

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW



Fall

2



Volume V, 1997

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

Miloš Havelka, Editor-in-chief

Editorial Board:

Ivo Bayer, *Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Praha*

Lubomír Brokl, *Institute of Sociology AS CR, Praha*

Jiří Buriánek, *Faculty of Philosophy, Charles University, Praha*

Martin Bůtora, *Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Praha*

Michal Illner, *Institute of Sociology AS CR, Praha*

Jiří Kabele, *Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Praha*

Jaroslav Kapr, *Institute of Social Sciences, University of Silesia, Opava*

Petr Matějů, *Institute of Sociology AS CR, Praha*

Ivo Možný, *Faculty of Philosophy, Masaryk University, Brno*

Jiří Musil, *Central European University, Praha*

Miloslav Petrusek, *Charles University, Praha*

Ladislav Rabušic, *Faculty of Philosophy, Masaryk University, Brno*

Jan Sedláček, *Faculty of Philosophy, Charles University, Praha*

Oto Sedláček, *Praha*

Jadwiga Šanderová, *Institute of Sociological Studies, FSS CU, Praha*

Jiří Večerník, *Institute of Sociology AS CR, Praha*

Jitka Stehlíková, *Managing Editor*; Mark Worthington, *English Editor*;

Jiří Voženílek, *Copy Editor*; Táňa Váchová, *Editorial Assistant*.

Czech Sociological Review (ISSN 1210-3861). Is published half-yearly. Orders can be placed with Sociological Review, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic.

The *Czech Sociological Review* is cited in the *Current Contents / Social & Behavioral Sciences (CC/S&BS)*, the *Social SciSearch* online database and the *Research Alert* current awareness, publications of the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI), USA.

One issue costs \$ 20 (30 DM) for institutions, \$ 17 (25 DM) for individuals, and \$ 13 (20 DM) for students.

Sociologický časopis (ISSN 0038-0288). Is published quarterly in Czech with abstracts and summaries of articles in English by the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Both reviews are printed by the Institute of Nuclear Information.

Podávání novinových zásilek povoleno ŘPP Praha, čj. 1043/95 ze dne 20. 3. 1995.

© Sociologický ústav AV ČR, Praha.

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

VOLUME V – 1997

Editor:
Miloš Havelka

Editorial Board:
Ivo Bayer, Lubomír Brokl, Jiří Buriánek, Martin Bútor, Michal Illner, Jiří Kabele, Jaroslav Kapr, Petr Matějů, Ivo Možný, Jiří Musil, Miloslav Petrusek, Ladislav Rabušic, Jan Sedláček, Oto Sedláček, Jadwiga Šanderová, Jiří Večerník

Managing Editor:
Jitka Stehlíková

English Editor:
Mark Worthington

Address of Editor's Office:
Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1
Phone: + 42 2 24 22 08 42
Fax: + 42 2 24 22 02 78
E-mail: sreview@soc.cas.cz

© Institute of Sociology AS CR, Prague

ISSN 1210-3861

ARTICLES

<i>Ferge, Z.</i> : Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe. The 'Old Left' and the 'New Right'	2/159
<i>Havelka, M., Müller, K.</i> : Radicalised Transformation, the Institutional Tensions and Modernisation Challenges	2/179
<i>Hubík, S.</i> : Mass Bricolage as a Source of an Alternative Education	1/57
<i>Marada, R.</i> : Civil Society: Adventures of the Concept before and after 1989	1/3
<i>Musil, J.</i> : Potentials and Limits of Prague's Future in the Context of Long-Term Development	1/23
<i>Novák, M.</i> : Is There One Best 'Model of Democracy'? Efficiency and Representativeness: 'Theoretical Revolution' or Democratic Dilemma?	2/131
<i>Róbert, P.</i> : Social Determination of Living Conditions in Post-Communist Societies	2/197
<i>Vlachová, K.</i> : Czech Political Parties and their Voters	1/39

ESSAY

<i>Havelka, M.</i> : The Czech Transformation – The Universal and the Particular	1/73
--	------

FROM SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS

<i>Kuchař, P.</i> : Working Conditions as Perceived by the Employed. A West-Central-East Europe View	2/217
<i>Nedomová, A., Kostecký, T.</i> : The Czech National Identity	1/79

RELATED DISCIPLINES

<i>Fialová, L., Kučera, M.</i> : The Main Features of Population Development in the Czech Republic during the Transformation of Society	1/93
---	------

REVIEWS

<i>J. Večerník</i> : Markets and People (P. Machonin)	1/113
<i>J. Krejčí, P. Machonin</i> : Czechoslovakia, 1918-1992. A Laboratory for Social Change (R. Marada)	1/115

NEWS AND INFORMATION

ISA Regional Conferences (P. Machonin)	1/119
On Sociological Classics in St. Petersburg (P. Machonin)	2/235
The Report on the Conference "Parliaments of Central European Countries in the Process of Incorporation into the European Union" (Z. Mansfeldová)	2/237

ANNOTATIONS

Annotations of works by the team studying social transformation and modernisation, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague (P. Machonin)	1/123
--	-------

DOCUMENT

Simmel and Masaryk (M. Petrussek)	2/239
T. G. Masaryk: Simmels Soziologie	2/249





ARTICLES

- Miroslav Novák: Is There One Best 'Model of Democracy'? Efficiency and Representativeness: 'Theoretical Revolution' or Democratic Dilemma?* 131
- Zsuzsa Ferge: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe. The 'Old Left' and the 'New Right'* 159
- Miloš Havelka, Karel Müller: Radicalised Transformation, the Institutional Tensions and Modernisation Challenges.....* 179
- Péter Róbert: Social Determination of Living Conditions in Post-Communist Societies* 197

FROM SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS

- Pavel Kuchař: Working Conditions as Perceived by the Employed. A West-Central-East Europe View.....* 217

NEWS AND INFORMATION

- On Sociological Classics in St. Petersburg (P. Machonin)* 235
- The Report on the Conference "Parliaments of Central European Countries in the Process of Incorporation into the European Union" (Z. Mansfeldová).....* 237

DOCUMENT

- Simmel and Masaryk (M. Petrušek).....* 239
- T. G. Masaryk: Simmels Soziologie.....* 249

Sociologický časopis (ISSN 0038-0288) vydává čtvrtletně a **CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW** (ISSN 1210-3861) pololetně Sociologický ústav Akademie věd ČR.

Cíl a poslání

Sociologický časopis je vědecká revue otevřená odborným a společenským problémům, sociologické teorii a metodologii, přinášející výsledky a interpretace sociologických výzkumů. Zaměřuje se na rozvoj oboru a jeho výuku a zároveň chce být užitečný při řešení praktických problémů české sociální a ekonomické politiky.

Nabídka rukopisů

Redakce přijímá originál a dvě dobře čitelné kopie, které neobsahují jméno ani pracoviště autora, lektorské řízení je oboustranně anonymní. V průvodním dopise uveďte úplnou kontaktní adresu včetně telefonního čísla. Nabídnout rukopis jinému časopisu, zatímco je posuzován našim časopisem, je považováno za neetické.

Formát rukopisu: Rukopisy musí být psány na stroji nebo tištěny na tiskárně počítače a musí splňovat ČSN 88 0220 (úprava rukopisů pro sazbu), tj. řádkování 2, 60 úhozů na řádce, 30 řádek na stránce A4. Tabulky, grafy a obrázky jsou přiloženy za textem. Stati, výzkumné a metodologické texty do 20 stran, recenze do 7 stran, zprávy a informace do 5 stran, anotace 1 strana.

Rozhodnutí o vydání: Rozhodnutí je autorovi sděleno do jednoho měsíce od data přijetí rukopisu. Je-li rukopis přijat, je autor vyzván, aby dodal konečnou verzi rukopisu, jednak na papíře a zároveň na disketě formátu IBM PC, a to buď jako textový soubor ASCII, v kódové tabulce bratří Kamenických nebo Latin2, nebo jako textový soubor ANSI v kódové tabulce ISO 1250. Rukopis obsahuje vedle vlastního textu *abstrakt* (20 řádků), *summary* (80 řádků) a *název stati v angličtině a češtině, abecední seznam literatury a stručnou informaci o autorovi*. Redakce provádí jazykovou úpravu textu. Větší úpravy textu redakce bez souhlasu autora neprovádí.

Adresa redakce: Sociologický časopis, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, 1. patro, místnost 106, telefon (02) 24 22 08 42, (02) 24 22 09 79, 93, 97, 1.283, 294, fax (02) 24 22 02 78, E-mail sreview@soc.cas.cz. Návštěvní dny v redakci pondělí a čtvrtek 10-16 hod.

Sociologický časopis (Sociological Review) (ISSN 0038-0288) is published quarterly in Czech with abstracts and article summaries in English. The **CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW** (ISSN 1210-3861) is published biannually in English by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Science of the Czech Republic. Both are printed by the Institute of Nuclear Information. **Postmaster:** Send address changes to the Sociological Review, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic.

Scope and Mission

The **CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW** is a scholarly review open to the discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

Manuscript Submission

The editors require an original and two legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the reading process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the **CSR** is deemed unethical.

Manuscript format: Manuscripts must be typed or computer printed (12-point type preferred), double-spaced, with 60 columns (characters) per line, 30 lines to an A4 page. The maximum length of research and methodological essays is 20 pages, 7 pages for reviews, 5 pages for news or information, and 1 page for annotations.

Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within one month from the date of your manuscript's arrival at the **CSR** office. If your manuscript is accepted you will be asked to submit your final version both on paper and on a microcomputer floppy disk, either in ASCII or ANSI text-only file. IBM disks are acceptable. The final version should also include a twenty-line abstract and an eighty-line summary, an alphabetized bibliography and basic, relevant curriculum vitae.

Is There One Best 'Model of Democracy'?

Efficiency and Representativeness: 'Theoretical Revolution' or Democratic Dilemma?

MIROSLAV NOVÁK**

Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Abstract: One element in the choice of a constitutional design or model of democracy is the criterion of efficiency. Different political scientists, however, understand the word 'efficiency' in different ways. The author suggests a distinction between its two main meanings: (1) efficiency-action capacity and (2) effectiveness-socio-economic performance. It is not just socio-economic effectiveness that is important, but also political efficiency-action capacity. Efficiency-action capacity is closely linked with the theory of democracy put forward by Schumpeter and adopted by the majority of political scientists today. Thus efficiency is essential not only for the government (in that it simplifies the operation of power) but also, and even more importantly, for the governed, for the citizens (in that it simplifies the choice and peaceful removal of the rulers, i.e. the executive).

Czech Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 5 (No. 2: 131-157)

"The problem then is always to find the form most appropriate to the circumstances. Reasonable people may disagree on what is most appropriate in particular circumstances. But so long as they agree that no one form is suitable for all circumstances they stand some chance of finding a form of authority suitable for the particular circumstances." [Dahl 1990: 75]

Introduction

The recent third wave of democratisation has forced – or at least encouraged – political scientists to deeper investigations of both constitutional choices (a majoritarian electoral system or proportional representation, parliamentary government or presidential government, etc.) and of more general questions such as what model of democracy (e.g. majoritarian or consensual) should be recommended for countries in the process of democratisation [see e.g. Lijphart 1991a, 1992a, 1992b, 1994c: 151-152]. Some political scientists, including Juan J. Linz [1990], recommend parliamentary rather than presidential government, while Arend Lijphart opts for the consensus model of democracy rather

*) This article is a fully reworked version of my article published in French in the *Revue internationale de politique comparée* in 1996 [see Novák 1996]. After my French article was published, various other texts appeared on the problem [e.g. Lijphart 1997, Crepaz 1996 and Kaiser 1997]. In addition I discovered the important work of Giovanni Sartori [1994c] and some other unpublished manuscripts of his [Sartori 1995, 1996]. I would also like to thank all those who sent me their written comments on my earlier article (particularly Yves Schemeil), and those who sent me their texts. I would also like to thank both anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

**) Direct all correspondence to Miroslav Novák, PhD., Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Ovocný trh 3, CZ-116 36 Prague 1, Czech Republic, fax + 420 2 26 09 21, e-mail novak@s.fsv.cuni.cz

than the majoritarian one, etc.. This article is primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with models of democracy (and in this context particularly electoral systems) and in conclusion looks at the application of the alternatives discussed in three post-communist countries of East Central Europe (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic).¹

One of the elements in the choice of a constitutional design or model of democracy is the criterion of efficiency. Different political scientists, however, understand the word 'efficiency' in different ways. The definition most commonly given in political science literature is action capacity, the capacity to act. A government is efficient in so far as it has a free hand in pursuing its policies. A second meaning of the term (effectiveness) concerns the capacity to achieve the government's socio-economic aims. In this article the first meaning, i.e. action capacity, is generally used.²

The relevant literature sometimes moves backwards and forwards between the two meanings of efficiency, almost without noticing, which in no way contributes to the clarity of the debate. There is no essential relationship between these two meanings: a government may have free reign in pursuing its policy and still achieve unsatisfactory results, while a government that is lacking in action capacity can be successful in economic or other terms.

Socio-economic Performance and Legitimacy in East Central Europe

The well-known sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset defined the concept of effectiveness in socio-economic rather than political terms: "Effectiveness means actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population and powerful groups within it as big business or the armed forces see them" [Lipset 1981: 64]. Socio-economic effectiveness is basically the same as what Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson term "state performance" [Lane and Ersson 1996], in which they include particularly civil and political rights, welfare spending, income equality, human development and the level of inflation.

As is well known, Lipset placed (socio-economic) *effectiveness* on a level with *legitimacy*. Long term effectiveness, for example, can to some extent compensate for insufficient legitimacy. Strong legitimacy can also compensate for insufficient effectiveness for a certain period of time (as was the case in the first years after the fall of the communist regimes in East Central Europe). If, however, socio-economic ineffectiveness lasts too long, even the highest political legitimacy cannot make up for it. "While effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative", notes Lipset [1981: 64].

For the countries of East Central Europe the economic and political transitions are typically parallel.³ The problem lies basically in the fact that the economic transition (the

¹) A useful introduction to the issues of politics in the post-communist countries of East Central Europe was recently published by Keith Crawford [1996].

²) As I noted in my earlier article [Novák 1996: 690-692], the great American theorist of democracy Robert A. Dahl suggested a distinction between individual effectiveness and collective effectiveness [Dahl 1970, 1990: 77] and in one of his more recent articles [Dahl 1994] he developed this thesis and used it explain the resistance in particularly the smaller countries seeking membership of the European Union. See also Bělohradský [1994].

³) Grzegorz Ekiert [1991: 310-311] noted on this point: "Thus the transition process in East Central Europe implies a parallel effort to establish new democratic institutions and to convert centrally planned and state-owned economies into free market economies. The interaction between the

spread of the market economy) cannot be as fast or as far-reaching as the political transition (the move to democracy).⁴ In Lipset's terminology, this problem can be seen as a relationship between strong (democratic) legitimacy and weaker (socio-economic) effectiveness.

Lipset's affirmation that "what they need above all is efficacy, particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity" [Lipset, Seong et al. 1993: 171], would meet with almost universal agreement. A far more problematic issue – and yet one on which Lijphart rests his hopes – is whether the change in constitutional solutions (particularly the replacement of a majoritarian voting system by proportional representation) will mean an increase in socio-economic effectiveness.

It should perhaps be said that *it is not just socio-economic effectiveness that is important, but also political efficiency-action capacity*. One clear advantage of political efficiency-action capacity is that it is easier to achieve than socio-economic effectiveness (as for example in certain relatively predictable circumstances the move from proportional representation to a majoritarian voting system could mean a fundamental rise in political efficiency-action capacity). Moreover, political efficiency is fundamental to democracy as we conceive it today, and so should be rejected only in exceptional circumstances (when the very survival of democracy is in question).⁵

What Is and What Is Not Efficiency, and What is it Good For?

The first question is what efficiency-action capacity is not. The Russian logician and writer Alexandr Zinoviev suggested making a distinction between negative destructive power and positive creative power. He pointed out that communist power is at one and the same time all-powerful and powerless. It is an exceptionally destructive but only a minimally creative force.⁶

The German liberal economist Wilhelm Röpke, who was one of those who propagated the term "a third way" as far back as the 1930s (which would surprise those Czech

democratisation of the polity and the marketisation of the economy presents a specific problem and creates an additional dimension of conflicts and tensions which are largely absent in classical transitions from authoritarian regimes."

However as Giuseppe Di Palma, in particular, well understood, this does not mean that this has only negative aspects: "The conventional argument is that because in Eastern Europe we have not only a political transition but also a socioeconomic one, this double feat is especially difficult. We may as well argue the opposite. It is precisely the close and unprecedented connection between a political and a socioeconomic transition that, instead of jeopardizing both, may help the latter ride piggyback on the former." [Di Palma 1991: 29]

⁴) This contrast between the speed of democratisation and the slow introduction of the market economy has been stressed by Jacques Rupnik in particular [1993: 406].

⁵) Here it is necessary to consider the first meaning of efficiency.

⁶) "Ибанская власть всеильна, и вместе с тем, бессильна. Она всеильна негативно, т.е. по возможностям безнаказанно делать зло. Она бессильна позитивно, т.е. по возможностям безвозмездно делать добро. Она имеет огромную разрушительную и ничтожную созидательную силу." [Zinoviev 1976a: 330]. The entire idea behind his novel *Zijajuščiye vysoty* is expressed in Zinoviev's non-literary work, where "communist" power takes the place of the "ibanskie" one [Zinoviev 1983: 204]. The same question was considered by Jon Elster [1980] in his 'paper' presented to the world congress of the International Political Science Association in Moscow in 1979, despite some disagreement on the part of the Soviet hosts.

liberals who support the market economy 'without adjectives'), distinguished between the "really strong state" and the "activist state" [Röpke 1943, 1962]. The really strong state is "a state which is able to set precise limits on those areas which it is interested in and which is able to use all its powers to enforce its authority within these areas, but avoids any intervention outside them" [Röpke 1962: 217-218]. A really strong state has the courage to govern but does not intervene in everything and does not want to control everything, while an "activist" state is ultimately only prey to special interests [Röpke 1962: 217]. Sartori echoed this to some degree recently when he noted that "effective government" should not be confused with "activist government".⁷ The latter should be rejected while we should support the former.

Sartori [1987: 122] also warned that a reduction in the power of the rulers does not necessarily mean more power for the ruled, but that it may be a game in which both sides, i.e. the rulers and the ruled, lose. If the power of the government is too limited this may become "an evil which affects the whole life of the collectivity" ("*un mal qui corrompt toute la vie collective*") [Duverger 1988b: 90]. It is a question of overload and ungovernability [see e.g. Crozier, Huntington et al. 1975, Rose 1980 and Dahrendorf 1980].

To turn now to the question of what efficiency-action capacity is, efficiency is closely linked with democracy. It is important not only for the rulers (in that it eases the wielding of power), but also and primarily for the ruled, for citizens (for whom it makes it easier to choose – and peacefully remove – the rulers, i.e. the executives).

In his classic work *The English Constitution*, first published in 1867 (!), Walter Bagehot used efficiency in its first meaning (as political action-capacity) when he described the practical fusion of the executive and the legislature as the "secret" of the efficiency of the English political system: "The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative powers." [Bagehot 1963: 65]. The term efficiency has been used in a similar way by such scholars as Gary Cox [1987], Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey [Shugart and Carey 1992], Raymond Aron [1960, 1965], Maurice Duverger [1982 and 1988b] and Giovanni Sartori [1968, 1994c].

Shugart and Carey [1992: 7-8] explain that "'Efficiency' refers to the ability of elections to serve as a means for voters to identify and choose among the competing government options available to them." It is therefore clear that efficiency "is closely related to identifiability – the ability of voters to identify the choices of competing potential governments that are being presented to them in electoral campaigns" [Shugart and Carey 1992: 8-9].

Therefore, in elections voters (citizens) must be able to either express their support for the existing government or to remove it and replace it with another one. This assumes that there is a reasonably clear difference between the government and the opposition (although there should not be too great an ideological divide). The opposition is concentrated or at least clearly identifiable. For example, in a two-party system, the opposition is almost 'monopolised' by the party which lost the election, just as government is concentrated in the hands of the party which won. A similar situation exists in what Duverger termed apparent – or bipolar – multipartism (which he includes among the

⁷) "The former is a government that has the capacity of implementing the policies that it pursues; but it may expound a non-activist philosophy of government and therefore choose, whenever it so decides, to remain inactive." [Sartori 1994c: 112]

“dualistic systems”⁸); Sartori [1976] calls this “moderate multipartism or limited pluralism”, i.e. bipolar shifts among coalition governments.

Elections in bipolar systems are therefore really decisive. This assumes that there is a real competition which calls for a sufficient level of consensus. The ideological distance between the relevant political parties must not be too great. Voters must be distributed around the centre, as in the normal bell-shaped curve. In other words, public opinion must have a largely unimodal structure [see Dahl 1965].

These wider connections should be borne in mind. It is not simply a case of whether a democratic government is capable of acting or not (even if it is very important, particularly for those countries in the throes of both political and economic transformation, which is the case particularly of the countries of East Central Europe).⁹ The very concept of democracy is of primary importance here, the concept of democracy itself and more precisely what Joseph A. Schumpeter [1962] called “another theory of democracy” (as opposed to the “classical doctrine of democracy”).

Schumpeter gave pride of place to the citizen-voter's function of producing (or giving birth to) the government – whether directly or indirectly,¹⁰ a function which implicitly includes the possibility of recalling that government.¹¹ At the end of each term in office the rulers must submit themselves to the verdict of the citizens as expressed in free

⁸) “*Si deux grandes coalitions permanentes se forment, qui présentent aux électeurs un programme commun et agissent de concert au Parlement, on est très proche des conditions de fonctionnement du bipartisme. Sous l'apparence extérieure d'un multipartisme, on trouve en réalité un dualisme profond*” [Duverger 1988a: 141].

⁹) Some people object that the post-communist political systems need a broad consensus and that a broad (rather than minimal) coalition is the best adapted to this. This is however a misunderstanding. (1) a broad coalition is needed in the initial phase of the post-communist transition when communist power is still a dangerous opponent. In later phases, however, a minimal winning coalition which can more easily carry out the necessary fundamental changes is more appropriate. (2) As Sartori [1994c] and Duverger [1982, 1988b] in particular showed, consensus is necessary for any democracy to function well, not just “consensus” but also “majoritarian” democracy. “Lijphart underestimated the fact that a minimum of consensus is vital to both types of democratic systems.” [Kaiser 1997: 433] Here I would like to refer to the conclusion of my guide to party systems [see Novák 1997a], where I point out that supporters of both models allow for consensus and centre. In majoritarian democracy a minimal coalition can govern without major problems (as can a single-party government) within a two-party system in which the other party forms the opposition) precisely because there is a broad consensus. Minimal coalitions are understandably more likely to be capable of action than are broad coalitions.

¹⁰) “...we now take the view that the role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body which in turn will produce a national executive or government. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.” [Schumpeter 1962: 269]

¹¹) Popper stresses this second main aspect, saying that democracy is not so much “the government of the people” (who do not in fact govern) but a system in which the people can remove a government in an election, i.e. without violence or bloodshed. The proportional representation electoral system, however, makes it more difficult to remove a government from power. Popper therefore criticises proportional representation as he himself stresses, as one of the very practical results of a new way of asking questions [Popper 1992: 4].

and competitive elections which decide whether the current team will be confirmed in office or replaced by another ruling team. In relation to this process, G. Bingham Powell Jr. [1989] spoke of "Citizen Electoral Control".

The majority of political scientists today – including the doyen of American political science Robert Dahl – have implicitly or explicitly accepted Schumpeter's concept of democracy. For the sake of consistency, we should recall what the author of *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* was well aware of and what was radically formulated by another prominent supporter of the contemporary (non-classical) theory of democracy, Karl Popper: that in this case democracy is in no way tied to the principle of proportional representation!¹² In Schumpeter's words, "The principle of democracy then merely means that the reins of government should be handed to those who command more support than do any of the competing individuals or teams. And this in turn seems to assure the standing of the majority system within the logic of the democratic method, although we might still condemn it on grounds that lie outside of that logic" [Schumpeter 1962: 273].

While effectiveness in the socio-economic sense, as Lipset understood it, is linked – if not directly opposed – to legitimacy, *efficiency*-action capacity, as understood by, for example, Bagehot, Duverger, Aron, Sartori, Shugart and Carey, is linked – if not opposed – to *representativeness*. Representativeness may be defined as the ability of elections to articulate and give a voice in the assembly to diverse interests, groups and parties [see e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992: 8]. The English type sacrifices the representativeness of parliament to the need for efficient government, while the continental type sacrifices efficient government to the representativeness of parliament. [Sartori 1968: 469; 1994c: 53; see also Sartori 1995]. Sartori also notes that: "To be sure, in a number of countries one finds a more balanced combination of efficient government and representative representation (for example, the countries having both proportional representation and a relatively limited number of parties, say from three to five). Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of institutional engineering the fact remains that *we cannot build a representational system that maximises at one and the same time the function of functioning and the function of mirroring.*" [Sartori 1968: 469].

This dilemma of efficiency or representativeness was formulated very effectively by Duverger: "A comparative analysis of western regimes reveals an unsurpassable conflict between the expression of opinion and the expression of will. The former requires the presence of many parties in order for every citizen to be able to choose that candidate in an election who is closest to his or her view. It also presupposes the division of seats in parliament in strict proportion to votes cast. The second requires a very different mechanism. For voters to be able to enforce the government which they have selected and for it to be able to function throughout its term in office, there must be few parties, which is able to enforce strict discipline and fall into the bipolar scheme of things. Expressing your opinion means voting for what is desirable. Expressing your will means voting for what is possible. The former is childish, the latter adult, and between the two there is a distance separating the principle of pleasure from that of reality." [Duverger 1988b: 72; cf. also Duverger

¹²) "...before concluding that democracy becomes unworkable if its principle is carried out consistently, it is just as well to ask ourselves whether this principle really implies proportional representation. As a matter of fact it does not. If acceptance of leadership is the true function of the electorate's vote, the case for proportional representation collapses because its premises are no longer binding." [Schumpeter 1962: 272-273]

1982: 247].¹³ Jean Tournon reaches the same conclusion with other words: the more a representative government tries to faithfully represent the various shades of opinion and conflicts, the less it is able to resolve them; the more it governs, the less it represents [Tournon 1985: 108]. Elections should aim to select not a copy of the electorate in miniature, but the holders of legitimate authority [Tournon 1985: 119, 108].

G. B. Powell Jr. reached similar conclusions [Powell 1982 and 1989] as did G. Sartori. If a parliamentary system maximises representativeness through an electoral system of proportional representation, governments will have generally shorter terms and voters will be less able to choose an identifiable executive which will be accountable for its results. Popper [1993: 8] stressed that political responsibility is so paralysed in coalition governments that it is not possible to say who is responsible. It is not hard to find examples that bear out this conclusion...

Did Arend Lijphart Bring a Theoretical Revolution¹⁴ in Political Science?

If we are to accept the main thesis of Lijphart's ambitious 1994 article "Democracies: Forms, Performance and Constitutional Engineering",¹⁵ we could conclude that what we

13) *"L'analyse comparative des régimes d'Occident révèle une contradiction insurmontable entre l'expression des opinions et celle des volontés. La première exige que de nombreux partis s'offrent au vote des citoyens afin que chacun puisse choisir un candidat très proche de ses préférences. Elle implique aussi que les sièges attribués soient exactement proportionnés aux suffrages reçus. La seconde a besoin de mécanismes opposés. Pour que les électeurs puissent imposer le gouvernement de leur choix et qu'il ait le moyen d'agir pendant toute la législature, il faut des partis réduits à un petit nombre, enserrés chacun dans une forte discipline et disposés suivant un schéma bipolaire. Exprimer une opinion, c'est voter pour le souhaitable. Exprimer une volonté, c'est voter pour le possible. Le premier comportement est infantile, le second seul est adulte. Entre eux, il y a toute la distance qui sépare le principe de plaisir du principe de réalité."* [Duverger 1988b: 72; see also Duverger 1982: 247].

14) In the case of Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigm, on which Lijphart openly leans, it is worth taking Popper's critique into account: "One of Kuhn's theses which can be demonstrated from the history of science is that every science is mature when *only one* basic conviction (one basic current) prevails. This is simply not true. History always shows that from Parmenides and Democritus up to Heisenberg and Schrödinger there have been two parallel lines in the theory of matter, or as Kuhn would have it two paradigms, i.e. a 'continuous theory' and a 'discontinuous theory'. These contrasting theories not only refute but also enrich each other. This is a strong argument against Kuhn's theory". [Popper and Lorenz 1985, 1995: 71]. Is there not a similar situation in the conflict between proportional representation and the majoritarian system, between government by a broad centrist coalition without an available alternative and the alternation of two moderate forces? We should not forget the very interesting and surprisingly *actuel* debate (of 1796!) between Benjamin Constant (*De la force du gouvernement actuel de la France et de la nécessité de s'y rallier* 1796) and his brilliant critic Adrien Lazay-Marnesia (*De la faiblesse d'un gouvernement qui commence, et de la nécessité où il est de se rallier à la majorité nationale* 1796). This "wonderfully modern" (P. Raynaud) discussion is analysed by Maurice Duverger in his noteworthy work *La nostalgie de l'impuissance* [Duverger 1988b: 196-201].

15) Lijphart considers, as he writes in the "abstract", that "if its validity is confirmed (...) it has great practical significance for the future of democracy in the world" [Lijphart 1994a: 1]. Lijphart's article was also highly regarded by the editors of the *European Journal of Political Research*, which published it in 1994, as it was one of the subjects considered in their Special Issue on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary in 1997, with selections and comments (see EJPR 31: 193-204, 1997). Manfred G. Schmidt started his commentary on Lijphart's article (Nomination: Arguments in favour of 'Democracies...') with the words: "Arend Lijphart's 'Democracies:

had learnt from Sartori, Duverger and Powell, i.e. that it is necessary to choose between efficiency and representativeness, is only "conventional wisdom" which is not borne out by reality. According to Lijphart, the consensus model of democracy ensures both representativeness and probably effectiveness.

Lijphart only reached this 'revolutionary'¹⁶ conclusion at the cost of confusion and half-truths. The first and most fundamental of these is an unnoticed shift from the meaning that 'conventional wisdom' ascribes to the term efficiency, to the second, i.e. from government action-capacity to socio-economic performance. He is therefore fighting windmills: 'conventional wisdom' generally limits itself – very wisely – to contrasting representativeness and efficiency-action capacity! And even if in the past the socio-economic performance of a country as action-capable as Great Britain has not been exceptional, Raymond Aron in his time replied to this that political regimes are only one of the factors of the effectiveness or otherwise of the government of a country [Aron 1965: 159]¹⁷ and that countries where political institutions function well can commit greater mistakes in the economic field than those where political institutions function less well [Aron 1965: 165-166].¹⁸

Aron put this very well in his lecture "Les institutions politiques de l'Occident dans le monde du XXe siècle": "In the case of efficiency, this is to be seen from the stability of the government and the consistency of the [governing] majority. This does not rule out mistakes (...), but does rule out the inability to choose. Democracy (...) is efficient when the legal competition produces a

Forms, performance, and constitutional engineering' is an outstanding contribution to political science." (EJPR 31: 193, 1997). I would like to thank Professor Manfred G. Schmidt (University of Heidelberg, Germany) for having sent me an offprint from this Special Issue. André Kaiser [1997: 432] writes that: "With the partial exception of Giovanni Sartori [1987: 238-240; 1994: 69-72], no-one to date has critically discussed the conceptual merits of Lijphart's proposal." It was a similar impression that led me to write my earlier article [see Novák 1996].

¹⁶) It is also worth noting Lijphart's 1994 article, inspired by Samuel E. Finer's later writings. There Lijphart claims that the theory that the consensus model (particularly its important elements such as the proportional representation electoral system) is justified not only by the argument of electoral justice, but also by that of effectiveness, and so represents a "theoretical revolution", as Thomas S. Kuhn understands it [Lijphart 1994b: 623]. The question is why. For Lijphart it is a fundamental attack on a strongly and widely accepted theoretical paradigm, i.e. against the paradigm which says that proportional representation best ensures the representation of minorities, but that the majoritarian system best ensures the effectiveness of the government. The 'traditional' argument of better minority representation, which is often put forward in support of the consensus model (and particularly in support of proportional representation) is by no means revolutionary. Arend Lijphart [1994b: 625] did not hesitate to term it so, while Sir Arthur Lewis stresses that multi-ethnic societies need a democracy so that all ethnic groups have proportional access to power and so presumes a proportional representation electoral system [Lewis 1965: 71, 79]. Lijphart himself uses the argument of better minority representation as one of the key criteria for judging all types of democratic state (not only for those which are divided in ethnic, religious, linguistic or other terms, for which this argument is undeniably valid) and even expresses his surprise that S. E. Finer did not use Lewis' argument to complement his theory! [see Lijphart 1994b: 625-626].

¹⁷) "...les régimes ne sont qu'un des facteurs de l'efficacité ou de l'inefficacité des gouvernements ou des pays" [Aron 1965: 159].

¹⁸) "Des pays où les institutions fonctionnent bien (...) ont commis des erreurs de gestion énormes et peut-être des pays où les institutions fonctionnaient normalement moins bien, ont-ils commis moins d'erreurs." [Aron 1965: 165-166].

majority, a government, a will; when the law of the majority produces an executive able to act..." [Aron 1960: 13].

Aron's compatriot Duverger expressed this same idea even more clearly: "A decisive Europe (i.e. those European countries which are action-capable – M. N.) is not a Europe in which decisions are good, but one where it is possible to make decisions, whether good or bad, on important affairs and other matters." [Duverger 1988b: 91-92].¹⁹

Thus a government which can act quickly and make rapid decisions need not always choose the solutions which turn out to be the best in the long term. Lijphart uses this fact to heap praise on the benefits of long and complicated procedures which he claims will help avoid mistakes. There is nothing new in this argument: it has raised its head in the debate between unicameralism or bicameralism in unitary states (as no-one denies the advantages of bicameralism in federal states). Lijphart adopts the arguments of the supporters of bicameralism.²⁰ Moreover, with reference to Samuel E. Finer [Finer 1975] he emphasises that the alternation of governments of differing orientation which is typical of majoritarian democracies can lead to overly frequent and abrupt changes in economic policy, while effective macro-economic management requires stable, steady policies rather than heavy handed ones [Lijphart 1994a: 12].

It is not difficult to argue against this. In the case of parliaments, their main drawback is that they tend to be slow and drawn-out, cumbersome rather than rash.²¹ It can be said that a bad decision taken in time is better than no decision and even than the right decision taken too late.

Finally – and it is important in distinguishing between the consensual and majoritarian models of democracy – the alternation of governments in majoritarian democracies does not generally lead to dramatic shocks or about-turns which could endanger the normal progress of economic policy.²² It is in fact those democracies which are termed

¹⁹ "L'Europe de la décision n'est pas celle où l'on décide bien. Elle est celle où l'on peut décider, bien ou mal, dans les affaires importantes comme dans les autres" [Duverger 1988b: 91-92]. Like Duverger, another French political scientist and constitutional lawyer, Olivier Duhamel, says: "Il serait évidemment absurde de prétendre que les pays du premier groupe [à système majoritaire] se portent comme un charme et que ceux du second [à système non majoritaire] agonisent. Il n'en demeure pas moins vrai que dans le premier groupe les citoyens décident qui gouverne et pour quoi, tandis que dans le second les électeurs désignent ceux qui choisiront à leur place les gouvernants et les options politiques. Dans le premier cas l'exigence majoritaire permet l'exercice de responsabilité [acomptabilité] politique, dans le second l'éparpillement partisan entretient la confiscation représentative du pouvoir." [Duhamel 1995: 29].

²⁰ Bicameralism is also one of the characteristics of his consensus model. Among the "nine (contrasting) characteristics of consensus democracy" Lijphart includes (as the third): "...a bicameral legislature, particularly one in which the two chambers are roughly equal powers and are differently constituted, instead of unicameralism..." [Lijphart 1991b: 486]

²¹ "Dans tous les Parlements, c'est la lenteur et non la précipitation qui constitue le défaut essentiel" [Duverger 1988a: 166].

²² Jean-Louis Quermonne, who has made several studies of alternation, maintains that even if alternation does not have a monopoly on democracy, experts see that it is generally more effective than a broad coalition of the centre: "Quoi qu'il en soit, ces différentes variantes de la conjonction des centres tendent à prouver que l'alternance au pouvoir n'a pas le monopole de la démocratie. Cependant, compte tenu de ses performances, il est normal qu'elle paraisse généralement les surclasser, aux yeux des observateurs avisés" [Quermonne 1988: 45].

'majoritarian' that could best lay claim to consensus!²³ Majoritarian democracies function well over the long term in relatively homogeneous societies which are not greatly "polarised" in Sartori's sense, i.e. in which there is little ideological (or other) distance between the relevant parties and so two parties (or two coalitions) with a majority mandate govern in alternation, moderately and close to the political centre. In addition, majoritarian democracies with such a moderate, centripetal mode of functioning with a unimodal distribution of public opinion generally retain this throughout their lives, i.e. polarisation declines rather than increases. As Dominique Pélassy [1992] notes, this is a point on which theory is almost always confirmed by practice.²⁴

Only when the ideological distance between the relevant parties is unusually great and the distribution of public opinion is bimodal, will democracy based on a two-party system with a majoritarian electoral system lead to more rather than less intense political conflicts [see Dahl 1965].²⁵ A bimodal distribution of political opinions generally corresponds to that spectrum of parties that Sartori terms great "ideological distance" between the relevant political parties (or great "polarisation", while a unimodal distribution corresponds rather to small ideological distance (i.e. weak polarisation). As Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori quite rightly noted in their well-known article, "...the best single explanatory variable for stable versus instable, functioning versus non-functioning, successful versus immobile, and easy versus difficult democracy is polarisation..." [Sani and Sartori 1982: 332].

The majoritarian model will only disturb the continuity of economic policy in the case of great ideological distance, i.e. strong polarisation²⁶ (fortunately rare in democracies). Lijphart is right in saying that in such contexts it is good to distinguish between "short-term stability" and "long-term stability" [Lijphart 1994b: 627]. However in the usual situation, in which ideological distance is relatively small, the economy of a country with a majoritarian democracy is not at risk of long-term instability and there is no fear that the results of political alternation of governments will lead to absurd cycles of nationalisation-privatisation-nationalisation, etc..

It is also symptomatic that Lijphart refers, especially in his recent article [see Lijphart 1994b], to the ideas S. E. Finer began to develop in the mid-1970s. There is no harm in saying that today, in the late 1990s, there is a greater consensus in Great Britain (and elsewhere), or a lesser ideologi-

²³) This is why in his work *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Sartori rejected Lijphart's term "consensus democracy": "In his most recent volume, *Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), Lijphart changes 'consociational democracy' into 'consensus democracy'. I shall not follow this renaming since it may convey, if unwittingly, the idea that the Westminster, majoritarian model is not consensus-based" [Sartori 1987: 251, note 42]. Duverger also notes that: "*En vérité, le consensus tourne exactement le dos au centrisme, parce qu'il est la condition nécessaire de l'alternance*" [Duverger 1988b: 42-43].

²⁴) "*Quand on rapproche la façon dont les électeurs des grands partis se situent sur l'échelle droite-gauche dans les systèmes européens à tendance bipolaire, on est frappé par le mouvement de concentration au centre qui les affecte*" [Pélassy 1992: 89].

²⁵) Here we cannot disregard the fact that increased polarisation can be caused by other factors as well. A majoritarian electoral system and other features of majoritarian democracy are not the only independent variables (even without considering that they may also be dependent variables).

²⁶) As will be shown later, no model functions well in a strongly polarised state: the 'consensus' model only functions a little less badly than the majoritarian one.

cal distance, on the basic principles of economic policy than there was in the 1970s and particularly in the early 1980s, even though the political system and its 'majoritarian' characteristics are more pronounced there now than in the past. At the beginning of the 1980s, for example, the two-party system barely functioned and there were open doubts about its future in Great Britain [see Duverger 1981: 12-13; 1982: 285-286]. The whole atmosphere was more ideological and less pragmatic than today.²⁷

It can be assumed that this was not a result of the "majoritarian" elements of the British political system (which was in fact suffering from them). It is however true that once ideological polarisation increased *for other reasons*, the remaining majoritarian elements (which were in a state of crisis because they were not adapted to a high level of polarisation) for some time in fact threw more fat on the fire. The reason is clear and has long been recognised by theorists [see Dahl 1965]: in situations of great ideological distance (polarisation) and a bimodal structure of public opinion, majoritarian elements such as the two-party system and the majoritarian electoral system tend not to lessen but to intensify conflicts. Had the ideological polarisation been still greater, it could have been the death-knell of the majoritarian model.

Gordon Tullock [1976: 23] commented in the mid-1970s that: "Thus, one anticipates that the parties in a two-party system would be very close together but that there would be considerable difference between them in a three- (or more)²⁸ party system. (...) It may be that the present situation [his work was published in 1976] in Britain, in which the Liberal Party has been reviving and regional parties have developed, means that there will be more difference between the two main (and smaller) parties than in the past. Indeed the current internal developments of sharpening differences between wings or groups within both the Conservative and Labour Parties may represent a movement in this direction."

Dominique Pélassy noted that at that time, when some critics blamed the majoritarian system in Great Britain for artificially intensifying conflicts between the parties, in most countries, when elections did not produce a decisive result, there were still those who proclaimed the merits of bipolar clarity [Pélassy 1992: 80-81].

It should not be forgotten that *no model will work satisfactorily in a strongly polarised state*: the 'consensual' model simply works a little less badly than the majoritarian one. As Dahl, for example, explained long ago, when there is strong (but not complete) polarisation, proportional representation and multipartism can help the centre to survive as long as centrist ideas, in the broadest sense of centre-left and centre-right, survive. The moderation of the parties close to the centre can force at least part of the power to work in coalition governments and in opposition and so to at least somewhat weaken antagonistic tendencies. On the other hand it is clear that in a strongly polarised society, under conditions of multipartism and a strictly proportional electoral system, the emergence of extremist parties is almost unavoidable. The increasing clientele of these parties makes it more difficult for the moderate parties (situated around the centre) to create coalitions which are viable and capable of action. The German Weimar Republic – and to a lesser extent Italy – are examples of this. Sartori referred to this as polarised pluralism or extreme multipartism.

Lijphart [1994a: 3], again appealing to Finer [1975] stresses the need for centrist policy-making. Duverger [1988b: 191; 1982: 282-283], on the other hand, has made a very useful distinction between *gouverner au centre* (i.e. government in the centre) and

²⁷) On the greater consensus and lesser ideological distance in the 1990s, particularly in economic policy, and on its results in contemporary democracy, see Braud [1997: 206].

²⁸) Here we are concerned with independent parties. The following does not relate to bipolar multipartism with the alternation of two permanent and relatively homogeneous coalitions.

gouverner par le centre (i.e. government by the centre), which relates to what he calls the paradox of the centre. When there is a strong centrist party or alliance in power, such a government is generally accused of impotence and slowly wears away the foundations of the regime. When, on the other hand, the centre is broken up by a bipolar system, a right-wing government is in normal circumstances forced to more moderate, i.e. centrist and centripetal policies if it does not want to lose the next elections, and the same applies in the case of a left-wing government. For Duverger, the "paradox of the centre" lies in the fact that the centre is only in power when it does not exist [*"Tel est le paradoxe du centre: il ne gouverne réellement que quand il n'existe pas"*] [Duverger 1982: 282; cf. 1988b: 194].²⁹ As far as "majoritarian" democracies are concerned, Lijphart should be reminded that in their case centrist policies are in fact normal! And at the same time they allow citizens to choose and sanction their rulers.

