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The CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is a scholarly review open to the discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

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A General Interpretation of Transition in the Czech Republic (1989-1993)

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Abstract: General interpretations of societal transition provide overall pictures of fundamental changes, their basic trends, their time scales, and the clashes between the main players. These interpretations allow both participants and analysts to focus on the important historical facts and the key social processes. The fundamental changes in the Czech Republic since November 1989 are shown here as a transition brought about by the interplay of the drama of the erosion of the old regime with that of the birth of a new order. The old order was partly dismantled and society found itself in transitional anomie, which made it possible to gradually build a new one. This transitological view sees a transition as a provisional state of affairs constructed by many different persons (individuals, groups, communities and organisations). This provisional situation is characterised by a rich dynamic of social problems, together with an unbalanced and changing distribution of gains and losses. The resulting conflicts become – in successful cases – part of the universe of myth. In this universe of myth these conflicts are seen as a series of crises/tests which push the society indirectly from the old order to the new. The originally open transition comes to a close when the participants cease to see the current events as provisional. The main task then becomes the normalisation of the new order, the enforcement of its regime and coping with the formerly provisional arrangements which were in many ways 'justified' by the apparent anomie.

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1. Introduction

1.1 How can fundamental changes in society be viewed?

There are two lights in which basic change in a society can be viewed. The first is as a transition, that is, as a series of lasting inter-connected and acted events/turning points unfolding unevenly on all the macro-, mezo- and micro-levels of society [the transitological approach, see, for example, Linz 1974; Dvořáková, Kunc 1994; Kabele 1998b]. The second is as a transformation, that is, as a series of linked changes or processes (upwards or downwards) which are parallel and basically homogeneous in time and space [e.g. Stark 1992]. They can mostly be conceptualised through a combination of strategically significant variables.

The modernisation theory of transformation that is dominant today sees the fundamental change in Eastern European societies as based in the introduction of modern institutions allowing increasing political pluralisation and the introduction of market economy systems in society [e.g. Zapf 1991, 1993; Machonin 1996; Machonin, Tuček et al. 1996]. This implementation comes up against government officials and economists,

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who underestimate the problem of varying tempos and the interconnectedness of changes in the legal-administrative, political, economic and cultural domains [e.g. Dahrendorf 1991, Srubar 1994, Večerník 1996, Sztompka 1996, Illner 1996].

1.2 Is there good reason to abandon the transitological approach?

The present dominance of the transformatological approach to the changes since 1989 is usually proclaimed as scientific progress since it has displaced the naive, speculative and ideological transitological approach. This dominance also has powerful support from organisationally complex and expensive comparative research organised on the basis of the mass collection of data in several countries at once.

There is an equally clear decline of the transitological perspective in public opinion. At the beginning of the changes everyone was caught up in a 'transitological' vision of a longed-for move to a new order. As the new initial regime should by now be consolidated, there is a growing 'transformatological' scepticism due to the overly simplified view of these changes as a form of 'muddled modernisation'.

1.3 Where does the path to knowledge not lead?

Dramatic and fundamental change in society cannot be seen as a systematic leap into a new order, nor as a planned modernisation of institutions. The basic difference from the point of view of understanding is not so much between the transitological and transformatological approaches as between a closed and an open view of the basic changes in society. The former makes the suggestive but mistaken assumptions that:

– there are strict rules or laws governing fundamental changes;

– the objectives of these changes are determined by the previous development of society and are independent of the choices of involved persons[1] (individuals, groups, communities and organisations);

– the only influence open to those actors is the choice of the right or wrong route to these objectives.

The open view, on the other hand [see, for example, Stark 1996, Illner 1996, Kabele 1998a, Havelka 1997], does not look at the effects of the parallelism of endogenous and exogenous processes or of transitions and the subsequent normalisation on the macro-mezo- and micro-levels of society as fully determinate. They have unclear and unique features and are not completely predetermined by past events either in their origins or in the course they follow.

1.4 What comparative advantages does the open transitological approach offer?

If fundamental changes in society are seen as a unique, piecemeal and stratified discontinuity, the changes can be seen as dependent on circumstances and so on the non-standard choices of all persons involved. This allows us to take into consideration the transaction cost of the choices of the key actors, that is the cost of:

– obtaining reliable information,

– the risk of decisions made on the basis of incomplete information,

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[1]) The mark of a person is the free and sovereign choice to act. Persons are not only individuals, but, in opportune social conditions can also be social units (groups, organisations, communities) and even whole societies. In the latter case these can be termed collective persons.

– co-ordination of approaches and settling conflicts,

– enforcement of accepted rules and agreements.

These transaction costs influence inevitably the course of extraordinary events, making them frequently seem to be the result of irrational intervention by the corrupted persons involved. For this reason the course of changes has been explained by the moral decline of the general public, by their clinging to outdated ideas and habits, or by the imperfect personalities of the leaders.

2. Socially Constructed Transition – A Theoretical Basis

2.1 What order do social events belong to?

The course of social events is not fully determined. This is not due just to a distorted understanding or knowledge of the situation, but the dynamic uncertainty is in fact ontological. Social events are therefore an ongoing source of greater or lesser crises and turning points, rises, transitions and declines. This also means that the social micro- and macro-worlds which are created by individuals, groups, communities and organisations to protect themselves from the crude impulses of uncertain social events and to be able intervene effectively outside their own boundaries, represent orders with two non-transmissible dimensions:

– the first – which is the traditional subject of the social sciences – is based on the foreseeability of regularities or on rules,

– the second is based in verisimilitude of orientations and the tendency of a plot, both corresponding to an understanding of the course of events as a narrative.

The first dimension rests on the predictability of the dynamics of the micro- and macro-worlds, while the second deals with the delicate problem of their unpredictability and uniqueness. In the first case we can speak of a *dynamic regime* in which the uniqueness of events can be understood either as the application of the probable relations and working rules of the game (and there can well be rules of the game for changing the rules) or their abandonment. In the second case the order is seen rather as a *world of narratives* which incorporates and communicates stories, biographies, histories and myths into the all-encompassing constitutive narrative, at one time of the family, at others of the community or the whole society, and refers to their common environment, the world.[2]

2.2 What, then, makes the course of social events extraordinary?

The social order is like both a world of narratives and a dynamic regime made reasonably certain by its actors through its definition, negotiation and enforcement in their efforts to cope with the uncertain course of events. This can be understood in two ways:

– The order lasts because it arises out of non-order, here described as a greater or lesser uncertainty of the course of social events;

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[2]) The theory of dual social construction [Kabele 1997] sees social orders as being constructed through *institutionalisation* (which shape the dynamic regime) and through *narrativisation* (which shapes the world of narratives). This produces an *architecture of game frameworks* which allow both individual and collective persons to understand the course of social events. It makes these participants into actors in the course of events and allows them to co-ordinate their interventions.

– For internal and external, local and global reasons the order finds itself sometimes in an extraordinary situation in which written contracts and unwritten agreements are no longer sustainable and the steps already taken towards negotiating and enforcing of the order are precluded so that new ways of doing so must be found, that is, developed, negotiated and enforced.

The extraordinary course of events represents principally uncertain – but by no means chaotic – events which, even despite great difficulties, are made locally more certain within the limits of its social construction. Such construction happens more or less consciously and spontaneously through the usage of basically identical semiotic capacities, and reserves of acquired experience which are in force within the normal process of making the social order sufficiently certain. On the one hand, the extraordinary course of events is therefore non-order, which is incorporated step by step into the order in a unique way, while on the other it represents a special meta-order of social construction.

2.3 What are the courses of the basic social changes?

Fundamental social changes are described, experienced and shaped by the behaviour of the actors in such a way that two not entirely distinct phases can be distinguished:

– an extraordinary period of dramatic change (the real transition), which tends to be relatively short (it is this period that is the primary focus of our interest),

– a period of normalisation which, on the other hand, tends to be relatively long.

In a *transition* there must be a break with a tradition. The old order is partially dismantled. A society or lower social unit (groups, organisations, communities) moves into a state of transitional anomie, which makes it possible to gradually develop, negotiate and enforce the new order.

In this perspective transitions are constructed by many people as a provisional arrangement. This provisional state shows a rich dynamic of social problems and an unbalanced and unstable distribution of losses and gains. The resulting conflicts become – in successful cases – part of the universe of myth, in which these conflicts are seen as a series of crises/tests that thrust the society indirectly from the old order to the new.

2.4 How can transitions penetrate a society?

The idea of order can be related both to the society as a whole and to the lower social units (groups, organisations, communities) that are part of it, and even to its individual members. Every societal order is basically an order of orders and its continuation normally depends primarily on tradition. The process of transition has the potential to affect all the coexisting and interrelated units in this order of orders. The hierarchical arrangement of individuals and social units and the spread of influence from one 'storey' of social events to another is one of the basic forms of both the spread and the normalisation of changes and transitions in the order of orders. On higher levels – in the social units which include the given unit – the dismantling of the order and the transitional changes going on at lower levels are often a normal part of a dynamic regime and of the world of narratives. For example, all groups, organisations and communities to some degree build biographical transitions and the death of individuals into their order.

2.5 What events make the course of transition anomic?

Transitional anomie leads to a major weakening of the enforcement of order [normative control, Durkheim 1957] over and above simple crisis situations, because the players must react to the fact that the old regime can 'apparently' no longer continue to exist in the same way. On the one hand it may break up spontaneously – in a spreading chain reaction, and on the other hand a disloyal but influential opposition may emerge inside it and effectively present an alternative vision of the regime. Transitional anomie has certain distinguishing marks:

- the old order ceases to be sufficiently well enforced on different levels and there are increasing deviations of all types,
- practices that had in the past been conducted in secret now move into the open,
- on a local basis, the regime breaks down and finds itself in confrontation with shadow practices that have arisen in reaction to it,
- in many cases the old order is protected because it could not be quickly replaced by new arrangements,
- in many spheres the regime finds itself in major conflict with newly emerging rules of the game,
- new working rules are sometimes only added to the game when they act as a front for the continuation of old practices or the spontaneous *ad hoc* emergence of new ones,
- there is an unanticipated misuse of the new rules.

In transition it is not only the dynamic regime that must pass through fundamental changes, but also the world of narratives, which must be narrated anew both in parts and as a whole. Only thus can the temporal rift caused by the end of the old regime be bridged and can the subjective identity of the persons (people, groups, communities and organisations) acting in transition be renewed. Transitional anomie therefore also means the breaking down of the guarantee of the identities of both individual and collective persons by formerly negotiated biographies and histories which unfortunately offered a promising life course only under the old order. The reason for this breakdown is an obvious and far-reaching but unclear change in the estimation of what is and what is not right and important. The typical sign of the destruction of the world of narratives is the overproduction of *ad hoc* composed narratives of the past, present and future, which individual or corporate persons are unable to identify with.

2.6 What are the outcomes of the basic social changes?

It should be recalled that the extraordinary is always temporary. In any circumstances it is introduced gradually into the order. At the same time the old order may be renewed in a more or less modified likeness, allowing us to talk about its restoration or modification. Like modifications of the old order, a new order is not clearly determined by the original state of the old order, nor is it generally in accordance with the original transitional vision. Extraordinary courses of events can also become bogged down in a chronic state of crisis: this can of course, from the point of view of this theory, become stabilised, creating a regime and its own world of narratives.

The extraordinary stage of transition concludes when the participants in events cease to see them as provisional. The task in hand then becomes the normalisation [Ka-

bele 1993b, 1998b or consolidation, Schmitter 1994[3]] of the new order, the enforcement of its regime and the coping with the formerly provisional arrangements that were in many ways 'justified' by the apparent anomie. The period of normalisation sees both a spontaneous and (at least on the part of the new rulers) intentional de-dramatisation of the life of the group or society and the deconstruction of the mythical aspect of fundamental change. There is a deep-reaching adjustment in the interpretational and interventional framework for the resolution of social problems.[4] At this point it is no longer enough to rely on either extraordinary measures or the extraordinary willingness of victims. It is instead necessary to 'compel' institutions to take measures in order to fulfil the tasks for which they were established and to induce all players to really respect the new institutional framework.

The climate of normalisation throws the black-and-white mythical view into disrepute and instead reinforces the anti-mythical view of the changes that have already taken place. In the perspective of the established new order, light is thrown onto many dubious customs and events from the transitional period and the groups, organisations, communities or society tends to be destabilised for a second time by the recognition of the costs linked with the transitional anomie and the 'debts' that this has left. In the normalisation climate – at least in the first years (1995-1998 in the Czech Republic), there tend to be incessant crises of social groups, communities, organisations or society, which are generally perceived as the results of insufficiently enforced or poorly conceived changes. According to the critics, institutions have been established and laws amended but these institutions have not changed sufficiently to be able to produce effective solutions, or

[3]) Schmitter, and indeed the majority of political scientists, see consolidation only in terms of the political regime and in concrete terms of the stabilisation of democracy. The concept here is therefore broader, in that normalisation is taken to encompass all the basic dimensions of the order (i.e. political, economic, legal and ethical, see 3.1) and involves all political regimes. Schmitter's view of the connection between consolidation and the change of a paradigm could be also criticised. It is necessary – according to him – to move from the study of actors' actions and decisions in the highly uncertain conditions typical of transitology, to a study of the institutional structures which are established by the authorities in negotiations with all actors in the stabilisation. Schmitter seems to resign from the basic comparative advantages of a transitological approach, which lie in the fact (see 1.4) that it makes it possible to see the change as a series of events, making it conditional on the non-standard choices of the actors. This makes it possible to take into consideration the unavoidable transaction cost of the choices of key actors. In its starting point, therefore, Schmitter's consolidology is hardly dissimilar to the prevailing transformatology.

[4]) Normalisation is the basic strategy of the party of those who are trying to solve the problems of society [Kabele 1998b] in each time. They attempt to 'deactivate' the dramatic nature of social problems and their moral and political urgency, so that either their institutional solution will become a normal part of a shared social world and satisfy the demands of their complainants, or can be effectively solved or rejected as problems. The preferred strategy is to set up a special organisation to solve each concrete social problem, which can then demonstrate that it has done something to resolve the problem. Such organisations can thus silence the original demands by saying that they have gone some way to satisfying them, but they also often fall prey to the bureaucratic syndrome [Crozier 1964] and they are skilful in dismissing these demands. The popularity of this strategy is shown by Benáček's and Středová's data [Benáček, Středová and Šlaisová 1998]. They show, for example, that employment in the Czech state bureaucracy was 51% higher in 1994 than in 1990 (and in the following three years it rose by a further 24%). Its cost as a percentage of the GDP also rose (as yet figures are available only for the period of 1993-1997).

alternatively, the unintended negative effects come to be seen as more important than the benefits.

2.7 What do all transitions have in common?

They must resolve the 'unresolvable' problem of reconciling discontinuity and continuity, for both individuals and the society. In order to cope with the derailment and the return to an order, individual and collective persons use basically identical semiotic capacities which provide the dramatic phase of transition with a mythical framework based on the competition between myths and anti-myths. Myths are the only effective defence against transitional anomie, determining the course of events and the sense of investment and of victims, mirroring the constitutive disposition of consciousness to renew hope.

After the dramatic phase of transition comes a relatively long phase of consolidation or normalisation. In the light of the newly established order's promises, however, the dramatic aspects of normalisation (continuing collapses and crisis) are already seen as improper.

