of the victorious or the defeated nations. Pre-war animosities were reinforced by this fact: Prague versus Vienna, Prague versus Budapest, Warsaw versus Moscow. Old markets crumbled, some nations and cities had to radically

[2]) In 1890, the population of Prague was 437,000, that of Brno was 146,000 and that of Ostrava 85,000.

redirect the focus of their markets and their general economic policies on foreign trade. Of course the war also destroyed the traditional commercial links among the five cities, which were slowly rebuilt in the subsequent period.

The cities of the victorious nations, mainly Prague, and to a lesser extent Warsaw as well, began to focus politically and culturally on their Western allies, and the Czechs stressed their liberal democratic orientation. For Prague, the models were France, the United States and Great Britain. Czech inter-war developments in the social sciences, literature and architecture were notable, and there is a great deal of documentation to support this. The history of Prague's avant-garde architecture in the Twenties and Thirties is one of the most interesting examples.

In the inter-war period, the five cities also exhibited considerable differences in their growth patterns. They might be classified into three categories:

1. The ones that grew fastest, Prague and Warsaw,

2. The ones that recovered slowly and grew rather slowly, Berlin and Budapest,

3. The one that stagnated and declined, Vienna.

The precarious inter-war equilibrium did not reduce the fragmentation of Central Europe and the pre-war symbiotic competition was weakened. Improved transportation and communication technology and economic internationalisation only served to make the basic inconsistency of the inter-war arrangements even more obvious. Multinationals were already in existence at the time. The interconnectedness of Western and Central European cities was continuously eroded by political rivalries based on narrow-minded national interests.

How were all these complex processes reflected in the concrete positions of the five capitals referred to above? In the late Thirties, Prague became a modern European metropolis. Its residents, however, were plagued by deep feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. Vienna struggled along from one crisis to the next, losing its population, particularly its intellectuals, its spirit, and its economic prosperity. Budapest slowly came back to life and in the late Thirties, exhibited a relative rise in its economic and cultural output. After a short gloomy post-war period, Berlin stabilised its economic power in the Twenties and became for a short period one of the most flourishing cultural centres in Europe. This came to an end, however, with Hitler's ascent to power and in the Thirties, Berlin changed into a capital preparing to reconquer lost positions of power. Warsaw slowly built up its position in the Polish macro-region, all the while competing closely with Cracow. Compared with the pre-war period, its status improved.

In order to explain some of the lesser known aspects of Prague's development, it is necessary to say a few words about it in the inter-war period. To a large extent, the energy of the population was concentrated towards building a state, as noted by Ferdinand Peroutka [1933-1936], the leading Czech journalist at the time. The unresolved problems of the German minority in Czechoslovakia also had a negative impact on life in Prague.

Compared with the other Central European capitals, Prague nonetheless retained certain important liberal features: it functioned much as Vienna does today, as a refuge for political emigrants,[3] and as a place where the Jewish students refused in Budapest,

[3]) After World War I, Prague sheltered Russian and Ukrainian political refugees and after 1933 it served the same purpose for German and Austrian anti-fascist refugees.

Poland and Austria could register at the university. Finally, Prague was to remain the one and only democratic capital in Central Europe almost until the outbreak of World War II.

5. The Years of Divided Europe

Compared with the situation after 1918, the years after World War II introduced a number of radically new patterns to the relations among the five cities. Europe was soon divided into two blocks, and two of the cities in question were divided as well. This time the war caused extensive damage to most of the cities. Warsaw was almost completely destroyed, as was Berlin to a large extent, and certain parts of Budapest and Vienna. The only city to escape almost intact was Prague. The events of this war had much more of an effect on the civilian populations than those of World War One, and led to far greater social changes and disruption.

The division of Europe not only meant a political separation, it also gave rise to differing regional processes. In the socialist countries, the capitals and their growth were more strictly checked by the State than in the liberal democracies. In fact, anti-urban policies were even introduced. Due to this check, Prague, for example, currently has approximately the same population as it did in 1940 (1,114,000 in 1940 and 1,214,000 in 1990).

Although history did repeat itself in a way – putting Prague and Warsaw once again on the side of the victors and Berlin, Vienna and Budapest on the side of the defeated – this fact was soon to lose whatever significance it might have had.

The five cities became the capitals of nations that had undergone considerable changes. The most radical change had taken place in Germany, where part of Berlin became the capital of only one part of the divided country. Warsaw was suddenly near the eastern border of Poland, since the entire country had been shifted westward. Prague ceased to be the capital of Slovakia and Ruthenia. If we discount the war period, the fewest changes of this kind were observed in Hungary and Austria.

In those parts of the macro-region that were allotted by the Yalta Conference to the Soviet Union's sphere of power, the most striking changes occurred in the socio-political and economic systems. These changes played a decisive role in determining the status of the capitals. Soviet-style central planning suppressed the growth of large cities, especially of capitals. Strict checks were enforced in Prague and Warsaw and to a lesser degree in Budapest as well. The consequence of these policies was obvious, as all these cities lost their position in the hierarchy of European cities. Particularly in the Fifties and Sixties, macro-regional policies were combined with the economic autarkic policies to eliminate the traditionally intensive multilateral interaction among Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Berlin and Warsaw. It was replaced by bilateral linkages to Moscow.

The situation slowly improved in the late Sixties. There was more and more contact among scientists, artists and writers from Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and East Berlin, and tourism expanded as well. In comparison with what was happening at the time in the West, however, this interaction was still negligible.

According to Enyedi [1992], the most dramatic changes pertained to the position of Berlin. The Soviet section of the city became the capital of the German Democratic Republic. East Berlin was to control an industrialised and developed country, albeit a small one. West Berlin remained an enclave without any direct attraction zone. It how-

ever exhibited remarkable cultural development, to a certain extent affecting Vienna and Budapest.

For a long time not only Prague but Warsaw as well as was cut off from Vienna and there was less contact than at any other time in the history of Central Europe. Vienna completely forfeited its position as leading metropolis of the area. This separation of Vienna from its international hinterland in the first few decades after World War II was one of the most striking phenomena in the region.

Although it had a better starting position than Vienna, Prague declined during this period into a provincial city. It never made any effort to become a junction between East and West, a gate-way from Western Europe to the USSR or the Balkans. In the new context, its position resembled that of the pre-1918 period. Soviet strategic considerations undoubtedly played a role in this connection. Prague was the westernmost capital, a city inside a region, Bohemia, which was slowly but surely losing its industrial and cultural significance. This trend was finally to come to an end in the Eighties.

In this third period, Vienna was the only capital to become a major international transport centre in the region. Its airport served as a gate-way to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Balkans. And Vienna became an important centre in the sphere of international politics (United Nations). It also took over Prague's pre-war role as a transit place for political refugees. In his book *Porträt Europas*, Salvador de Madariaga rightly noted that Vienna was the hidden capital of Europe, since it was where East met West. If we examine Berlin in this period, we see that it lost its traditional position. Even the financial injections from the FRG could not stop its long-term decline from its macro-regional position.

6. Interim Summary for the 20th Century

How to summarise the changes in the Central European systems of capital cities during the 20th century? Despite the shortcomings of the procedure which uses data on the size of population in measuring the general power position of cities,[4] it has nevertheless been applied here since data on population are relatively the most reliable and comparable.

In the course of the 20th century, as a consequence of great political changes, and the termination and division of states, and also as a consequence of divergent economic development, the rank size of Central European capitals has markedly changed, as is apparent from the following comparison.[5]

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[4]) For discussion on the different criteria measuring the size and, indirectly, the power position of cities see the study on regional and settlement structure of the Czech Republic [Hampl, Gardavský, Kühnl 1987].

[5]) The table on changes in the rank order of capital cities in Central Europe between 1910 and 1991 and the comments on the changes are based on a study by Musil and Illner [1994] published in a book on the development and administration of Prague.

Table 2. Rank order of Central European capitals according to the size of population in 1910 and 1991

Rank of cities in	Prague	Vienna	Budapest	Warsaw	Berlin
1910	5	2	3	4	1
1991	5	4	2	3	1

While in 1910 the smallest capital, Prague, accounted for 8% of the combined population of these capitals, and the largest, Berlin, accounted for 45% of this total, by 1990 these values changed to 13% and 32%, respectively. This whole sample of the capitals became more *homogeneous*, while the total population number of these cities increased only a little. In 1910 altogether 8.4 million inhabitants lived in them, while in 1991 the figure was 9.6 million.

To a certain extent it can be said that the more uniform position of Central European metropolises measured by population also corresponds with more uniform political and cultural (but less economic) position and importance. Vienna and Berlin were in both world wars capitals of states which lost. Germany was, moreover, divided after the Second World War, as was Austria for a short time. It can be said to a certain extent that in the competition of cities in this field, at least with regard to the quantitative and demographic characteristics, Warsaw, Budapest and also Prague were strengthened. Future development will probably change this trend. The growth of Berlin's importance must be reckoned with alongside Vienna in its potential for performing an important coordination and gateway function, which has been higher than most experts estimated. The newest data show that "for multinational corporations, Vienna remains the gateway to Central and Eastern Europe".[6]

It is necessary to note that the picture of the Central European urban system would change if added to these five capitals were Munich, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Leipzig, Dresden and perhaps also Wróclaw. We would find that Munich is today more populous than Prague and it may soon attain Vienna's size. On the other hand, we would observe the decline of such cities as Leipzig and Dresden.

A broader comparison which included cities similar in their size and importance to Prague in the late 1930s, such as Milan, Turin and Barcelona, would show that Prague grew substantially slower and its importance in the European context started to decline rapidly, especially after the Second World War.

7. The Assessment of Prague's Present Developmental Potentials

The potentials here are understood as: (1) internal preconditions and qualities which can contribute to future innovative urban development, (2) external conditions of Prague's development which are determined by its position in relation to other European and Central European cities, i.e. Prague's chance *vis-à-vis* those cities with which it competes.

A series of these external conditions determining Prague's position can be partly derived from the previous section of this study which attempted to place Prague in the hierarchy of Central European capital cities.

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[6]) See the article in *International Herald Tribune*, March 14, 1997: "Rush to Vienna continues unabated."

The assessment of the "force" of the individual parameters of the potential is conducted as based upon international rating studies on cities, and upon information from a great number of statistical analyses and studies on European cities, as well as upon the knowledge of European capital cities acquired during visits to them. Prague is compared in terms of quality with especially cities of similar size and function. Obviously, such assessments cannot avoid a considerable degree of subjectivity. To diminish as much as possible this subjective element in evaluating Prague's potential, the author presented his assessment to different groups of Czech and American students. The correlations between his scores and those of the students were rather high. Similar "subjective" methods are used also in rating studies on cities performed by some international organisations.

When estimating Prague's potential it was *disaggregated* into the nine following categories:

1. Geographic potential as expressed by locational parameters
2. Demographic potential
3. Economic potential expressed by number and structure of economic activities
4. General political potential measured by the presence of internal and international organisations and institutions
5. Potential of the urban infrastructure, technical as well as social and cultural
6. Social or human potential as expressed by the skills of the population, readiness for contacts, by "cultural capital", and by communication abilities
7. Cultural potential as expressed by the cultural traditions, variety of cultural activities, and architectural quality of the city
8. Municipal political potential as measured by the stability of municipal political bodies, local initiatives, and co-ordination between central government and the municipality
9. Environmental potential as expressed by the quality of the dwelling stock, recreational facilities, psychical characteristics of environment, internal transport network, and public transport.

The following table presents the "force", or intensity of the individual categories of the potential and the intensity of the individual parameters. A five point scale was used, the lowest value of the parameter is expressed by one character (+), the highest by five (+++++). One should again stress that the procedure is based on qualitative assessments derived from much information of heterogeneous quality. To arrive at more reliable results for the same parameter, some assessments were based on more than one source of information.

Table 3. Structure of Prague's present developmental potentials

	Parameters of the potential	Force of the individual parameters
1.	*Geographic parameters*	
1.1	Broader geographic location in terms of the possibility to be integrated with Western Europe	++++
1.2	Location in regard to main international traffic routes	++
2.	*Demographic potential*	
2.1	Natural growth potential	+
2.2	Attractiveness for immigrants	+++
3.	*Economic activities and their structure*	
3.1	Presence of one or more strong domestic industrial and financial groups	++++
3.2	Presence of one or more strong foreign industrial and financial groups	+
3.3	Sufficiently diversified industrial structure with a possible development of innovative high-technology	+++
4.	*Internal and international political functions*	
4.1	Political position in the Czech Republic	++++
4.2	International political position, presence of seats of international political organisations	+
5.	*Urban infrastructure*	
5.1	First-class telecommunication network permitting easy contacts with the external world by the quick dissemination of information inside the country	+
5.2	Presence of important universities, research institutes and professional schools with theoretical orientation	+++
5.3	Presence of technological services and applied research (sale of know-how) with strong human capital	++++
5.4	Access to financial resources, especially to commercial credits, available also to small- and medium-sized companies	++
5.5	Diversified network of services for business companies (marketing, managerial consultation, legal consultancy)	++
6.	*Social, i.e. human, potential of the city*	
6.1	Advanced urban society with skills necessary for the functioning of the metropolis (transition from the secondary economic structure to the tertiary, advanced structure of private business, and entrepreneurial spirit)	+
6.2	Readiness of the population for contacts with the world (fluency in foreign languages, social and commercial skills, technological skill)	+++
6.3	Mental disposition of the population with elements of cosmopolitan spirit, including tolerance towards foreigners and immigrants, towards national, ethnical, intellectual, and religious plurality, the spirit of "open society"	++
6.4	Dynamic cultural capital, i.e. dynamic, non-conservative temperament of the people	+++
6.5	Informal mechanisms for information exchange inside the metropolitan area, i.e. an advanced culture of conferences, international exhibitions, informal meetings in clubs, cultural centres, etc.	++

7.	*Cultural potential*	
7.1	Presence of the cultural and intellectual traditions, the presence of a cultural image of the city	++++
7.2	Offer of cultural and intellectual activities for domestic and foreign visitors	++++
7.3	Quality of the city itself, its architecture and aesthetic attractiveness	+++++
8.	*Political conditions and municipal administration*	
8.1	Stability of the political structure, prospects of pluralistic democracy	+++
8.2	Presence and stability of the legal state	++
8.3	Good municipal administration ensuring smooth functioning of the city	++
8.4	Local policy initiatives fostering innovations	++
8.5	Good co-ordination between the central government and municipal administration (understanding or at least the neutrality of the centre towards the city)	+++
9.	*Quality of environment and housing*	
9.1	Quality and diversity of dwelling stock	++
9.2	Accessibility of cultural and recreational facilities	+++
9.3	Recreational facilities in the city surroundings and its attractiveness in terms of nature and landscape	++++
9.4	Quality of the physical characteristics of environment (air, water, soil)	+
9.5	Security in the city	++
9.6	Quality of the internal transport network	++
9.7	Quality of public transport	+++

To make the results of our estimates better understandable and more synoptic, the *average scores* have been calculated for each of the main eight categories of potentials. Here are the results of the rating, starting with the highest, i.e. best, values, and ending with the lowest values.

Table 4. The Potentials of Prague

Category of potential	Scores
1. Cultural potential	4.3
2. Geographic, i.e. locational	3.0
3. Economic	2.7
4. Social and human	2.6
5. General political	2.5
6. Infrastructural	2.4
7. Municipal political	2.4
8. Environmental	2.4
9. Demographic	2.0

The picture is not surprising. Prague's assets are based on culture, to a large extent on the beauty of the city, on her location, in a lesser degree on its industrial skills and traditions and on the human capital of the city. To the less attractive aspects of Prague belong the political institutions, their activities and behaviour, and the environmental and infrastructural qualities of the city.

8. Prague and the Changing European Order

All cities are part of an interurban network and the future of all of them depends on the wider political, economic and cultural context, as well as on the changes in the general

patterns of the urban system itself. The end of Europe's division into two blocks after 1989, started to change the position of Prague and of other capital cities of former socialist states. A realistic assessment of their future potential and position must be now based on the confrontation of the existing qualities of these cities with geopolitical changes (membership in European Union, NATO, etc.), and the long-term trends in the European urban system, as described in the first part of this study.

The chances of the reintegration of Prague into the European urban system are quite high. Prague is quickly de-industrialising and becoming a typical service centre. The chances of it becoming a high level command and co-ordination city, such as Brussels, Frankfurt, and Milan are, however, rather small. Prague will remain a regional centre serving mainly the Czech Republic with *some* gateway functions for Central and Eastern Europe. These functions will be primarily performed – as empirical data already show – by Vienna, Berlin and to a lesser degree by Budapest. Prague is not, however, facing decline due to peripherisation. The reintegration of the city into European urban networks is, and will be, stimulated by the continuous improvement of Prague's accessibility (the enlargement of the airport, by the construction of high speed railways and motorways).

The growth of Prague's role in the European urban system is, and will be in the future, stimulated by the market economy. This has been proved by many data on the Czech economy – now already eight years after 1989. One cannot expect, however, a considerable and quantitative growth in the size of the city, in fact one can predict only a relatively modest population growth in the whole of the Prague metropolitan region, a growth based predominantly on suburbanisation.

In many respects Prague has started to compete with other capital and large cities in the region, especially with Budapest, Vienna, Berlin and Munich. The real trump card of Prague in this competition and in this building up of a new position, is undoubtedly the cultural potential of the city. Prague is already now the main centre of urban tourism in Central Europe and it is becoming a preferred convention, congress and conference centre. The chance to become one of the important cultural centres of Europe undoubtedly exists. The crucial impulse for this must be the activities of Prague intellectuals, artists and professionals, and their endeavours to engender creative thinking and ingenious artistic works.

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Czech Political Parties and their Voters*

An Analysis of Voting Patterns in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: This article deals primarily with voting patterns during elections to the Chamber of Representatives. The new trends in voting patterns [Matějů and Vlachová 1997] that emerged during the Senate elections are not considered in the article. Information on voting patterns during the parliamentary elections are supplemented by information gained from surveys carried out in autumn 1996. The article maps out the shifts in votes between the 1992 and 1996 elections and the developing stability of voting behaviour in relation to the developing system of political parties. It analyses certain motives underlying voting behaviour (including sympathy for the political party or the lack of it, potential second choice and negative voting), together with the distribution of voters between parties on the left-right spectrum. It discusses the links between these motives and the more stable alignment of voters with political parties, and the nature of the current governing coalition and of other coalitions which parties indicated were possible. The data used has been taken from various surveys, including two during parliamentary elections in the spring of 1996 and one in autumn 1996.

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There were two elections in the Czech Republic in 1996, the general election to the lower house of parliament, i.e. the Chamber of Representatives, in spring, and to the upper house – the Senate, in autumn. Both elections confirmed suppositions that the Czech political scene is in a process of development which will lead to a change in the party system. Parliamentary politics in the Czech Republic is now seven years old. This is not really long enough to be seen as totally developed and stable, but it is nevertheless clear that the political scene here is moving closer to that common in western democracies. The present system of political parties has more than one feature that is important for the consolidation of the democratic system of government and those features of political development that are not yet fully mature appear positive [Krause 1996: 425]. Out of the welter of political parties in 1991-1992 there have emerged several parties which represent the major political interests and which have a relatively solid core of voters. Following last year's elections the lower house of parliament is largely made up of classical political parties (as opposed to heterogeneous political movements or post-materialist parties), behind which lie specific opinions and ideas and also classical

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political ideologies [Vlachová 1996b][1] and social classes [Matějů and Řeháková 1996]. These political parties cannot now be said to be "hovering" over the political, economic and social reality without being connected with it [Tóka 1997]. The rates at which they are becoming part of the Czech political system differ, contributing to a certain predictability and institutionalisation of the future political competition.

Voting preferences in the Czech Republic are becoming more stable, as is the case in the stable western democracies. They are focusing around six political parties and have also reached a certain degree and limits on the left-right spectrum. Voting is becoming a habit rather than a constantly new decision [Runciman 1971], and the number of people who change their allegiance between elections or in the course of an election campaign is falling.

The Contribution of the Political System

According to the simplest classification in terms of the number of political parties, the Czech Republic has a multi-party political system.[2] This allows for the largest possible number of different political interests and the largest possible number of structural cleavages – democratic political conflicts on questions of economics, social policy, foreign policy, the concept of the regime, religion, minorities, an so on. [Lipset and Rokkan 1967]. As a multi-party system shows in practice, however, not every interest is in fact politically important and not every country has a large number of politically relevant cleavages [Downs 1957].

A political system such as that which now exists in the Czech Republic, in which there is only one important structural cleavage on the economy and social policy (the socio-economic dimension), naturally gives rise to a limited number of large parties – theorists estimate two or three [Downs 1957], and several smaller parties. The major parties – the right-wing ODS during the second parliamentary term and now the left-wing ČSSD as well –represent the major and conflicting interests in the fields of the economy and social policy and are coming to represent the two main streams of politics. A degree of irrationality in the multi-party system allows the existence of smaller parties which can stress minority interests which are not covered by the major socio-economic ones (religious, as with KDU-ČSL, the basic concept of the system as with KSČM and possibly also SPR-RSČ, foreign politics –KSČM and SPR-RSČ, ethnic minorities – SPR-RSČ, etc.). Both the major parliamentary parties and the smaller ones are forced to form alliances within the government and in opposition. This imposes a certain degree of similarity on them, together with a certain similarity of their voters, and forces them into a political system in which they have no hope of gaining an absolute majority.

A democratic political system also makes it possible for very small political parties to exist, representing particular interests. These very small parties lie outside the main

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[1]) The typology of political ideologies is from Janda [1989: 176-178] according to Kingdon [1981].

[2]) The Czech Republic has a system of proportional representation with a threshold of 5% for political parties and 7% for coalitions. This voting system favours the formation of a multi-party political system. In 1991 politicians were already debating what voting system would best suit the then Czechoslovakia [Gabal et al. 1996] and there was considerable support for a majoritarian voting system, but a system of proportional representation was eventually chosen and the Czech Republic took this over after the split of the Federation.

political spectrum (outside parliament) and are a by-product of a political system which allows them to hope that they will become important. Those which do not find their place in the political spectrum (as in Italy in the 1960s, for example, there were no significant regional political parties,[3] although they later became important) are condemned to a meagre existence or to extinction. In the Czech Republic today such parties include the SD-LSNS, LB, SDL, MNS-HSMS, HSMS-MNS, DEU, DŽJ and many others.

Changes in Voting Patterns between the 1992 and 1996 Elections

There has been major development in the Czech parliamentary political spectrum since the 1992 elections to the Lower House (at that time still the Czech National Assembly[4]). Of the parties which won parliamentary seats in 1992 – the ODS-KDS coalition, ODA, KDU-ČSL, ČSSD, LSU, LB (the Left Block – a coalition of the KSČM and SDL), HSD-SMS and the SPR-RSČ (see Appendix 2) – some have been shown to be strong, stable and significant, while others have undergone changes [Kopecký, Hubáček and Plecitý 1996], becoming less important, merging, splitting or disappearing. The HSD-SMS split into the HSD-SMS and the ČMSS. The ČMSS merged with what was left of the LSU to form the ČMUS, the LSNS split off from the LSU almost immediately after the elections and the LB split into the KSČM and the Left Block, while the ODS merged with the KDS. This development was seen at the parliamentary level (in the parliamentary caucuses), at the national level, and at the same time in the behaviour and allegiances of voters, leading to a more consolidated, easily visible and stable parliamentary political scene. As Krause [1996] noted, the fact that unstable parties did not win seats in the 1996 elections was a positive sign of the stabilisation of the political system, since if they did not have a firm organisational base they could not offer lasting political success and really represent their voters.

The outcome of this development was clear from the results of the elections to the Chamber of Representatives of 31st May/1st June 1996. In the period since the 1992 elections the political spectrum had become clearer on the left and in the centre, and the search was on for an acceptable left and at the same time an equal and clear opposition for the relatively strong right,[5] which had managed to consolidate itself earlier than the left, in fact one whole parliamentary term before. According to Novák [1996], it was positive that the ČSSD was growing stronger and that at the same time the ODS was maintaining its strong position. After the 1990 and 1992 elections (see Appendix 2) the strongest opposition party was the KSČM, which was however not acceptable as an alternative government. The fact that those opposition parties in favour of retaining the status quo became more powerful was a factor in the realisation that a reasonable alternative to the then government was emerging.