Duverger's thesis that "government in the centre" is better than "government by the centre" has been largely confirmed by Reuven Y. Hazan's research into election results in ten Western European countries between 1979 and 1989. Hazan showed that those centre parties which have more than 20% of seats in parliament do not greatly contribute to moderation (as would seem to be the case intuitively) but rather to increased polarisation, i.e. instead the "counter-intuitive" analysis applies [Hazan 1995: 438-439].³⁰

Turning to another weak point of Lijphart's thesis: the correlation between certain performances (particularly socio-economic or economic growth, the level of unemployment, the level of inflation, etc.) and the form of government are not very convincing and are not necessarily causal. Richard Rose, who compared the economic performance of democracies with a majoritarian electoral system with the performance of those with a system proportional representation (like G. Bingham Powell Jr., he refers to the latter as "representational"), reached a different conclusion from Lijphart and one which was less in favour of those states with a proportional representation system! In his conclusion he writes: "*there is no consistent link between electoral system and economic performance*"

²⁹) It is a pity that in his noteworthy article (in which from Duverger's works he quotes only from the English translation of Duverger's classic book on political parties), Hazan does not seem to know Duverger's conception of the paradox of the centre and says: "The advocate of the centre's moderating impact is Duverger [sic!], while the champion of its polarizing effect is Sartori." [Hazan 1995: 424]. Duverger's thesis of the "paradox of the centre" agrees with Sartori's thesis that the existence of centrist parties does not have a centripetal and moderating effect, but rather a centrifugal and polarising one. As both Duverger and Sartori agree that the existence of relevant (particularly if large) centrist parties has an unfortunate effect on the party system; Sartori sees this negative effect in the increase in polarisation, while for Duverger it is primarily in the increasing impotence of the government. Sartori and Duverger differ in their view of what the "basis" of the centre is (Duverger sees the centre not as something which exists in itself, but as something derivative).

³⁰) Two conclusions of Hazan's research are as follows: "(1) The presence and growth of centre parties directly and positively impact on the parliamentary strength of extremist parties; but they impact only when the centre is large – defined as more than 20% of the parliamentary seats. (2) The presence and growth of centre parties directly and centrifugally impact on the movement of parties along the left-right continuum; but they impact uniformly for both left and right only on the moderate parties." [Hazan 1995: 436]

[Rose 1992: 17]. Lijphart himself was forced to admit that his conclusions are only “tentative”.³¹

Is Voter Turnout an Excellent Indicator of Democratic Quality?

There is yet another point in Lijphart's article which has aroused criticism. I will limit myself here to only a couple of examples. Lijphart sees voter turnout as “an excellent indicator of democratic quality because it shows the extent to which citizens are actually interested in being represented” [Lijphart 1994a: 4]. He calculates the mean voting participation of countries with proportional representation as 84.5%, while in countries with majoritarian electoral systems it is only 75.3%, i.e. 9% less than in the former [Lijphart 1994a: 6-7; see also Lijphart 1997: 7-9].

It should be noted that Lijphart does not include Switzerland (known for its exceptionally high level of non-participation) among those countries with proportional representation, even though he himself says that “Switzerland comes closest to the idealtype of consensus democracy”! [Lijphart 1994a: 2]. His justification for excluding Switzerland is that it does not have a parliamentary government. And when slightly later in his article Lijphart compares majoritarian and consensus democracies and is forced to include Switzerland in his considerations, he tries to present it (together with the USA) as one of two exceptional “deviant cases”, which can probably be explained away by the frequency of elections and the multitude of electoral choices [Lijphart 1994a: 10]. In contrast with this it should be noted that abstentionism is increasing in the old European and American democracies in which voting is not compulsory and that the Swiss and American cases are in fact only the tip of the iceberg [see Hermet 1996: 90, 1989: 70-75]. Jan-Erik Lane and Swante Ersson, who recently studied the development of voter turnout in 18 western European countries since 1980, also discovered a long-run decline: the average participation rate was 81.5% in 1980-84, 80.1% in 1985-89, 79.4% in 1990-94, 74.9% in 1995-96 [Lane and Ersson 1997: 183-184].

Some scholars, including the French political scientists Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau [Mayer and Perrineau 1992: 37] even see – probably rightly – one of the causes of the very low level of participation in Switzerland as the absence of alternation in government.³² Since 1959 (!), when the socialists became a permanent part of the federal executive, all relevant political parties on the federal level have been represented in the seven-member Swiss government (the Federal Council), a situation which H. Kerr [1987: 124] called an “all-party regime”. There are still the same parties and their proportions have not changed since 1959 (2 Radical Democrats [PRD], 2 Christian Democrats [PDC], 2 Socialists [PDC], 1 Agrarian [UDC]). The Swiss call this the “magic formula” – and yet it is known that such a broad coalition is one of the key features of Lijphart's consensual model of democracy!

By this logic high electoral participation can exist where there are only two “camps” which are divided by a great ideological distance.³³ But this – very negative – situation (bipolarity plus

³¹) “My conclusion, in the absence of definitive evidence based on more broadly comparative research on democratic institutions, has to be tentative” [Lijphart 1994a: 15].

³²) In the case of the USA, a low electoral turnout is often explained as a result of “alternation without a [real] alternative”, or in other words of the “*consensus à l'américaine*” [see Mény 1978: 11; Toinet 1976: 927; Braud 1997: 222].

³³) “*Quand l'éventail des choix politiques est ouvert et que les pôles de droite et de gauche du système partisan représentent véritablement deux pôles opposés, le système a de la polarité (...) Cette polarité, par la clarté des alternatives qu'elle propose, encourage la participation. (...) En Suisse, où depuis 1959 les quatre grands partis (parti radical, parti socialiste, parti démocrate-chrétien, union démocratique du centre) participent ensemble à l'exécutif de la Confédération, la polarisation du système de parti est quasi inexistante et la participation électorale une des plus faibles du monde occidental*” [Mayer and Perrineau 1992: 37].

polarisation) which should bring about increasing electoral participation is miles away from what Lijphart calls for (nor is it viable in the long term since, as was mentioned above, bipolar systems cannot function well when there is great ideological distance).³⁴

In the Swiss situation, when there is a sensitive subject that arouses strong emotions (e.g. xenophobic initiatives of the nationalist far right), participation rises markedly. While average participation in the thirty referenda and popular initiatives between 1965 and 1973 was only 42.4%, with a maximum of 74.7% in the vote on the initiative "*contre l'emprise étrangère*" (against undue foreign influence) in June 1970, and a minimum of 26.7% (!) for the vote on the stabilisation of the construction market and the support of the currency in June 1972 [Sidjanski 1975: 17]. In later times, for example, the popular initiative for the abolition of the army, which aroused passionate disputes and strongly polarised the population, enjoyed a level of participation much above the average (69.2%).³⁵

The situation with elections is similar. The first parliamentary elections after the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia, which took place in June 1990, enjoyed exceptionally high participation (more than 96%). They were seen basically as a choice between the former communist regime and liberal democracy. It is difficult to offer this as a model for a stabilised democracy to copy... The excellent Swedish analyst of political participation, Herbert Tingsten, noted that in various countries such as German and Austria, an extremely high vote was achieved just at the point when their democracies began to break down [Tingsten 1937: 225-226].

It is generally clear that one of the ways of increasing participation is to increase ideological distance (polarisation) and reduce consensus, which can hardly be seen as desirable. A whole range of serious studies, particularly in the period of the collapse of democracies in Europe between the two World Wars, confirms this conclusion.³⁶ It is also indisputable that one of the many reasons (although by no means the only one) for electoral abstention is people's satisfaction with the general state of affairs, so that they do not see any need to go to the urns [see e.g. Berelson, Lazarsfeld et al. 1954: 322; Almond and Verba 1965: 339, 347]. Philippe Braud recently commented that a certain scepticism in relation to the traditional forms of political participation can be a sign of greater civic maturity [Braud 1997: 223] and a similar idea was put forward by Ronald Inglehart [1990].

It would of course be cynical if the low participation in elections in the old 'consolidated' democracies was a reason for rejoicing, but we should accept that a low level of participation has not always one and the same significance. It need not even always indicate something negative (just as a high level need not necessarily be a positive sign). Seymour Martin Lipset explained this very convincingly in his still highly regarded classic work *Political Man* (1960) and his conclusion is worth quoting. "The evidence confirms Tingsten's thesis that a sudden increase in the size of the voting electorate probably reflects tension and serious governmental malfunctioning and also introduces as voters individuals whose social attitudes are unhealthy from the point of view of the requirements of the democratic system. On the other hand, a high vote is not necessarily bad. (...) To the extent that the lower strata have been brought into the electoral process gradually (through increased organisation, an upgrading of the educational system, and growth in their understanding

³⁴) Daniel-Louis Seiler commented, however, that it is not possible to associate bipolarity exclusively with low polarisation or multi-polarity only with strong polarisation: "*Il existe [aussi] des systèmes bipolaires, plus ou moins fortement bipolarisés; ainsi l'Autriche de la 1ère République (...) De même on aperçoit facilement des exemples de systèmes multipolaires dénués de toute polarisation: ainsi la Norvège, où la défense de la périphérie constitue un pôle*" [Seiler 1982: 129].

³⁵) The most recent information can be found in [Papadopoulos 1994, Kriesi 1993].

³⁶) See Lipset [1981: 227-229], who refers to authors such as H. Tingsten, Francis G. Wilson, W. H. Morris Jones, D. N. Hogan, Harold F. Gosnell, W. B. Munro, David Riesman.

of the relevance of government action to their interests), increased participation is undoubtedly a good thing for democracy. (...) Thus *neither high nor low rates of participation and voting are in themselves good or bad for democracy*; the extent and nature of that participation reflect other factors which determine far more decisively the system's chances to develop or survive" [Lipset 1981: 229]. In such circumstances it is clear that the statement that voter turnout is "an excellent indicator of democratic quality" [Lijphart 1994a: 4] is unsustainable.

Has Lijphart Fallen into a Pre-Aristotelian Approach?

Lijphart constantly proclaims the superiority of consensus democracy (over majoritarian democracy) in questions of the representation of minorities, but this is in fact unnecessarily gilding the lily. Nobody denies that consociational elements of the political system are more appropriate to a society divided into various ethnic, linguistic, religious and other subculture.³⁷

This brings us to the crucial point in evaluating Lijphart's thesis. In the fourth book of his *Politics*, Aristotle already put forward the idea that it is not so much (or at least not only) a case of looking for the best government of all, for the best regime as such, but rather for a regime which suits the given conditions. In Lijphart's case, after suggesting a distinction between consensus and majoritarian forms of democracy, he seeks to promote the former as the better form, superior – according to almost all criteria – to the majoritarian model.³⁸ This stance leads him to suggest that if we are to decide between these two models (as is the case in countries in the process of democratisation),

³⁷) Stein Rokkan demonstrates this very clearly on the basis of the system of proportional representation, as an important element of consociational democracy: "It was no accident that the earliest moves toward proportional representation (...) came in the ethnically most heterogeneous European countries: Denmark in 1855; the Swiss cantons in 1891; Belgium in 1899; Moravia in 1905; Finland in 1906. In linguistically and religiously divided societies majority elections could clearly threaten the continued existence of the political system" [Rokkan 1970: 157]. We should however remember that in some circumstances a majoritarian electoral system can work to the benefit of ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities when these are concentrated in certain regions [see Duverger 1981: 401]. Furthermore, if we contrast, as is usual, proportional representation and majoritarian electoral systems, we should not lose sight of the crucial importance of constituency magnitude, as demonstrated by Douglas W. Rae [1971], Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart [1989] and even Lijphart himself with his collaborators [Lijphart 1994c].

³⁸) Lijphart's position on this has developed. Initially he was satisfied with a more modest and reasonable position, in his own words: "The conventional wisdom has long been widely accepted without adequate empirical examination (...). In fact, I have committed this error myself. (...) I argued that power-sharing was the best kind of democracy that deeply divided countries could attain, but I admitted – far too readily! – that it was necessarily less effective and less efficient than majoritarian forms of democracy" [Lijphart 1994a: 3]. Sartori is therefore right when he considers Lijphart's conception of "consociational democracy" to be an important contribution to our understanding of democracy, but rejects absolutely his later attempt to create a "grand theory" of the superiority of "consensus democracy": "Lijphart was absolutely right in holding that a democracy could work even under adverse conditions (especially a fragmented political culture) by having recourse to non-majoritarian, consociational practices; and his consociational democracy construct was a perceptive and important addition to our understanding of democratic governance. Thereafter, however, Lijphart has blown up these premises into a 'grand theory' of a superior form of democracy: consensus democracy. And while I do follow the initial Lijphart, I cannot follow him that far." [Sartori 1994c: 70]

we should favour the consensus model. As has been shown above, Lijphart sees this not just as better in terms of representation and protection of minorities, but also as more effective.

The fact that he uses the term effectiveness in the sense of socio-economic performance does however have two unfortunate results: (1) in contrast with what he himself declares, he has not been successful in casting doubt on 'traditional' wisdom because it has something else to set up against representativeness, i.e. efficiency in terms of action-capacity, and (2) his thesis falls into difficulties since there is not necessarily a causal relation between the various models of democracy and socio-economic effectiveness.

Lijphart could be content with arguments which are far from insignificant and proclaim, for example, that consociational characteristics are appropriate in many conditions, with the exception of relatively homogeneous countries and where ideological distance is not too great [see Sartori 1987: 240; Dahl 1989: 161-162].³⁹ As his more recent texts unfortunately show, however – particularly his article "Democracies: Forms, Performance and Constitutional Engineering" – he is not content with this and has moved ever closer to a pre-Aristotelian approach, comparing models as if one of them is to be recommended as the best for all countries beginning the process of democratisation [see Lijphart 1994a: 12-15].

I myself would prefer a different approach. It would be better to ask in what conditions the 'consensus' model is best suited, or more specifically, in what circumstances is there no real choice as it is the only realistic possibility for preserving democracy.⁴⁰ And we should also ask what type of states could instead adopt majoritarian elements without any great difficulties (particularly the majoritarian electoral system or a more general electoral system with a clear majoritarian effect).⁴¹

Only then could we really ask whether the consensus model would not also be better in those countries whose relative homogeneity and small ideological distance allow them to adopt elements of the majoritarian model.⁴² But we should be careful that here too we do not use – as does Lijphart – always one and the same criterion to evaluate all countries, or at least that all criteria do not have the same weight, the same importance. Comparisons between countries whose sociological characteristics (homogeneity or segmentation, etc.) place them closer to one 'model'⁴³ or the other should be treated differ-

³⁹) We should not however be too impressed by Lijphart's consensus model. As will be shown, it is only at first sight that the majority of 'consolidated' western democracies follow the consensus rather than the majoritarian model.

⁴⁰) As seems to be the case in countries with major linguistic, religious or ethnic divisions, such as Belgium. In these cases we can turn to Raymond Aron: "*Quand un pays est trop divisé sur le régime le meilleur ou sur ce qu'il convient de faire dans une situation donnée, mieux vaut souvent d'accepter une demi-paralyse*" [Aron 1965: 231].

⁴¹) As is well-known, even with proportional representation there can be a marked majoritarian effect, as for example when constituencies are small (with no more than five seats for each constituency).

⁴²) If we really wanted to overturn the 'conventional wisdom', we should not do as Lijphart did when he tried to surreptitiously replace efficiency-action capacity (which the traditional concept uses) with something else, i.e. effectiveness-socio-economic performance.

⁴³) The terms 'majoritarian democracy' and 'consensus democracy' are only ideal-types (to use Max Weber's terminology), which real political systems can more or less approximate: "A first

ently. A criterion which is important or even decisive for a highly segmented country, may well be insignificant for relatively homogeneous one, and *vice versa*. In countries which are relatively homogeneous in ethnic, linguistic and religious terms, for example, the criterion of better representation for ethnic or other minorities loses much of its importance.

For an example of the use of differing criteria in different circumstances we can look to Raymond Boudon, who in his work *L'Idéologie ou l'origine des idées reçues* [Boudon 1986: 222-225] notes that in many agrarian societies, particularly in African and Vietnamese villages at the beginning of the 20th century, decisions in village meetings were often made on the basis not of a simple or even a qualified majority, but of unanimity. Observers noticed that this rule of unanimous decisions almost always meant endless discussion. As could be expected from Boudon, he was not satisfied with a culturalist interpretation of this fact but sought a rational explanation.⁴⁴ Briefly, he argues that these agrarian societies function in a system that is close to a subsistence economy, where simple existence is important and there is a very strong interdependence between the members of the collective, so that an initiative by one member can very easily have a serious effect on the life of another member. Thus everyone has a reason to have the power of veto so that the meeting can take a unanimous collective decision, rather than any other way of transforming individual opinions in collective decision-making. What then is the cost of this process?⁴⁵

It is true that the rule of unanimity leads to very long discussions, but in such societies time is relatively cheap: people's contribution to the economy takes up only a small part of their time and they can devote much of what remains to the functioning of the 'political system'. In other words, in traditional agrarian societies there is a wealth of time and a close interdependence between the members of the society. In modern societies time is more valuable and interdependence between the members of the society is much less. While in traditional agrarian societies the rule of unanimity satisfactorily fulfils the function of changing individual opinions into collective decisions, in modern society the members of a collectivity tend to submit to a simple majority decision. In modern society the unanimity rule would be dysfunctional, just as majority rule would be dysfunctional in traditional agrarian communities [Boudon 1986: 225].

It is paradoxical that Lijphart suggests a similar model⁴⁶ for contemporary society to that which Boudon finds appropriate for traditional agrarian societies! In his article on democracy quoted above, Lijphart refers to Rupert Emerson and Raul S. Maglapus, who noted that non-European (African and Asian) nations of the Third World have consensual rather than majoritarian traditions [see Lijphart 1994a: 14-15]. But instead of providing a logical explanation as to why the consensus model is particularly suited to traditional agrarian countries (and for highly polarised or segmented societies, whether traditional or modern), Lijphart simply states that "...at the deeper level of political culture, the prevalent orientations tend to be more consensual than majoritarian in most areas of the world" [Lijphart 1994a: 14].

observation is that I would definitely stress the ideal-type, indeed the polar-type, nature of the distinction between majoritarian and consociational democracy. Lijphart stresses, instead, the empirical and empirically extracted nature of his types and, by so doing, is in danger of overstating his case. The contrast is empirically overdrawn, to begin with, in that no real-world democracy abides by absolute majority rule" [Sartori 1987: 239].

⁴⁴) Raymond Boudon refers to the work of Samuel L. Popkin [1979].

⁴⁵) On the common question of the two types of cost of collective decision-making see Buchanan and Tullock [1967].

⁴⁶) It should be stressed that these are similar but by no means identical: the principle of 'unanimity' goes further than (although with the same logic as) that of 'consensus'.

Are 'Consensual Characteristics' More Common in Democracies than 'Majoritarian Characteristics'?

One's initial impression could be that the great majority of 'consolidated' western democracies are closer to the consensus model than the majoritarian one. It is not true that such 'consensual' characteristics as proportional representation, multipartism and bicameralism are more frequent than their counterparts in the majoritarian model, i.e. majoritarian electoral systems, two-party systems and unicameralism? When the question is considered in somewhat more depth, however, the facts turn out to be somewhat different.

Not only does proportional representation rarely appear in an (almost) pure form, but in some cases (e.g. Greece, Spain) the officially proportional electoral system in fact has a clear majoritarian effect. For example, the index of disproportionality for Spain, as calculated by Richard Rose [1984: 75], is 84, which is higher than for most countries with a majoritarian electoral system, including Great Britain! Richard Rose's calculations showed only two countries with majoritarian electoral systems which were even more disproportionate than Spain: New Zealand (index of disproportionality 80) and France (index 79).

In the case of unicameralism and bicameralism, it should not be forgotten that this is only relevant in the case of unitary states, as no-one opposes the idea of American-style bicameralism for federal states. Taking only unitary states into account in comparing the effects of uni- and bicameralism, the prevalence of bicameralism is greatly reduced. In addition, bicameralism in the strict sense of the word implies – as Lijphart himself says – that both chambers (upper and lower houses) have approximately the same level of competence. In some countries in which there is formally a bicameral parliament, the upper house has far less power (as for example in Great Britain), and so this strict criterion of bicameralism does not apply.

As for party systems, multipartism is of course far more widespread than two-party systems. Bipolar multipartism as Duverger and Sartori, among others, understand it, seems to be more compatible with the 'majoritarian' logic, just like the two-party system!

As Norman Schofield [1995] recently showed, looking only at multi-party countries (i.e. excluding countries with two-party systems from his analysis), the most frequent situations in Western European democracies are (1) various forms of minimal winning coalitions, including so-called minimal connected winning coalitions, and (2) minority governments. It is probably not necessary to show how minimal winning coalitions are closer to 'majoritarian' logic than to the 'consensual' one. It is worth mentioning however that minority governments are even closer to the 'majoritarian' logic than are minimal winning coalitions, which is not in fact the paradox it at first seems.

This seems to bring us to the Achilles heel of Lijphart's consensual model: a broad coalition in the sense that Lijphart's model calls for (i.e. all relevant parties should have at least approximately proportional representation in the government)⁴⁷ has only been in practice for any real length of time in Switzerland (since 1959). It did work in Colombia but only temporarily (for four consecutive parliamentary terms). Even in Austria, where such a coalition existed after the Second World War, there has now long been what is

⁴⁷) On the major disadvantages of such broad coalitions see Duverger [1988b: 192] and Braud [1997: 180].

known as the 'grand coalition' (a coalition of Social Democrats and the Popular Party), which is in fact only one of the types of minimal winning coalitions, that incorporating the least number of parties, as Leiserson understands it. It is easy to understand why in recent decades in Austria there has only exceptionally been a different type of minimal winning coalition, i.e. one with the least number of parliamentary seats, as Riker⁴⁸ understands it. This too corresponds to the 'majoritarian' logic rather than the 'consensual' one: the third party, Heider's FPÖ is seen as an extreme party and so neither of the two moderate parties can go into coalition with it. Basically, it is not possible to say that the overwhelming majority of well-established democracies are closer to the consensual model than to the majoritarian one.

Does 'Conventional Wisdom' Only Apply to Parliamentary Systems?

While Lijphart tries to show that consensual democracies are superior in terms not only of representativeness, but also of effectiveness, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey in their significant recent work [see Shugart and Carey 1992] put forward a different thesis which is interesting. The traditional idea that it is necessary to choose between representativeness and efficiency⁴⁹ may apply for parliamentary systems, but not for systems with a directly-elected president.⁵⁰ Briefly summarising their arguments, in parliamentary government there is only one body which is directly elected, i.e. the parliament: "With only one agent of the electorate, it is not feasible to have both efficient and representative elections in the same system" [Shugart and Carey 1992: 8]. In systems, in which the president (or more usually the leader of the executive) is directly elected, there are two such bodies, the parliament and the president, and Shugart and Carey consider that it is thus possible to maximise two aims at one and the same time, i.e. both efficiency and representativeness.

Shugart and Carey are clear as to their preference: a directly elected president (or more usually the head of the executive) which allows the voters to identify with their executive (identifiability) which can then be responsible for its results (accountability), then a very representative parliament (which usually implies a proportional voting system). One of the major points of Shugart and Carey's work is the rich comparative analysis of systems in which the president is directly elected, but their thesis on the possibility of maximising both representativeness and efficiency is less plausible.⁵¹

It would not be right to use Scott Mainwaring's important article [1993] to rebut Shugart and Carey's conclusions. Mainwaring argues that the combination of a presiden-

⁴⁸) On the various types of minimal winning coalitions see my recent guide [Novák 1997a: 185-189].

⁴⁹) Unlike Lijphart, Shugart and Carey contrast representativeness with efficiency-action capacity, thus respecting 'conventional wisdom'.

⁵⁰) This argument could also be used for those parliamentary regimes in which the premier (Prime Minister) is directly elected. To date this is the case only in Israel, where it was introduced in 1992 and first used in 1996. Duverger [1996: 117-118], who recommended this direct election of the premier (Prime Minister) in France in 1956, recently suggested defining this form of parliamentary system as "semi-parlementaire" (semi-parliamentary), as with the earlier recognition of the French 5th Republic as "semi-présidentiel" (semi-presidential).

⁵¹) For a very well-considered and accurate evaluation of Shugart and Carey's important work see the review by Jean Blondel [1993: 415-416].

tial regime with multipartism (remembering that according 'Duverger's laws' multipartism is linked with proportional representation) is very negative for the stability of democracy. It should be stressed that a political system in which the head of the executive (whether president or premier) is directly elected and in which the legislature is elected by proportional representation does not allow both representativeness and efficiency to be maximised.

Certain constitutional elements such as proportional representation which favour representativeness can be in conflict with such elements as the direct election of the head of the executive which favour efficiency. A driver who directs one horse to the left and the second to the right, still cannot go left and right at the same time. In the best case he will go in an intermediate direction, e.g. directly ahead, in the worse the carriage will be torn between two opposing pressures.

It could be *à la rigueur* to find an analogous constitutional configuration of a small number of parties in parliamentarianism with a proportional election system. Sartori's conclusion as to such a configuration could also apply for such a constitutional design as Shugart and Carey suggest: it could eventually produce a more satisfying balance between efficiency and representativeness but would not produce a constitutional arrangement that would maximise both political aims at the same time.

Conclusion: On the Prospects of Constitutional Engineering⁵² Not Only in East Central Europe

In conclusion I would like to recapitulate, recalling some simple ideas which have unfortunately been rather forgotten in recent times and try to apply some of the theses considered to three newly democratic countries of East Central Europe.

The first and main source of inspiration should be Sartori's attempt to clarify the relevant concepts [see e.g. Sartori 1970, 1994a, 1994b]. Using terms which have various meanings can lead to confusion.⁵³ In the case of the term efficiency, a distinction has been suggested between the two main meanings of the term: efficiency-action capacity and effectiveness-socio-economic performance.⁵⁴

In order that democracy can function satisfactorily, it requires both effectiveness-socioeconomic performance and efficiency-action capacity. As far as effectiveness is concerned it seems that there is no definite relation between the various constitutional choices (particularly electoral systems) and socio-economic performance (although correlations need not necessarily be causal). Expecting the move from a majoritarian electoral system to proportional representation or from unicameralism to bicameralism to improve economic performance is illusory at best.

The case of efficiency-action capacity is somewhat different. The adjustment of the existing electoral system (e.g. a marked reduction of the size of constituencies and a cor-

⁵²) On constitutional engineering see principally Sartori [1994c and 1996].

⁵³) It was Sartori [1994c: 69-73] who pointed out the importance of the terminological problem relating to Lijphart's later work and his 'grand theory' of the superiority of consensus democracy over majoritarian democracy.

⁵⁴) As to the term collective effectiveness, which Dahl sometimes uses, this can be replaced by the importance which decision-making can have in a democratic unit, which depends primarily on the dimension and the jurisdiction of the government of the unit.

responding increase in their number) or the replacement of one electoral system by another (e.g. a move from proportional representation to a majoritarian electoral system) can in many cases increase the efficiency-action capacity of the government.

It is clear that such increased action capacity is especially important in the radical transformation in the economic field, such as in the post-communist countries of East Central Europe. This presumes at least a minimal consensus (or in other words a relatively low level of polarisation) and a relatively homogeneous state. Hungary, a fairly homogeneous country, adopted a largely majoritarian electoral system [see Lijphart 1992b], and could well provide a model for the Czech Republic and Poland, also relatively homogeneous countries. The experience of these three countries which (together with Slovenia) are considered to be the best students of both political democracy and market economy among the former communist countries, and which (unlike Slovenia) are under consideration for membership of both NATO and the European Union, is of particular interest, especially from the point of view of the effects of the electoral system.⁵⁵

In the post-communist countries of East Central Europe the party system is just taking shape and a strictly proportional voting system may reinforce tendencies to fragmentation and complicate government stability. The tendency towards party fragmentation is as strong as it was during the first two legislative elections and is evident not only during elections but also in the appearance of new parliamentary groups during the parliamentary term. Except in Hungary, where the main parties were formed earlier than in the other countries (even before 1989), the post-communist countries of East Central Europe have now had their third free parliamentary elections and are so emerging as stable party systems. The effects of the five-percent threshold have changed greatly over time, as can be seen in the Czech Lands, where the threshold has been in force since the first free elections in 1990.⁵⁶

Poland initially had a strictly proportional system which resulted in 29 (!) parties gaining seats in the lower house of parliament (the Sejm), which is perhaps a 'world record'. The strongest of the parties had only 12% of votes. Poland could then have followed the example of Hungary and replaced the proportional system with a largely majoritarian electoral system, or a more general system with a largely majoritarian effect. It did not however go so far and opted instead to follow Czechoslovakia (and its successor states) and introduce a quorum (5% for individuals and 8% for coalitions). In addition Poland adopted the D'Hondt system of seat allocation for smaller constituencies (this system tends to favour large parties and is thus somewhat less proportional than the Hare-Niemeyer system of seat allocation which Poland had abandoned).

In Czechoslovakia (and its successor states) the five-percent threshold has been in force from the outset, i.e. since the first legislative elections in 1990. In the first (and largely also the second) democratic elections this voting quorum had a marked majoritarian effect as the voters still gave a large proportion of their votes to very small parties. Those who were not successful in the elections did not gain seats in parliament, and those votes were divided between those few parties which got over the five-percent threshold. The first legislative elections with the five-percent threshold in Poland in 1993 represented an extreme case, producing an unusually large disproportion: 9 of the 15 party lists did not gain places in the lower house of parliament (the Sejm), 35% (!) of votes

⁵⁵) On this subject, see the *International Political Science Review*, vol. 18, no. 4, October 1997. Issue title: "Elections and Parliaments in Post-Communist East Central Europe." Issue editor was Jerzy J. Wiatr and other authors of articles included János Simon, Stanislaw Gebethner, David M. Olson, Attila Ágh and Jana Reschová.

⁵⁶) A similar tendency could be noted in Germany in the 1950s, and the objection that its electoral system was 'mixed' is of little value. Specialists know that Germany has a basically 'personalised' system of proportional representation.

were 'lost' and were 'redistributed'. The coalition of Kwasniewski's Democratic Left Alliance (SDL) and the Peasant Party (PSL) thus required only 36% of voters to gain 66% of parliamentary seats. In the second legislative elections with the five-percent threshold (in 1997) the level of disproportionality fell but was still considerable. The Polish President Kwasniewski recently noted that in 1997 his post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) gained a higher proportion of the vote than in 1993 (27% compared with only 20% in 1993). Even so it lost the 1997 elections whereas in 1993 it had won a resounding victory. In 1997 the elections were won by Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), which gained 34% of votes and 44% of seats.

The third parliamentary elections with the five-percent threshold in the Czech Republic were held in 1996 and voters had already had time to get used to this threshold (what Duverger terms the "psychological effect"): they therefore chose not to vote for parties which had no chance of entering parliament, which greatly increased the level of proportionality. In 1992 the centre-right coalition (ODS-KDS, ODA, KDU-CSL) gained an absolute majority (52.5%) of seats with only 42% of the vote. In those elections 19% of votes were 'lost' (and redistributed). In the third Czech legislative elections in 1996, however, only 11% of votes were 'lost' and so 44% of the vote was not enough for these three parties (ODS,⁵⁷ ODA, KDU-CSL) to gain an absolute majority in parliament (they held only 49.5% of seats). They were thus forced to form a minority government and the results are clear: the stability of the government is endangered and there is a high risk of paralysis and impotence [see Novák 1997b: 178-179].

The question is now whether a similar fate awaits Poland in its third legislative elections with the five-percent threshold. In any case, it is easy to agree with Jerzy Wiatr when he says that "The institutional instability of Polish parliamentarism has been contrasted with a highly stable evolution of parliamentarism in Hungary (...), indicating that it is not the novelty of parliamentary institutions as such or the immaturity of the young democracy that explains the Polish paradox, but rather the specific history of institution-building in Poland since 1989" [Wiatr 1997: 444].

Speaking more generally, it would be a pity if the significance of political efficiency-energy capacity were underestimated in the name of a one-sided view and in comparison with other aims of absolute representativeness. As has been shown, political efficiency is basic to democracy as we know it today. The concept of efficiency is closely linked with the theory of democracy put forward by Schumpeter and subsequently adopted by the majority of contemporary political scientists. This question has both theoretical and practical importance; efficiency should only be abandoned in exceptional circumstances (when the very survival of democracy is at stake).

As to the relation between representativeness and efficiency-action capacity, neither a parliamentary nor a presidential system is, unfortunately, able to maximise both at the one and the same time. Some political scientists claim to have found a constitutional choice which does maximise both aims (representativeness and efficiency) but their arguments are less than convincing. In addition, the actual circumstances must be taken into account: choices which are valid in one situation will not necessarily be appropriate in other circumstances.⁵⁸ No 'model', either majoritarian or consensual, suits all democratic (or democratising) countries.

⁵⁷) The KDS mini-party, which contested the 1992 legislative elections in a pre-election coalition with ODS, later joined with ODS before the next elections.

⁵⁸) This is the position of Robert Dahl: "Whether people committed to the democratic process find it reasonable to adopt majority rule for all collective decision, impose limits on majority rule, or move toward consensual arrangement therefore depends in part on the conditions under which they expect collective decisions will be made. If and as these conditions change, arrangements judged

It is particularly inappropriate to recommend the so-called consensual model (and such of its elements as a strictly proportional electoral system) for those countries in the process of democratisation which are relatively homogeneous and are not highly polarised. Strict proportional representation favours serious fragmentation and polarisation, clears the way for parties opposed to the system as such (anti-system parties), inhibits the formation of a viable party system, places strains on government stability and can lead to impotence and paralysis.

Translated by April Retter

MIROSLAV NOVÁK gained a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Geneva in 1988 and since 1990 has lectured in political science in the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague. His chief area of interest is comparative political sociology, particularly the political transition in the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe, and party systems. His published works include his 1997 books *Systémy politických stran* (Political party Systems, Prague: Slon) and *Une transition démocratique exemplaire? (An Exemplary Democratic Transition?, Prague: Editions du CEFRES).*

References

- Almond, Gabriel A., Sidney Verba 1965. *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Boston: Little Brown and Co.
- Aron, Raymond 1960. "Les institutions politiques de l'Occident dans le monde du XXe siècle." Pp. 11-42 in *La Démocratie à l'épreuve du XXe siècle. Colloques de Berlin*, éd. par Raymond Aron, François Bondy et al. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
- Aron, Raymond 1965. *Démocratie et totalitarisme*. Paris: Gallimard, coll. Idées.
- Bagehot, Walter 1963. *The English Constitution*. London: The Fontana Library.
- Bělohradský, Václav 1994. "Demokratické dilema a norské NE." *Lidové noviny*, 1. 12. 1994: 5.
- Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al. 1954. *Voting. A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Blondel, Jean 1993. "Presidency or Constitutional Monarchy?" *Gouvernement and Opposition* 28: 415-416.
- Boudon, Raymond 1986. *L'Idéologie ou l'origine des idées reçues*. Paris: Fayard.
- Braud, Philippe 1997. *Science politique. I. La démocratie*. Paris: Seuil, coll. Points.
- Buchanan, James M., Gordon Tullock 1967. *The Calculus of Consent*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Cox, Gary 1987. *The Efficient Secret*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Crawford, Keith 1996. *East Central European politics today*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.
- Crepaz, Markus M. L. 1996. "Consensus versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes." *Comparative Political Studies* 29: 4-26.
- Crozier, Michel J., Samuel P. Huntington et al. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy. Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: New York University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. (ed.) 1965. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

suitable in previous circumstances may be modified in one direction or another – toward stricter majoritarianism or toward greater non-majoritarianism" [Dahl 1989: 161].

- Dahl, Robert A. 1970. *After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1990. *After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society*. Revised Edition, Yale University Press. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1994. "A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation." *Political Science Quarterly* 109: 23-34.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf 1980. "Effectiveness and Legitimacy: On the Governability of Democracies." *The Political Quarterly* 51: 393-410.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf 1990. "Cesty ke svobodě: demokratizace a její problémy ve střední Evropě" (Ways to Freedom: Democratisation and its Problems in East Central Europe). *Svědectví*, no. 91: 87-97.
- Di Palma, Giuseppe 1991. "Why Democracy can work in Eastern Europe." *Journal of Democracy* 2: 21-31.
- Duhamel, Olivier 1995. *Les démocraties* (2nd edition, first edition 1993). Paris: Seuil, coll. Essais.
- Duverger, Maurice 1981. *Les partis politiques* (10th edition, first edition 1951). Paris: Armand Colin, coll. Points.
- Duverger, Maurice 1982. *La République des citoyens*. Paris: Editions Ramsey.
- Duverger, Maurice 1988a. *Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel. vol. 1* (17th edition, first edition 1955). Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Duverger, Maurice 1988b. *La nostalgie de l'impuissance*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Duverger, Maurice 1996. "Les monarchies républicaines." *Pouvoirs*, no. 78: 107-120.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz 1991. "Democratic Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration." *British Journal of Political Science* 21: 285-313.
- Elster, Jon 1980. "Négation active et négation passive." *Archives européennes de sociologie* 21, no. 2.
- Finer, Samuel E. 1975. "Introduction: Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform." Pp. 3-32 in *Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform*, ed. by Samuel E. Finer. London: Anthony Wigram.
- Hazan, Reuven Y. 1995. "Center Parties and Systemic Polarization." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7: 421-445.
- Hermet, Guy 1989. *Le peuple contre la démocratie*. Paris: Fayard.
- Hermet, Guy 1996. "Abstentionnisme." P. 9 in *Dictionnaire de la science politique et des institutions politiques*, ed. par Guy Hermet, Bertrand Badie et al. (first edition 1994), Paris: A. Colin.
- Inglehart, Ronald 1990. *Culture shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kaiser, André 1997. "Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9: 419-444.
- Kerr, Henry 1987. "The Swiss Party System: Steadfast and Changing." Pp. 107-192 in *Party Systems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium*, ed. by Hans Daalder. London: F. Pinter.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter (ed.) 1993. *Citoyenneté et démocratie directe*. Zurich: Seismo.
- Lane, Jan-Erik, Svante Ersson 1996. *Comparative Politics*. (First edition 1994). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Lane, Jan-Erik, Svante Ersson 1997. "Parties and Voters: What Created the Ties?" *Scandinavian Political Studies* 20: 179-195.
- Lewis, Arthur 1965. *Politics in West Africa*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

- Lijphart, Arend 1991a. "Constitutional choices for new democracies." *Journal of Democracy* 2: 72-84.
- Lijphart, Arend 1991b. "Majority rule in theory and practice: the tenacity of a flawed paradigm." *International Social Science Journal*, no. 129: 483-493.
- Lijphart, Arend (ed.) 1992a. *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend 1992b. "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, 1989-1991." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4: 207-223.
- Lijphart, Arend 1994a. "Democracies: Forms, performance, and constitutional engineering." *Journal of Political Research* 25: 1-17.
- Lijphart, Arend 1994b. "On S. E. Finer's Electoral Theory." *Government and Opposition* 29: 623-636.
- Lijphart, Arend 1994c. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma. Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1996." *American Political Science Review* 91: 1-14.
- Linz, Juan J. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1: 51-70.
- Lipset, Seymour M. 1981. *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics*. Expanded edition (first edition 1960). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M., Kyoung-Ryung Seong et al. 1993. "Comparative analysis of social requisites of democracy." *International Social Science Journal*, no. 136: 155-175.
- Mainwaring, Scott 1993. "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 26: 198-228.
- Mayer, Nonna, Pascal Perrineau 1992. *Les comportements politiques*. Paris: A. Colin.
- Mény, Yves 1978. "Initiative populaire, référendum et recall dans les Etats américains." *Pouvoirs* 7: 107-113.
- Novák, Miroslav 1996. "Démocratie(s) et efficience(s). Y a-t-il un choix constitutionnel supérieur à tous les autres?" *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 3: 689-712.
- Novák, Miroslav 1997a. *Systémy politických stran. Úvod do jejich srovnávacího studia* (Political Party Systems. Introduction to its Comparative Study). Prague: SLON.
- Novák, Miroslav 1997b. *Une transition démocratique exemplaire? L'émergence d'un système de partis dans les pays ichèques*. Prague: Editions du CEFRES.
- Papadopoulos, Yannis (ed.) 1994. *Elites politiques et peuple en Suisse*. Lausanne: Réalités sociales.
- Pélasy, Dominique 1992. *Qui gouverne en Europe?* Paris: Fayard.
- Popkin, Samuel L. 1979. *The rational peasant*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Popper, Karl R. 1992. "Resumé filosofického myšlení: Interview I" (Summary of Philosophical Thought: Interview I). *Reflexe*, no. 7-8: 1-20.
- Popper, Karl R. 1993. "Resumé filosofického myšlení: Interview II" (Summary of Philosophical Thought: Interview II). *Reflexe*, no. 9: 1-23.
- Popper, Karl R., Konrad Lorenz 1985. *Die Zukunft ist offen*. München: R. Piper.
- Popper, Karl R., Konrad Lorenz 1995. *L'Avenir est ouvert*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Powell, G. Bingham Jr. 1982. *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham Jr. 1989. "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1: 107-130.
- Quermonne, Jean-Louis 1988. *L'Alternance au pouvoir*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

- Rae, Douglas W. 1971. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (2nd edition, first edition 1967). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rokkan, Stein 1970. *Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Röpke, Wilhelm 1943. *Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart*. Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag.
- Röpke, Wilhelm 1962. *La crise de notre temps*. (2nd French edition, first French edition 1945). Paris: Petite bibliothèque Payot.
- Rose, Richard (ed.) 1980. *Challenge to Governance: Studies in Overloaded Politics*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Rose, Richard 1984. „Electoral Systems: A Question of Degree or of Principle“, in: Arend Lijphart, Bernard Grofman (eds.), *Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and Alternatives*, New York: Praeger
- Rose, Richard 1992. *What Are the Economic Consequences of PR?* London: Electoral Reform Society.
- Rupnik, Jacques 1993. *L'Autre Europe*. Paris: Odilo Jacob (2nd French edition, 1st French edition 1990).
- Sani, Giacomo, Giovanni Sartori 1982. „Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies.“ Pp. 307-340 in *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change*, ed. by Hans Daalder and Peter Mair. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1968. „Representation: Representational Systems.“ Pp. 465-474 in *International Encyclopedia of the social sciences*, vol. 13, ed. by David L. Dills. New York and London: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1970. „Concept misformation in comparative politics.“ *American Political Science Review* 64: 1033-1053.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1976. *Parties and Party Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1987. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1994a. „Bien comparer, mal comparer.“ *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 1: 19-36.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1994b. „Guidelines for Concepts Analysis.“ In *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*, ed. by Giovanni Sartori. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1994c. *Comparative Constitutional Engineering*. New York and London: Macmillan.
- Sartori, Giovanni 1995. „Failure of Representation or failure of Understanding?“ Paper prepared for the Symposium „The Crisis of Representation“. Forum international des sciences humaines, Paris, October 26-29, 1995 (Unpublished).
- Sartori, Giovanni 1996. „Constitutional Engineering and its Limits.“ Lecture delivered at III Conferencia de la Union Interamericana de Organismos Electorales, Mexico D. F., July 1996 (Unpublished).
- Schofield, Norman 1995. „Coalition Politics: A Formal Model and Empirical Analysis.“ *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7: 245-281.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1962. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (3rd edition, first edition 1942). New York: Harper and Row.
- Seiler, Daniel-Louis 1982. *La politique comparée*. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg, John M. Carey 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Sidjanski, Dusan 1975. "Environnement politique en Suisse." In *Les Suisses et la politique*, ed par Dusan Sidjanski, Charles Roig et al. Berne et Francfort: Lang.
- Taagepera, Rein, Matthew S. Shugart 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral System*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tingsten, Herbert 1937. *Political Behaviour: Studies in Election Statistics*. London: P. S. King and Son.
- Toinet, Marie-France 1976. "La concurrence électorale imparfaite aux Etats-Unis." *Revue française de science politique* 5: 899-928.
- Tournon, Jean 1985. "Représenter ou gouverner, il faut choisir." Pp. 107-119 in *La Représentation*, ed. par François d'Arcy. Paris: Economica.
- Tullock, Gordon 1976. *The Vote Motive*. London: The Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Wiatr, Jerzy 1997. "Three parliaments in the Era of Transition, 1989-1995." *International Political Science Review* 18: 443-450.
- Zinoviev, Alexandr 1976a. *Zijajuščiye vysoty*. Lausanne: L'Age d'homme.
- Zinoviev, Alexandre 1976b. *Les Hauteurs béantes*. Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme (French trans.: W. Berelowitch)
- Zinoviev, Alexandre 1983. *Le Communisme comme réalité*. Paris: Livre de poche.