2.8 Why do transitions become politicised?

Transition brings social upheaval. Both actual and expected losses and gains touch many people and groups, organisations and communities, which are also forced to transform themselves (induced transformations and transitions) and join together into effective coalitions. In such a situation the particular constellation of individual and collective persons forming any social unit can have a marked effect on the course of its transition. In the case of small groups of two, three or four individuals, or big corporations, a very specific course of events can be expected. In larger social units and arrangements, however, different strategic groups take shape and can become transitional 'movements'. It can be said that transitions expand and change as a result of political conflicts. At the same time they lead spontaneously to the unstable polarisation of society into those who are locally or globally for certain changes and those who are against them.

2.9 Why do transitions in fact need a mythical framework?

The transition of a social unit is always linked with attempts to get around or to change the rules of the game during the process of dismantling old institutions and establishing new ones, usually 'borrowed' from outside worlds. These often conflicting attempts throw the course of social events into relative chaos. The mythical framework, however, can provide a common direction for the transition, showing the clashes between its good and bad protagonists and can determine the time frame for the extraordinary existence of social units in the provisional situation [Kabele 1994, 1998b]. By their very obviousness, which rests on common faith, myths endow the transition with legitimacy and help those involved to endure the trials linked with the extraordinary times. In this way they greatly reduce the transaction costs which are inevitable in the co-ordination of choices, and in the negotiation and enforcement of both temporary and permanent measures. Only the increasing transitional normalisation can make the mythical framework relatively dispensable, because the role of reducing transaction costs is shifted to the new constitution, or statutory realm, and to other rules of the game which have been enforced or spontaneously accepted during the changes.

2.10 Why do transitions which affect the whole of society have a particular nature?

Societal transitions differ from transitions of lower social units in that they do not generally take place through the inclusion into the relatively stabilised relations of higher social units, that is, in an environment of well-established communication, morality, justice, law, the market and political competition relatively untouched by anomie. Moreover, a vision of the new order is fundamental to these 'endogenous' societal transitions, as it provides the only way out of the crisis of the old order. Here the above-mentioned myth is not just an instrument of the transition, but also serves as a substitute for the stable environment of some higher social unit.

The transition of Czech society in 1989-1993 was at one and the same time part of the break-up of communist Czechoslovakia, of the collapse of the former communist bloc and, as is now being recognised, of the changes of the entire northern hemisphere. The environment in which it took place was relatively unstable, both in institutional and narrative terms.

3. The Transition of the Czech Republic 1989-1993

"Revolutions are melancholy moments of history. (...) Before they occur, there are many years of repression, of arrogant power and malign neglect of people's needs. A stubborn old regime clings to privilege, and by the time it begins to reform its ways it lacks both credibility and effectiveness. People do not like it. Energies of conflict build up into a state of tense confrontation. It is a powder keg. When a spark is thrown into it (...) an explosion takes place and the old edifice begins to crumble. Suddenly everything seems to give. Yesterday's high treason becomes today's law of the land, and yesterday's law today's treason. To the more excitable, vistas of unheard-of opportunities open up, 'people power', liquefaction of everything hard and fast, utopia. Many are caught by a mood of elation. Not just the abuses of the regime, but the constraints of society itself seem suspended.

However, the honeymoon does not last. (...) Turmoil does not help economic development, and political instability raises fears. Suddenly the mood changes. Sometimes, a foreign power intervenes and thereby leaves utopia intact, though not the revolution. Sometimes, a Jacobin faction within takes over from the impotent majority. Is not 'people power' a contradiction in terms? Quickly, the slogans of better days are perverted to justify a new regime of terror. (...) Many years later, people realise that there have after all been lasting changes. The first day of the revolution is celebrated as a public holiday. But in the meantime a generation of disillusioned men and women have vacillated between sullen submission and vain protest." [Dahrendorf 1988]

Modern societal transition can only be really understood through the ethno-theory of revolution or, in this case, a more precise myth of transition. This ethno-theory constitutes the skeleton of a general interpretation of societal transition, which provides an overview of the fundamental changes in society, its basic trends, its time scale, and the clashes between the main players. Such a framework is used not only by lay persons and politicians, but also scholars [Popper 1950]. Both transitological and transformatological approaches need such a framework, as only such an interpretation can provide the key to both the selection of historical facts and the selection and interpretation of key social processes and adequate indicators and variables.

3.1 Where from, where to and how long?

If a change is viewed as a transition, its direction and duration are already implicit in this view, as both the end of the change and the general course of events are anticipated. However, it is not enough to say, either *ex ante* or *ex post*, that the transition of the Czech

Republic was a move from real socialism to democratic capitalism [see, e.g. Kabele 1992, Przeworski 1992] as both concepts only seem clear at first sight, and there is considerable doubt as to the exact relation between them at any one point of the transition. It must also be said that in a transition they do not even serve as concepts which indicate a certain type of order, but rather of suggestive and mutually dependent images: of an ironic caricature and a dreamy mirror-image vision of this. For Furet [1994] revolution leads to a symbolic inversion of the imaginary of the old regime. In reconstructing the changes in the Czech Republic, both capitalism and real socialism should be seen as orders which encompass all aspects of society, that is, political, economic, legal and ethical. Counterposing them as mental types – in accordance with contemporary views – produces the following basic oppositions:

	Capitalism	Socialism
Economy	Market, with private ownership	Planned, with state ownership
Politics	Parliamentary democracy and constitutionalism	Democratic centralism and the leading role of one party
Law	Division of public and private law	Class approach to rights
Ethics	Individual social responsibility	Social solidarity

From the definition (see 2.3) fundamental change cannot be achieved in the short term but also it cannot be allowed to continue for decades. In the medium term (5 years, perhaps?), the balance of these changes can provide a reasonable compromise in the initial description of them. Dahrendorf's [1991] well-known theoretical *bon mot* of the three speeds of the transformation offers a more sophisticated expression of the room for manoeuvre in such changes, but I do not find it fully convincing. He suggested that lawyers have six months to reform the constitution, politicians six years to reform the economy, and citizens sixty years to recreate a civil society.

3.2 How was the last Czech transition viewed?

Dahrendorf's [1988] *a posteriori* description of the revolution (transition) is a sceptical view from a certain distance of both time and space. This robs it of any mobilising force which would allow the 'revolutionaries' to believe in the justice and inevitability of their actions. It does, nonetheless, grasp the basic narrative structure through which the participants perceive the changes, which creates two mythical structures that bare their teeth at each other. They can be described as the drama of the erosion of the old regime and that of the birth of a new order. The point they have in common (either at the beginning or at the end) is the special attention to the most attractive revolutionary upheaval.

EROSION OF THE REGIME		BIRTH OF A NEW ORDER
Exposure (collision)	From prose to drama	
	+ the birth of the opposition	
Crisis	Persecution of the opposition	Exposure (new beginning)
	+ weak enforcement	
Peripeteia	Moves towards reform	
Catastrophe	**Revolutionary upheaval**	**Collision**
	Provisional state	
	Drama of the dynamics	Crisis and peripeteia
Catharsis – reconciliation	of social problems	
	Second wave of the revolution	Catastrophe
	Normalisation	Catharsis-reconciliation

The revolutionary upheaval (which may be more or less abrupt, compare, for example, Czechoslovakia with Hungary) therefore concentrates the 'highest' symbolic force. For all those involved, historical time is divided into the time before and the time after. All the old tales are either broken off for good or at least set on a completely different course [Kabele 1992].

3.3 How did the structures of myth contribute to the inner view of transition?

The mythical backdrop to the drama of the erosion of the regime is very well described by Greimas [1966]: the initial part of the myth begins with a series of negative functions (the coming together of the unhappy and alienated, the breaking off of dialogue). The turning point is ushered in by a string of trials based on arrangements (usually between the main protagonist and the accomplice holding transcendental power). After these trials comes a series of positive functions (unhappiness is overcome and the main protagonist is rewarded).

The drama of the birth of the new regime has a similar structure, although in this case it is dual: it incorporates both the basic model and its mirror image. The initial stage of the myth starts with a series of positive functions (growing happiness, euphoric individual experiences and a will to reach agreements), which also have another more negative face (the loss of certainty, local and sometimes very unpleasant turning of coats and the polarisation of new and old structures). The turning point (towards good or evil?) follows with a series of trials which break unwritten agreements on the unity of society, but are at the same time heroic, with victims calling for confrontation with the transitional anomie. In Dahrendorf's scenario this is succeeded by a negative phase of the second revolution (increasing repression and the suffering of the innocent where; in the Czech case at least, the political forces took shape around the anti-myth), whose mirror image is the new regime's gradual moves to transformed society, leading through a normalisation phase to the practical and symbolic acceptance of the new order. The above duality corresponds to the fundamental equivocation and dual nature of events in the drama of the birth of the new order. This drama is played out in the open competition of myth and anti-myth, which is gradually played out in the political polarisation of society and in transitional conflicts.

3.4 Why did real socialism seem to last for ages?

The real socialist regimes remained stable in most countries of the Eastern Bloc, despite the weakness of their inner and outer enforcement. Until it was totally clear that it was inescapable and unreformable, most of those involved – both people and organisations – had a real interest in preserving the socialist regime. There was a general conviction that it was necessary to come to terms with its shortcomings and this was made easier by the wide-ranging shadow sphere created by the regime itself, where the actors could enjoy their characters based more and more on the idea of individualism. This situation postponed the overturning of the regime, but also represented an 'invisible' evolutionary change which was already moving in the direction of the later transition [Možný 1991, Bayer, Kabele 1996]. This meant that before and during the transition society had to move from the obviously utopian scenario of liberation to an acceptance of a vision of transition and the new order [a concrete utopia, Srubar 1994], which could become the focus of shared faith and a reason for taking risks. In the opportune conditions this vision could then become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

3.5 Who cracked the old regime?

In the course of a transition in any direction the preliminary weakening of the old regime's mechanisms of enforcing order is of fundamental importance. A disloyal opposition forms in the bosom of the old regime and is visible to the public, and when the 'revolutionary upheaval' comes this opposition can offer trustworthy leaders and can found a relatively effective social movement, leading the upheaval and then taking power on a provisional basis [Arendt 1965; Bayer, Kabele 1996; Marada 1997]. In the Czech Republic this role was played by Charter 77 and the Helsinki Committee for the Protection of the Unjustly Accused. In the last two years prior to November 1989 these groups diversified into a whole range of smaller groupings with differing programmes and more limited political aims. The regular demonstrations on particular occasions also helped mobilise the half-loyal background of dissident circles [Šiklová 1990].

A similar process of 'mobilisation' could also be seen however among the highly-placed and ambitious functionaries of the regime, who saw a possibility of unseating the old guard in the leadership of the Communist Party. By 1989 the group of the 'normalisers' dating back to 1969 were visibly 'morally exhausted' with the effort to satisfy the demands of socialist consumerism, and to keep both the *nouveaux riche* of the shadow economy and the ever more daring dissident structures under control. With the changes in Poland and Hungary, the Soviet Union had ceased to be a sure guarantee of the Communist Party's supremacy and Comecon had begun to fall apart as an international exchange mechanism for goods and raw materials.

3.6 How did Poles and Hungarians help Czechs in the transition?

The problem of starting the move from the obviously utopian scenario of liberation to the acceptance of a programme-vision of transition brings us back into the realm of the mysteries of narrative representation and parable [Ricoeur 1986, Kabele 1997]. This semiotic capacity satiated by imagination transformed the fictional forecast-scenario of the regime's fall into a thinkable 'reality' founded on faith, which was already starting to take shape. In this mythical framework it was easy to find signs of the regime's passing. Thus emerged the captivating dilemma of the crossroads of two irreconcilable trajectories: the slow disintegration of the regime or rapid transition. The above-described 'historical'

work ending with the choice of fundamental change and followed by visible acts was by and large accomplished in Poland and Hungary.

3.7 How does one do revolutionary upheaval like the Czechs? Velvetly, of course!

In the Czech Republic the actual changeover of power came rapidly and fitted into the framework provided by the traditional (1918, 1948, 1989 and even 1968), non-tragic but still dramatic ritual of transfer of power:

open conflict with power	→	mass demonstrations	→	symbolic general strike	→	denouement based on the respecting of political will

The apolitical majority became politicised with the drama of preparing for the general strike and began to participate actively by presenting declarations and petitions. The revolutionary situation was characterised by the hypertrophy of historical consciousness aroused by the judgement of history together with the power vacuum which was the precondition for "the emergence of practical and ideological modes of social action" [Furet 1994]. The down side of this hypertrophy of historical consciousness was the fundamental reversal in the concept of the legitimacy of the regime. The ritual of the upheaval was played out both inside and outside society by the convincing election of Václav Havel as president by the communist members of parliament in January 1990.

3.8 So was the changeover of the order in fact a drama or an institutional reconstruction?

The birth of a new order – seen from within – is a drama in which it is important whether the political forces that summon the revolutionary upheaval can offer a successful alternative vision and can manage to preserve some room for manoeuvre. Only thus can these forces be seen by the public as 'constructive' and able to realise at least the broad lines of their vision, that is, to take control of the hectic dynamic of social problems thrown up by the transitional anomie without having resort to force or even terror. A successful return from the extraordinary to order – even though we may have considerable doubts when we compare this order with the original vision – is therefore possible when there is a wide-ranging dismantling of the old and the construction of a new regime with a rapid institutionalisation, which is allowed by the freeing of relations in a state of transitional anomie. The drama of the birth of the regime highlights therefore the key problem of transition, the transaction costs linked with the negotiation and enforcement aspects of the dismantling and constructing regimes, which the transformatological view as a rule disregards [with the exception of Stark 1996].

3.9. How did this transition interfere with people's everyday lives?

In the Czechoslovak transition, the dramatisation of the changes was largely determined by the dynamics of social problems [Kabele 1993b]. Both the public and the strategic groups placed undue significance on some events and processes, while others were suppressed. The transition spread through society, destabilising the grounds for actions by all those involved, from individuals to whole regions. They now faced new opportunities, but also threats to their existence. This mobilised them and forced them to change both their environments and themselves. Actors in the transition could react in many ways and avoid the need for change for a long time. They could work either to suppress the transitional anomie or to intensify it. The resulting transitional expansion must be understood

primarily as a process of interaction transferring changes in both directions between the level of the social macro-world and that of the micro-world in which individuals and families live out their everyday lives.

3.10 What were the obstacles to dismantling the old regime?

Real socialism deprived individuals and all social units of their sovereign persons (entitlements to sovereign choices) or displaced these entitlements into a shadow world, leaving the solution of issues to the quasi-person 'THEY'. THEY allow, force, decide, set the obstacles, and so forth. This THEY consisted of the hierarchical infrastructure of the state police, army, administration and economy, always coupled with the all-invasive Communist Party apparatus in which effective power was based on bureaucratic clientelism, patronage and an effectively monopolised corruption by the Communist Party. To dismantle the quasi-sovereignty of 'THEY', a renewed plurality of sovereign persons, both individuals and institutions, was needed, so this dissolution of THEY was also the uncontrolled and risky construction of persons. More precisely, this dissolution of THEY triggered an actual, anomic flow of events with a multi-faceted narrative significance, which could only produce a new order. Earlier attempts at reform only served to arouse a strong and spontaneous opposition to these chaotic relations.[5]

While it may have seemed during the revolutionary upheaval that the old regime had come to an end and that everything had become spontaneously unstuck in the rising enthusiasm or transitional anomie, the basic problem of the transition was in fact to extend it to the lower organisational levels. If transition does not reach the local levels, where the distribution of strategic interests can affect every person in the country, either positively or negatively, the revolutionary upheaval is necessarily limited to a simple transfer of power and in the worst case degenerate into the emerging reign of the Mafia. The protagonists of any transition must come to terms with local opposition to fundamental changes, and must demonstrate and prove the validity of their power of definition. The first precondition for such success is to convince this majority that the old regime has come to a definitive end and that it is necessary to 'leap' into the flow of history and learn to swim.[6]

3.11 Why was the nature of transition so heavily determined by economic change?

The dominant and manifest idea of the state socialist transition in 1948-1953 was the elimination of private property and with it the market. According to prevailing opinion, 1989 was in fact fundamentally a move in the opposite direction, that is, a capitalist transition, and the natural ground for this to be played out was radical economic transformation, in contrast to Spain or Portugal in the 1970s. It was not difficult for the communist powers to destroy the market but at the beginning of the 1990s there was nobody who really knew how to revive the personal convictions, responsibility and habits, to create the network of institutions and the written and unwritten rules of the game, which had taken shape over hundreds of years in the historical market economies. After about four years of transformation, these economic conundrums could be summed up in a single

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[5]) In addition to 1968, there were at least three different attempts at partial economic reform which would introduce some market elements in communist Czechoslovakia.