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[3]) "In Italy ethnic and regional cleavages are not relevant at the level of national policy making" [Sartori 1966: 142].

[4]) In the period from the foundation of the Czechoslovak Federation until 1992, the Czech National Assembly was of the second rank in the national parliament. The main legislative body of the then Czechoslovak Federation was the bi-cameral Federal Assembly. After the split of the federation at the end of 1993 the Czech National Assembly became the lower house of the Czech Parliament – the Chamber of Representatives.

[5]) Here strong is meant in terms of electoral support, as this decides the strength of the representation in the legislature.

The considerable flow of voters towards the left of centre ČSSD began in the increasingly mature political system between the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections and it reached a peak during the 1996 electoral campaign. The ČSSD now seemed acceptable not only for left-wing voters but also for many who had previously voted for right-of-centre parties. It gained many votes that would otherwise have gone to those political parties which had little chance of gaining seats in parliament, but also attracted voters from the larger political parties. The number of ČSSD voters gradually approached that of ODS voters (see Figure 1). This gain helped the ČSSD become the main opposition to the right, which was and is primarily represented by the ODS. On the left it became clear that the support for the former Left Block in the 1992 elections had been largely dependent on the KSČM voters. After the Left Block split into the LB and the KSČM between the elections, the ČSSD became more attractive to those less radically minded voters (Table 1) while others remained faithful to the Communist Party. Two major parties thus took shape on the left of the political spectrum, representing the communist and socialist ideologies.

Figure 1. Developing Voting Preferences for ČSSD and ODS



Source: IVVM

Table 1. Changes in Voting Preferences 1992-1996 (in %)

1992	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	1996 ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ	Others
LB	*67.1*	14.2	0.4	0.5	1.3	3.9	12.6
ČSSD	2.7	*75.3*	1.6	2.5	8.2	1.5	8.2
KDU-ČSL	1.4	10.4	*72.8*	1.1	4.7	3.6	6.1
ODA	3.2	16.0	5.9	*33.5*	31.2	3.2	9.1
ODS-KDS	0.9	15.4	5.2	5.6	*63.3*	2.5	7.1
SPR-RSČ	5.5	22.0	1.7	2.0	2.8	*61.6*	4.4
Others	11.3	29.0	5.2	4.5	23.3	6.6	20.2

Note: Row percentages. Total for each row is 100%, N = 12,222.
Source: Exit poll for Czech Television (IFES/SC&C/ARC).

The law of the "collapse of the centre" was also borne out. The first to fall out of parliamentary politics was the OH (today the SD merged with the LSNS), but it was followed by other political parties which placed themselves on the centre of the spectrum and represented politically undefined positions which are difficult for voters to understand – the LSNS and ČMUS. The centre ground was taken by the KDU-ČSL, described as a centre-right party, which is a flexible combination of elements of Christian conservatism, socialism and populism.

The political right also showed signs of a modest development. Back at the end of the former election campaign the conservative right had merged when a majority of KDS members joined with the ODS, taking a majority of the voters for the ODS-KDS coalition in 1992. The strongest flow towards the ODS was of people who had voted for the ODA, which while very similar is in some ways more liberal (Table 1). This was a natural and rational movement. Supporters of the ODA were aware how difficult the position of this small party is and of the risk involved in voting for it, and many of them chose instead to vote for the very similar but more stable ODS. It can be said that the performance of this party since the election shows that there was no foundation for its supporters' fears just after the election, when for a long time it was not clear whether ODA had in fact reached the 5% threshold for entry into parliament. The liberal ideas which ODA is so close to, particularly in its ideas on economic policy, are not very strong in the Czech Republic. There was also a strong movement of voters towards the ODS from small political parties not represented in parliament, and there has been some shifting of voters between the three parties in the coalition (ODS with KDU-ČSL and ODA with KDU-ČSL).

Table 2. Stability of Voting Preferences (in %)

	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ
1992 elections /1996 elections	61.4	40.5	60.4	35.9	63.5	52.0
May 1996 /December 1996	88.5	82.2	89.9	76.8	91.8	79.5

Note: Coefficient of stability of distribution $S_k = 2n_{kk} / n_k + n_{+k}$ [Řehák and Řeháková 1986: 294], $N_{Exit\ poll} = 12{,}222$, $N_{ISSP} = 729$.
Source: Exit poll for Czech Television (IFES/SC&C/ARC), ISSP 1996 – Role of Government.

The supposition that voters were looking not just for a left wing but also for a viable opposition is borne out by the fact that the opposition parties, the ČSSD, KSČM and SPR-RSČ, had already gained more than 30% of their voters during the period between the two elections (ČSSD 31.7%, KSČM 30.7% and SPR-RSČ 37.0%), while the same period was not overly successful for the coalition parties, particularly ODS and KDU-ČSL. ČSSD and ODA – the two most important and most active political rivals of ODS – won over a considerable proportion of their voters during the electoral campaign. ČSSD ran a very successful campaign, while many voters moved towards ODA at the last minute without being particularly influenced by the campaign. KSČM and ODS ran less successful campaigns than the other parties, restricted by the limits that a one-dimensional political system (left-right) presents for six political parties with different ideological positions to divide and limit the number of voters. These limits did not allow

them greater voter support which would increase the core of a long-term stable electorate. KSČM, ODS and KDU-ČSL had the most stable core of faithful voters from the previous elections – KSČM 58.7%, ODS 55.9% and KDU-ČSL 48.8%.[6] These voters had chosen their party during the 1992 elections to the Czech National Assembly and retained it for last year's elections to the Chamber of Representatives.

Table 3. When Voters Decided (in %)

	During the 1992 elections	Between 1992 and 1996	During the electoral campaign
KSČM	58.7	30.7	10.6
ČSSD	25.7	31.7	42.6
KDU-ČSL	48.8	18.7	32.5
ODA	27.0	27.0	46.0
ODS	55.9	25.7	18.4
SPR-RSČ	34.6	37.0	28.4

Note: Row percentages. Total for each row is 100%, N = 892.
Source: Survey "24 Hours before the Elections," SC&C for Czech Television.

Figure 2. Reasons for Voting for Different Parties



r_{Dim1}[7] = 0.25, r_{Dim2} = 0.22, percentage of explained inertia: Dim1 40%, Dim2 32%.
Note: people – led by likable people, like – party I dislike the least, program – good election manifesto, person – strong personalities, future – offers good prospects for the future, strong – strong party, trust – I trust the party, other – other reasons.
Source: Survey "24 Hours before the Elections," SC&C for Czech Television.

[6]) Brokl [1996: 396] gives different figures on voter stability.
[7]) Correlation between row and column scores, singular value.

The ODS, KSČM and KDU-ČSL are the parties with the most stable electorate at the present time (Table 2). They retained 60-64% of their voters between 1992 and 1996, and interim results from the period of marked political instability from May to December 1996 show their voter stability as rising to 88-92% of loyal voters, which is comparable with western democracies [cf. Brynin 1995: 248]. In a political system which is still in the process of formation this means that these parties have become a part of this system and, at the same time, institutions which have gained sufficient legitimacy as representatives of the political interests of citizens. The other political parties as yet have a less stable electorate. They are not as institutionalised as the former three parties and still have considerable development ahead of them.

The institutionalisation of parliamentary parties is also indicated by some of the reasons people gave for voting for a certain party (Figure 2, analysis by ANACOR[8]). Reasons for voting for ODS and KSČM were much clearer and more uniform and reasons for voting for the other parties were much vaguer. Support for ODS was based on the strong party, strong personalities and clear conceptions which voting for this party could bring. Support for ČSSD was based on its election manifesto and on the fact that it was the party people disliked the least. The reasons for voting for KDU-ČSL were less clear and were a combination of its election manifesto, faith in the party, the fact that it was the party people disliked the least, and a mixture of other factors. Reasons for voting ODA included a liking for the people in the party and the fact that it was the party people disliked the least. The fixed star in the political firmament, the KSČM, was chosen for the faith in the party held by those people who were loyal to it. Reasons for voting SPR-RSČ are surprisingly similar to those for voting for ČSSD, i.e. its election manifesto and the fact that it was the party its voters disliked the least. Summarising the motives for voting for the different political parties, it can be said that voters for ODS and KSČM tended to have positive reasons, voting for parties they felt would represent their interests. For these voters, the relationship with other political parties was only secondary. For voters of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODA and SPR-RSČ, on the other hand, negative motives were common – people voted for them because they wanted to vote against another party, rather than because they thought these parties would well represent their interests. This was a case of tactical voting.

Summing up the information on voter stability, on the time at which they decided to vote for a particular party, and on the reasons for doing so, the parliamentary political spectrum has moved further towards the optimal set of parties in the present conditions. ODS has now joined the KSČM as a fixed element of the Czech parliamentary spectrum and KDU-ČSL, ČSSD and SPR-RSČ are becoming parties which people are used to, and without which the Czech parliamentary spectrum would be incomplete. The ODA is still searching for a clear profile, for voters and a stable position in the political system.

Voting, Second Vote, Sympathy and the Lack of It

As in all multi-party systems, elections to the Czech parliament are linked up with preferences and likes and dislikes [Downs 1957] which often spring from non-political motives. Table 4 shows the percentage of cases in which people's vote for a party overlapped with their sympathies. While this was more common for the opposition

[8]) SPSS 6.1.

parties, it played an only slightly lesser role in voting preferences for the parties of the governing coalition. The mixing of sympathies and preferences with political choices is an integral part of multi-party systems, which offer voters several parties that have similar programmes but which they may find more or less likeable. In such a political system, however, voters should think more carefully about who to give their vote to and who will in fact actually profit from this vote. In political systems with a number of different parties elections generally produce coalition governments with all their related problems. Last year's elections showed that Czech voters do in certain circumstances try to overcome their likes and dislikes.

One proof of this behaviour is the drift away from heterogeneous political movements (around 1992) and small unstable parties (around 1996), which meant that in the third free elections since 1989 only six political parties gained seats in parliament, four of which have no political twin there. The only remaining parties which have considerable similarities are ODS and ODA, which are still refining their ideologies and thus their attractions to voters. Despite the signs of a certain electoral rationality, this does not however mean that every political issue, let alone likes and dislikes, is so important that a new political party must be formed.

Table 4. Votes and Sympathies for Parliamentary Parties (in %)

Vote	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ
Sympathy	96.2	91.1	85.2	81.1	83.6	95.1

Note: Diagonal percent, N = 901.
Source: Survey "24 Hours before the Elections," SC&C for Czech Television.

Voters in the Czech Republic expressed the greatest degree of liking for ČSSD and ODS (25.4% of those surveyed for each party), followed by the KSČM. The ranking of political parties according to people's degree of sympathy is close to that of voting preferences for the party (right-hand column in table 5) with the single marked exception of ODA. The ODA is the fourth best-liked party and is the only one in which there is not a significant overlap between sympathy and voting – 35.6% of those who sympathise with ODA voted for ODS, representing 10.4% of ODS's voters, while only 1.2% of ODS sympathisers voted for ODA, making up 4.6% of the total. These figures are not very favourable for ODA, showing the instability of its electoral base, and they imply a worsening outlook for the next elections. It is clear that the gradual settling down of the political scene and the psychological effect of the five percent threshold are leading supporters of small parties to vote for large parties with a similar platform.[9]

The ranking of parties which voters do not like is far more interesting. The first three places are taken up by KSČM, ODS and SPR-RSČ in that order (bottom row in Table 5). The ODS, which is undoubtedly a serious, democratic party which legitimises the present system and which was in power during the greatest part of the post-communist reforms, is here found in the company of the two extremist parties. The fact that ODS is one of the most disliked parties on the Czech political scene can at first

[9]) On the mechanical and psychological effects of the five-percent threshold, see Brokl [1996: 392] and Novák [1996: 411].

glance be easily explained. The ODS has lost popularity[10] because it was in the government between 1992 and 1996 as the strongest party and the strongest member of the coalition. Any political party which is in power, alone or in coalition, becomes worn and commonplace after a certain time and loses popularity. The ODS is not liked by voters of KSČM and SPR-RSČ, which is to be expected from the radicalism of both the politicians and voters of these parties, from their marked dissatisfaction with the government's performance and also from their different ideas about what political system is desirable. While ODS, together with its coalition partners ODA and KDU-ČSL, supports the present system, the KSČM and SPR-RSČ represent an opposition not only to the government but also to the system as such.[11] A detailed analysis of those who expressed a dislike for ODS (Table 5), however, produces an alarming conclusion – that a significant number of ČSSD[12] supporters also dislike ODS.

Table 5. Sympathy for or Dislike of Parliamentary Parties (in %)

			Dislike				Overall
Sympathy	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ	sympathy
KSČM	0.0	0.9	3.7	3.7	78.0	6.4	9.8
ČSSD	18.9	0.0	0.7	3.2	*37.5*	22.5	25.4
KDU-ČSL	40.8	11.8	0.0	1.3	7.9	18.4	7.0
ODA	35.6	9.6	1.0	0.0	7.7	28.8	9.5
ODS	45.9	7.1	0.7	0.4	0.0	29.2	25.4
SPR-RSČ	28.1	1.0	7.3	2.1	44.8	0.0	8.4
Others	28.1	0.0	1.8	3.5	38.6	22.8	-
Overall dislike	29.9	4.0	2.0	1.7	27.5	21.9	

Note: Percentage by row. Difference to 100% made up by voters of other parties, N = 1,174.

Source: Survey "24 Hours before the Elections," SC&C for Czech Television.

[10]) It has been described as arrogant, absolutist, and so forth. Its dominant position during the former parliamentary term was not popular with a part of the population, even though the system was undeniably pluralistic and democratic.

[11]) These are parties which would, if possible, change the system of government. The majority of their voters agree with them on this. The KSČM launched their manifesto in 1996 under slogans such as *We are for the change of the system, for socialism, and Socialism, a chance for the future.* The KSČM typically works within the system and behaves according to its rules. Although it would prefer a different regime, it has accepted the "game" of parliamentary democracy. This is not however the case with the SPR-RSČ, which is far less ready to accept the rules than is the KSČM. Members of the SPR-RSČ have carried out a number of acts which have been judged criminal (although they were politically motivated they were not political crimes but offences such as assault and injury, damage to property, incitement to racism and nationalism, disturbing the peace, and patronage). Such acts demonstrate a lack of respect for the laws of the country.

[12]) ČSSD is considered to be a democratic political party, an opposition which accepts the system as such, an equal rival for the ODS and the main party in a possible alternative government. Even if the fact that voters always react against the opponents of "their party" is taken into account, there remains the question of why the ČSSD supporters' reaction was so marked.

The map of dislikes shown in Table 5 is very similar to that of negative voting (Table 6). Just as a liking for a political party overlaps with voting for it, so a dislike for it clearly overlaps with negative voting. Voters for the parties in the present government coalition would never vote for an extremist party, on either extreme. The KDU-ČSL, ODA and ODS voters are all similar in this. In certain circumstances they would feel able to vote for the other democratic party – ČSSD – although ODS voters saw this as a rather extreme choice. Were ČSSD voters forced to vote for one of the parties in the governing coalition, more than a third of them would not consider ODS under any circumstances. The choices of those voting for extremist parties is limited on two points, on the one hand the ODS, and on the other the party from the other extreme. Voters for the parties in the government coalition show similarities not just in negative voting but also in their second preference. If they had to vote for another party apart from their own, it would be another of the coalition parties. For KDU-ČSL[13] and ODA the most frequent second choice is ODS, while ODS voters would opt for ODA. ČSSD voters feel closest to the KDU-ČSL, and ČSSD is the second choice for voters of the extremist parties.

Table 6. Parties a Person Would Never Vote for by the Party actually Voted for (in %)

	Would never vote for					
Voted for	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ
KSČM	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	71.0	21.0
ČSSD	20.3	1.4	3.6	2.3	*33.3*	35.6
KDU-ČSL	50.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	7.6	33.3
ODA	37.0	3.7	1.9	0.0	7.4	48.1
ODS	57.1	7.6	0.4	0.0	0.0	31.9
SPR-RSČ	28.2	0.0	2.6	5.1	59.0	2.6
Others	33.3	0.0	1.8	0.0	21.1	38.6

Note: Row percent. Total to 100% made up by other parties, N = 750.
Source: Survey ISSP 1996 – Role of Government.

Despite the natural loss of popularity over the period when ODS was the strongest party in parliament and in the government, the high percentage of people who dislike ODS is clearly a result of the battle of its main rival ČSSD and of the political struggles within the coalition (at times during the 1992-1996 term the KDU-ČSL and ODA based their politics on blackmail rather than on co-operation within the coalition). Brokl [1996: 402] comments that these two parties demonstrated "blackmail potential" [Sartori 1976: 123], both exploited their position as parties without real responsibility, and the KDU-ČSL prepared its ground for participation in the peripheral changes in the government in both the centre-right (the present government coalition) and the centre-left (ČSSD and KDU-ČSL [Novák 1996]. Parties with differing platforms such as ČSSD and ODS attract largely differing social and opinion groups of voters, although this does not necessarily mean that they do not compete with each other. They are in the throes of a long political

[13]) These results do not agree with those from the panel survey "24 Hours before the Senate Elections", which SC&C carried out for Czech Television. There twice as many loyal KDU-ČSL voters said they voted for ČSSD, as those who voted for ODS, in the second round when they could not vote for a member of their own party.

battle for floating voters and those not loyal to any one single party. Parties such as ODS and ODA which have similar political programmes are competing for the same voters and so are in close competition. The experience of countries with multi-party systems shows that there can be competition even between members of the same coalition government [Münich and Šorm 1995].

The Czech Republic is no exception in this. During the last parliamentary term political competition in this country took on the guise of continuing, and not just pre-election, confrontation between the ČSSD and ODS and the political stigmatising of the main right-wing parties by social democratically inclined voters using anti-right-wing rhetoric. The ODS was presented by its opponents as a political party which has no natural place on the Czech political scene and which is importing "inhuman" liberal-conservative policies into a country where there is no tradition of these. It described ODS's position as much more extreme. It is well known that voters react more strongly to a more "extreme" rival than to one which is ideologically milder. The presence of a more "extreme" rival therefore draws voters into a closer psychological bond with their party [Bowler, Lanoue and Savoie 1994].

A similar process went on within the government coalition, dominated by ODA in confrontation with ODS. ODA was naturally trying to win over voters from ODS, but this was not achieved and neither ODS nor the coalition as a whole gained any popularity. Anyone who felt disillusioned with ODS policies voted for the opposition rather than for other members of the coalition. Close competition was shown to hold one great risk, that it can cast a stigma and a certain uncertainty on the whole coalition, even though it seems to harm only the major party.

In both types of political competition, which are typical of multi-party systems, ODS was the passive party and carried out a defensive competition primarily aimed at retaining voters [Sani and Sartori 1983]. As a member of the former governing coalition it underestimated factors which should have been taken into account in predicting the behaviour of voters. Both ODS and the other coalition parties underestimated their expectations as to how voters would vote, how the government's performance affects them and what strategies the most important opposition parties, primarily ČSSD, would offer. They did not use the same type of advertising and aggressive confrontation towards ČSSD during the 1992-1996 term as they do now. The formerly little-known ČSSD, through a well-chosen strategy of marking out its ground in relation to the ODS and largely ignoring the other parties, was able to develop into an equally strong rival of the main right-wing party and to win over voters from smaller left-wing parties with similar policies. It could be said to have carried out an expansive contest, primarily aimed at winning voters [Sani and Sartori 1983].

Although there is widespread agreement that ODS, and also KDU-ČSL and ODA, committed certain errors in the way they presented themselves during the electoral campaign,[14] there is still the question of why ČSSD voters and sympathisers have such a

[14]) In illustration; the main slogans which ODS, ODA and KDU-ČSL used during the campaign were not considered successful. In the survey "24 Hours before the Elections" (SC&C for Czech Television) respondents were asked to rank a number of slogans from 1 (I don't like it at all) to 5 (I like it very much). The slogans of the coalition *Dokázali jsme, že to dokážeme* (*We've shown we can do it*) (ODS), *Volte pravou rukou* (*Vote by the right hand*) (ODA) and *Klidná síla* (*Quiet*

negative stance towards the main right-wing party in the present political system, seeing it as almost extremist, and as comparatively antagonistic as towards the real extremist parties. To indicate the difference, voters and sympathisers of the right-wing parties do have an antagonistic stance towards the extremist parties that represent at the very least a disturbing element in political stability and at worst a danger to democracy. The answer is perhaps to be found in the position and opinions of social democratic voters and sympathisers. Although surveys show that voters and sympathisers of the present ČSSD have a greater degree of acceptance of the values of the current system than do KSČM and SPR-RSČ voters, it should not be forgotten that they include people whose social position is different from that of voters for the liberal-conservative parties, who have a personal antipathy for ODS, who frequently came to the ČSSD from extremist parties (a vote for SPR-RSČ prior to that for ČSSD), who vote negatively, and who in general are less ready to accept the democratic system than are those who vote for the coalition parties. The ČSSD has attracted a certain type of voter. There was a hypothesis that the formerly positive stance of ODS voters towards ČSSD could have been because they did not see ČSSD as a serious political rival, but that if they saw the results of the Senate elections as threatening their political interests, they might feel a growing antipathy towards the ČSSD. This was not however borne out by the facts. Even six months after the parliamentary elections ODS supporters had not projected their assessment of the political situation into a dislike for the ČSSD.

Left and Right

The dominant axis of the Czech political system is the classical socio-economic dimension of left-right [Kischelt 1994: 36]. This means that the main political conflicts in society are over the economy, the role of the state in the economy and social inequality, i.e. the conflict between redistribution and the market. According to this dimension, five of the present parliamentary parties can be distributed from left to right as follows: KSČM, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODA, ODS and can be labelled according to the traditional terminology of the left-right political dimension[15] communist, social-democratic (socialist), christian democratic and liberal-conservative (although ODA can be seen as more liberal and ODS more conservative). The SPR-RSČ is something of an exception here. Its programme is not dominated by economic issues and it can be seen as similar to the right-wing populist parties that are well known in western democracies.[16] Its existence represents different dimensions such as authoritarian-liberal, anarchy-order, majority-minority, foreign policy versus the internal regime. The SPR-RSČ is close to the extreme ideological right – fascism and it is extreme in its concentration of authoritarian, racist, anti-European and anti-democratic ideas, rather than in terms of its economic programme. The KSČM, on the other hand, is clearly extreme in terms of its economic programme, although its extremism is also clear in its position on foreign

strength) (KDU-ČSL) received average rankings of 2.55, 2.60 and 2.66, i.e. less than the mid-way value of the scale. The least popular slogan was that of the KSČM – *Socialismus, šance pro budoucnost* (*Socialism, a chance for the future*).

[15]) There is a widespread agreement as to where different ideas and ideologies are placed on the spectrum. Starting from the left it goes: communism – socialism – liberalism – conservatism – fascism [Heywood **1992**: 16].

[16]) It can be compared with the French National Front or the Austrian Freedom Party.

policy and its ideas on the form of the political system. The position of the individual parties on the left-right spectrum corresponds to the positions where their voters place them [Šimoník 1996] and also to where their voters place themselves. The exception is the extremist SPR-RSČ, which does not see itself as extreme and which its voters see as centralist [Šimoník 1996]. The average position of its voters is somewhere between ODA and ODS, although the dispersion of their positions on the left-right scale according to their own assessments is wider (table in Figure 3).

The multi-party political system leads to a distribution of voters into several peaks along the spectrum. This creates the possibility for several parties to exist, but the number of these that do in fact have a peak on the spectrum in any one country is not great – usually only two or three. The Czech political spectrum during the 1996 electoral campaign (Figure 3) has three main peaks which represent three political parties: KSČM, ČSSD and ODS, which are also the parties which a large number of voters see as the most attractive. The voting preferences of two of them – ČSSD and ODS – have given them a considerable advance over the others and they now represent the major political conflict in society – the socio-economic conflict, and also that between the two opposing ideologies – socialist and conservative [Matějů and Vlachová 1997]. The political system is close to bi-polar. The other parties – KDU-ČSL, ODA, SPR-RSČ – do not have a peak on the left-right spectrum which is not covered by another stronger party. The political spectrum is not as a rule one-dimensional and the existence of parties without a peak on the left-right scale is made possible by the voting system along with other possible dimensions of the political spectrum, such as liberalism-authoritarianism, anarchy-order, secularism-religiousness, town-country, democracy-totalitarianism, majority-minority, the post-materialist dimension, the dimension of foreign policy, and even the non-political dimension of liking-disliking that is common in western democracies.