Mass Privatization, Distributive Politics, and Popular Support for Reform in the Czech Republic

**JOHN S. EARLE
SCOTT G. GEHLBACH
ZUZANA SAKOVÁ
JIŘÍ VEČERNÍK**

Published by the Institute of Sociology,
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic,
Jilská 1, Praha 1,
fax + 420 2 24 22 02 78,
e-mail sociolog@soc.cas.cz

"Working Papers" WP 97:4

Copies may be ordered from the address below:

Price 92,- Kč (5 USD)

Summary: This paper presents an empirical analysis of the role of privatisation policy design in creating a constituency for economic reform, focussing on the case of the Czech Republic in the early 1990s. Drawing on a sample survey of 1459 Czech individuals in January 1996, we construct attitudinal indicators of the respondents' reactions to reforms, their opinions on the roles of the state and the market in the economy, their perceptions of the legitimacy of transition, and their democratic values. Using ordered probit estimation techniques, and controlling for income and a variety of other characteristics of individuals, we find that receiving property through the extensive Czech program of restitution is strongly associated with higher support for reform, for markets, and for democracy. Concerning the voucher privatisation program, we find that participants tend to be more supportive of reform than non-participants, but most of this effect is accounted for by the stronger support of participants who have retained their shares rather than selling shortly after receiving them. Among workers employed in firms of different ownership types, there is a weak tendency for workers in privatised firms to oppose reforms, but a clear propensity of entrepreneurs to support them. The results provide evidence for the hypothesis that the particular design of a reform program may have important effects on the attitudes of the citizenry, including their willingness to support the reform and their faith in markets and democracy.

Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe*

The 'Old Left' and the 'New Right'

ZSUZSA FERGE**

Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest

Abstract: The situation of women was improved in many respects under the totalitarian state socialist system. However, the improvement was brought about from the top down, without civil participation and control. Also, many legal and financial dispositions concerning the family, women and gender relations were fundamentally conservative. Such politics may not be seen as left-wing. The socialists never analysed their mistakes in this respect, so that a consistent left-wing agenda on family and gender policy is still missing irrespective of whether they are in government or in opposition.

Since the collapse of the old system, many new 'right' trends have gained ground. Conservative trends are harming the reproductive rights of women and are questioning the legitimacy of their work outside the home. Economic crisis and monetary pressures are leading to a wholesale reorganisation of former social policy dispositions, with a minimal state, the scaling down of universal and social insurance benefits, the spread of individually targeted social assistance and market or quasi-market solutions. This results in increasing child and female poverty. Also, the situation of women on the labour market is worsening because of the weakening of rights and the play of 'free' market forces.

The attitudes of women have been changing during and after 'socialism'. This is one of the foundations of further changes. The other and most important one is that in the new system civil and political rights have been strengthened. This is a gain for civil society in general. These rights allow the assertion of group interests, hence they may effectively serve the interests of women. For this to happen, however, it will take time, but this seems the only asset of women in the face of a 'patriarchal' state and an unrestrained market.

Czech Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 5 (No. 2: 159-178)

1. The 'Old Left' – Before and After

It will take a long time before it is possible to give a credible brief account of the performance of the Soviet-type state socialist systems or totalitarian socialism. The difficulties of a fair assessment are not easily overcome in the case of women either, all the less

*) My own experience is limited to Hungary. Since there have been not only politically induced similarities but also extremely important differences among the countries of the bloc, I tried to gather information on other countries as well, so as to avoid unwarranted generalisations. The systematic account of the various (similar or different) trends is a task which is yet to be done.

The paper was originally prepared for the conference *Family, sexuality and labour markets: the role of symbolic politics in the assault on the welfare state*, University of Bergen, Norway, May 26-28, 1995, and then rewritten in early 1997 thanks to an extended stay in the Institute of Human Studies, Vienna. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers of the *Czech Sociological Review* for making useful comments.

**) Direct all correspondence to Professor Zsuzsa Ferge, Dept. of Social Policy, Eötvös Lóránd University, Muzeum krt. 4/c, Budapest 1088, phone + 36 1 266 1008, e-mail ferge@ludens.elte.hu

because politics varied a lot during the 40 or 70 years in question. Let us start this tentative and cursory assessment with some 'objective' trends.

The 'equality of women' was long a declared objective of politics. One of its foundations was the equalisation of formal rights. Acts were adopted at an early stage of the system assuring equal rights for women in politics (the right to vote and to be elected), and within marriage. This meant among other things the abolition of legal and social discrimination against illegitimate children, the right to divorce or to inherit, and so forth.¹ Whether all these rights materialised or not is a different issue. While women certainly went to vote (the right having become an unconditional must for both sexes), they have remained vastly underrepresented in all leading positions.²

Another foundation was the enhancement of educational opportunities. The schooling of girls up to tertiary level was encouraged with no small success. For instance, the rate of girls in higher education went up from a pre-war level of 20 percent or less to over 50 percent. In this case there was no real pressure, and sometimes – particularly in earlier periods – some positive discrimination may have been applied in favour of women.³ Nonetheless, the educational structure of girls has remained somewhat crooked in all the countries. They have been overrepresented in educational channels leading to less well-remunerated or less 'marketable' jobs (such as teaching), and underrepresented particularly in vocational training and in the technical sciences. These – more or less spontaneous – one-sided options of girls has led to some segregation both in educational institutions and, as a consequence, also in the world of work. Whether the survival of traditional female educational and professional choices (operating usually against the long-term interests of women) was biologically or socially conditioned was a matter for debate even at the time [Ferge 1983].

The most important pillar of 'emancipation' was certainly the gainful employment of women. In all the countries 80 to 90 per cent of women had gainful employment at the end of the eighties. The anti-women bias – the underrepresentation of women on the higher levels of the job-hierarchy, a more or less segregated job-structure, and the 20 or 30 percent lower pay for women even in similar jobs plagued state-socialist countries by and large as much as most countries in Western Europe (with the possible exception of Sweden and Norway).

It is nowadays a controversial issue to what extent the politics of the gainful employment of women was motivated by strong ideological pressures; by the need of man-

1) One (male) Hungarian sociologist long maintained that the system gave more rights to women than to men, allowing women to destroy the social fabric by undermining the family, socialising children in a feminine way etc. [Hernádi 1988].

2) It is a rare pleasure to look at the paintings or photos representing the members of the 'Politbureau', of the Central Committee or the Council of Ministers in any of the countries at any point in time. Women are always conspicuous by their absence. One could find at most one or two 'token' women in those illustrious bodies. The ratio of female MPs was 30 percent at most.

3) In later years, in Hungary at least, some negative discrimination against women could be detected in fields where they had become overrepresented, like in law, or where strong male interests could successfully prevail to curtail the entrance of women. In fact, the relationship between the prestige and the earnings of a profession on the one hand, and its degree of feminisation on the other had been uncovered already in the sixties and has been demonstrated systematically ever since [e.g. Sullerot 1968, Koncz 1985] which explains the increasing vocality of male interests.

power for extensive industrialisation; by the aspiration to hold down wages (so that only families with at least two earners could manage); or by the political will to exert maximum control over the population. It is also debated whether the high activity rate of women was only forced on society from the top down, or whether there was also a push in this direction from the bottom up. *Put more simply, the debate is about whether women wished to work or were only coerced to do so.*

In all probability, many of the above factors and perhaps others too, played some role in shaping the final outcome. The impact of symbolic coercion or violence (to enforce the norm to work outside the home) is undeniable, and so are its negative effects, such as the overburdening of women, and the weakening of the already declining family. It may also be that retrospective evaluation is highly influenced by the later political climate. Right around the time of the collapse of the system it was indeed fashionable to vilify everything belonging to the past, so that all the facts and measures concerning women were interpreted by many as the malevolent intervention of a macho state wronging women. In the later years opinions have become more nuanced. This diversity of evaluation is easy to detect in the literature both East and West. It is emphatically present in the current Eastern literature. For instance, Sieminska [1994] sees the work of women in Poland as being only enforced from above. According to Panova et al. [1993: 17] in Bulgaria “the right to work outside the family (...) turned into a burden, a compulsion”. In Ostner’s [1994: 52] formulation based on survey results “East-German women not only wanted but had to work to make ends meet”. Analysing historical evidence, Havelková [1993: 64] suggests, though, that “In the Czech case, the high employment of women (...) was not resented by women as much as is sometimes claimed today in sweeping criticisms against the totalitarian system”. Szalai [1991] has also many doubts and queries. I am unable to arbitrate in these debates. On the basis of personal experience and of some – always debatable⁴ – statistics, it seems to me that in the early years the aspiration of women for more freedom played a larger role, and the feeling of pressure from above was weaker than in the later decades. This may only be an optical illusion, because I was just at the beginning of my adult life in the post-war years and strongly identified with the socialist view on the work of women. However, Heinen [1995: 95] notes also for Poland that according to surveys done at different periods, there was a shift between the sixties and the eighties in women’s attitudes towards work from a more ‘positive’ to a more ‘critical’ attitude.

The work of women outside the home was supported by a heavily subsidised network of services offering alternatives to home chores (laundries, canteens, etc.), and more importantly by alternative child care. Child-care institutions were spreading with some delay: ideology was at its strongest in the fifties, while the expansion of the child-care network started in all satellite countries in the sixties. From then on, it developed rather rapidly almost everywhere. With the exception of Poland, for instance, from the 1980s onwards, 80 to 90% of children between 3 and 6 had access to kindergartens. Nurseries for children under 3 had always been less all-encompassing, often causing difficulties if

⁴) I am referring to the first post-war survey on women which was carried out by the Central Statistical Office in 1960. In this the majority of women expressed their wish to, or satisfaction with, paid work, and not only for financial reasons. These results may be suspect because the survey was done in 1960, when self-censorship, or hidden political fears may have distorted the answers. [*Women...* 1962].

women with a young child wanted or had to continue to pursue a gainful occupation. It is again a controversial issue whether these institutions served essentially indoctrination and regimentation (for former East-Germany, see for example Ostner [1993]), or the genuine needs of children and women or families.⁵

The need for the work of women weakened, however, with time. An alternative for institutionalised early child care was found in the late sixties. The first paid and job-protected extended leave (initially two, somewhat later three years leave) was introduced in Hungary in 1967⁶ over and above the relatively long (around 20 weeks) fully-paid maternity leave [Kamerman and Kahn 1991]. The other institutions for 'parenting' were not weakened thereby, but ideological pressure changed the orientation, beginning to favour child-rearing at home, and the home-making role of women. As a matter of fact, in all the countries of the bloc 'parenting' politics had become strongly influenced by pronatalist concerns from usually the late sixties onwards. The assessment of Heitlinger [1993: 96] for Czechoslovakia is valid for most countries: "With the arrival of socialist pronatalism in the late 1960s, many facilities and measures adopted in the 1950s on egalitarian grounds were expanded to meet explicitly demographic objectives." It is also generally valid that "While popular (...) the pronatalist measures had a predictable negative impact on women's careers and the domestic division of labour" [ibid.]. The pronatalist concerns had a weaker or stronger impact on the right to chosen parenthood, to sexuality, and abortion almost everywhere, with the most tragic practice and consequences in Romania [Harsanyi 1993].

All in all, however, the *objective* situation of women has probably improved everywhere as compared to the pre-war situation. Their paid work outside the home contributed to the well-being of the family (at least it helped to make ends meet); their educational advancement and the work outside the home enriched (at least in the majority of cases) their life experience; their status as earners weakened their former oppression within and outside the family and made them (somewhat) less subservient in some walks of life.⁷ Also, it attenuated female poverty, especially in the case of mothers who practically all started to work, and of older women who obtained a pension in their own right. Indeed, despite many inequities and inequalities subsisting between men and women, the 'feminisation of poverty' was much less salient than in most western countries.

The question is, to what extent was this policy left-wing? Formally it followed some of the tenets laid down in the early classics (Bebel for one) or in socialist blue-prints. If, however, we try to apply it to the welfare state models worked out by Jane Lewis, we encounter serious difficulties. Lewis makes a distinction between three main gender welfare regimes, namely a strong male-breadwinner state (for instance Britain), a

⁵) The pedagogical and psychological views influencing the work of teachers in Hungarian kindergartens were, for instance, strongly influenced by Western 'progressive' or liberal child pedagogy.

⁶) The reasons were not exclusively 'pro-family'. The nurseries were expensive; there was fear of unemployment caused by the economic reform to be introduced in 1968, etc.. Still, the measure became very popular and was gradually introduced in many countries.

⁷) A. Titkow supports this view with the usual necessary caveats: "It is probably true that coping with the demand of paid work, superimposed on the traditional roles of women, has bettered women's self-evaluation. It has served not only as a source of gratification but as a counterweight to the problems work caused to women's mental and physical health, and also as an asset to women's authority in the family." [Titkow 1993: 253]

modified male-breadwinner state (for instance France), and a weak male-breadwinner state (for instance Sweden). The last model is the closest to what may be termed 'left' politics. These categories are based on the politics concerning mothers and wives; on the respective rules of social security, on the availability of supporting services, child-care in the first place, and on the situation of women on the labour market. On the face of it, then, many practices in the Eastern bloc countries were close to the weak male-breadwinner model. However, already Lewis warns us that weak male-breadwinner policies may be motivated not so much by concerns for gender equality as by labour market shortages or pronatalism [Lewis 1992].

Taking into account the – to say the least – mixed motivation of family policy, and also some political aspects to which we will soon turn, a former assessment of the state socialist welfare regime also seems to apply to the politics concerning women:

“despite formal similarities, the liberal and emancipating dimension of the Scandinavian model was entirely absent from the state socialist model of welfare. It had even less in common with the other regime types in Europe. If one wants to label the state socialist welfare system, it could be described as an *anti-liberal- statist-hierarchized-socialist mix, with conservative bits thrown in*” [Ferge and Kolberg 1992: 207].

It would be tedious to prove in detail the validity of this assertion. The anti-liberal, over-centralised, statist character of all politics does not need detailed documentation here. Let me just mention some of its salient characteristics. All decisions were always taken at the top, and the influence of the citizens (or, rather, of the subjects) was, if it existed at all, weak and indirect. It was in this case 'politics for us, but without us'. Rigid anti-liberalism banned all forms of citizen's participation, grass-root movements, spontaneous associations as well as initiatives of individuals or of small groups. The totalitarian logic (even when it became milder) rejected micro-solidarities or partial identities, that is solidarities on a lower level than the international or the national, and identities other than the global identity of “the socialist man” [Avineri 1991]. Hence spontaneous women's movements, feminist or otherwise, never emerged, and women could not identify with each other, expressing collectively, for instance, the wrongs which harmed all of them.

The other, private dimension of this has perhaps even more serious implications. Because of the impossibility of free public discourse, *gender relations never became a public issue*. In public life, work, studies, culture, or even politics, women have become (almost) equal, and they may have felt (almost) equal. But in the private sphere, in partner relations, within the family as well as in the private (interpersonal) side of relations – whether in politics or at the workplace – the traditional construction of the role of men and women remained by and large untouched.

The conservatism of politics concerning women became particularly clear in the later decades, when (essentially for better political control, but also for strengthening the basis of the intergenerational transmission of recently acquired advantages and privileges) politics started to idolise the family. This meant, as already pointed out, the provision of welfare incentives for the home-making woman; more or less serious limitations of human rights in the case of abortion and divorce; the condemnation of 'illegal', out of marriage relationships; taboos placed on sexuality, especially on homosexual relationships, on wife and child abuse, and such like. The 'communist' morality relating to

women and the family varied from country to country, but in quite a few cases it became similar to the most orthodox Catholic morality.

To sum up: there were undoubtedly many deliberate steps which improved the position of women. However, the politics informing these decisions was always extremely inconsistent, driven as much by half-understood socialist ideology as by non-explicit male interests and the interests of 'politics'. Because of these contradictory pressures and the absence of a clear political framework the political practice was also extremely erratic. In fact, after the consolidation of totalitarian socialism no political theorist ever tried to elaborate a consistently left-wing (socialist or social democratic) family policy or gender policy. The party-state just did not need them, and (the hardly existing) civil society was not allowed to touch the issue.

The problems stemming from the lack of a consistently left-wing family and gender policy have become apparent since the transition. While there was only one party, it was by and large 'natural' that it was divided on many issues. But in a multi-party system one would expect left-wing parties to have left policies, and right-wing parties right ones. Such is not the case though in many countries, and emphatically not in the countries under transformation. In Hungary for instance, where an ultra-conservative government was in place for the first four years, the socialists, then in opposition, often reacted to conservative endeavours (for instance, in the debate on abortion) with the 'correct' left-wing arguments. But as soon as they came to power in 1994, and had to implement a consistent policy, it became apparent that they had never reflected on the contents of the pre-transition family and gender policy, neither were they able to work out any new programme.

2. The New Right

The neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideologies which are still in ascendance throughout the world have had a particular attraction in the transition countries, where formerly only one ideology was recognised as legitimate. This very understandable swing of the pendulum has often been analyzed by political scientists. Here it is necessary to point out some of the implications of these ideologies which have relevance for the situation of women.

2. 1. Conservatism

The well-known leading values of conservatism assign a high priority to religion, particularly the Catholic Church, to the family, and in some cases to the nation.⁸ In the field of *social policy*, over and above the encouragement of interpersonal charity, the main practical principle advocated by the Catholic Church is subsidiarity, a shift of responsibility for help or social action in general from the center or higher levels to the lowest practically possible level. It is widely recognised that subsidiarity is a heavily gendered principle [Duncan 1996, Ostner 1993]. The consequences of this principle coincide with those of the neo-liberal efforts to cut back the state. From the present perspective they both imply a growing role of the caring functions of the family, which means first and foremost increasing the tasks and responsibilities of women for the care of children, the elderly, and the sick. In post-socialist countries these old or increased burdens may have gone unattended, or a particular 'benefit for home nursing' may have been introduced or

⁸) The racist/ethnocentric orientation of the extreme right will not be discussed here.

adapted to the new conditions. In this case institutional underpinning and official recognition have been promoting the changing role of (mainly) women.⁹

However, the role of conservatism and the Church has a particular relevance for *family policy*. This affects – to name only the most important elements – the *work of women* outside the home, *child bearing* and *child rearing*.

As far as work is concerned, the ideological pressure of the fifties, which forced women out of the home, has been replaced by another ideological pressure suggesting that the employment of women, and particularly mothers runs against the best interests of the child, of the family, and therefore of society. Since the proper place of the woman is supposed to be the home, the gainful employment of women is ideologically and politically devalued. These efforts are well served by growing unemployment. In all the post-socialist countries but Hungary, the rate of female unemployment is higher than that of males. Moreover, the non-registered loss of jobs (returning home without registering as unemployed) affects mainly women. Overall data are still scarce, but the former high employment rate of women has certainly diminished. According to a survey covering five Central-Eastern European countries, the rate of 'active' women in the 15-60 age-range did not reach 70 percent even in the Czech Republic, and was near or under 50 percent in two other countries. This was also in most countries significantly lower than the activity rate of men. (This result is only slightly modified if we consider the 15-55 age-range for women.) (See Table 1.)¹⁰

Table 1. The percentage rate of active earners within the 15-60 age range in five countries

	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Hungary	Germany	Poland
Male rate	79	56	60	60	70
Female rate	67	47	55	50	64
n (all actives)	1336	1166	1077	887	1477

Source: SOCO.

Conservative views on *child bearing* have been forcefully presented in quite a few countries. This picture is also varied though, depending on former practices. In Romania, where the situation was by far the worst, the revolution started in Timisoara with doctors performing free abortions, and legislation has been accordingly changed since [Harsanyi 1993]. Because of this past it is now practically impossible to put the issue on the political agenda. In Bulgaria the issue of abortion has not been raised as yet [Todorova 1993]. In the Czech Republic where the practice became liberal in 1987, "since the fall of

⁹) As was already mentioned in the case of child care grants, it is hard to evaluate unambiguously benefits which reward and reinforce symbolically the traditional role of women. On the one hand it is better to have some financial reward for a task one has to do anyway. On the other hand these benefits have always a negative impact on the trends of 'emancipation' and gender equality.

¹⁰) The survey was carried out as part of the SOCO project initiated and co-ordinated by the Institute for Human Studies, Vienna. The countries covered included the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, and the eastern states of Germany that used to be East Germany. The first results are presented in the International report on the Social Consequences of the Transition, written by Zs. Ferge, E. Sik, P. Róbert, and F. Albert. The survey is usually referred to as the SOCO survey.

Communism, the abortion debate has been broadened (...) pitting 'a woman's right to choose' against 'protection of the unborn child'" [Heitlinger 1993: 101]. This author believes though that the curtailment of rights is not likely in the Czech Republic, she is less sure about future developments in Slovakia. According to Milic [1993], the curtailment of women's rights is on the agenda in all the countries of former Yugoslavia. The determined attempt of the conservative parties under the first government (1990-94) in the Hungarian Parliament to restrict birth control rights was defeated only under the pressure of civil society. In Poland a draft law submitted to the Sejm in 1989 proposed just before the parliamentary elections a total ban on abortion [Fuszara 1993]. Genuine mass mobilisation prevented legislation going the whole way as proposed by the Senate. However, the struggle has continued in 1997 as shown by the decision of the Supreme Court advocating a change in the current legislation and a return to the position stressing the inviolability of human life. The biggest losers seem to have been the women of former East Germany where – despite extremely strong resistance – the more restrictive West German legislation was extended to the whole of the newly united country. According to many observers, this was the major bone of contention, and almost a stumbling block, in the debates on the unification. The endeavours to promote giving birth by the 'stick' had been to some extent counterbalanced by 'carrots' rewarding maternity. For instance, the Hungarian Parliament extended in 1993 the family allowance to the yet unborn foetus. (This measure was abolished in 1995.) They also introduced a sort of mother's wage for mothers with 3 or more children. Similar steps were also under consideration in other countries. However, the neo-liberal forces successfully opposed all the efforts – conservative or otherwise – to improve by state action the situation of mothers and children. In some cases the ethnocentric bias of conservatism had a negative effect on families. One case in point is the Serbian proposal (in 1990) to increase family benefits for families with three children but to abolish all benefits for families with more than three children (the majority of whom are Albanians).

Child-rearing has also become an ideologically loaded issue. If the place of the woman is the home, and if the main duty and privilege of the woman is to bear and rear children, then there is no more need of the former network of child-care institutions. As a direct consequence, nurseries for the under-3s have become undesirable and their number has contracted almost everywhere. The cuts also affected kindergartens, despite the fact that their pedagogical role was more widely accepted. According to a UNICEF report ["Children..." 1997], a smaller or larger decline of child-care institutions may be observed in all the transition countries, if not for ideological, then for financial reasons, and this affects both nurseries and kindergartens [Fajth 1996, "Children..." 1997] (Table 2). These cutbacks harmonise, of course, with the minimalist welfare program of the neo-liberals.

2. 2. *Liberalism*

Neo-liberalism had entered the scene in some countries, mainly Hungary and Poland, already under the former system from at least the late seventies onwards. However, it remained somewhat shamefaced and represented more of a hidden than an open agenda. After the disappearance of the official ideology, it was able to become part and parcel of official politics in all the countries in transition. Obviously, the liberalisation of the economy, including the creation of a market and the reintroduction of private ownership, and of politics complete with many freedoms and new institutions such as political par-

ties, independent courts and such like was everywhere an absolute must. These changes were supported by a huge majority of the citizens. However, neo-liberal thinking also affects social policy, and thereby the everyday living conditions of the citizens in many ways. This is much less in line with the expectations of the large majority of the citizens who, at the time of the transition wanted not only political freedom and a market, but also hoped for a Swedish-type welfare state 'written large' [Myles and Brym 1992: 29]. All the surveys conducted since demonstrate that these expectations have remained very intense [e.g. Ferge et al. 1995], but have been heavily disappointed.

Table 2. Children in nurseries and kindergartens in selected CEE countries

	1989	Most recent year available since 1990	1989	1995
	Children in nurseries ^a		Pre-primary enrolment rate ^b	
Bulgaria	12.9	9.9 ('94)	93.0 ('85)	67.5
Czech	13.8	1.7 ('93)	99.3	88.6
Hungary	11.7	10.9('95)	91.0 ('85)	86.9
Poland	na	na	48.7	45.3
Romania	4.4	3.2('94)	82.9	58.4
Russia	34.7	19.8('94)	69.3	54.0
Slovakia	na	na	91.5	70.8

a) Percentage of all 0-2 years old in nurseries

b) In percentage of the relevant population

Source: UNICEF: 97 and 158

New endeavours are aimed at assuring the free choice and the autonomy of citizens. The instruments of this objective are the 'minimal state' with substantially reduced taxation, the pluralisation, privatisation and marketisation of former public services and public goods, and the limitation of state help (if any) to the 'truly needy'. J. Kornai [1992] coined the expression of a "premature welfare state", implying that the Hungarian state in the eighties was overdeveloped and profligate. He has suggested the introduction of another "pure" model. In this model the responsibility of the state for public welfare should be strictly limited: "the state gives financial help from the taxpayers' money only to the needy", and builds up the legal framework for the operation of the non-profit and for-profit insurance companies or of other marketed services including health and unemployment insurance [Kornai 1994]. A Czech economist, Kinkor [1996] goes much further: he negates the validity of such concepts as the public interest or the public good; he maintains that the state had to stop interfering not only in the economy, but also in education, health care, culture, and housing which should be regulated by free exchange; and he qualifies unemployment as purely an individual problem, and therefore "the foolish battle of governments with unemployment is nothing other than a distortion of this extremely valuable information source" [Kinkor 1966: 119, quoted by Potůček 1966: 6].

It is understandable that the enormity of the task and the lack of any historical experience led to many mistakes. Partly because of the fatal attraction of the above ideology, many of the badly needed reforms went overboard. As the authors of a World Bank book note:

"Because the previous system failed to produce many of its predicted economic and social benefits, radical reformers during the transition have been quick to con-

demn, and even to discard, almost everything that existed during the past. As a result, there is now a serious risk that, at least in the health sector, some of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe may throw out the baby with the bathwater” [Preker and Feachem: 289-290].

In fact, the risk has not been limited to the health sector. Too liberal policies in, for example, foreign trade, or ideologically based solutions in privatization, or unthinking monetarist shock-therapies have probably even harmed the economy. The vulnerability of social policy has been much greater though. However, it is true that the fraction of the GDP redistributed for social policy purposes has usually remained at its former level for some years after the transformation, and has only lately started to shrink. (Of course in absolute terms the value diminished from the start with a 15 percent or larger drop in officially recorded GDP.)

The cuts go parallel with structural changes. Some of them have already taken place, many more are in the offing. Some changes are responses to new needs such as the introduction of unemployment insurance, the development of active labour market policies, or the introduction of new forms of social assistance. Others operate in the above-mentioned direction of the minimal state. The bulk of price subsidies were abolished without any compensation. Universal or near-universal (employment-related) benefits such as the family allowance have been abrogated everywhere and replaced by means-tested variants [“Children...” 1997: 100]. Universal services have been generally transformed into insurance (in the case of health services) or partly marketised (some parts of the health system, or schools in some countries). The level of benefits has been cut back, not only because of the shortage of funds (affecting for instance pensions), but also on ideological grounds. Unemployment benefits offered at first on a relatively good level were cut back in order ‘to give more incentive to get people back to work’; social assistance to stimulate self-help and to avoid a ‘dependency culture’; health and pension standards in order to give space to, and incentive for, private (market) provisions. In many areas low or no fees had been replaced by relatively high or market prices (homes for the elderly, school meals). It has to be emphasised that the ‘quasi-market’ solution widespread in England (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1994) implying that the state retains its financing and regulatory role and abandons service delivery, is seen with less favour than genuine marketisation.

Theoretically both the state and the market are gender-blind. In practice they are not. Feminist analysts started to show over a decade ago [Williams 1989, Walby 1990, Lewis 1993] the gender biases built into the operation of a ‘patriarchal state’.¹¹ However, it has long been recognised that the elimination of the ‘spontaneous’ or quasi-intended gender bias of state politics needed deliberate intervention, often prompted by civil movements, but ultimately implemented (paradoxically or not) by state action. Interestingly enough, once civil and political rights had been extended to women, the bulk of interventions to promote gender equality have usually focused – rightly or wrongly – on the labour market, more precisely on the conditions enabling women to become equal

¹¹) More recently, Skocpol [1992] argued that a ‘woman-friendly’ welfare state was historically not inconceivable, since this is how welfare politics started in the United States. This seems to be, however, a unique case.

partners (competitors) on the labour market.¹² Practically all the directives and recommendations of the European Union (starting with Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 recommending the principle of equal pay to equal work) relate to this point.¹³ They cover the equal pay of women (1975), equal treatment at work (1976), equal treatment in social security (1979 and 1986), minimum maternity leave rights (1992), and the possibilities of 'reconciling occupational and family responsibilities' (The Social Charter 1989) which seems possible only by providing public caring services [Duncan 1996]. Evidence suggests that even when directives, pieces of legislation, monitoring, some civil control and even a court of redress exist, the situation of women may deteriorate because market forces under the present conditions are increasingly hard to curb, and public support in employment and child care are low priorities. Thus the position of women relative to men has deteriorated on the labour market in the last decade or so in the European Union in terms of unemployment, job segregation, their presence in atypical and non-protected jobs, and the earning gap [*Women...* 1994]. Also, the feminisation of poverty seems to be on the increase mainly because of the increasing number of single mothers.

The question is what happens to women when public commitments are shrinking, when the state is both unwilling and unable to intervene in market transactions, and when the gender issue is almost absent from the political agenda. The answer is almost self-evident. If nothing happens to counteract the sociologically foreseeable consequences of very unequal conditions and power relations, the majority of women are likely to be among the losers of the social transformation. The winners among them will be – and already are – the best educated younger women who have an entrepreneurial spirit: the world has opened for them.

Of course, the processes which may be detrimental to women have only started. They are also not always properly followed up by appropriate statistics or monitoring. Still, some information is already available, and informed guesses may also be advanced. As far as the position of women on the *labour market* is concerned, the decline of economic activity in the case of both sexes, and the higher risk of unemployment for women have already been noted. The preparation of men and women for the requirements of the market seems to be increasingly unequal. While the educational level of men and women used to be equal or women had an advantage, the type of education of men seems to have been always more 'market-oriented' and therefore better adaptable to the new conditions. Nowadays men appear to be more and more overrepresented in those educational streams leading to highly rewarded posts.

More detailed studies show some causes and consequences of the increasing vulnerability of women. Women have more difficulties in getting a job (even with the same qualifications as men) because they are less 'flexible'. In other words, when young, they are a risk to the employer because of absences due to pregnancy or the illness of a child. (Heinen [1995: 94] reports cases when private company directors requested a written

¹²) Some particularly vulnerable female groups, like mothers or old women, the core groups leading to the feminisation of poverty may appear as exceptions. The redress of their situation may require only additional benefits. Ultimately though, their poverty is also caused by their tenuous relation to the labour market.

¹³) Of course, the documents of the Union repeatedly emphasise that the Union concerns itself rather 'with workers than with citizens in general' [Duncan 1996: 407], and this in itself is significant.

promise from women applicants not to get pregnant for a certain period. Kotowska [1995: 85] records that the personal characteristics and family conditions of female applicants are more closely scrutinised than those of men.) Because labour laws or legislation protecting women are weakened or may be easily disregarded, women have to accept unhealthy jobs, long hours or work-shifts hard to adjust to family needs, and various new forms of exploitation and harassment [Moghadan 1996].¹⁴ Even when these and similar practices are illegal, women do not protest for fear of not getting or losing a job. Where a benefit still exists, such as extended child care leave, a decreasing proportion of women are making use of it and for a shorter time. They are also anxious for their job because they may be made redundant if not immediately after the return, then shortly afterwards.¹⁵ 'Higher' age (over 40 or so) is in general an obstacle to re-employment, but in case of women increasing sexism creates additional difficulties. Both women and men are harmed by unprotected jobs on the black market, but women may be in an even weaker situation. The wage gap has increased partly because women seem to accept low wages and bad working conditions more easily than men, and partly because the rapid widening of inequality in earnings profits particularly those in top positions rarely attained by women. One may assume, albeit research would be needed to prove the point, that the specific psychological disposition of women may mean that they are less ready (in a statistically significant way) than men to espouse, and to adjust their behaviour to, the dominant values of the market, especially competitiveness and exclusively profit-oriented 'rationality'. If true, this may harm their chances in reemployment, promotion, and so on.

The withdrawal of the state from the social sphere and the institutional changes in *welfare provisions* have a negative impact on families and individuals in general, but they may affect women in particular ways. The shrinking of child-care services is a clear case in point. If there are no free or cheap institutions offering good day care for children, the work of the mothers becomes either extremely difficult, or too costly, or outright impossible. The consequence is a decrease in income, or increasing poverty. The result is similar when family benefits become targeted and their level is eroded.

Children (or families with children) in general, and single mothers in particular have become particularly vulnerable. The ratio of children in poverty has increased dramatically, usually more than that of the whole population (Table 3). This obviously hits parents as well.

There are hardly any data on single mothers. According to the SOCO survey (covering five Central-Eastern European countries) their situation was particularly bad in Poland and East Germany (Table 4). In East Germany mothers have become one of the poorest groups because of a combination of all the above problems and because unemployment benefits were relatively good for men at least [Engfer 1995]. According to Eng-

¹⁴) The book referred to is a collection of papers about the experiences of women with the market covering China, Vietnam, Cuba and the European countries Bulgaria, Poland, and Russia. The book is still in manuscript so that quotations and references cannot be offered. It is though a fascinating chronicle covering legislation, statistics and case studies, all written by women from the respective countries.

¹⁵) Under state-socialism – with state enterprises and co-operatives – it was easy for the state to enforce the protection of these jobs. With private employers, especially with foreign companies the situation is different.

fer, the adverse conditions of single mothers represent a new development in East Germany. As shown in the same table, families with one or sometimes two children are usually better off than families with more than two children, so that larger families are in particular danger of poverty. However, single mothers seem to be even in greater danger. On the basis of Table 4, the Hungarian situation seems to be relatively favourable, but in 1994 the family benefits had as yet been untouched.

Table 3. Incidence of poverty among the whole population and children in selected countries

		Low income (35,40 or 45% of the average wage)		Poverty (60% of low) income line	
		Total population	Children	Total population	Children
Bulgaria	1990	13.8	17.7	2.0	32.7
(45%)	1994	63.5	71.9	32.7	42.5
Czech Republic	1989	4.2	4.2	0.2	0.3
(35%)	1992	26.7	40.1	1.4	1.2
Hungary	1989	10.1	7.0	1.1	1.8
(40%)	1994	22.0	27.5	6.1	9.5
Poland	1989	23.1	30.6	5.8	8.4
(40%)	1992	36.3	52.6	10.9	19.9
Romania	1989	28.2	34.3	7.0	8.9
(45%)	1994	65.7	75.7	29.1	37.5
Slovakia	1989	4.1	5.8	0.1	0.1
(40%)	1993	31.3	52.1	5.1	9.4

Source: ["Children...": 24].

Table 4. Equivalent income in families with children in % of households without children, head under 60, 1994¹⁶

	Czech Republic	Poland	Hungary	Germany	Slovakia
Single parent	69	42	81	63	66
couple, 1 child	89	56	90	90	89
couple, 2 children	78	48	86	76	74
couple, 3 +children	55	44	85	94	57

Source: SOCO

The increasing poverty of families affects women also in other ways. According to previous research [Sas 1976] they have always been predominantly responsible for the finances of the household, and they have been the main agents in official matters relating

¹⁶) The number of the families observed is relatively low in some sub-groups, so that the results have to be handled with caution:

	Czech Republic	Poland	Hungary	Germany	Slovakia
n, families total	112	203	150	101	143
out of it:					
Single parents	52	60	76	142	48
couple, 3+ children	39	123	49	24	80

to the family. Hence they may experience more difficulties than previously in making ends meet.¹⁷ And it is probable that the humiliating experience of asking for assistance and dealing with bureaucratic red tape is also mostly their lot.

The gains from liberalism are basic. The basic liberal value is freedom, and indeed the foremost gain of the transition is freedom in many meanings of the term. It is thanks to the liberal strand in politics that civil and political rights have become firmly established. The new freedoms also allow women to correct former failures, to start grass-root movements, to initiate a public discourse both on gender-relations and on the 'women's issue' in general, or to put pressure on politicians to take this issue seriously, if not for other reasons than in order to conform to the established norms of the European Union. However, as will be shown presently, very little seems to be happening in this area.

3. Changing Attitudes

3.1. Attitudes

The transformation of social relations on the macro and micro level was part and parcel of the egalitarian socialist project from 1945 onwards. The relationships in practically all the countries of Central-Eastern Europe before the war were heavily hierarchised, inequalitarian, and sometimes, as in Hungary, almost feudal. This meant extremely asymmetrical relations between rich and poor, employer and employee, and also between men and women. This asymmetry was built into the 'habitus' of people, and expressed itself among others in body language as well as in verbal communication. In the Hungarian language for instance, as in French or German, there are two ways of addressing people. The asymmetry meant that the employer addressed the worker with "*tu*", and the worker had to answer "*vous*". This same pattern could prevail between master and servant, parent and child, or husband and wife.

The forty years of state socialism can be seen as a forced modernization project. One element of it was the modernization of the above relations. Apparently, in this case there was a breakthrough. The spontaneous subservience of workers or servants practically disappeared. After all, even if workers never believed that they were the 'ruling class', and used to make fun of this slogan, they could not help but feel a change in their social standing concerning their objective conditions as well as their relative position within society [Kemény 1985]. The same applies to women. The spontaneous deference and submission both in private and public life has weakened – even though vestiges have survived. One of the most telling ones is that in public debates (political or scientific meetings included) the 'big white man' may address the woman opponent by her given name, while he expects the woman so addressed to give him his full title and/or family name.

All in all it seems that despite the big divide between the power elite and the rest of the population under the former system, people in different walks of life started to

¹⁷) The vastly increased supply of consumer goods and the disappearance of queuing in the 'consolidated' countries are certainly a gain for everybody. However, we do not know to what extent is this a compensation for those who can afford only the cheapest products. Also, price-hunting which is practised by a large majority everywhere [Sik 1995] is also time-consuming. More psychological tests would be needed to know how people in general, women in particular, evaluate these various trade-offs.

believe themselves less submissive, less dependent, and more equal. The habitus started to change. And since this element of the socialist project cannot be considered particularly socialist, but an integral part of a normal process of modernisation, one may hope that the change cannot and will not be reversed.

Attitudes have also changed in other areas of life. One important field is the attitude to work. I have already discussed the controversial experience under state socialism. The situation is no less controversial nowadays. There are comparative survey data relating to 1988 and 1994 on this issue. Apparently, men used to be far more conservative than women before the transition and came closer to the outlook of women in 1994. However, this is not only because men have become somewhat less conservative, but also because women may have become more so. The opinion according to which mothers, especially mothers with small children, have to remain home has become more prevalent [Tóth 1995]. This shift does not seem to hold for all the aspects of women's work. In most countries women seem to be starting to re-evaluate their former working experience. "Bulgarian women entered the post-communist epoch with a very positive attitude to working. Only one-fifth of women, compared to one-third of men, think that women should stay home and not work (...) Even if they were fully secure financially, 70 percent of working women would still prefer to work full-time" [Petrova 1993: 26]. In several surveys in Russia it was found that around 90 percent shared this view [Waters 1993: 292].¹⁸ Šiklová [1993: 82] quotes results from a relatively early Czech survey with lower figures, but still with a positive bias for work outside the home. (28% would 'definitely' work, 32% 'would consider it', and 40% would 'definitely not work'). Women of former East Germany continue to be more work-oriented than their Western counterparts.

It is anybody's guess as to what extent the changes are influenced by new ideological pressures, by real convictions which could not be expressed freely beforehand, or by the weakening supports for working women; and to what extent are the continuities motivated by the inertia of habits, by continued or increased existential necessities, or by a genuine wish to work, for whatever reasons. My own impression is that women resent being forced out of work or being condemned as 'bad wives and mothers' if they work at least as much as they resented it when they were forced to perform low-paid, inhuman jobs, to have a double burden, or to come under ideological pressure for not working.

3.2. Women's movements

One of the puzzling facts about the new democracies is that women are not keen to use the new freedoms to improve their position. With the exception of the limitation of rights to birth-control, which is mobilising women everywhere whenever there is a threat of the issue of abortion being placed on the legislative agenda, there is no significant self-mobilisation.¹⁹

¹⁸) It is seldom added – as it is by the Russian researcher Posadskaya quoted by Waters – that men have always been forced to work, but nobody is concerned about whether they would like to work less or not at all [Waters 1993: 292].

¹⁹) It has to be added that when the Hungarian government introduced some restrictions on abortion in the early seventies, this event triggered the only civil initiative of women, producing a large number of signatures against the restrictions at a time when there was some genuine risk in participating in this enterprise.

The participation of women in politics has remained insignificant. The ratio of female MPs was around 30 percent in the last decades of the former system. This was an improvement over the first decades due partly to international pressure after the UN took up the issue. The relatively significant presence never meant, though, that the women could give voice to an independent view. Still, the drop in this ratio is not reassuring. After the first free elections the rate of female MPs was 8% in Bulgaria [Panova et al. 1993: 18]; 5% in Croatia and 10% in Slovenia [Drakulic 1993: 124]; 10% in Czechoslovakia [Šiklová 1993: 76]; 9% in Poland [Fuszara 1993: 250]; 7% in Hungary in 1990, and 11% in 1994 and so forth. Their absence at the top levels of decision making is as conspicuous as ever. All this is seen with complete indifference or equanimity by women as well as by men.

The legislation on equal human and political rights was mostly already in place under the old system. The enforcement of these rights is not much better ensured, however, than before, except in cases when there is an elected *ombudsman* (Poland, Hungary) to protect human rights, which also includes the rights of women. Meanwhile the employment rights and the social rights of women have been weakened, as discussed above. Also, former taboos concerning for instance sexual harassment at the workplace have survived, and many new sexist phenomena go unattended.

The most important development is the revival of 'civil society'. There are everywhere beginnings and new initiatives. However, feminist movements are usually weak, with low membership, low public support, and the sympathisers or members come almost exclusively from academia. The majority of women who avail themselves of the new right of association are more likely to join conservative or religious groups. (Pro-life movements also belong to this category and they may be quite strong.)

In other words, the necessity of the consciousness raising of women is hardly felt. The question of the absence of women's liberation movements has recently appeared on the agenda of social science as witnessed by all the writings referred to in this paper. Research is still scarce, and opinions, when gauged, are of course highly contradictory or inconsistent. One of the radical Hungarian journals addressed, for instance, an all-round inquiry in 1994 to some prominent people, among others, on the issue of women's movements ["Körkérdés..." 1994, Hadas 1994]. The answers varied considerably – and this variation is recurring in the other countries. Some invoked the lack of necessity for women's mobilisation arguing that women had already more rights than men [Hernádi 1994]. Women (in this inquiry as in instances already mentioned above) often asserted that they never felt discriminated against, and did not see therefore the need for self-mobilisation. The very difficult situation of women has often been invoked as a reason of non-involvement: under their heavy double or triple load women never had time or energy to think about themselves. A similar argument suggested that after the transition, slow or rapid impoverishment added to the worries of women, so that they became even less interested in politics. This view also seems rather widespread. Elena Bonner, one of the radical democratic leaders in the former USSR visited the USA in 1990. She answered a question concerning the role of women in her country in the following way: "You know, our country is on such a low socio-economic level that at the moment we cannot afford to divide us into 'us women' and 'us men'. We share a common struggle for democracy, a struggle to feed the country" [Todorova 1993: 30].