[6]) The most effective method of convincing people is, of course, terror. In the Czechoslovak case, the repellent decay of the Soviet Union played a major role in its rejection.

sentence: that it was necessary to introduce budget restrictions, liberalise prices, devalue the currency and especially to privatise state property. The steps needed were exactly the reverse of those of building state socialism, which started with nationalisation and price freezes, made the artificially revalued currency unconvertible and introduced a comprehensive system of budgetary measures to redistribute resources.

After nine years however, by which time the new regime could be expected to be visibly normalised, it became paradoxically obvious that:

- some expected basic changes had not in fact taken place, including those in the position of the government and the central institutions (banks) in the economy,
- it was much more difficult than expected for both individual and new collective persons (organisations) to become established in the new democratic and market institutions, and in some cases the way they did so must be seen as a deviation.

Changes in both the new position of the government and in the introduction of suitable institutions only went half way. The construction and especially the normalisation of the new order had run into long and drawn-out problems with the law, opening up a massive shadow area for corruption and less-than-honest practices. The government and the central institutions had passed over a considerable degree of economic power to free economic subjects, including individual citizens, but they had not been equally successful in handing over an adequate degree of responsibility for failure.

3.12 How did myths help the described transition?

Solving the problem of dismantling the old regime and constructing a new one in its place meant a complex manoeuvre of shedding and rebuilding the legal and institutional 'shell'. This was the riskiest but also the most important task of the transitional period. It called for a major collective investment, both intellectual and economic, which had to be underpinned by an optimistic vision, and required a very complex and strategic introduction, negotiation and then enforcement, if the high transaction costs were not to make it impossible. It supposed a complete reversal of the political, legal and economic reasoning and negotiation strategies of the major part of society [Kabele 1993a]. This was only possible if it was linked with sacrifice, but also offered transcendental hopes.

In the period of transitional anomie, market strategies became the driving force of the transformation even in the sphere of spontaneous action, thanks to their establishment in the universe of myth, which offered a convincing juxtaposition of communism and capitalism, of planned and market economies, which could be bridged by travelling a dramatic path full of trials (see also 2.8 or 3.2-3.3). In the Czech capitalist transition the market should not be seen as a purely economic concept, but rather had a fundamental symbolic significance. The market became a mythical figure [an *actant*, the accomplice holding transcendental power, Greimas 1966] which supported the heroic protagonists of transition in their struggle with the old structures and the communist Mafia.

3.13 Why did myths have to resist anti-myths?

Myths inevitably bring forth anti-myths which invert their content and their primary of role of endowing the transition with a sense that can be trusted. The anti-mythical understanding of the upheaval and the events that followed rejected the idea that the new order was attainable. The shocking extraordinary is an irreversible exclusion from order, or events sinking down to total frustration. The irreversibility of the collapse is an essential

element of the anti-myth, and is itself a realisation of the negative transcendence of frustration or the all-embracing evil. The anti-myth is first and foremost of becoming irreversibly bogged down in the extraordinary disorder or of an unsustainable collapse into still worse disorder.

Myths bring concrete competing visions into play [Srubar 1994] and anti-myths destroy these by challenging the sense of trials and risks in the name of such visions. Once the transition has been brought successfully under control it is of course important that myths – it need by no means be only one single myth – prevail over anti-myths, if the extraordinary course of events is not to become bogged down in chronic crisis.

Transitional normalisation, on the other hand, with the progressive unveiling of myths, the exposure of the debts of transition anomie, and the crisis which appears as a result of changes that have only been half carried through, naturally reinforces the anti-mythical view.

3.14 What were the myths and anti-myths fighting in the Czech case?

In the Czech case there were two myths that played a key role in the transition to capitalism, in defining the directions and nature of conflicts: that of the return to Europe, and of belt-tightening during the radical transformation (in the specialised terminology of the social costs of economic transformation). In the first case, the democratic capitalism of Western countries was in direct opposition to the toppling of the real socialism of the countries of Eastern Europe. In the second, the economic myth was an irreconcilable but surpassable juxtaposition of the planned and the market economies. Natural extensions of this were the myth of the dangers of a third way which would combine the advantages of both old and new regimes, and that of the self-made man, which juxtaposed the worn-out state bureaucrat and the free entrepreneur.

The opposition introduced an anti-myth of the betrayal of the revolution, based on the polarisation of the emerging hopes and ideals for the revolution and the new elite's apparent failure and arbitrary use of power. In the Slovak Republic this was relatively successful, as the results of the 1992 elections were significantly influenced by the political myth of a maturing nation, which placed the sovereign nation state in opposition to the still developing and non-sovereign nations in thrall to more powerful nations.

3.15 Why was there a trade-off between adaptability and legal correctness during transition?

Mertlík [1993] described the new institutions as 'empty shells', and indeed the institutions (various types of banks, tax authorities and control institutions, etc.) were built up from nothing along western lines. They appeared to be copies of Western European institutions, but were fundamentally different in the way they worked and often exceeded their authority. In this way the transitional anomie was thrust out into the corridors of the "corridors of power" and took on a less obvious form as a latent "systematic vacuum" [Mertlík 1993] which was complemented by shadow institutionalisation. This is also the reason why Stark [1996] can speak about the path dependence of the fundamental change which is grounded on "rebuilding organisations and institutions not on the ruins but with the ruins of communism as they redeploy available resources in response to their immediate practical dilemmas."

In the state of transitional anomie the government and other central institutions rule primarily through the credibility of external institutional pressure, the mythical frame-

work of transition, more or less effective bureaucracy, and the extent of available resources, which are primarily the income figuring on their budget. In relation to the state, quasi-state and private organisations, the government found itself in the position of a principal trying to exert pressure on an agent [see, for example, Coleman 1990]. This meant that all these 'controlled' organisations could easily make use of their better sources of information and better bargaining position – the state is not able to enforce just and productive working rules during transitional anomie – to appropriate state resources and assets. They could also exert effective pressure on central institutions to ensure a degree of security for their risky business undertakings and 'tolerance' for their less-than-transparent business activities and organisational practices [Stark 1996] in return for their loyalty. In this way a transitional trade-off between adaptability and legal correctness was negotiated, defining the figure of the brand new institutional system. Nevertheless, one condition of successful normalisation was the break with the institutional outcomes of this trade.

3.16 When, according to our hypothesis, did the extraordinary stage of the Czech transition come to an end?

The Velvet Revolution, as a ritual of transition, took Czech society into an extraordinary period marked by transitional anomie and the successes and failures of 'building' a new order. This extraordinary time, however, created its own momentum rooted in the helter-skelter dynamic of social problems, the overall weakness and growing entanglement of the government. The split of Czechoslovakia through a set of concurrent circumstances, at the same time as the last great step in the economic transformation, tax reform, was able to become something of a second ritual of transition, which the public generally already felt the lack of, but one which brought the extraordinary time to a close. It signalled the beginning of the phase of normalisation, the undramatising of social events.

The end of the dramatic transition did not mean that all the changes originally conceived and still important today had been achieved (ranging from the transformation of the railways to a final solution for a state farm somewhere in the Šumava region). Nor can it be seen as the transition from an economic transformation controlled by the government to an economy with its own momentum ruled by the invisible hand of the market. The undramatising of reality immediately revealed that many important changes had been 'strategically' deferred because of high transaction costs. In other cases the reported radical reform of ministries and institutions turned out to be more of a form of mimicry that allowed old practices to survive. So the end of the extraordinary time must be understood primarily as a collective symbolic act which confirms the 'success' of the transformation and at the same time announcing a fundamental change in the rules of the game: the time in which problems could be solved by extraordinary means, since ordinary forms either did not exist or were clearly ineffective, was at an end.

4. Final Questions

4.1 Once more, what advantages does the transitological approach offer?

The view of the changes in Czech society since 1989 as an discontinuous transition offers a hypothetical explanation for the paradox of the 'founding' elections in post-communist countries (Poland 1989, Hungary 1989 and Czechoslovakia 1990, 1992). In these elections those voters who traditionally had a stake in a strong system of state social security

and who had 'social democratic ideas' often voted for right-wing parties instead of for those on the left. Szelényi, Szelényi, and Poster [1996] see the explanation for this paradox in the temporary victory of the conservative forces in the "game of political symbols", which strongly articulated the ideological aspects of events. Later (as with the Hungarian elections in 1994 and with the Czech case in 1996) came the inevitable shift back to political interests.[7] Right-wing parties were able to play successfully with political symbols because the prevailing mythical framework casting disgrace on the old structures and ascribing miraculous powers to two mythical actors: the market and democracy.

4.2 Why is the sunny transition of five years ago now seen as a muddled modernisation?

There are two virtually inevitable aspects to the change in the lay view. These correspond to the strengthening anti-mythical view due to an increased 'sensitivity' to the disorder of normalisation and the paradoxical effects of the increasing enforcement of the new order, which has 'brought the transitional marasmus into the light of day' and is encouraging people to profit from the disorder 'as long as the opportunities last'. The normalisation is also marked by the fact that both lay and expert publics seek some simplified and closed understanding of the fundamental change as a well thought-out and engineered modernisation (see 1.3).

4.3 Why and when did the Czech government fail?

The generally held ethno-theory of muddled modernisation and the long political crisis places the guilt firmly on the government's shoulders, accusing it of having made bad decisions and directly or indirectly consorting with groups which were misusing the fundamental changes in society for their own ends. Both accusations may be true in some cases. The sweeping generalisation of the events, however, hides the fact of how little space the government had for manoeuvre in the transitional anomie and its overall inability to influence the course of transition in the micro-worlds, particularly when it could not resort to repressive measures.

4.4 Why did the crisis in Czech normalisation come with such a delay?

In retrospect the government came up to scratch in the actual transition but fell down in the normalisation. This questionable balance of accounts is marked by a general underestimation of the legal extent of the changes needed and the choice of 'weak and convenient' ministers of justice (Kalvoda, Novák). It is of course difficult for normalisation to become established in opposition to strategies of interest groups, if it is not underpinned by a consciousness of crisis and the installation of a new government 'with a *tabula rasa*'. These interest groups doggedly defend the advantages they have already gained during the transition (subsidies, convenient forms of ownership, salaries and pensions rising faster than productivity, etc.).

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[7]) The shift from political symbols based on the mythical framework to 'politics of interests' can probably be seen even better in the Czech transition. The second elections were held early – in 1992, after only two years – when the overall positive mythical framework of the great changes was not yet exhausted. They resulted in the victory of the right-wing parties connected with the Velvet Revolution.

The 'great' and 'velvet' Czech success in transition was therefore rather paradoxically condemned by society, when the government received only a weak mandate at the last elections, to wait for stagnation as the impulse to start a more energetic normalisation.

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The 'Velvet Revolution' and the Limits of Rational Choice Models

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Abstract: This article examines the limitations of two rational choice models in explaining the 'Velvet Revolution' in Czechoslovakia. The article is partially based on interviews with former student leaders and Civic Forum activists carried out in the springs of 1992 and 1993. Two important conclusions are, firstly, that in non-violent revolutions like the one that occurred in Czechoslovakia, the main collective action problem for political entrepreneurs is communication rather than collective incentives. Secondly, rationalist models need to take into account the time factor. The utility of participating in a revolution can vary over time.
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Introduction

In recent years, rational choice models have become increasingly popular in the field of political sociology. At the same time, recent events, such as the collapse of the communist-led regimes, have made clear some of the weaknesses of the rationalist approach. This article focuses on one aspect of rational choice models: their ability to explain quick, non-violent revolutions. The Czechoslovak 'Velvet Revolution' of 1989 provides a recent example that illuminates these limitations.

This article focuses on the two most common rationalist approaches to revolutions: the 'free-rider' and threshold models. The free-rider approach keeps the assumption of the public choice school in economics, which holds that all actors are rational egoists. The threshold model also assumes rational behaviour, but it allows for non-egoist preferences, such as altruism, 'Kantian', utilitarianism and so on.

The Free-Rider Problem

In the traditional public choice models developed by economists, all actors are considered egoists, whose actions are motivated by rational calculation. Consequently, collective action – including demonstrations and revolutions – is usually seen as a free-rider problem. Although a group as a whole would gain by solidarity, each individual has an incentive to let others do the dirty work. According to this logic, the cost of participating is high, while the cumulative effect of that one person's involvement is marginal. If a woman knows that she would be better off if one million people demonstrated for a particular issue, but at the same time calculates that her joining the manifestation would only increase the total by 0.0001% (1/1,000,000x100), she will realise that her additional presence will make no difference to the outcome; yet if everyone thought that way, nobody would demonstrate.

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Potential revolutionaries can overcome the free-rider problem through some system of sanctions and rewards to encourage participation. This can either be done collectively, if it is a small group of people who can easily monitor the behaviour of its members, or if political entrepreneurs are able to give "selective incentives". Taylor [1988: 67] considers *both* conditions necessary.

Thus, for the selective incentives to work, the following assumptions are necessary:

1) *participation* must be felt as a *cost* rather than a benefit,[1]

2) it must be *possible* to *monitor* participation,

3) *political entrepreneurs* must be able to give *rewards* and *punishments*,

4) people *become political entrepreneurs* because they believe it will further their *careers*.[2]

This last condition is a corollary of the egoistic assumption, since once that assumption is dropped, it becomes possible for an altruist to become a political entrepreneur who is not concerned about future career prospects.

If any of the above four assumptions fail to hold up, then the entire public choice approach to a case study is invalidated. My argument, however, is not limited to the claim that *one* of the criterion is not met in the cases of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, rather, it is that *none* of the criteria are met.

1) The most important notion in the free-rider approach is that the *cost of participating* dissuades most people from participating in a revolt. Since the major activity of the majority of the participants in the 'Velvet Revolution' was to attend mass demonstrations, there is no reason to assume that attending them was experienced by all or even most of its participants as a cost. Even Taylor [1988: 86] admits that demonstrations are problematic. In contrast to many other forms of collective action, public manifestations can actually give pleasure. For many citizens of these countries, it was the first time in their lives that they could openly express their opinion by taking part in a form of political collective action which was not sanctioned by the state. This type of non-violent, 'velvet' revolution involved totally different cost-benefit calculations than participation in the usual sort of violent, military-based revolt.

2) In contrast to the type of jungle-warfare practised by the Vietnamese described by Taylor, in which guerrilla support was organised in small village communities, *monitoring* of the participants of mass demonstrations is an extremely difficult task. At the official, Communist-led mass rallies, citizens usually marched together with their colleagues from the workplace, making it easy for local party officials to keep track of everyone. In Czechoslovakia, however, the demonstrations took place after working hours; and organised marches from the workplace to the rallying points were rare. Not only was it impossible for the political entrepreneurs to monitor participation, it was also impossible for the community members to uncover and punish free-riders. In contrast to the small Vietnamese villages which Taylor discusses, the revolutionary centres of the Czechoslo-

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[1]) Cf. Taylor [1988: 85-86]: the public choice approach excludes "action taken where the pleasure of the act itself gives important benefits, instead of them being limited to the consequences of the action".