Every party on the political spectrum operates politically within the limits that the other parties allow it. All parties have little room to manoeuvre and so they seek any possible way to set themselves apart from the others and maintain their position. Party ideology takes first place among the different ways of achieving this, with the real political questions on which the parties are competing being thrust into second place. Ideology and politics are much more precisely directed in a multi-party system than in a bi-party one. Parties tend to approach or distance themselves from other parties on the political spectrum according to the issue in question. Political ideology is however a stable element of the party and the ideological label which corresponds to the party's clear position is its best definition in the overcrowded political system. Unlike in two-party systems, parties competing with a number of others are less mobile, since if they shift in any direction they enter the territory of other parties, they compete for voters on similar issues and if they are less successful they can drop from being a parliamentary party into the position of a marginal force.

Figure 3. Self-Positioning of Voters on the Left-Right Scale



	KSČM	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ
Average	2.30	3.80	4.73	4.89	5.22	5.05
Std	0.94	0.92	0.82	1.04	0.81	1.26
N	105	267	82	65	300	78

Note: The figures on the graph are percentages of the total. Average for the population: 4.37. median: 4.
Source: Survey "24 Hours before the Elections", SC&C for Czech Television.

Conclusion

Parties owe their electoral success both to themselves and to their voters. In last year's elections the ČSSD attracted voters from both the centre and the extremes, for a variety of reasons. The analysis shows that it was the political party which came closest to both the average voter and the median voter [e.g. Downs 1957] (table in Figure 4), and this was an important factor in its success. Although it has set itself the aim of attracting the more faithful voters of the extremist parties, the data on stability, on possible shifts and on the distribution of voters on the left-right spectrum indicate that none of the parties can be sure to win over the voters of other parties, without a shift in the political spectrum and the risk of losing some of their existing supporters. The increasing stability of the electorate has both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, a highly stable electorate is an important indicator of the predictability of their behaviour and it undoubtedly contributes to the stabilisation of political parties' positions and of the political system as a whole. On the other hand, however, it can mean that a relatively small number of floating voters can control the political struggle and so make it more difficult for the parties to strengthen their position in the "overflowing" and ideologically structured political sphere.

An interesting fact arising out of the identified range of the second elections and the limited voting preferences is dislike and negative voting (i.e. the party which a person would never vote for). Every voter reacts in a certain way to the range of parties there is to choose from. Among the many factors influencing voting behaviour is the fact that the voter is able to recognise that party in a given political system whose ideology is

unacceptable to him or her, and to vote in such a way as to limit that party's chances of gaining power. The knowledge of the ideologically unacceptable opponent of "their party" can tie voters closer to the latter party [Bowler, Lanoue and Savoie 1994], thus contributing to the ultimate stability of the electorate. The extent and limits of voting behaviour in a multi-party system can also be judged from the possible party coalitions which would be acceptable to voters. Even if it seems that it is better for voters to be able to choose between more than two parties, some authors [Downs 1957] consider that the multi-party system does not really offer most voters a greater choice. The results of elections in political systems with more than one party most often produce coalition governments which suffer all the problems arising out of close political competition. The smaller the number of coalitions which a voter's preferred party is prepared to enter, the easier it is for the voter to predict what a vote for this party will mean in reality. If a voter knows that his or her preferred party will enter a certain coalition, he or she will vote for that party, even if voting for another party would produce the same coalition. Such a voter knows that the more votes a party gains, the stronger it will be within the coalition. If, however, voters do not know what coalitions their party is prepared to enter, then it is not possible to say which party they actually prefer. There may be many resulting coalitions, with many different policies. If voters know who they are supporting along with their favourite parties, there is less need to vote tactically and their voting behaviour becomes more predictable. For this reason it is also important for parties to know which coalitions their voters would accept.

The range of voting preferences indicates that the present coalition is the obvious one for those who voted for the member parties, as their second choice was generally one of the other coalition parties. It is in fact the most natural and most homogeneous of all the theoretically possible coalitions. For voters of KDU-ČSL and ČSSD a coalition between them would have been acceptable but does not seem as natural as the existing one. There are limits for the democratic voters of the extremist parties, which have zero coalition potential, as these parties have distanced themselves from the democratic parties and the latter generally do not consider forming coalitions with them. Voters for extremist parties are prepared to compromise in only one direction [Downs 1957] and would only accept a coalition of their party with the ČSSD, which is also in opposition. They would exclude the ODS, the strongest party and one which supports the status quo, and the party on the opposite extreme. The ODS is also excluded by ČSSD voters.

The extent and limits of voting preferences are in accordance with the signs of possible and unacceptable coalitions which political parties offer their voters. The possible coalitions which parties consider are reasonably homogenous. They are generally groups of parties lying next to each other on the left-right spectrum and do not link parties across the centre from left to right or vice versa. The range of voting preferences generally also includes neighbouring parties. Collaboration between parties is based on ideological similarities and the majority of voters can clearly see what their vote can bring in political terms.

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Appendix 1

Abbreviations Used:

ČSSD – Czech Social Democratic Party

ČMSS – Bohemian-Moravian Party of the Centre

ČMUS – Bohemian-Moravian Union of the Centre

DEU – Democratic Union

DŽJ – Pensioners for Security

HSD-SMS – Movement for Self-Governing Democracy- Society for Moravia and Silesia

HSMS-MNS, MNS-HSMS – moravian national parties

KDU-ČSL – Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party

KSČM – Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

LB – Left Block

LSNS – Liberal National Social Party

LSU – Liberal-Social Union

ODS – Civic Democratic Party

ODA – Civic Democratic Alliance

SD-LSNS – Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party

SDL – Party of the Democratic Left

SPR-RSČ – Association for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party

Data

The following surveys were used for the analysis of voting behaviour: Exit poll for Czech Television (IFES/SC&C/ARC), "24 Hours before the Election" (SC&C for Czech Television, 1966) and ISSP 1996 – Role of Government (Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic) Respondents who did not vote or did not answer the question as to which party they voted for were excluded from the analysis. Voters for small parties which did not reach the 5% threshold for entry to parliament were included in the category of Others.

The parties included in the analysis were those political parties holding seats in the Chamber of Representatives in Parliament: KSČM – communist party, ČSSD – social

democratic party, KDU-ČSL – christian democratic Party, ODA – liberal-conservative party, ODS – liberal-conservative party, SPR-RSČ – right-wing populist party.

Questions Asked:

1. *Could you tell me which party you like the most?*
2. *And could you tell me which party you like the least?*
3. *Could you try and remember which party you voted for in the 1992 parliamentary elections?*
4. *What party have you decided to vote for? (If you have already voted, what party did you choose?)* (in 1996)
5. *When did you decide to vote for this party?*
6. *Can you tell me why you decided to vote for this party?*
7. *Taking your political opinions as a whole, where would you place yourself on the political scale from left to right?*
8. *If the votes were transferred to two parties, which party would you give your vote too?*
9. *What political party would you never vote for?*

Appendix 2

Parties entering Parliament in 1992 (in the Czech National Assembly later the Chamber of Representatives).

	Percentage of total vote
LB	14.05
ČSSD	6.53
HSD-SMS	5.87
LSU	6.52
KDU-ČSL	6.28
ODA	5.93
ODS-KDS	29.73
SPR-RSČ	5.98

Source: Central Electoral Commission and Czech Statistical Office

Parties entering the Chamber of Representatives in 1996.

	Percentage of total vote
KSČM	10.33
ČSSD	26.44
KDU-ČSL	8.08
ODA	6.36
ODS	29.62
SPR-RSČ	8.01

Source: Central Electoral Commission and Czech Statistical Office

Mass Bricolage as a Source of Alternative Education

(Towards the Sociology of Education)

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Abstract: The Czech multimedia institution *Receptář* (The Book of Prescriptions) consists of several components: a TV programme (weekly), a journal (monthly), radio broadcasting (weekly), a club, a foundation, special events entitled days of *The Book of Prescriptions*, various get-togethers *etc.* In this form *The Book of Prescriptions* represents a remarkable sociocultural phenomenon whose main goal is to mediate an exchange of ideas, projects or know-how. The basic principle of *The Book of Prescriptions'* activities is *bricolage* – the concept/problem analysed by two great theoreticians: C. Lévi-Strauss and J. Derrida. With the aid of technology (TV, PC, *etc.*) *The Book of Prescriptions* changes *bricolage* into *mass bricolage*, an interesting feature of postmodern alternative non-formal education. Thus *The Book of Prescriptions* functions as a new type of educational institution and, as such, is a worthy subject of the sociology of education which searches for new alternatives of adult education.

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1. Marginalised education as an alternative education

Marginalised structures of meaning are obviously distributed *marginally*, in no way by a dominant mass medium or a grouping of mass media. Marginalised ways of *education* are (obviously) distributed in the same way – *i.e.* marginally, in no way by a dominant mass medium or a grouping of mass media. However, a certain paradox has existed in reality: the awakening of intended meaning structures, their disclosure, publication and distribution is actually dealt with by a grouping of mass media, the media that are a distributor of the very opposite cultural codes of today, namely stereotypes of the mainstream of mass culture. Thus, a multimedia institution in relation to marginal coding and education is not a speculative fabrication but a Czech reality which has brought a marginalised project into life.

In the Czech Republic there operates a multimedia stimulator, moderator and distributor of (originally) hidden/unused and marginal educational codes; these cultural codes represent a typical product of alternative education; the activity of this multimedia institution means the implementation of a certain educational strategy; this educational strategy represents an alternative education strategy and it is developed on principles different from the those of the official educational strategy. This research, carried out two years ago, thus disclosed a universally applicable model of a highly democratic process of exchange of (originally) *marginal* ideas, knowledge, values and educational relationships, a model built on *modern* technologies and procedures but involving features of education, phenomena of a post-industrial and *postmodern* type.

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The multimedia institution called *Receptář* (*The Book of Prescriptions*) was the *subject* of this research. The *objects* of the research were concrete texts that came into existence within the framework of the implementation of this educational project. For several years this has resulted in continued stratified *bricolage*[1] which has been realised on the theme of a given educational strategy. The sense and objective of this *bricolage* is the disclosure of marginalised or hidden or unused (alternative) cultural codes, the distribution of which activates people (individuals as well as communities) through the mass media (*Receptář*) and mobilises major or minor human resources.

The connection of the *mass media* with *bricolage* gives rise to a new educational phenomenon – *mass bricolage*, which is hard to conceive in modern educational strategies.

What is surprising is the effectiveness of *Receptář*, which is reflected in several basic areas at which its educational strategy is aimed. For example, the relationship between the distribution of new cultural codes and the labour market is remarkably effective: *Receptář* functions here as a means of effecting (i.e. putting into effect) *the communicative transformation of cultural values into economic values*. By the continuous distribution of hundreds of ideas and items of knowledge of an alternative nature it has created *hundreds* of job opportunities, and with dozens of individuals it has inspired successful business activities. In this respect *Receptář* operates as an alternative educational institution of a postmodern/post-industrial type. ("Postmodern" signifies here "the cultural logic of late capitalism" or post-industrialism [Jameson 1991].)

2. Theoretical background and context

Theoretical sources of the research consist of ideas of structuralism (C. Lévi-Strauss) and neostructuralism (J. Derrida) on the one hand, and theories of alternative education (B. Bernstein, S. Aronowitz, H. A. Giroux) on the other.

Structuralist/neostructuralist positions facilitate the application of the very fruitful idea of *bricolage*, from the sociological dimension of radical and postmodern educational theses concerning essential social changes in the field of education.

The first thesis refers to the gradual transformation of knowledge, representing the contents of literacy, and later on the contents of education, into the means of exchange, that is into the goods. The conclusions of Baudrillard's "critique of the political economy of signs" [Baudrillard 1981] also apply to the area of education. At this point this process – the transformation of signifiers, structures/functions of signifiers/meanings – starts with the *separation of knowledge or the known from the knower*, and education and the educational project become literally an object of *market exchange*. Furthermore, they become a general equivalent of market exchange:

> "Market relevance is a new concept both of knowledge and of its relation to those who create it (...) Knowledge should flow like money to wherever it can create advantage and profit. Indeed, knowledge is not just like money: it is money. Knowl-

[1]) In the theoretical part of the research, by connecting the outlined conceptions, *bricolage* was defined together with its function and sense in terms of education: *bricolage* is a process of disclosing hidden marginalised cultural codes which, by providing adequate intervention from outside, may change into an alternative educational project/process and may initiate the desirable impulses of social and cultural mobilisation of individuals, communities and regions.

edge is divorced from persons, their commitments, their personal dedication..." [Bernstein 1993: 155].

This conformity to the market results in an acceptance of strategies of gradual transformation of education into vocational training. This strategy, however, also spreads into areas where it is not fully implementable. And that is another instance.

The second instance, then, is the *vocationalisation of education* and the decline of education as a means of spiritual edification. Bernstein comments on this:

"This orientation represents a fundamental break in the relationship between the knower and what is known. In the medieval period the two were necessarily integrated. Knowledge was an outer expression of an inner relationship. The inner relationship was a guarantee of the legitimacy, integrity, worthwhileness of the knowledge, and the special status of the knower. (...) Now we have a dislocation, which permits the creation of two independent markets, one of knowledge and another of knowers." [Ibid.: 157].

The third instance is the constitution of paradigmatic functioning of the so-called *privileged text* which is justified by various means. It always works, however, as a centre or an axis around which additional cultural codes entering the educational process gather. This privileged text (this centre) is then a criterion for the constitution of the two abovementioned instances. But it leads us to another theoretical thesis.

One goal of this research is to show how the alternative forms and ways of education presented by *Receptář* coincide with these theoretical presuppositions.

Radical pedagogical theory as well as postmodern education theory connect the issue of education with the issue of the position of an individual in the power structure of society. For example, Giroux suggests that "illiteracy is not merely the inability to read and write, but also a cultural marker for naming forms of difference within the logic of cultural deprivation theory"; this is so in the opposite case, literacy, "becomes a form of privileged cultural capital, and subordinate groups, it is argued, deserve their distributional share of such cultural currency" [Giroux 1989: 150].

This would mean, though, that the process of acquiring cultural competences through the mastering of the codes of these competences is always an adoption of privileged competences, and that other underprivileged competences do not even deserve to be referred to as "education". Such is the logic of this theory, and it is also affirmed by Bernstein when he says that "the basic question to be asked is always with reference to the privileging pedagogical text" [Bernstein 1993: 172]. From the viewpoint of this theory each literacy (and education in general) is actually a privileged text. For the term 'non-education' refers to underprivileged, helpless and marginalised groups and individuals gathered around underprivileged texts.

From this point of view alternative education is the process concentrated around underprivileged texts. The source of such texts in our research is *mass bricolage*. What is then *alternative education*?

An attempt to fully respect the sociocultural conception of education is obvious in J. P. Hautecoeur's definition of literacy [Hautecoeur 1994: 15], which this project will adapt as a definition of alternative education: "alternative education *may be considered as the semiotic process of playing with unprivileged codes (texts) to deconstruct and reconstruct meanings and strategies of communication.* It is a game that is reserved not

only for specialists. In the pragmatic perspective of everyday communication, each participant learns a certain number of the rules of the game and applies them. Trying to modify the rules or introduce new ones is the objective of cultural intervention." I would add that literature in the field of contemporary pedagogical theory argues this way too [Street 1993, Verhoeven 1994]. Such a conception of alternative education has a significant social dimension and moves the problem from the field of educational theory/practice to the field of sociology (or social and cultural anthropology).

The *objective of this research* was to survey the *particular work creation, distribution and acquisition of the alternative process of playing with unprivileged codes and texts* – as represented by the multimedia *Receptář* (*The Book of Prescriptions*).

3. Receptář (*The Book of Prescriptions*)

The activities of the complex institution called *Receptář* (*The Book of Prescriptions*) were the field and material of the whole research. In the Czech Republic (then still Czechoslovakia), this institution started in 1987 as a special TV programme for enthusiasts of various hobbies.[2]

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[2]) The *Receptář* (*The Book of Prescriptions*) educational project is the project of an institution that has two "pure" types of mass media – *television and periodicals* – and quasi-mass media, such as meetings, a club, exhibitions *etc.* The *Receptář* gradually changed into a more complex organism that included the television programme, a periodic magazine, *Klub Receptáře* (*The Book of Prescriptions Club* – which united its fans) with *R-Noviny* (the bulletin of the *Club*), *Nadace Klubu Receptáře* (*The Book of Prescriptions Club Foundation*), a book *edition* and a series of *activities* (*Dny Receptáře – Days of The Book of Prescriptions*) which take place in various locations and regions. The organisational structure of this institution is shaped by a TV programme (weekly), a magazine (monthly), a club and a club foundation (with its own periodical – but the club foundation was operating only during the period of this research). In addition, there is a telephone line which can be installed in every major municipal unit in the Czech Republic. The publishing institution (publishing house *RENA*) which focuses only on publications for the audience of *Receptář* is another, loosely associated but very important, organisational component. In total, the *bricolage* institution referred to as *Receptář* involves every week about 1.2-1.7 millions individuals (or small groups).

The *principle* that determines the shape of the whole educational project is quite simple: the team of *Receptář* personnel gathers information (knowledge, ideas, minor educational projects, know-how) which it receives in great quantity from enthusiasts. It is selected and distributed back to the audience, either in the overall scope (TV) or as far as special interest is concerned (to magazine readers), and purposefully (to club members).

Essential data concerning *Receptář*:

TV-viewers (weekly)	premiere minimum 1.2 million
TV programmes so far (August 95)	225
magazine readers monthly (approximately)	400,000
Receptář Club members	50,000
booklets and books	30
readership of booklets and books	200,000

Sources: *Receptář* archives; *Czech TV Reviews* 1987-1995; Interviews with P. Podlaha & K. Knotek (*RENA* Publ. House); *Receptář nejen na neděli* (The Book of Prescriptions not only for Sunday), Vols. 1 (1990)-6 (1995); [Hubík 1995].

Even though this institution also functioned from the beginning as an *educational institution*, its educational efforts were rather *implicit* and focused on the phenomenon called the *hobby*. The change in this institution's activities came after the political changes in 1989, and is connected with the establishing of the *Nadace Klubu Receptáře* (*The Book of Prescriptions Club Foundation*) which in its statute in 1992 drafted principles for the educational level strategy of its activities. Since then, the educational activities of *Receptář* have been *explicit, controlled, programmed*, and not only hobby-oriented. Furthermore, these activities are multi-media, not just uni-media as they were in the beginning (1987).

There is a mutual communication between an unspecified public, local communities, various individuals, hobby organisations, and so on, on one side, and *Receptář* on the other. It is directed mostly one-way (toward *Receptář*), and its purpose is the *mass exchange of selected information.* This information has a contextually pre-defined character – it is *bricolage* of both kinds (see Derrida's interpretation of Levi-Strauss's concept below). Information selection is done by the creators of the TV programme, magazine publishers, edition publishers, *Klub Receptáře* activists and organisers of *Dny Receptáře* (*The Book of Prescriptions Days*). The process can be simply drawn as follows:

Figure 1. Information flow through *Receptář*



Source: [Hautecoeur 1994: 305].

4. Bricolage

This process is based on twofold principles analysed by C. Lévi-Strauss and J. Derrida as the principles of *bricolage*.

4.1 Lévi-Strauss-Model (*LSM*)

C. Lévi-Strauss introduces this word when he needs to explain the difference between mythical thinking and modern scientific thinking. He writes:

> "There still exists among ourselves an activity which on the technical plane gives us quite a good understanding of what a science we prefer to call prior rather than primitive, could have been on the plane of speculation. This is what is commonly

called bricolage in French. In its old sense the verb 'bricoler' applied to ball games and billiards, to hunting, shooting, and riding. It was however always used with reference to some extraneous movement: a ball rebounding, a dog straying or a horse swerving from its direct course to avoid an obstacle. And in our own time the bricoleur is still someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to those of craftsman." [Lévi-Strauss 1968: 16-17]

It is typical for *bricolage* that "it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal." [Ibid.: 17] Besides this

"the bricoleur is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks, but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with whatever is at hand, that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relations to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The use of the bricoleur's means cannot therefore be defined in terms of a project (...). It is to be defined only by its potential use (...), the elements are collected or retained on the principle that they may always come in handy (...)." [Ibid.: 17-18][3]

All the highlighted features of *bricolage* – deflection, play, means of a non-professional, limited means, unlimited tasks – can be understood as a task of the *Receptář* project. The characteristics of *instrumentality* and *anything can be used for everything* can then be understood as a defining of methods that can be used by those who want to implement the project of *Receptář*.

This means that the individual participants in the game called *Receptář* use alternative discourse creation as their programme. In this game, alternative means the same as "drawing from a limited world of instruments that is always within reach".

But Lévi-Strauss himself adds that "the difference is therefore less absolute than it might appear. It remains a real one, however, in that the engineer is always trying to make his way out of and go beyond the constraints imposed by a particular state of civilisation while the 'bricoleur' by inclination or necessity always remains within them. This is another way of saying that the engineer works by means of concepts and the 'bricoleur' by means of signs." [Lévi-Strauss 1968: 19-20]. A basic means for the "engineer" to get beyond the limits of a given set (of knowledge, methods etc.) is then called a *concept* (i.e.

[3]) For example, Derrida sums up C. Lévi-Strauss's thoughts as follows: "On the other hand, still in *The Savage Mind*, he (Lévi-Strauss) presents as what he calls *bricolage* what might be called the discourse of this method. The *bricoleur*, says Lévi-Strauss, is someone who uses the means at hand, that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogeneous – and so forth." [Derrida 1978: 28]

something with defined meaning), and a basic means for the *bricoleur* to reorganise a set (of knowledge, methods etc.) is on the contrary called a *sign*[4] (i.e. something "waiting" for meaning).

Consequently, any thing assumes any function in *bricolage* (or a sign assumes whatever meaning according to circumstances, purposes, context *etc.*), any instrument can become an object, or any object can become an instrument.

We can sum up as clearly as possible Lévi-Strauss's opinions of the differences between *systematically* functioning reason on the one hand and so-called *bricolage* on the other:

Figure 2. Different characteristics of science and *bricolage* according to C. Lévi-Strauss

science		*bricolage*
straightness		divergence
specialisation		non-specialisation
unlimitation of instruments		limitation of instruments
anything has a unique function		anything can be for anything
concept as instrument		sign as instrument
creation through realisation of project		creation through reconstruction
inventive innovation		discovery innovation
discovery innovation		inventive innovation
system	?	play
play	?	ritual

Source: [Hubík 1995b: 63, Hautecoeur 1994: 310].

The task of *Receptář* activity is at first sight led by the basic working instrument to which Lévi-Strauss refers as a *sign*.

The alternative educational project of *Receptář* unequivocally invites us to reorganise, restructure and re-contextualise either the known grammars of various skills (know-how, institutions, strategies *etc.*), or to create new grammars (know how, institutions, strategies *etc.*).

The *Receptář* way is mostly a *bricoleur's* way. Originally and in most cases, it is characterised by terms[5] stated in the right column of the scheme stated above. These

[4]) "Concepts thus appear like operators opening up the set being worked with and signification like the operator of its reorganisation (...)." [Lévi-Strauss 1968: 20]

[5]) The *content analysis* of *Receptář's texts* has unequivocally proved the character of the projects as projects based on *bricolage*. For instance, the *semantic formulas* of these texts are profiled by the expression *bricolage* (kutilství) in most cases, and they are structured according to functions that define *bricolage*: the suggested texts' key word is *nápad* (idea), and it is immediately followed by the word *kutil* (handyman) (or derived words). The structure of semantic formulas in projects according to a function, a new use of an old instrument or new use of a thing or material is absolutely essential; without respect to their oscillation in specific editions of the magazine or the TV programme it is possible to state that the appearance of semantic formulas structured in this way is more than 50%. Besides this: the *semantic portrait* of the *bricoleur* himself/herself is primarily built from activities of searching for innovations of all kinds until "the bricoleur finds peace", that is, until there still are things to reorganise and re-contextualise.

terms also define the *alternative discourse of education in a particular community*. By interaction with *Receptář*, this discourse transforms into an alternative educational project entering the *mass* exchange of further (similar) alternative projects.