One of the most widespread explanations is that the totalitarian system destroyed solidarities and infantilised people to such a degree as to render them unable to organise themselves. It is sometimes added that feminism was presented by politics in such a dire light as to turn everybody against it. The anti-feminist arguments advanced by women are noted also by Havelková [1993: 65]. Some researchers (Neményi [1994], myself) think that women living in the totalitarian system had to find fearful the rhetoric of early feminism which claimed, among others, that "the private is political". On the one hand, totalitarianism was about invading every sphere including the private, and women and men had the utmost difficulty in retaining some freedom – which was possible only in the family. On the other hand, the rhetoric of early feminism (domination, oppression, liberation, revolution etc.) was too reminiscent of the Bolshevik rhetoric, even the word 'feminism' was too close to 'communism'.

Whatever the real explanation is, it is significant that while political and other movements have started to proliferate with the new freedoms, women have remained by and large silent. But it is also worth noting that in the most recent years the absence of feminism has become an issue: public discourse may just be emerging now.

It may well be – albeit I heavily dislike this argument – that an old political cliché describes the current situation: it has to get much worse before it starts to be better. Only in this particular circumstance the cliché has to be slightly modified: maybe it has to get much worse for women before they start to fight to make it a bit better. Whether civil society will be strong enough to fight the indifference of politics and the enmity of the market in relation to women is an open question. But as more and more people note, the grass-roots struggle, or in other words a strong civil society is the only hope for emancipation.

ZSUZSA FERGE has since 1988 been Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Sociology and Social Policy at Eötvös Lóránd University in Budapest, where she was head until 1996. She has been visiting professor at several European and American universities, and recently received an honorary degree from Edinburgh University. In 1997 she was visiting fellow at the Institute for Human Studies in Vienna. Her main areas of research and teaching include social structure, stratification, social reproduction, and social and societal policy. She has had numerous books and papers published in both Hungarian and English.

References

- Avineri, S. 1991. *The Return to History. International Perspectives*. New York: The American Jewish Committee.
- Barr, N. (ed.) 1994. *Labour Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The transition and beyond*. Published for the World Bank and the London School of Economics and political Science. A World Bank Book. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- "Children at Risk in Central and Eastern Europe: Perils and Promises." 1997. *Economies in Transition Studies, Regional Monitoring Report (UNICEF)*, no. 4.
- Drakulic, S. 1993. "Women and the New Democracy in Former Yugoslavia." Pp. 123-130 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Duncan, S. 1996. "Obstacles to a Successful Equal Opportunities Policy in the European Union." *The European Journal of Women's Studies (SAGE)* 3: 399-422.
- Engfer, Uwe 1995. "The case of former East Germany." Country study prepared within the SOCO project. Mimeo. Vienna: Institute of Human Studies.

- Fajth, Gáspár 1996. "Family Support Policies in Central and Eastern Europe." UNICEF International Child Development Center, Florence, Italy. Paper prepared for the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council Task Force on Economies in Transition Workshop, Washington D.C. 19-20 September 1996.
- Ferge, Z. 1983. "Biológiai különbségek, társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek" (Biological differences, social inequalities). In *A nők társadalmi szerepvállalásának biológiai problémái* (Biological implications of the social role of women). Budapest: TIT.
- Ferge, Z. 1992. "Social policy regimes and social structure. Hypotheses about the prospects of social policy in central-eastern Europe." Pp. 195-222 in *Social Policy in a Changing Europe*, ed. by Z. Ferger and J. E. Kolberg. Boulder, CO: Campus and Westview.
- Ferge, Z., J. E. Kolberg (eds.) 1992. *Social Policy in a Changing Europe*. Boulder, CO: Campus and Westview.
- Ferge, Z. et al. 1995. *Societies in transition. International report on the Social Consequences of the Transition, a survey carried out as part of the SOCO project initiated and co-ordinated by the Institute for Human Studies, Vienna*. Cross-national report on five countries, prepared by Z. Ferger, E. Sik, P. Róbert, F. Albert. Institute for Human Studies, Vienna.
- Funk, N., M. Mueller (eds.) 1993. *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Fuszara, Malgorzata 1993. "Abortion and the Formation of the Public Sphere in Poland." Pp. 241-252 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Hadas, M. (ed.) 1994. *Férfiuralom* (Male domination). Budapest: Replika Kör. (Replika Könyvek, 2.)
- Harsanyi, D. P. 1993. "Women in Romania." Pp. 39-52 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Havelková, H. 1993. "A Few Prefeminist Thoughts." Pp. 62-73 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Heinen, J. 1995. "Unemployment and Women's Attitudes in Poland." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 2: 91-110.
- Heitlinger, A. 1993. "The Impact of the Transition from Communism on the Status of Women in the Czech and Slovak Republics." Pp. 95-108 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Hernádi, M. 1988. *Nemek és igenek. A feminizmus vitaanyagából* (Yes-s and No-s. feminist debates). Budapest: Minerva.
- Hernádi, M. 1994. "Válasz a Körkérdésre a nőkről" (Responses to the all-round inquiry on women). *Replika*, no. 13-14.
- Kamerman, S. B., A. J. Kahn (eds.) 1991. *Child care, parental leave, and the under 3's. Policy innovation in Europe*. New York-Westport, CT-London: Auburn House.
- Kemény, I. 1985. *Ouvriers Hongrois*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Kinkor, J. 1996. *The Market and the State. Why do we Need Philosophy?* Prague: Svoboda.
- Koncz, K. (ed.) 1985. *Nők és férfiak* (Women and men). Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó.
- Kornai, J. 1992. "The postsocialist transition and the state: Reflections in the light of Hungarian fiscal problems." *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 82: 1-21.
- Kornai, J. 1994. "A legfontosabb: a tartós növekedés" (The first priority is lasting growth). *Discussion Paper Series*, no. 6. Budapest: Collegium Budapest, Institute for Advanced Studies.

- Kotowska, I. E. 1995. "Discrimination against Women in the Labor market in Poland during the transition to a Market Economy." *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society* 2: 76-90.
- "Körkérdés a nőkről." 1994. *Replika*, no. 13-14.
- Le Grand, J., W. Bartlett (eds.) 1994. *Quasi-Markets and Social Policy*. Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Lewis, J. 1992. "Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes." *Journal of European Social Policy* 2: 159-171.
- Lewis, J. (ed.) 1993. *Women and Social Policies in Europe*. Aldershot: Elgar.
- Milic, A. 1993. "Women and Nationalism in the former Yugoslavia." Pp. 109-137 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Moghadan, V. (ed.) 1996. *Transitions and Gender in the Former Socialist World: Market Reforms, Women and Work*. UNU/WIDER book manuscript.
- Myles, J., R. J. Brym 1992. "Markets and Welfare States: What East and West Can Learn from Each Other." Pp. 27-36 in *Social Policy in a Changing Europe*, ed. by Z. Ferge and J. E. Kolberg. Boulder, CO: Campus and Westview.
- Neményi, M. 1994. "Miért nincs Magyarországon nőmozgalom?" (Why there is no women's movement in Hungary). In *Férfiuralom* (Male domination), ed. by M. Hadas. Budapest: Replika Kör. (Replika Könyvek, 2.)
- Ostner, I. 1993. "Slow Motion: Women, Work and Family in Germany." In *Women and Social Policies in Europe*, ed. by J. Lewis. Aldershot: Elgar.
- Ostner, I. 1994. "Back to the Fifties: Gender and Welfare in Unified Germany." *Social Research* 1: 32-59.
- Panova, R., R. Gavrilova, C. Merdzanska 1993. "Thinking Gender: Bulgarian Women's Impossibilities." Pp. 15-21 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Petrova, D. 1993. "The Winding Road to Emancipation in Bulgaria." Pp. 22-29 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Potůček, M. 1996. "Theory and Practice of Czech Social Policy." Paper prepared for the seminar on The Future of the Welfare State in Post-Communist Europe organised by the Central European University and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Prague 1996: 1-14.
- Preker, A. S., R. G. A. Feachem 1994. "Health and Health Care." In *Labour Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The transition and beyond*, ed. by N. Barr. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sas, J. H. 1976. *Életmód és család* (Ways of life and the family). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
- Sieminska, R. 1994. "Continuity or Change? The Woman's role in Polish Public Life since the Fall of the Communist Regime." *Social Research* 1: 326-334.
- Sík, E. 1995. "Coping strategies." In *Societies in transition. International report on the Social Consequences of the Transition, a survey carried out as part of the SOCO project initiated and co-ordinated by the Institute for Human Studies, Vienna*. Cross-national report on five countries, ed. by Z. Ferge. Vienna: Institute for Human Studies.
- Skocpol, T. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge, MA-London (UK): The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Sullerot, E. 1968. *Histoire et Sociologie du travail féminin*. Paris: Gontier.

- Szalai, J. 1991. "Some Aspects of the Changing Situation of Women in Hungary." *Signs* 17: 158-160.
- Šiklová, J. 1993. "Are women in Central and Eastern Europe Conservative?" Pp. 74-83 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Titkow, A. 1993. "Political Change in Poland: Cause, Modifier, or Barrier to Gender Equality." Pp. 253-256 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Todorova, M. 1993. "The Bulgarian Case: Women's or Feminist Issues?" Pp. 30-38 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Tóth, O. 1995. "Attitüdváltozások a női munkavállalás megítélésében" (The changing attitude of women towards work). *Szociológiai Szemle*, no. 1.
- Walby, S. 1990. *Theorising Patriarchy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Waters, E. 1993. "Finding a Voice: The Emergence of a Women's Movement." Pp. 287-302 in *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, ed. by N. Funk and M. Mueller. New York and London: Routledge.
- Williams, Fiona 1989. *Social Policy. A Critical Introduction. Issues of Race, Gender and Class*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Women in Employment and at Home* 1962. (English Supplement). Budapest: Central Statistical Office.
- Women and Structural Change: New Perspectives* 1994. Paris: OECD.

Radicalised Transformation, the Institutional Tensions and Modernisation Challenges

MILOŠ HAVELKA*

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

KAREL MÜLLER*

Institute of Learning Foundations, Charles University, Prague

Abstract: The article attempts to theorise about the social changes mobilised by the transformation strategies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It looks at what resources and actors have been mobilised, how they can be related to the institutional changes underway, and whether the emerging institutional changes towards competitive economic and political systems can be supported by efficient resource allocation and socio-cultural adaptations. In order to do this it is useful to refer to the current debate on modernity/post-modernity and its efforts to identify common practices or institutional forms coming out of the various developments in the advanced countries. The most appropriate patterns are discussed and applied as a framework for the assessment of the intended and unintended social implications of the economic transformation in the Czech Republic.

Czech Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 5 (No. 2: 179-195)

1. Introduction

Observations of the ongoing changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are now indicating that the available political resources mobilised to serve the democratisation of the political systems of these countries have been exhausted, and that the transformation is challenged by more complex issues bound to economic, social and cultural interactions and more subtle ways of mobilisation. However, such practical efforts are associated with a lack of cognitive and regulatory capacities. As early as the beginning of 1990, J. Habermas correctly remarked that the transformation of the post-communist countries was marked by the absence of any preliminary theoretical concepts or normative projects. Instead of classical revolutionary “innovative and future oriented ideas”, more pragmatic models and sober efforts to “come back to democratic legal statehood” and to switch “orientation to the capitalist advanced West” have prevailed [Habermas 1990: 181].

Such pragmatic orientation has produced a specific reflexive framework which has accompanied the advancing changes. On one hand, it has been able to respond to the identifiable and changing public attitudes, on the other it has become difficult to assess (with distance and critically) the emerging implications of the undertaken steps. The prevailing orientation of transformation strategy towards issues of economic reform is an

*) Direct of all correspondence to Doc. PhDr. Miloš Havelka, CSc., Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, phone + 420 2 24 22 08 42, fax + 420 2 24 22 02 78, e-mail havelka@soc.cas.cz or Doc. ing. Karel Müller, CSc., Institute of Learning Foundations, Charles University, Legerova 63, 120 00 Praha 2, phone/fax + 420 2 64 34 725, e-mail muellerk@sun.izv.cuni.cz

example of such a pragmatic approach. The technological and industrial gaps in relation to the advanced countries and their implications for levels of consumption and welfare have been most apparent, and public opinion has understandably accepted the suggested path following the examples of the advanced countries. Consequently, economic competence has been accepted as the legitimate regulatory capacity able to exploit the available formal and informal capitals, i.e., the true guide of action. Such a positive coupling between the general endeavour of enterprise and the orientation of the transformation strategy towards economic issues can be well observed in the course of changes in the Czech Republic (CR), the experience of which will be at the forefront of the discussion on institutional issues. Moreover, the public debate on transformation has been reduced to issues of restructuring the economic system from etatistic regulatory patterns to competitive (open) forms. Within this perspective the essential question was formulated as follows: Should the state-owned enterprises be restructured in the course of their detatisation, i.e. by the the state in its fiscal and co-ordinative capacities, or should such restructuring be left to the privatised enterprises themselves? The latter perspective, which has prevailed in the public perception as well as in the predominant political view, does in fact suggest the implementation of economic reform in two steps – (i) privatisation and (ii) subsequent modernisation carried out by the privatised firms.

The economic reforms that have followed the democratisation process have produced quite strong effects of economic mobilisation regardless of the strategies (radical, evolutionary) which have been used by the respective countries. In most CEE countries, at least those which have had certain tradition and level of industrialisation, the period of recession has been comparatively short and economic growth has been good in terms of the macroeconomic figures. However, a closer look at the situation of the economic actors (firms) and the institutional framework of the emerging business enterprise sector (BES) indicates that the mobilisation effects produced by the economic reform are driven by various sorts of structural dependencies rather than promoting a sort of disembedding from the previous regulatory and self-regulatory patterns, promoting niches of innovative action (both in technology and regulatory forms), and shaping an institutional framework for a fair competitive environment. The radical course of the economic reform in the CR has produced such effects in quite an explicit form, as shall be discussed later.

It is suggested here that the implications of two radical reformative steps – the democratisation of the political system and the economic reform – are shaping the ground for a more extended and interactive reflexive framework of transformations. In the first period of transformations the more ideological and pragmatic approaches could prevail due to the weakness of systematic (expert) social knowledge and the rather utopian character of public opinion. Several essential issues are emerging which are already transcending the present political and ideological platforms. Firstly, the parallel and rapid transformations of the political and economic systems have not been able to dismantle the etatistic linkages and paternalistic (anti-meritocratic) inclinations which would encourage the functional disjunction of both systems and the promotion of their open and competitive forces. On the contrary, corporate patterns are re-emerging, undermining the effects of the liberalisation in small and medium-sized businesses, the service sector, regional initiatives and the role of professionals – and thus hindering the formation of the middle social strata in general. Such exclusions will not only undermine the needed shifts in social structures and value patterns, but narrow the base of legitimation and the ca-

capacities of the transformation efforts. Secondly, the rapid economic liberalisation and a weakened political culture and authority will sharpen the tensions between local, national and traditional resources on the one hand and international and globalising pressures on the other. This may engender certain unpredictable impacts – either strengthen the position of regions and their globally active actors in relation to the authorities of the national state and produce the tensions in the national legal and political system, or limit the globalisation impacts while promoting an anti-foreign climate and excessive nationalistic feelings. Again, the control of these tensions will depend much on the capacities of socio-cultural mobilisation. In the economic system itself, the rapid and formal transformation (by coupon privatisation) was not able to produce effective change in the governance structure, nor stimulate the modernisation of the technological capacities and rationalise the firms' productive factors. It has been, in fact, a sort of 'zero-sum-game' redistributing the available resources to those with cultural capital (in Bourdieu's sense) potential. The impact of such social action and networking has followed to a great extent the most established techno-economic structures – manufacturing branches with unfavourable industrial capacities and social networks (such as production with high energy consumption, negative environmental impact and low technological demands and few innovation challenges). These branches have also been able to survive best the subsequent pressures of economic recession. Finally, the issues of violence, and control of the means of violence are of importance. The shifts from etatistic regulatory forms to effective self-regulatory action and initiative are much dependent on this issue since the uncontrolled diffusion of the means of violence, both in direct and formal state control and indirect and informal misuse of lack of rules and authorities, are in fact undermining the maintenance of the borderline between the legal and illegal arenas and actions and hence the legitimisation of successful economic actions (and actors) and the motivation to legal action. It is suggested that the theories of modernity/modernisation and the debate focused on the understanding of the institutional framework of modern societies can form a fruitful cognitive framework to reflect critically the newly emerging consequences of the radicalised economic change and suggest an adequate concept for their understanding and control.

The debate on modernity/post-modernity issues offers a wide range of approaches reflecting the historical and formative bindings of the modernisation processes and their specific and diversified "processes, factors and causal patterns" [Hall, Gieben 1992: 1], the experiences of different regions and of civilisation spheres [e.g. Grasnow 1995], the growth and strategy options in the different levels of development [Wallerstein 1991], not to mention the classical works on this issue. The situation of the CEE countries is, however, marked by specific features which do not easily fit the assumptions made by these concepts. These features have been conditioned by the adaptive developments in the environment of etatistic (socialist) regulatory regimes. They can be seen in a specific coupling of radical industrialisation with an etatistic regulatory pattern which has been embedded in the specific economic (public ownership) and social (homogenised) structure, and has shaped specific socio-cultural adaptive patterns and tensions. They can be described as the embedded relationship between egalitarian tendencies and redistributive regulatory patterns with least motivation potential to individual action due to the prevailing anti-meritocratic attitudes [Machonin, Tuček 1994]. In institutional terms they were marked by the deconstruction of the borderlines between the economic and political system and between state and self-organised capacities of economic and political sectors.

Of course, such a situation has produced crucial tensions between the economic and social structure – advances of industrialism (and its shifts to more advanced technologies) and missing evaluative patterns for the efforts of the industrial actors and educational, professional and innovative action in general. The real shape of these socio-cultural patterns has become to some extent evident in the course of radicalised liberalisation. Whether, and how effectively they are mobilised in favour of and in response to new industrial and institutional options seems to be the crucial question of the social transformations which are addressed in this paper. The issue will be examined as follows: Firstly, the modernity/post-modernity debate will be outlined from the point of view of (i) common features of the modernisation process which might form a reliable guide for the assessment of (the direction of) transformations in the CEE countries, and (ii) the most appropriate concepts for the assessment of the crucial structural shifts in terms of resources and institutional patterns. In the concluding sections these shifts will be analysed and discussed with respect to the ongoing changes in the CEE countries and in the view of the chosen modernisation conceptual framework.

2. Outline of the Suggested Concept of Modernisation Process

As mentioned above this part is guided by the aim to assess both the common features (and problems) of the modernisation process as such and the specific adaptive patterns of the CEE countries which are usually described by the term transition or transformation. As stated earlier some modernity concepts stress and suggest the structural features of modernisation, and a certain convergence of the process. Others are more open and consider the direction of the changes to be the only meaningful feature of the concept. Moreover, the distinction between modernisation and transformation should be identified, in order to be able to apply the modernity concept in the assessment of the transformation. The following discussion will select from the available concepts and their cognitive assumptions such theoretical elements, or group of elements, which might help in theorising about the transformation in the CEE countries from the perspective of modernisation.

Here modernisation is understood as the evolutionary process in the direction of modernity. It differs from the notion of modernism (which represents the epoch following the New Age), or post-modernism (suggesting the overcoming of modernity). The modern epoch is characterized by the functional differentiation of sub-systems of society, the notion of modernity is used to define particular features of the developments of society since the Enlightenment. The following list enumerates such features: alphabetisation, secularisation, specialisation, industrialisation, urbanisation, democratisation, massification, emancipation (of individuals, groups, nations, cultures, gender), centralisation, automatisisation, bureaucratisation (as the growth of administrative competencies both in the economic and political sphere), informatisation (technical and social), rationalisation, the growth of political participation and education – in their latest developments, for example, ecologisation, and miniaturisation. Such a list of the features of modernisation presents a first approximate account: it is a long term, deeply rooted, slow, uneven process with different temporalities, outcomes and unintended consequences which, however, indicates a certain pattern and formative power [Hall, Gieben 1992].

Modernisation is understood as a wider concept reflecting those political, social, economic, cultural and particularly civilisatory processes, and contemporary changes, which can be associated in a historical and systemic way with the processes of the New

Age, the Enlightenment, and in particular, with dynamic industrialisation and its implications. The understanding of historical and systemic (formative) features should be sensitive to both technological and cultural factors and aware of socio-technical closures and their civilisatory implications. By that we avoid understanding modernisation as the diffusion of technological innovation mediating the spread of socio-cultural patterns from the centre to the periphery, which is at the core of concepts of westernisation or dependency theories. At the same time we see the limits of the concepts in which modernisation is understood as a dependent cultural factor – a view which is well-rooted in the Middle European context (see critical reflections of this in [Loewenstein 1990]), also present in different approaches of modernism or post-modernism. The positive coupling of both industrial and socio-cultural aspects can be found in those evolutionary concepts which take into account the growth capacities of both poles. S. Eisenstadt in this perspective suggests: “modernisation does not only mean the evolution (... measured by) various indices of the social mobilisation and growing structural differentiation but also such an evolution of social, economic and political system which not only creates permanent change but also is in a position to manage it by the help of its own institutional dispositions” [Eisenstadt 1973]. A similar approach is suggested by Giddens and Beck and will be discussed later.

The formative features of modernity can be expressed in the functional perspective as well as in the perspective of its content.

1) From the functional point of view it represents the novelty of trends, orientations, patterns of behaviour; it means the permanent openness of the ongoing changes, as well as the rapidity of the stabilisation and renovation of social structures and institutions under the pressure of economic, political, cultural etc. ‘innovations’; a state of novelty opposed to everything that is assessed as old, traditional, left behind or inherited, petrified and sedimented.

2) From the viewpoint of content, modernity is understood as the principal intention of human action, thinking and creation, which cannot be ultimately fixed, and which has the nature of oriented permanency of change and necessary openness that is associated with a well-defined notion of progress (in non-theological and non-utopian terms). Instead of the progress of humanity or awareness of freedom, the progress of technologies, knowledge, innovations, structures or systems is used.

In the sphere of knowledge modernisation is oriented towards the strategy of ‘trial and error’, it promotes the process of falsification and has the nature of permanent fallibility; in the sphere of the arts it is carried out by the continual actualisation of the relationships among aesthetical functions, norms and values; in the sphere of technology it faces the perpetual pressure of innovations; in the sphere of law it is marked by the continuous resolution of the tensions between the legality and legitimacy arising out of the economic, cultural and social pressures on the legal framework.

The essential features of modernisation (by function and content) have been described on an abstract (theoretical) level, although certain examples have been mentioned in order to demonstrate their relevance in the social processes. The question can now be posed concerning how such characteristics can be applied on the level of social action and its institutional framework; how such a perspective can be related to the capacities of the institutions to reflect upon the changing environment and to respond to it by institutional change. The starting point is to refer to various socio-historical trends (or assumed

relationships): it seems as though the progressing individuation process, and its consequent implications for the growth of political, social and human rights cannot be, mastered without free consumption, power sharing and reflexive action. Thus welfare resources, participative democracy and reflexive policy are important factors of modernisation.

In extending the socio-historical background of the common features of modernisation, four factors can be distinguished to identify a productive (sociological) bridge to the understanding of the institutional aspects of modernisation:

- i) the mobilisation of subjective and objective spheres of social life and individuals resulting in the intensified mobility of goods (the extension and intensification of the economic sphere, the standardisation of production, the productivity of economic factors, the solution of environmental issues etc.), social mobility (the productivity of decentralised systems, tensions between the centre and periphery, among the various forms of growth and decline of social status, between privileged and underprivileged urban areas etc.), and cultural mobility (forms of presentation and communication of needs and interests, changes in expectation patterns, value orientations) – in particular information mobility (promoted by various forms of mass media and advancing computerisation);
- ii) Differentiation and specialisation, which are related via modernisation to the division of labour. At the same time, the possibilities of the internal stabilisation of the systems facilitated by qualified (differentiated and specialised) decisions and performance are becoming more evident. It should be stressed that differentiation and specialisation are not only more frequent than in the pre-modern societies, but also their content and forms change (the formation of new professions, the secularisation of the professions, the restructuring of status and roles, the growth of participation etc).
- iii) Changes of values towards more universal and functionally specified value patterns associated with secularisation, which not only means the decline of various 'beliefs' and 'prejudices', but also the institutional disjunction of beliefs (and ideologies of various forms) from education; formal education is expected to shape and guarantee new forms of competence.
- iv) A particular (and not always accepted) factor of modernisation is the capacity to institutionalise conflict (e.g. by help of projection into organisation patterns, modes of problem identification and solution, modes of decision-making etc.); such an approach is responsive to the controversial nature of modern resources and orientations (to freedom, empathy and solidarity, sympathy), and to the unintended and destructive impacts in the political, social or economic spheres.

The above outlined approach to the institutional issues of modernisation should be more closely bound to a more open and dynamic understanding of the institutional framework which would cover both the processes of de-institutionalisation and re-institutionalisation. The radically disappearing statist, planned, top-down and hierarchical regulatory framework in the CEE countries, and efforts to establish open and competitive markets and civic institutions are shaping favourable and much-needed ground for this line of debate.

3. The Institutional Framework in a Period of Radicalised Modernity

In the current debate the institutional issues are assessed in a controversial way. On the one hand is the Weberian concept of institutionalisation as steadily advancing rationali-

sation and bureaucratisation which can be counter-balanced only by the heroic intervention of charismatic personalities. Much empirical evidence can be found in favour of the prevalence of such 'top-down' mobilising pressure. The emancipatory outcome of this situation is sought in various forms of critical reflections on existing institutions. For example, the post-modern approach identifies the 'overcoming' of such (top-down) pressure by events outside the existing institutions – at the borders of their fractured functions and aims. Other approaches stress (within the received sociological tradition) the role of communities and small social units as opposed to the great scale of formal and abstract systems of action. There is also enough empirical evidence about the success of the diversified strategies of such local and bottom-up initiatives towards the existing regulatory and organisational forms [see e.g. Eder 1990, Sennett 1994].

Zapf and Dierkes correctly suggest that attempts to overcome such a dichotomy have until now failed, since the study of institutions follows "two mutually isolated methodological and theoretical accounts: firstly, the formation of the institutions is derived from the actions of people; secondly, their prior existence is a precondition for the action of people" [Zapf, Dierkes 1994: 10]. Such isolated approaches always result in one-sided outcomes. Either the subordination of individual action to the collective framework is followed, which limits the options for understanding the institutional change, or, conversely, the subordination of collectivities to the individual is assumed, which leads to the extensive formalisation of action and the organisation framework.

A sound basis for the inter-related assessment of both perspectives in the analysis of institutions is provided by the structure-agency sociological approaches. Their feasibility is, of course, not only the result of the methodological advance of the discipline. It is the result of both the counterfactual capacity of sociology and the changes in the institutionalized practices themselves, which since the 60s have begun to transcend the received structure-functional views. D. Bell in his fresh concept of post-industrial perspective foresaw radical changes of social and political systems [Bell 1973], yet still within the stability (and functionality) of the modern institutional setting because of its embedding in the cultural framework, i.e. in the sense of the Parsonian "cultural value-scientific integrate" [Parsons 1949, 1960]. In the 70s and 80s, however, more essential changes in value patterns were identified, if not always in readily apparent forms [e.g. Inglehart 1977, Yankelovich 1981]. More transparent and significant events have been documented indicating the emerging cultural turn – a transition from the convention based pattern of values to one based on the postconvention [Habermas 1990].

In the sense of the above-mentioned evolution of the concepts of institution, and its socio-cultural circumstances, the 'institutions' can no longer be understood as mere senseless sublimations of purposes, norms and action able to prevent or inhibit human action. We understand them rather as cultural products expressing knowable practices of human interaction, or directly in the Weberian sense as specific 'chances' of action [Weber 1922]. 'Knowability' – as opposed to 'reasonability' – is laden with reflexive capacities: "the permanent monitoring of social practices in the light of incoming information about these practices themselves" – capabilities and capacities which can be labelled as institutional reflexivity [Giddens 1990: 38]. The study of the tensions, conflicts, legitimisation controversies and mistrust which arise at the borderlines of the institutions, or their interfaces, helps identify the orientations of institutions and so the context and sources of their potential changes as well.

After examining the basic features of modernity and its consequences for the concept of the institution the question can be posed with regard to what conceptual pieces can be picked up and used for a better understanding of the ongoing de-institutionalisation in the CEE countries. If we return to the discourse which formulated the factors (or sociological aspects) of modernisation it can be seen that the socialist statist regulatory regime did, indeed, fail to balance and co-ordinate all four factors of modernisation. While promoting the techno-economic growth it became subject to differentiation and specialisation. However, being short of open, pluralistic institutions it was limited in the mobilisation of the subjective and objective spheres of social life, in the public assessment of the differentiated social claims and practices. From this point of view it can be assumed that an extensive institutional gap has developed in the CEE countries in relation to the advanced, democratic countries.

The implications of the institutional gap can be followed in the course of the transformation process, in particular through the mobilisation effects and the attempts at their (institutional) consolidation. Since these implications are rooted in the socio-cultural pattern, their analysis can be approached from various perspectives, and is associated with known methodological difficulties. Here only an analysis of the general institutional framework is intended. In this view at least two challenges or missions should be kept in mind which seem to be important for the possible route of socio-cultural shifts: (i) the formation of the basic modern institutional framework, the foundations of which have been, in some socialist countries, de-constructed, or in others had no roots at all, (ii) the implementation of the political and regulatory practices which acknowledge the institutional gap, its socio-cultural background and possible routes and resources to overcome it. Here, it is necessary to mention the phenomenon suggested some time ago by Veblen as the advantage of the latecomers (or those lagging behind). Recently, its feasibility has been well-demonstrated by the developments in the East Asian countries. It is the aim of the above suggested missions to keep in mind such an option. The first approach, the formation of the basic institutions, stresses the functional aspects, the latter ask whether de-institutionalisation, and active experimenting in the search for standard modern institutions can be promoted by a more open kind of knowledge production, which is suggested by the concept of reflexive modernisation [Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994]. An outline of the main features of both suggested perspectives will be presented since it is in our view useful for the analysis of the institutional changes in the CEE countries.

A more evolutionary structural approach is suggested by W. Zapf and applied in the analysis of the transformation of the New Federal Countries [Zapf 1994]. He makes use of two essential ideas of Parsons which he finds appropriate for understanding modern societies, and in particular for the institutional capacity to change. First, the so-called "evolutionary universals of society" – social structure, cultural legitimation, rational legal system, administrative capacities, monetary market system and democratic associations, which he reformulates in a more direct way as the institutions of competitive democracy, market system, welfare society with mass consumption and welfare state. Secondly, development is understood as the combination of inclusion (of new groups into the basic institutions), value assessment to more general orientations (a high flexibility of the diversified cultural symbols within the basic values), differentiation (in the sense of institutional innovation) and status enhancement (as the growth of welfare and social competence for many citizens, and basic social and political rights).

The institutional aspects of the reflexive modernity concept are best outlined by the so-called institutional cluster of modernity suggested by Giddens [Giddens 1990]. It is worked out on the same (meso-) level as Zapf's model but in a more extensive and dynamic framework. In his model the driving forces of modernisation are seen in balancing the processes of fragmentation and displacement with the trends of globalisation and integration on the one hand, and the balancing of the trends to violence and surveillance with the opportunities of freedom of speech, participation and dialogue on the other. The key institutional dimensions (organisational clusters) of modernity are connected with the capitalist system, and industrial system (as general efforts to form 'artificial nature', domesticated nature). The integrity of modern society is conditioned by the role of the (national) state in the surveillance of the relevant population and territory and control of the means of violence (their monopolisation and the consequent pacification of social relations). Institutional reflexivity is influenced by the many-sided interfaces and interactions among the mentioned institutional perspectives (e.g. the industrialisation of capitalism, the etatisation and industrialisation of war, etc.); the resources for such interfaces are related to the capacities to identify unintended implications (which in his view rest both in the design of modernity and the 'failure' of the human factor), the circularity (reflexivity) of knowledge systems, power differentials and shifts in valuation patterns. The countervailing (subjective) resources are specified in the reflexive politics and social movements since he is counting with the diarchic (controversial) nature of modernity.

The above-mentioned outline of the institutional cluster of modern societies stresses in particular those features which are basic and common in shaping modern institutional forms and environments, and which might be taken into consideration while analysing the situation of the institutional changes in CEE. However, it should be kept in mind that these concepts do not, of course, give a full and clear-cut picture of the issue. In particular, the concepts of reflexivity are still a subject open to debate. While there is consensus on the understanding of reflexivity as different from reflexion (science based discourse) there is no consensus on the nature of reflexivity. While Giddens assumes a well monitored and trust-based interaction of (abstract) expert system with symbolic tokens, Beck argues that non-knowledge and overwhelming risks are typical for the modern situation, and Lash finds that the concept of the institutional reflexivity is short of hermeneutic cultural resources [Beck, Giddens, Lash 1994]. These conceptual differences might all be accepted in the analysis of the situation of the CEE countries in the sense that they describe the interactions of the basic cultural sources of modern societies – science, arts and morals – and the re-foundation of this cultural framework is an important mission and pre-condition of the transformation process. The second inconsistency of the suggested approaches is related to the combination of different concepts of institution for the analysis of the present situation of the CEE countries. Indeed, Zapf's approach is based on the Parsonian functional and consensual approach while that of reflexive modernisation is based rather on the potential of differentiation, dissent and borderline approach. While the CEE countries are facing a sort of radicalised (double mission) modernisation – to re-found basic modern institutions (in Zapf's approach) and at the same time to face postmodern challenges – both concepts are suggested to help selectively theorise about the possible course of re-institutionalisation in the radicalised developments in these countries.

4. The Institutional Tensions of Transformation Processes in the CEE Countries (with particular reference to the situation of the Czech Republic)

In the preceding parts we have suggested that modernisation can be understood as the aim of the transformation, or as its energy, or as both. There is, however, an essential difference between the notions of modernisation and transformation. While the modernisation represents a certain orientation, intention or inclination, the transformation is characterized by specific aims which can be followed by specific strategies, well-selected means or resources (like de-etatisation, privatisation etc.). However, as suggested above, modernisation concepts offer, with the exception of general functional and content-like characteristics, certain structural patterns indicating formative factors, resources and relationships which can be applied in the assessment of the transformation strategies and their implications. The general modernity characteristic (of evolutionary and innovative tendencies) has been re-formulated into a more instructive approach which understands the transformation as a confrontation of structural dependencies and mobilisation effects.¹ Moreover, the resources of both sides are specified by their diachronic nature. While the basic institutional framework (in Zapf's interpretation) is marked by discontinuity (from an etatistic to a competitive pattern), the particular (local) resources have a continuous (or evolutionary changing) nature. In the first steps of the transformation process, which followed political aims, the discontinuities were in the forefront of public attention and were able to legitimise the economic reform and its political actors even though it combined rather utopian visions with pragmatic decision making. The advance of the economic reform, and the emerging socio-cultural tensions, are revealing more the continuities of local (or traditional) resources and the more complex nature of their change and consolidation. Here, we are facing more general questions which have been already hinted at in the introductory section: how far was socialism modern, has it formed some modern resources, that is to say what is the shape of the structural dependencies influencing the transformative efforts?

The question of the relationship between socialism and modernisation is not new but the rapid collapse of the former socialist bloc has led to its better specification. In the 60s two contradictory solutions were suggested. Firstly, the neo-conservative concept of post-industrialism of D. Bell which anticipated the convergence of capitalism and socialism on the basis of the social implications of industrial shifts [Bell 1973]. The convergence concept has also been assumed in most reformist socialist concepts. Secondly, the position of critical theory and its concept of 'late capitalism' [see Glatzer 1991], which has stressed the necessity of more substantial social and institutional changes transcending the prevailing forms of social (capitalist) order.

As indicated above the present concepts of modernity have departed from the polarity of such views but have not accepted one-sided liberal concepts of 'the end of history'. From such perspectives the socialist efforts can be understood as a specific modernisation step, and in two aspects: (a) in their ideal perspective, original intention and starting mobilisation effect, and perhaps reformatory efforts (since the 60s) as well as (b) in their decline, which was actually brought about by global modernisation pressures which deconstructed and delegitimised regulatory patterns based on a one-party political

¹) In this concept we combine Stark's approach of path dependency with Eisenstadt's mobilisation concept.

system and a planned, command economy. Beck's specification of the modernisation process into two phases – simple and reflexive modernisation – seems best fitting to interpret this issue [Beck 1986]. The socialist modernisation efforts were developed within the framework of simple modernisation: their institutional context was based on the assumption that the growth of (expert) knowledge and technology is correlated with more reliable control of the natural and social environment. Such a perspective led to the growth of the techno-economic system (close interactions among the economic, industrial and political systems) and the suppression of the countervailing civic and emancipatory arenas and forms. This technocratic growth (of simple modernisation) was felt in the 50s and the 60s in general. Yet, in the socialist bloc – due to the de-construction of the institutional universals (competitive market, pluralist political system and professional and civic autonomies) – the development followed a specific (even anti-modern) route.

The understanding of the above-mentioned point (b) – the adaptive steps of the socialist regimes and social environments to modernisation pressures (and the growing techno-economic gap with the advanced countries) – is of crucial significance for the comprehension of the means of the current transformation processes. Due to the decline in resources and institutional capacities, this period (of the 70s and 80s) can be labelled as a period of late socialism.

The socio-economic tensions and contradictions in the period of late socialism and the attempts to reconcile them, took on different forms in the individual CEE countries. These forms have already indicated different modernisation resources – some experimenting with the regulatory patterns and forms of social mobilisation (such as Poland or Hungary), others went on to mobilise their industrial resources with the expectation of closing the technological gap with the modern world. The Czech lands belonged to the latter group, and their modernisation resources, as well as their institutional implications, have been already anticipated in some earlier studies and described in follow-up research into the transformation process. For example, the techno-economic indicators of the various manufacturing industries have been monitored for two decades indicating a growing technological gap within the diversified pattern of industrial structure [Kolanda 1992] and the unreadiness of the industrial infrastructure for the 'implantation' of high-tech manufacturing; consequently, the traditional (medium and low-tech) industrial branches have absorbed most of the available resources mobilised by the economic reform. The adaptive behaviour of enterprises under such industrial constraints have been clearly identified by Mlčoch, which he calls non-parametric and lobbying behaviour [Mlčoch 1992] – corporate behaviour well fitting into the redistributive, egalitarian and anti-innovative nature of the socio-economic system. Socio-cultural implications have been identified which accompany the growth of anti-meritocratic and traditional orientations [Machonin, Tuček 1994]. The industrial capacities (of science, technology, education, and services) have been expected to form the mobilising (continuous) resources of the transformation process. However, the radical change in their socio-economic environment not only revealed some localities capable of surviving but also extensive communicative and interactive deficits and a weak institutional background [Müller 1993].

All the above-mentioned studies of late socialism indicate that some important (adaptive) shifts in power distribution within the socialist institutional framework occurred. These were marked by the growth of the power of localities (complementary to the decline of centralistic power) and carried out predominantly by informal sources and

networking. They shaped a sort of pseudo-market (black economy), self-organising activities ('second society') and a re-orientation to foreign patterns (with a loss of trust in domestic capacities). Within such a regulatory framework many local activities became differentiated and were able to stimulate functional growth but their status (and public assessment) was problematic, as the post-revolutionary events have indicated. Namely, due to the absence of public communication arenas such bottom-up actions and networking it was not possible to facilitate both public discussion and evaluation and the actor's self-actualisation and responsibilities based on public frameworks. This could not, of course, lead to 'visible' evaluation, and shifts in values, risk assessment, mobility shifts and the institutionalisation of conflicts. On the contrary, the tensions between the formal and informal evaluations accumulated within the existential knowledge of individuals and knowledgeable practices of institutions.

This analysis of the developments of late socialism, and their institutional implications, show the pattern of the institutional gap which has emerged in relation to the advanced industrial and democratic countries. Its features are even more evident if we look at the institutional framework from the perspective of reflexive modernisation. Even though late socialism development was characterized by the decline in the resources of the centralistic power, and the emergence of local, bottom-up niches of action, this did not constitute a bridge to the modern institutional pattern. The resources of the 'black economy' and 'second society' were shaped by a rejection of or confrontation with public aims. They cannot be considered as functioning as the resources of re-institutionalisation, either in the constructive or reflexive perspective. In this sense the institutional adaptations in the period of late socialism were diverging from the general modernisation route. The radicalised transformation steps have disclosed these divergences and the forthcoming transformation strategies will have to take into account their socio-cultural impacts. In this sense Machonin is correct in labelling late socialism as "a repeated dysfunctional extensive industrialisation" [Machonin 1996: 177]; it has created the limits to the post-industrial challenges [Bell 1973] rather than the resources for the radicalised modernisation as was expected by the aims of the strategy of the economic reform in CR. In order to study the institutional changes more closely it is necessary to abandon the general view of the situation of the CEE countries and focus on the situation in the Czech lands.

The impact of the structural dependencies on the interaction of the (top-down) regulatory steps with the mobilisation shifts seems to be the crucial framework for the institutional change. It can be observed in various areas and is reflected in critical studies. For example, a study of the post-privatisation economic situation (and the strategies of its actors) indicates that the differentiation into the standard management, employee (trade union), and public (state authority or consumer associations) sectors and actors is still led by structural paternalist dependencies rather than being mobilised by liberal patterns [Vláčil 1995]. Similar dependencies have been identified in welfare and social policy issues [Večerník 1996], and in the emerging pluralistic political system by Novák; in his view the 'anti-system' parties – a phenomenon of the structural dependence in the political system – are undermining productive alternations of governments within the competitive political environment [Novák 1995].

In order to give a systematic picture of the above indicated institutional tensions the application of the notion of the institutional cluster of modernity is suggested. Since the institutional adaptation of the transformation process faces a double mission – to

form a basic institutional pattern and to promote the reflexive capacities of the institutions – we suggest the application of two blocs of modernity concepts referring to this issue: Zapf's concept of institutional patterns of modernity, which offers an insight into the problems of the first mission, and the concept of Giddens which tackles the latter. Of course, both perspectives will produce contradictory pictures of the changes for conceptual as well as analytical considerations (indeed, the clash of the top-down regulatory steps and the responsive bottom-up actions is laden with extensive conflicts). For this reason it is best to follow the emergence of the institutional tensions at a meso-level – along the borderlines between the elements of the above mentioned institutional cluster of modernity.

In accordance with this approach the niches of institutional tensions can be specified in the following areas and forms:

- i) In the sphere of economic system, and the situation after the radical (mass) privatisation, the basic line of tension (in relation to the basic institutional pattern) can be observed at the borderline with the political system (and state) on the one hand and the industrial system on the other. The formation of market institutions, and the insulation of their functional (parametric) aims from political and industrial aims, is adversely affected (corrupted) by the revival of corporate patterns backed by the informal interfaces to both the regulatory authorities and the dominant (extensive) industrial and financial actors. Instead of becoming public, open and interactive, the emerging market institutions are retaining features of sectoral, corporate and closed orientations and actions. On the other side, the mobilised innovative market actors and niches of enterprise are constrained by the limited capital resources, the insolvency of economic actors (limiting the scope of economic exchanges) and the fragility of contract relations.

These contradictory pressures can be, for instance, explicitly observed in the course of the formation of the banking sector, which is an important factor of accumulative economic capacities and in this sense also an intermediary actor between the political and industrial systems. Its involvement in the radical privatisation has extensively drained the available domestic capital resources by risky credits (amounting to more than one-third of total credits) and its actors formed networks with the large companies. Consequently, the available capital was mostly deployed in traditional industrial sectors. Their formative role and capacity in promoting the prospective areas of enterprise (e.g. the small and medium-sized business, or more advanced technologies) has been blocked by the lack of capital, expertise and foresight. Consequently, the de-etatisation of the banking sector has been halted, signalling not only a uncertain situation for the monetary control of the economic system but also the formation of the corporate linkages among the banks, executive and industrial sectors. Similar problems are emerging in the fiscal area and its mediating role to the public services and their institutions.