[2]) Cf. Hardin [1982: 35] "Political entrepreneurs are people who, for their own career reason, find it in their private interest to work to provide collective benefits to relevant groups."

vak revolution, were large cities, such as Prague, Bratislava, and Brno. It was nearly impossible for community members to keep track of the hundreds of thousands of participants in these demonstrations.

3) So far, I have discussed the difficulty for anyone to monitor participation in mass demonstrations; the concept of *political entrepreneurs*, however, requires more than the ability to keep track of supporters and opponents, it also requires the ability to give selective incentives to them. This task is much easier for traditional types of revolutionary organisations, such as Leninist, fascist and national liberation movements, than for the organisers of the Czechoslovak revolution of 1989. For example, before coming to power Leninist parties were highly disciplined and centralised groups, with clear lines of authority and clear goals of obtaining power and changing society. Through their tight organisation they could deliver selective incentives to their activists and pressure others into joining them. Moreover, during their first years in power they had the additional advantage of being able to reward people who had helped them in conquering the state by offering them high positions, while punishing their enemies through repressive measures.

In contrast, the Czech 'Civic Forum' (*Občanské fórum* or OF) and the Slovak 'Public Against Violence' (*Verejnost proti násiliu* or VPN), were all loosely-knit organisations, without any clear goals or strategies, and without even clear membership. None of these organisations had worked out a political or economic program during the initial period of mass demonstrations. Rather than striving to conquer the state, they demanded future elections and the resignation of the most hard-line leaders. Not aiming for their organisations to obtain power, they could hardly be in the position of giving selective incentives in the form of future rewards.

Far from the usual image of power-hungry revolutionaries, many of these leaders did not even want power in the beginning. In Slovakia, VPN actually refused to participate in the national government until after the elections over half a year later [interview with Gál], while the Czech OF felt it needed at least six months before it could be prepared for the responsibility of ruling [Draper 1993: 16-17].[3] Even then, they were not sure that *they* should be the ones to have power, they simply wanted to have democratic elections.

4) So instead of being able to give selective incentives, it is doubtful if the main dissidents-turned-politicians became active in order to *further their careers* by striving for power. For example, even though Havel founded OF and became president because of its later demand, he was not sure that he would support his own creation in the upcoming elections [interviews with Fišera and Pithart]. Even his decision to become president himself, was uncertain; dissidents spent several days trying to persuade the "reluctant president."[4] So in contrast to the normal picture of revolutionaries plotting to take over, OF's

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[3]) Horáček, Pithart and Gabal all indicated to me in interviews that OF was caught off guard by the sudden collapse of the Communist Party and that they were not prepared for the sudden need to take governmental responsibility. None of them, however, mentioned the six-month preparation period. Nevertheless, this seems like a realistic account, since they demanded that elections be held first around six months later.

[4]) That is the title of a book by Simmons [1991]. Unfortunately, his account of the actual manner in which Havel was convinced to take on the position has not been verified by any of my interviews or the published sources which I have read. My account is based on interviews with

'leaders' were reluctantly forced into taking responsibility for the government, when they saw that the Communist Party was unable to renew itself after the resignation of its Politburo and the ensuing inflexible attitude of Prime Minister Adamec in proposing a new cabinet [interview with Gabal, cf. interview with Žák].

The Free Rider Problem and the Student Strike

If public choice fares poorly for the case of mass demonstrations and dissidents-turned-revolutionaries, at least it might do better in explaining the student strike. After all, university faculties are small enough to allow both the strike leaders and the school administration to keep tabs to some extent on the participants. This may seem similar to Taylor's "small communities", in which those going against the stream can be frozen out.

Even though the faculties in a sense resembled small communities, the continuously changing composition of the student body makes social sanctions implausible. Many of the students knew it would be their last year, and none of them except potential graduate students could have expected to stay more than four more years. Once they finished with their studies, they had little reason to believe that they would have much contact with their former class-mates. Moreover, if the smallness of communities were a factor, a direct negative correlation between the size of faculties and extent of student participation should be expected. My interviews with student leaders, however, indicate no such correlation. For example, at the large Electro-technical Faculty of the Charles University with around 4000 students, according to Martin Benda, as much as 80% of the students were active at one point. Meanwhile at the smaller Pedagogical Faculty with between 1200-1500 students, Semin and Litvák claim that less than 15% were active. While this actually indicates a positive correlation between size and participation, another example points in the opposite direction: at the Economic University Löwenhöfer estimates that between 200-300 of the approximately 5000 students were active in the strike, while at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, with half as many students, Ježek and Purnama claim that twice as many actively participated. So in contrast to the hypothesis that small communities promote greater co-operation, my interviews indicate that no correlation between size and participation existed.[5]

Of course there are validity problems in asking student leaders after the event to estimate the percentage of participants. It would have been better if I could have sent observers to each of the faculties in order to count the number of participants in each event. However, these interviewees had no incentive to lie, so the only problem is their memory. It is very possible that the respondents might have erred by 20-30% in their estimates. Nevertheless, when a student claims that 80% of the students were active at the Electro-technical Faculty and another student claims that only around 15% were at the Pedagogical Faculty, these differences are so large that it is still extremely likely that the

Horáček, Kocáb, Pithart and Vondra, as well as such published sources as *Der Spiegel* [1990: 178].

[5]) Of course, I am aware of the validity problems in conducting such interviews several years afterwards, but while not being able to definitely 'falsify' public choice on this point, I believe the burden of proof rests with its supporters. I can only point out that based on the available evidence – however scarce it may be – there is no reason to believe that public choice's hypothesis was correct.

former faculty had much higher participation rates than the latter. At the very least, we can claim that the available evidence points against the free-rider approach.

Concerning the possibility of using rewards or punishments to promote co-operation, the possibility of the strike leaders punishing non-participants was also limited, since they could not exactly drag them out of their dorms and summarily execute them. Similarly, since these leaders were not demanding any positions at the universities, they did not have any credible way of promising future rewards to prospective activists.

The credibility of the university administration to punish potential strikers was much greater, than for the strike leaders. Yet, since the strikes were successful at least in all of Prague's universities and their faculties, such tactics, if used, obviously did not work. According to strike leaders whom I interviewed at eight different faculties of three different universities or academies, not one of the deans directly threatened the strike leaders. Only one person (Vidím at the Economic University) claims to have been threatened at any meeting, and it was done by a local Party functionary rather than a university official. In addition, at the Pedagogical Faculty, a general threat was made that the police could be called in [interviews with Štindl and Semin]. At the other faculties, the pattern seems to be that the deans either tried to persuade the students not to strike, but did not prevent them, or that they actually supported the strike, but tried to moderate its demands to exclude support for systemic change and to prevent co-operation with OF. At some of the faculties, the students even received a great deal of help from the teachers, although this varied from faculty to faculty, as did the attitudes of the deans.

Finally, the question arises as to whether the students' strike leaders were any more motivated by future gain than their dissident counterparts. Again, I cannot find any evidence to back up this public choice assumption of political entrepreneurs. At all of the faculties – except for DAMU – the strike committees were comprised mostly of those participating in the preparations for the November 17 demonstration.[6] These students had no idea that the demonstration would be such a large manifestation, nor did they believe that the police would intervene, since it was officially allowed and the Socialist Youth Organisation (SSM) had received assurances that the security police would keep away [Mohorita 1991: 30-31 and interview with him]. Rather than igniting a revolution, the organisers thought it would simply be the first among many activities to gain support for the legalisation of their independent student organisation STUHA [interviews with the Benda brothers]. The original calls for a student strike did not come from them, but rather from students at DAMU, who had not even participated in any of the preparations for the demonstration or any of the other student-oppositional activities before then. The STUHA members eventually supported the DAMU proposals, but even then, rather than expect the old regime to fall, most of those with whom I spoke insist they thought at first that reform communists would take over and limit the changes to a one-party Czechoslovakian version of *perestroika* [interview with, for example, Semin]. In addition, in common with the dissidents, most of the STUHA leaders had been politically engaged well before the strike, and thus had taken great risks to their careers at a time when their chances of success were slim. Finally, it should be noted, that if they really were basically motivated

[6]) Another important group within the strike committee was comprised by students who worked on semi-legal students newspapers, which were socially critical and run by independent students, but officially put out by the Socialist Youth Organisation SSM. Many of the independent students, however, were also members of the SSM [interviews with Ježek, Pajerová, Purnama and Doubek].

by hopes of political power, then it would have been natural for them to follow the Hungarian example and start a youth party. Since they had won great respect for their role in the revolution, they most likely would have fared even better than the Hungarian FIDESZ.[7]

The Importance of Communication

As shown above, the collective action problem for the intellectuals was not the ability to find selective incentives to encourage workers to participate as in public choice theory. Rather, the collective action concern for the student leaders and dissidents became communication. If they could spread their message to the populace, they believed they had a chance in succeeding. They had to inform the populace that (1) the police had brutally beaten students during a peaceful demonstration, (2) the 'official' version of the events was not true, (3) the students were on strike and had the support of musicians and actors, (4) a general strike was being planned on a particular date, (5) daily demonstrations were being organised and finally, (6) large crowds were attending these demonstrations, which shows that the revolt was gaining support. Spreading this information was a difficult task given the Communist Party's control over the police, military, media and other means of mass communication.

For example, a major goal of the students was to convince workers to participate in the general strike which they had set for Monday, November 27. The students had no way of rewarding or punishing workers for joining the strike. Nor did they possess any means for controlling which workers actually participated. The main concern for the students was simply to gain access to the factories in order to discuss the situation with the workers. Thus, the students began by organising trips to factories. At first, it was often difficult to gain admittance, as the guards often refused to let the students in behind the gates. The student leaders came upon a unique solution: they arranged for famous actors and actresses to accompany them. Afterwards, it became much easier to enter the premises. The guards and workers might have been distrustful of young intellectual students, but they respected their heroes from film and TV.

Not only did the students use famous celebrities to gain access to the factories, they quickly utilised other forms of communication to spread their message. There are countless examples. Already on the first evening, the famous dissident Petr Uhl used a phone to contact Western radio, which in turn broadcasted the event across the country. At most faculties the students seized the SSM's communication facilities – with or without its consent. This included everything from SSM's student radio, to its photocopying and fax machines. At the Economic University, the dean allowed the students to use the university's facilities as well, although he tried to prevent Charterists from appearing at the campus. At some faculties, teachers helped students translate their declarations into various languages for the Western media. When the students visited the factories, they also came equipped with video films of the police's violence.[8]

Further help in communication came from the National Front parties, who quickly abandoned the sinking regime. Once the old institutional structures began to loosen, the

[7]) Professor Zbořil, who was elected advisor to the DAMU students during the strike, told me that he thinks it was a great mistake of the students that they did not start such a party.

[8]) Based on interviews with Chalupa, Purnama, Rovná, Staňková, Urban, Zbořil and Zbořilová. The use of videos is also discussed in Horáček [1990: 54].

allied parties no longer limited themselves to being loyal puppets of the regime. On Sunday, November 19 the Socialist Party Central Committee met and condemned the police intervention. They demanded political democracy and a guarantee against such further attacks [Fleyberk 1990: 21, the declaration is reprinted in Otál and Sládek 1990: 43-44]. The following day, the party's newspaper *Svobodné slovo* began writing freely. On Tuesday, the Socialist Party allowed OF to speak from the balcony of its publishing house at the main square, *Václavské náměstí*.

The Threshold Model

The most common way for rational choice theorists to explain revolutions when the free-rider dilemma does not pose a problem is to substitute the demand for rational egoism with a more general one of instrumental rationality. Rather than needing to be egoistic, the actors can have other preferences such as altruism. Given a set of preferences, the actors behave rationally in the sense that they try to achieve their goals in the most efficient (optimal) manner.[9] In such a model, the goals themselves need not be rational, just the means of achieving them. In the "broad theory" favoured by Jon Elster, this requires rational reasoning in the choice of means as well as preferences. He writes [1989a: 25] that "we must require not only that beliefs be rational with respect to the available evidence, but also that the amount of evidence collected be in some sense optimal".

In the case of collective action, Elster [1989b: ch 8; cf. 1989a: ch 5] divides citizens into egoists, Kantians and utilitarists. Kantians choose to engage in collective action regardless of its consequences as long as they consider it a just cause. Meanwhile, utilitarists base their decision on how they expect it to influence society. If they feel that society will benefit and that it has a good chance of succeeding, they will participate. On the other hand, if they think it will fail and lead to greater repression afterwards, they will abstain.

Granovetter [1978] built on this idea of different values toward participating in collective action. According to him, the decision of joining revolts varies in accordance to the amount of people who have already committed themselves. At the one extreme, some will demonstrate against the regimes regardless of both how much repression they may face and how little the chances of success may be. Others will have various 'thresholds' and decide to become engaged only when a certain level of participation has already been reached. The thresholds will vary from person to person. It can be graphically shown that only a slight change in thresholds – caused, for example, by changes in preferences or decreased perceived costs – is enough to radically increase the number of participants.

According to Hermansson [1992: 231], this is exactly what happened in Eastern Europe. He notes: "All of the Eastern European states had civil rights organisations which continuously decided to protest despite hard repression." Yet, that was not enough to spark off revolts, for in general: "As long as most of the citizens have significantly higher threshold levels than those of the civil rights movement's core group, the majority of the citizens will most likely remain passive, keeping the opposition rather small and weak." He presumes that the 'snowball' effect that was witnessed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1989 as the size of the demonstrations quickly increased, was caused by

[9]) Elster [1983] gives three necessary conditions for rational preferences: they must be consistent (which requires transitivity), complete (for a pair of options, the actor can express preference for one of them or be indifferent to them) and they must have continuity.

changes in the perceived costs of participating, which in turn lowered the individual thresholds [Ibid.: 231-232].

A more detailed account of how the threshold model could be applied to Eastern Europe is provided by Kuran [1991], who shows how the threshold can be determined by the trade-off between private and public preferences. According to Kuran, the actor's private preferences for toppling the regime are fixed at any moment, while the public preference is under his/her control. Since the two preferences can differ, this 'preference falsification' makes it hard to know what a person really thinks. The internal payoff is based on the psychological cost of preference falsification, while the external one depends on the calculated personal rewards and costs of participating. The threshold point of joining the revolution comes where the external cost of joining falls below the internal cost of preference falsification. As in the original article by Granovetter, this threshold is based on the percentage of the population joining opposition. Kuran shows in a ten-person example that if one person changes her private preferences because of "an unpleasant encounter at some government ministry," it may be enough to spark off an unexpected revolution [Kuran 1991: 19].

The Granovetterian model has several advantages over its public choice competitor. First of all, its assumption about different values and thresholds is more reasonable than the one of rational egoism. For example, it allows for political entrepreneurs, such as Havel who are driven by moralistic principles rather than personal gain. Secondly, it gives a reasonable explanation of the snowball effect, in which after the initial small demonstrations, their size rapidly grew. Similarly, the concept of lower perceived costs can explain why, for instance, demonstrations with around 10,000 participants in Prague in 1988 could not spark off a wider revolt, while a rally with only a few thousand more taking part 15 months later led to the downfall of the established order.