The *Receptář* represents stratified *bricolage*. *The first level* of this stratification of the alternative educational *Receptář* project is *basic* and it is the *original and current medium of the whole project*. The *bricoleur* takes part in this level of the educational programme in both social roles – as the educator and the educated; it only depends on the phase of the semantic exchange whether one role is adopted or the other. On this level of events, it fully complies with Lévi-Strauss's ideas on *bricolage*, and with the views of postmodern educational theories on the approach to education and the role of educator/educated. For this level of an educational project, it is typical that education here "expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal". The range of this level is determined by the interest of the *amateur* on one side and the necessary cultural codes carrier on the other.

In the *Receptář* texts, this *interpretation and implementation of LSM-bricolage* that is – I repeat – basic, corresponds with levels represented by the following slots: *Who knows – will answer* (and furthermore, *Who knew it, answered*), *The marketplace of ideas*, and *A mail full of ideas*. These texts represent approximately 25% of the whole number of themes, and their semantic structure is fairly simple: sketches, questions, answers, messages. Nevertheless, we must note that even on this textual level, which forms the basis of the whole project, the addressee finds significant information, and the *hidden* or *unused cultural codes* are revealed here as frequently as the second textual level.

Lévi-Strauss assumed that this type of activity and its carriers are only a "marginal" feature of an industrial society. There are approximately 60,000 members of the *Receptář Club*, and they mostly represent *bricoleurs* of the first type (but also of other types – detailed differentiation requires further explanation) – which represents approximately 0.5% of the Czech population (children included). This is by no means a marginal feature.

The content analysis of the texts, as well as the questionnaire procedures, have revealed that if the respondent takes part in a mass *bricolage* of the *Receptář*, he/she is usually motivated by an effort to obtain cultural codes of a smaller scope, for example,

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Here, we can add that the overall structure of the *Receptář* also defines its texts, especially by the *bricolage* optics. The approximately thirty page magazine, with 12 editions per year (since 1993, there are 40 pages; part of it is a special appendix "for the enterprising") which is divided into twenty-one sections. From these, eight sections are explicitly *hobby* themes oriented, and approximately one-sixth belongs to a 'do-it-yourself' information exchange. An identification of various communities' alternative educational discourses is, for instance, promoted by sections *Kdo to ví – odpoví* (Who knows it – will answer), *Kdo to věděl – odpověděl* (Who knew it – answered), *Pošta plná nápadů* (A mail full of ideas) or *Tržiště nápadů* (The marketplace of ideas).

These titles may raise a smile and doubts as to whether we can consider them to be alternative educational projects. Of course, not always. But the doubts will disappear as soon as we verify the effectiveness of such an information exchange in the field. As the empirical research revealed, the alternative *Receptář* projects were implemented at least once by approximately 50% of the participants, and approximately 10% of them have been motivated by these projects to some enterprise activity or to work which brought about savings [comp. Hubík 1995a].

knowledge that will help a person improve their flat/house, workplace, housework, work in the garden, or improve the equipment of tools and accessories.

4.2 Jacques Derrida-Model (*JDM*)

The structuralist step towards its *post-position*, that is towards the neostructuralist conception of *intertextuality*, does not allow such a simple idea of *bricolage* as Lévi-Strauss created. The play of mutual acts of differentiation which gives rise to the very possibility of the existence of text as text, and, consequently, any learning (which is only the reading of texts of the world) of a signal nature, cannot prove any fixed point, with the exception of the points which can be conventionally agreed on. The idea of a text which is independent of such intertextual play is absurd. This is why Derrida notes:

> "If one calls *bricolage* the necessity of borrowing one's concepts from the text of heritage which is more or less coherent or ruined, it must be said that every discourse is *bricoleur*. The engineer, whom Lévi-Strauss opposes to the *bricoleur*, should be the one to construct the totality of his language, syntax and lexicon. In this sense the engineer is a myth. A subject who supposedly would be the absolute origin of his own discourse and supposedly would construct it out of nothing, out of the whole cloth, would be the creator of the verb, the verb itself. The notion of the engineer who supposedly breaks with all forms of *bricolage* is therefore a theological idea, and since Lévi-Strauss tells us elsewhere that *bricolage* is mythopoethic, the odds are that the engineer is a myth produced by the *bricoleur*. As soon as we cease to believe in such an engineer and in a discourse which breaks with the received historical discourse, and as soon as we admit that every finite discourse is bound by a certain *bricolage* and that the engineer and the scientist are also species of bricoleurs, then the very idea of bricolage is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down." [Derrida 1978: 285]

Structuralist arguments are much more forcible though. According to Derrida – "in effect, what appears most fascinating in this critical search for a new status of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a *centre*, to a *subject*, to a privileged *reference*, to an origin, or to absolute archia" [Ibid.: 286]. For us, the *privileged reference* or *absolute archia* is here *privileged educational text* or *privileged educational strategy*.

The process of creating alternative strategies of education, as well as the process of creating alternative education, is in *Receptář* de-centred in the above-mentioned meaning: from this point of view the whole active complex called *Receptář* has no centre.

The absence of a centre which consequently means also the *absence of orientation* of knowledge is, in my view, a *condition for essentially creative rational work*. I emphasise the *condition* so that there will not be a misunderstanding: it is not possible to shift the whole problem to one side – for example, to the side of *bricolage*. For both logical and practical reasons it is necessary to admit the existence of both of them. As for the logical reasons, Derrida has made a note, the benefit of which has not been taken yet:

> "There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology – in

other words, throughout his entire history – has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play." [Ibid.: 292]

In the light of these formulations the very problem of the "engineer" and the *bricoleur*, the scientist and the non-scientist, appears to be different. This difference between the types of learner and also the difference between the types of rationality can be obtained only within one of the two mentioned types of interpretation – that one which believes in the *centre* and in the *orientation* of the process of learning. Lévi-Strauss admitted this type of interpretation and did not abandon it: this is why Derrida addressed a "rebuke" to him concerning the ethics of nostalgia, the nostalgia for the old times of cognitive certainties of a paradigmatic cultural type.

I have said that for both logical and practical reasons it is necessary to admit the existence of both of them. In this sense Derrida concludes:

"There are more than enough indications today to suggest we might perceive that these two interpretations of interpretation – which are absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy – together share the field which we call, in such a problematic fashion, the social sciences." [Ibid.: 293].

From this it is clear that both Lévi-Strauss and Derrida are substitutes: the first for the first one, the second for the second one – together they represent the *both*. We can sum up as clearly as possible the opinions of both theorists as follows:

Figure 3. Different characteristics of science and *bricolage* according to C.-Lévi-Strauss

Centred, archic interpretation of science and *bricolage*

Either/or:
(science and/or *bricolage*)
LSM

straightness	**or**	divergence
specialisation	**or**	non-specialisation
unlimitation of instruments	**or**	limitation of instruments
anything has a unique function	**or**	anything can be for any function
concept as instrument	**or**	sign as instrument
creation through realisation of project	**or**	creation through re-construction of event
inventive innovation	**or**	discovery innovation
system	**or**	play
play	**or**	ritual

Figure 4. Different characteristics of science and *bricolage* according to J. Derrida
De-centred, anarchic interpretation of science/*bricolage*

Both:
(science and *bricolage*)
JDM

straightness	**and**	divergence
specialisation	**and**	non-specialisation
unlimitation of instruments	**and**	limitation of instruments
anything has a unique function	**and**	anything can be for any function
concept as instrument	**and**	sign as instrument
creation through realisation of project	**and**	creation through re-construction of event
inventive innovation	**and**	discovery innovation
system	**and**	play
play	**and**	ritual

Receptář is also interested in **both**: *bricolage* and the *system* of solving various problems. It does so regularly and it also consciously mixes together both these ways – again on the basis of *bricolage* or on the basis of systematic engineering education. In this cultural complex together with Lévi-Strauss we recognize *bricolage* and educational *systematics* as two antipoles (*LSM*); in *Receptář* together with Derrida we recognise *bricolage* and systematics as "the coexistence of various in one" in that *obscure economy* (*JDM*).

The second level of the *Receptář's* educational project is – considering the genetic and logic issues – carried by the first level and is linked to it. In the *Receptář* texts, this *interpretation and implementation model of JDM-bricolage* corresponds with textual levels that are not precisely determined by slots or names of the thematic units, but they permeate the texts of the entire educational project. It is in texts, where Derrida's statement that "the engineer is a myth produced by the *bricoleur*" comes true: it is the texts that synthesise *scientific* knowledge with the *amateur's* ideas, in texts where there is not a symmetrical exchange of social roles of the educator and the educated, but rather of the roles of *engineer* and *bricoleur*. As we mentioned before, if "the engineer and the scientist are also species of *bricoleurs*, then the very idea of *bricolage* is menaced and the difference in which it took on its meaning breaks down."

The content analysis of the *Receptář* texts revealed that an expert (engineer, scientist, teacher) achieves the role of a *bricoleur* especially when there is a possibility of an improvement of the current cultural code by means of methods that might seem suspicious in the theoretical discourse, or are negligible problems in the particular field. Nevertheless, even unskilled, untrained individuals with detailed knowledge of the theme or a problem get into the roles of qualified experts. The range of this level is determined by the *bricoleur's* interest on one side, and the *engineer's* interest on the other side, while the relationship between them as roles is logically equivalent.

Thematically, the texts of the second model represent approximately 30% of the project. Intended projects are included and the semantic structures are of a higher level than in *LSM*. The texts usually include scientific elements or knowledge from expert oc-

cupations. Derrida's assumption of the *centre*, as well as Bernstein's idea of a privileged pedagogical text are missing in this model. The *bricoleur's* and *engineer's* positions are equal because when considering the strategy of the *Receptář* educational project, one cannot exist without the other.

The content analysis of the texts reveals that the *Receptář pro podnikavé* (*The Book of Prescriptions for the Enterprising*) TV show and a magazine appendix called *Receptář pro podnikavé*, or a part of it – a slot *Rozjedeme to?* (*Shall we start it?*) are an important platform for information exchanges of this type. The information exchange finds its practical implementors here, and many projects gathered by the semantic field of the *Receptář* have transformed into successful enterprising businesses. This type of *bricolage* proves that the pragmatic basis of an educational project, which could be understood as a *do-it-yourself* game at first, produces very complicated codes, for instance the production *know-how* that forms jobs, the actually implemented *know-how*.

At random, from the *Receptář For Every Day* magazine, we can find confirmation of the educational effect of this type of *mass bricolage*.[6]

The questionnaire procedures carried out on the Czech population revealed that from the number of people who follow one or the other form of the *Receptář* (which is, according to the survey, approximately 12% of the population), 68% have at some time implemented ideas from the semantic field of the *Receptář*, approximately 28% on more than one occasion. What is important – apart from the objective to "save" (material, time, people, *etc.*), there was an important objective to "introduce production" (from the presented 68% of respondents, approximately 18% answered in this way).[7]

Apart from these described functions that are carried by the two models of *bricolage*, the *Receptář* educational project has stimulated another very important phenome-

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[6]) Fifty-six companies from all over the Czech Republic reacted immediately to information that a company that manufactures aids for handicapped people needed co-operation with other companies [*Receptář*... 1994, no. 2: 3].

After a radio broadcasted invitation with a description of tools needed by a manufacturer, there was an immediate reaction from a company that took over its production and distribution [*Receptář*... 1994, no. 5: 51].

After an invitation to manufacture more complicated working tools, there was an immediate reaction from various companies who were interested in the production [*Receptář*... 1994, no. 1: 33]. Such cases are common, see for instance [*Receptář*... 1994, no. 2: 37; no. 11: 37].

These facts not only reflect a system of *offer-demand*, as it might seem at first sight. The step that precedes the offer is substantial, that is the formation of the *bricolage* result and its position in the semantic field of *Receptář*. Usually there is a further exchange of information, the reason being to change and improve the result of *bricolage*. The presented examples – and there could be hundreds more of them – document an important issue: this type of *bricolage* forms jobs, extends the job market and enterprise, and by this it mobilises individuals and groups.

[7]) It is interesting to compare these facts with the results of the research project implemented by W. Leirman in 1993-1995 in 16 European countries (including the Czech Republic), that is known as *Eurodelphi*. A tendency towards the vocationalization of adult education has been unequivocally confirmed by this project: the factor of "technology and labour" has been connected with education as the most important, similarly within the fields of "unemployment and the organisation of labour". In other words, the *fields* that adult education can contribute to the most, are, according to the respondents (who were experts), the fields of technology and labour [see Leirman 1995: 4].

non – that is attempts at imitation among those who originally created and used its semantic field. I have found at least *two attempts* to draft and implement an analogical semantic field, but most likely there are more of them. The foundation of *Vzdělávací spolek uměleckých řemesel* (*Educational Association of Art Crafts*), as well as the foundation of *Spolek pro kutily-řezbáře* (*Association of Bricoleurs-woodcarvers*) are not creations of multimedia institutions, but are translations of the basic formula of literacy strategy that the *Receptář* uses, into "the field" where it acts as a new focus or transmission point [*Receptář*.... 1994, no. 1: 35; no. 7: 37].

5. Postmodern dimension of mass bricolage: (modern technology) *times* (neo-medievalism)

The *Receptář* educational project combines modern and pre-modern cultural codes in an interesting way, which is shown by means of an outstanding combination of modern (industrial) and pre-modern (traditional) modes of thought, and finally action. For *bricoleurs* from models *LSM* and *JDM*, H. J. Silverman's views on the postmodern in general are completely true, as well as Lyotard's views on the postmodern creator of work. According to Silverman "postmodernism does not open up a new field of artistic, philosophical, cultural, or even institutional activities. Its very significance is to marginalise, delimit, disseminate, and decenter the primary (and often secondary) works of modernist and premodernist cultural inscriptions." [Silverman 1990: 1]

In models *LSM* and *JDM*, the *bricoleur* only "reads modern texts" (for instance some *privileged text*), with his own eyes, as J.-F. Lyotard describes it:

> "A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by pre-established rules. (...) Those rules (...) are what the work of art itself is looking for." The postmodern creator is "working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done" [Lyotard 1987: 81].

In other words, this can be described as a *desire to rediscover the wholeness of labour and its product – a work* (as postmodern discourse does under the theme of *nostalgia*).

However, materiality will be more useful. B. Bernstein expressed materiality better:

> "It may well be the case that a new manual handicraft, artisan industry could emerge, with its own commercial outlets, reviving apprenticeship and even guild-like organisations: a neomedievalism. It is also possible that there will be an expansion of the cultural field, of its agencies and agents" [Bernstein 1993: 157].

We can state that it fully perceives events in models *LSM* and *JDM*: it rehabilitates non-modern ways of thinking, non-modern cultural codes and non-modern tools and combines them purposefully with modern ways of thinking, modern codes and modern tools. This intertextual fact (which is impossible in "official" modern education) makes mass *bricolage* a typical postmodern phenomenon in the social field of education.

The *Receptář* activities are a good example of the end of universal reason and universal education which was realistically summarised by Z. Bauman by means of his simple characteristic of postmodernity: first and foremost, it is the

> "*pluralism* of cultures, communal traditions, ideologies, forms of life or language games (...), or the awareness and recognition of such pluralism. Things which are plural in the postmodern world cannot be arranged out in an evolutionary time-sequence, seen as each other's inferior or superior stages. Neither can they be clas-

sified as right or wrong solutions to common problems. No knowledge can be assessed outside the context of the culture, tradition, language game, etc., which makes it possible and endows it with meaning. Hence no criteria of validation are available which could be themselves justified out of context. Without universal standards, the problem of the postmodern world is not how to globalise superior culture, but how to secure communication and mutual understanding between cultures" [Bauman 1988: 225-226].

It is indeed the best characteristic of the *Receptář* as a postmodern, alternative educational institution.

Unfortunately, the scope of this work does not allow me to attach a rich appendix describing basic cases of those two ways of creating educational strategies which led towards both creating jobs and producing new goods. At the same time these two matters – *creating jobs and producing goods* – comprise one of the functions of the two approaches (*LSM, JDM*), in which *bricolage* has the sovereign position. I can refer here to the results of my own research and state that *those two types (LSM, JDM) of transforming cultural values into economic values today mean hundreds of proven jobs and dozens of new production procedures and new commodities on the official markets* of labour and commodities. They also mean hundreds of jobs and thousands of new production procedures and new commodities on the *alternative market* of labour and commodities which has been traditionally well-developed in the Czech Republic. It is logical that alternative types of education and alternative types of educational strategies create an alternative type of market, and *vice versa*.

8. Conclusion

By linking mass media and bricolage, there develops a new educational phenomenon – mass bricolage, which is difficult to imagine within modern educational strategies.

The *Receptář* acts as the *alternative educational institution* of a postmodern and post-industrial type that offers people an education in the classical meaning of the word (edifying) as well as in the modern meaning of the word (vocationalized).

The *Receptář* alternative educational project is unusual. It really is a project *for everyone*. Ten to fifteen percent of the adult population, thousands of ideas and implemented smaller projects, many ideas from the *bricoleur's know-how* have transformed into successful enterprising projects, hundreds and hundreds of minor messages that improve everyday life, basic and higher means of enlightenment – all this forms the semantic field that is here *for everyone*.

The implementation scheme of the *mass bricolage educational strategy* is based on the following steps:

1. The creation of an institution that disposes of two or three types of *mass media* (TV show, periodical, or radio).
2. The creation of a *network* of information suppliers from communities and groups outside the mainstream of educational activities.
3. Initiating a *mass bricolage* on various levels that will develop automatically by selecting semantic structures determined for exchange.

Over a period of five years, experiences from the Czech environment proved that a particular educational project can quickly become a profitable project, which is very relevant as far as educational possibilities are concerned.

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Pavel Machonin: Social Transformation and Modernization (On Building Theory of Societal Changes in the Post-Communist European Countries)

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The Czech Transformation – The Universal and the Particular

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Abstract: In the economic, political and social transformation of the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe some groups of values are asserting themselves. These are different in themselves and in the degree of their universal validity, and on the other hand they are connected with the specificity of the historical processes pertaining to these countries. Universal values and general civilisational characteristics and their historical continuity create the main feature of western society, and at the same time, the general modernisational goal of the directing of the transformation. In opposition to this are the subjective projects and illusions of individuals and groups concerning the possibilities of the transformation, especially those formed in political movements after the revolution of 1989, and these have the quality of being particular and discontinuous. General post-revolution democratic, liberalisation, and privatisation changes represent a separation with the past, but are at the same time interconnected with it. This group of values including the inherited mentality, and the cultural and social capitals of the past (the so-called politics of national interest), intervene in a determining way in the character of the changes and in creating universal institutions and individualisation processes of transition.

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At the beginning of 1990, one could speak of a "principal openness" or even an original innocence in the economic and political transformation processes of the Central European post-communist states – especially when the necessarily universal character of these processes and the absence of any preliminary theoretical studies or normative guiding principles of change [e.g. Offe 1991] were emphasised as the *differentia specifica* of these processes. Jürgen Habermas nevertheless perceives the ongoing process of a "catching-up revolution" (*die nachholende Revolution*) in such "openness". He points to the absence of new mobilising ideas and to the awareness, in the place of such ideas, of deficits in the social order, and the corresponding sober attempt to do away with them was to be asserted [Habermas 1990: 181].

The course taken by the transformation process thus far continues to be described as universal, uniform, westernising. It is seen principally as a process which occurs identically in all the countries of "pragmatic socialism", in which each of the countries concerned has been at best "an exception in the transition". Today, such a view is manifested in a particularised form, the analysis of which may well require a different, historically longer-sighted perspective.

The first phase of the economic, political, legal and social reconstruction was most prominently programmed in the privatisation of "nationalised" property; in the liberalisation of prices combined with controlled inflation, the liberalisation of foreign trade and the simultaneous control of exchange rates; in the democratisation of political life and the "reinvestment of rights" into social life; and in the restructuring of industry and the mod-

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ernisation of production. This reconstruction is being realised in the various post-communist countries at varying speeds and in different ways. Nevertheless, the reasons for these differences and shifts in emphasis should in no way be interpreted from an exclusively socio-political perspective, as the results of, for example, social threats (to individuals, groups, classes etc.) or the disappointing gap between expectations and results – not, therefore, as they have on occasion been interpreted with regard to the most recent election results in some post-communist countries. Here the individual historical foundations of each country seem to come into play. These can appear either as attempts to restore former market, democratic, national and other institutions (as J. Habermas observed [1990: 180]) or, on the contrary, as ways of clinging to the allegedly positive aspects of the "pragmatic socialist" regime. In this light, the entire transformation process seems to resemble an attempt to make the laborious border crossing to a market economy with rucksacks from the past, in which it is hoped to smuggle something of the earlier, etatistic times.

Not only the *new* – its independence, possibilities and relevance to the present – and not only its differences from the old, but also the *old* itself and its "presence in the *new*" is apparently becoming an increasingly acute problem. It is perhaps fitting at this point to recall Alexis de Tocqueville, who once tried to show that the French Revolution "brought far fewer innovations than is commonly assumed" and that its "real achievement" is to be seen more in the fulfilment or even a definitive acknowledgement of a lengthy process of changes, the inner necessity of which had its roots well back in the pre-Revolutionary period. When seen from this point of view, a whole range of concrete results – such as "administrative centralisation", the "guardianship of administration", the independence of justice etc. – turn out not to be "achievements of the Revolution (or of the Empire)," as was claimed in de Tocqueville's times, but "rather the products of the *ancien régime*" [de Tocqueville 1978: 36, 48].

The above should not be read as some purely conservative emphasis of historical continuity, but rather as an indication of the historically perpetual tension between the general and the particular. In this way, attention is drawn to more general historical polarities which can also be categorised under the headings of *continuity* and *discontinuity*, *tradition* and *change*, *integration* and *differentiation*, *history* and *system* or even *the universal* and *the individual*.

We thus arrive at what Heinrich Rickert once called "individual causality" [Rickert 1929: 388ff.], in which the historically individual, the specific and the anomalous turn out be the necessary, and in which the universal can be wholly marginalised.

Historiosophically, we find ourselves facing a *"split"* (*Entzweiung*) [Hegel 1801: 173] in the concept of *"necessity"* which guides our sights precisely to that specific complementarity which was originally intended to represent an energy of objective progress and development. This energy has always constituted an important foil for the understanding of social changes. Moreover, it is in this energy that the individual and the specific (which clearly does not always have to mean the contingent), and the objectively necessary and universal, mutually necessitate one another.

On the one hand, what we are dealing with are the necessarily globalising and unifying components of economic, political, and societal changes which are radically expelling the old economic, legal and constitutional order and are removing the "pragmatic socialist" rules of social integration. The various resulting constraints, regroupings and

changes in the social status of groups and individuals, in the social dynamic, in forms of socialisation, and the consequent release of tendencies toward the mass homogenisation of life and the assertion of various cultural values – many of which are felt as foreign – can be perceived by the population as disorientating or even threatening (indeed, this is borne out by most investigations).

A part of this objectivising side of the split is constituted by those transformation phenomena that the Hungarian sociologist Zsuzsa Ferge analyses as "quasi-intentional" and which she places parallel to the desired, proposed and unexpected features of the transition [Ferge and Miller 1987: 297]. These features also seek to accentuate developments which, although unintended, did not occur without people's awareness of them – developments which have merged with the transformation to such an extent that they will continue to influence the political and social structure well into the future: from money laundering to attempts to retroactivate justice, to underestimating the consequences of the transformation of the education system (e.g., the legal introduction of school fees).

Finally, there are other, new demands which place a very pressing task before the near-complete restructuring of the economy, the legal system and politics: the overcoming of the actual differences which are relatively constituted on western averages (of productivity, quality, mobility as well as of living standards etc.). These differences seem to be gaining in importance and will no doubt necessarily bring with them still more radical measures in the areas of state expenditure, the structuring of industry, wage and price regulations, tax policy and so on. Furthermore, they reveal the already existing institutional lacunae.