The continuing exclusion of the small and medium-sized businesses, technology-based manufacturing with a higher level of sophistication, and the lagging transformation of public services are depriving the liberal orientation of the economic reform of its social support and long-term competitive resources.

- ii) In the sphere of the political system the main line of tension (excluding the above-mentioned interfaces to the techno-economic structures) is shaped at the emerging borderline between the state, with its surveillance function, and bottom-up action and movements claiming local or regional political, social and human rights, and re-

establishing their self-organising function. The manifestations of these tensions can be observed in various areas: the formation of a decentralised administrative system, regionally or ethnically-based public initiatives, professional associations and the strategies of public movements. The formation of this borderline is suffering from both the prevailing centralistic pressures, and missing evaluative responses to local action, and local action limited to narrow, short term orientations. The more general indication of these institutional tensions is signalled by the differentiation of the political sphere as well as the limited growth of its power-sharing capabilities. Such a situation is undermining not only the productive alternations of governments, as mentioned above, but also the productive competition between political visions and the formation of their conceptual platforms.

- iii) In the sphere of industrial system, and its restructuring into a post-industrial pattern, including the transformation of its crucial institutions (of science, technology, education and other public services), institutional tensions can be observed on two levels: in the course of the formation of the borderlines (1) between the system of expert knowledge (in academic institutions and professional communities) and professionals in the administration, business and other social institutions, and (2) between the sphere of expert knowledge actors and lay actors; even though the platforms of professional autonomy have been re-established, the weak communicative interfaces among the institutions persist and limit the process of public learning and action in the appropriation and control of modern industrial resources. For these reasons the formation of intermediate capacities (between academic and industrial science, between the scientific disciplines and educational subjects, and among the professional communities), which is the important factor of re-institutionalisation in this sphere, is weak and hence the restructuring of the institutions themselves is lagging behind. The communicative competence of the knowledge-producing institutions is of particular importance for the mobilisation of the socio-cultural patterns and the reflexive capacities of the political system and its actors. Both of the above-mentioned institutional tensions are limiting the mediating (comprehensive, counterfactual) role of expert knowledge institutions between routine social practices and political efforts to shape realistic future-oriented programmes. The growing public influence of local, partial, unjustified or utopian visions, and the general decline of public expectations, are the other side of the coin.

5. Discussion

The aim of this paper has been to suggest the appropriate modernisation framework, or at least assemble some pieces of received modernity concepts, in order to assess the political, economic and socio-cultural transformations in the CEE countries. Within this perspective more detailed attention has been paid to the problem of the institutional issues which have emerged out of the de-institutionalisation of the etatistic regulatory system. The analytical insight has been supported in particular by an outline of the institutional tensions resulting from the radicalised economic reform as pursued in the Czech lands.

With reference to the conceptual considerations, and the institutional issues identified, the current transformations in the CEE countries can be understood as a reaction to a robust modernisation pull. The pull effect has been shaped by the political will and the public desire to adopt and achieve the socio-economic framework of the advanced countries on the one hand, and the radicalised reformative strategies (liberalisation, privatisa-

tion), which have been thought to produce the adequate mobilisation effects, on the other. The robustness of the modernisation impact is seen in two aspects: (i) in the gaps concerning the (objective) economic and industrial resources, and (ii) in the institutional deficits which have arisen in the relation to the (unexpected) implications of the liberalised economic and political environments. These institutional challenges are not only associated with the radicalised transformations of the regulatory systems into liberal and competitive frameworks, but particularly with the simultaneous transformations of both the economic and the political systems, and the necessary maintenance of the administrative and welfare distributive functions of the state. In comparison with the other attempted routes of modernisation in recent times (East Asian, South American or Spanish) this is a historically unique situation which is producing extensive social tensions and costs that are bound up with the reformative efforts.

So far, the emerging problems have been identified in economic terms as the growing external and internal indebtedness of firms, the tight fiscal situation, monetary problems (devaluation or re-valuation of the exchange rate), high inflation, decapitalisation and so on. Indeed, restructuring the economic system into a standard competitive and efficient form is an independent and powerful factor of modernisation. It is an important resource in the control and the restructuring of the welfare roles of the state and in the recovery of the industrial system, which can feed back the resources of economic growth. However, the parallel transformation of the economic and political spheres does not allow for combining compensatory effects of advances and setbacks in both spheres, to establish a reliable path of growth. On the contrary, a mutual draining can be observed – both in terms of the monetary resources and authority. Consequently, the transformation of the public institutions is lagging behind and exerting massive pressure on the state budget. Indeed, since the instruments of public authority are very provisional, the issues of public institutions are reduced to the fiscal or financial aspects and thus facing insurmountable limits to their change. On the other hand the formation of the BES is suffering from a legitimisation deficit. Thus, the main line of conflict is located between the emerging private sector, and its enterprising vigour, accumulative effects, including its professional, small business, middle class and liberal infrastructure on the one hand, and the public sector with its welfare, public services, public knowledge and political functions including its communicative cultural background on the other. Direct confrontations between both spheres of action (and the missing mediation between them) are strong enough to undermine the effects of economic mobilisation and release the impact of various elements of structural dependencies.

Within the followed modernity concept, and the focused attention on institutional aspects, it is suggested that the further advance of the transformation process is conditioned by the capabilities and capacities to specify and solve the emerging inter-institutional tensions and conflicts. These are usually resolved in a pragmatic way (on a case-by-case basis) instead of being institutionalised. The institutionalisation of conflict is, of course, conditioned by the capabilities to mobilise socio-cultural resources. It can follow either a very narrow (inflexible) or a wider and more flexible scope and route in processing the shifts in value orientations. At least two of the above-discussed aspects seem to be important for the productive or destructive outcomes of such shifts: (i) the promotion of the legitimisation arena by the inclusion of emerging social claims and the formation of conceptual platforms which would extend the power of the evaluative proc-

esses, and subsequently the effectiveness of ongoing social differentiation and growth; the constrained course of such development is engendered by the absence of such concepts and platforms, their limited legitimation power and the consequent process of social exclusion, the ideologisation of public reasoning, and the tense social environment, and (ii) the formation of intermediary capacities and capabilities which would avoid the direct confrontation of institutions (and possible consequent deterioration of relations, or corruptive impacts), promote their internal transformation by the help of external sources and thus the formation of effective and interactive capacities of institutions.

KAREL MÜLLER works in the field of social studies of science and technology. He graduated in economics and his post-doctoral study focused on the problems of R&D economics. He later conducted research at the Academy of Sciences, having taken part in the interdisciplinary studies of the implications of S&T. He focused on sociology, more specifically on the empirical study of research institutions in the social context and modernity concepts. At present he is teaching at Charles University, lecturing in the field of the sociology of knowledge, innovation and modernity. MILOŠ HAVELKA graduated from Masaryk University in Brno. Cultural editor of a Brno daily newspaper over the period 1968-1970, from 1970, he was researcher at various institutes of the Academy of Sciences in Brno and Prague. He specialised in the history of sociology and systematic problems of social philosophy. He recently edited and contributed to the publication, *The Controversy about the Meaning of Czech History 1885-1938* (Prague, 1995). His book *Max Weber. An Introduction to His Thought as an Introduction to Social Philosophy* is forthcoming. Since 1994, he has been Editor-in-chief of the *Sociologický časopis* and the *Czech Sociological Review*.

References

- Beck, U. 1986. *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Frankfurt am M.: Edition Suhrkamp.
- Beck, U., A. Giddens, S. Lash 1994. *Reflexive Modernisation, Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*. Cambridge (UK): Polity Press.
- Bell, D. 1973. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in social forecasting*. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
- Eder, K. 1990. *Kollektive Akteure zwischen Identitätsuche und Mobilisierungsindustrie*. Hamburg: Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung.
- Eisenstadt, S. 1973. *Tradition, Change and Modernity*. London, New York: John Wiley.
- Giddens, A. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press in co-operation with Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Glatzer, W. (Hrsg.) 1991. *Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften*. Frankfurt am M.: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Grasnow, B. 1995. "Chinesische Modernisierung und kultureller Eigensinn." *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 24: 183-195.
- Habermas, J. 1990. *Die nachholende Revolution*. Frankfurt am M.: Suhrkamp.
- Hall, S., B. Gieben (ed.) 1992. *Formations of Modernity*. Cambridge (UK): Polity Press with Open University.
- Inglehart, R. 1977. *The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and the Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Kolanda, M. 1992. *Československý průmysl a jeho národohospodářské okolí v první etapě reformy* (Czechoslovak Industry and its Environment in the First Reform Period). Praha: Prognostický ústav AV ČR.

- Loewenstein, B. 1990. *Der Entwurf der Moderne. Vom Geist der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und Zivilisation*. Darmstadt: Deutsche Buchgemeinschaft.
- Machonin, P. 1996. "Modernisation and Social Transformation in the Czech Republic." *Czech Sociological Review* 4: 171-186.
- Machonin, P., M. Tuček 1994. "A Historical Comparison of Social Structures in the Czech Republic in 1984 and 1993." *Working Papers* 94/4, Prague: Institute of Sociology.
- Mlčoch, L. 1992. "The Czechoslovak Economy between the Past and the Future." *Prague Economic Papers*, no. 3: 209-220.
- Müller, K. 1993. *Scenario for the Transformation of Science, Technology and Education in the Czech Republic*. Prague: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the ČR.
- Novák, M. 1995. "Systémy politických stran a základní modely opozice" (Systems of the political parties and basic models of opposition). *Sociologický časopis* 31: 305-320.
- Parsons, T. 1949. *The Structure of Social Action*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Parsons, T. 1960. *Structure and Process in Industrial Societies*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Sennett, R. 1994. *Civitas – Die Grossstadt und die Kultur des Unterschiedes*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag.
- Večerník, J. 1996. "Změny na trhu práce a v materiálních podmínkách života v České republice v období 1989-1995" (Changes in Labour Market and the Welfare in Czech Republic in the period 1989-1995). Praha: Národohospodářský ústav Josefa Hlávky.
- Vláčil, J. 1995. "Profesní a sociálně politické orientace českých manažerů" (Professional and Socio-political Orientations of the Czech Managers). *Sociologický časopis* 31: 435-447.
- Wallerstein, I. 1991. *The Lessons of the 1980s, in Geopolitics and Geoculture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, M. 1922. *Grundriß der Socialökonomik III. Abteilung Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
- Yankelovich, D. 1981. *New Rules, Searching for Self-fulfilment in a World Turned Upside Down*. New York: Random House.
- Zapf, W. 1994. *Modernisierung. Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und Transformation*. Berlin: Sigma.
- Zapf, W., M. Dierkes (ed.) 1994. *Institutionenvergleich und Institutionendynamik. WZB Jahrbuch*. Berlin: Sigma.

Czech Women in the Labor Market Work and Family in a Transition Economy

NICOLE KOZERA

Published by the Institute of Sociology,
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic,
Jilská 1, Praha 1,
fax + 420 2 24 22 02 78,
e-mail sociolog@soc.cas.cz

"Working Papers" WP 97:6

Copies may be ordered from the address below:

Price 77,- Kč (5 USD)

Summary: This paper examines the change in Czech women's position in the labour market since the revolution and focuses on the effects of the transition from a planned economy to a market economy on women's integration of family and work responsibilities. By comparing the following variables from before and after the 1989 revolution, labour force participation rates, occupational segmentation, wage differences, social policy regarding working women and families, discrimination in the labour market, and women's attitudes about family and work, the author determines that on the whole, no fundamental change has occurred for Czech women in the labour market. No mass exodus from the labour market has taken place, as originally feared and the labour force participation rate remains high. Rather, different segments of women have been affected both positively and negatively, depending upon their jobs, their financial situations, their attitudes about work and family, and their locale (rural vs. urban). Attitudes about work have changed to some extent, with the younger generation more eager to pursue careers before starting their families. In general, women continue to prioritise family, but manage well their full-time jobs and families. The author concludes with a section based on one-on-one between interviews with women throughout the Czech Republic, in which excerpts from the interviews are presented without analysis or comment. The main sources of data for this paper are journal articles, working papers, surveys conducted by the Czech Institute of Sociology and by IREX, and personal interviews conducted by the author.

Social Determination of Living Conditions in Post-Communist Societies*

PÉTER RÓBERT**

Social Science Informatics Center (TÁRKI), Budapest

Abstract: Living conditions have played a special role in most of the former communist societies. After World War II, living conditions were controlled by the communist equality principle, while in the following decades living conditions improved and took on the role of legitimating the communist system. In this article we investigate the inequalities in living conditions in six post-communist societies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovakia). The data are taken from the 1993 comparative survey *Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989*, conducted by Iván Szelényi and Don Treiman.

Living conditions are operationalised from the viewpoint of material and cultural consumption. Separate measurements were constructed for both of these dimensions and present a typology of living conditions: (1) high material and high cultural living conditions; (2) high material and low cultural living conditions; (3) low material and high cultural living conditions; and (4) low material and low cultural living conditions.

A causal analysis is performed where to investigate the social determination of belonging to different types of living conditions, applying multinomial logistic regression. Social and demographic characteristics of respondents (occupation, education, income, informal economy participation, gender, age, residence) and also 'accumulated' social assets from 1988 such as informal economy participation and party membership are used as predictor variables. Analyses are run separately for the six countries for presenting the country specific differences in the determination of living conditions.

Czech Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 5 (No. 2: 197-216)

Introduction

In this paper I analyse living conditions operationalised by cultural and material consumption in six post-communist countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia. Living conditions comprise a broad concept in sociological research. The theoretical ground for making distinctions between expressions such as 'way of life' or 'lifestyle' can be based on the allocation of resources in respect of money and time. Two types of resources can be distinguished: financial and temporal. The resources

*) Previous versions of this paper were presented at the semi-annual meeting of ISA RC28, Stockholm, May 1996 and at the Research Seminar of Humboldt Universität, Berlin, November 1996. I appreciate the comments of the participants of these meetings. I also acknowledge Matild Sági for the multinomial logistic regression estimates I use in the analysis. This article was prepared at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies, NIAS, when I was holding a Magyar-Fellowship between February 1 - June 30, 1997.

**) Direct all correspondence to: Dr. Péter Róbert, PhD., Social Science Informatics Centre (TÁRKI), Victor Hugo u. 18-22, H-1132 Budapest, Hungary, phone + 36 1 497 531, fax + 36 1 1 290 470, e-mail robert@tarki.hu

connected to income and time can be divided into a constrained and a discretionary part, taken from the perspective of the Maslowian hierarchy of human needs [Maslow 1954]. Both financial and temporal resources have a constrained part on the bottom of the hierarchy used for ensuring the basic needs of nutrition, accommodation and physical safety. On the higher level, the discretionary part of resources serves for covering further needs influenced by choice, value orientation and individual preferences. Accordingly, living conditions have a constrained part which is closer to the term 'way of life' suggesting a higher degree of objectivity and conditionality; and a discretionary part which is closer to the term 'lifestyle' with a connotation more strongly associated to individual choices and values.

The use of cultural and material consumption patterns is frequently used in sociology for investigating living conditions. This approach expresses that living conditions are based on goods which are available on the market, people decide to buy them or not, or decide what to buy among a variety of 'functional equivalents' which serve the purpose of covering the same needs. From a theoretical perspective, Weber's multidimensional stratification approach is to be referred to in this respect, which is based on consumption groups and their similarities or differences in prestige [Weber 1966]. Veblen's study on leisure class is another point of reference. He emphasised the importance of the visibility of living conditions and introduced notions like 'conspicuous leisure', 'conspicuous consumption' and 'prestige consumption' [Veblen 1931]. In his more recent studies, Sobel [1981, 1983] also operationalises lifestyle by consumption. Collins [1979] speaks about cultural market, cultural currency and cultural ties forming a link which helps social groups represented by a given visible lifestyle to recognise each other. Bourdieu goes one step further and states that the possession or lack of cultural capital influence schools success in meritocratic societies [Bourdieu 1973, Bourdieu and Passeron 1977]. Nevertheless, when Bourdieu attempts to find empirical support for his theory, he also uses lifestyle measures manifested by cultural consumption or attributes connected to tastes, aesthetics and habits.

Bourdieu [1984] proposes another model of lifestyle of a multi-dimensional character. According to his concept, lifestyle has both an economic and a cultural dimension (which, of course, are correlated), through which the status hierarchy becomes doubled. Those without enough discretionary time and income to be able to maintain a lifestyle based on values, tastes, aesthetics and other preferences are found on the bottom of society. On higher societal levels, groups appear which are able to make lifestyle decisions related to their preferences. In the economic dimension the hierarchical order goes from unskilled labourers to managers and wealthy entrepreneurs, while in the cultural dimension it goes from the same unskilled labourers to university professors and artists. The decisions these groups make concerning their lifestyle are manifested in their relationship with art, in their taste, in use of discretionary time, in clothing, eating habits, housing, and so forth.

In this paper, I first present an overview of previous researches and the role of living conditions under and after communism. This section provides the basis for the hypotheses. The empirical part of the paper begins with a description of the data and measurements of dependent and independent variables. The results are then presented and discussed.

Living Conditions Under and After Communism

Living conditions played an ideological role in the former communist societies. Communist leaders placed great emphasis on physical and psychological safety, namely that workers need not be afraid of losing their job, that their salary was sufficient to cover their needs in respect of basic nutrition and clothing, and that they receive housing from the state. Equality of consumption was a basic principle in the 1950s and 1960s in communist societies. Since market relations were destroyed in the economy and planning regulations were applied, the communist governments were able to keep the consumer prices of housing, clothing, nutrition, etc. low irrespective of the real costs of production. In accordance with equal opportunities in education, it was an ideological goal to make theatre performances, exhibitions in museums, concerts or libraries available to the broadest possible audience of working people. Prices for cultural consumption were also kept artificially low, thus financial circumstances had little influence on cultural participation.

In the 1970s market relations began to emerge in some communist countries, for example, Hungary and Poland as did the appearance of inequalities consumption. Material consumption and the possession of consumer goods became prestigious and a means of attaining 'visible success' (Sobel's term). Living conditions gradually improved everywhere under socialism and communist leaders used this fact for legitimating the system. This mechanism worked most effectively in Hungary, was present in Czechoslovakia and Poland to some degree, and was much less observable in Bulgaria or Russia.

The new legitimating role of living conditions became reflected by sociological research. In the Soviet Union more than 100 works had been published on 'way of life' by 1976 [Siciński 1978: 9]. These researches were supported by the official ideology. Since leisure time gradually increased under socialism, party officials wanted to know more about the 'utilisation of free time', that is the activities of working people in the time when they were not working [e.g. Szántó 1972]. Another political item on the agenda of this research was to prove the "levelling out of big class differences and the rise in the living standard of the broad mass of people" [Filipcova 1972: 6]. Research on culture was expected to prove that the so-called 'cultural monopoly' of the former ruling classes had been abolished under socialism and that the cultural knowledge and interest of the working class had substantially increased [e.g. Vitányi 1978]. For a better 'registration' of way of life, time budget surveys were 'invented' by Alexander Szalai in Hungary at this time. The method was later developed into a tool of comparative research on living conditions [Szalai 1972, Szalai and Andrews 1980].

While some investigations into way of life took an approach with strong psychological, philosophical or ideological aspects [Siciński 1974; Mansurov, Yadov et al. 1974; Gheliuta and Gogoliukhin 1974], others were better connected to stratification research presenting also empirical findings [Wesołowski 1970, Machonin 1970, Szántó 1977, Siciński 1978]. The introduction of multidimensionality and the concept of status inconsistency [Lensi 1954] strengthened the link between stratification and lifestyle research [Machonin 1970]. The relation of status inconsistency and social inequalities was also discussed at that time in Polish sociology [Wesołowski and Słomczyński 1983]. In the 1980s, Kolosi [1984] carried out a stratification model survey in Hungary using this approach. In his research, cultural lifestyle turned out to be the most important status dimension determining social position. In the consumption model of Utasi [1984], the

majority of Hungarians were characterised by a certain kind and degree of inconsistency in respect of living conditions. Perhaps the most important thing to be learned from these empirical works is that inconsistency influences living conditions under socialism and the category of 'stylistic unity' as introduced by Sobel [1983] cannot be applied for these societies.

Previous studies also proved that the ideological goal of equality in cultural and material consumption was not fulfilled. The empirical test of Bourdieu's cultural capital hypothesis – following the earlier works by DiMaggio [1982], DiMaggio and Mohr [1985] or De Graaf [1986] – indicated that cultural lifestyle is an important intervening variable of status attainment models, a significant channel for the reproduction of social inequalities under communist conditions [Róbert 1984, 1990; Kolosi 1987; Mateju 1990; Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Róbert 1990]. In a recent analysis on income determination Böröcz and Southworth [1996] found that measurements for cultural capital and habitus influenced even earnings over and above the level of formal education.

In a comparative perspective, using Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Dutch data, Kolosi [1990] found that, on the one hand, social origin determines both cultural and material lifestyle, on the other hand, there is an indirect influence where education and income play the role of intervening variables. Using data from the same three countries, the results of De Graaf [1991] demonstrated that the better educated member of the family has the greater influence on the family's consumption (status maximalisation effect). He also found that status inconsistency affects material consumption. In the case of high income and low education (over-rewarded position) material consumption increases; while the low income and high education combination (under-rewarded position) leads to a lower level of material consumption.

All previous studies in the field referred to above show that living conditions have not been independent of various sociological determinants in the former communist societies. There is no reason to assume that this association, which was obviously present in the 1970s and 1980s, has disappeared during the course of transformation. In fact, emerging market principles, i.e. the abolition of the former state subsidies on consumer goods as well as of cultural leisure time activities may practically result in an increase in prices. The social consequences of this process in respect of material and cultural consumption are contradictory – at least for Hungary. The available survey data (taken from TARKI's Data Archive from 1982 and 1986) indicate an increase in the possession of various consumer durables such as automatic washing machines, colour televisions, freezers, microwaves, VCRs, PCs, and so on. Central Statistical Office data also display the same trend: for example, colour televisions were present in 23% of households in 1986 as compared with 71% in 1993; ownership of automatic washing machines was 25% of households in 1986 as against 40% in 1993 [Harcza 1994].

Changes are more unfavourable in respect of cultural participation. Both data from earlier Hungarian stratification and lifestyle surveys and data from the recent time budget surveys reveal a decline in time spent visiting theatres, museums or reading books and newspapers [Falussy and Zoltánka 1994]. Previous time budget surveys also showed that Hungarians spent more time on work and money-making activities than citizens of other European nations [Adamczuk, Andorka et al. 1988], indicating that Hungarians were ready to devote their discretionary time to earning discretionary money. This process may

be stronger in Hungary as compared to the other post-communist societies because subsidies in the cultural field have probably been withdrawn here to a higher degree.

Hypotheses

It is assumed that living conditions are highly stratified in the post-communist societies. In addition we expect that living conditions are not crystallised (to use Lenski's expression) and a large proportion of citizens in these countries have to 'choose' between cultural and material lifestyle because they cannot 'afford' both. Following certain traditions of stratification research [Machonin 1970, Wesołowski and Słomczynski 1983, Kolosi 1984] the inconsistent character of living conditions under post-communism are going to be taken into consideration. The belief is that a certain proportion of the population in these societies have only constrained financial and temporal resources and have no options as regards their living conditions. Another proportion of the population have more financial and temporal resources but are 'forced' to decide how to use the discretionary part of their resources. This choice will result in inconsistent living conditions in either the cultural or material respect. Finally, a part of the population have enough financial and temporal resources to afford consistent living conditions in terms of both cultural and material assets.

In the social determination of living conditions, social status as measured by income, education and class position is expected to have an impact. Since market relations are still underdeveloped in post-communist societies, the various forms of informal economy participation can indicate the possession of special ambitions, skills and capabilities. These activities may also affect living conditions significantly. In respect of demographic features some gender differences are expected and it is assumed that a younger age and urbanised place of residence have positive effect on better living conditions. Present living conditions are expected to be influenced by economic market-related assets or political assets from the period before 1989. During the egalitarian communist era differences between official salaries were not too high, the redistribution system was the main source of inequalities, but individuals and families were able to participate in the informal economy. These activities are even stronger indicators of market-related ambitions and capabilities before 1989 than in the present. Previous Communist Party membership represents a political asset, a favourable position in the redistribution system being useful even for present living conditions.

It is anticipated that the influence of income will vary by the type of living conditions. It will be smaller for cultural rather than material consumption and it will be the strongest for the type of both cultural and material lifestyle. Conversely, education is assumed to be stronger for cultural than material consumption. Based on Bourdieu's work on distinction of cultural and economic lifestyle, a stronger impact of self-employment on material assets and a stronger effect of service classes on cultural activities is assumed. The impact of informal economy participation should be stronger for material assets. Since this activity is time consuming, it may even have a negative impact on cultural consumption. Informal economy participation before 1989 will especially influence the level of material assets. It can be expected that gender differences in favour of women can be found especially for cultural consumption. The influence of a higher level of urbanisation will be stronger for cultural lifestyle. Moreover, Communist Party membership will have an impact especially on the living conditions of those who combine cultural and material assets.

In respect of country variation, living conditions are expected to be at a higher level in Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic as compared to Slovakia, Bulgaria and Russia. The general pattern of social determination may be quite similar for socio-demographic effects. Income may influence living conditions rather more strongly in Hungary than in the other post-communist societies because prices for both material and cultural consumption have increased there to a larger degree. Urban-rural differences in determining living conditions may be larger in Russia and Bulgaria when compared to the other four post-communist societies. For informal economy participation a more marked country-specific variation should be seen. Since the informal economy flourished mainly in Hungary and Poland, it will matter more for these countries, – especially when measured for the period before 1989. Finally, for Communist Party membership a stronger impact for Bulgaria and Russia is anticipated where communist redistribution was stronger than in other countries.

Data and Measurements

The survey data of 'Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989' (the principal investigators were Iván Szelényi and Donald Treiman, UCLA, USA) were used for the analysis. Six transition societies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia) were involved in the survey, the field work was carried out in 1993. All previous information on respondents are of a retrospective character. More than 4500 adult people (aged between 18 and 60) were interviewed face-to-face in each of the countries involved.

For the analysis a dependent variable containing four categories was developed indicating whether the respondent has only material assets, or only cultural assets, or both, or none. The categorisation is based on the fact of whether the respondent has a higher or lower score on the scales measuring material or cultural living conditions compared to his/her country specific average. The independent variables contain measurements for social status (income, education, occupation, labour force participation), demographic position (gender, age, place of residence), informal economy participation in the present and past, and political participation under the communist regime (see details in the appendix).

Results

Table 1 presents the typology for living conditions, the dependent variable of the analysis. Since the distributions are based on country-specific calculations the percentages cannot be compared one by one row-wise but the pattern displayed by the typology can be interpreted. The distributions are based on normalised values of material possessions and cultural participation and they are also relative in the sense that the country specific means have been used as cutting points.

The strongest inequalities in living conditions can be observed for Hungary where the distribution is the most polarised. Every fourth respondent is above the country-specific average in both material and cultural respects, while almost every second respondent scores under the average. The 'consistent uppers' are of a similar magnitude in Poland and Slovakia and are only somewhat smaller in the other three countries. The proportion of 'consistent lowers' is about the same in Bulgaria and Hungary, only somewhat smaller in Poland and Slovakia and much smaller in Czech Republic and Russia. The inconsistent – cultural or material – 'middles' also indicate a characteristic pattern

for these societies: those with cultural activities always form a larger group (with the exception of Poland where the difference in distribution is very small).

Estimates of causal analysis on the typology of living conditions are shown in Table 2a-2c.¹ The explanatory power of the models vary between 11% for Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia and 21% for Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland.

Table 1. Living conditions typology by countries (%)

Typology	Bulgaria (3326)	Czech Rep. (5040)	Hungary (3808)	Poland (3079)	Russia (3616)	Slovakia (4066)
Above the average	19.3	20.4	25.1	23.6	19.1	22.7
Cultural activities	21.5	26.6	17.9	19.7	25.6	24.4
Material assets	11.6	17.6	13.7	17.0	18.7	14.7
Below the average	47.6	35.4	43.3	39.7	36.6	38.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 survey

Diverse types of living conditions are differently influenced by the basic status variables: income, education, labour force participation, and class. Income seems to have a moderate impact on living conditions. Cultural consumption is not influenced by financial situation (if it is controlled for the other predictor variables). Income has a significant effect only for Hungary. At the same time, it affects the other two types of living conditions somewhat more strongly. Income has the largest influence on living conditions in Hungary and Poland.

¹) The main analytical tool applied in the paper is multinomial logistic regression. This method performs maximum-likelihood estimation of models with discrete dependent variable. The explanatory variables can be either discrete or continuous ones. In the multinomial logistic regression models we estimate a set of coefficients corresponding to each outcome category, i.e. to each type of living conditions in our case. (One of the categories is considered as reference, in our case this was the type neither with high cultural nor with high material assets.) The exponential value of coefficients is the relative risk ratio for one unit change in the corresponding variable. We present these values in our tables. For all procedures analytical weighting method was used. For estimations we used STATA 4.0. intercooled version.

Table 2a. Social determination of living conditions, cultural assets only:
(Multinomial logit odds. Reference category is neither high cultural activities nor high material assets. Standard errors in parentheses)

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovakia
income (deciles)	1.040 (0.021)	1.028 (0.015)	1.067*** (0.019)	1.033 (0.023)	1.010 (0.017)	0.991 (0.016)
education (years)	1.476*** (0.036)	1.343*** (0.027)	1.388*** (0.031)	1.450*** (0.040)	1.264*** (0.024)	1.283*** (0.027)
in labour force	1.019 (0.125)	1.248* (0.124)	1.302* (0.138)	1.078 (0.140)	1.425** (0.181)	1.433*** (0.150)
higher controller	1.751 (0.577)	1.907*** (0.379)	1.773 (0.523)	2.175** (0.618)	1.948*** (0.324)	2.125*** (0.456)
lower controller	1.879*** (0.338)	2.295*** (0.309)	2.416*** (0.431)	3.448*** (0.768)	2.488*** (0.347)	3.802*** (0.613)
routine non-manual	1.493* (0.284)	1.762*** (0.214)	1.797*** (0.264)	1.659** (0.271)	1.613*** (0.236)	1.601*** (0.209)
self-employed with employees	3.353 (2.700)	1.890 (1.103)	1.869 (1.505)	1.114 (0.697)	0.820 (0.922)	0.986 (1.108)
self-employed without employees	1.696 (0.549)	0.610 (0.176)	0.876 (0.243)	1.727 (0.546)	1.027 (0.470)	1.113 (0.322)
self-employed farmer	0.179 (0.161)	0.993 (0.691)	0.514 (0.282)	0.392** (0.119)	0.337 (0.324)	0.636 (0.417)
second farm in 1992	1.591 (0.521)	0.688 (0.697)	1.026 (0.229)	0.852 (0.286)	1.251 (0.205)	0.758 (0.343)
second business in 1992	2.917 (2.147)	1.207 (0.673)	1.575 (0.638)	1.061 (0.492)	2.051 (0.845)	1.869 (0.916)
second job in 1992	1.912 (1.695)	0.412* (0.178)	1.535 (0.464)	1.321 (0.386)	2.608*** (0.581)	0.483 (0.272)
sex	0.805 (0.091)	0.496*** (0.044)	0.586*** (0.062)	0.678** (0.086)	0.984 (0.100)	0.665*** (0.065)
age	0.990* (0.004)	1.030*** (0.003)	1.005 (0.004)	1.004 (0.005)	0.984*** (0.003)	1.017*** (0.003)
town	1.318* (0.178)	1.212* (0.106)	1.970*** (0.237)	1.377* (0.206)	0.929 (0.129)	1.093 (0.105)
city	2.767*** (0.429)	2.100*** (0.297)	2.095*** (0.342)	2.280*** (0.357)	1.302* (0.160)	1.970** (0.430)
capital	2.165*** (0.500)	2.220*** (0.331)	3.103*** (0.509)	2.304** (0.712)	1.510* (0.297)	1.754** (0.318)
second farm in 1988	0.418** (0.140)	1.132 (1.190)	0.930 (0.204)	0.867 (0.285)	0.953 (0.159)	1.013 (0.463)
second business in 1988	9.496 (0.363)	0.944 (0.665)	1.161 (0.525)	1.981 (1.563)	0.207* (0.141)	1.162 (0.918)
second job in 1988	1.317 (1.429)	3.313* (1.863)	1.390 (0.372)	1.002 (0.354)	0.721 (0.197)	1.783 (1.051)
communist party member	1.581* (0.320)	1.204 (0.154)	1.374 (0.291)	1.685 (0.478)	1.293 (0.233)	1.401* (0.210)

(continued)

Table 2a. (continued)

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovakia
Log Likelihood	-3194.386	-6050.098	-4382.053	-3241.669	-4470.770	-4773.133
Number of obs	3255	5049	4319	3081	3765	4098
$\chi^2(63)$	1765.71	1533.39	2377.10	1706.13	1194.43	1354.44
Prob > χ^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.2165	0.1125	0.2134	0.2083	0.1178	0.1243

The reference category for occupation is manual workers, for place of residence it is village.

Level of significance: *** = .0001, ** = .001, * = .05

Higher education improves the likelihood of better living conditions significantly. To be precise, education is a more important factor for high cultural activities and it is less important for living under good material conditions, for which income is more important. As regards income, the odds of higher education are the highest for those living conditions of the 'consistent uppers' who are above the country average in respect of both cultural activities and material assets. The odds for education are somewhat higher in Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria as compared to Czech Republic, Slovakia and Russia.

Labour force participation does not play an important role in its effect on living conditions – if controlled for the other explanatory variables. It does not count in Bulgaria at all, and has moderate influence in the other countries.

The inconsistent – cultural vs. material – lifestyles are determined in characteristically different ways by class. High culture participation is influenced by white-collar occupations (high and low controllers and routine non-manuals), while material assets are affected by market-oriented occupations (the self employed with or without employees). However, the likelihood of belonging to the 'consistent upper' type of both high material and cultural assets is improved by both service and market-oriented occupations including both controllers and self-employed. However, being a self-employed farmer does not mean an advantageous position for any type of lifestyle in the examined countries. In fact, this class category influences high culture participation negatively in Poland and Bulgaria.

These results seem to be in line with Bourdieu's concept on cultural and material lifestyle. The relative risk of high cultural activities without material assets contrasted to the category of neither high material assets nor high culture participation is 2-4 times larger for low controllers and routine non-manuals compared to manual workers and farm labourers. At the same time, market-oriented occupations do not significantly improve the likelihood of high cultural activities. On the other hand, non-agricultural self-employed respondents have a 2-9 times higher likelihood of belonging to the type of material lifestyle without cultural activities. For the 'consistent uppers' type of living conditions with both cultural and material assets, either 'intellectual' or 'market oriented' class positions improve the odds strongly.

Table 2b. Social determination of living conditions, material assets only:
(Multinomial logit odds. Reference category is neither high cultural activities nor high material assets. Standard errors in parentheses)

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovakia
income (deciles)	1.110*** (0.024)	1.130*** (0.018)	1.169*** (0.022)	1.194*** (0.025)	1.064*** (0.019)	1.114*** (0.020)
education (years)	1.159*** (0.031)	1.103*** (0.025)	1.186*** (0.028)	1.132*** (0.032)	1.073*** (0.021)	1.195*** (0.029)
in labour force	0.971 (0.129)	1.405** (0.154)	1.654*** (0.187)	1.341* (0.180)	0.973 (0.121)	1.435** (0.177)
higher controller	1.288 (0.534)	1.874** (0.418)	1.380 (0.475)	1.108 (0.380)	1.152 (0.222)	1.631* (0.401)
lower controller	1.644* (0.358)	1.566** (0.245)	1.288 (0.282)	2.029** (0.498)	1.172 (0.194)	2.021*** (0.394)
routine non-manual	1.520 (0.351)	1.430* (0.204)	1.699*** (0.275)	1.337 (0.231)	0.932 (0.155)	1.253 (0.199)
self-employed with employees	1.060 (1.303)	4.667** (2.386)	5.663** (3.813)	5.621*** (2.730)	8.735** (7.110)	7.241** (5.601)
self-employed without employees	2.050* (0.703)	1.789** (0.387)	2.085*** (0.458)	3.643*** (0.972)	1.532 (0.689)	0.978 (0.314)
self-employed farmer	0.611 (0.285)	2.529 (1.453)	1.787 (0.608)	0.854 (0.169)	1.614 (0.815)	0.868 (0.517)
second farm in 1992	1.628 (0.547)	1.1e-9*** (1.4e-9)	0.983 (0.212)	1.571 (0.462)	1.110 (0.212)	1.248 (0.624)
second business in 1992	2.198 (1.808)	2.122 (1.156)	1.988 (0.760)	1.137 (0.497)	1.498 (0.658)	0.895 (0.551)
second job in 1992	0.358 (0.521)	0.423 (0.218)	1.662 (0.550)	0.773 (0.261)	1.395 (0.378)	0.262 (0.212)
sex	1.353* (0.168)	0.902 (0.085)	0.832 (0.092)	0.801 (0.098)	1.112 (0.117)	1.006 (0.112)
age	0.995 (0.005)	0.998 (0.003)	0.999 (0.004)	0.991 (0.005)	1.016*** (0.003)	1.002 (0.004)
town	1.331* (0.191)	0.927 (0.086)	1.197 (0.141)	1.473** (0.209)	1.175 (0.150)	0.676*** (0.074)
city	1.458* (0.275)	0.994 (0.169)	1.071 (0.192)	1.478* (0.237)	0.693** (0.087)	0.388** (0.138)
capital	3.243*** (0.785)	1.115 (0.195)	2.292*** (0.385)	1.430 (0.486)	0.544* (0.141)	0.885 (0.195)
second farm in 1988	0.843 (0.285)	1.3e9*** (1.6e9)	1.164 (0.246)	0.794 (0.231)	1.366 (0.261)	0.670 (0.342)
second business in 1988	0.627 (0.500)	0.479 (0.368)	3.466*** (1.352)	1.897 (1.436)	0.834 (0.499)	1.540 (1.331)
second job in 1988	1.027 (1.624)	2.825 (1.786)	0.818 (0.263)	0.976 (0.378)	0.970 (0.290)	1.752 (1.230)
communist party member	1.680* (0.378)	1.083 (0.156)	1.250 (0.295)	1.209 (0.377)	1.276 (0.239)	1.637** (0.265)

(continued)

Table 2b. (continued)

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovakia
Log Likelihood	-3194.386	-6050.098	-4382.053	-3241.669	-4470.770	-4773.133
Number of obs	3255	5049	4319	3081	3765	4098
$\chi^2(63)$	1765.71	1533.39	2377.10	1706.13	1194.43	1354.44
Prob > χ^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.2165	0.1125	0.2134	0.2083	0.1178	0.1243

The reference category for occupation is manual workers, for place of residence it is village.

Level of significance: *** = .0001, ** = .001, * = .05

Class determination seems to have high country specific variation. For example, a low controller position matters much more in Poland and Slovakia. Non-agricultural self-employed respondents are much more likely to live under high material conditions in Russia, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland compared to Bulgaria and Czech Republic. The largest country variation is shown for the 'consistent uppers' type with both cultural and material assets. Especially new large-scale entrepreneurs with employees in the less developed post-communist societies have much more of a chance of belonging to this category. (E.g. large-scale Russian entrepreneurs are a 12 times larger likelier to have both cultural and material assets when contrasted to manual workers and the category of neither high material nor high cultural assets.)

The impact of participation in the informal economy on living conditions is low if it is controlled for the other explanatory variables including also informal economy activities in 1988. A second job in Russia means a higher chance of an inconsistent cultural lifestyle, whilst a second business activity in Hungary results in significantly higher odds for the 'consistent uppers' type, even in this case. In Hungary this can be a consequence of old traditions of informal economy participation dating back to the seventies which has undoubtedly survived the system change. In Russia, however, the formal market relations may be less developed and this fact increases the significance of the informal economy.

For the demographic set of variables, some gender effects were found indicating that women 'consume more culture' than men. Age effects are very small, they do not exist for Hungary and Poland at all. Some country variation appears: an older age is more advantageous for better living conditions in Czech Republic and Slovakia, while youngsters 'consume more culture' in Bulgaria and Russia.

Regional differences seem to influence living conditions to a higher degree. From villages to the capitals, from less-urbanised to more-urbanised settlements, the odds of high culture consumption increase in almost all of the post-communist societies. This impact is the strongest for Hungary where the results indicate a 3 times higher chance of high culture participation without material assets in Budapest, whereas it is less present for Russia and Slovakia.

Table 2c. Social determination of living conditions, both cultural and material assets:
(Multinomial logit odds. Reference category is neither high cultural activities nor high material assets. Standard errors in parentheses)

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovakia
income (deciles)	1.185*** (0.027)	1.171*** (0.020)	1.221*** (0.023)	1.280*** (0.030)	1.133*** (0.021)	1.152*** (0.020)
education (years)	1.527*** (0.041)	1.412*** (0.031)	1.543*** (0.036)	1.511*** (0.043)	1.279*** (0.026)	1.339*** (0.030)
in labour force	1.325 (0.191)	1.252* (0.141)	1.847*** (0.209)	0.902 (0.125)	1.258 (0.184)	1.628*** (0.196)
higher controller	2.433** (0.810)	2.279*** (0.470)	4.360*** (1.210)	3.478*** (0.982)	3.566*** (0.610)	3.838*** (0.817)
lower controller	2.630*** (0.504)	3.016*** (0.431)	2.914*** (0.531)	4.914*** (1.131)	2.813*** (0.438)	5.439*** (0.914)
routine non-manual	2.593*** (0.521)	2.158*** (0.292)	2.254*** (0.350)	2.240*** (0.398)	1.213 (0.223)	2.118*** (0.305)
self-employed with employees	5.728* (4.561)	3.667* (2.040)	9.082*** (5.911)	8.469*** (4.080)	12.743*** (10.060)	8.275** (6.387)
self-employed without employees	2.199* (0.766)	1.206 (0.312)	2.416*** (0.543)	4.692*** (1.336)	1.505 (0.699)	1.805* (0.504)
self-employed farmer	5e-16*** (1e-8)	2.851 (1.705)	0.726 (0.375)	1.327 (0.363)	0.468 (0.471)	2.215 (1.085)
second farm in 1992	1.237 (0.484)	1e-10*** (0.000)	1.209 (0.291)	1.389 (0.472)	1.400 (0.259)	0.727 (0.346)
second business in 1992	3.350 (2.436)	2.590 (1.366)	3.021** (1.085)	0.933 (0.409)	2.083 (0.877)	1.689 (0.850)
second job in 1992	2.216 (1.974)	0.605 (0.256)	1.366 (0.415)	1.073 (0.319)	1.241 (0.325)	0.892 (0.464)
sex	0.991 (0.127)	0.530*** (0.052)	0.704** (0.079)	0.786 (0.105)	0.892 (0.103)	0.668*** (0.072)
age	0.990 (0.005)	1.021*** (0.003)	0.997 (0.004)	0.998 (0.005)	0.988** (0.004)	1.013** (0.004)
town	1.965*** (0.325)	1.173 (0.118)	1.868*** (0.239)	2.835*** (0.471)	0.889 (0.141)	1.122 (0.118)
city	3.849*** (0.713)	1.573** (0.255)	1.963*** (0.338)	4.110*** (0.721)	1.222 (0.169)	1.389 (0.336)
capital	6.585*** (1.568)	2.331*** (0.371)	5.078*** (0.836)	3.956*** (1.250)	1.638* (0.360)	1.939*** (0.366)
second farm in 1988	0.623 (0.246)	7e+9*** (2e+9)	0.734 (0.176)	0.758 (0.256)	1.177 (0.220)	1.281 (0.613)
second business in 1988	0.727 (0.518)	0.256 (0.203)	2.151 (0.847)	3.615 (2.682)	0.497 (0.292)	1.679 (1.253)
second job in 1988	0.790 (0.903)	2.889 (1.673)	1.379 (0.373)	1.226 (0.428)	1.362 (0.397)	1.509 (0.882)
communist party member	1.872** (0.391)	1.165 (0.163)	1.273 (0.275)	1.634 (0.476)	1.738** (0.318)	1.754*** (0.265)

Table 2c. (continued)

	Bulgaria	Czech Rep.	Hungary	Poland	Russia	Slovakia
Log Likelihood	-3194.386	-6050.098	-4382.053	-3241.669	-4470.770	-4773.133
Number of obs	3255	5049	4319	3081	3765	4098
χ^2 (63)	1765.71	1533.39	2377.10	1706.13	1194.43	1354.44
Prob > χ^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R ²	0.2165	0.1125	0.2134	0.2083	0.1178	0.1243

The reference category for occupation is manual workers, for place of residence it is village.