Unfortunately, the threshold solution also raises a number of problems. First, it is difficult to test empirically and risks becoming tautological. After all, only two outcomes are possible: either a revolution succeeds or it fails. If it succeeds, it is caused by a change in threshold; if it fails, it is due to a lack of change. In a more nuanced form, one could compare snowball developments to ones of slower increases of participation. Then one could conclude that the differences were dependent on different threshold levels in these societies (perhaps one society had more Kantians than the other etc.). However, circular reasoning is unavoidable in these cases, since the assumptions are determined by the outcomes. In defence of Granovetter, one could argue that in reality, it is difficult to formulate theories in a manner that they can be falsified by Popperian types of tests; instead, it is important that the theory provides a 'reasonable' explanation of the mechanisms behind actual events. In this case, 'falsification' depends on how reasonably the social scientist feels the theory explains a particular event.

A second problem is not what it explains, but rather what it leaves out. If the main causes of revolutions turn out to be the original preferences (thresholds) and the changes in these thresholds (which often are caused by decreases in the costs of participating), then it is these two factors which need explaining. Threshold models, however, take these preferences for granted. Theorists using these models also tend to lack theories about *when* costs of participation decline. They often look at a particular event and note that since the number of people taking part in the revolt increased, then the costs of participation have decreased. Then they find a plausible explanation for the decline in costs. If

rational choice supporters want to give more than a purely historical, non-generalisable description of what happened, then they need to combine rationalist models with theories about preference formation and lowered costs (or in the words of Tarrow [1991], "political openings"). One can imagine several types of approaches to these problems, such as adding institutional or cultural explanations of preference formation, or psychological explanations of when thresholds change. For example, theories of rising expectations could be fruitful. The point is simply that if social scientists using threshold models want to understand the underlying causes of a revolution, then the focal point of their research should be centred around the two issues of (1) preference formation and (2) changes in thresholds.

A third problem with the threshold model is the time factor. The threshold model predicts that participation will continuously increase once a certain threshold is reached. However, as Opp [1993: 210] notes, this model cannot explain why in East Germany the number of demonstrators suddenly decreased after reaching their peak in early November 1989. An obvious rationalist response would be that after the Wall was opened in early November, East Germans had less reason to demonstrate. But they could have just as well become even more encouraged and more willing to demonstrate, since they could more clearly see the results of their efforts. Moreover, until the regime agreed to free elections, they still had good reason to continue demonstrating.

A reasonable hypothesis is that *the utility of participating in demonstrations decreases with time*. While it is fun to join mass manifestations against a repressive regime, for the majority of the population the novelty of shouting anti-governmental slogans wears off with time.

My interviews indicate that there were three main groups of students, each possessing different utility functions over time. The first were *student leaders*, the second were *active participants* and the third were *passive supporters*.

The *leaders* resemble Elster's Kantians, who were willing to participate regardless of the costs. Most of them had been involved in some sort of oppositional activity before the strike. Among these people, the utility of participation either increased with time, since they enjoyed the attention they were getting as revolutionary heroes, or at least stayed the same, since their level of activeness stayed the same until the strike ended several months later. They acted as a pressure group on OF, which continuously demanded more radical and swifter changes than OF's more cautious representatives intended [Bradley 1992 and interviews with Urban and Zbořil]. Litvák, who was a member of the Federal Student Strike Committee, told me that they had difficulties maintaining grassroots student support for continuing the strike after Havel was elected president, but that most of the activists in Prague wanted to continue to ensure that the democratisation process would not slow down.

Some of my interviews suggest that the willingness among activists to participate also correlated positively with its costs. In other words, when the perceived need was greatest, so were their efforts. Thus, Litvák says that during the first days when rumours of a military attack were floating, around 80 students slept in the Pedagogical Faculty's building. Doležal also notes increased determination and activity among the strike leaders of the Philosophical Faculty on the first Wednesday, when the people's militia faced them across the bridge. In addition, during the first few days, 3-4 students always slept in the building, so that they could become martyrs in case of an attack.

The second group of students *took part*, but did not organise such activities as going to the countryside to inform the citizens of what happened, visiting factories, distributing pamphlets, and so on. In contrast to the leaders, their utility of participating seemed to at first increase and then decrease over time, while they were negatively influenced by increased costs. Thus, all the students I interviewed except Doležal claim that the number of students engaged in these activities increased during the second week,[10] after the Politburo had already resigned, the people's militia had left Prague and the chances of violence had already become remote. In addition, they also claimed that the participation level sharply decreased after 3-4 weeks. Jan Urban, who co-ordinated the student activities in the countryside with OF, notes a similar trend. Two factors probably played a role: on the one hand, the excitement of starting a revolution wore off after a while; on the other hand, the expected result of continuing their actions decreased, once Havel was elected president, around three weeks after the strike had begun.

The last group were the *passive supporters* who attended the weekly meetings in the beginning and perhaps attended a few demonstrations. All of the students leaders whom I asked claim that the number of students attending the weekly meetings increased in the second week and then dropped. They do not believe, however, that this increase indicated greater support, but rather it reflected the fact that many students had missed the first Monday meeting because they had spent the weekend in the mountains. They attended the following week's meeting to get more information on the strike, and then, perhaps after attending a few more demonstrations, considered the strike an extended vacation and went back to the mountains. Among this group, it is hard to determine what their utility functions looked like, but after the initial joy of being able to publicly state their opinion, the benefit of being active sharply decreased with time. Moreover, since this group did not guard the university buildings or take part in other risky activities, the perceived costs of participating were higher for them than for the other two groups.

Conclusion

The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia exemplifies some of the limitations of rational-choice approaches to social movements. This article shows that the free-rider problem does not exist in cases of short, non-violent revolutions that are based mainly on demonstrations. Under such circumstances, many people experience participation as a benefit rather than a cost. At least this is true in the short term.

The main collective action problem for the 'political entrepreneurs', then was not to give selective incentives for people to join the revolution. Rather, the main problem was communication. The students and dissidents had to spread the news to the populace that their demonstrations were taking place, a new organisation OF had been formed, and that a nation-wide general strike was to take place. Since the Communist Party enjoyed monopoly control over the mass media, this was quite a difficult task. Once the citizens were informed about the situation, it was rather easy for the revolutionaries to mobilise them.

[10]) Otherwise, he agrees with the general trend that the number of participants decreased with time, even though the costs had decreased. He claims that around 800 were active the first week, about half that amount the second week, and that after one month, it became difficult to find students who were willing to guard the faculty building.

This does not mean that rational choice cannot account for this aspect. It was perfectly rational for the political entrepreneurs to ignore public choice theory and concentrate on communication rather then devising means of selective incentives. Furthermore, it was perfectly rational for the populace to understand that if the dissidents and students could succeed in spreading their message, it meant the country was in a new political situation. Thus, the citizens could calculate that the political entrepreneurs had a chance to succeed in overthrowing the system. This analysis does show, however, that public choice theory must broaden its framework.

In examining the threshold model several problems were found. First, it risks being tautological. Any time a revolution succeeds, the theorist can claim that it is because something happened that lowered the thresholds enough to induce the populace to participate. Any time the revolution fails, the theorist can claim that it is because the thresholds were not lowered enough. Thus, by definition the theory is always correct. The second problem is that the model leaves out the most important issues. It says nothing about what kinds of measures tend to lower people's thresholds, nor does it say anything about under what conditions these measures are likely to take place.

Finally, the threshold model assumes that the utility of participation remains stable over time. Thus, it cannot explain why participation levels in Czechoslovakia and East Germany declined after a period. Interviews with student activists indicate that the utility of participation actually increased over time for the student leaders. The second group was the students, who participated in activities, but did not organise them. For this group, the utility of participation appears to have quickly increased and then slowly decreased. Finally, there were the passive supporters. They attended the meetings and demonstrations in the beginning, and then saw the revolution as a chance for an extended vacation. For this group, the utility of participating appears to have dropped sharply over time.

Of course, one must be careful in drawing too strong conclusions from interviews. It would have been better if extensive statistics about the participation of students were available. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the threshold model should be refined to take the time question into consideration. For even if more exact statistics might show that this article's hypotheses about the utility functions of the various groups is not completely correct, the fact that participation levels in both Czechoslovakia and East Germany undoubtedly declined over time demonstrates that the utility of demonstrating can vary over time.

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Benda, Martin: member of STUHA, the Student Strike Co-ordinating Committee and of the Strike Committee at the Electro-Technical Faculty of the Charles University, presently studying theology. *Interviewed 20 May 1993.*

Chalupa, Pavel: member of Student Strike Committee at DAMU, presently has a radio program. *Interviewed 22 December 1990.*

Doležal, Jiří: member of the strike committee at the Psychological Institute of the Philosophical Faculty at Charles University, presently working as a journalist. *Interviewed 15 May 1992.*

Doubek, Vráťa: member of the strike committee at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University. At the time of the interview was doing research on Tomáš Masaryk. *Interviewed 5 May 1992.*

Fišera, Ivan: advisor to OF (Civic Forum), one of its four organisational leaders until the first elections, previously taught managers at the Research Institute of Technology and Economy, presently working for the Central Trade Unions. *Interviewed 6 May 1993.*

Gabal, Ivan: at the founding meeting of OF (Civic Forum), later campaign manager for OH (Civic Movement), previously member of the Circle of Independent Intelligentsia. Presently director of a market research company. *Interviewed 15 April 1993.*

Horáček, Michal: journalist, co-founder of the group MOST (Bridge) which established the first contacts between the Communist Regime and Czech dissidents. Presently working for a betting agency. *Interviewed 1 June 1992.*

Ježek, Vlasta: member of the strike committee at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, was active in the campaign for OH at the time of the *interview on 5 May 1992.*

Kocáb, Michal: well known Czech musician, co-founder of MOST, presently owner of a radio station and other businesses. *Interviewed 4 July 1993.*

Litvák, David: member of the Student Strike Co-ordinating Committee, presently working as a translator. *Interviewed 26 March 1993.*

Löwenhöfer, Petr: member of STUHA and the strike committee at the Prague Economic University, presently private businessman. *Interviewed 16 June 1993.*

Mohorita, Vasil: former leader of the Socialist Youth Union (SSM), general secretary of the Communist Party (1990-1991), Member of Parliament for the Communist Party at the time of the interview. *Interviewed 4 March 1992.*

Pajerová, Monika: former editor of a semi-legal student paper at the student press centre (STIS), one of the leaders of the Student Strike Co-ordinating Committee and presently culture attaché in France. She was also a candidate to Parliament for OH in the 1992 elections. *Interviewed 2 June 1992.*

Pithart, Petr: signatory of Charter 77, participant in the several of the negotiations between OF and the regime, elected Czech Prime Minister as OF's candidate in the first post-communist elections. Professor at the Central European University at the time of the interviews. *Interviewed 2 March 1993 and 14 April 1993.*

Purnama, Alan Rezner: member of the strike committee at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University. *Interviewed 15 May 1992.*

Rovná, Lenka: teacher at the Prague Economic University (then and now) who helped the students there organise the strike. *Interviewed 4 June 1992.*

Semin, Michael: student leader at the Pedagogical Faculty in Prague, member of the committee planning the November 17th demonstration and later member of the Student Strike Co-ordinating Committee. Presently working for the conservative think-tank 'Civic Initiative'. *Interviewed 2 March 1993,*

Staňková, Magdalena: member of the Strike Committee of the Educational and Sport Faculty of Charles University and of the Co-ordinating Committee of OF (Civic Forum). Presently runs a news service for members of parliament. *Interviewed 30 March 1993.*

Štindl, Ondřej: member of the strike committee at the Pedagogical Faculty of the Charles University; *interviewed 14 May 1992*; presently working at a radio station.

Urban, Jan: founding member of OF (Civic Forum), became the organisation's general manager and then chairman. *Interviewed 25 June 1993* and *29 April 1995*; was working as a free lance journalist at the time of the first interview and at the time of the second interview was working for the state television company.

Vidím, Honza: member of the Student Strike Co-ordinating Committee and strike committee at the Prague Economic University. Assistant to the conservative ODS mayor of Prague at the time of the interview. *Interviewed 25 June 1993.*

Vondra, Saša: former speaker of Charter 77, the only member of OF to have attended all the negotiations with the Communist government; *interviewed 1 July 1993.* Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and member of the conservative ODS at the time of the interview.

Zbořil, Zdeněk: former lecturer at DAMU, was elected student advisor to DAMU's strike committee. He was a professor of political science at Charles University at the time of the interview. *Interviewed 21 December 1990.*

Zbořilová, Zlata: student activist at the Philosophical Faculty of Charles University, *interviewed at the end of December, 1990.* She was still a student at the time of the interview.

Žák, Václav: at the founding meeting of OF (Civic Forum), today vice-chairman of OH (Civic Movement); *interviewed 11 May 1993.*

The Development of Czech Environmental Policy 1990-1995

A Sociological Account

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Abstract: Using the case study of the Czech Republic, the article examines the link between the development of environmental policy and the more general social and economic development of a post-communist society. The initially progressive arrangement of environmental agencies and procedures of the early 1990s, which were in tune with the concurrent development in the West, was abandoned due to the arrested expansion and diversification of the policy community. The ethos of environmental policy-making of the early 1990s, which was a consequence of the special circumstances of that period, could not be maintained in the following years as there was no sufficiently strong social group underpinning and advocating these changes. This is documented on the inability of journalists to grasp and further communicate complex environmental issues, and on the non-existence of a social stratum corresponding to the 'new middle class', from which Western environmental groups draw their support.

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1. Environmental policy during the first half of the 1990s

When the first (and the last) federal government body in the area of the environment was created in 1990 in what was then Czechoslovakia, it had a surprisingly progressive structure. It was not an ordinary ministry dealing with 'a sector', but a committee headed by a chairman (instead of a minister). This institutional arrangement reflected an idea that the environment should not be treated as a particular and separate sector of government policy, but rather that environmental considerations should penetrate all government policies. Its members were the ministers of the environment of both republics, deputy ministers of foreign affairs, finance and economy and also chairmen of committees of the environment of all three parliaments. This new federal authority focused mainly on legislative, strategic and international aspects of environmental policy.

At the republic level, attempts were also made to overcome the legacy of the past and move environmental policy-making to a more advanced stage, certainly at least by means of what broadly resembled structural reorganisation [Weale 1992]. For instance, a comprehensive Czech environmental inspectorate was created, taking over inspections of water management and air pollution and thus covering waste management, forest protection and water management, and air pollution. The establishment of the Czech Ministry of the Environment in January 1990 signalled the end of the highly ineffective and sectorally divided old environmental protection arrangements. One of the major acts of the Ministry was the preparation of the 'State Programme for the Protection of the Environment'. The programme set guidelines for relevant state institutions, a strategy for legisla-

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tive work and environmental policy development, and proposals for handling environmental research, education, regional environmental problems and international co-operation.

Apart from short-term oriented 'first aid' programmes aimed at fast reduction of mainly air and water pollution in the form of 'end-of-pipe' solutions and clean-up projects, the ministries of the environment were also concerned with long-term considerations as documented by the emphasis placed on environmental education and research. While at a practical level the effort to embark on a more progressive approach to environmental policy foundered, at least at the level of official rhetoric, there were attempts to shift the focus from reduction of the amount of pollution towards the adoption of the principle of prevention. For instance, this principle was temporarily applied when competencies over land use planning and building code were transferred from the economic ministries to the Ministry of the Environment. It did not take long, however, before these powers were removed from the Ministry of the Environment and returned to their original holders.