On the other, subjectivising side of the split, we are confronted with the individualising, sometimes particularising components of the transformation process. This process is important not only with respect to the various forms of the cultural sedimentation of changes and the creation of stabilising institutional frameworks for these changes; it is also important for its potential capacity to orient social behaviour and for bringing with it in a self-generated independent form the various "positive" and "negative" dimensions of the old. Here we are confronted with the burden of the old redistributive-egalitarian habits and demands, intellectual illusions and anti-meritocratic stances on the one hand, and on the other, the natural demands for the preservation of individual and collective identity. These demands are bound up with the needs of authenticity, individual biography and continuity of orientation in life, all of which are rooted in both personal experience, which has not been depreciated, and in the productivity of generational experiences. This side of the split seeks to defend the rights of individuality and self-responsible subjectivity.

It is on this side of the split, too, that we must place all of the cultural, historical and social-psychological realities that are often analysed as problems of political culture or thematised under the rubric of "mentalities" which can either strengthen or weaken new institutions. The nature of their influence on the transformation process and its form can be extracted through the following (intentionally pointed) question: "Are the "positive" results of the Czech transformation to be deemed the success of a unique strategy by Václav Klaus, or rather are they rather an achievement of a "Czech mentality" (which has changed over the long term)?

The "Pandora's boxes full of paradoxes" [Offe 1995: 66] which political analysts are constantly confronted with arise in the area of the mutual dependence (as well as the

asymmetries and antagonisms) of the market economy and democracy, and are not only enlarged but also enriched by the productivity of this split.

Nevertheless any attempt to opt entirely for one or the other side of the division (and thus to reject the other), or to let one be absorbed into the other helps equally little as with all of the various illusions of a dialectical resolution. The one-sided over-emphasis of the first, objectivising and at the same time synchronising component of the division culminates in Fukuyama's thesis on "the end of history" [Fukuyama 1989]: that a welfare economy combined with a liberal democratic parliamentarism seems "to be all there is" – both in the empirical and the normative sense. In this case the entire transformation could really be understood as only a necessary move in this end-game. There would be no possibility for new models to follow; all that would be left to politics would be the fine-tuning of details or minor repair jobs.

All too often in the Czech Republic, the dominant social scientific analysis of, for example, the changes in the originally "pragmatic socialist" egalitarian-antimeritocratic social structure, under the pressure of the privatisation and the evolving market, as well as the asymmetrical orientation of the process of the emergence of a new middle class, seem to steer the conception of the transformation in this direction.

And vice versa: a huge exaggeration of the other, the individualising and particularising components of the split can legitimise adherence to the really or allegedly rewarding historical models, and it can lead to the articulation of various cognitive styles (group, local, etc.), thereby simultaneously bringing with it the decentralisation of the crucial points or weaknesses of the objective demands on the political, economic and social transformation and introducing an unproductive and illusory transformation. The revival of nationalism and ethnic regionalism in almost all of the post-communist states is, in this context, one of the most striking examples of this.

I believe that we should conceive the general character of this split as positive and productive: namely, as a natural sign of the transformation's movements and changes, as an essential mode of its self-preservation, perhaps even as mode of existence of the modern in our time in general. Hence Anthony Giddens recently – albeit with a different intention – sought to draw attention to something similar while writing on the complementarities between the fragmentation of experience and the unification of social life, between the "disembedding mechanisms" of the modern and the "reflexive" reconstitution and stabilisation of the modified, between the modern connection of the local and the global and so forth.

The split should therefore be seen as a permanent tension (in the social-ontological sense) which lends the transformation an historically individual form and, simultaneously, as a compensatory force (in the sense of an integrative "transformation spirit"; an "organising" ideology for various local and group thought patterns) which "temper" development and in which the historical continues to function. On the one hand, the split enables inwardness and tradition – the individualising "causality from freedom" – to resist the constraints of pseudoscientific objectivity and the "corruption of reason" (with its unifying constraints which lead to the de-individualisation of life and the socialisation of freedom). On the other hand, this tension must also be understood as signifying that the universal – that which is generally true and objective in every romantic return to history – will impede, if not wholly prevent, any fundamentalism of faith or values as well as – we hope – political totalitarianism.

Addition

I think that in every analysis of the transformation, it is important to point out the "split nature", the "difference" present in this transformation. That which Max Weber once formulated as the important task of a "science of reality" – namely, the understanding of the "fact of having become this and not that" of each historical individuality – arises from the tension (in a necessary split and at the same time a split necessity) between the universalising and particularising traits of the transformation and at the same time between the continuity and discontinuity of the final states. This means that we should not see the transformation exclusively as an "installation" of the new, but also in the context of a "survival" of the old; we should not see it only as an implementation of the abstract and of objective necessity, regardless of the traditional, or even regardless of those elements which objective necessity has rejected from life as superfluous.

	Universality	Particularity
Continuity	the most general civilising characteristics (Europeanness, enlightenment, educational systems of institutions, Christianity, urbanisation, science, industrialisation, secularisation, humanism, society, "world history", functions of the middle class, etc.	Mentalities, traditional value systems, "atheism", egalitarianism, national culture and national interests, social and cultural capital, "the capitalism of a nomenclature," historicism, etc.
	RATIONALITY	IDENTITY
Discontinuity	the radical changes of power politics, privatisation, price and trade liberalisation, the state under the rule of law, new institutions, "political politics," a "market without adjectives," "managerism", etc.	the role of dissent, the smoothness of the process of change, "apolitical politics", the role of celebrities and intellectuals overall, a market with adjectives, a course of normalisation, etc.
	NECESSITY	SUBJECTIVITY

This primitive table is intended merely to show that identity is not a synonym for our rationality; rather, it is far more the result of the history of our origins, the visualisation of which we agree upon, but cannot justify. Undoubtedly, it can be applied to the majority of the countries in transition in Central Europe. The otherwise apparent differences thus develop during the classification of their individual, specific, and historically differentiated contents. It is also possible to discuss to what extent the relationships between the individual segments of the table can be designated as complementary or compensatory relationships. The visualisation of all four segments can most probably be seen as complementary, while the diagonal connection between the particularising traits of the transformation and the discontinuous elements of universalising objective (political and economic) necessity shows the compensatory nature of the split. This relationship between the discontinuity of the universal and the continuity of the particular can be interpreted as the

source from which so-called "historical alternatives" arise, and where most of the (philosophical) problems of the foundation and orientation of meaning develop.

It is only in this tension, which is perhaps personified by our President, Václav Havel, and our Prime Minister, Václav Klaus, that the foundations for the long-term process of social modernisation, which alone – so most people believe – can lead us back to Europe, should be constructed. The country's current difficulties and the population's self-sacrifice will thereby be justified and legitimised. And perhaps then the transformation will attain an over-arching historical meaning, as it will have contributed to that which made the old system disintegrate: the conquering of social stagnation, individual and social unfreedom and civic and moral irresponsibility.

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The Czech National Identity

Basic Results of the 1995 National Survey

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Abstract: Two main processes can be recognised in contemporary Europe: one of them leads to unification and progressive integration, the second one – as the result of the failure of the communist governmental system in the Eastern Europe – leads to the opposite process – disintegration. The path of European nations and states to a 'United States of Europe', from personal or state nationality to Europeanism, is one of permanent fluctuation between two relatively opposite identities. It is very important at this moment to transform the traditional conception and interpretation of national identity. But before this it is necessary to answer the questions of 'who we are, who we want to be and who we should be within the context of contemporary Europe'. International comparative research which was carried out in 26 countries within the scope of the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) aspired to provide some basic information about the national identity of the inhabitants of the countries involved in the project. In November 1995 the ISSP survey was also realised in the Czech Republic.

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A random sample of 1700 (total sample) people of age 16 to 75 was selected to answer questions concerning several issues including national identity, regionalism, globalism, attitudes to ethnic minorities, refugees, and immigrants. Issues on Central Europe and the relationships between various states were also covered. Field work started on 28th October 1995 and finished on 27th November 1995. The method used was personal interview. Excluding ineligible subjects and non-responses a total of 1111 eligible ISSP questionnaires were received.

Due to the fact there is no legal access to any register of individuals in the Czech Republic, a two stage sampling method – first a random sample of households, then a random sample of individuals in each of the chosen households – had to be adopted. This bias was overcome by the weighting procedures involved in the data analysis.

The first part of this paper presents the basic features of the Czech national identity based on the analysis of the data collected by the survey. In the second part, the respondents' view on the relationships between the Czech Republic and other states will be analysed more deeply with special emphasis on Central Europe.

The population of the Czech Republic– a closed society?

The current population of the Czech Republic used to be rather heterogeneous in terms of both ethnicity and language. The coexistence of Czechs and Germans was typical of the border regions. As for the urban population, Jews were generally represented as the third

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most important ethnic group. Moreover, the population of the old Czech Lands was exposed to a continuous exchange of ideas and various cultural influences coming from both the West and the East. The historical events of the 20th century have totally shattered this picture of an open and multi-cultural society. Most members of the Jewish community living in the Czech Lands were killed in concentration camps during World War II. The majority of those who survived the Nazi regime later emigrated, mainly to Israel. Over 90% of the German-speaking population was forced to leave the country in the early post-war period. Although in the late 40's some immigrants (mainly Slovaks) were encouraged to resettle in the border regions, the scope of immigration could not alter the newly-constituted and overwhelming majority of Czechs in the Czech Lands.

The 1948 Communist *coup d'état* and the subsequent installation of a Soviet-type communist regime seriously hindered the natural exchange of both ideas and people between the Czech Lands and neighbouring countries. The two waves of mass emigration which occurred in the Czech Lands after the 1948 Communist overthrow and after the 1968 Soviet Army invasion, do not bring to mind the words 'natural' and 'exchange'. The same is true for the Czech-Russian relationships which were based on an organised exchange of delegations and groups of visitors and (at least for the majority of Czechs) on rare contacts with the officers of the occupying army after 1968. Thus, the only real natural contact between the Czechs and other nations – that which was neither restricted by the border control, nor by the ideological aims of 'tourism planners' – was for more than forty years represented by the coexistence with Slovaks within the framework of Czechoslovakia.

After the fall of the Communist rule in 1989, two conflicting processes came to light. On the one hand, the collapse of the Iron Curtain, i.e. the renewal of civic and political freedom and the beginning of economic transformation, led to substantial changes in the life of the 'ordinary' inhabitant, consisting of sharp increases in the presence of international and inter-cultural elements. Simultaneously, however, the aggravation of Czech-Slovak political tensions ended up with the split of Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Czech Republic, founded on 1st January 1993, has become a typical nation-state. The consequence of the aforementioned historical developments is that the population of contemporary Czech Republic has never been so homogeneous in terms of ethnicity as in the mid-1990's, when the survey on national identity was held.

This statement is confirmed by the March 1991 population census data where 94.8% of the population of the Czech Republic declared themselves as Czech, while only 3.1% declared themselves as Slovak, with the remaining 2.1% declaring themselves as other nationalities. As specific demographic questions were included in the ISSP questionnaire, the ethnic homogeneity of the contemporary population of the Czech Republic is even more apparent. Asking respondents about their ethnic heritage ('Which country/countries of the world did your ancestors come from?') we found that 90.2% of the population declared themselves as being of Czech origin, while only 2.3% of respondents mentioned Slovak, 1.7% Austrian, 1.5% Polish and 1.1% of German origin. Concerning the language which respondents use at home, the uniformity is even more overwhelming: 98.9% of respondents speak Czech at home. The most common second languages used at home are Romany (2.9%) and Slovak (1.2%). We can speak of an almost totally homogenous society as far as citizenship is concerned – 99.7% of the respondents hold Czech citizenship, and the number of inhabitants without Czech citizenship is negligible.

The fact, that 96.8% of the respondents' parents had Czech (Czechoslovak) citizenship at the time of the respondents' birth also shows that the scope of immigration to the Czech Republic was very limited for several decades.

Besides ethnic homogeneity, a low spatial mobility is typical of the population of the Czech Republic. Asking respondents about their experience of living abroad, we found that 88% answered "never" and only 7% of the population had lived outside the Czech Republic for more than 1 year. Moreover, it is possible that a substantial part of those who had experienced living outside the Czech Republic, are people who lived in Slovakia before the split – which at the time was not abroad. Spatial mobility was also rather low in terms of internal migration. 57% of respondents spent most of their childhood in the town (village) where they currently live, and an additional 16% in a different town (village), but in the same district. The figures presented here mean that almost three quarters of the respondents never in actual fact moved away from the environment in which they were born. This fact is also reflected by the population's strong identification with their home town (village) – 86% of respondents feel very close or close to their town or village.

People who have never really moved to a new neighbourhood are, not surprisingly, not very willing to do so, regardless of the potential improvement in their working or living conditions. Generally, the potential migrant becomes increasingly unwilling to move in direct measure to the distance and the level of unfamiliarity to the possible new place of residence. While 42% of the population is opposed to a possible move to another neighbourhood or town (village) within the same district – regardless of potential improvement in working or living conditions (the same percentage is in favour of such a move), about 60% refuse to move to another district within the Czech Republic, 79% is unwilling to move outside the Czech Republic, and 80% outside Europe.

Considering the figures presented above, a 'typical member of Czech society' is represented by a Czech-speaking person of Czech citizenship and Czech origin, living in the same town (village) or at least not far from his/her birthplace, having a close relationship with his/her place of residence and not very willing to move anywhere, especially not away from his/her home country. Taking into consideration that this person has no personal experience with living abroad, it is not surprising, that his/her attitudes towards foreigners generally (and immigrants in particular) can be described with words such as 'fear', 'caution' or 'mistrust'. This can be easily confirmed by the respondents' answers to questions concerning the relationships between the Czech Republic and other countries (Table 1) as well as their attitudes towards immigration (Table 2).

Table 1. Attitudes to other countries: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" Figures in the table represent valid answers in % (The original scale: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree, strongly disagree – was reduced to a three-grade scale)

Statement	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in the Czech Republic	59	12	29
Czech television should give preference to Czech films and programmes	56	24	20
The Czech Republic should limit imports of foreign goods in order to protect the national economy	54	18	28
Czech schools should make much more effort to teach foreign languages properly	88	9	3
For certain problems such as environmental pollution, international bodies (e.g. UN, EU, WHO) should have the right to enforce laws	74	15	11
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	34	23	43
The Czech Republic should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflicts with other nations	32	22	46

(The number of valid answers ranges from 1044 to 1101.)

From the figures in Table 1, it is obvious that some isolationist ideas (of both economic and cultural dimension) found substantial support in Czech society. But it is also worthwhile mentioning that respondents' answers indicate more or less a 'defence strategy', i.e. that of trying to preserve the Czech Republic against an unwanted foreign influence, but does not necessarily indicate the presence of a desire to live in 'splendid isolation' nor directly 'out of the world'. A clear 88% of respondents agreed with the statement, that "Czech schools should make much more effort to teach foreign languages properly", 74% agreed that international bodies like UN, EU, WHO (World Health Organisation) should have the right to enforce solutions to certain problems such as environmental pollution etc.. A generally suspicious attitude towards foreigners is however not accompanied by an excessive loyalty to one's own state. Only a minority of the population (34%) expressed willingness to support their country even if the country was in the wrong (while almost 43% refused). Moreover there are also less people who would rather the Czech Republic followed its own interests even if it led to conflicts with other nations (32%), than people opposed to such a policy (46%). Looking at the percentages presented here one should be aware that there are substantial differences among different groups of respondents. The lower the education and the higher the age of the respondent, the greater the level of isolationism that can be expected. Typical isolationists also live in the countryside, claim to be of left-wing or extreme right-wing orientation and subjectively feel themselves as belonging to the lower classes.

Table 2. Attitudes to immigration: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" Figures in the table represent valid answers in %. (The original scale: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree, strongly disagree – was reduced to a three-grade scale)

Statement	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
Immigrants increase crime rates	68	17	15
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in the Czech Republic	42	24	34
Immigrants make the Czech Republic more open to new ideas and culture	23	26	51
Immigrants are generally good for the Czech Republic's economy	8	24	68
The Czech Republic should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants	90	6	4
How much do you agree or disagree that refugees who have suffered political repression in their own country should be allowed to stay in the CR?	57	24	19

(The number of valid answers ranges from 994 to 1090.)

The attitude of Czech society towards immigration can undoubtedly be described as negative. About two-thirds of the respondents consider immigrants as a threat to the security of their society. Taking into consideration the relatively low unemployment rate, respondents do not fear so much that immigrants will take jobs away from them. Nevertheless, a clear majority of respondents do not believe that immigration is beneficial to the national economy. The idea that immigrants bring new ideas and cultures is also not welcomed. Even in the current situation of a relatively low immigration rate, an overwhelming majority would support taking stronger measures against illegal immigrants. On the other hand, the emigration due to political reasons under communist Czechoslovakia has made Czech society more tolerant to refugees suffering political repression in their own country. In this context it is interesting to mention that the most important underlying factor influencing the variability of answers is the respondents' political orientation. Left-wing supporters (and particularly Communist Party supporters) express much less tolerance towards the immigrants than the rest of society. It seems that the old Communist ideological line 'emigrant = traitor' is still alive. People who were taught to be hostile to former Czech emigrants are not willing to tolerate any kind of immigration.

Isolationism and hostility to an 'alien' world also have some deep historical roots and they belong to the milieu of the original Czech society.

Concept of nationality and citizenship

How are the concepts of nationality and citizenship understood by the population of the Czech Republic? What is the relationship between being a Czech national and a Czech citizen? In order to get a clearer understanding of these questions, respondents were asked to determine what, according to them, the important factors for being truly Czech are. Table 3 shows the basic frequencies of the respondents' answers.

Table 3. Respondents answers to the question: "How important do you think each of the following indicators is for being truly Czech?" (N=1111) (freq. in %)

Indicator	very important	fairly important	not very important	not important at all
to speak Czech	75	19	4	2
to feel Czech	69	22	6	3
to have Czech citizenship	51	31	12	6
to live in the CR for most of one's life	46	32	15	7
to respect the CR laws and institutions	41	40	10	9
to be born in the CR	37	30	22	11
to be Christian	10	11	26	47

It is important to mention here that the terminology used in the question comprises both possible meanings: 'to be truly Czech' can be understood both in terms of nationality and citizenship. Thus, the figures show not only what is perceived to be more and less important, but also demonstrate the respondents' concepts of nationality and citizenship.

Generally speaking, the ability to speak Czech together with the feeling of being Czech were considered by far the most important conditions for being truly Czech. Over 90% of the people asked held it to be very or fairly important. The respondents were not so strict as to the necessity to have the Czech citizenship, to live for the most part of one's life in the Czech Republic nor to respect political institutions and laws of the country, although around 80% of them considered these conditions as important. Surprisingly enough, only 67% of the respondents required that a 'truly Czech' person be born in the Czech Republic. Finally, being Christian is perceived as almost irrelevant in the highly secularised Czech society.

Looking more deeply behind the data reveals interesting facts. It is obvious that people, in practice, do not make any relevant difference between citizenship and nationality. In an ethnically highly homogeneous, and for decades closed, society, being 'truly Czech' automatically means having both Czech nationality and Czech citizenship. When speaking about citizens of the Czech Republic people usually think about members of the Czech nation. The easiest (and almost unique) way to become a member of the Czech nation is to have Czech parents (or at least one Czech parent). Moreover, emigrating from the Czech Republic or even losing Czech citizenship can be tolerated if a person's parents are Czech-speaking, and feeling Czech, one can be 'truly Czech'. The hypothesis that this 'blood law' is applied extensively is also supported by the fact that, in spite of the generally negative attitudes towards immigration, over 62% of the respondents agree that: "It should be easier for those immigrants who are of Czech nationality and have come from other countries to attain Czech citizenship".

On the other hand, it is very difficult to become 'truly Czech' if one comes to the Czech Republic from abroad and has no Czech origins. Besides this, a substantial part of respondents (49%) think that: "It is impossible for people who do not share Czech customs and traditions to become fully Czech". In other words, a member of an ethnic minority born in the Czech Republic, having Czech citizenship, speaking only Czech and having lived in the Czech Republic for his/her entire life could not be considered as a 'truly Czech' person if his/her way of life is too different from what is commonly accepted as the norm.

A more detailed statistical analysis of the data (factor analysis) shows that the respondents were rather consistent in their answers (only one factor was extracted). Simply said, respondents who have considered one condition (for example, the ability to speak Czech) as very important for being truly Czech, also tended to consider the other conditions as very important, and vice versa. Finally, it is important to point out that the respondents' opinions were rather determined by their personal data. Less-educated, older people, living in the countryside tended to be more demanding. However, gender, and the economic and political orientation of the respondents were insignificant.

What do the inhabitants of the Czech Republic think about themselves and their country?

It is conventional wisdom that scepticism and pragmatism are typical of 'the Czech national character' (if such a thing does exist). It seems that the data we have obtained from the ISSP questionnaire, support at least the first part of this claim. Although Czech society is rather suspicious towards immigrants (as can be seen above) it is obvious that people do not think very highly of their own country and nation either. Only 15% of the respondents believe that: "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Czechs", while over 40% do not think so and the rest do not know. The Czech Republic is also not considered to be a better place than the majority of other countries – only just over one-fifth of the respondents agreed with this statement. Taking into account, that over 70% of the population have found themselves feeling ashamed of something about their country, it is rather surprising to discover that the same proportion of respondents would rather be a citizen of the Czech Republic than of any other country in the world.

To give a clearer picture of why people identify themselves with their home country, respondents were offered a set of potential reasons for national pride and were asked to determine how proud they were of each item on the list. Chart 1 summarises the basic frequencies.

The most frequent reason for being at least somewhat proud of the Czech Republic is its history – more than 91% of the people think so (50% of respondents are very proud of Czech history). Taking into account the terminology used in the question and the fact that the Czech Republic was founded in 1993, respondents should, strictly speaking, evaluate the time period between 1993 and 1995. But evidently, they either have considered the Czech Republic as the descendant of the Czech Kingdoms as well as Czechoslovakia and/or have thought of the history of the Czech nation. The same is true for the achievements in arts and literature, which were also highly evaluated (33% very proud, 53% somewhat proud). As for other potential reasons for being proud of the Czech Republic, the share of satisfied respondents declines rather rapidly. However, the majority of people asked still feel proud of the Czech Republic's achievements in sports, science and technology, and political influence in the world. Economic achievements and the way democracy works is a cause for pride for only around one-third of respondents. Far less people think there is anything to be proud of concerning the fairness and equality of treatment of all groups in society, the armed forces or the social security system.

Chart 1: How proud are you of the Czech Republic in each of the following aspects (N=1111)



A more detailed analysis of the data (factor analysis) shows that there are basically two different types of pride (two factors are extracted). The first type of pride is based on the evaluation of aspects which can be classified as cultural (history, arts and literature, sports, sciences and technology). All topics mentioned have some common features: they are more the products of the long-term development of society than of the contemporary state, they are more independent of the governments and regimes (and entirely independent of the present government) and, finally, they are more closely connected to the Czech nation than to the Czech state(s). The second type of pride is based on the assessment of the situation in today's Czech Republic. Looking at the answers of individual respondents, one can find any combination of the above-mentioned attitudes. Being proud of contemporary achievements can be, but also need not be, accompanied by the pride in history and culture and vice versa. It is interesting to see that the intensity of both identifiable 'types of pride' was more or less irrelevant to most of the respondents' personal data. The only underlying factor explaining some variation in the respondents' answers is their political orientation: the pride in the present achievement of the state is more probably felt by right-wing people who are evidently more satisfied with the present general state of the country.

Europe and the world as seen from the Czech Republic – the relation between the Czech Republic and other countries

Geographical location, the history of mutual relationships, as well as recent political situations are the most important factors influencing the population of the Czech Repub-

lic in their attitude towards any foreign country. Respondents were first asked to present their image of Central Europe. Each individual country from the list of countries offered to respondents came under the heading West, Central or East European. It was up to the respondent to decide what kind of criteria he/she would use. Chart 3 summarises the results of such classification. Individual countries were classified into the three above-mentioned groups in accordance with what they meant to the majority of respondents. Figures in brackets represent the percentage of respondents who considered the country as a component of the respective parts of Europe. Furthermore, because the 'westernmost' countries are placed the most leftward and the 'easternmost' the most rightward (see the West-East axis at the bottom of the chart), the position of the country's name in the chart displays also the respondents' personal understanding of mutual 'distance' between pairs of countries.