Level of significance: *** = .0001, ** = .001, * = .05

For the inconsistent type of material assets without high culture consumption the data indicate a strong positive impact only for the Bulgarian and Hungarian capitals where the chances are 2-3 times higher of belonging to this category. There is no significant connection between place of residence and material lifestyle in Czech Republic. For Poland, residents of small towns and cities are a bit more likely to live under good material conditions and not participate in high culture than the inhabitants of Warsaw. For Russia and Slovakia the estimates show a greater likelihood of this category being found in villages, in contrast to towns and cities which are more characterised by the 'consistent lowers' type of living conditions. This result displays strong country variations showing that this type of inconsistency is more typical for respondents in Russian and Slovakian villages and for inhabitants of Sofia and Budapest.

For the 'consistent uppers' type of living conditions with both material and cultural assets, the 'residential ladder' seems to be the steepest. Regional inequality is especially strong in the two countries with a 'hydrocephalus' settlement hierarchy: Bulgaria and Hungary. Residents of Sofia or Budapest have 5-6 times more chance of belonging to this type relative to those living in villages and of being in the 'consistent lowers' type of living conditions. This holds for respondents from the Russian and Slovakian capitals much less, while the residents of Warsaw and Prague are in between.

Few estimates for participation in the informal economy in 1988 are significant if controlled for the other explanatory variables. For inconsistent cultural activities, this is farming in Bulgaria and second business in Russia – both have a negative impact. In the latter case the explanation can be that market activity was so close to doing something illegal in the former Soviet Union that only a very special group with low cultural status would risk doing it. In Czech Republic, respondents were producing agricultural products for the market as early as 1988 now live under much better material conditions. This holds for the type of both material and cultural assets as well. Lastly, in Hungary the 'early businessmen' who established their second business in the 1980s, have a 3 times better chance of belonging to the inconsistent material type of living conditions.

Previous Communist Party membership was also expected to affect present living conditions especially in the societies where the centralised party power was the strongest. In fact, when controlling for all other variables, we found significant influence of previous Party membership only for Bulgaria, Slovakia and Russia. These effects are somewhat stronger for the type of 'consistent uppers' with both cultural and material assets.

Discussion

The goal of this paper was to present the socio-demographic determination of living conditions in six East European post-communist societies which are on the way from centralised, politically determined redistributive systems to market economies. In the analysis two theories were built on: the concept of economic and cultural lifestyle by Bourdieu [1984] and the status inconsistency theory by Lenski [1954], Machonin [1970], Kolosi [1984] and others. In the paper such terms as 'consistent lower' and 'consistent upper' living conditions are referred to, as well as inconsistent types dominated by 'pure' cultural or 'pure' material lifestyle. In the analysis I attempted to reveal the reasons why a person belongs to one or another type of living conditions. I also aimed to highlight country specific variations among the six societies.

From previous stratification research it is known that status inconsistency was high in the East European societies under socialism. As a consequence of the egalitarian ideology and practice of communist governments, one form of inconsistency was that income differences were relatively small compared to the existing occupational and educational inequalities. At the same time, while salaries were kept artificially low, consumer prices were also subsidised. Thus, consumption was less dependent on income as compared to Western societies and this also made it possible to maintain the illusion of equality. Lifestyle and cultural reproduction research highlighted the hidden and mostly culturally based mechanisms of inequalities only in the late eighties [Róbert 1984; Kolosi 1987; Mateju 1990; Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Róbert 1990].

The results still indicate a weak explanatory power of income three years after the economic and political turnabout. Although estimates for income are statistically significant, the relative risk ratios are very close to 1, especially for the type of cultural lifestyle but also for the other two types of living conditions. While high culture participation seems to be almost as inexpensive as it was under the previous regime, it is much more affected by high education, managerial, professional or non-manual class position and residential status. When characterising the group of individuals who belong to the inconsistent type of cultural lifestyle with lower material assets than the country average, we can speak about educated people in low controller or routine non-manual positions who are likely to be females and who live in more urbanised settlements.

The group of individuals who belong to the other inconsistent group with higher material assets but lower cultural participation than the country average, might be similar to the snobs of the French Revolution. They are the *nouveau riches*, although they are better educated than those who have neither cultural nor material assets. Good material living conditions can be attained by being active in the newly developed market and – in some cases – in the informal economy. Having a high income and – in some countries – previous Communist Party membership are also among the requirements. Higher education also improves the likelihood of living under good material conditions but it is less important compared to the case of the other types of living conditions. When characterising this type of living conditions, market related activity, some kind of entrepreneurship and a good financial position, should be emphasised. It is not accidental that recent research in Hungary on participation in the hidden economy is approached by economists by means of investigating consumption [Árvay and Vértés 1995].

While results on class cleavages are quite close to Bourdieu's concept on social determination of economic and cultural lifestyle, I would like to underline a significant

difference as characteristic for the post-communist societies and this is the higher degree of status inconsistency. In the Western societies following an economic lifestyle does not mean having fewer cultural assets than the country average, and following a cultural lifestyle does not mean living under worse material conditions than the country average. However, this can be observed in the post-communist countries and this feature of these societies is in line with inconsistent middle class formation [Róbert and Sági 1994]. While inconsistency seems to survive the economic and political transformation, there is a consistent type of living conditions with high culture participation and good material assets in these societies. But in order to belong to this category people have to have in combination all forms of resources, such kinds of advantages as high income, good education, a powerful position in the labour market, controller job or entrepreneurship, participation in the informal economy, starting market activity as early as in the late eighties, and – in the most rigorously Soviet-type societies – having a good political ‘past’ and connections.

In respect of country variation the most typical approach divides the six countries investigated here into two groups: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland on the one hand, and Bulgaria, Russia, Slovakia on the other. This is based on the assumption that the first group is closer to the Western type of societies than the second, partly due to differences in economic development and earlier introduced market characteristics, partly because of the earlier introduced democratic changes and weaker redistributive pressures of party power. Indeed, our analysis confirms this view to some degree. Especially when considering the influence of Communist Party membership, present living conditions are more strongly determined by the previous redistributive hierarchy in Bulgaria, Russia and Slovakia. However, when analysing the impact of participation in the informal economy, the two groups appear as Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia versus Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland. Moreover the role of the informal economy has quite different roots in these societies: long-lasting traditions of informal economy activities in Hungary, and less-developed market relations in Bulgaria and Russia. Finally, in respect of regional differences, the unequal spatial distribution of cultural institutional possibilities and of material living conditions indicate a division between Bulgaria and Hungary on the one hand and the other four countries on the other.

The division of the societies investigated seems to display another pattern again for the explanatory power of the models used in the analysis. We can conclude that the attempt to find the determinants of belonging to different types of living conditions was moderately successful. This model explains about 21% of the variance for Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and only about 12% for Czech Republic, Russia, and Slovakia. There is a common feature of the causal relationship in these societies, namely that income has a significant but small effect on living conditions, while the other components of social status, education and class have much stronger influence. In fact, the variation between these societies was caused by the influence of class and education on living conditions which turned out to be stronger for Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland when compared to Czech Republic, Russia and Slovakia. This grouping brings together the two ‘reform-communist’ countries (Hungary and Poland) and the two countries that used to be one (Czech Republic and Slovakia). The reason why Bulgaria and Russia fall into different groups and why they differ so much in this respect is somewhat unclear and needs further investigation.

Appendix

For material consumption six dichotomous variables (0 vs. 1) were used showing whether the respondent's family has automatic washing machine, video cassette recorder, satellite receiver, microwave oven, deep freezer, personal computer, as well as two further continuous variables which were considered the living territory for a person in the household (M^2 per capita) and the total value of vehicles owned by the respondent's household (0 if none). (See also Table A1.)

Since the observed frequencies of these variables differ within countries and they are of country specific character, they were normalised separately for each of the countries. Accordingly, the so-called z-scores of these variables show the divergence of the respondents' material conditions from their own societies' average. The eight normalised variables were added together resulting in a continuous score for material living conditions. This method means that: (1) the more durables the respondent's family has the higher score the variable of material assets; (2) and also the less common and frequently widespread durables the respondent's family owns the higher score the variable of material assets.

For measuring cultural participation seven-grade variables were used on the respondents' activities in five fields of cultural consumption, i.e. how often the respondent goes to art museums or art exhibits, to ballet, opera, theatre or concerts, listens to classical music at home, reads 'serious' books such as history, biography, science or literature, goes to the library, as well as a nine-grade variable on the number of books a respondent has. (See also Table A2.)

Based on the same consideration, these variables were again normalised separately for each of the countries and then they were added together resulting in a score for cultural living conditions. This measurement has the same features as the previous one for material assets.

In the next step dichotomous variables were computed from the continuous scores for the material and cultural assets where the cutting point was if the respondent had a higher score than his/her country specific average (1) or not (0). The dependent variable of the analysis is derived from the combination of these two dichotomous variables distinguishing four types:

- if the respondent's position is not better than his/her country specific average is in respect of either cultural or material consumption;
- if the respondent's position is better in respect of cultural activities than his/her country specific average is, but this is not the case for material assets;
- if the respondent's position is better in respect of material assets than his/her country specific average is, but this is not the case for cultural activities; and
- if the respondent's position is better in respect of both cultural and material consumption than his/her country specific average is.

For income it was assumed that the consumption unit in modern societies is the family, therefore family income was used instead of personal income. Since we are speaking of respondents' cultural and material assets relative to their country specific averages, it was appropriate to use income deciles. The deciles were calculated separately for each of the examined countries.

The respondents' educational level was measured by years in school. For labour force participation we used a dummy variable with code 1 (in the labour force) and 0 (out of the labour force) at the time of interview. The occupation (present or most recent) is based on the Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero class classification: high controllers; low controllers; routine non-manuals; self employed with employees; self-employed without employees; self-employed farmers; manual supervisors; skilled workers; semi- and unskilled workers; agricultural labourers [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992]. For the multivariate models dummy variables were computed distinguishing between high controllers, low controllers, routine non-manuals, and the three self employed categories, while the manual worker categories were considered as reference.

For demographic position gender (0 = female; 1 = male) was included, age at the time of data collection (in 1993); and size of residence (village, town, city and capital of the country). For the

multivariate models dummy variables were computed for each category of residential position and village was used as reference.

For measuring participation in the informal economy there were a series of dummy variables such as part-time activity in agriculture (0 = not, 1 = yes); part-time activity in non-agricultural business (0 = not, 1 = yes); other part-time activities or second job (0 = not, 1 = yes). These measurements were computed for the time of survey as well as for 1988.

For measuring political participation before 1989 a dichotomous variable was applied: the respondent was a member of Communist Party in 1988 (1) or not (0).

Table A1. The proportion of certain consumer durables by countries (%)

	Bulgaria (N=3326)	Czech Rep. (N=5040)	Hungary (N=3808)	Poland (N=3079)	Russia (N=3616)	Slovakia (N=4066)
automatic washing machine	32.7	65.6	41.5	59.3	89.9	52.3
VCR	23.7	24.0	37.5	53.7	8.9	22.5
satellite	1.7	8.8	20.6	11.4	0.5	13.3
microwave	2.2	8.1	14.8	5.1	2.2	7.5
freezer	5.4	68.6	64.4	44.4	10.0	63.5
PC	1.4	5.8	8.6	13.2	2.3	6.4
car	31.5	54.0	43.8	45.3	22.2	43.6

Source: Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 survey

Table A2. Average frequencies for cultural consumption (standard deviations in brackets) by countries (measured on 0-6 scale where 0 = never, 6 = more than once a week; for books 0 = none, 8 = more than 1000)

	Bulgaria (N=3326)	Czech Rep. (N=5040)	Hungary (N=3808)	Poland (N=3079)	Russia (N=3616)	Slovakia (N=4066)
museum	0.80 (1.14)	1.05 (1.23)	1.04 (1.32)	0.85 (1.15)	0.84 (1.14)	1.14 (1.24)
theatre	0.98 (1.30)	1.11 (1.30)	0.92 (1.29)	0.74 (1.14)	0.85 (1.18)	1.05 (1.28)
classic music	0.86 (1.65)	1.66 (1.91)	1.40 (1.94)	1.45 (2.07)	1.10 (1.77)	1.90 (2.06)
book reading	2.21 (2.28)	3.30 (1.93)	2.09 (2.10)	2.12 (2.21)	3.30 (2.18)	3.13 (1.99)
library	0.78 (1.54)	1.09 (1.73)	0.67 (1.48)	0.66 (1.48)	1.35 (1.93)	1.05 (1.70)
books	3.93 (2.47)	5.24 (1.60)	5.14 (1.99)	4.21 (2.02)	5.18 (1.96)	4.86 (1.70)

Source: Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 survey

PÉTER RÓBERT is Associate Professor at the Institute of Sociology, ELTE University, Budapest, and Head of Research Department in Social Research Informatics Center (TARKI), Budapest. His main interests are social stratification and mobility, labour market processes, attitudes towards social inequalities, political preferences. His contributions have been published in *European Sociological Review* and *Research in Stratification and Mobility*.

References

- Adamczuk, Lucjan, Rudolf Andorka, István Harcsa and Iris Niemi 1988. "Modernization and Time Budget in Finland, Hungary and Poland." Pp. 223-256 in *In Memoriam Alexander Szalai. Hungarian Sociological Studies* 2, ed. by L. Cseh-Szombathy. Budapest: Hungarian Sociological Association.
- Árway, János, András Vértés 1995. *The Share of the Private Sector and the Hidden Economy in Hungary*. Budapest: GKI Economic Research Company.
- Bourdieu, Pierre 1973. "Cultural reproduction and social reproduction." In *Knowledge, Education and Cultural Change*, ed. by R. Brown. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Bourdieu, Pierre 1984. *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, Jean-Claude Passeron 1977. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage Publications.
- Böröcz, József, Caleb Southworth 1996. "Decomposing the Intellectuals Class Power: Conversion of Cultural Capital to Income, Hungary, 1986." *Social Forces* 74: 797-821.
- Collins, Randall 1979. *The Credential Society*. New York: Academic Press.
- De Graaf, Paul M. 1986. "The Impact of Financial and Cultural Resources on Educational Attainment in the Netherlands." *Sociology of Education* 59: 237-246.
- De Graaf, Nan Dirk 1991. "Distinctions by Consumption in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Netherlands." *European Sociological Review* 7: 267-290.
- DiMaggio, Paul 1982. "Cultural Capital and School Success: The Impact of Status Cultural Participation on the Grades of U.S. High School Students." *American Sociological Review* 47: 189-201.
- DiMaggio, Paul, John Mohr 1985. "Cultural Capital, Educational Attainment and Marital Status." *American Journal of Sociology* 90: 1231-1257.
- Erikson, Robert, John H. Goldthorpe 1992. *The Constant Flux*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Falussy, Béla, Viktor Zoltánka 1994. *A magyar társadalom életmódjának változásai az 1976-77, az 1986-87 és az 1993. évi életmód-időmérleg felvételek alapján* (Changes in way of life in the Hungarian society based on way of life-time budget surveys from 1976-77, 1986-87 and 1993). Budapest: Central Statistical Office.
- Filipcová, B. (ed.) 1972. "Society and Leisure. Special Issue on Socialist Life Style." *Society and Leisure Time* 4, no. 3.
- Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Paul M. De Graaf, Péter Róbert 1990. "Reproduction Theory on Socialist Ground: Intergenerational Transmission of Inequalities in Hungary." In *Research in Social Stratification and Social Mobility* 9, ed. by A. L. Kalleberg. Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Gheliuta, A. M., S. P. Gogoliukhin 1974. "The formation of a new type of worker." Pp. 169-203 in *Transformations of Social Structure in USSR and Poland*, ed. by M. N. Rutkevitch, W. Wesolowski, V. S. Semyonov, M. Jarosinska, V. V. Kolbanovsky. Moscow-Warsaw: Institute of Sociological Research. Academy of Sciences of USSR-Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- Harcsa, István 1994. *Életmód-életkörülmények a 90-es években* (Way of life – living conditions in the 90s). Budapest: Central Statistical Office.
- Kolosi, Tamás 1984. "Status and Stratification." In *Stratification and Inequality*, ed. by R. Andorka and T. Kolosi. Budapest: Hungarian Sociological Association.
- Kolosi, Tamás 1987. "Latent Dimensions of Status Inheritance." Paper presented at the semi-annual meeting of ISA RC 28 Social Stratification, Berkeley.

- Kolosi, Tamás 1990. "The Determinants of Life Style." Paper presented at the "Social Stratification and Differentiation of Life Styles" session of ISA RC 28 Social Stratification at the XII. World Congress of Sociology, Madrid.
- Lenski, Gerhard 1954. "Status Crystallization: A Non-vertical Dimension of Social Status." *American Sociological Review* 19: 405-413.
- Machonin, Pavel 1970. "Social Stratification in Contemporary Czechoslovakia." *American Journal of Sociology* 75: 725-741.
- Mansurov, N. S., V. A. Yadov, Z. Sufin, T. M. Jaroszewski (eds.) 1974. *Personal activity in the socialist society*. Moscow-Warsaw: Institute of Sociological Research, Academy of Sciences of USSR-Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- Maslow, H. H. 1954. *Motivation and Personality*. New York.
- Matějů, Petr 1990. "Family Effect on Educational Attainment in Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands and Hungary." Pp. 187-210 in *Social Reproduction in Eastern and Western Europe*, ed. by J. L. Peschar. Nijmegen: Institute for Applied Social Sciences.
- Róbert, Péter 1984. "A Multidimensional Approach to Social Mobility." In *Stratification and Inequality*, ed. by R. Andorka and T. Kolosi. Budapest: Hungarian Sociological Association.
- Róbert, Péter 1990. "The Role of Cultural and Material Resources in the Status Attainment Process: The Hungarian Case." Paper presented at the "Social Stratification and Differentiation of Life Styles" session of ISA RC 28 Social Stratification at the XII. World Congress of Sociology, Madrid.
- Róbert, Péter, Matild Sági 1994. "Social background of middle class formation in Hungary." Paper presented at the session "Process of Stratification in Eastern Europe" at the XIII. World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, July 18-23.
- Siciński, Andrzej 1974. "Style of life in socialist society." Pp. 173-199 in *Personal activity in the socialist society*, ed. by N. S. Mansurov, V. A. Yadov, Z. Sufin and T. M. Jaroszewski. Moscow-Warsaw: Institute of Sociological Research, Academy of Sciences of USSR-Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences.
- Siciński, Andrzej (ed.) 1978. *Styl życia. Przemiany we współczesnej Polsce* (Style of life. Transformations in contemporary Poland). Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.
- Sobel, Michael E. 1981. *Lifestyle and Social Structure: Concepts, Definitions, and Analyses*. New York: Academic Press.
- Sobel, Michael E. 1983. "Lifestyle Differentiation and Stratification in Contemporary U.S. Society." In *Research in Social Stratification and Social Mobility* 2., ed. by D. Treiman and R. V. Robinson. Greenwich: JAI Press.
- Szalai, Alexander 1972. *The Use of Time. Daily Activities of Urban and Suburban Population in Twelve Countries*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Szalai, Alexander, Frank M. Andrews (eds.) 1980. "The quality of Life. Comparative Studies." *SAGE Studies in International Sociology* 20.
- Szántó, Miklós 1972. "Free Saturdays and Changes in the Way of Life of Hungarian Industrial Workers Living in Town." *Society and Leisure Time* 4: 41-53.
- Szántó, Miklós (ed.) 1977. *Ways of Life*. Budapest: Corvina Press.
- Utasi, Ágnes 1984. "Life styles, demand levels and Hungary's elite." In *Stratification and Inequality*, ed. by R. Andorka and T. Kolosi. Budapest: Hungarian Sociological Association.
- Veblen, Thorstein 1931. *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: The Viking Press.
- Vitányi, Iván 1978. "An Investigation into Artistic Taste among Workers." Pp. 267-280 in *Hungarian Society and Marxist Sociology in the Nineteenseventies*, ed. by Tibor Huszár, Kalmán Kulcsár and Sándor Szalai. Budapest: Corvina Press.

- Weber, Max 1966. "Class, status and party." In *Class, Status and Power*, ed. by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset. New York: The Free Press.
- Wesołowski, Włodzimierz 1970. *Zróżnicowanie społeczne* (Social stratification). Wrocław: Ossolineum.
- Wesołowski, Włodzimierz, Kazimierz Słomczyński 1983. "Reduction of Inequalities and Status Inconsistency." *Angewandte Sozialforschung* 11: 185-194.

Working Conditions as Perceived by the Employed

A West-Central-East Europe View

PAVEL KUČAŘ*

Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague

Abstract: The need for international comparisons of work conditions and the labour market has grown together with the pace of integration of the post-communist countries into the EU. This need is most probably met to some extent by a multi-focus international research programme entitled "Employment conditions, labour market insecurity and work motivation of the employed and unemployed". The project was prepared on the basis of British methodology and besides the Czech Republic also Great Britain, Slovakia, and Bulgaria took part in it. The idea behind the whole research was, according to the central theme of it, to point out the differences that exist in the particular countries in the given field. This paper deals firstly with people's reactions to the effects of market mechanisms: to problems with job-seeking and possible strategies to cope with the loss of one's job, which at the same time basically indicate the conditions of the labour market. The second main topic is a description of complex attitudes to work including an analysis of basic development tendencies. On the basis of the comparison of the situation in the particular countries the crucial common features as well as significant differences are described.

Czech Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 5 (No. 2: 217-233)

Introduction

The need for international comparisons has grown with each advancing stage of (actual or potential) integration of the post-communist countries into the EU. Sporadic international projects taking place in the 70s and 80s (for example, – Automation and industrial workers, 1976) have been quickly joined by others since the end of the 80s [e.g. as to social structure analysis cf. Peschar 1990, Matějů 1995, researches by ISSP]. Today, it would be difficult to find an area without at least some basic information of a comparative nature.

Yet, more detailed analyses are needed more than ever. The issues of the labour market and employment form one of the areas where this need is most acutely felt, mainly in the developed western countries. The decision-making process over whether to invest or not in the post-communist countries depends to a certain extent upon workforce assessments in relation to these countries, in other words their abilities to meet the economic effectiveness criteria of such investments. Berger states: "Specific components of Western bourgeois culture (especially those of activity, renewability, and self-control) are inevitable conditions for capitalistic development" [Berger 1993: 235]. Therefore, an important consideration in this is worker profile, focusing on profession, qualifications, values, motivation on the level of adaptability, assertiveness, and so forth.

Specific information on these issues, based on international comparisons has been provided by research programmes focusing on the effects of the transformation and pri-

*) Direct all correspondence to PhDr. Pavel Kuchař, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Celetná 20, 116 36 Praha 1, phone + 420 2 24 49 15 00.

vatisation processes, both at the global level [Pollert, Hradecká 1994], and at the factory or enterprise level [e.g. Vlášil et al. 1996]. However, there is a lack of more systematic analyses of the social consequences of work and employment as well as of those relevant characteristics that are either common or different in the Czech Republic and in the Western countries. At present, the requirements for a more detailed study in the area of human resources are most probably met best by a multi-focus international research programme entitled "Employment conditions, labour market insecurity and work motivation of the employed and unemployed".¹ The project was prepared on the basis of British methodology [Gallie, White 1993] and besides the Czech Republic, Great Britain, Slovakia, and Bulgaria also took part. This contribution draws upon data from this study; the group of countries established *ad hoc* reflects, at least from the point of view of typology, the important West-Middle-East axis.

The different paths which the European regions have taken in their development so far have led to different economic and social standards as well as differences in the cultural and axiologic spheres [Berger 1993]. The further development of these regions is also obviously determined by these roots: while the Central-European countries may follow up their pre-communist, although not always entirely democratic, past, the Eastern European countries mostly lack such experience. Therefore to draw closer to the developed countries is for them not only an economic and political problem, they have also, to a great extent, to face up to this historical inheritance (perhaps first of all). Any international comparison has to count with these differences; otherwise there is a great risk of false conclusions. This aspect of comparative research programmes, especially of those concentrating on countries with unequal economic and political development levels, is pointed out by many authors [e.g. Smith, Meiksins 1995]. At the same time, it is also true that the word and the idea of 'transformation' has been heard (or had been heard up until some time ago) rather frequently, even in developed countries of Western Europe, and especially in Great Britain in the times of so-called Thatcherism. Thus the results of research devoted to the effects of these processes are valuable not only because of the gain in methodological experience but also due to their content [e.g. Barrell 1994; Drucker 1993; Rubery, Wilkinson 1994].

The analysis of conditions under which people enter the working process may concentrate on two main fields of interest: an objective one where current social and legal norms and the situation in the labour market are dealt with, and a subjective one where individual qualities and their functioning in the market are considered. For the purposes of the present analysis, institutional employment aspects and those of the labour market in the specific countries are omitted in spite of their importance in understanding all the relations [Solow 1990]. The focus will be on basic subjective phenomena: the presumption concerns the dynamics of mutual relationships between what one prefers according to one's individual needs and what one adapts to because of the pressure of external influences. Behavioural changes reflect both changes in one's expectations, and in the rate of submission or constraints. If value orientation changes express themselves more in the changes of preferences, then the changing market forces influence mainly the level of

¹) The project was carried out as a grant of the EU No. CIPA-CT93-0223 in the years 1994-1996, partly (survey of the unemployed population) as a grant of the Grant Agency of Czech Republic during 1995-1996. For description of the research (sampling, methodology) see the Appendix.

adaptability [Etzioni 1988: 253]. A quite wide specification of understanding the idea of 'perceiving working conditions' emerges from the described relations, this being a complex reflection of the above-mentioned objective phenomena (external pressure) and subjective qualities (value preferences) [Dubois 1994].

This paper will first concentrate on people's reactions to the effects of market mechanisms: Problems with job-seeking and possible strategies in the event of the loss of one's job basically describe *the situation in the labour market*. As soon as partial changes in attitudes are generalised for the whole society, they gain the substance of quasi-objective indications of the prevailing value system of that society. Consequently attention will be paid to complex *attitudes to work* and its basic descriptions including analysis of basic development tendencies.

1. Job-seeking strategies

The level of social and economic development in Great Britain, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria is markedly different. In a slightly simplifying manner it may be said, with the exception of Great Britain, these countries may be considered types of European governmental systems which are recreating themselves after the breakdown of communist regimes. The Czech Republic should be one of the first countries to achieve integration into the EU. Although united in one state with the Czech Republic for three-quarters of this century, Slovakia will probably wait somewhat longer for integration. Bulgaria belongs to those countries for which, at present, full integration is rather a long-term consideration [Moerell 1995].

The horizons of integration mentioned above are only an external frame for the evaluated trends. In its objective dimensions, the labour market determines the present chances of an individual. The first issue here is what opportunities a person is offered by the labour market and, obviously, what obstacles he has to face, and to what extent he is able to assert himself on the labour market [Colbjornsen 1986]. It is clear that in similar comparisons – between countries of a seemingly equal level, such as the countries of the EU [cf. Barrell 1994] – the independent intervening variable is the social and branch structure of particular countries.

Both actual opportunities and opinions of the citizens are heavily differentiated in the social sphere. Meanwhile, the ongoing social and economic transformation is associated with growing diversity and enables new, at least hidden sources of social conflicts [Večerník 1995]. Especially the lower social status groups (according to education, incomes, lifestyle) are more and more prepared to listen to populist promises (from both left and right of the political spectrum) concerning 'simple' and 'equitable' solutions to present problems. From this point of view Bulgaria is a significant case. Although it was a rather prosperous agricultural and industrial country at the end of the 80s, it almost reached a point of economic collapse in the middle of the 90s thanks to its post-communist governments. However, due to the aims and the limits of this study, the following results of the analyses cannot deal in depth with the influences of transformation effects such as the new stratification of society and the emergence of a private owners class, changing working demands, growing income differences and so on.

Bearing in mind all these limits, the structure of answers to the question concerning the *possibilities of choosing an accessible job* is quite explicit. The highest number of possibilities was declared by the British (21%) and the Bulgarians (14%). Adding up

both the positive variants ("a wide choice" + "some choice"), more than half of the Czech (59%) and British respondents (54%), and almost half the Slovaks (49%) had a wide choice. Only 37% of the Bulgarians declared this variant. The negative variants may perhaps be more significant. These were declared by a half of the Bulgarians but only by 19% of the Slovaks, 16% of the British and 12% of the Czechs.

Thus it is clear that from the viewpoint of the chances of choosing a job the most oppressive situation is in Bulgaria, where a half of working people would in fact seem to have no choice. This state applies to almost the whole of the social class structure (60% of unskilled workers, 54% of routine non-manual workers and 42% of professionals). The influence of class position on the distribution of this choice is most pronounced in Slovakia, and it is least pronounced in the Czech Republic. However, generally it can be stated that people with higher education and in a higher social position have better chances in choosing a job.

It is worth mentioning that age and gender play no important role here. The probable cause of this is the fact that there had been constant (and, in fact, egalitarian) conditions for employment choice in the so-called socialist countries for a long time. As a consequence of insignificant social and territorial mobility, relatively stable patterns of employment choice (and 'non-choice') were created. Although after 1989 social mobility has become more dynamic, there is still doubt as to whether this change is assumable in a situation of extended pressure on the labour force.

The labour market situation is illustrated by possible strategies of coping with unemployment that may arise. They concern not only the chances offered by the labour market, but also (and perhaps mainly) a willingness to choose from within the offered possibilities, that is, they concern boundaries up to which an individual is ready to gradually relinquish his requirements [Beharrell 1992]. Here, the density of the social safety net undoubtedly plays an important role (the higher the density of a safety net, the weaker are the incentives for people to work and the more they rely on government assistance). The unemployment rate in a particular country is, obviously, of great importance here as well. At the end of 1994 this rate was 3.2 in the Czech Republic, 8.7 in Great Britain, 14.8 in Slovakia, and about 13% in Bulgaria. A certain picture of the mentioned boundaries of possible concession of individuals is already implied by these figures.

Thus, what are people in the compared countries ready to give up for a job, and what they are not? An outline of positive choices is shown in Table 1.

With the exception of the first possibility (training in a different type of skill) the Bulgarians are ready to give up more than all the others. The foregoing statement concerning their significantly limited chances in job-seeking is thus proved here. Although on the one hand it gives empirical evidence of their willingness to sacrifice, on the other it makes the present occupational structure of Bulgarian society unstable to a great extent. The structure loses the ability to stand occasional disruption that may lead in its implications to further instability in the society as a whole.

On the opposite end of the scale to the Bulgarians are the Czechs whose readiness to give up something is the lowest. A converse risk is menacing here – Czech society is far too stable, unemployment as a social problem in fact does not exist here. The absence of labour market pressure, expressed in little or no personal experience with unemployment, has an impact that people are not sufficiently prepared for changes and any possible disruption that might occur, especially after the country's integration into EU.

Interestingly, the Slovak attitudes in their selected strategies sometimes resemble the Czechs and sometimes the British.

Table 1. Strategies of coping with possible unemployment – positive answers (in percentages)

	GB	CZ	SK	BG
Training in a different type of skill	73.2	52.5	58.5	72.9
A lower level of skill or qualification	35.2	27.8	35.1	66.9
Worse physical work conditions (heat etc.)	22.7	17.0	19.6	55.3
Night work	34.9	27.5	34.7	50.0
Weekend work	49.1	39.0	46.3	57.6
Less pay	27.9	7.7	9.8	44.1
Moving to a different area	33.7	15.1	15.3	35.9

Question: *If you were to lose your present job, would you be prepared to consider another job which, by comparison, involved...*

(1) Yes, (2) No, (3) I am not sure

Nevertheless, a generally accepted strategy is based on agreement with a change in one's present occupation, but within the same qualification level as far as possible (especially in the Czech Republic, not in Bulgaria). The second most frequent strategy would mean working on weekends. The variant almost completely rejected (namely in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia) is lower earnings – however even this variant would be acceptable for almost a half of Bulgarians. The negative attitude towards moving elsewhere for a job in all post-communist countries would seem influenced most of all by the non-existence of a housing market. For this reason such a variant is hardly possible.

2. Attitudes towards work

We start the analysis of work attitudes with a discussion of the present situation among the employed population and seeking answers to basic questions. Do the particular countries differ in this sphere? If so, in what aspects? A partial answer is offered by the first analytical step – the evaluation of basic reasons for keeping a job. The variants of the offered answers covered a basic motivational spectrum of possible choices, which means social, economic and individually psychological aspects. In the questionnaire the particular motives were investigated by separated dichotomy variables (in the form of "agreement-disagreement") on the one hand, and by one nominal variable that included all variants on the other. For the following comparison we used the latter, only contingency coefficients C_n are calculated from the former.

In this table the particular percentage frequencies are not as interesting as are the differences between the countries. These differences reflect very clearly the general social and economic characteristics of the given social systems. The polarity is established by Great Britain on the one hand, and Bulgaria on the other, as is similar to all other comparisons. The lower standard of living in Bulgaria implies the most significant evaluation of work as a source of income for meeting basic needs. This value of work is, on the contrary, of lesser importance in Great Britain. While only a very small part of the British consider the main reason for having a job is because they see it as a normal thing, the share of this evaluation of work is five times higher in Bulgaria. In Bulgaria only 1%

of respondents placed an interest in working in first position, while in Great Britain this reason is considered as the priority by more than one tenth of all employed.

Table 2. Basic working motives (in percentages)

	GB	CZ	SK	BG	C _n
Working is a normal thing to do	2.7	7.0	8.6	14.4	0.438
I need money for basic essentials (food, rent, loans, etc.)	64.6	68.7	74.8	78.6	0.177
To earn money to buy extras	7.3	3.5	1.3	1.4	0.182
To earn money of my own	6.1	7.9	5.6	2.2	0.223
For the company of other people	2.1	2.0	0.9	2.0	0.230
I enjoy working	11.0	9.0	7.6	0.9	0.177
To follow my career	5.8	1.2	1.0	0.4	0.246
Other reason	0.4	0.7	0.2	0.1	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Question: *Which statements best describe your reasons for working at present?*

Thus it is clear that work attitudes demonstrate basic differences between the countries. If for the British an understanding of work as an individual's choice prevails, the Bulgarians understand work more often as an objective necessity. However, besides the level of economic development, a level of modernisation in the respective countries is probably reflected as well [Machonin 1996]. It is unclear to what extent Bulgarian society reflects (or can reflect regarding its development to date) post-materialistic values [Moerel 1995]. A transition from one to another understanding of work is not only an expression of a certain standard of living, but also a shift in the value system. While the standard of living can be raised quite quickly, a change of values is a matter of several generations' exchange [Ishikawa 1994].

This hypothesis is proven by the findings on the relationship between work as the means of economic security. This relationship was observed in the question on willingness to work even in a situation of full material affluence (a question which is not referred to in the tables here). The data do not prove a linear dependence between the standard of living, self-realisation, and work attitudes. The Bulgarians would go on working in most of the cases (77%), the British (68%) and the Slovaks (64%) less often, and the Czechs least often. Undoubtedly, it may be discussed how different people understand this question. The British probably know that living without having an engagement or business is possible, while the experience of living under socialist regimes (with a legal obligation to work) in the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the one hand, and in Bulgaria on the other, is different, from this point of view. Albeit we speak of manifested attitudes that were more or less modified in factual consequences, it is clear that social and cultural patterns of behaviour are different in particular countries.

Employment is not the only thing that is dealt with here in this connection. There are differences in work conditions in the compared countries, for instance in average working hours – they are the longest in the Czech Republic (43 hours weekly) while in Great Britain only about 40 hours (with information about Bulgaria unavailable). We deal with the interiorisation of a complex of alternative lifestyles. Work is substantial but not the only part of them. While the Czechs can thus connect material affluence with a

possibility of not working (to leave off work) more often, for the Bulgarians it is not a reason in itself to quit the job (they probably understand 'material affluence' differently).

Subjective perception of working conditions is usually measured by means of a set of basic characteristics of work. According to this experience approximately 15 characteristics may be selected that are mostly used in the particular countries and that cover fundamental dimensions of work attitudes. A cross-sectional approach is at issue here (why do people have a job?) as well as the investigation of the dynamics of changes (what have been the changes in the meaning of particular characteristics since 1989?). The former (cross-sectional approach) is presented in Table 3 which shows the share of positive evaluations (1) of the above-mentioned characteristics in the particular countries and contingency coefficients C_n .

Table 3. Characteristics of work ("It is essential", in percentages)

		GB	CZ	SK	BG	C_n
Friendly people to work with	PEOPL	23.8	26.8	24.2	31.3	0.131
Good promotion prospects	PROSP	10.5	19.4	20.2	8.3	0.356
Good pay	PAY	25.9	45.1	53.8	55.2	0.273
Good relations with supervisor	MANAG	29.3	14.3	15.8	21.1	0.272
A secure job	SECUR	36.0	30.2	38.0	19.2	0.199
A job where I can use my own initiative	INIT	24.3	17.6	17.1	53.7	0.350
Work I like doing	INTER	34.4	26.7	25.2	16.3	0.261
Convenient hours of work	CONV	13.0	13.3	12.0	26.3	0.113
Choice in my hours of work	HOURS	8.4	11.6	9.4	10.1	0.151
The opportunity to use my abilities	ABILI	28.1	18.7	15.5	18.3	0.286
Good fringe benefits	BENEF	6.9	9.5	12.5	24.4	0.279
An easy workload	EASY	3.0	5.2	4.8	9.1	0.162
Good training provision	TRAIN	26.8	10.5	10.3	11.6	0.354
Good physical working conditions	CONDS	22.2	19.8	24.1	21.1	0.150
A lot of variety in the type of work	VARIE	16.9	14.8	8.8	10.5	0.329

Question: *In a list of factors people usually look for in a job tell me how important they are for you*

(1) Essential, (2) Very important, (3) Fairly important, (4) Not very important, (8) Does not know


The most significant deviations between the particular countries may be found in evaluations of promotion prospects, training provision, using one's own initiative, and of variety in the type of work. By contrast, there is quite good accord in opinions on working hours and on choice in one's hours of work, in evaluation of working with other people, and of physical working conditions.

By looking at the distribution of basic frequencies (positive answers) one can read other specific features – such as preferences of particular characteristics in the different countries. A complex picture of these preferences is visible in results of the LINDA method (linear decomposition analysis) that works on the principles of correspondence analysis. The basic data entry for this analysis are the above-mentioned frequencies of positive answers.

The resulting Chart 1 shows the positions of the particular characteristics and of the respective countries in the space defined by their interrelationship. The first axis may be called an 'axis of work effects'. It is specified by good pay on the one end and by good training provision on the other. Other characteristics that define this axis are doing work one likes, good relations with a supervisor, and the opportunity to use one's abilities. This axis exhausts 49% of variance, which means that the people's attitudes in the particular countries are first of all determined by the position on this scale.

The second basic axis is established by possibilities of using one's own initiative as an opposite to a secure job and good promotion prospects. Other characteristics establishing this axis are again work a person likes doing (but with reverse load), and convenient hours of work. This axis may be called 'stability of work' (45% of variance).

Chart 1. Characteristics of work



The identification of the countries in the space defined in such a way is quite simple. The first factor is explicitly connected with Great Britain, the second one (with the same load) with Bulgaria. While the opposition in the first factor is Bulgaria (preferences of material effects of work), in the second factor it is Slovakia (preferences of prospects). In the two-dimension space, the Czech Republic and Slovakia occupy a common quadrant with a tendency (especially in the case of the Czech Republic) to the central parts of this space.

The chart shows the mutual distances of particular countries, in other words, what is typical for each of them:

Britain. Of all the countries it is such items as good training provision, good relations with supervisor, interest in the job, the opportunity to use one's abilities in the job and a lot of variety in the type of work that are most frequently evaluated as positive. By

contrast, significantly, good pay and good fringe benefits are stated here to be most important in least of cases.

Czech Republic. Attitudes in almost all characteristics come close to the average evaluations. Somewhat higher importance is ascribed to good promotion prospects (together with Slovakia) and to variety in the type of work (together with Britain), less importance was given to using one's own initiative. Good relations with one's supervisor are declared to be the least important of all the countries in the study.

Slovakia. Attitudes here are similar to those in the Czech Republic. A specific feature is the highest importance of good promotion prospects, good pay and a secure job. The least weight is carried by the chance to use one's own initiative.

Bulgaria. In many characteristics the attitudes are in opposition to British attitudes. It is the most pronounced in the evaluation of the importance of using one's own initiative, which is the absolutely dominant characteristic here. The highest importance among all countries is also ascribed to good fringe benefits, good pay gained quite a high importance (together with Slovakia), as did convenient hours of work. The least often declared are the importance of a secure job and of good promotion prospects, an interest in the job, and good training provision.

It is clear that these preferences show the differences of the modern history of the compared countries mentioned in the beginning. While in Great Britain the dominant characteristics concern long-term work effects (importance of qualifications, interest in the job, using one's abilities; with good pay being relatively unimportant), in Bulgaria they concern short-term effects (importance of using one's own initiative, fringe benefits; with a secure job and interest in the job being relatively unimportant).

The lifestyle in a given country and the attained standard of living are obviously markedly reflected in the presented distribution. It is clear that a preference for good pay rises with the need of it and with its importance in the individual's value orientation. The position of fringe benefits suggests something about distributive models valid in the given society. Concerning other indicators, similar specifications are somewhat contradictory. The importance of personal initiative in the job might indicate distinct meritocratic principles as well as a certain absence of relevant institutions and their substitution by elements of personal initiative. At the same time it may express an effort to gain higher earnings and thus a better feeling of self-expression. This would prove the foregoing hypotheses about a lack of alternative lifestyles in Bulgaria. The final judgement concerning these ideas is, obviously, dependent on the context of other factors.

When comparing the observed countries according to their mutual distances (Table 4) a contrast between Great Britain and Bulgaria is rather evident. At the same time the affinity of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is clear. Britain has relatively the closest distance to the Czech Republic but even this distance is further than that between the CR and Bulgaria. It means that although the Czech Republic with its attitudes is situated approximately in the centre of these countries, its position is still closer to Bulgaria than to Britain.

Table 4. Matrix of distances between countries – an evaluation of the present state (2 factors, after rotation)

	Britain	Czech	Slovak	Bulgaria
Britain	0.00			
Czech	5.90	0.00		
Slovak	7.40	1.53	0.00	
Bulgaria	8.98	7.18	7.75	0.00

3. The dynamics of changes

To be able to evaluate the present state, the trends (i.e. changes) within this period should be known. On basis of these the possible trajectories of future development may be formulated, but with an awareness of the higher or lower determination of such considerations by a set of exogenous factors. The key question is the choice of the time interval within which we want to observe the validity of the mentioned trends. Concerning the post-communist countries there is no doubt that the starting point of this interval for measuring the present trends should be at least the last year of communist rule, i.e. 1989. The data collection of our survey took place five years after 1989 (in 1994). Thus the interval in which the changes were observed covered this crucial period in history in the British survey. (Coincidentally, the data collection was carried out in 1992.)

The development trends (Table 5) were observed in two ways: firstly using the same set of characteristics of work, as in the previous case (i.e. on the higher level of universality), but with a different evaluation scale. The second approach was related to the respondent's work performance (over the preceding 5 years). We start with the more general view, the basic analytical approach will be similar – using variant 1 as a basis.