This short period of about two years at the beginning of the 1990s when the relationship between the environment and economy was not simply regarded as a zero-sum game, when attempts were made for integrated pollution control and when more advanced principles such as the principle of prevention were employed, was followed, starting June 1992 when the second general elections were held, by a new period during which many progressive features were abandoned. What was previously seen as a necessary first step to fundamental improvement of the state of the environment – clean-up and installation of end-of-pipe technologies – suddenly became the ultimate goal of pollution control policy. The Ministry of the Environment lost some of its newly gained competencies and the environment again became a discrete policy area. Selected problems once again came to represent environmental issues at the expense of others and were presented by the state authorities as indicators of an officially proclaimed overall improvement of the state of the environment. In the Czech context, an example of the former is air pollution, partly in response to the adverse effects of air pollution, in particular its links to the poor state of health of the population living in the most polluted areas.

To document an almost anecdotal dimension of the U-turn of Czech environmental policy in the course of the first half of the 1990s it suffices to say that the notion of sustainable development was for a certain period completely banned from official government documents despite frequent references to the notion in Czech environmental legislation passed just a few years earlier.

A remarkable feature of the first 'enthusiastic' period after 1989 (November 1989-mid-1991; see Jehlička and Kára [1994] for more details) was the close relationship between state officials and activists from non-governmental environmental groups. The high degree of influence of environmental group activists on government's environmental policies, certainly unusual by international standards, was embodied in 1990 in the founding of the Green Parliament that was initiated by the Czech Ministry of the Environment as its consultative body. The Green Parliament's members were representatives of the majority of the existing environmental groups at that time.

This effort to open political processes and enable public participation in the formulation of environmental policies sharply contrasts with the subsequent situation marked by a culture of secrecy and the effort to exclude citizens from environmental decision-making, which increasingly resembled practices of the communist regime.

It was often the case that people who criticised the communist government for being responsible for environmental crisis in Czechoslovakia were also among the chief proponents of democracy. They were publicly denounced by the communist authorities and their views were portrayed by the controlled media as a threat to the progress of the communist society.

By the mid-1990s, after six years of democratic government, the situation was, worryingly similar. As at the end of the 1980s, Czech environmentalists appeared in the middle of the 1990s on a list of subversive elements which was drawn up by the state intelligence services. In addition to the accusation of being a threat to the well-being of society, this time they were also deemed to pose a threat to democracy. Thus, while maintaining their views and goals, environmentalists in the eyes of the government and a certain section of the media went through a paradoxical transformation from being one of the major proponents of democracy to one of its major threats [Fagin and Jehlička 1997].

At an international level, the actions in the early 1990s of the Federal Committee chaired by Josef Vavroušek also differed markedly from the otherwise more common low-key mode of Czech foreign policy. The publication 'Europe's Environment. The Dobříš Assessment' [Stanners and Bourdeau 1995] initiated by him and particularly the first pan-European conference of ministers of the environment held in Dobříš castle near Prague in 1991 were the most tangible results of his effort to achieve environmental improvement in the Czech Republic within the European framework. The goals of the conference were:

> "(...) to upgrade substantially the existing European environmental protection and restoration institutions, national as well as international, and to integrate them into a pan-European system of co-ordinated 'mechanisms' of environmental efforts at the continental level. (...) The second Dobříš objective was to develop, implement and then periodically to revise an environmental programme for Europe. (...) But the third objective was the least conventional and, in my view, the most important. I wanted the ministers to start to discuss human values and environmental ethics for sustainable development as the basis for such ways of life which can re-establish harmony between humankind and Nature." [Vavroušek 1993]

Hence it can be argued that at the beginning of the 1990s Czechoslovakia took an active part in the effort to shape environmental policies in Europe. Immediately after the fall of the old regime, one of the most important goals of Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic was membership of the EU. The Association Agreement was signed in 1991, which started the process of harmonisation of Czech laws and standards, including environmental legislation. In contrast to the early 1990s, in the subsequent years the Czech Republic no longer sought to be active in the arena of international environmental policy. Half a decade of harmonisation of the country's environmental standards with the EU delivered an unexpected outcome. The Czech Republic's environmental co-operation with the EU institutions as well as some consequences of domestic environmental policies came under criticism from the EU Commissioner for the Environment. The Czech Republic was warned that the environment could become a narrow point of integration to the EU. For instance, Czech authorities were criticised for their unwillingness to release information necessary for EU transboundary environmental projects [Čech 1997] and for a lack of attention to energy efficiency [Poláček 1996].

This stemmed from the fact that environmental harmonisation of the Czech legislation remained for the most part only at the level of 'formal implementation' (i.e. the incorporation of EU legislation into national law) as opposed to 'practical implementa-

tion' (i.e. the application of this national programme to effect the required changes in the behaviour of target groups). As was often the case with other policy areas, Czech environmental policy, both domestic and international, was to a great extent merely a limited formal imitation of Western (in this case EU) environmental policy. Formally identical or similar institutions and processes were not functional or acquired their own logic of operation, which was often sharply different from their Western models.

While at least some government departments and agencies and policies rhetorically and formally embraced the EU policy line broadly defined as ecological modernisation, especially at international fora, domestically both the interpretative and action frames [Jachtenfuchs and Huber 1993] significantly differed from the meaning of this concept. The actual content of practical environmental measures remained firmly in the spirit of the reactive strategies of the 1970s. In the middle of the 1990s environmental problems were still basically seen as problems of pollution, which were to be resolved by scientific expertise, progress of technology and the installation of end-of-pipe devices.

2. Alternative accounts

A standard explanation of the above-described developments employs concurrent broad domestic social and economic processes. On the one hand, it is argued that environmental issues slipped down the agenda due to a certain improvement of the state of the environment as a consequence of the slowdown of the economy. On the other hand, resultant serious economic problems are alleged to have led to social problems which replaced the environment as a major issue.

On the basis of the findings of my research (over 30 interviews with politicians at central and local level, NGO activists, academics, civil servants and teachers; two questionnaires, each yielding more than 300 responses; a content analysis of a leading Czech daily; analysis of academic publications) I propose an alternative explanation. While certain peculiarities of the domestic political setting such as the highly centralised character of the Czech state or the intentional effort of state authorities to undermine the development of civil society contributed to fast abandonment of newly established institutions and practices once their proponents lost their position, I would argue that the underlying causes have deeper roots.

As an observer of Czech environmental politics and policy in the early 1990s I was struck by the fact that the above-described progressive approach to environmental policy of the official state environmental agencies had no social underpinning. Superficially it seemed that there was, at least immediately after the demise of the old regime, strong environmental concern among the general public. It is now established in most academic accounts of the pre-1989 high environmental awareness of the Czech general public that the environment figured in the ecological discourse primarily as a tangible symbol of the wider ills of the socialist system [Holy, 1996]. However, even that genuine environmental concern as evidenced by results of various opinion polls did not go beyond people's worries about effects of pollution on their health and/or about environmental degradation of a 'local' character directly experienced by them. Furthermore, according to all opinion polls conducted since 1991, people have become ever more satisfied with the state of the environment.

These findings led me to focus on underlying factors of the 'new politics of pollution' [Weale 1992] of the 1980s in the West and draw comparisons with the Czech case.

It was apparent that despite the effort of the first post-communist generation of environmental policy-makers to get wider segments of society involved, environmental regulation remained a matter for specialists and those few former environmental activists turned politicians who seized the opportunity offered by special circumstances of the immediate post-communist period.

A discrepancy between the intentions and deeds of the first post-November 1989 group of environmental policy-makers in terms of fundamental environmental reform and a superficial character of environmental reporting in Czech mass media that did not correspond with what was actually going on at higher political levels raised a question of to what extent the process of the emergence of the 'new politics of pollution' as it occurred in the West in the 1980s could be applied to post-communist societies. My hypothesis was that the process of policy community expansion associated with general social trends, which was the crucial factor behind the transformation of pollution control policy in Western Europe by the early 1990s, reached only an early stage in the Czech Republic.

3. The underlying factors of the transformation of pollution control policies

Weale argues that the transformation of pollution control policy was related to the expansion of environmental groups whose capability to change the character and functioning of the policy community depended on a number of more general social and economic changes:

> "Environmental groups have benefited from rising educational standards, both in terms of support, since the better educated frequently value environmental amenity highly, and in terms of providing activists and a constituency that are scientifically and socially literate. The ability to challenge the policy decisions of existing elites in part depended upon showing technical competence, and rising educational standards have supplied new generations of supporters able to handle complex bodies of information. A related trend has been the development of specialist journalists in science and environmental affairs who have been able to explain technical issues in an accessible way." [Weale 1992]

Drawing on this line of argument in my own research I set out to examine to what extent these conditions for the development of new politics of pollution were in place in the Czech Republic in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I pursued the following three interrelated directions of research:

1. Examination of environmental discourse in the media at the beginning of the 1990s;
2. Analysis of the potential of the academic sphere for stimulating the process of learning;
3. Opportunities/constraints for learning stemming from the (under)development of civil society.

4. Environmental discourse in the media

The empirical basis of the content analysis was the entire environmental coverage in the Czech quality daily with the largest circulation – *Mladá fronta* – between 1 November 1988 and 31 October 1992. The communist period was included in the analysis as one of my major aims was to observe how impacts of transition from one political system to another on a broad area of environmental issues was reflected in environmental coverage in the most popular Czech daily. I wished to see how this diverged from the standard of the communist period and to what extent the environmental coverage no longer subjected to censorship converged with western development in this field.

The result of my analysis was a list of environmental articles produced for each month containing the date, the headline of an article, its main subject or issue focus expressed in several key words, journalist genre, the length of an article measured in columns, an author, the originator (if distinguishable) of an article and its geographical location in the case of the news's foreign reference.

Articles were classified according to five different genres: news; note; comment; interview and analysis; and according to 34 issue areas. While it needs to be recognised that the various issue areas could not often be entirely separated, they were an indicator of the primacy focus or emphasis of coverage.

The extensive environmental coverage in *Mladá fronta* in the last period of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, documented in my research on the last 12 months of the old regime, and the subsequent wave of environmental reporting revealing the legacy of communism, did not produce any long-lasting concern for the environment. However, it directed attention to certain issues, such as air pollution, and presumably prompted politicians to act – to adopt new laws addressing the problem. But the proposed solution (installations of end-of-pipe technology) was fully in line with measures used in dealing with any other problems. Articles whose arguments would challenge traditional and well-established modes of behaviour and social norms, scarcely appeared in the newspaper.

The outburst of environmental coverage in the last phase of the old rule could therefore be best interpreted as an indirect criticism of the communist regime itself. The claim that the extensive environmental coverage was partly meant to draw attention to deficiencies of the political system rather than an expression of the genuine environmental concern of the journalists and the society as a whole, is supported by two facts. First, after the demise of the communist regime, environmental coverage shrank relatively quickly. Society at large, as well as the media, were losing interest in the environment, while at the same time these issues were far from being resolved. Second, many new environmental problems brought about by the new conditions of post-communist economic and social life passed unreported in the media including *Mladá fronta*.

Analysing an uneven distribution of variable problems in the mass media over time makes sense because, as Hansen [1993] pointed out, it is to do with the way in which elaboration and maintenance of the problems in public arenas offer insights into the power of different groupings in society to define what should be the focus of public concern, action, and ultimately, resource allocation. And this is precisely what the content analysis of *Mladá fronta's* environmental coverage enabled me to understand.

The analysis of the Czech daily provided an insight into how environmental problems were actually presented by those who had access to news creation. One of the findings of my analysis of environmental coverage in *Mladá fronta* was a conspicuous lack of news either created or originating outside the fora of conventional and official politics and science. The views of 'counterexperts' and activists of environmental groups, who in Western environmental coverage often function as agents of alternative views, was for most of the time of the analysis almost entirely lacking in the coverage. Environmental groups were active in Czechoslovakia, but they were rather small and therefore one likely reason for the absence of their voice in the newspaper was a lack of political power to get access to the media and to make their voice heard.

One of the most peculiar features of *Mladá fronta's* environmental coverage was the dominance of domestic issues throughout the whole period under scrutiny. The annual

share of domestic environmental coverage in total environmental coverage never dropped below 72 per cent and was most of the time over 80 per cent. In contrast, the combined categories of international and global environmental coverage only once exceeded 20 per cent and for most of the period made up only over 10 per cent. Lacey and Longman [1993] conducted a content analysis of the British press whose period under scrutiny considerably coincided with my analysis of *Mladá fronta*. For instance, during these 30 months *The Guardian* published 504 articles containing reference to the 'greenhouse effect' and 436 articles mentioning the expression 'global warming'.[1] The same figures related to *The Times's* coverage of these two phrases were 431 and 392. On the other hand, *Mladá fronta* published in the same period 16 articles, whose main thrust was global warming.

A pro-active approach to the international environmental co-operation of the post-communist administration passed unnoticed by the media and *Mladá fronta* was no exception in this respect. To a certain extent, such an approach by the media was maintained as regards the first pan-European conference of ministers of the environment convened and organised by the Czechoslovak government in June 1991. If an attempt at being in the forefront of the European environmental diplomacy hardly achieved recognition in *Mladá fronta*, it was not utterly unexpected that the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 received very poor coverage too.

5. Academic sphere

In Czechoslovakia during a short period after 1989 plans for establishing university faculties designed to carry out teaching and research on the environment were drawn up. Symptomatically, the intention was to locate them in the areas of the severest pollution (northern Bohemia and northern Moravia) and they were meant to concentrate on environmental science and technology. These plans were abandoned before they could be implemented, mainly due to lack of financial means and waning support for the environmental cause. In general, very little was done elsewhere by the state bodies to promote research and teaching in this field. Few departments of environmental studies and research programmes on environmental issues were established. Courses of various kinds on environmental issues were taught usually within faculties and departments of natural sciences, and students kept studying the management of protected areas and scientific analytical methods in the same manner as they did prior to 1989. For instance, Charles University Centre for the Environment compiled a list of all courses related to the environment taught at this the most prestigious Czech university in the academic year 1993/1994. Out of the total of 211 environmental courses available, only 20 had the character of a social science course.

Social science in general continued to be a marginalized area of academia. There were still very few opportunities to study social sciences. The number of candidates who in the first half of the 1990s wanted to study social science at the Prague faculty was regularly ten times higher than the number of accepted students. This corresponded with very few teaching opportunities in social science and in environmental studies in particular.

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[1]) Due to Lacey and Longman's methodology a great deal of these articles contained both phrases and therefore it is impossible to find out how many articles dealing with the effects of greenhouse gases on atmosphere there actually were; the minimum was 436.

This was a situation which hardly favoured the development of environmental learning. There were no or very few foci in terms of departments, conferences, seminars and journals where ideas could be generated in academic discourses. Few academic books by domestic authors were published, especially in social sciences. As a consequence of the past there were only few potential authors in the first place. Secondly, because of the disappearance of subsidies it became financially increasingly difficult to publish any academic book, let alone in a 'small' discipline. The restricted access to foreign academic journals and books due to lack of financial means still persisted too.

Practical difficulties hindering environmental learning in the existing niches included a lack of funding for this type of academic work and for subscription to foreign journals, lack of contacts with foreign academics working in the same field, few domestic books published and a lack of domestic academic journals. What proved to be an especially harmful feature of the organisation of academia in the Czech Republic, was the tradition of carrying out work within clearly defined discipline boundaries, and the reluctance of academic authorities to accept and support interdisciplinary research.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned reasons, environmental learning in the Czech Republic in the post-communist period did not advance significantly compared with the situation prior to 1989. After a short enthusiastic spell in 1990-1991, things in many ways returned back to normal. The lack of academic research base of environmental studies from the past turned out to be crucial. No systematic measures aimed at ameliorating this situation were taken after 1989. Therefore, environmental thought in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s did not, in a general sense, catch up with the contemporary development in the West. This view is confirmed by findings of a report of the Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe [*Environmental...* 1994] which was drafted on the basis of information provided by leading environmental academics, activists and government officials:

> "It is interesting to observe that a comprehensive opinion about the environmental problems of these (Eastern European) countries or the need for a total change in approach is nearly entirely missing from most of the individual reports (i.e. on individual countries). The lack of the aspiration for a reorganised, and broadly based approach connecting economy and environment is an important general warning towards the nature of environmental problems in the region."