Chart 2. Europe as seen from the Czech Republic: "Some people suggest that Europe has three parts if one considers geographic location, politics and history: West, Central and East Europe. In your view, to which of these parts do the following countries belong?"

West Europe	Central Europe	East Europe
France (93)	Austria (58)	Croatia (50)
The Netherlands (91)	The Czech Republic (90)	Bulgaria (73)
Germany (78)	Poland (80)	Lithuania (87)
Switzerland (77)	Hungary (77)	Ukraine (94)
Italy (68)	Slovakia (60)	Russia (97)
	Slovenia (50)	
←WEST		EAST→

Note: Countries were classified in accordance with the opinion of the majority of respondents. Figures in brackets represent percentages of respondents who considered the country as a component of the respective parts of Europe.

Surprisingly enough, from among 16 countries only three are regarded as unquestionably Central European – The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. More than three-quarters of respondents think so. Although the majority of people classified also Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia as Central European countries, their choice was far from indisputable. However, while Austria is perceived as a West European country by a significant number of respondents (around 40%), the other mentioned countries are labelled as East European by the same share of respondents. France, The Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Italy are placed in West Europe by a clear majority of respondents (Italy is closest to Central Europe). On the other side Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania and Bulgaria are unambiguously placed in East Europe, Croatia seems to be somewhere between Central and Eastern Europe.

The respondents' answers helped to reveal the classification criteria which were used. The majority of respondents have obviously not only thought about the geographical location, but have also taken into consideration the culture, political system as well as the history of the countries. This is the only explanation for the great differences between pairs of neighbouring states (Italy-Slovenia, Austria-Slovakia, The Czech Republic-Germany, etc.). The other important feature in the respondents' answers is the clear iden-

tification of Czech society in Central Europe, and also the somewhat ethnocentric view of the reality – note that the only 'pure, Central European country' is the Czech Republic itself.

Leaving the question of the mental map of Europe aside, one can analyse the issue of the Czech Republic's relationships with other countries. Respondents were asked to determine three countries with which the Czech Republic should co-operate most closely in economic and political terms, those which are the most similar in cultural terms, and those which could become a danger for their home country. The following table shows the share of respondents who mentioned individual countries.

Table 4. Relationships between the Czech Republic and other countries

Country	% of respondents who mentioned the country	Country	% of respondents who mentioned the country
*A. Which three countries should the CR co-operate most closely with in **economic** terms?*		*B. Which three countries do you think are the most similar to the CR in **cultural** terms?*	
Germany	73.3	Slovakia	76.7
USA	33.9	Poland	56.3
Austria	33.0	Austria	37.5
Slovakia	26.9	Germany	23.7
France	22.3	Russia	12.1
*C. Which three countries should the CR co-operate the most closely with in **political** terms?*		*D. Which countries do you think could become a danger to the CR?*	
Germany	56.6	Russia	67.8
Slovakia	34.1	Germany	51.8
Austria	33.7	Slovakia	16.2
USA	33.3	China	13.5
Poland	23.0	Yugoslavia	10.5

It is evident from the tables above that two countries – Germany and Slovakia – have a special position. Germany is considered as the most important partner for not only economic but also political co-operation (it is believed especially by younger and politically right-oriented respondents). However, at the same time, Germany still remains a potential danger for slightly more than half of the population (older and politically left-oriented respondents often hold this view). Slovakia is generally perceived as the country by far the most similar in cultural terms but, particularly among the older and left-oriented respondents, there is the belief that the Czech Republic should co-operate closely with Slovakia both on a political and economic level. Rather surprisingly, Slovakia was mentioned also as one of the countries which could become a danger to the Czech Republic. Since almost exclusively right-oriented respondents have expressed this opinion, it is very probable that in speaking about 'the danger from Slovakia' they are thinking predominantly about political instability or, as sometimes mentioned, the 'transfer of leftist ideas'.

The greatest danger for the Czech Republic is Russia. This belief is shared by all groups of society – even the majority of left-oriented respondents think so, a considerable

part of whom belong to Communist Party supporters (38%!). On the other hand, the image of the USA is different – the Czech Republic should co-operate closely with the USA in both political and economic terms, although it must be admitted that older and politically left-oriented respondents do not share this idea so much. Austria is also considered as an important partner for both political and economic co-operation. Moreover, it is claimed that Austria is one of the most similar countries. It is worthwhile mentioning here that there are no differences among different groups of respondents as to attitudes towards Austria. Another country which should be mentioned here is Poland. The majority of respondents consider Poland as one of the most similar countries to the Czech Republic in cultural terms, a substantial part of Czech society is in favour of close political co-operation. Looking at the data globally it seems that the Czechs show two basic tendencies in perceiving foreign countries. Older and left-wing people tend to support co-operation with the 'old allies' (chiefly the former communist countries) and are more suspicious towards the 'old enemies' on the other side of the former Iron Curtain. On the other hand, younger and right-oriented people tend to reject all traditional alliances preferring exclusively western orientations.

Austria and the Czech Republic – a common history in the eyes of Czechs

Questions asking respondents about their attitudes towards the Austro-Hungarian Empire are an integral part of the questionnaire. Due to the fact that none of the respondents have had any personal experience with living under this rule (the oldest respondents were born in 1920), the data we have obtained reflect an image of this reign based mostly on history lessons at school, literature, and stories passed down. This could be the main reason why the most significant feature of respondents' answers to questions concerning this was a large measure of no opinion (from 42% to 54% used "do not know" or "neither agree, nor disagree"). Looking at the half of respondents who have expressed some opinion, we can conclude that relationships towards the reign of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy are unclear as seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Attitudes to the reign of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy: "In the following, we list alternative descriptions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Please say if you agree or disagree with them" (in %)

Statement	Agree	Disagree	No opinion
The Empire was a prison for the nations and peoples that lived under its rule	32	26	42
People in Central Europe have not lived so well and happily since the Empire fell apart	13	42	45
The Empire was economically heterogeneous and inefficient	31	16	53
The bureaucracy of the Empire was more efficient and reliable than present-day state administration in Central Europe	19	27	54
The Empire helped the economic development of its underdeveloped regions	29	22	49

It is clear from the figures that a negative evaluation of the reign of the monarchy is slightly more prevalent among Czech society than a positive view. But there are differences as to individual items. While only 13% of the population agreed that "People in

Central Europe have not lived so well and happily since the monarchy fell apart" (42% disagree), the share of respondents admitting that the monarchy helped the economic development of its underdeveloped regions is slightly higher (29%) than the share of opponents (22%). It seems that contemporary Czech society tends to admit some positive economic effects of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but does not see anything else to be highly regarded. Not surprisingly, only about 10% of the respondents regret that the monarchy fell apart. For the majority of Czechs this reign is evidently a part of history very distant from their everyday lives. It is also interesting to note that in the minds of respondents contemporary Austria is usually not connected with the monarchy (as seen in contrast to the very positive image of present-day Austria). There are also no differences based on age, gender, education or political orientation of the respondents.

The Czech Republic and European integration

If the survey data served for prediction of the results of a hypothetical referendum on the entrance of the Czech Republic into the European Union, adherents of the process of European unification would be satisfied: 50% of respondents were in favour of joining the EU, 18% were against and the remaining 32% did not know. Taking into account all questions related to the EU it is possible to produce a more structured view on the respondents' attitudes and opinions. The results of such a classification is shown in Chart 3 (the procedure QUICK CLUSTER from the SPSS statistical package was used to determine the individual groups of respondents).

Chart 3: Groups of respondents in accordance with their relationship to the European Union (N=751)



The typical characteristics of individual groups are as follows:

Group 1 (8% of respondents) – the respondents of this group have a very limited knowledge of the EU; they think the Czech Republic would not benefit from being a member of the EU; they view joining the EU with disfavour and have no opinion as to the way the Czech Republic should enter the EU.

Group 2 (12% of respondents) – possess a limited knowledge of the EU; they do not know whether the Czech Republic would benefit from being a member of the EU; despite this fact they support joining the EU after

fulfilling the necessary pre-conditions; the EU should be joined individually.

Group 3 (17% of respondents) – hold an average knowledge of the EU; they think the Czech Republic would not benefit from being a member of the EU; and are strictly against joining the EU; the Czech Republic should do all it can to protect its independence from the EU; this group holds no opinion as to the way the Czech Republic should enter the EU.

Group 4 (11% of respondents) – have an average knowledge of the EU; the Czech Republic would benefit from being the member of the EU, and this group gives its support for joining the EU after fulfilling the necessary pre-conditions.

Group 5 (52% of respondents) – have relatively the broadest knowledge of the EU; the Czech Republic would surely benefit from being a member of the EU; this group is strictly in favour of joining the EU; the Czech Republic should join the EU individually and as quickly as possible.

An analysis of the data supports the idea of positive statistical relationships between the level of knowledge of the EU and the conviction regarding the usefulness of joining the EU for the Czech Republic. It is interesting to note that people who both know a lot about the EU and reject joining it are practically not present in the sample. Czech 'Euroscepticism' is more a product of the fear of the unknown than a rational decision based on the rejection of EU principles. This claim can be indirectly supported by the fact, that older and less educated people are much more opposed to the idea of joining the EU.

Attitudes towards the EU are also influenced by the political orientation of the respondents. Those who place themselves on the left of political spectrum generally express much more reservations towards the EU than the rest of the population. This fact is somewhat paradoxical, showing different images of the EU held by the population and the political elite. While the EU is often accused by Czech right-wing politicians of being an anti-liberal stronghold of social engineering and bureaucracy, functioning under the influence of different kind of socialists, the majority of right-wing respondents perceived the EU as a symbol of successful capitalism. On the other hand, the majority of the Czech left-oriented political elite usually speak of the EU as an example of a well-managed organisation preserving high social standards of employees, which contrasts with the 19th century capitalism installed in the Czech Republic by the right-oriented government. A substantial part of the left-oriented respondents, however, (probably influenced by the years of communist propaganda) still tends to consider the EU as an organisation serving only the interests of "multinational capital".

Conclusions

1. A deep emotional relationship is typical for 90% of the inhabitants of the Czech Republic.
2. Most people are not ready to change their place of residence even if it can improve living or working conditions. Three-quarters still live in the same place, or not very far from, where they spent their childhood.
3. The Czechs see the integrity of the Republic as the basic condition of its existence.
4. Speaking and feeling Czech, one can be 'truly Czech'. Also, having Czech citizenship is mostly required.

5. Only one-third of Czechs can speak well another language. Mostly they can speak German, English and Russian. They are aware of the fact, that language education is poor and must be improved.
6. The Czechs mostly don't recognise the difference between nationality and citizenship.
7. The inhabitants of the Czech Republic are very proud, especially of its history (including history of the Czech Kingdom), arts and literature. Also, they are mostly proud of the results of the national economy since 1990.
8. People would like to regulate the import of goods and to restrict immigration. They are afraid of the impacts of immigration (increasing crime rates, the conflict of different cultures, unemployment).
9. Attitudes to the national minorities are not marked, probably due to the national homogeneity of the population. Hostility is concentrated towards Gypsies.
10. The Czechs feel themselves to be typical Central Europeans. They prefer to collaborate in cultural, political and economic issues especially with Germany and other Western European countries, and also the USA. They are mostly afraid of Russia.
11. People support affiliation to the European Union and NATO. But they hold a low level of knowledge of these organisations.

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The Main Features of Population Development in the Czech Republic during the Transformation of Society

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Abstract: The behaviour of the population of the Czech Republic has been changing since 1991. The changes have resulted in a considerable decrease in marriages and births, and a slight fall in mortality rates. The decline in the number of newly-weds and new-born children can be attributed to significant structural changes in society connected with the transformation of the reproductive model established in the post-war era. The changes have been initiated most notably by the younger generation, within which certain trends diverge. Some young people continue to enter into marriage at an early age, and half of first children were the product of pre-marital conception. Another part of this generation has been postponing both marriage and childbearing, and this portion has been growing rapidly. The present decline in marriages appears to be due to two factors: the higher age at which people are marrying for the first time, and falling marriage rates in general (the increasing proportion of never-married persons in the population). Similarly, the decline in births was caused not only by an earlier trend towards lower fertility but also a lower proportion of people living in wedlock. Hence the expectation that in the second half of the 1990s a new reproductive model will gradually come into being. This will include a higher age at first marriage and lower fertility in general. This development will result in changes in population structure, and, especially, in the structure of households and families.

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In any country changes in the population are the result of complex interrelationships between the bio-social structure of the population, its demographic behaviour and its environment. Demographic research aims to trace not only the main features of population reproduction but also the ways in which it is changing. The primary task is to ascertain the extent to which this is due to internal demographic factors, i.e. primarily the age structure of the population, and to what extent it is due to changes in the environment. The population development in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s shows that people's demographic behaviour has changed decisively under the influence of external factors. This has led to a rapid transformation of the reproductive patterns developed over the previous forty years.

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1. Before 1989

During the 1950s the Czech Republic attained a relatively stable model of demographic behaviour which lasted until the end of the 1980s. This period was marked by a universally low age of marriage for both men and women, with virtually every man and woman spending at least some years of their life in the married state. The average age of men on their first marriage was 24, while brides were usually under the age of 23. Throughout this period there were fewer than 5% of men and 3% of women aged 45-49 who had never married. Virtually all women married and usually at an early age. Very young marriages, often contracted because the woman was pregnant, were not very stable. In the late 1980s only one-fifth of marriages lasted for ten years. Some of those who divorced soon remarried, and these represented more than one-fifth of all marriages.

The changes in the economic situation of both families as a whole and of their individual members undoubtedly contributed to the loosening of marriage ties. The almost total shift of economic activity into the hands of the state meant that the family ceased to be a production unit. All young people found a job after completing compulsory schooling or professional training. Women kept their jobs after marriage and the birth of their children, with maternity leave and the right to return to the same job in the same place guaranteed by law (in 1972 this was fixed at two years after the birth of the youngest child). Most women, however, worked because their income was necessary to maintain the family's standard of living. Only a very small proportion of women stayed at home with their children: 95% of women aged 25-44 were working, even when they were looking after small children at the same time.

The model of a two-child family prevailed throughout this period: in 1991 almost two-thirds of women in their first marriage had two children after ten years of marriage, 14% had one child, 15% three children, and only 3% were childless. Although there was a slow but steady decrease in the average number of children per family, almost all women did have children, so that the fertility rate stayed at 1.96 children per woman throughout the 1980s. Most children were, however, born shortly after marriage and the average age of mothers at the birth of their first child was under 23 and under 26 for the second. This early child-bearing was also linked with the frequency of pre-marital sex, since due to the low level of use of effective contraceptive measures, up to 55% of first children were conceived outside marriage. The most common means of preventing further children after the last wanted one was abortion, which was legalised in 1958. Abortion was a more frequent outcome of a third pregnancy than was childbirth, and accounted for up to 42% of pregnancies. The percentage of children born outside wedlock remained very low (around 5%) and it was only at the end of the 1980s that it rose as high as 8%. This was a clear sign of the recognition of marriage as an institution and of the infrequency of non-marital cohabitation among young people.

Families with dependent children were privileged by the state. Married people had a better chance of obtaining a flat than single ones, and families with children were given preference over those without. In this respect it was better for those intending to marry in any case to do so early and have children soon, since this meant they became eligible for the low-interest loans intended to help newly wed couples to set up their flats, for cheap family holidays, and so on. [Frejka 1980]. At the end of the 1980s it was already exceptional to find different families sharing a flat unless by choice; young couples, particularly those with one or two children, generally had their own flats, although parents

frequently helped them financially in obtaining these. Early marriage and parenthood led to a smaller age gap between generations.

Another important factor in the population structure was the relatively high mortality rate, which reflected the increasing backwardness of medical care, the worsening environment, unhealthy living and eating habits, and particularly the low level of responsibility that individuals were prepared to take for their own health. As a result, life expectancy at the beginning of the 1960s was around 67 years for men and 74 for women, i.e. 5-6 years less than in developed countries. The rising mortality rate among men meant that considerably more women reached old age and above the age of 70 the majority of these were widows.

The Czech Republic shared these characteristics with the other countries of Eastern Europe [Rychtaříková 1994]. At the same time, up to the early 1960s the growth of the population in the Czech Lands was basically similar to that in a number of other European countries, particularly from the south and west [Kučera 1994, Pavlík et al. 1986].[1] The normal way the family functioned (the nuclear family in which children became independent on marriage, the attempt to provide for one's old age) was similar, as was family size, since the move to planned parenthood came at approximately the same time as in other Western European countries [Horská et al. 1990].

In the immediate post-war period almost all European countries demonstrated a common pattern of population growth, regardless of their political orientation. This was the rise in both marriage and birth rates which became known as the 'baby boom'. The age at first marriage fell throughout Europe, particularly among women, and at the same time the percentage of people marrying increased. The mortality rate fell sharply, leading to a long-term rise in life expectancy. Some countries did however exhibit certain concrete features which were at variance with the trend. In the early 1960s two distinct trends began to emerge on the European continent: one characteristic of the communist countries and the other for the rest. Demographic behaviour in the Czech Republic became typical of that in the communist countries of Eastern Europe [Monier, Rychtaříková 1990].

In the countries of Western Europe the marriage rates began to fall in the mid-1960s, with steadily fewer people, both single and previously married, opting for matrimony. Living together outside marriage did not however preclude children and the number of children born outside wedlock rose. Sociologists and demographers linked the rising number of illegitimate children and the increase in families that were in formal terms incomplete to the overall changes in society. They pointed to the fact that these children were generally raised in families with two parents, even if these families were looser than in the past [Sullerot 1992]. Relations between partners, whether legal or informal, were growing less and less stable. On the advice of the experts most countries simplified divorce procedures and the rate of divorce rose [Haskey 1993].

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[1]) This includes similar development in earlier periods (particularly in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th) in terms of marriages (older age at marriage with men marrying first at around 27-28 and women at 24-25 years of age, 95% of men and 91% of women ever married), and births (after the end of the demographic wave of the mid-1930s the long-term number of children per women fell to 1.6 and one-fifth to one-quarter of all women remained childless, while 12% of children were born outside matrimony).

These changes led to a permanent long-term fall in the birth rate so that by the mid-1970s in some countries the total fertility rate fell under 1.5, i.e. well under the rate required to keep the population stable. Together with the rising life expectancy this brought about a fundamental change in the age structures of Western European countries. In some countries the percentage of people over the age of 65 rose above 15%, only slightly less than the number of children under the age of 15.

This change in the dynamics of population growth in the majority of western countries has been so persistent, widespread and fundamental that it has come to be called the 'second demographic transition' [Kaa 1987]. It was clear from the start that some of the communist countries of Eastern Europe had a number of features in common with this development [Tabah 1980: 359]. This is based on a change in the style of living, culture and ideas of contemporary society, primarily the new emphasis on the aims and interests of the individual, on the right to set one's own aims and the path to attain them. Economists also point out that marriage and the number of children in a family is more and more often the result of a choice (albeit partly subconscious) between possible gains and necessary costs [Becker 1981], within the context of increasing demands on the standard of living achievable by individuals.

2. Changes in Demographic Behaviour After 1990

2.1 Changing Patterns of Marriage and Divorce

The first noteworthy change in the demographic behaviour of the Czechs was a fall in the number of marriages as early as 1991. There were 19,000 fewer marriages than in 1990 and only a small part of the fall can be explained by anticipated marriages the previous year. Since then the number of marriages has fallen each year, falling below 55,000 (5.3 marriages per 1,000 inhabitants) in 1995, i.e. only two-thirds of the 1989 figure. This was despite a 15% rise in the total number of those aged 17 to 29, with the 17-24 age group up by 21%, as the numerically strong group of those born between 1974 and 1979 reached maturity. The marriage rate, however, fell sharply.

The likelihood that a single person will marry fell by 50% for the age group with the highest rate of marriage (which in 1989-1991 was men aged 22-24 and women aged 19-23). The peak in marriages shifted to the 23-26 age group for men and 22-24 for women. There was however little change in the average age of those marrying for the first time, which rose by 1.6 years for men to 26.2 and for women by 2.1 years to 23.9 years. The sharpest fall was in the number of very young men marrying, but it was the drop among those aged 21 and 22 which was most significant for the overall development. The predicted number of those remaining unmarried at the age of 30 rose to 42% of men and 29% of women [Rychtaříková 1995: 160-162]. A large percentage of young people are postponing marrying and it is this that has caused the sharp drop in the number of marriages and the slight rise in the average age at marriage.

There have been no major changes in patterns of divorce since 1989. The number of marriages being dissolved has remained approximately the same as at the end of the 1980s (around 30,000 per year), when it stood at 1.2% of all existing marriages and 37% of marriage initial. Divorce was highest among people aged 20-24, after two or three years of marriage cohort. This was very similar to the previous period. The number of divorced persons in the population did however rise, reaching 12% of men and 14% of women aged 40-49 in 1995.

The rate of remarriage by divorced or widowed persons fell (by one-third and one-fifth respectively), and so both the number and the percentage of people under the age of thirty in existing marriages declined relatively quickly. The fall was greatest in the 20-24 age group, in which the number of married men fell by 7 percentage points and the number of married women by 13 between 1991 and 1995. The percentage of people in the 25-29 age group was also lower in 1995 (by 6% for men and 4% for women).

It is probable that the number and percentage of people preferring to live together without marrying has risen at the same time as the marriage rate has fallen. Research carried out in December 1995 showed that 8 out of 100 complete families fell into this group[2] and this is also borne out by the rise in the number of children born outside marriage.

2.2 Changes in Reproductive Patterns

The social transformation began in a period when the birth rate was falling slowly with fewer third or later children, so that the number of children planned by a family settled at around two. The birth rate had already fallen below two children per woman but it was only from 1991 onwards that it fell much below 1.9, and even in 1991 a majority of children (59%) were born to mothers under 25. The change came in 1992, since when there has been an ever-accelerating decline in the number of births, initially only of first children, but since 1994 also of second children, representing a significant drop in the absolute number of children born. Since 1992 the slow decrease in the birth rate has changed into a sharp fall.

The drop in the total fertility rate from 1.86 in 1991 to 1.28 in 1995 was due largely to the reduced fertility of women under the age of 25. It is only since 1994 that the birth rate among women aged 20-25 has been falling, and that of older women has remained virtually unchanged. It is largely young women who have begun to limit their children and the fall in the number of young people marrying has undoubtedly had a marked effect on the number of children being born.

Had the number of children born to married couples remained at the 1990 level for each age group, 102,800 births could have been expected in 1995, i.e. 16,600 fewer than in 1990. This means that the fall in the number of married women from 1990 to 1995 would on its own represent a 14% reduction in the number of children born. In fact only 81,100 children were born to married couples in 1995, i.e. 32% less than in 1990. The second part of this reduction (21,700, 18%) shows the fall in the number of women having children. The drop of 38,300 children born within marriage between 1990 and 1995 was therefore 57% due to the decrease in the number of children born to married women and 43% to the fall in the number of married women. The effect of this reduction in the number of married women is increasing year by year as the generation of women postponing marriage reach the age at which women earlier most often had children.

This fall in the number of births was originally linked with the fall in the number of marriages, particularly among young single people. This postponement of marriage brought the postponement of a couple's first child and in 1994 and 1995 also the second child. In 1995 19,700 fewer first children were born, with 50% of this reduction due to

[2]) Information from the IVVM survey M95-29 "Marital Status, Parenthood and Cohabitation," 18. 1. 1996.

the general fall in the birth rate. With second children the proportion of the total drop (12,800 fewer children) attributable to the falling birth rate was 64% and among third or later children (5,700 fewer) it was 61%. The fall in the number of married women accounted for 59% of the fall in number of first children, 28% of second children and 13% of third or later children. It is clear that fewer married women have been having children than in the past.