Table 5. Changes in the meaning of characteristics of work ("More important", in percentage)

		GB	CZ	SK	BG	C _n
Friendly people to work with	PEOPL	26.6	21.1	20.6	30.7	0.137
Good promotion prospects	PROSP	24.8	33.8	32.9	16.0	0.206
Good pay	PAY	45.8	56.6	58.4	65.8	0.166
Good relations with supervisor	MANAG	30.5	19.7	30.1	38.5	0.186
A secure job	SECUR	52.8	50.4	54.8	66.0	0.121
A job where I can use my own initiative	INIT	34.3	21.7	18.7	21.9	0.237
Work I like doing	INTER	35.1	21.9	18.9	22.9	0.251
Convenient hours of work	CONV	24.0	14.8	9.9	19.7	0.170
Choice in my hours of work	HOURS	22.3	17.3	9.8	11.2	0.204
The opportunity to use my abilities	ABILI	37.1	25.4	23.3	26.5	0.191
Good fringe benefits	BENEF	18.1	20.6	22.3	40.7	0.228
An easy work load	EASY	12.1	8.0	7.5	13.0	0.154
Good training provision	TRAIN	36.4	24.4	19.0	18.1	0.220
Good physical working conditions	CONDS	28.9	33.3	36.7	27.5	0.200
A lot of variety in the type of work	VARIE	27.6	15.3	9.8	13.6	0.255


Question: *Has the meaning of these aspects changed for you since 1989?*

(1) More important, (2) Less important, (3) It is the same, (8) Don't know

In comparison with Table 3 it is revealed that differences between the countries are not as significant in the case of development trends as they were in the evaluation of the present state. The highest number of changes has been found in the evaluation of variety in the type of work, work one likes doing, using one's own initiative and fringe benefits. The only insignificant differences are in attitudes towards a change in the importance of a secure job and friendly people one works with.

As in the preceding case, a LINDA method was applied here. The result is an identification of two main factors (chart 2). The first one may be specified again as 'factor of work effects' because it is established by the same polar characteristics as was in the analysis of the present state – i.e. good pay on the one side and promotion prospects and variety in the type of work on the other side. This latter factor is not very clear-cut; a higher number of tested characteristics may be involved in it. Towards the opposite side (good pay) these characteristics are work one likes doing, using one's own initiative, and with a reverse sign of load (closer to good pay) there are fringe benefits, good physical working conditions, and good promotion prospects (in case of the present state this characteristic was a part of the other factor). This factor exhausts 48% of variance.

Chart 2. Characteristics of work – changes since 1989



A somewhat smaller part of variance (45%) is covered by the second, much more polarised, factor. One pole of it is established by good promotion prospects, and the opposite pole by fringe benefits. This factor may be called a 'factor of time horizons of benefits' (long-term versus short-term). Together with the first one it shares the evaluation of good physical working conditions. Besides this, it is established by a secure job and good relations with a supervisor.

The basic position of the particular countries conforms to the evaluation of the present state. Here, again, the first factor is especially characteristic for Great Britain, while

the second one for Bulgaria, with the same load but with a reverse sign. An opposition in the first factor is Slovakia with its preferences for material work effects, in the case of the second factor it is the Czech Republic with preferences for long-term advantages.

The typical features of the particular countries are clear from Chart 2. It gives an answer to the question as to what has changed in the course of the previous five years from the point of view of mutual comparison. What is most important at present?

Britain. This country exhibited the highest growth of importance among the compared countries in the case of good training provision, variety in the type of work, work one likes doing, and using one's own initiative. Significantly, the least increase of importance concerns good pay and fringe benefits, changes in the importance of a secure job were also low.

Czech Republic. In this case most of the changes are again close to the average. The most significant deviations are in the growth of importance of good promotion prospects (together with Slovakia) and, on the contrary, the least growth of importance in good relations with one's supervisor.

Slovakia. The highest changes were recorded in the evaluation of importance of good physical working conditions and of the already-mentioned good promotion prospects (together with the Czech Republic). The evaluation of working hours changed least of all.

Bulgaria. Here there is again a distinct counterbalance to the British evaluation. The importance of fringe benefits changed much more markedly, along with characteristics of a secure job, good pay, good relations with one's supervisor and friendly people one works with. On the other hand, in particular good promotion prospects and good training provision were least often evaluated as more important at present.

The presented development trends largely correspond with the findings concerning the importance of individual work characteristics at present. In Great Britain, a gradual strengthening of factors expressing mostly the long-term consequences of work has occurred (qualifications, interest), while especially in Bulgaria such a development concerns rather factors of short-term advantages (fringe benefits). Obviously, some qualitative characteristics have gradually gained ground here, too (friendly people to work with, relations with supervisor). Their dynamics are slower, however, because the satisfaction of contemporary, mostly basic subsistence needs logically takes priority.

A somewhat different situation is that in the Czech Republic where a traditional model based on career planning with long-term perspective has clearly strengthened (at least concerning some socio-professional groups. There are small differences in the management hierarchy [according to Bata's thesis of "we are all in the same boat"]).

Lastly, when again comparing the particular countries with one another from the point of view of the calculated distances (Table 6), the similarity in the development dynamics with the evaluation of the present state is pronounced. However, distances between the countries are in the case of development changes slightly shorter (which means that the evaluation of the development trends is less clear-cut) with one exception – a greater distance between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This means that the dynamics in both countries are more unequal than the evaluation of the present state. In other words, while the given state is evaluated in a similar way, the assessment of the development trends is different. It is also worth mentioning that the distance of this evaluation

between Great Britain and the Czech Republic is almost the same as between Slovakia and Bulgaria.

Table 6. Matrix of distances between countries – evaluation of development trends (2 factors, after rotation)

	Britain	Czech	Slovak	Bulgaria
Britain	0.00			
Czech	5.59	0.00		
Slovak	7.21	2.18	0.00	
Bulgaria	8.08	7.03	5.95	0.00

Another approach in discovering changes during this five-year period was based on a comparison of the factual contents of work in 1994 with that of 1989. Here the personal experience of respondents was reflected, which measured changes in the importance of distinct issues by means of a simple mobility scale “increase-stability-decrease”.

Table 7. Changes in job characteristics in the period 1989-1994 (in percentage)

		Increased				Decreased				C _n
		GB	CZ	SK	BG	GB	CZ	SK	BG	
Job security	SECUR	27.5	26.7	29.0	7.0	36.7	51.3	60.3	65.8	0.288
The level of skill I use in my job	SKILL		62.1	51.9	51.7	35.3	9.0	3.3	4.0	7.0
0.245										
The variety of tasks I perform	VARIE	65.0	46.1	40.2	22.3	9.6	7.1	8.5	11.5	0.341
The provision of training	TRAIN	39.2	26.9	18.2	14.7	18.6	16.9	27.0	22.5	0.236
Tightness of supervision over my job	TIGHT	29.0	50.4	57.6	38.3	31.2	9.8	6.2	10.7	0.296
The effort I have to put into my job	EFFOR	61.5	66.5	69.3	39.7	7.5	3.6	3.5	6.4	0.228
My chances of promotion	PROM	31.1	19.1	14.7	15.9	24.1	22.1	33.0	19.8	0.199
The responsibility involved in my job	RESPO	64.6	60.4	62.3	50.4	8.3	3.9	3.7	3.9	0.171
The stress involved in the job	STRES	53.4	47.9	46.3	53.8	12.4	6.6	4.8	5.2	0.147

Question: *Compare your current job with what you were doing five years ago (even if you were in the same job). For each of the following things would you say there had been a significant increase compared to five years ago, a significant decrease or little or no change?*


(1) Increased, (2) There has been little or no change, (3) Decreased, (4) Don't

The most pronounced differences between the particular countries are in changes of variety of tasks in the job. The most marked changes here took place in Great Britain, while this work characteristic changed only among a small part of the population in Bulgaria. The least differences between the compared countries were recorded in the proportion of changes in the extent of stress involved in the jobs, with only small differences in changes in responsibility.

The LINDA method again reveals deeper relations between the particular countries and the mentioned characteristics. Firstly, there are differences in the characteristics increasing their importance. The first factor is defined, on the one hand, by the variety of tasks, and by the tightness of supervision over one's job on the other. It exhausts 58% of variance, and it is quite close.

The second factor is not so close. Its axis is defined by performance and a stress, as well as chances of promotion, tightness of supervision over one's job, the provision of training, and job security. This factor exhausts 40% of variance.

Chart 3. Increase in levels of job characteristics



Both factors are markedly influenced by the situation in Bulgaria. In the first one, its opposition is Great Britain, in the second one, it is Slovakia. Chart 3 reveals the positions of the given countries with respect to the particular characteristics. It implies that for Great Britain a growth of importance of promotion chances and the variety of tasks one performs is symptomatic. For Bulgaria a pronounced growth of stress involved in the job, as well as the chances of promotion are typical. In Slovakia the biggest growth was recorded concerning the tightness of supervision over one's job. The Czech Republic oscillates around the average again without any significant deviations.

While relatively the smallest growth is ascribed to tightness of supervision in Great Britain, in Bulgaria it is performance in work and variety of tasks. There is a clear difference in the dynamics of creative characteristics of work in these countries, giving probably the best picture of both the present socio-economic conditions and short-term development tendencies.

Regarding a decrease in the importance of some of the mentioned characteristics, the situation is somewhat simpler as it concerns only few of them. Firstly, it concerns job security, the importance of which has decreased in all countries, most of all in Bulgaria. The tightness of supervision fell in Great Britain, with the chances of promotion and the provision of training decreasing in Slovakia.

Table 8. Matrix of distances between countries – evaluation of the increase of importance of characteristics of work (2 factors, after rotation)

	Britain	Czech	Slovak	Bulgaria
Britain	0.00			
Czech	4.63	0.00		
Slovak	6.20	1.57	0.00	
Bulgaria	7.58	2.94	1.38	0.00

The matrix of distances between the particular countries (Table 8) has a similar structure as was in the previous cases. Here, again the Czech Republic is nearest to Great Britain, and similarly the smallest distance is between the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Conclusion

How people in different social, economic, political, and cultural systems perceive the conditions of their work says much about both the systems themselves and the ability of the people to handle these conditions. Each of these systems plays its role in understanding the contemporary state in different ways. As to the countries that were subject to this analysis, the most important seem to be the factors of history and culture. The chosen axis, 'West-Central-East', shows not only differences in the economic standard of the specific countries but at the same time it defines boundaries that are either completely or at least in the near future untranscendable. The values and aspirations of the inhabitants of historically Protestant Britain, Catholic Slovakia, and Orthodox Bulgaria will most likely differ for a long period of time. It would probably be closest to the truth to describe the position of the Czech Republic on this axis as the 'western middle part'.

The idea behind the entire research was, according to the central theme, to point out the differences that exist in the specific countries. This paper was not aimed at evaluating the quality of labour markets but to grasp their specific features bearing in mind the ongoing European co-operation and potential integration.

The starting point of the analysis was the consideration of the situations in the labour markets in the specific countries, from the viewpoint of those who participate in that market. The vast difference between the attitudes of the Czechs and the Bulgarians reflects the general situation in the labour markets in both countries – almost zero unemployment in the Czech Republic and the significant stability resulting from it, and still growing unemployment and huge (today we may say disastrous) economic instability in Bulgaria.

The analysis of expected working conditions has shown a differentiated approach to their evaluation in specific countries. While in Great Britain preferences orientated towards a long-term working perspective have already gained ground (qualifications, variety, the exploiting of one's abilities), in the post-communist countries, namely in Bulgaria, this approach is more of a distant perspective. Mainly short-term effects are preferred here (pay, social benefits). The most common features are, of course, shared by Czech Republic and Slovakia, due to their shared history. And although the Czech Republic of all the post-communist countries is the next closest to Great Britain in all relations, with the other two countries (Slovakia and Bulgaria) it still has rather more things in common.

Nevertheless, differences in the dynamics of development are becoming visible. Probably the most important piece of knowledge here is the rather different attitudes of the employed to the development up until now, in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. These represent not only the different political and economic models applied today in both the countries (and also reminders of the past social development) but their potential expressions in the labour market as well.

Although the present analysis covers only a part of the whole area, the wide range of themes that were subject to the research and the quality of the collected data make it possible to comment on the other important circumstances of employment, unemployment, and the labour market. The study of the attitudes of the employed has proven useful in this aspect; it is no surprise after all that the strategies of the people engaged in the labour market contribute fundamentally to its constitution and functioning as a 'new' institution.

Appendix

The international project "Employment Conditions, Labour Market Insecurity and Work Motivation" was carried out with a grant from the Commission of EU in the years 1994-1996, partly (a certain part of the survey of the unemployed population) with a grant from the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic. It was realised in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Great Britain and Bulgaria. The co-ordinator of the international team was Duncan Gallie, Nuffield College, Oxford, the co-ordinator in the Czech Republic and Slovakia was Pavel Kuchař, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, in Bulgaria the co-ordinator was Dobrinka Kostova, Centre for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Sofia University.

The research consisted of two parts – a survey of the employed population and a survey of the unemployed. Data collection in both these parts was provided in the Czech Republic by the UNIVERSITAS inquirers network, and in Slovakia by the Sociological Services inquirers network.

The employed population survey

The data collection in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria was carried out in the period October-December 1994, in Great Britain in the same period in 1992.

A stratified random sample was applied in all countries, and on the level of households was carried out on the basis of the Kish tables. It involved economically active individuals who were employed at the time of the survey. The sample did not include women on maternity leave, employed pensioners or the unemployed.

In the Czech Republic and Slovakia the respondents were people aged 18-60. The size of the observed samples was 2,009 in the Czech Republic, 1,001 in Slovakia.

In Bulgaria the respondents were men aged 20-59 and women aged 20-54. The size of the observed sample was 2,002.

In Great Britain the age group 20-60 was investigated. The sample size was 3,869 respondents.

PAVEL KUCHAR is the senior researcher of the Institute of Sociological Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University in Prague. His main interest concerns social issues connected with the functioning of the labour market.

References

- Barrell, R. 1994. *The UK Labour Market. Comparative aspects and institutional developments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Beharrell, A. 1992. *Unemployment and Job Creation*. London: Macmillan.
- Berger, P. 1993. *Kapitalistická revoluce* (A Capitalistic Revolution). Bratislava: Archa.
- Colbjørnsen, T. 1986. *Dividers in the Labour Market*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Drucker, P. F. 1993. *Postkapitalistická společnost* (A Post-Capitalistic Society). Praha: Management Press.
- Dubois, P. 1994. "Markets in Organizations and Organizations of Markets." Paper for 'Work, Employment and Society in the 1990s: changing boundaries, changing experiences.' Canterbury, September 1994.
- Etzioni, A. 1988. *The Moral Dimension*. New York: The Free Press.
- Gallie, D., M. White 1993. *The Employment in Britain Survey*. Oxford: Nuffield College.
- Ishikawa, A. 1994. "Continuity and Discontinuity of Socialist Values and Practices in the Processes of De-socialism." Paper for XIII. World Congress of Sociology. ISA, Bielefeld, July 1994.
- Machonin, P. 1996. "Modernization and Social Transformation in East Central Europe." Paper for ISA regional conference 'Building Open Society and Perspectives of Sociology in East Central Europe'. Krakow, September 1996.
- Matějů, P. 1995. "In Search of Explanations for Recent Left-Turns in Post-Communist Countries." *Working Papers* 95:1. Prague: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
- Moerell, H. (ed.) 1995. *Proměny pracovních vztahů* (Changes in Working Relations). Praha: FF UK.
- Peschar, J. L. (ed.) 1990. *Social Reproduction in Eastern and Western Europe*. Nijmegen: Institute for Applied Social Sciences.
- Pollert A., I. Hradecká 1994. "Privatisation in transition: the Czech experience." *Industrial Relations Journal* 25: 52-63.
- Rubery, J., F. Wilkinson 1994. *Employer Strategy and the Labour Market*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, C., P. Meiksins 1995. "System, Society and Dominance Effects in Cross-National Organisational Analysis." *Work, Employment and Society* 9: 241-267.
- Solow, R. M. 1990. *The Labour Market as a Social Institution*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Večerník, J. 1995. The Emergent Labour Market and Job Prospects in the Czech Republic. *Prague Economic Papers* 4: 65-84.
- Vláčil, J., I. Hradecká, I. Mazálková, G. McDermott 1996. "Politics, Skills and Industrial Restructuring: Local Institutions of Human Development." *Working Papers* 96:8. Prague: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

The territorial dimension of public administration reforms in East Central Europe

MICHAL ILLNER

Published by the Institute of Sociology,
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic,
Jilská 1, Praha 1,
fax + 420 2 24 22 02 78,
e-mail sociolog@soc.cas.cz

“Working Papers” WP 97:7

Copies may be ordered from the address below:

Price 111,- Kč (6 USD)

Summary: Territorial decentralisation of government has been an important part of the democratic reforms in East Central Europe after 1989. In the paper, some aspects of the decentralisation efforts in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are discussed – their political and intellectual background, expectations they have caused, results they have so far delivered and problems they have created or visualised. Territorial decentralisation of government did not materialise as expected, and the reforms were halted half-way, particularly in Czech Republic and Poland. While decentralisation to the local level was mostly successful, it is pending on the regional level in these two countries and recently more centralist policies have been re-introduced. The author argues that both an insufficient decentralisation on the regional level as well as an excessive fragmentation of government on the local level are the problem.

On Sociological Classics in St. Petersburg

A non-state European University, encompassing faculties of history, political science and sociology, economics and ethnology, founded by local government and scientific institutions and supported by some distinguished international foundations has since November 1994 been at the traditional centre of the Russian scholarship – St. Petersburg. In May 1997 the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology organised (in co-operation with the Open Society Institute in Moscow – East-East Program) a scientific conference devoted to the theme “The Use and Abuse of Sociological Classics in Contemporary Sociology”. Fifteen comprehensive contributions from sociologists, political scientists and historians from St. Petersburg and Moscow, Ukraine, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic – predominantly representatives of the young and middle generation – were presented and discussed before an audience made up of specialists and numerous students of the organising faculty. A broad horizon, erudition, a remarkable selection of themes, originality of thought, open and well-informed discussions were all notable attributes of this academic symposium.

The dean of the convening faculty, V. Volkov, opened with the hypothesis of two possible approaches to the classics: a) the historical or post-modernist scepticism related to the Kuhnian image of relatively frequent changes of paradigms; b) the evaluation of the role of classics as those who by their work constituted the scientific discipline, formulated its common language and still serve as an educational example in solving sociological problems.

D. Aleksandrov wasted no time in criticising Kuhn's approach, which, it was said, was applied successfully in a few sciences only (such as geology, biology, sociology and psychology) and became popular mainly as an impulse of thought for the sociology of knowledge. However, this was not confirmed by the further developments of science and became mainly an instrument in the hands of those who felt themselves to be endangered by the progress of science. R. Shpakova from the state

Petersburg University delivered the more traditional, but thoroughly balanced view of a historian of sociology on the role of classics in the cognitive processes in this science.

The following essential contributions were presented by two sociologists from Moscow. Both issued from a positive evaluation of the role of classics rather sharing the image of continuity in sociological knowledge. By the selection of personalities, the work of whom they analysed, as well by the characteristics they ascribed to them, the speakers indirectly or explicitly criticised other figures who were often seen as crucial in the past (e.g. Comte, Marx and Parsons). A Filippov in his contribution “Georg Simmel: A Dubious Classic” depicted his hero in a very sympathetic light as one of the founding fathers of sociology who turned his attention not only to the social, cultural and time dimension of human existence, but also to the sensory and space dimension as well. It was this non-traditional extension of the subject of sociology together with the stress laid on philosophical aspects of the social, and the lack of logical dogmatism (allegedly with substantial subjective assistance of T. Parsons) that prevented him from becoming in the relevant literature the third among those scholars who distinguished sociology as a science from other sciences by explaining social phenomena exclusively by other phenomena of social character in clearly defined empirical limits. According to Filippov, the other two classics in this sense were Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, the latter also for his clear definition of the rules of sociological methods. In the course of the discussion this sociologist, in spite of his clear preferences concerning the significance of the thought of these three men, recommended that in the process of empirical study one should apply from the classical legacy as well from other theories everything that actually helps in the analysis of contemporary societies. The other orator from Moscow, V. Radaev, devoted his contribution, which was one of the highlights of the conference, to the explanation of the circumstances, both principal and typical of the time period, which made Max Weber one of the indisputable classics. According to this speaker, the status of a classic belongs nowadays to such a personality, who a) was critical

enough in relation to Marxism, but did not distance himself too far from the subject of interest of this influential school; b) deals with a sufficiently broad field of issues, his system being open and even encompassing many internal contradictions and ambivalences – it is this that makes it inspiring for the solving of new situations; c) did not close his work and thus enabled new endeavour for further developments of the conceptual framework (an example of this is Weber's contribution to stratification theory); d) uses a relatively esoteric, not always quite clear language, thus enabling various explications and applications and e) enters extra-academic issues and gives in this way the opportunity to a certain – albeit not too excessive – ideologisation of sociology in the form of simple conclusions. Some problems in this connection arise from Weber's 'Wertfreiheit' as well as his insufficient inclination to unambiguous prescriptions for sociological work. His legacy is not a suitable basis for nationalism: this ideology is so far rather awaiting a 'new Marx'. In the same spirit, using the same principles, O. Kharkhordine from the organising institution – somewhat surprisingly for some of the participants – logically and convincingly highlighted the foundational significance of the work of the English political scientist T. Hobbes for social science, and demonstrated the possibility of applying his conceptual scheme to present-day political practices in Russia. Analogously, the Ukrainian scholar A. Pogorelyi compared the Weberian concept of rationality with the approach of the increasingly recognised civilisation theorist N. Elias.

After this fundamental block of lectures, there came the turn of several relativising contributions giving place to the representatives of alternative sociologies and, in this way, to the possibility of the emergence of diverse paradigms. T. Desseffy from Budapest analysed the undoubtedly important role of A. Schütz in creating an alternative to the Parsonian concept of culture and rationality, placing the stress on everyday human experience. E. Zdravomyslova and A. Temkina from St. Petersburg presented an extraordinarily rich characterisation of the contents and, especially, of the epistemology of feminist sociology, treating it as one of the

streams of alternative sociology, explicitly criticising the classics, mainly Durkheim's system. The erudite historian N. Koposov, also a Petersburger, informed the audience about the meeting of French sociologists and historians on the occasion of the anniversary of E. Durkheim. This conference appealed to the co-operation of history and all social sciences. It led to the identification of a protracted crisis in social sciences and signalled a possible turn towards a new, constructivist, paradigm. Thus an urgent subject of interest became the possibility of a two-fold, i.e. objective and structural, or subjective explication of society and, deduced from this a balancing between monism and dualism.

The Czech participant, P. Machonin, presented a contribution devoted to the influence of 'grand theories' on research and theory building concerning the post-communist transformations. He affirmed the existence of a post-modernist and liberal critique of rationalism and classical theories, and of the thesis on the 'end of history', acknowledging the relative justification of some aspects of this, namely those related to the collapse of communism. (Later, in response to a comment from Koposov, he asserted that, this process was of course in connection with a profound civilisation crisis that preceded the fall of communist regimes.) However, he rejected the tendency to an excessive generalisation of this critique and the exception of the liberal theory as the only one of the criticised 'grand theories'. He argued that in the study of the post-communist transformation the principle of historicism must be applied as well as a highly sophisticated rational analysis using impulses from both more significant ('grand') and other sociological theories, including the alternative European and oriental sociologies, and subjecting them to normal scientific verification and falsification. A. Dmitriev from St. Petersburg reminded the participants of the relativity of the application of the political categories 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' when using classical works for analyses of contemporary societies. The young Polish sociologist A. Mielczarek introduced the example of the use of Tocqueville's theory of revolutions in an empirical research into the

emergence and subsequent fates of the new political elites in Polish communities.

G. Batygine from Moscow presented a well-informed, critical, but carefully deliberated picture of developments in Soviet sociology in the period between the 1960s and the 1980s. In the discussion on this issue Machonin suggested some additional criteria enabling the distinction of vital and retardant elements in this process: the knowledge of world sociology, the attitude to empirical research, the ability to dissociate oneself from the Stalinist scheme of the non-antagonist classes and attendant to this the theory of social homogenisation and the participation or not in the ideological critique of the so-called revisionism in the countries belonging at that time to the Soviet block.

The Hungarian sociologist Pál Tamás sees the function of a scientific canon as characterising a classic, in the creation of common language as an instrument of internal communication, in a certain communicativeness with the external environment and in supplying evidence of the solidness of the scientific discipline's professionalism. He believes the stress

on social change rather than social order and the complexity of the system of inequalities to be fundamental characteristics of contemporary sociology.

This fruitful conference was concluded with an intriguing inquiry addressed to the participants. They were asked whom of the personalities of world sociology they consider to be sociological classics. There was a marginal tendency to turn attention to the role of some lesser known and lesser acknowledged sociologists, including the representatives of alternative sociology. However a distinct main tendency appeared: immediately after the almost universally acknowledged contribution of Max Weber the participants clearly singled out Émile Durkheim and, only one vote behind, Karl Marx. It seems that, in spite of all the turbulence in human history as well as in science, and in spite of the presented criticism, the belief in the significance of the 'trinity' of the founding fathers of sociology still survives within the East-European scientific community, including the younger generation.

Pavel Machonin

The Report on the Conference "Parliaments of Central European Countries in the Process of Incorporation into the European Union"

The conference was held on the 12th to 14th September 1997 in Prague and its organisers were: the Committee for Legislative Studies as a part of the International Society for Political Science (IPSA), the Delegation of the European Committee in Prague, the Czech Society for Political Science, the Sociological Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, the Centre for European Studies at the College of Economics in Prague, in co-operation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

The conference was arranged as a part of long-term programme of the Committee for Legislative Studies IPSA and was preceded by scientific meetings in Bucurest and Ljubljana. The Prague conference was focussed on the role of the parliaments of Central European

countries in the process of integration into Europe.

In the opening speech, Daniel Kroupa, the head of the Permanent Delegation of the Czech Parliament, and Joannes ter Haar, the ambassador of the European Committee in Prague, emphasised that this is the first conference on the given theme to be held in the Czech Republic, one of the leading candidates for EU membership. According to ter Haar, membership in the EU also means a feeling of European identity at the same time, something that cannot be cultivated at a minister's meeting or through the adoption of a new law and the adjustment of legislation and norms, but only by means of comprehensive democratic discussion. This discussion should take place in parliament and must comprise both the gains and losses of integration.

More than fifty participants made up the extensive group of experts from prominent officials of national parliaments, the European Parliament and executive power, and representatives from their respective specialised insti-

tutes, to scientists representing various independent European scientific institutions. This enabled the theme of investigating the role of parliaments of Central European countries in the frames of the European integrative process to be discussed in an extended coherent context as well.

The conference provided an appropriate setting for the comparison of the role of Central European parliaments of associate countries with those of countries with full membership in the European Union as well as the European Parliament in the process of European integration. The participants in the conference reported and discussed both concrete legislative and administrative problems, as well as theoretical consequences of the formation and function of supranational institutions, such as the European Parliament, for political studies and the theory of democracy. The reports of participants, some of them quite critical, were concentrated on the role of parliamentary institutions and the executive, on the co-operation between the executive and parliaments in the process of approximation of legal norms. Even the process of integration in its wider context was a subject for discussion, especially the importance of political parties for the development of a supranational frame of functioning of European structures, the positions and relations

among political parties, the attitude of the public towards membership in the European Union, and the tasks of civil and lobby groups in the process of integration.

The programme of the conference was divided into four parts. The first part was focussed on the role of parliaments in countries with full membership in the EU in process of European integration. The second part was dedicated to the role of Central-European parliaments in their pre-entry strategy. The third part sought to identify the role of the European Union and national institutions in the process of extending the EU to encompass the Central European countries. The reports read in the fourth part diverted attention from the parliaments to the significance of public opinion, political parties and lobby groups in the process of European integration.

The conference, which took place in the historical seat of the Czech assembly in a informal atmosphere of expert discussions among a wide spectrum of specialists, was undoubtedly a valuable professional experience for the participants from countries that aspire to membership in the EU, and for full members of the EU a deeper acquaintance with the problems of associate members which are not always clear in official political communication.

Zdenka Mansfeldová

Masaryk and Simmel*

(Reflections on an Unknown Review by Masaryk)

MILOSLAV PETRUSEK

Charles University, Prague

1.

The most important Czech thinker of the 20th century, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, always saw himself as first and foremost a sociologist. Not only did he say so on many occasions, but he also designated many of his writings as 'sociological', although they would not today be considered thus in the strict sense of the word. This was very much the case with his famous work *Rusko a Evropa* (*Russia and Europe*), written in 1912, which he subtitled *Sociologické skizy* (*Sociological Sketches*).

The mass of literature on Masaryk (unfortunately mostly Czech)¹ includes texts on his sociological work, but strangely enough does not include any which can provide the answer to one searching question: if we consider that Masaryk (1850-1937) was a contemporary of Max Weber (1848-1920), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Wilfred Pareto (1848-1923) and Georg Simmel (1858-1918), there is good reason to ask what were Masaryk's professional academic relations to his contemporaries who are today considered as the 'classics' of sociology?² Only two such relationships on the theme of Masaryk in relation to classical sociologists have been researched in detail and in all aspects, and those are his relations with Comte and Marx [see Machovec 1992]. However neither of these two was Masaryk's direct contemporary (Masaryk was just starting school when Comte died, and was just moving from Vienna to the university in Prague at the time of Marx's death) and they were certainly not 'professional colleagues' in the sense of belonging to the same scientific (sociological) community.

Jiří Musil has recently made an attempt to incorporate Masaryk into the international sociological context of his time [Musil 1993: 89-100]. Musil rightly considers and convincingly argues that Masaryk quite precisely marked out his relations not only with Comte, Marx and Mill, but also with Spencer, with the representatives of social Darwinism (Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer), with some American sociologists (Ward, Kidd), and

*) The author would like to thank the University of Constance (particularly Dr. Franheim) for providing access to their sources on Simmel, the Grant Agency of Charles University (grant no. 83/94) for financing his term of study in Constance, and Alena Miltová, who so industriously and meticulously identified materials on Simmel.

¹) A number of Masaryk's works have recently been published in translation, mostly in English, including Giddens' edition of Masaryk's *Sebevražda* (*Suicide*) with his introduction [Masaryk 1970, Giddens 1970], the English edition of the 3rd volume of *Rusko a Evropa* under the title *The Spirit of Russia* (published in Czech in 1996), Huanus J. Hajek's neglected work [1983] which is a qualified introduction to Masaryk, or Gordon Skilling's notable work [1994].

²) See Jeffrey C. Alexander's famous article *The Centrality of the Classics* [in Giddens and Turner 1987], or Turner's book [Turner 1993] which features the classics canonised from a 'positivist perspective': Comte-Spencer-Durkheim-Marx (compared with Simmel and Weber)-Weber-Mead. Parson's canonisation includes Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber [Parsons 1949], etc.

also, with respect to his deep interest in the 'Russian question', with the most important Russian sociologists of the time (Lavrov, Michajlovskij and to some degree Karejev). Masaryk was extremely well read with an unusually broad perspective, and also had wide-ranging interests which took in the economic theories of his era, particularly with their methodological results and interconnections (the conflict between Gustav Schmoller and Karl Menger) etc.. Zdeněk Pinc (following Jan Patočka), for example, reproaches Masaryk for "not being concerned with the great philosophies, but rather with marginal ones", saying that it is not possible to learn philosophy from Masaryk because "philosophy must be understood through the fundamental ideas and not via marginal authors", which may in fact be justified [see Pinc 1992: 300]. As far as Masaryk's relations with his *sociological contemporaries* are concerned, however, this is very far from being the case. Musil's list can be greatly extended, since Masaryk was familiar not only with Durkheim (it is interesting that Masaryk never reacted to the latter's *Suicide*, although this was one of his own dominant interests),³ but also Le Bon and Tarde – the antipodes of Durkheim. He also referred on more than one occasion to Tönnies, reacted to Weber's early work on Roman agrarian history (Šrubař made a qualified comparison between Masaryk and Weber in his as yet unpublished study [1996]), and so on. In sort, Masaryk was familiar with his great contemporaries and always responded to them in cases of factual concepts [see Petrusek 1993: 60-76]. Despite Masaryk's efforts to gain recognition and respect as an academic sociologist, he was never in fact successful in this and his relations with his contemporaries were never on a systematic basis, just as he never created a systematic base for his 'sociological theory'. The standard objection that "Masaryk did not create a sociological system" (Bláha, Fischer, Chalupný) is the leitmotif of all attempts to reconstruct a 'Masaryk system' and at the heart of criticism of Masaryk as a sociologist. This is certainly a criticism which is relevant to the times and spirit of the 19th century, when the creation of a system was seen as the one logical conclusion of someone's work. Today, when there is a tendency to steer clear of creating systems and indeed the very word 'system' (after the intoxication with systems analysis and 'general systems theory') has virtually become a dirty word, Masaryk's (and Simmel's) lack of system may be seen as a point of entry into the postmodern debate, as has indeed already been the case with Simmel.

Musil probably somewhat exaggerates when he finds signs in Masaryk's writings of things that were only explicitly stated long after the latter's death. Masaryk was apparently "close to all theories of social interactionism, especially symbolic interactionism. His ideas moved along paths which led to the structuralist theories of Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu and certainly also Norbert Elias (...) nor was he unfamiliar with the modern versions of exchange as put forward by Homans and Blau" [Musil 1993: 98]. Allowing that Masaryk can, with hindsight, be seen in this light, it seems likely that certain misunderstandings about him may be dismissed and his links with contemporary sociological theory be identified in a very simple step inspired by the current so-called

³) Jaroslav Střítecký raised an interesting and amusing point when he posed the question of whether "Masaryk would not have become the Austro-Hungarian Durkheim" if he had not moved from Vienna to Prague in the 1880s. It is true that Masaryk's move to the Czech environment meant a radical change in his scientific interests and in particular a fundamental move towards politics. Střítecký's question can therefore also be rephrased as "Would the first Czech Republic have had a president of Masaryk's standing" if Masaryk had stayed in Vienna?

Simmel renaissance, i.e. the enormous re-emergence of interest in this sociologist who until recently was marginalised or, rather, 'badly read'.

2.

The name of Georg Simmel appears in Masaryk's writings (although only briefly as Mušil's exhaustive study does not note it) primarily in his *Otázka sociální* (*The Social Question*), in which Masaryk considers the close but antagonistic relationship between "sociology and socialism" (with Simmel figuring alongside Tönnies, Bartha, Stammeler among others). A close material relation between Masaryk and Simmel is indicated in Mestrovíč's analysis of modernity and of his attempt to establish 'postmodern critical theory' [see Mestrovíč 1991 and 1993] and in Frisby's work [Frisby 1981]. The latter in fact quotes Masaryk's review of Simmel's book [Simmel 1908], a review probably unknown in this country to date. Frisby in fact took a quote from this review as the motto of one chapter of his book on Georg Simmel's 'sociological impressionism' – the sentence "Modernity has found here a dynamic expression: the totality of fragmentary, centrifugal directions of existence and arbitrariness of individual elements are brought to light" [Frisby 1981: 45]. Even allowing for the miracles that English can wreak with the German language, all my searching has not yet found this sentence in any of Masaryk's reviews.

Masaryk was in fact not able to read Simmel in the same way that Frisby did some years later and while he was undoubtedly one of the great analysts and critics of modernity, he could not perceive what he himself had in common with Simmel. It is enough to look at Masaryk's critique of Simmel's *Soziologie* in order to understand that Masaryk read it as an academic sociologist of his era, with more or less the same objections as were raised from the turn of the century up to the end of the 1970s, i.e. first and foremost his not entirely successful attempt to set specific limits for sociology as a science of 'special forms of association'. Masaryk's academic approach can also be seen in his insistence that Simmel should resolve the question of sociology's position in the complex of sciences, clearly define its content and not refer to method (although Masaryk's first teacher, Comte, stated that "the more complicated phenomena become, the less it is possible to distinguish between method and science", [see Comte 1927: 101]). He also maintained that Simmel should set out a 'system' and 'clearly define concepts'. Masaryk did not realise that precisely the same criticisms (except perhaps that of the classification of science) would be levelled at himself. He was largely justified in his criticism of Simmel's 'formalism', but the real problem lies elsewhere. Today it is clear that Simmel's key *sociological work* is not *Soziologie* but rather *The Philosophy of Money*⁴ and that that part of *Soziologie* which is relevant to sociology today is one which Masaryk viewed overall positively if only marginally – "the separate excellent and valuable ideas" which were however "complicated by the explanation" because the "systematic links" were broken.

⁴) The Russian researcher into Simmel, Jonin, wrote that "Economists and philosophers turned to the *Philosophy of Money* provoked and confused by the bizarre title, but not those for whom it was intended, i.e. sociologists. While sociologists may have ignored the *Philosophy of Money*, they saw *Soziologie* as a fundamental sociological text, a tractate which offered an exhaustive view of Simmel's sociology. The part was taken as the whole, meaning that for decades there was a totally false interpretation of Simmel's sociology" [Jonin 1981: 34].

Today Simmel's attempt at 'formal sociology' is recognised as an offering of the day to the commonly felt need of academic sociology to define itself as a distinctive science. For Simmel himself it was perhaps more an attempt to demonstrate his particular academic competence than something that really interested him. His discussion of social forms was better and more convincing in his short studies, sketches and essays on fashions or shame, than in his Kantian reminiscences of the difficulties of abstract considerations.

Masaryk's critique clearly agrees with later ones, as for example that of Sorokin, who like Masaryk maintained that the analogy between sociology and geometry is not admissible because "phenomena like power, authority, domination and competition do not have geometric dimensions" [Sorokin 1936: 402]. Similarities are also clear in Szczepański's later critique in which he stated that despite all Simmel's attempts "the requirement of dividing form from content cannot be met because the forms of social relationships have a different relation to their empirical forms than do the forms of the triangle to diagrams on a blackboard" [Szczepański 1967: 476]. Szczepański was also in full agreement with Masaryk when he said that "Simmel was not content with a general programme, but also presented his postulates in a series of monographs which laid out his ideas, the clarity of his reflections and surprising solutions", but all in vain – sociology in this sense does not exist.

Simmel's closest contemporary reader was one of the "Holy Trinity" of Czech sociologists (Masaryk-Bláha-Chalupný), i.e. Emanuel Chalupný. Ten years after Simmel's death, Chalupný paid considerable attention to his attempt at making sociology systematic [Chalupný 1927].⁵ Chalupný compared Simmel's attempt with Giddings, who was at one time very popular in the Czech Lands, because Giddings basic work came out in Czech translation [Giddings 1900] – on Masaryk's initiative, it should be remembered – and saw his concept as the science of association as very close to Simmel (apart from anything else Simmel was well known in America from the end of the last century thanks to his student, Park). Chalupný says that Simmel's concept, which at least tries to define sociology but at the same time rejects the idea that it is an independent subject and reduces it to "a mere method", is too extreme, on which Chalupný is in complete accordance with Masaryk. The former, however, differs from Masaryk in his careful reading of the excursus on jewels and on letters, analysing them through the prism of his own sociological outlook and identifying an inner conflict in Simmel's formal sociology: "Simmel offers a keen empirical examination but cannot draw from this basic conclusions for the concept of science: and thus in his 'Sociology' he explains many things which belong to sociology *as I would define it*, but not to sociology *as he himself defined it*, since that definition disputes the possibility of a content-based sociology" [Chalupný 1927: 92]. Chalupný thus expresses an inconsistency which undeniably existed but which Simmel was able to live with and which did not in fact worry him too much. The overall context of Simmel's life work shows that his work towards a 'formal sociology' was by no means marginal, but nor was it central to his work (on the other hand, positivist formalism, the formation of sociological dichotomies and classifications, is a key factor in

⁵) It is a sign of the times that when it was written Chalupný's extremely well-researched book does not even mention Max Weber. There is in fact a Max Weber mentioned as co-author of the *Lehrbuch der Biologie*, together with M. Nussbaum and G. Karsten, but this must be a pure coincidence.

von Wiese's work). At the end of his life Simmel in fact announced that he was abandoning sociology in order to devote himself to philosophy and his aesthetic interests. It is however undeniable that his *Soziologie* is the first European work which includes the word 'sociology' in its title and that almost the last works that Simmel published during his lifetime were variations on formal sociology, *Grundfragen der Soziologie (Individuum und Gesellschaft)* and his last work *Lebensanschauung (Vier metaphysische Kapitel)*. Unlike Masaryk and Chalupný [see Masaryk 1885, Chalupný 1945] he was in fact indifferent to the question of sociology's position in the system of sciences, and the lack of a system was inherent in his work.

Szacki shows convincingly that there were a number of factors underlying Simmel's lack of system: his relatively undefined philosophical starting point, his unbelievably wide interests ranging from sculpture and musical ethnology through ethics to the theory of culture, the tension between two readerships – the public, for whom, in Leopold von Wiese's words, he was "a literary salon sociologist", and the academics, for whom he was, almost until his death, an honorary *Privatdozent* who was entitled to teach but not to take part in the life of the academic community. Even before authors influenced by postmodernism and postmodern thought such as Bauman, the Weinsteins or Frisby, Szacki clearly saw that "Simmel was fascinated by the unending variety of aspects of reality, not by any (in his view illusory) possibility of organising them on any solid basis" [Szacki 1981: 506]. This was one reason that Simmel saw "society as an unstable, fragile, shaky and unsure form, which when it settles is like sand rather than rock – in a process of constant socialisation" [Bauman 1995: 19]. In a way Simmel anticipated the postmodern "death of the social", but that is not the main concern here, Masaryk neither saw nor wanted to see the society of his time in this light, but he did have three points in common with Simmel:

1. Like Simmel in his 'formal sociology', Masaryk was never convincing in his attempts at academic sociology, primarily because the sociological was not alive. Masaryk was convincing in his only lightly argued but rhetorically convincing reflections on "the crisis of our times", particularly in his key work *Moderní člověk a náboženství (Religion and Modern Man)*. It was not purely by chance that this series of essays was published at virtually the same time as Simmel's *The Philosophy of Money* (Masaryk – 1898, Simmel – 1900).

2. Masaryk was one of the most clear-sighted analysts of modernity and those same factors which motivated Simmel were also at work with Masaryk. These included his reflections on the neuroses of city life, on the crisis of culture, on the transitoriness of intellectual fashions, and particularly on "titanism" and "faustism".⁶ As a diagnostician

⁶) Two brief quotations in illustration of this: "I feel that a reader with normal psychological experience will immediately answer the question of whether there are more psychoses to be found in the city or in the country that of course in the city, just as suicide is more common in cities. Why is this answer so easy and what does it really mean? That psychoses and suicide are greater in the very centres of modern life. This is something truly new and modern, and yet it is not a question of the quantity of psychosis but rather of various types and degrees. It is not only the physiological and pathological aspects of individual and mass psychosis that are of interest, but also the psychological and social ones. Scientific analysis confirms what is commonly heard today on all sides, that people are becoming more nervous, more sensitive, irritable and irritated, that they are weak, tired and weary, sad and joyless" [Masaryk 1934: 19]. The similarity with Simmel's analysis of

Masaryk was frequently as perceptive as Simmel, and Giddens quite rightly said that while the dramatic success of Durkheim's *Suicide* overshadowed Masaryk's *Sebevražda* (*Suicide*), it could not hide the similarities between the two authors, particularly as far as the role of religion and religious life in the contemporary social crisis was concerned [see Giddens 1970: xli]. This may be present in Simmel's work but it is expressed in an entirely different way.

3. The third point of similarity is the way in which Masaryk, like Simmel, although carefully and certainly at least partly unconsciously, created a new style of expression which has come to be called 'sociological impressionism', in direct relation to Simmel. This was first pointed out in the Czech Lands by Pavel Tomášek [1972], but without attributing it to the original source: this was not David Frisby, who wrote an monograph on Simmel with the same name, but Georg Lukács, one of Simmel's most famous pupils, who first used this term as early as 1918. It is worth going a little more deeply into his role, as while it may not seem directly related to Masaryk there is an undoubted connection.