6. Membership of the Green Party and of environmental groups

Initially it was the Green Party, rather than the environmental groups, which seemed to be the champion of the environmental cause in former Czechoslovakia. Founded as the first political party after the demise of the old regime it attracted wide support and ranked high in pre-electoral opinion polls in 1990. However, despite this enthusiastic origin and strong support, its fortunes did not last long. It was losing members and electoral support. Financial decline was a logical consequence. The lowest point in the short history of the Green Party came with the 1996 general elections in the Czech Republic, when the party did not secure enough financial means to field its candidates.

My Czech Green Party questionnaire was carried out at the point prior to which the party lost a large share of its initial membership at the end of 1992 and at the beginning of 1993. The return rate of my questionnaire, which was sent to all members of the party in Bohemia, was more than 40 per cent (311 returned out of over 700 sent out).

I also sought to find Czech environmentalists beyond the Green Party's ranks in order to obtain comparative data which would enable me to draw more reliable conclusions about the nature and character of Czech environmentalism. I realised during my initial interviews with the Czech Green Party's leading figures that the party members were likely to be a rather different group to Western Greens and environmentalists in general. Therefore, I turned my attention to members and activists of environmental groups. A convenient way to reach members of different environmental groups was to publish a questionnaire in a magazine which these people read. I chose the only well-known and prestigious magazine for environmental activists which was published in the country at that time – *Nika*.

Nika's circulation dropped sharply from about 10,000 in 1989 to 3,500 in November 1992 when my eight-page questionnaire was published in it. Nonetheless, even after this significant fall, *Nika* was still by far the most well-known and most respected environmental magazine in the Czech Republic. The number of returned questionnaires was 310.

The major legal environmental organisations existing during the communist period were very small by contemporary Western standards. Even more surprisingly, in terms of the size of their membership, environmental organisations legally existing under communism started to decline immediately after November 1989. This observation can be well illustrated by the example of the Czech Union of Nature Conservationists (CUNC), an association of primarily conservationist character. It had 25,000 members at the end of 1989, 8,000 members in 1993 and about 6,000 two years later. This trend was confirmed by the *Nika* questionnaire.

Another finding is that the decline of the 'old' organisations in the post-1989 period was not accompanied by the formation of 'new' organisations which would match the old ones in their size. Admittedly, in the wake of political upheaval there was an upsurge of a large number of various organisations, but most of them were tiny and often soon disappeared without a trace. By the mid-1990s there were only three major environmental organisations of this kind in the Czech Republic. The Rainbow Movement had at the end of 1995 approximately 300 members, Children of the Earth registered about 600 members, and the number of Greenpeace supporters did not exceed several hundred [Fagin 1996].

It can be concluded that six years after the 1989 political change, the combined membership of environmental organisations in the Czech Republic did not exceed the figure from 1989 and their influence was far smaller than during the turning period of the early 1990s. The fact that the political constraints on participation in and activities of environmental groups were lifted with the arrival of democracy, suggests that there were some other reasons for the arrested development of environmental groups and the decline of the Green Party. The small and effectively declining membership of environmental groups indicates that the pool of supporters of these groups was for some reasons limited.

There are strong indications that the Czech Greens saw the party primarily as a vehicle for alleviation of locally confined environmental problems which they personally experienced in their everyday lives and which they deemed to affect human health. In this sense, their environmental concern had a strongly anthropocentric character. Although they ascribed the same weight to global, national and local environmental problems influ-

encing their decision to join the party, when they had to make a choice, they clearly gave the priority to typical tangible and in essence local environmental problems.

In this respect, the Greens were similar to the general public who, according to the results of various opinion polls conducted in the early 1990s, perceived air and water pollution as the most pressing environmental problems. There is also another indication that the foundation of the Green Party was a result of the popular environmental concern of the late 1980s. Forty-four per cent of those who were members of the party at the time of my survey joined the party during the first month of its existence. Furthermore, many answers suggest that the Czech Greens concentrated primarily on the environment and paid much less attention to other issues (social, economic and political) which a political party has to deal with as well. With a certain degree of simplification, it can be argued that by most of its members, the Green Party was perceived as a kind of environmental group campaigning on local environmental issues rather than a proper political party addressing the whole range of issues from a particular point of view.

Overall, the Czech Greens did not fit the Western stereotype of green party members – university-educated, post-materialist middle-class professionals who perceive environmental problems in their social, economic and global contexts and complexities.

Although the Czech Greens were a distinct group within the Czech society, the degree of their distinctiveness was much lower than that of the *Nika* readers. This group was more similar to Western environmentalists than the Czech Greens. Not only were a majority of them professionals with university degrees, but also many of them worked in the public sector – almost half of the *Nika* readers worked either in a local authority or academia. They were mostly non-religious. Forty-four per cent of them appeared to be post-materialists which was double the share of the Greens and a percentage five times higher than among the Czech general public. Unlike the Greens, they gave a clear priority to the global over the local environmental issues. There is an indication that the environmental concern of the members of environmental groups among the *Nika* readers was of a less anthropocentric character than that of the Czech Greens. While for more than half of the latter group the fact that their activity can result in the improvement of human health was a decisive motivation for joining the Green Party, the *Nika* readers put considerably less emphasis on the detrimental effects of environmental degradation on human health. This was a decisive reason for joining an environmental group for only a quarter of those who did so.

While on the surface the *Nika* readers seemed to match Western environmentalists quite well, on closer inspection finer but very important differences emerged. First, although equally highly educated, the *Nika* readers experienced a very different type of higher education. Over 50 per cent of those who studied at an institution of higher education did science and medicine (out which more than half were biologists) and a quarter had their degrees from polytechnics. The second sharp difference was their right-wing political orientation as more than half of them regarded themselves to be right of the centre and also voted for right-wing parties. The third important difference was that only just over 40 per cent were post-materialists.

To conclude, neither group of the Czech respondents could be described as closely resembling Western environmentalists. The following section will put forward arguments explaining why there are only very few Western-like environmentalists in the Czech Republic.

It can be concluded therefore that in the Czech Republic in the first half of the 1990s the number of people who would resemble Western environmentalists was extremely small. In terms of the social and attitudinal profile the Czech Greens were effectively a different party to most Western green parties. Their purely anthropocentric concern with environmental pollution affecting human health was in tune with the general public environmental perceptions. In this respect, the Green Party was a direct consequence of Eastern European environmentalism of the late 1980s, whose characteristics was a rather limited scope of perception of environmental problems which neglected social and ethical dimensions as well as global economic and ecological interdependencies.

The fact that the *Nika* respondents were in some ways similar to Western environmentalists, does not substantially alter this conclusion. It has to be realised that this relatively large sample represented a very small total membership of environmental groups. The environmental movement in the Czech Republic and in the whole of Eastern Europe remained weak in the middle of the 1990s.

7. Explanations

While the structure of the economy in Central European communist countries was until the end of the old regime dominated by industry and most people were working in this sector, there was, nevertheless, a relatively strong tertiary sector.[2] At the same time, the share of university and polytechnic graduates in the Central European population was lower than in Western Europe. Almost all jobs were entirely secure under communism. Hence, the first condition for emergence of the new politics of pollution – the spread of educated new middle classes with secure jobs – was in Central European communist countries fulfilled only to a limited extent.

Furthermore, after 1989, all post-communist countries experienced declining industrial output and the public and private service sector was the second fastest growing sector of the economy. Despite the expansion of this type of employment over the first half of the 1990s,[3] no parallel growth in support for environmental groups and the Green Party occurred. In fact, quite the opposite took place while this sector significantly expanded. This confirms Poguntke's [1993] and Rootes's [1994] objections to structural change as a sufficient explanatory factor for support for environmentalism.

The second factor (according to Poguntke [1993]) – historical situation (ecological crisis) – was clearly present in all Eastern European countries both before and after the fall of communist regimes. Both groups of my respondents indicated confrontation with environmental problems as the main reason for joining them. However, given that during the democratic period the old environmental problems originating in the pre-1989 period were not resolved while new problems emerged, the decline of both the Green Party and environmental groups during the first half of the 1990s suggests that persisting ecological crisis on its own does not necessarily maintain environmental concern. It seems that this 'shallow' environmental concern championed in the Czech Republic mainly by the Greens, which frames environmental issues primarily in terms of pollution, is not con-

[2]) While in the EU 60 per cent of the workforce worked in the tertiary sector in 1988, this figure in the Czech Republic was 40 per cent [Kopačka 1996].

[3]) For instance, by 1993, the share of people working in the tertiary sector in the Czech Republic had increased to 49 per cent in comparison with 40 per cent in 1988 [Kopačka 1996].

nected with value change and can be therefore easily superseded by other, more immediate problems.

Despite the fact that ecological crisis and also to a limited extent socio-economic status as factors influencing the support for environmentalism were present in the Czech Republic both prior to and after 1989, environmentalism of a Western kind has not developed. This leaves me to examine the role of the third factor influencing support for Western environmentalism – value change. Despite serious reservations about post-materialism as a single explanatory factor of the rise of Western environmentalism, post-materialism remains an important tool for detecting social groups prone to hold positive attitudes to and support for environmentalism. It was empirically proven that the majority of greens and activists of environmental movements in the West are post-materialists. A much lower share of post-materialists among the two Czech groups of respondents in comparison with Western environmentalists is one of the most striking findings of my surveys. This applies particularly to the extremely highly educated *Nika* readers as post-materialism is associated, along with structural shifts in employment, with the expansion of higher education. Since post-materialism as a manifestation of value change is deemed to have its origin in formative processes of childhood, adolescence and adult socialisation (family, education and occupation) it is necessary to focus on differences in socialisation experiences between Western and Central European environmentalists. In general, it is argued that highly educated professionals working in service sectors are most likely to be post-materialists and consequently environmentalists.

Rootes [1994] narrows down these criteria drawing on empirical findings that in the West the membership of environmental groups and Green Parties[4] is composed predominantly of highly educated social, cultural and human service professionals. He argues that it is education in humanities, art and social sciences which is crucial in inculcating values positive to the environment. In comparison with other highly educated social groups, people with shared socialisation of this type are not only more likely to be concerned about the environment and understand the complexities of environmental problems but also adopt more radical political stances. A social science background is therefore highly important for the development of Western environmentalism whose features are not only deep understanding of complexities of ecological problems, but also emphasis on democratic participation, sensitivity to social justice and awareness of the interconnectedness of environmental and social issues.

The single most important factor which clearly distinguished readers of *Nika* – a group of people in many ways similar to members of Western environmental groups – from their Western counterparts was their educational background. The *Nika* readers (and also the Czech Greens with experience of higher education) were conspicuous by the lack of education in social science, arts and humanities on the one hand, and by the dominance of an educational background in sciences and technology on the other. The *Nika* readers' awareness of the global dimension of environmental issues is explained by their academic expertise resulting from their high education in biology and related disciplines, as well as

[4]) Voerman's (1995) survey of the members of the Dutch Green Left party revealed that not only more than 80 per cent of his respondents – members of the party – appeared to have attended some form of higher education, but also that among the highly educated, social scientists were best represented (42 per cent) with the arts in second place. The British Greens are also dominated by social science, arts and humanities graduates [Rüdig et al. 1991].

from the fact that a significant part of them worked in academia. Academia in all Central European countries was, during the communist regime as well as in the mid-1990s, dominated by technology and science. As they were close to 'information channels', *Nika* respondents knew of the problems and even might have been alarmed by them. Contrasting the *Nika* readers with the Czech Greens is quite illustrative here. The Greens' level of education was considerably lower and therefore their perception of environmental problems did not go beyond immediate 'local' concern.

8. Conclusion

The first post-1989 generation of Czech environmental policy makers who were elevated to their posts due to the unique circumstances of the time pushed progressive environmental policies which were abandoned once this group of people lost power in 1992. Sociologically, the explanation of this complete change rests on a lack of social basis for the pursuit of advanced environmental policies typical of the first two years of the 1990s. The environmental policy community remained limited due to the existence in the Czech Republic of specific barriers to general social trends which gave rise to the 'new politics of pollution' in Western Europe in the 1980s.

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Pension Reform Paths in Comparison*

The Case of Central-Eastern Europe

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Abstract: Pension reform seems inevitable in Central-Eastern Europe, as the process of economic transformation has been putting great strain on the existing old-age security systems. To a great extent, local reform discourse in Central-Eastern European countries reflects the recent international pension controversy, triggered by forecasts of population ageing and a novel wave of pension reforms in Latin America. This paper analyses the different pension reform experiences of Poland and Hungary, on the one hand, and of the Czech Republic, on the other. In the comparative analysis, there is a special focus on the relationship between the relevant set of political actors, the respective structural settings and the resulting institutional choice in old-age security, shedding light upon the political economy of pension reform in the region. It turns out that neither the sole reform of public pay-as-you-go schemes nor their replacement by mandatory private fully funded systems has proved to be a suitable reform option in itself. Rather, hybrid schemes that combine elements of both systems represent a viable alternative in Central-Eastern Europe, both politically and economically.

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1. Introduction

Ageing populations and financially troubled public pension schemes, as well as a novel wave of pension reforms in Latin America have triggered renewed debate about the need to reform old-age security schemes in many parts of the world. Is it sufficient to adapt technical parameters – such as coverage, eligibility, benefit formulas and retirement age – while basically maintaining a public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system? Or is a private, fully funded (FF) pension scheme, such as the one introduced in Chile in 1981, a more appropriate solution?

This recent international pension controversy quickly seized the countries of Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), where the process of economic transformation had put additional strain on existing pension systems. Interestingly, after years of heated pension reform debate the paradigmatic choices made in individual countries of the region are far from uniform.

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This paper deals with the pension reform experiences of Poland and Hungary on the one hand, and the Czech Republic on the other, trying to identify the factors influencing the institutional choices made in the area of old-age security. In a comparative analysis, I will focus on the relationship and interaction between the structural setting, constellations of relevant political actors and paradigmatic outcomes of pension reform in the countries considered. Inspired by the analytical framework presented by Mayntz and Scharpf [1995], which was further elaborated in Scharpf [1997], this paper is intended as a contribution to the political economy of pension reform in CEE.

First, the institutional legacy and post-socialist problem settings will be reviewed. Then, the contemporary pension controversy, clearly reflected in the local reform discourse, will be presented. Subsequently the Polish and Hungarian experience will be contrasted with the reform path in the Czech Republic. Here, the question will be raised as to what accounts for the different reform paths in the region. To explain the respective institutional choices, I will compare structural settings, actor constellations and paradigmatic choices in the three countries considered. The final section contains some concluding remarks.