The relatively young women in the 24-29 age group who married at an average age of 22 around the turn of the decade have already had one or two children, but younger women have been postponing marriage and, once married, childbearing. Older women (in 1995 the group aged 28-30) have already basically finished childbearing and when they do have children it is to 'round out' their families. In this case there is no distinction between women in their first marriage who have a second child, or those in a second or later marriage who are more often having a third child with their new partner. While childbearing among this group does play a certain role it is that of the young women which is decisive in the overall pattern of reproduction. It can be supposed that the marked fall in the number of children born within marriage since 1992 is to some extent a contemporary phenomenon of postponing marriage and childbirth to a later age. This is borne out by the current situation in a number of Western European countries where the average age of young women at marriage has risen by 4-6 years, with the age at which they have their first child also correspondingly increasing.

There was however a marked rise in the number of children born outside of marriage during this period. Comparing 1995 with 1990, 70% of this rise was due to the rise in the number of unmarried women and 30% to the rise in the number of these women having children. In 1995 the number of unmarried women giving birth fell again, bringing a fall in the number of non-marital births, and the percentage of such children rose only because of the sizeable fall in the number of children born in wedlock. Up to 1994 the rise in the number of non-marital births affected first, second, and later children, but was most marked among second children. This can be explained by the already mentioned supposition about the higher percentage of people choosing to live together without marrying. As the rise in births to unmarried mothers was highest among the 25-29 age group, it can be presumed that more single women are living in such relationships than in the past.

Since 1990 the number of abortions has fallen significantly: from 108,000 in 1989 and 1990 to 48,000 in 1995. The number of interrupted pregnancies therefore fell by 40%, despite the rise in the number of young women. This is also borne out by the marked fall in the risk of unwanted pregnancies, with a steadily increasing number of women turning to modern contraceptive methods (primarily hormonal contraceptives) and to the use of condoms, partly as a precaution against HIV, instead of more traditional methods. Previously there was always a reciprocal relationship between the birth rate and the number of abortions (a higher number of births meant a lower number of abortions and vice versa) but since 1990 both have come to follow the same pattern. This implies that a steadily increasing number of women are using effective means of preventing unwanted pregnancies rather than relying on the possibility of an abortion.

Between 1990 and 1994 the number of deaths per year also fell. There was a slight rise in 1995 due to the influenza epidemic which hit the Czech Republic at the very end of the year, but up to the end of November 1995 about 3,000 fewer people had died than

in the same period the previous year. The mortality rate, which reflects the overall state of health, has improved across virtually the entire population, with the exception of men aged 15-34. Men's average life expectancy rose by 1.4 years between 1989 and 1994, and that of women by 1.2 years. Because of the formerly high rate of marriage, the reduced risk of death and so of the death of a spouse has led to an increase in the number of middle-aged and elderly people who are still married. This in turn affects the pattern of mortality as married people, particularly men, have a noticeably better survival rate (for example in 1994 7,500 "more" unmarried men died but only 3,300 unmarried women). Infant mortality has also fallen, with fewer than 8 children per 1,000 live births dying before the age of one. This fall in the mortality rate reflects changing behaviour patterns with people paying more attention to their health and to a healthier lifestyle. This is particularly noticeable among those aged 50-70, both men and women, who showed the sharpest fall in the death rate.

This improvement in mortality rates and the fall in the birth rate is speeding up both the absolute and relative ageing of the population. At the beginning of 1996 only 18.3% of the population was under 15 years of age (with an annual fall in the number of children under the age of 15 of almost 56,000). At the same time the proportion of the population over the age of 60 has risen to over 18% as those born in the earlier "baby boom" of the second half of the 1930s reach retirement age. The number and percentage of people in the over-70 and over-80 age groups is also rising relatively fast, with one in twelve Czech citizens now over the age of seventy.

The fall in the net level of reproduction under 0.7 which was recorded in 1994-1995 could mean that the natural population loss will continue to increase in the long term.[3]

2.3 Probable Reasons for the Changes in Demographic Behaviour

The changes in patterns of marriage and childbearing have arisen out of the immediate environment in which these patterns take shape. There are four basic causes. The first is the fact that during the period from 1940 to 1990 childbearing was concentrated into a very narrow age range, so that only a limited number of people, primarily those aged 17-30, had any real influence on the number of marriages and births. In such a situation even a very slight change in the conditions in which this age group lives and reproduces can have a decisive effect on the overall growth of the population.

The second cause is the close link between patterns of marriage and childbearing, which was greatly strengthened over the last forty years. With the model of a two-child family in which the first child is born soon after marriage, the number of people marrying before the age of 30 or at most 35 is decisive. The factor becomes still more important the moment that there is a rise in the number of married couples choosing to postpone having children. This is what has been happening since 1992, as the number of marriages in the Czech Republic began to fall in 1991 and in the following year parents began to postpone childbearing, so that the combined effects of these factors have been accumulating since 1993.

The third factor is the influence of the social and economic situation, which has a marked influence on young people's decisions to marry and then to have children. Young

[3]) In 1994 the natural population loss was 10,800 people, while in 1995 it reached 21,800.

people who have just finished their education and have only begun to carve a position for themselves in society and the economy are most at risk from unemployment, even if this is largely temporary. They are more likely than older people to opt for self-employment, which offers higher gains but also greater risks and greater demands on their time. The wider opportunities for attending further and higher education have also extended the period spent in education by a large part of the younger generation and this too is a reason for their postponing marriage to a later age.

The short-term fall in real incomes brought about by the economic reforms begun in 1991-1994 also had a negative effect on rates of marriage and divorce, together with the sharp rise in the prices of flats and furnishings, and of the overall cost of accommodation. While real incomes have been rising again since 1994, the shortage of flats has continued to increase, worsened by the halt in the construction of rented and cooperative accommodation. This is reinforced by the very pragmatic behaviour of the Czechs, who have adjusted rapidly to the changing economic and social conditions. This pragmatism can also be seen in patterns of reproduction. A similar phenomenon has been observed in various other periods since the 1930s when a fall in the standards of living has manifested itself immediately in a drop in the numbers of marriages and births.[4]

Both the fall in the number of people choosing to marry at an early age and the pressure of falling standards of living, which has mostly affected families with children, have contributed to the drop in the birth rate. The removal of many subsidies, including those on food and other consumer items (products for children and babies were heavily subsidised) and the introduction of a value added tax, by which children also in effect became tax payers, were contributing factors.[5] Children's allowances, now parental allowances, and the tax deductions for children have lost much of their importance and as a microcensus in 1992 showed, are seen as social benefits. The number of children in a family has become much more important in determining differences in household income [Vytlačil, Kuchařová 1992].

The restructuring of the national economy and the increasing importance of the service sector in the gross national product did nothing to reduce the demand for women's labour. As a result, young women, particularly those in well-paid jobs, prefer to concentrate on their careers rather than to start a family, and so are postponing marriage and childbearing. The general pressure to work harder has also limited the possibility of part-time work which primarily interests mothers of young children.

The fourth factor, which should not be underestimated, is the rapid adaptation to the past and, at the same time, the present pattern of demographic behaviour in Western

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[4]) This resulted in the "demographic waves" which can also be observed in the table on the patterns of childbearing.

[5]) In 1990 the personal consumption of the population including state support and subsidies was 265,874 million crowns, giving a per capita figure of eight times the then average wage. This included not only direct subsidies on food and manufactured goods intended primarily for children, but also subsidies for day-care centres, nursery schools, after-school care, school canteens, transport to and from school, the costs of convalescent care for children, field trips, summer camps, special education campaigns, etc. [Statistická... 1991]. J. Večerník has discussed the compensatory function of social funds in the overall budget of families with children in his article on the influence of the number of children on the income and expenditure patterns of households [Večerník 1992].

Europe. The change in the political system opened up Czech society and brought it into direct contact not only with the culture of Western Europe but also with its lifestyle. Marriage and family are no longer among the foremost interests of young people, who now have different ideas as to how to spend their time, devoting themselves to interests which are sometimes very demanding, such as travel, audio-visual technology, personal computers, luxury cars, an active social life, politics, or participation in various groups or organisations (environmental, charity or others).[6] This is without taking into consideration the possibility of private business, which has opened up previously unimaginable possibilities for young and talented people, particularly if they do not have to worry about a partner or family. This change in lifestyle is not so much an imitation as a reaction to the social environment being created around it.

As to the improvement in mortality rates, there is a whole set of factors influencing this. The most important is the modernisation of medical technology and the range of new prescription medicines now available. The privatisation of medical facilities has meant an improvement in health care. The eating habits of a large part of the population have also improved (increased consumption of vegetables and citrus fruits throughout the year and a fall in consumption of meat and animal fats) and the number of people who are consciously trying to have a healthier lifestyle is rising. This is despite the fact that the relatively high level of alcohol consumption has not fallen and that the number of smokers and drug addicts has increased.

3. Conclusion

In society today reproductive patterns tend to be conscious. The scope for individual choice is however limited by biological possibilities and by the given cultural norms, which include both moral norms and even more importantly socio-economic factors. The most important among these are the possibilities of earning a living and the parameters of the standard of living. These have also played an important role in the changes in the patterns of demographic behaviour in the Czech Republic in the first years of the transformation from a controlled to a market economy.

The reproductive patterns in the Czech Republic in the 1970s and 1980s only seemed to be stable, as Vereš indicated as early as 1991 [Vereš 1991]. For many years the ruling ideology in the Czech Republic rejected the idea of more decisive factors playing a role in creating contemporary society's patterns of lower rates of marriages and births. These first appeared, more or less obviously, in the 1960s, and sociologists and demographers were well aware of the importance of women's working lives in reducing the number of children, and of the role of individualism in weakening marriage ties and in the growing generation gap. The influence of these factors was steadily reduced by various economic and ideological means but one notable phenomenon did survive: up to the beginning of the 1990s marriage was generally seen as a normal part of life and women in particular saw a two-child family as desirable. This was demonstrated by research findings in 1995. When earnings levels were largely dependent on age and seniority, it was generally considered better for women to have their children early in their working life when their earnings were lowest. This, together with the popularity of mar-

[6]) Information from IVVM survey V95-22 "Představy svobodných o příštím společném soužití a o počtu dětí" (Single People's Views on Future Cohabitation and on the Number of Children) 12. 4. 1995, and "K životním cílům svobodných" (The Life Aims of Single People), 13. 4. 1995.

riage, contributed to early marriage (which indeed could hardly have been earlier in view of the length of schooling). In this respect, the measures taken to increase the population in the late 1960s and early 1970s were successful because they were well calculated, and made it much easier for young families with children to establish themselves (regardless of political events). By the early 1980s, however, they were already less effective.

Once meritocratic factors came to play a greater part in determining personal status [Machonin, Tuček 1994] and the state ceased to provide financial aid for young families so that the time needed to obtain the necessary means for starting a family (primarily a flat) became longer, the motives for early marriage disappeared. These factors are elements in the sharp fall in childbearing. When A. J. Coale considered the preconditions for the falling birth rate in contemporary society, he observed that individual couples must see it as profitable under the given social and economic conditions [Coale 1986].

In most countries of Western Europe, the second demographic transition was largely due to people freely choosing their way of living, also in terms of marriage and children. For this reason it was relatively smooth and gradual. In the post-communist countries the pressure of new economic and social conditions has speeded this process up and so the changes in the demographic patterns in the Czech Republic have been rapid and far-reaching. Even if there were enough affordable dwellings and the standard of living of families with children were to rise faster, a steadily increasing number of young people would reject the previous pattern of demographic behaviour.

The formerly strong link between social and population development has still not entirely disappeared but has taken on a rather different guise. It is becoming a major distinguishing factor among the population as a whole, in terms of income, social and political factors, but also of expectations about future development. On one hand there is an increasing part of the population which has no need of an active social (and indirectly population) policy. On the other hand the percentage of the population which is greatly dependent on state aid, in both material and psychological terms, is not noticeably decreasing. While poverty, as one of the results of greater differences in society, is still rare in comparison with the countries of Western Europe, it is more likely to affect families with children than retired people who used to be its main victims. The society here is as a whole poorer than its Western European counterparts, but the increased direct contact with these countries has meant that standards there have become well known.

The relation between social and population development is not static. A rising standard of living and increasing "needs" bring new demands and young married couples and families with children tend to be left behind in this spiral. This produces a certain frustration, which can be observed in the reduction of the number of children, as they are seen as one obstacle in the way of development both of the individual and of the family. Social policy can compensate for this development only so far and only for a limited part of the population. Population growth is therefore limited not just by the difficult social position of the younger generation but primarily by its growing ambitions and demands for higher standards, principally in material terms.

The analysis of population development shows that the new patterns of reproductive behaviour, characterised by later marriage, postponing or rejecting marriage and the birth of fewer children to older mothers, have as yet only been adopted by a part of the younger population, although their numbers are growing. Their peers are still following the behavioral patterns of the preceding period, with early marriage, often due to preg-

nancy. In 1995 almost 60% of brides up to the age of 35 were pregnant. For this reason age at marriage has still not risen significantly. The number of children per couple is gradually decreasing.

Changes in patterns of demographic behaviour are normally relatively gradual. Even if the Czech Republic has seen rapid change, at least one decade is required for the creation of a new pattern of childbearing. The new model will probably be very close to the current situation in Western Europe.

The consequences of the change in demographic patterns will not become clear for at least another five years. It is already possible to say, however, that the postponement of childbearing will create a marked break in the age composition of the population and contribute to its ageing, as the falling death rate will contribute to a rise in the overall age of the population and lead to its steadily greater natural decrease. For this reason the changes in demographic behaviour will have far-reaching consequences.

Translated by April Retter

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Appendix

Table 1. Selected Characteristics of Marriage and Divorce in the Czech Republic 1989-1994

Indicator	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
No. of marriages (1000s)	81.3	91.0	72.0	74.1	66.0	58.4	55.0
No. of divorces (1000s)	31.4	32.1	29.5	28.6	30.2	30.9	31.1
Marriages per 1000 inhabitants	7.8	8.8	7.0	7.2	6.4	5.7	5.3
Divorces per 1000 inhabitants	3.03	3.09	2.85	2.77	2.93	2.99	3.01
Divorces per 1000 existing marriages	12.2	12.4	11.5	11.2	11.9	12.2	12.3
Average age at first marriage							
men	24.6	24.0	24.7	24.8	25.4	26.2	.
women	21.8	21.4	22.2	22.5	23.2	23.9	.
Proportions of single people by the age of 50 (according to nuptiality tables)							
men	11	9	15	14	17	24	27
women	5	4	9	8	12	18	20
Total divorce rate (x 100)	37.2	38.0	34.8	33.9	36.2	.	.

Source: ČSÚ, Pohyb obyvatelstva (Population Change) [Rychtaříková 1995: 160-162].

Table 2. Probability of Marrying for Single Persons and Age-Specific Remarriage Rate of the Divorced and Widowed in the Czech Republic 1989 and 1994

	Probability of Marrying for Single Persons (multiplied by 1000)				Remarriages per 1000 Divorced and/or Widowed Persons			
	males		females		males		females	
Age	1989	1994	1989	1994	1989	1994	1989	1994
15-19	37	17	69	25	.	.	.	.
20-24	159	92	224	126	285	107	314	136
25-29	131	89	130	85	221	119	182	106
30-34	56	45	58	40	126	87	97	66
35-39	26	21	26	20	82	56	59	40
40-44	13	10	13	9	61	41	41	29
45-49	9	7	8	5	49	35	32	22

Source: ČSÚ, Pohyb obyvatelstva (Population Change)

Table 3. Selected Characteristics of Childbearing in the Czech Republic 1989-1994

Indicator	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
No. of live births (in 1000s)	128.4	130.6	129.4	121.7	121.0	106.6	96.1
Extra-marital births, per 100 live births	7.9	8.6	9.8	10.7	12.7	14.6	15.6
Live births per 1000 inhabitants	12.4	12.6	12.5	11.8	11.7	10.3	9.3
Total fertility rate	1.87	1.89	1.86	1.72	1.67	1.44	1.27
Mean age of mother at birth, regardless of marital status							
of any child	24.8	24.8	24.7	24.8	25.0	25.4	.
of first child	22.5	22.5	22.4	22.5	22.6	22.9	.
of second child	25.6	25.6	25.7	25.8	25.9	26.1	.
of third child	29.2	29.2	29.3	29.2	29.3	29.6	.

Source: ČSÚ Pohyb obyvatelstva (Population Change) [Rychtaříková 1996]

Table 4. Age Specific Fertility Rate in the Czech Republic 1989,1992 & 1994

Live births per 1000 women at specified ages

Age	All women				Married women				Unmarried women			
Group	1989	1992	1994	C	1989	1992	1994	C	1989	1992	1994	C
15-19	44.9	44.7	32.6	-27	540.0	518.1	454.5	-16	7.9	10.0	10.6	+34
20-24	172.9	154.0	121.8	-30	275.6	241.4	210.9	-24	24.5	29.4	29.1	+19
25-29	103.9	94.8	85.5	-18	118.7	108.6	98.7	-17	31.3	36.6	38.7	+24
30-34	36.6	35.1	35.7	-2	43.3	37.1	37.3	-14	24.7	25.0	28.7	+16
35-39	11.2	10.3	10.7	-4	11.3	10.1	10.4	-8	10.4	11.2	12.3	+18
40-44	1.6	1.8	1.8	.	1.6	1.7	1.6	.	1.8	2.3	2.3	+28
45-49	0.1	0.1	0.1	.	0.0	0.1	0.1	.	0.0	0.0	0.0	.

C - change 1989-1994 in percentage

Source: ČSÚ Pohyb obyvatelstva (Population Change)

Table 5. Selected Characteristics of Mortality in the Czech Republic 1950-1995

Characteristic		1950	1960	1989	1995
Life expectancy at birth	men	62.2	67.6*	68.1	70.0
	women	67.0	73.4*	75.4	76.9
Life expectancy at 60	men	15.0	15.1*	14.9	15.9
	women	16.9	18.3*	19.2	20.2
Percentage surviving at	men	68.8	77.7*	77.3	79.2
age 60 (in 1000s)	women	78.0	87.0*	89.4	90.3
Infant mortality (per thousand live births)		64.2	20.0	10.0	7.7

*) 1960-1961

Source: FSÚ, Demografická příručka 1982; ČSÚ, Pohyb obyvatelstva (Population Change)

Table 6. Age Distribution of Population and Proportion of Married Persons in the Czech Republic as of 3. 3. 1991 & 1. 1. 1995

	Total population				Proportions married			
	in 1000s		in %		Male		Female	
Age Group	1991	1995	1991	1995	1991	1995	1991	1995
0-4	643	602	6.2	5.8	.	.	.	.
5-14	1522	1346	14.8	13.0	.	.	.	.
15-24	1556	1709	15.1	16.5	14.9	12.3	31.1	25.4
25-34	1368	1353	13.3	13.1	72.6	68.3	82.7	79.4
35-44	1649	1528	16.0	14.8	80.0	77.7	81.6	80.2
45-54	1210	1452	11.8	14.1	82.8	80.9	78.0	76.9
55-64	1051	988	10.2	9.6	84.2	84.0	65.1	66.4
65 +	1303	1356	12.6	13.1	72.6	74.5	29.5	31.3
Total	10302	10333	100.0	100.0	65.5*	60.1*	62.8*	57.9*

*) Of all persons over the age of 15.

Source: ČSÚ: Sčítání lidu, domů a bytů k 3. 3. 1991 (Population and Housing Census)
Pohyb obyvatelstva (Population Change)

Table 7. Selected Characteristics of Social Development in the Czech Republic 1990-1994

Characteristic	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Index of living costs of employees[1]	109.9	168.1	187.3	226.2	249.8
Index of real earnings of all employed people[1]	94.5	69.6	76.7	79.6	85.8
Rate of unemployment (%)[2]	0.7	4.1	2.6	3.5	3.2
No. of unemployed (1000s)[3]					
graduates with higher education	3.5	24.6	17.4	23.9	20.0
under 25s	.	72.6	43.6	57.6	47.0
Completed dwellings (1000s)[4]					
total	44.6	41.7	36.4	31.5	18.2
privately built	17.2	10.4	12.5	14.3	7.4
other	27.4	31.3	23.9	17.2	10.8

[1]) Indexes; 1. 1. 1989 = 100
[2]) Rate of unemployment as a percentage of total workforce
[3]) The two groups partially overlap
[4]) Average for 1970-1979: 81,409; for 1980-1990: 58,787

Source: Statistická ročenka České republiky 1995 (1995 Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic)

Table 8. Structure of Households according to Relationship between Money Income and Minimum Wage in the Czech Republic, 1992

Type of Household	No. of households in 1000s	in min. wage	Percentage of households with income at x times the minimum wage 1.00 -1.24	1.25 -1.49	1.50 -1.99	2.00 -2.99	3.00 +
All households	3 836	2.8	8.7	18.6	36.3	24.6	9.0
Households with dependent children:							
1 child	704	4.1	8.1	14.9	33.2	30.4	9.3
2 children	740	4.4	11.9	20.2	36.9	21.4	5.2
3 children	40	11.4	24.4	24.3	28.9	9.6	1.4
4 or more children	23	20.7	32.4	20.8	18.9	6.2	1.0

Source: [Vytlačil, Kuchařová 1994: 354].

Table 9. International comparison of Selected Demographic Characteristics in 1994 (or most recent published data)

Characteristic	Czech Republic	Germany*	France	Nether-lands	Sweden	Great Britain	Italy
Total first marriage rate for women	0.55	0.61[1]	0.50[1]	0.60[1]	0.57[2]	0.50[2]	0.67[2]
Mean age of women at first marriage	23.9	26.9[1]	26.4[1]	26.9[1]	26.2[1]	28.3[1]	26.1[2]
Total fertility rate	1.44	1.34	1.65	1.57[1]	1.76[1]	1.88[1]	1.33[2]
Mean age of women at birth of any child	24.4	28.9[1,3]	28.7[1]	29.8[1]	28.1[1]	28.8[1]	29.3[2]
Mean age of women at first child	22.9	27.6[1,3]	27.4[2]	28.3[1]	26.2[1]	27.0[1]	27.4[1]
Percentage of illegitimate births	14.6	11.9[1]	34.9[1]	13.1[1]	31.8[1]	30.4[1]	7.3[1]
Legal abortions per 100 live births	50.2	10.4	22.5	9.9	29.0	23.4	26.1
Life expectancy at birth							
both sexes (average)	72.9	76.1	77.0	77.0	78.2	76.3	76.9
men	69.5	72.9	72.9	74.0	75.5	73.6	73.5
women	76.6	79.3	81.1	80.0	80.8	79.0	80.2

*) West Germany
[1]) 1993
[2]) 1992
[3]) married women only

Figure 1. Probability of Single Persons Marrying by Age





Figure 2. Fertility Rate and Induced Abortion Rate



Figure 3a. Age Specific Marital Fertility Rate



Figure 3b. Age Specific Marital Induced Abortion Rate



Figure 4. Expected Change in the Age Specific Fertility Rate (According to [Burcin, Kučera 1995]).



Political, Organizational and Policy Transformation at the Municipal Level: The Case of Liberec

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Summary: Local government transformation in the Czech Republic is documented and analysed in a case study of the town of Liberec. Local government transformation, comprising political, economic, administrative and policy dimensions, has meant a profound historical change for the town. The major qualitative changes have been greater local autonomy, more discretion in local decision-making and policy-making, a wider scope of local government activities and the enhanced predictability of local government revenues. The main characteristics of local political culture in Liberec are the technocratic managerialism of local political elites, on the one hand, and the very low participation of the citizens in local politics and their very low confidence in the fair handling of their problems by the municipal office, on the other. The local authority in Liberec has shown a high capacity of adaptation to the rapidly changing political and economic environment. Its policy style has been characterized as active, displaying initiative and open both to regional and international co-operation.

Jiří Večerník: Markets and People. The Czech Reform Experience in a Comparative Perspective

Aldershot-Brookfield (USA)-Hong Kong-Singapore-Sydney, Avebury 1996, 294 pp.

Jiří Večerník's *Markets and People* based on the experience of the Czech social and economic reform is a new sociological book of Czech origin published in English, and thus accessible to the international professional community.