3.

Lukács did not intend his term as a *bon mot*, let alone any belittling of Simmel's very special means of expression, in the essay in which Simmel set the status of a "sociological genre". He drew it from Simmel's ability "to see even the smallest and most insignificant phenomena of daily life *sub specie philosophiae*, so that they became transparent", and particularly from the fact that Simmel was for him a philosopher and sociologist of a "transitional era", a "transitional thinker" [Lukács 1991: 146]. It is difficult not to recall Nejedlý's (generally perceptive) analysis of Masaryk as a philosopher of an era of transition and a sociologist of crisis, or Pinc's metaphor of Masaryk as a "period thinker". Like Simmel, Masaryk developed a literary genre of sociological-philosophical essays in parallel with his academic sociology, and Simmel has remained the real master of this genre. Masaryk's academic works, particularly *Rukověť sociologie* (*A Handbook of Sociology*), *Člověk a příroda* (*Man and Nature*), *Základové konkrétné logiky* (*The Basics of Concrete Logic*) are all typical of him, as if being almost symbolically unfinished and almost too boring to read was an essential element of a certain academic stance. Masaryk rather incomprehensibly clung to his *Basics of Concrete Logic* as his fundamental work, rather like Goethe in his conviction that his studies of optics would

the city mentality is not accidental: Simmel was certainly more perceptive and the concept of blaséness is lacking in Masaryk's work. An excellent collection of Masaryk's 'diagnoses' of the time was prepared by J. L. Fischer in the context of the last *fin de siècle* [Fischer 1930: 177n], and Mestrovic [1991: 54n] placed Simmel in the context of our *fin de siècle*. The second example is concerned with the overriding subject of Simmel's second creative period (1900-1991), i.e. love. Masaryk, on this: "Politics was hypocrisy, religion was hypocrisy, now love too has become hypocrisy. Egoism, horrible, cold, mortal egoism is enjoying an orgy. Love has become egoistical, the woman sold, the courtesan has pushed out the sweet, romantic, dreaming innocent grisette. Man has cut himself off from woman, since he has begun to feel contempt for her, has abandoned the warm hearth of love and turned to wine, now haunting evil places. Love has been overcome by the spirit of the times: just as people did not believe the old kings and the old religion, now love too has become an old illusion" [Masaryk 1934: 263]. Masaryk was undoubtedly more of a moralist than Simmel, but nobody except Simmel's contemporary Bouglé saw in Simmel more than an essay-writing moralist.

become part of European intellectual history. In 1926 Masaryk explained his concept of “concrete logic” as an attempt at creating “a theory of science and the sciences”, as “a science of science and the sciences” – as if he were a precursor of the Vienna Circle. That may be a somewhat forced parallel – Masaryk’s classification of the sciences has its roots far back into the last century [for a more detailed discussion see Olšovský 1993: 44].

The basic fact, which Lukács notes, that Simmel provided a new and different thematic orientation for sociology, was also noted by Adorno, who said that “in defiance of all psychological idealism, Simmel was the first to turn to concrete matters and so became the canonical master of all those who were becoming tired of the vociferousness of the critique of knowledge and intellectual history”. Habermas cites this thesis in his study *Simmel as a Diagnostician of His Times* [Habermas 1986, cited according to Zimmel 1996: 541]. It is a fact that Masaryk, despite occasional leanings towards speculative excursus into the philosophy of history, was tired of the “vociferousness of the critique of knowledge and intellectual history”. He was certainly a case of a “diagnostician of his times *par excellence*” rather than just of “our Czech crisis”.

Some of these interconnections have recently been pointed out by Ivan Mucha, who says that “Simmel was one of the first sociologists to pay attention to marginal phenomena. In this he was a precursor of the contemporary analytic postmodern society”. He does however differ from this society in that “despite all his imagination and his unique ability to seize apparently unimportant moments, Simmel has something of the heroic which is lacking in the postmodern authors” [Mucha 1994: 84]. Masaryk certainly shared Simmel’s imagination but there cannot be the slightest doubt that he was also a *heroic thinker*. This is by no means irrelevant in an era which proclaims itself to be “post-heroic”: Masaryk would certainly have been afraid that this was a trifle previous.

Zygmunt Bauman writes that in his essays on flirting, jewellery, the Berlin Trade Fair, doors and bridges, shame or discretion, Simmel discovered a “sociological style which time has shown to be the most suitable, the most in harmony with the type of reality which it sought to express” [Bauman 1995: 33]. The fundamental point is that *time has shown* it, because Simmel’s contemporaries (as with Masaryk’s contemporaries) were less than enthusiastic about Simmel’s style, because it mixed strategies of argumentation and academic conventions not just of its times, and in general went against the strategies of argumentation and the model of the construction of sociology as presented and represented by the radical scientist paradigm (mostly neo-positivist in origins). Célestin Bouglé in *L’Année sociologique* (XI, 1906-1909) wrote in a review of one of Simmel’s books that “for sociology to become scientific more is needed than just essays, even such suggestive ones as those coming from the pen of the moralist, Simmel”.⁷ Durkheim (in a review of Simmel’s most logically consistent work – *The Philosophy of Money*) even described Simmel’s style as “bastard speculation”, which expressed reality subjectively, without being as perceptive as art, at the same time seeking abstract formulations without reaching the standard of science [Durkheim 1980: 98]. Sorokin too found

⁷) Here I cannot give the exact source. The French manuscript of Bouglé’s reflections together with the sources can be read in the 1908 edition of Simmel’s *Soziologie*, which I had at my disposal. According to a note on the manuscript, but also according to what Masaryk indicated in his review and what he omitted, I am almost certain that Masaryk worked from this copy of Simmel’s book – Masaryk obviously found the quote from Bouglé himself and the tone of his criticism is consistent with Bouglé’s standpoint.

Simmel to have “simply methodological shortcomings”, because all Simmel’s work is founded purely on the “speculative generalisations of a gifted man, supported by a method of illustration in the form of two or three randomly chosen and one-sided facts” [Sorokin 1936: 405]. At the end of his life Sorokin apologised to Simmel, not in words but in acts, when he wrote a volume of “Simmelian” essays on the mystical power of love.

Simmel understood intuitively that, in Green’s words, “style and text are as important as the logic and empirical reasoning of a theory” [Green 1988: 47], that style and rhetoric on the one hand and logical argumentation, empirical verification and historical authentication on the other are often of equal importance in sociology. Simmel’s – and Masaryk’s – sociological impressionism, their essays, their personal ways of formulating problems and their strategies for arguing these are *de facto* the start of the major change in the sociological paradigm, the return to a non-scientific, non-quantitative, non-experimental sociology.⁸

There is one more fundamental link between Masaryk and Simmel and that is their interest in art not just as a social phenomenon (in the style of positivist *sociology of art*) but as a basic life form or a *fundamental way of viewing the world*. The Russian researcher into Simmel, Jonin, writes that “Simmel did not see method and style as opposites, but rather saw many features in common between them. Method has much in common with what in art history and artistic creation we call style. Differences in style in all spheres of life, and so also in science, together with the impossibility of setting up method and style in opposition, are a characteristic mark of the times” [Jonin 1981: 568]. Thus not only is sociology close to art (and particularly to literature) both as a source of knowledge (as with Masaryk) and in its style of expression, but *sociology is becoming literature*. This is particularly the case today with the extant parts of the works of Georg Simmel and Tomáš Masaryk.

⁸) Sufficient evidence that the paradigmatic change in interpretative and qualitative sociology can be traced back to the first half of the century is provided by Hubík in his *Sociologie vědění* (*The Sociology of Knowledge*) (SLON 1997). The reasons behind the close relationship between literature and sociology were first described by Nisbet [1967: 18] when he wrote on the emergence of sociology that “two final points must be stressed: first, the moral basis of modern sociology and, second, the intuitive or artistic frame of thought in which central ideas of sociology have been arrived at”. In his 1977 work, Nisbet wrote of sociology as an “artistic form”, showing how sociologists paint “landscapes” (pictures of landscapes “democracy in America”, “capital”, “the city” in Tocqueville, Marx and Simmel) and portraits (the bureaucrat, the bourgeois, the intellectual, etc.). This idea was further developed by Lepenies, who spoke of sociology as a “third culture” lying between science and literature [Lepenies 1985] and who found clear connections between the efforts of 19th century literature and those of the “founding fathers of sociology” [Lepenies 1996]. Masaryk’s links with literature have been well researched by now. He was also linked with Simmel by his passions for an “artistic understanding of the world”, a passion which in Simmel was tamed and corrected by certain academic canons. Masaryk’s early article *O studiu děl básnických* (*The Study of Poetic Works*), in which he clearly proclaims the superiority of an artistic (poetic) knowledge of the world over the scientific one (today we might say “the privileged position of artistic understanding above scientific understanding”), is marked by a still somewhat naïve spirit of late romanticism. While this was in striking contrast with his Comtean roots, Masaryk never lost his enthusiasm for literature as a “source of sociological knowledge”.

The fact that Masaryk was not able to read Simmel's *Soziologie* as being intellectually close to himself (at least in parts) can be put down simply to the fact that in his reviews of Simmel, Masaryk produced standard products of his academic professorial sociological work. A deeper connection between Masaryk and Simmel has yet to be revealed. This would certainly be a worthwhile task, precisely because it would be a purely non-academic task, but one which, in the spirit of the tradition of Simmel and Masaryk, is relevant to the most urgent questions facing not only contemporary sociology but first and foremost the (post)modern world today.

Translated by April Retter

References

- Bauman, Z. 1995. "Freud, Kafka, Simmel. Próba hermeneutiky socjologicznej" (Freud, Kafka, Simmel. Attempt at Sociological Hermeneutics). In *Pojednanie z różnicą?*, ed. by E. Rewers. Poznań: Humaniora.
- Comte, A. 1927. *Sociologie*. Praha: Laichter.
- Durkheim, E. 1980. *Contributions to L'Année sociologique*. New York: The Free Press.
- Fischer, J. L. 1930. "Duše umdlené a bojovné. Na okraj Masarykova náboženského problému" (A Tired and Struggling Spirit. On Masaryk's Religious Problem). In *Vůdce generací I.* (Leaders of a Generation I.). Praha: Čin.
- Frisby, D. 1981. *Sociological Impressionism. A Reassessment of Georg Simmel's Social Theory*. London-New York: Routledge.
- Giddens, A. 1970. "Introduction." In *Suicide and the meaning of Civilization*, by Thomas G. Masaryk. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Giddens, A., J. Turner (eds.) 1987. *Social Theory Today*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Giddings, F. G. 1900. *Základy sociologie* (The Fundamentals of Sociology). Prague: Laichter.
- Green, B. S. 1988. *Literary Methods and Sociological Theory: Case Studies of Simmel and Weber*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Habermas, J. 1986. "Simmel als Zeitdiagnostiker." In *G. Simmel. Philosophische Kultur*. Berlin.
- Hajek, H. J. 1983. *T. G. Masaryk Revisited. A Critical Assessment*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Chalupný, E. 1927. *Sociologie I. Základy, sv. 1: Podstata sociologie a soustava věd* (Sociology I. The Fundamentals, vol. 1: The Substance of Sociology and the System of Sciences). Praha: Bursík a Kohout.
- Chalupný, E. 1945. *Logika věd. Základní orientace* (The Logic of Science. A Basic Orientation). Praha: Jan Pohořelý.
- Jonin, L. G. 1981. *Georg Zimmel – sociolog* (Georg Simmel – Sociologist). Moscow. Nauka.
- Lepenies, W. 1985. *Die Drei Kulturen*. München: Carl Hanser Verlag.
- Lepenies, W. 1996. *Niebezpieczne powinowactwa z wyboru* (Dangerous kinship of choice). Warszawa: Oficyna naukowa (written 1989).
- Lukacs, G. 1991. "Georg Simmel." *Theory, Culture and Society* 8: 145-150 (written 1918).
- Machovec, M. 1992. "Masaryk a marxismus" (Masaryk and Marxism). In *Masarykův sborník VII*. Praha: Academia.
- Masaryk, T. G. 1885. *Základové konkrétné logiky. Třídění a soustava věd* (The Basics of Concrete Logic. The Division and System of Sciences). Praha: Bursík a Kohout.
- Masaryk, T. G. 1887. *Versuch einer konkreten Logik. Classification und Organisation der Wissenschaften*. Wien: Carl Konegen.

- Masaryk, T. G. 1898. *Otázka sociální. Základy marxismu filosofické a sociologické* (The Social Question. The Basics of Philosophical and Sociological Marxism). Praha. Laichter (English translation *Masaryk on Marx*, ed. by E. Kohák, 1972).
- Masaryk, T. G. 1909. "Simmels Soziologie." *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft* XII: 600-607.
- Masaryk, T. G. 1926. *O studiu děl básnických* (The Study of Poetic Works). Praha. G. Voleský. (written 1884).
- Masaryk, T. G. 1934. *Moderní člověk a náboženství* (Religion and Modern Man). (written 1896-1898). Praha. Laichter.
- Masaryk, T. G. 1970. *Suicide and the meaning of Civilization*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Mestrovíč, S. 1991. *The Coming Fin de Siècle. An Application of Durkheim's Sociology to Modernity and Postmodernity*. London-New York: Routledge.
- Mestrovíč, S. 1993. *The Barbarian Temperament: Toward a Postmodern Critical Theory*. London: Routledge.
- Mucha, I. 1994. "Může se stát Georg Simmel miláčkem postmoderny?" (Can Georg Simmel Become the Darling of the Postmodernists?). In *Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philosophica et historica* 2. Praha: Univerzita Karlova.
- Musil, J. 1993. "Masarykova sociologická teorie: co je z ní stále živé" (Masaryk's Sociological Theory: What it Still Has to Offer). In *Masarykův sborník* VIII. Praha. Ústav TGM.
- Nisbet, R. 1967. *The Sociological Tradition*. London: Heinemann.
- Olšovský, J. 1993. "Konkrétní logika – celoživotní téma T. G. Masaryka" (Concrete Logic – A Lifelong Interest of T. G. Masaryk). In *Masarykova praktická filosofie*. Praha: Masarykova společnost.
- Parsons, T. 1949. *The Structure of Social Action. A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of recent European Writers* (1st ed. 1936). Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Petrusek, M. 1993. "Masarykova sociologie z pohledu dneška" (Masaryk's Sociology Seen from the Present). In *Masarykova praktická filosofie*. Praha: Masarykova společnost.
- Pinc, Z. 1992. "Masaryk – myslitel periodický" (Masaryk – A Thinker of His Times). In *Masarykův sborník* VII. Praha: Academia.
- Simmel, G. 1908. *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot.
- Skilling, G. 1994. *T. G. Masaryk. Against the Current: 1882-1914*. London: Macmillan.
- Sorokin, P. 1936. *Sociologické nauky přítomnosti* (The Discipline of Sociology Today). Praha: Laichter.
- Šrubař, I. 1996. "Max Weber a Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk: Dvě diagnózy evropských společností na počátku 20. století" (Max Weber a Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk: Two Diagnoses of European Society at the Beginning of the 20th Century). Unpublished manuscript.
- Szacki, J. 1981. *Historia myśli socjologicznej* (History of Sociological Thought). Warszawa: Państwowe wydawnictwo naukowe.
- Szczepański, J. 1965. *Sociológia. Vývin problematiky a metód* (Sociology. The Development of Themes and Methods). Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry.
- Tomášek, P. 1972. "Georg Simmel – impresionistický styl sociologického myšlení" (Georg Simmel – An Impressionist Style of Sociological Thought). In *Studia minora* G 16. Brno: UJEP.
- Turner, J. 1993. *Classical Sociological Theory. A Postivist's Perspective*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.
- Zimmer, G. 1996. *Izbrannoje 2* (Collected Writings 2). Moscow: Jurist.

Simmels Soziologie.*

Von

Professor Dr. **Th. G. Masaryk**, Mitglied des österreichischen Reichsrats in Prag.

Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Von G. Simmel. Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1908, 782 S.

Ein schweres Buch. In wenigen (10) Kapiteln wird ein weites Gebiet abgehandelt, aber der Leser muß sich den Stoff selbst gliedern; die Kapitelüberschriften heben den Inhalt nicht genügend hervor, denn sie enthalten viel mehr, als sie anzeigen, und die Kapitel zerfallen nicht in Unterabteilungen (§§). Den meisten Kapiteln sind ein oder mehrere Exkurse angefügt, aber auch dadurch wird der Stoff und das Ganze nicht übersichtlich gemacht. Zwar ist am Schlusse ein Materialverzeichnis, aber das ist unvollständig; ich erwähne z. B. nur, daß Schlagworte wie: Geschichte, Geschichtsphilosophie, Staat, Repräsentation, Wahlsystem u. v. a. fehlen. Ich stelle an die Spitze meines Referates diesen Mangel nicht aus äußerlichen Gründen: als ich das I. Kapitel „Das Problem der Soziologie“ vornahm, suchte ich mich sogleich in den weiteren Kapiteln über das Verhältnis der Soziologie zur Geschichtsphilosophie, Geschichte usw. zu orientieren und darum erwies sich mit der Index und das Kapitelverzeichnis als ungenügend. Und ich will darum gleich sagen, daß mir der reiche Inhalt des umfangreichen Buches ungegliedert, begrifflich nicht durchgeklärt erscheint; wir haben einzelne sehr gute und wertvolle Untersuchungen, aber die Soziologie als Ganzes und System haben wir in dem Buche nicht.

Der Autor der „Soziologie“ betont zwar selbst, daß sich das Gebotene wenig zu einem systematischen Zusammenhang abrunde, das Buch sei völlig bruchstückhaft und unvollständig; trotzdem betone ich das von meinem Standpunkt. Simmel selbst will mit dem Stoffe seine Grundanschauung über das Wesen der Soziologie exemplifizieren und gerade über diese Grundauffassung hege ich einige Zweifel und finde diese in der Ungliedertheit des Stoffes bestätigt.

Mich interessiert in erster Reihe die Frage über die Stellung, die Simmel der Soziologie im System der Wissenschaften anweist. Das ist die erkenntnistheoretische und philosophische Aufgabe der Klassifikation der Wissenschaften, mit der die Soziologen, nach Comte's Beispiel noch immer vollauf beschäftigt sind. Simmel bietet keine vollständige Klassifikation der Wissenschaften, aber seine Untersuchung über das Wesen der Soziologie muß einige der wichtigsten Probleme berühren und behandeln.

Simmel weist die Ansicht (Comte's) ab, nach welcher die Soziologie die allumfassende Wissenschaft vom menschlichen Denken und Handeln darum wäre, weil dieses Handeln und Denken in der Gesellschaft und durch dieselbe bestimmt vorgehe; Chemie, Botanik usw. werden nicht zu Inhalten der Psychologie, weil die Gegenstände dieser Wissenschaften nur im menschlichen Bewußtsein wirklich werden und den

*) *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft* XII (1909): 600-607. Edited by Prof. Dr. Julius Wolf, Breslau, printed in Leipzig.

Voraussetzungen desselben unterliegen. Allein die Einsicht, der Mensch sei in seinem ganzen Wesen und allen Äußerungen durch die Wechselwirkung bestimmt, in der er mit anderen Menschen lebt, müsse allerdings zu einer neuen *Betrachtungsweise* in allen sog. Gesellschaftswissenschaften führen. Simmel erklärt aus diesem Grunde die Soziologie als eine neue *Methode* und er vergleicht die neue Methode mit der Induktion, wie dieselbe als neues Forschungsprinzip in alle möglichen Wissenschaften eingedrungen sei.

Bevor ich in der Darstellung der Ansichten Simmels weiter gehe, will ich gleich gegen diese Bestimmung der Soziologie als neue Methode meine Bedenken aussprechen: der Vergleich der Soziologie mit der Induktion ist auf den ersten Blick verfehlt. Die neue *Betrachtungsweise* (so unterstreicht Simmel) hat mit der *Methode* nichts gemein, sondern diese „*Betrachtungsweise*“ bedeutet eben nur, daß wir in neuerer Zeit das menschliche Denken, Fühlen und Handeln in seiner gesellschaftlichen und historischen Bedingtheit betrachten und erklären. Das hat mit der Induktion gar nichts ähnliches. Simmel selbst denkt bei der neuen *Betrachtungsweise* vornehmlich an die historische *Betrachtungsweise*, an den sog. historischen Sinn. Das ist gewiß ein Problem für sich, nämlich zu erklären, wann und wie sich dieser historische Sinn entwickelt und befestigt hat; es würde sich zeigen, daß es sich nicht bloß um eine historische Methode handelt. Seit einigen Jahren wird über das Wesen der Geschichte sehr lebhaft diskutiert, besonders in der deutschen Wissenschaft und Philosophie; es ist ein großer Mangel, daß Simmel auf dieses Problem nicht eingegangen ist, vielmehr auf Grund einer offensichtlichen Äquivokation (*Betrachtungsweise: Methode*) dem faktischen Problem ausgewichen ist.

Daß hier Unklarheiten vorliegen beweist der ganze Gedankengang. Zuerst konstatiert Simmel die neue *Betrachtungsweise* in den Geisteswissenschaften, aber bald darauf in den bestehenden Wissenschaften überhaupt; tatsächlich handelt es sich um alle Wissenschaften. Wir haben jetzt die Geschichte aller Wissenschaften, Begriffe und Dinge – was ist also jetzt die Geschichte und was kann sie sein? Was ist die Geschichte (schlechtweg) neben der Geschichte der Wissenschaften, der Literatur und Kunst, Politik und Wirtschaft usw., usw., – das ist jetzt die Frage.

Und selbstverständlich: wie verhält sich zur Geschichte die Soziologie? Was ist die Soziologie neben der Geschichte? Auf diese Frage gibt Simmel keine Antwort, trotzdem ihm die eigene Terminologie – („ganze historische Wirklichkeit“, „gesellschaftlich-historische Realität“ als Objekt der Soziologie) – dazu zwingen müßte.

Simmel sieht in der Soziologie nicht nur eine neue Methode, er sieht in ihr auch eine neue selbständige Wissenschaft, denn sie habe ein eigenes und neues Objekt und zwar sei dieses Objekt die Gesellschaft. Nach Simmel haben wir in der „Struktur der Objektivität“ die Legitimation für eine selbständige Soziologie zu suchen. Die Gesellschaftsbegriffe selbst bestimmt Simmel durch die zwei Begriffe: Inhalt und Form, die die in Wirklichkeit untrennbaren Elemente jedes sozialen Seins und Geschehens, jeder sozialen Erscheinung bilden. Ein Beispiel: die Parteibildung finden wir als „Form“ in der Politik, aber auch in der Kirche usw.; die Wirtschaft als Inhalt realisiert sich in der Form des Freihandels aber auch in der Form des Abschließungssystems usw.

Ich würde auf diese Scheidung von Inhalt und Form in diesem Sinne kein großes Gewicht legen, das könnte Sache der Terminologie sein; allein bei Simmel wird diese

Scheidung dadurch ganz besonders wichtig, daß sie in Anlehnung an Kants Scheidung von Inhalt und Form vorgenommen wird.

Simmel meint darin, daß die Form unveränderlich bleibe, während sich ihre Inhalte ändern und daß andererseits der Inhalt (Stoff) beharre, während seine Formen sich ändern, die besagte Legitimierung für die Selbständigkeit der Soziologie zu finden; und weil ihm Stoff und Form eine unlösbare Einheit des sozialen Lebens ausmachen, so bestimmt er die Aufgabe der Soziologie als Feststellung, systematische Ordnung, psychologische Begründung und historische Entwicklung der reinen Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Das ist eben die Anlehnung an Kant – „reine Formen“ der Vergesellschaftung! Auf dem Titelblatt haben wir nur die „Formen“, aber in dem Buche werden die reinen Formen hervorgehoben. Weil aber angeblich Form und Inhalt eine unlösbare Einheit ausmachen, so ist der Inhalt mit der Form quasi mitgegeben: das wird meist so direkt nicht ausgesprochen, aber es wird so verstanden und es ergibt sich aus dem weiteren Zusammenhange. Kaum daß die Soziologie erkenntnistheoretisch als selbständige Wissenschaft in ihrem engeren Objekt ihre Legitimation gefunden hat, betont Simmel wiederum, daß die Soziologie das Gesamtgebiet ihrer Gegenstände, die „gesellschaftlich-historische Realität“, unter einen besonderen Gesichtspunkt rücke: „Nicht ihr Objekt, sondern ihre Betrachtungsweise, die besondere, von ihr vollzogene Abstraktion differenziert sie von den übrigen historisch-sozialen Wissenschaften.“

Ich glaube, Simmel gelangt zu diesen Widersprüchen durch seinen Kantismus. Und darum sage ich weiter, daß seine Formen, und gar die reinen Formen (auch „reine Tatsache“) einfach nicht existieren. Das zeigt übrigens die schwankende Terminologie und die mannigfachen Definitionen, in denen neben den Formen immer wieder der Inhalt bestimmend mitunterläuft (die Soziologie z. B. habe die Kräfte, Beziehungen und Formen zum Gegenstand, durch die die Menschen sich vergesellschaften). Ich wiederhole, auf die Terminologie kommt es nicht an; will man die Parteibildung, die Konkurrenz, die Arbeitsteilung usw. Formen nennen, weil dieselben auf den verschiedensten sozialen Gebieten sich finden, so habe ich nichts dagegen; nur darf man dann die Reinheit dieser „Formen“ nicht kantisch fassen. Das Problem besteht doch darin, daß verschiedene soziale Gebiete, Kategorien (Staat – Kirche usw.), unterschieden werden und es kommt auf die Gründe dieser Unterscheidung an; und wenn wir gewahren, daß sich z. B. Parteien nicht nur im Staate, sondern auch in der Kirche, in der Literatur usw. bilden, so sind hier schon, wie Simmel selbst sagt, gewisse Kräfte wirksam – wozu also die Form so betonen? Simmel bestimmt den sozialen *Inhalt* als Interesse, Zweck, Motiv (an anderer Stelle auch als Triebe – auch hier sind die Bestimmungen schwankend), die *Form* als „Form oder Art der Wechselwirkung unter den Individuen, durch die oder in deren Gestalt jener Inhalt gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit erlangt.“ Simmel merkt gar nicht wie er da zu einer Gestalt der Art oder Form gelangt – doch betone ich nur, daß es eben zwischen Art und Form einen großen Unterschied gibt und daß es sich tatsächlich um verschiedene Arten der Vergesellschaftung handelt.

Wie sich Simmel von der kantischen Auffassung von Form und Inhalt nicht frei machen kann, dafür findet der aufmerksame Leser beständig Belege in der schwankenden, sich gegenseitig korrigierenden oder doch ergänzenden Begriffsbestimmung. Ich habe eben den Satz wörtlich angeführt, in welchem gesagt wird, daß der soziale Inhalt *durch* oder *in* den gewissen Formen verwirklicht wird; zwischen *durch* oder *in* ist gewiß ein großer Unterschied, zumal wir eben einige Seiten später

lesen, daß die Formen nicht sowohl die Vergesellschaftung *bewirken*, als vielmehr diese Vergesellschaftung *sind*.

Die Soziologie ist nach Simmel eine allgemeine Wissenschaft, die allgemeine Soziologie; als solche verhalte sie sich zu den soziologischen Spezialwissenschaften wie die Geometrie zu den physikalisch-chemischen Wissenschaften von der Materie – also wiederum Kant und Kant ohne Berechtigung, denn das Verhältnis der Soziologie, sagen wir z. B., zur Nationalökonomie ist eben ein ganz anderes als das der Geometrie zur Chemie und Physik. Ich will nicht nach den erkenntnistheoretischen Gründen forschen, warum Simmel hier gerade die Geometrie (nicht die Arithmetik!) heranzieht. Es ist einfach nicht richtig, daß die Soziologie sowie die Geometrie die Erforschung der Inhalte anderen Wissenschaften überlasse. Die Geometrie steht zur Chemie (sollen wir etwa an eine Geometrie der Atomlagen denken?) in einem ganz anderen Verhältnis als die Soziologie zur Nationalökonomie und zu den übrigen sozialen Spezialwissenschaften. Ist die Soziologie die „allgemeine“ Wissenschaft gegenüber ihren „Spezialwissenschaften“, so steht die Geometrie zur Physik und Chemie, resp. zu den „physikalisch-chemischen Wissenschaften von der Materie“ nicht in dem analogen Verhältnisse einer allgemeinen Wissenschaft zu ihren Spezialwissenschaften. Das sieht jeder, der das Verhältnis dieser Wissenschaften genauer ansieht.

Simmel gelangt von seinem Formstandpunkt in der Soziologie dazu, die Frage: Aufstellung von Gesetzen oder Begreiflichmachen einmaliger, historischrealer Verläufe als irrelevant abzuweisen. Er drückt sich so aus, seine Problemstellung werde von der Notwendigkeit dieser Entscheidung „von vornherein nicht berührt;“ betrachtet man den Inhalt, so könne man sich für die Auffindung von Gesetzen aussprechen, betone man die Form, so genüge das Begreiflichmachen. Begreiflichmachen – schon der Terminus zeigt an, daß Simmel die Frage anders faßt als etwa Windelband oder Rickert; Simmel betont den „Sinn“, den „soziologischen Sinn“ der geschäftlichen Inhalte – immer wieder muß er nolens volens die kantische Form den sozialen Inhalten opfern.

Von methodologischer Wichtigkeit ist noch das Verhältnis der Psychologie zur Soziologie. Das Feststellen und Begreiflichmachen der vergesellschaftenden Wechselwirkung und zwar nicht nur in den großen (Staat, Klassen usw.) sondern auch in den kleinen, unfertigen, stets wechselnden Gesellschaftsgebilden erfordert selbstverständlich die psychologische Behandlung, denn es sind ja Motive, Gefühle, Gedanken, Bedürfnisse der Individuen, die gesellschaftlich aufeinander wirken. Aber diese psychologische Behandlung der sozialen Tatsachen macht die Soziologie nicht zu einem Kapitel der Psychologie. Simmel meint, sowie in der Astronomie und Chemie das Entdecken und das Nach-Denken jeder astronomischen oder chemischen Wahrheit ein Bewußtseinsereignis sei und trotzdem nicht in die Psychologie, sondern eben in die Astronomie usw. gehöre, weil die Inhalte, nicht die seelischen Prozesse diese Wissenschaften konstituieren, so sei auch die Soziologie neben der Psychologie eine selbständige Wissenschaft: in dieser Beziehung bestehe gegenüber der Astronomie und den Wissenschaften der äußeren Natur überhaupt nur ein gradueller Unterschied.

Ich will nicht darüber richten, ob der Unterschied nur graduell ist; die Tatsache ist hier ausschlaggebend, daß der Mensch mit seinem individuellen Bewußtsein ein Glied des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen ist. Dadurch wird das Verhältnis der Psychologie und Soziologie ein besonders intimes – wie dieses Verhältnis sachlich und methodisch

bestimmt werden soll, das wird von dem Verhältnis abhängen, welches zwischen dem Individuum und dem Gesellschaftsganzen angenommen wird.

Simmel geht auf die Fragen in einem späteren Exkurs über Sozialpsychologie etwas näher ein. Er weist den Mystizismus ab, der von einer „Volksseele“, einem „Bewußtsein der Gesellschaft“, einem „Recht der Zeiten“ u. dgl. phantasiert und darum ist ihm die Sozialpsychologie keine Kollektivpsychologie, sondern nur Individualpsychologie, die auf sozialem Gebiete angewendet wird. Wir dürfen für die Einheitlichkeit der summierten Aktionen der Individuen keine einheitliche psychische Ursache, also kein en „sozialen Geist“ u. dgl. annehmen. Wohl sei zu erklären, wie das Individuum unter dem Einflusse der gesellschaftlichen Umgebung psychisch tätig sei, aber auch diese Erklärung gebe die Individualpsychologie.

Simmel hebt hier besonders die Fragen hervor, die er die statistischen und ethnologischen nennt.

Zuletzt geht Simmel auf das Verhältnis der Soziologie zur Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik ein. Und zwar formuliert er von vornherein die Frage nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik der Soziologie. Über die Erkenntnistheorie ist nicht viel zu sagen: die Soziologie basiert eben, wie jede Wissenschaft auf erkenntnistheoretischen Begriffen, diese Begriffe kommen in der Soziologie zur Anwendung und darum gibt es eine Erkenntnistheorie der Soziologie. Man kann das in dieser Knappheit und Allgemeinheit gelten lassen, wenn man auch die Frage stellen müßte, wie es hier mit der Logik, resp. Methodologie zu halten sei, was dann weiter auf das Verhältnis der Logik und Methodik zur Erkenntnistheorie einzugehen veranlassen würde. Mit Simmel zu sprechen, es gibt gewiß auch eine Logik, eine Methodologie der Soziologie.

Das führt folgerichtig zu der Hauptfrage, wie Simmel die Philosophie definiert und welche Wissenschaften er als philosophische anerkennt. Doch bleiben wir bei der Metaphysik der Soziologie. Diese Metaphysik hat nach Simmel die Aufgabe, ihre Einzelwissenschaft – die Soziologie – in Vollendungen und Zusammenhängen zu führen und mit Begriffen und Fragen in Beziehung zu setzen, die „innerhalb der Erfahrung und des unmittelbar gegenständlichen Wissens keinen Platz haben.“ Hier sind zwei Aufgaben zu scheiden. Auf den „Grad der Erkenntnis“ beziehe sich die Unbefriedigung an dem fragmentarischen Charakter der Einzelnerkenntnisse – der Mensch ergänze die Einzelnerkenntnisse mit den Mitteln der Spekulation. Eine zweite „metaphysische Funktion“ sei auf eine andere „Dimension des Daseins“ gerichtet; man könne dieselbe als den Sinn oder den Zweck, als die absolute Substanz unter den relativen Erscheinungen, auch als Wert oder die religiöse Bedeutung ausdrücken. Hier ergeben sich Fragen, wie: Ist die Gesellschaft der Zweck der menschlichen Existenz oder ein Mittel für das Individuum? Kann es eine metaphysisch-religiöse Bedeutung von Gesamtheiten geben oder ist diese der individuellen Seele vorbehalten? U. dgl. m.

Simmel bezeichnet diese Art von Fragen als schlechthin philosophische „Mag man Philosophie überhaupt als Wissenschaft anerkennen oder nicht: die Philosophie der Gesellschaft hat keinerlei Rechtsgrund, sich den Vorteilen oder Nachteilen ihrer Zugehörigkeit zur Philosophie überhaupt durch ihre Konstituierung zu einer besonderen Wissenschaft der Soziologie zu entziehen.“

Ich glaube die Begriffsbestimmungen Simmels genügend vollständig angeführt zu haben, um abermals sagen zu dürfen, daß auch diese Bestimmungen recht unpräzise sind. Kurz gesagt – Simmel vermengt die deutsche, resp. kantische Definition der Philosophie

(für die Metaphysik wird die Erfahrung aufgegeben!) mit der französischen, positivistischen. Die Metaphysik wird mit der Philosophie identifiziert; aber da die Metaphysik oder Philosophie der Gesellschaft auch mit der Soziologie identifiziert wird, so ergibt sich die Frage: wenn Soziologie = Philosophie der Gesellschaft, was ist dann nach der angeführten Definition die Philosophie (= Metaphysik) der Philosophie der Gesellschaft?

Während derart die Philosophie der Gesellschaft (auch „Sozialphilosophie“) nur eine andere Bezeichnung für Soziologie ist, wird an mehreren Stellen der Begriff der Philosophie der Gesellschaft von der Soziologie auch abgeschieden.

Nur kurz sei darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß Simmel die Metaphysik auch mit der Religion identifiziert oder doch in eine so unbestimmte Beziehung bringt – das alles macht die Begriffsbestimmung der Soziologie nicht sonderlich klar.

Diese verwirrende Terminologie mag noch um die Bezeichnung „Erkenntnistheorie der Gesellschaft“ bereichert werden. Gemeint ist die Erkenntnistheorie der Soziologie, aber in etwas anderem Sinne als oben angegeben wurde. In einem Exkurs wird nämlich die Frage aufgeworfen: Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich? Also wiederum Kant. Simmel sucht nach dem „Apriori“, das die empirische Struktur des Einzelnen als Gesellschaftswesen ermögliche und forme – Simmel fragt, wie ist die Gesellschaft überhaupt als eine objektive Form subjektiver Seelen möglich?

Das „Apriori“, das Simmel hier hervorhebt, hat, wie er selbst zugibt, nur ungefähre Ähnlichkeit mit den Kategorien Kants; sein Apriori lasse sich nicht durch ein einfaches Schlagwort, wie die Kategorien Kants, bezeichnen, Simmel gibt selbst weiteres zu, daß es sich bei seinem Apriori streng genommen nicht um Erkenntnisse, sondern um praktische Prozesse und Seinszustände handelt. Trotzdem – Apriori! Man kann den erkenntnis-theoretischen Schaden, den das Analogisieren mit Kant in der Forschung anstellt, nicht besser illustrieren, als mit diesen quasi kantischen Grundbegriffen Simmels: Kants Begriffe werden für ganz andere Dinge und Begriffe angewendet. Nehmen wir zum Belege eines von den drei Aprioris vor, die Simmel beispielsweise anführt.

Der Mensch sei nicht ganz und ausschließlich ein Gesellschaftswesen, der Einzelne sei mit gewissen Seiten nicht Element der Gesellschaft und seine Eigenschaft, dieser Zustand bilde die positive Bedingung dafür, daß er mit der anderen Seite seines Wesens das Element der Gesellschaft sei. Jedes Individuum werde von der Gesellschaft befaßt, zugleich aber stehe es dieser Gesellschaft gegenüber, ein Sein für die Gesellschaft und ein Sein für sich.

Zugegeben. Was ist da das Apriori („soziologische“ Apriori)? Wenn Simmel die Kant'sche Terminologie anwendet und etwa sagt, ein solches Apriori mache die Form der empirischen Gesellschaft möglich (die Sache wird auch anders formuliert), so läßt sich dem gegenüber nur betonen, daß der Gebrauch des Begriffes Apriori hier gar keine Berechtigung hat. Die Gesellschaft ist aus Individuen mit individuellem Bewußtsein zusammengestellt und es ist durch Beobachtung und Analyse festzustellen, was an dem Individuum eben das Individuelle, was an ihm das Soziale ist, es ist festzustellen, wie der beständige Prozeß der Vergesellschaftung der Individuen vor sich geht. Es ist ganz unerfindlich, was Simmel für diese Aufgabe durch die Anlehnung an Kant gewinnen will – im Gegenteil, die Sache wird nur verwirrt.

Ich begnüge mich in meinem Referate mit diesem methodologischen Bemerkungen, durch welche gezeigt werden soll, wie Simmel das Gebiet der Soziologie eingeengt hat; einige Betrachtungen des Inhaltes seines Buches würden zu demselben Resultate gelangen. Über diesen Inhalt könnte ich manches Lobende sagen, es sind gute und wichtige Untersuchungen über die Vergesellschaftung, Untersuchungen über die Über- und Unterordnung, über den Streit u. a.; aber auch in diesen Einzeluntersuchungen gibt es keine stramme Gliederung des Stoffes, die Begriffe werden selten präzise gefaßt, jedenfalls nicht erschöpft. So z. B. haben wir einen Exkurs über den Adel; es wird nicht gezeigt, wie der Adel resp. Aristokratismus auf verschiedenen Gebieten und wohl in sachlicher Wechselbeziehung sich entwickelt hat, wir sehen nicht, wie der Begriff des Adels und Herrschers, wie speziell der Monarchismus mit dem Adel zusammenhängt usw. Die Bemerkungen, die Simmel macht, sind gut, anregend, aber unvollständig, ohne Zusammenhang mit dem Ganzen, mit einem Worte: ungegliedert.



Grappling With Democracy

Deliberations on Post-Communist Societies (1990-1995)

edited by ELŻBIETA MATYNIA

Graduate Faculty of New School for Social Research, New York

This collection of essays is the offspring of an intellectual project which was initiated ten years ago in New York, Warsaw and Budapest to provide the opportunity for a sustained and uninhibited discussion of democratic theory and the prospects for democratisation. After 1990 this loosely structured endeavour came to be generally known as the Democracy Seminars, with more or less formalised chapters in 14 countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The collection introduces the reader to the debate that surrounds the unprecedented systemic changes taking place in the post-Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, especially in their political, social, and cultural realms. The book is organised into four major parts, which follow the Introduction (*The Democracy Seminars and Beyond*) and the Prologue. These are: *Continuity and Change*, *Constituting Democracy*, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, and *Nationality and Diversity: Challenges to Liberal Democracy*.

298 pages, paperback, ISBN 80-85850-13-3, 160 x 235 mm

Price: 14.95 USD

Social Transformation and Modernization

On Building Theory of Societal Changes in the Post-Communist European Countries

by PAVEL MACHONIN

Using the results of empirical surveys, the domestic and foreign literature and his own personal experience, the author has written a study presenting an overview of the gradual creation of sociological theory in relation to the birth, operation, and collapse of state socialism, and the post-communist transformation in the relatively industrially advanced countries of Central Europe.

Machonin addresses a wide range of important questions in this work:

Is the current critique of state socialism from the liberal and democratic point of view sufficient?

What is the nature of the newly emerging social differentiation?

What type of relationships will assert themselves: those founded on the inherited egalitarianism, inequalities based on class, or meritocratic principles?

What are the prospects of the left- or right-wing populist, neo-liberal and social-reformist strategies?

Does not the 'return to Europe' imply the clear-cut progress of modernization?

156 pages, paperback, ISBN 80-85850-27-3, 140 x 200 mm

Price: 8.90 USD

Published by SLON Publishing, Prague 1997

Orders should be sent to:

HARRASSOWITZ Buchhandlung & Antiquariat Taunusstrasse 5 D-65174 Wiesbaden

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

2

OBSAH

STATI

Novák, M.: Existuje nejlepší 'model demokracie'? Efektivita a reprezentativita: 'Teoretická revoluce' nebo demokratické dilema?	131
Fergeová, Z.: Ženy a sociální transformace ve střední a východní Evropě. 'Stará levice' a 'Nová pravice'	159
Havelka, M., Müller, K.: Radikalizovaná transformace, institucionální napětí a modernizační výzvy	179
Róbert, P.: Sociální vymezení životních podmínek v postkomunistických společnostech	197

ZE SOCIOLOGICKÝCH VÝZKUMŮ

Kuchař, P.: Jak jsou zaměstnanými vnímány jejich pracovní podmínky. Hledisko západní, střední a východní Evropy	217
---	-----

ZPRÁVY A INFORMACE

O sociologické klasice v Petrohradě (P. Machonin)	235
Zpráva z konference "Parlamenty středoevropských zemí v procesu začleňování do Evropské unie (Z. Mansfeldová)	237

DOKUMENT

Simmel a Masaryk (M. Petrusek)	239
T. G. Masaryk: Simmels Soziologie	249

PE 6452
S1 5. 1997.

REVIEW

2

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

- Novák, M.: Is There One Best 'Model of Democracy'? Efficiency and Representativeness: 'Theoretical Revolution' or Democratic Dilemma? 131
- Ferge, Z.: Women and Social Transformation in Central-Eastern Europe. The 'Old Left' and the 'New Right' 159
- Havelka, M., Müller, K.: Radicalised Transformation, the Institutional Tensions and Modernisation Challenges 179
- Róbert, P.: Social Determination of Living Conditions in Post-Communist Societies 197

FROM SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS

- Kuchař, P.: Working Conditions as Perceived by the Employed. A West-Central-East Europe View 217

NEWS AND INFORMATION

- On Sociological Classics in St. Petersburg (P. Machonin) 235
- The Report on the Conference "Parliaments of Central European Countries in the Process of Incorporation into the European Union" (Z. Mansfeldová) 237

DOCUMENT

- Simmel and Masaryk (M. Petrusek) 239
- T. G. Masaryk: Simmels Soziologie 249

ISSN 1210-3861



72