The text is divided into an introduction and five parts: the labour market and earnings, income differentiation and poverty, households as consumers and capitalists, escape from socialist paternalism, and economic reform and political behaviour.

The book represents a work in several respects not only unique in the Czech sociological output after 1989, but in the whole of the post-war period. It is namely one of a few scientific monographs dealing with a special topic, based on a long-lasting and systematic theoretical and empirical study of a clearly defined subject. In the field of (very largely conceived) economic sociology accompanied by extensive incursions into social policy it must be considered a pioneer work in the field of Czech sociology, while many economists will also welcome it as a contribution to their discipline. Some of the themes discussed in the book are seriously dealt with for the first time in Czech sociological literature. Its contents create a dignified sociological pendant and accompaniment to the existing, though not sufficiently synthesizing, Czech literature on economic transformation. It is also evident that the work is informed by more general 'transformation' and in particular 'modernisation' literature.

Regarding the scientific nature of the monograph, Večerník demonstrates a good knowledge and use of current domestic and foreign literature, the extensive application of empirical data of many types coming from a whole range of the author's own work, originally conceived surveys, from statistics, secondary analyses of other empirical research, from literary sources, as well as from the current day-to-day situation and its reflection in daily information and standard journalistic production. Quantitative sociological and statistical data are elaborated and used on a good methodological level, applying sophisticated multivariation analyses, and clearly presented in tables and graphs.

With regard to the scientific nature of Večerník's study some unconventional traits may be noted, the first of these being the concrete historical approach by means of which he realises his 'comparative perspective'. Practically everything in this book is discussed in contra-position and/or in understanding of analogies and relations to the former state socialist system; to other societies going through similar processes of post-communist transformation; as well as to the contemporary advanced Western societies. Taking into account the systematic critical analysis of the ongoing changes, which represents the essence of the book, along with the constant attention devoted to the unfinished processes – this all without outlining any apodictic 'one-way' prognoses – we come to the conclusion that the topic is theoretically reproduced as social change, as historical transformation of the Czech economy and society. There are not so many works which could compete in this respect, either in the Czech Republic or in other post-communist countries.

The only possible reservation in this connection concerns the brief passages dealing with the retrospective evaluation of the social and economic aspects of state socialism. J Večerník has been one of the pioneers of empirical sociology since the 1960s and he knows intimately the problems of 'really existing socialism'. That is why he is able to characterise the nature of this system far more plastically than most of the younger domestic scientists and the majority of foreign ones. We may recall in this connection his pioneering work in revealing the egalitarianism and anti-meritocratism typical of state socialism. This time, however, he did not fully avoid somewhat declarative characteristics of the social and economic forms of the state socialist system; it seems that to a too large extent he abstracted from the whole complex of their genetic and causal linkages and historical metamorphoses. Let us hope that he returns in the future to this

topic in a more detailed special study. The undisputable influence of the 'legacy of communism', mainly of the economic etatism and income egalitarianism, on the present situation directly calls for a more concrete analysis of this recent past.

The second unconventional and positive trait of the author's scientific methodology is the obvious fact that he did not become a slave to his own inductive generalisations as well as to the concepts, theories and ideologies formulated by various authorities. Both the data obtained and the conceptual and methodological apparatus taken from world sociology and economy serve him only as instruments in how to arrive at his own interpretations, generalisations and evaluations, by which he reacts to the various facts fixed both by his own research and by other sources. Thus he attains a serious knowledge of the concrete historical reality. In this respect, it is a well-founded sober work, certainly engaged, but exclusively in the sense of a well-intended scientific contribution to the better future of the author's own society.

The third explicit unconventional trait of the monograph is the systematic confrontation of the objectively stated behavioural data, and the subjective attitudes and strategies of the behaviour of the population. (It concerns primarily the economic strategies of households and the evaluation of living standards in public opinion.) It is quite logical that this approach led the author to the analysis of political orientations and preferences. In the chapter devoted to these issues, he used information on political attitudes from January 1996 and the development of political preferences until mid-1996. However, he did not have the opportunity to use later data and thus present more recently developed interpretations corresponding to more significant turns in the attitudes of the Czech population than he presupposed (including their objective reasons, consisting of quite specific developments of social differentiation and mobility, both individual and collective).

A rich and many-sided description of public attitudes demonstrates, on the one hand, that people, though with some delay, tend from the first strongly ideologically influenced orientations to more rational attitudes to social reality. On the other hand, the same description offers enough material to understand that there exists a certain tension between the objective positions of people and their subjective perceptions. This is traditionally valid for all kinds of self-ranking, in the framework of which the subjective perception very substantially differs from reality. J. Večerník shows this distinctly when analysing the disparities between the objective and subjective indicators of poverty. In this case a group of people always appears who consider themselves to be poor, although this is not true from the point of view of the objective indicators. This perhaps calls for the rethinking of the question of if the 'measuring' of poverty prevailingly on the basis of income differentiation adequately shows different aspects of this phenomenon. Another example of the tension between the objective and subjective aspects of social processes is a certain delay in the shifts in political preferences when compared to the real changes in social and economic positions. This phenomenon could be explained as a consequence of the time necessary for acquiring, participating in, and becoming aware of the objective changes.

The author himself points out some other methodological principles applied in the book. In the first place his endeavour to interconnect the micro- and macro-structural approach, in the second, the combination of the analysis on the level of individuals and families, and on that of institutions. We could add to this that, according to his own statement, the view 'from below', that is from the microstructure of individuals and households, is dominant in the study. This means that the macrostructural economic and sociological analysis (e.g. from the point of view of possible various strategies of the economic reform, as well as from the angle considering other possibilities of social stratification and class-structure developments) can be accomplished on the basis of data concerning individuals and households critically analysed. The stress laid on the view 'from below', however, is undoubtedly a clear-cut specific and positive contribution of Večerník's analyses. In no place in the book can one find the naive image of a possibility to put through – without any modifications – the patterns elaborated by elites against the objectively-based social experience of the population.

This monograph is certainly an outstanding work in the Czech context. However, it can also stand a severe evaluation from the point of view of wider European standards. It means not only a valuable contribution to the existing knowledge concerning a country undergoing an interesting course of transformation. By its subject, conception, complexity of contents and methods, and theoretical and methodological level it fits well into the European context, being able to complete and correct the hitherto dominant influence of the knowledge accumulated and presented by German, Polish and Hungarian sociologists, by the general theoretical and methodological insights this work brings.

There remain several comments with regard to problems, the exposition of which may evoke new incentives for further consideration.

As far as the labour market in the Czech Republic is concerned, for the time being, only the first steps have been taken towards its full emergence. The same goes for the assertion of meritocratic principles, which are usually seen as an attribute of developed labour markets. Among the factors which hampered these processes – along with other connections (e.g. when analysing the earnings differentiation) – the deliberate policy of the Czech government should be noted. The government clearly – and to some extent justifiably – preferred to avoid the possible dissatisfaction of the lower classes rather than (a) a more rapid increase of competition among enterprises (with inevitable consequences in the form of bankruptcies, unemployment and decline in living standards), (b) concurrent adequate investments and wage increases in the quaternary sector of the budget sphere. On the other hand, it allowed (in this case less justifiably) an inadequate improvement of material conditions and earnings in directly or indirectly state-controlled finance and insurance, and in a section of the administration. All this is partly discussed in the text but a clear and direct statement concerning the main reason for these phenomena is lacking.

In the otherwise very good and informative part dealing with privatisation there is not to be found an explicit analysis of the very important issue of the illegal and/or immoral acquisition of capital, which might raise the question of the class-ascriptive and meritocratic aspects of the emerging social and economic differentiation.

The interesting and inspiring chapter on the middle class could be formulated more distinctly in connection with the lagging of the part of this class employed in the budget sphere behind the social and economic position which the 'new middle class' should attain in an advanced society. This is actually the most important deviation of the Czech transformation from the liberal-meritocratic model with significant consequences for political behaviour.

Generally speaking, all such reservations and suggestions represent only a mention of certain points to be discussed in connection with an outstanding work, one indisputably enriching the Czech sociological literature and contributing to the cognition of both Czech and other similar European societies under transformation.

Pavel Machonin

Jaroslav Krejčí, Pavel Machonin: Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992. A Laboratory for Social Change

Houndmills and London, MacMillan Press Ltd., St Anthony's Series 1996, 266 p.

The 1992 division of Czechoslovakia, historically still a fresh event, has not only given political scientists the task of accounting for the immediate circumstances, impulses, and consequences (actual or potential) of the split. With some distance, it has also presented historians with the challenge to reflect upon the relatively brief lifetime of the Czechoslovak state. This challenge is all the more compelling, if we consider all the kinds of historical turbulence that the state went through during the short period of its existence. Krejčí and Machonin's book takes up this challenge, and it does so from a particular point of view.

As the subtitle suggests, the viewpoint is that of social science. Yet it should be noted from the first that this treatise is not based on a particular sociological theory or paradigmatic

explanatory model, neither does it aspire to building any new one. Although neither of the authors is a historian by profession, their text – while pursuing sociologically relevant issues – still retains the character of rather a historical account. It builds on what are called 'hard facts', which are presented without being filtered through or subject to a general and systematic sociological concept. The information is conveyed to the reader in a text that is not overburdened with theoretical sociological terminology we might expect from such authors as Giddens or Sztompka, the latter representing one of the major figures in the field that Krejčí and Machonin address in their book – that of the problem of social change. In other words, Krejčí and Machonin do not take Czechoslovakia just as an illustration – i.e. as a historical case through which to test the explanatory power of a theoretical sociological paradigm. Their primary subject is Czechoslovakia itself and certain important aspects of the country's development, not the theory of social change.

It is necessary to mention the sociologically relevant issues the authors pursue in their book. The basic orientation is provided by the formal arrangement of the text, which is divided into three major parts: the first two ('Ethnopolitics' and 'The Economic Context') are written by Jaroslav Krejčí, and the third ('Social Metamorphoses') by Pavel Machonin.

The first part looks at the 74-year history of Czechoslovakia from the viewpoint of the nationality issues. Here the exceptional character of the Czechoslovak 20th century 'experiment' becomes particularly apparent. It is demonstrated that various sorts of national tensions and attempts at their resolution significantly marked Czechoslovak history and politics from its creation in 1918, to its end in 1992 when the state was divided as a result such tensions. The text starts with a sketch of the complicated ethnic or national composition of the East Central European region before 1918, as the historical context from which the country arose. It then focuses upon classifying and characterising the major inter-ethnic and inter-national relations (tensions) within the multinational state. Here the country's development is followed predominantly through its political history. Occasional remarks on differences in social conditions and cultural backgrounds of different national and ethnic groups serve especially to explain the motives and consequences of political measures taken (by various kinds of political actors and in various regimes) in order to re-form relations, that is to cope with actual or potential tensions, among those groups. From the sociological point of view, this part of the book not only grounds its argument in a great many relevant statistical figures. It also points to some differences in status – both political and social – that the different 'minorities' (Slovak, Hungarian, German, Jewish, Gypsy, etc.) acquired in various stages of the Czechoslovak state.

To some extent, the national issue is extrapolated into the second part of the book as well. This part deals with the issue of the economy, accentuating different starting positions as well as different courses of economic development particularly between the Czech and the Slovak parts of the country. (A special chapter is devoted to 'the role of the economy in Slovakia's nation-building.') On the other hand, the description of the economic development shows the country's embeddedness in a wider international context along a somewhat different line than the previous part. It reflects upon the high credit that socialist ideas enjoyed in this part of the world after both World Wars, and which affected the ways in which the economy was consolidated after these wars (with some liberalising tendencies towards the end of the 1920s). The events that disrupted these consolidating processes – the world economic crisis of the early 1930s, the German occupation of 1939-1945, and the Communist take-over of 1948 – all represent more direct (and also powerful) political impacts on domestic economic development coming from the international environment. Besides providing a concise account of the economic policies implemented in and by various political regimes, this part of the book also provides basic information on the developments in incomes, growth or decline of production, the changing character of industry, and so on. In doing so, it prepares the ground for the last part, discussing the changes in social structure that accompanied – as both consequences and sources – the national tensions and economic developments.

Machonin's contribution – which represents more than half of the whole text – thus stands as a kind of sociological consummation of the preceding parts of the book. Again firmly anchored in available sociological and statistical data, it describes the dynamics of "class structure and/or stratification, and other social factors influencing or attending the changes in vertical structures in the Czech and Slovak republics." (p.114) Class structure or stratification is then followed predominantly along the social-economic criteria and characteristics of various social groups of the population. Thus, for example, when the text speaks about lifestyle patterns (p. 179ff.), it rather describes the structure of Czechoslovak society according to patterns of material consumption (which of course can more easily be grounded in 'hard data': how much people spend and on what). It is social-economic characteristics (e.g. the distribution of the economically active population among the major sectors of the economy) that also serve in the description of differences in the class structure and social stratification dynamics among different national communities, particularly between Czechs and Slovaks. In this line, egalitarian tendencies between 1948 and 1989, as well as the counter-egalitarian movements after 1989 are also brought up in the text.

To conclude, a general observation is that readers seeking reliable historical information will probably be more satisfied than those eager for more speculative sociological interpretations. The text is sober, disciplined, and the sociological explanations of national, economic, and social events or tendencies are well aware of their limits, which are drawn by attainable relevant sociological information.

Radim Marada

ISA Regional Conferences

The author of this brief information had towards the end of 1996 the opportunity to take part in two of a whole series of regional conferences organised by the International Sociological Association in co-operation with some national sociological associations as a part of the preparative work for the World Congress of Sociology in Toronto, 1998. The main purpose of these meetings is to stimulate the initiative of the member associations and of the individual sociologists in developing empirical and theoretical sociology on a level corresponding to the significant historical changes in both world society and the regions of which it consists. It is hoped that these activities will assist in limiting certain stereotypes in sociological research, partly caused by the quantitative prevalence and great theoretical and methodological influence of North American sociology.

One of these was the regional colloquium *The Future of Sociology in Eastern Asia* (Seoul, November 1996) the character of which distinctly corresponded to this intention.

The conference was attended by many sociologists from many countries of the region. The papers encompassed contributions of authors coming from the Korean Republic, Japan, continental China, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and the USA. The guests from the USA, Singapore, India and Czech Republic contributed to the discussion. It is obvious from the list of countries that the representatives of the 'Asian Tigers,' i.e. societies undergoing rapid modernisation accompanied by extraordinary economic successes, dominated at the colloquium. The search for effective ways to help the rapidly developing East Asian sociology (including sociology in continental China, represented by the contributions of Ma Rong and Huang Pin and, of course, the traditionally advanced Japanese sociology, represented by the presentations of Kokichi Shoji, Hashizume Daizabura and Shurijo Yazawa) face this sudden shift in the historical developments of social reality was significant for the course of the conference discussions.

The introductory speech of Prof. I. Wallerstein, the President of the ISA, opened the crucial discourse by a critical analysis of 'Eurocentrism' (the dominant North American influence inclusive) in sociology. Wallerstein, on the one hand, defended certain universal contributions of 'European' sociological thought, and on the other hand, stated his hitherto prevailing inability to prevent the separation of social science from philosophy and the humanities – i.e. the search for truth from the search for good and beauty, of scientific knowledge from social and political action, and consequently, the insufficient critical approach to the dominating capitalist social and economic system. A series of contributions devoted to the issue of the necessity and forms of the indigenisation of sociology (Kyong-Dong Kim – Korea, Alatas – Singapore, and many others). In most of them, the starting point was the collapse of Marxism, in which some sociologists had seen certain support in the identification of the problems of national liberation and the endeavour of facing backwardness and poverty. Most delegates spoke somewhat sceptically about the role of the European sociological tradition and also the role of the extraordinarily strong influence of American sociology, in which they do not find sufficient inspiration for the solution of their countries' problems. In several contributions the ideas formulated by contemporary European postmodern, or, at least, non-traditional sociology were mentioned with some optimism, mainly in the framework of the theory of 'risk society' and 'reflexive modernisation'. The most elaborated approach to this topic was demonstrated by the Korean sociologist Han in his paper analysing the process of modernisation and the emergence of civic society in his country. His contribution was inspiring for research into similar issues in Europe.

In several papers one had to notice the explicit criticism of excessive universalism, including the tendency to construct general models of the transformations taking place in various East Asian countries (e.g. in the contribution of Lui from Hong-Kong).

Most of the participants in the discussion considered the oriental schools of philosophical and sociological thought, above all Confucianism with its concept of civic society, to be the most hopeful sources of inspiration (Kyong-

Dong Kim, Sug-Man Choe and Hein-Cho from Korea). Much stress was laid on the respect for traditions, experience, and social psychology of the domestic population. The Korean sociologist Lee best summarised the essence of the discussion concerning these issues by his demand that sociology prove its relevance to history, social reality, and concurrently, the inclusion of the region into the global world system.

An analogous regional conference *The Building of an Open Society and the Prospects of Sociology in Eastern and Central Europe* organised in September 1996 in Kraków in Poland, somewhat differed from the model presupposed by the leadership of the ISA. It firstly paid less attention to the issue of the institutionalisation and self-awareness of sociology and, secondly, focusing on the objective processes taking place in the region, used, to a large extent, the external assistance of several Western scholars, and also in the presentations of the regional sociologists quite naturally respected the European context. This fact symbolised the favourable circumstance that the European post-communist transformation has been for several years a subject of interest for a broad circle of social scientists from Western Europe and, of course, from the USA as well – the latter being represented in Kraków by Prof. I. Wallerstein. This scholar, in his historical and geopolitical analysis of the epoch 1917-1991, beginning with the Russian revolution and ending with the collapse of the Russian empire, posed the question of the historical meaning of the subsequent period of democracy, which will be loaded with many new societal problems and inevitable disputes as to their resolution.

It was the crucial, though not explicitly formulated question of the concept of the post-communist evolution in Europe as 'transition' or 'transformation,' which corresponded to the 'all-European' character of the conference. Coenen-Hunter (Switzerland), being fully aware of certain weak points of the 'transition approach' continued in developing it by a sophisticated analysis, applying the concepts of status incongruity, relative deprivation, circulation of élites, and so on. B. Grancelli equally applied to the same process Coleman's theory of 'rational choice'. A clear example of the use of an 'a priori' scenario of the transition according to Brzezinski for the analysis of social changes in Estonia was the paper on the mass-media role prepared by M. Lauristin. In accordance with his former publication, the organiser of the conference, Prof. P. Sztompka from the Jagellonian University in Kraków also supported in his concluding speech the 'transition approach'.

Those who were dealing with the analysis of the real historical processes of the post-communist 'transformations' did so mostly in the framework of the 'modernisation theory'. The well-informed contribution of G. Therborn from Sweden belonged to this type of analysis. He conceived modernisation as an innovative process and laid much stress on the social problems evoked by the contemporary transformations. The Czech case was analysed from the angle of a broadly conceived cultural modernisation by P. Machonin whose abbreviated contribution was published in the last issue of the *Czech Sociological Review* No 2, 1996. The process of modernisation of Slovenian society from the point of view of the role of internal and external factors was the subject of the presentation by M. Novák.

Other contributions to the post-communist transformation stressed, as a rule, partly important aspects of this societal change. M. Marody from Poland in her considerations concerning society after the institutional and political transition focused on the application of the sociological and socio-psychological concept of 'habitus'. Though she herself polemised with the interesting contribution of V. Yadov devoted to the cultural and psychological analysis of the Russian national character, objectively their approaches rather complemented one another.

G. Skapska from Kraków very openly and critically discussed the hitherto insufficiently developed processes of the emergence of civic society. An accomplishment of this stream of thought was a feminist – in the best sense of the word – presentation from M. Jogan from Ljubljana. A. Sulek from Warsaw analysed the role of public opinion surveys in the transformation process. E. Zdravomyslova presented an extensive study on the developments of politi-

cal sociology during the Russian transformation.

Two studies acquired a significant position at the conference, both also dealing with a certain aspect of civic society, namely with the regional or local level of social organisation. M. Illner from Prague contributed an original general analysis of the contradictory process of decentralisation in the post-communist European countries. H. Kubiak, one of the hosts, presented a voluminous, culturally and historically well-founded study – not by chance created in Kraków – about the role and metamorphoses of the interrelations of national states and regions in the process of European integration.

Although these two of the first wave of regional ISA conferences differed in some aspects, they both by their contributions proved the justifiability of the idea of an intentional activation of regional and national sociologies as an important condition for further progress in world sociology. The common feature of both was the stress laid on the close connection of sociology with the analyses and generalisations of the ongoing processes of societal transformation and modernisation.

Pavel Machonin

Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, Austria

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Annotations of works by the team studying social transformation and modernisation, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague

New Books

J. Krejčí and P. Machonin: Czechoslovakia 1918-1992. A Laboratory for Social Change

Houndmills, Basingstoke and London, Macmillan 1996 (in association with St Anthony's College, Oxford); New York, St Martin's Press 1996, 266 pp.

The book is divided into three parts. The first (written by J. Krejčí) on ethnopolitics is devoted to the analysis of the complicated ethnical relationships in pre-war and post-war Czechoslovakia, with the accent on the gradual Slovak emancipation. The second part (by the same author) contains an outline of the economic context of ethnic and social aspects of the development, systematically comparing the situation in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. The third part (by Pavel Machonin) is called "Social Metamorphoses" and covers social and political structural changes in Czech and Slovak societies. As a whole, this monograph brings the first systematic information about the recent history of societal changes in one of the most interesting present-day post-communist countries addressed in English to international specialists.

P. Machonin and M. Tuček (eds.): Česká společnost v transformaci. K proměnám sociální struktury [Czech Society in Transformation. To the Metamorphoses of Social Structure]

Written in Czech with a summary and table of contents in English. Praha, SLON 1996, 364 pp.

This book, written by a team of sociologists of various generations, represents a pendant to the pioneer work of a team led by P. Machonin "Československá společnost" [*Czechoslovak Society. A Sociological Analysis of Social Stratification*] published in 1969. It is based on a comparison of the results of stratification surveys in 1984 and 1993 and many other data, and brings systematic information about all important issues concerning class structure and/or stratification, social mobility, social-psychological perceptions, and factors influencing their developments. Some interest might be evoked by the comparison of the results of the application of internationally used class and status indices and the Czech multidimensional social status construction. The book raises many new questions concerning the present-day problems and further prospects of the post-communist transformation in a once highly developed Central European industrial country.

P. Machonin, P. Šťastnová, P. Kroupa, A. Glasová: Strategie sociální transformace v České republice a jejich úspěšnost v parlamentních volbách 1996 [Strategies of Social Transformation in the Czech Republic and their Results in the 1996 Parliamentary Elections]

Brno, Doplněk 1996, 134 pp.

This book combines the approaches typical of both sociology and political science. It is based on a theoretical definition of possible and more or less probable tendencies of social developments in Czech post-communist society, and corresponding strategies of social and political actors. These are concretised and illustrated by means of the statements of their top representatives and of their programme concerning two points: the evaluation of the achievements of the transformation, and the vision of the future. On the basis of this qualitative analysis, a prognosis about the prospects of the strategies to be applied in societal reality is formulated. Finally, this is confronted with the quantitative analysis of the results of the Czech parliamentary elections in 1996 and the social composition of the electorates supporting the institutional representatives of the most important strategies.

Some Recent Working Papers of the Institute of Sociology, AS CR in Prague

M. Tuček: Zpráva o vývoji sociální struktury české a slovenské společnosti 1945-1993 [A Report on the Developments of Social Structure in Czech and Slovak Societies 1945-1993]

WP 96/6, 80 pp.

The paper represents an original overview of data from both sociological and statistical sources concerning the changes in: class structure, economic activity and its branches and occupational structure, structure of educational background, characteristics of political elites, material standards of households and structure of leisure activities, and in distribution of multidimensional social status indices.

P. Machonin: Socio-Economic Changes in the Czech Republic, with an Appendix Concerning the 1996 Election Results

WP 96/10, 39 pp.

A sociological analysis of the Czech post-communist societal transformation (new elites, social differentiation, new classes, attitudes and political preferences, long-term outlooks – social transformation and modernisation). Presented at an international Friedrich Ebert Foundation conference in Prague in April 1996. The prognosis of political preferences is supplemented by the results of the subsequent Parliamentary elections, which show a satisfactory level of verification.

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