2. Institutional legacy and post-socialist problem settings

Pension systems in socialist CEE, whose coverage had become near-universal in the 1960s and 1970s, showed certain basic design features. They were organised as one-pillar public systems, not separated from either the state budget or other branches of social security, giving way to different forms of cross-subsidising. Employers' contributions were the only source of financing.[1] The contribution-benefit link was weak: contributions were not registered on an individual basis, and wages in only a small number of working years were considered as relevant earnings, sometimes as little as the last year before retirement.[2] Although there was less pension differentiation than in any fully fledged earnings-related scheme, certain branch privileges did make a difference, and insufficient adjustment of current pensions to inflation created a situation where entry pensions were considerably higher than average pensions. Many pensioners had to go on working to make ends meet. The creation of this *de facto* extra labour supply was functional in the context of the socialist economies, where labour hoarding by enterprises resulted in an excess demand for labour on a macro level [Götting 1997: 58-60]. The retirement age was comparatively low, mostly 60 for men and 55 for women.[3]

Economic transformation affected the existing pension systems in CEE in a number of ways. Rising expenditures for old-age security were the result of the shift from indirect to direct transfers that were needed to halt the erosion of real pension value related to adjustment-induced inflation and to the drastic curtailment of subsidies on basic goods and services. On the other hand, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises had an impact on both the revenue and the expenditure side of public pension schemes. The privatisation, downgrading and closing-down of enterprises has been accompanied by a mounting number of disability pensions and by early retirement policies. Designed to

[1]) Exceptions regarding the existence of an employee's contribution include Poland from 1968 to 1972 and Hungary since 1954.

[2]) However, in pre-1989 Hungary, length of employment and size of income determined the level of pension benefits [Götting 1995].

[3]) Only in Poland was the legal retirement age higher – 65 for men and 60 for women.

avoid large-scale unemployment, this policy led to an increased number of pensioners and a falling number of contributors to the scheme, resulting in a continuous worsening of the system dependency ratio (SDR)[4] of existing old-age security schemes.

According to Lodahl and Schrooten [1998: 4-5], the SDR rose from 38.9% (1989) to 60.7% (1995) in Poland, from 54.4 (1989) to 61.0% (1995) in the Czech Republic, and from 51.4% (1989) to 82.0% (1995) in Hungary, while the old-age dependency ratio (OADR) remained largely unchanged.[5] This suggests that the current pension crisis in CEE is transformation-induced and not linked to population ageing. In the future, population ageing will affect the region, but to a lesser extent than in Western, Northern or even Southern Europe [see Prinz 1997].

It was obvious that the existing old-age security systems had to be reformed, both to restore their financial sustainability and to adapt some of the previous design features to the new economic order. It was relatively undisputed between social security experts that essential reform measures included the following: abolishing privileges, introducing employees' contributions, separating pension schemes from other social insurance plans, raising the retirement age, restricting easy access to early retirement and to invalidity pensions. Other, more controversial measures, consisted in the separation of pension schemes from the state budget and in strengthening the link between contributions and benefits.[6]

Some of the above-mentioned reform measures have already been implemented (for details, see statistical appendix). But restructuring in Poland and Hungary was not sweeping enough to restore the financial sustainability of the public pension schemes. In spite of high contribution rates – an extreme case being Poland with 36.7% of standardised gross wage[7] –, Polish and Hungarian old-age security schemes are dependent on state subsidies. In Hungary, the state budget had to cover Pension Insurance's deficit of 0.4% of GDP in 1996. In Poland, the 1995 state subsidy to the Social Insurance Fund (ZUS) was 2.1% of GDP, while the subsidy to the Farmers' Pension Fund (KRUS) amounted to another 2.1% of GDP [Lodahl and Schrooten 1998]. In both countries, many of the necessary reform measures, such as a rise in pension age and the abolition of privileges, have met with considerable political resistance or have even been blocked by constitutional courts [Żukowski 1995: 15].

By contrast, the restructuring of the public pension scheme in the Czech Republic has contributed to a stabilisation of its financial situation; it is currently running a surplus (1996: 0.3% of GDP). It should be noted, however, that the differences regarding the financial situation of public pension schemes in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic

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4) The system dependency ratio (SDR) is the number of pensioners, divided by the number of contributors to the pension scheme, in the same period of time.

5) Between 1989 and 1995, the OADR – the number of people over 60 years old, divided by the number of 20-59 year-olds – fluctuated between 28.0% and 29.8% in Poland, 32.5% and 33.8% in the Czech Republic, and 35.0% and 36.1% in Hungary [Lodahl and Schrooten 1998: 4-5].

6) The World Bank recommends exactly the opposite, namely "reducing and flattening benefits" [*World Bank* 1994: 285], which is unsurprising in the context of the overall pension strategy of this international organisation. See below.

7) The nominal contribution Polish employers are obliged to pay amounts to 45% of gross wage. However, for international comparison, the contribution has to be recalculated to account for the fact that there is no employee's contribution.

cannot be explained by the respective extent of pension reform alone.[8] Rather, it should be taken into consideration that the Czech pension insurance also benefited from a more favourable situation on the local labour market; whereas Poland and Hungary faced a far more drastic decline in the number of contributors to the public pension scheme. Between 1989 and 1996, the number of employed Poles and Hungarians dropped by 16% and 25% respectively. In contrast, the number of employed Czechs fell by only 5% in the same period.[9]

Another reform measure, in fact the first move towards pluralisation of pension provision, was far less controversial in the CEE region: in Hungary and the Czech Republic, supplementary old age security institutions – private FF pension funds on a voluntary basis – were created in 1994. In September 1997, 1.3 million Czechs, or 25% of the labour force had joined one of 38 private pension funds.[10] In Hungary there were no less than 308 pension funds, while the number of participants amounted to 0.6 million, that is, only 13% of the labour force.[11] Whether the much stronger response of the Czech public is only a transient phenomenon, remains to be seen. After all, a government incentive for participants was provided in both countries, a direct government subsidy in the Czech case and a tax credit in the Hungarian case [see Vittas 1996].

However, it was by no means undisputed that reforms within the public old-age security system, accompanied by the creation of private pension funds on a voluntary basis, were the right choice for CEE. Since the early 1990s, more radical proposals have been raised that demanded a complete privatisation of pension provision, thereby reflecting the credo of the 'new pension orthodoxy', to be reviewed below.

3. The contemporary pension reform controversy

For over 100 years now, economists have been divided on the features of efficient systems of old-age security, especially about the strengths and weaknesses of the two alternative financing methods [Schmähl 1995]: While pay-as-you-go (PAYG) implies that current outlays on pension benefits are paid out of current revenues from pension contributions, thus calling for inter-generational solidarity as a necessary precondition, in fully funded (FF) schemes the individual accumulates a fund over the entire working life, which is converted into an annuity upon retirement. Thus, there is a strict actuarial relationship between individual contributions and pension benefits.

Underlying the economic debate about the pros and cons of PAYG versus FF schemes are fundamental normative differences regarding the appropriate roles of the market and state in social security. This is also true for the recent international pension controversy between those who claim that it is sufficient to adapt technical parameters of

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[8]) For example, the Czech pension formula is still rather redistributive, combining a flat-rate component with a earnings-related component. In absence of statistical data on the lifetime working record of the insured, it is technically impossible to introduce a strict contribution-benefit link that includes past earnings records.

[9]) This calculation is based on the data provided by Lodahl and Schrooten [1998: 4-5].

[10]) Communication by Allianz-Živnobanka penzijní fond, a.s. on January 21, 1998. It should be noted that the Czech pension fund segment lacks transparency, hampering the access to basic data on the schemes.

[11]) Numbers for the Hungarian funds refer to the end of the second quarter of 1997, as communicated by the Budapest-based State Supervision of Private Funds on November 19, 1997.

public PAYG systems and the proponents of a complete or partial privatisation of old age security, generally referring to the so-called 'Chilean model':[12] In 1981, under the military dictatorship of General Pinochet, Chile was the first country in the world to switch from a public PAYG pension system to a multi-pillar scheme in which the lion's share of old age security falls to private, FF pension funds.

A research report of the World Bank, published in 1994 to establish the guiding criteria of the organisation's pension policy, served to lend international prominence to the 'Chilean model'. With its keynote title "Averting the Old Age Crisis. Policies to Protect the Old *and* Promote Growth" the report intends to address a global problem with a universal strategy modelled not only on social policy considerations but also on macroeconomic desiderata. This report, which aroused considerable attention world-wide, laid the foundations for what appears to have become the 'new pension orthodoxy'.[13]

The World Bank claims that the existing public pension schemes on PAYG basis "have spun out of control in middle- and high-income countries" [*World Bank* 1994: 1]. The only way out of the pension crisis is, according to the World Bank, a multi-pillar system modelled on the Chilean precedent. This system rests on a mandatory system of private pension funds that are intended to replace the public PAYG system as the major provider of old-age security. As benefits are actuarially tied to contributions in the private pension fund pillar, transparency increases and incentives for contribution evasion could disappear. The proponents of a mandatory funded tier expect that it increases long-term saving, capital market deepening, and growth [Ibid.: 254]. In the World Bank report, there is a special chapter on Eastern Europe. In this region, the introduction of Chilean-style pension privatisation would imply special psychological and political advantages, according to the World Bank: "These choices would signal the government's intention to transfer responsibility to individuals for their own well-being ... and establish a constituency for macroeconomic stability, financial sector reform, and enterprise privatisation" [Ibid.: 286].[14]

The World Bank's most prominent opponents in the global pension reform arena are the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Social Security Association (ISSA).[15] In paradigmatic terms, the confrontation is between Anglo-American liberalism and the Continental European welfare state tradition.[16] While the

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[12]) An exhaustive study of the Chilean pension reform has been conducted by Queisser [1993]; for a more recent analysis see Mesa-Lago and Arenas de Mesa [1997].

[13]) I have been inspired by Lo Vuolo [1996: 692], who coined the Spanish term "la nueva ortodoxia en materia previsional", to choose this label for the dominant faction within the international pension reform debate. It does not, however, apply to all national discussions, a case in point being Germany, where the 'orthodoxy' still defends PAYG.

[14]) Cf. Fougerolles, who expects that pension privatisation will reduce the conflict between capital and labour, since "individuals have a direct and visible stake in the reformed, free-market economy – they are investors" [Fougerolles 1996: 93].

[15]) Cf. Beattie and McGillivray [1995], representatives of ILO and ISSA, respectively, for a detailed critique of the World Bank's pension reform concept.

[16]) As to the latter, I am referring mainly to what has been labelled by Esping-Andersen [1990] as "conservative-corporatist welfare-state regime". The increasing heterogenisation of West European welfare policy makes it increasingly difficult to identify 'the' common continental European paradigm.

underlying normative assumption of the World Bank's "Averting the Old Age Crisis" is that private, funded schemes are inherently superior to public, PAYG pension systems, ILO representatives have tried to refute this assessment: in their opinion, many of the existing public PAYG systems continue to function efficiently, without being at the brink of collapse, and, once reformed, will be able to face the demographic challenge [see Cichon 1995]. The transition from a public, PAYG system to a private, funded pillar is neither desirable nor necessary, according to the critics of the 'new orthodoxy'. Rather, it boils down to a very risky strategy for future pensioners [Beattie and McGillivray 1995]: Since the amount of future old-age benefits is linked to rates of return on pension assets, the investment risk has to be borne by the insured.[17] In many parts of the world, high inflation rates threaten to erode accumulated pension capital in real terms, and the supply of profitable, not overly risky investment opportunities on incipient financial markets might be limited.[18] Moreover, the switch from PAYG to FF financing implies high transition costs: pension entitlements acquired under the former PAYG system will have to be recognised, in order to obtain political support for the switch to FF. Consequently, a double burden is placed on the transitional generations that have to contribute to their own retirement plans, while also paying for current pension obligations [Gonzalez 1996].

4. Systemic pension reform in Poland and Hungary

Reflecting the international pension controversy, in both Poland and Hungary a long-standing, polarised debate about the design of a comprehensive reform of the existing old-age security schemes was to be observed.[19] Two major conflicting parties were to be identified: on the one side, following the traditional continental European pension paradigm, pension administrations, welfare ministries[20] and many social security experts,[21] held that a reform of the existing public PAYG systems would suffice. On the other side, the respective ministries of finance argued that a fundamental regime change was inevitable, referring to the 'Chilean model' as a case in point. This position was initially also supported by the World Bank, which – in the Polish and Hungarian context of high external debt – was able to perform as a major external actor in pension reform.

In both Poland and Hungary, the basic conflict between the Ministry of Finance and the Welfare Ministry about pension reform was settled in 1996, when a compromise was worked out that reflects the relative weakness of the latter portfolio. The Hungarian pension reform laws were passed by Parliament in July 1997 and came into force on January 1, 1998 [see *Acts No. LXXX, LXXXI, LXXXII, LXXXIII* and *LXXXIV of 1997*]. The Polish pension reform laws were passed by the *Sejm* in the summer of 1997 and

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[17]) A similar argument is to be found in *Worried Future Pensioner* [1995].

[18]) It should be noted that according to the proponents of pension privatisation, accumulated pension capital should be invested on the local financial market, not abroad, to close the postulated 'savings gap'.

[19]) For a summary of the Polish discussion see Żukowski [1995: 28-31] and Golinowska et al. [1997: 18-21]; for the Hungarian discussion see Ferge [1997] and Simonovits [1997: 19-24].

[20]) Strictly speaking, the respective ministry is called the Welfare Ministry in Hungary and Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in Poland.

[21]) While Hungarian social security experts tend to back the continental European fraction almost unanimously, in Poland this is only true for professors of Social insurance law, while most economists dealing with social security seem to be in favour of partial or full pension privatisation.

autumn 1998, while the reform itself came into effect in early 1999.[22] In both countries, the new old age system will be of a mixed type, combining a mandatory public PAYG pillar with a partially mandatory FF system. This two-tier scheme offers a purely public as well as a mixed pension option on a mandatory basis:

1) *The PAYG tier*, to be financed by the employer's and part of the employee's contributions, is mandatory for everybody, at least as a first pillar. The public pension scheme will cover acquired pension claims by paying some sort of compensatory pension, to be topped up by post-reform pension claims if the insured decides to stick to the purely public pension option.

2) *The FF tier* consists of a newly created pension fund system.[23] For young people, this tier is mandatory, complementing the first tier (mixed pension path).[24] Those already working are free to choose between the purely public and the mixed pension path. If they opt for the latter, private pension funds will replace part of the first tier: reformers expect that about one-third (Poland) to one-quarter (Hungary) of future pension benefits of a mixed type will come from private pension funds. In Poland, those above age 50 cannot enter the FF scheme, but have to stay in the public system (purely public pension path).[25]

Although the general set-up of the Polish and the Hungarian pension reforms is strikingly similar,[26] it should be noted that both reforms differ in many details. The two most important distinctions between both reforms include the range of first-tier reforms, as well as the corporate constitution of second-tier institutions. Polish reform plans for the first, PAYG tier, yet to be passed by the *Sejm*, are much more radical[27] than the ones enacted in Hungary, reflecting their co-operation with a Swedish advisory team.[28] As regards the

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[22]) For the Polish reform proposal see *Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform* [1997]. The reform project was supposed to come into force in 1999, but only part of the relevant legislation was passed by the Polish *Sejm* before the September 1997 elections. Still, the new coalition government has proceeded with the preparations for pension reform.

[23]) The new mandatory pension funds in Hungary were set up parallel to the already existing voluntary funds. A separation of both systems is necessary, because mandatory pension funds require stricter government supervision than voluntary ones.

[24]) While joining a pension fund will be mandatory for all new entrants to the labour market in Hungary, everybody under 30 would be required to do so according to the Polish pension reform draft.

[25]) Note that the Hungarian reform draft provided for an age limit of 47 [cf. *Minister of Welfare and Minister of Finance* 1997]. However, in the final version of the pension reform legislation it was dropped on constitutional grounds.

[26]) Interestingly, such pension reform projects are also envisaged in Croatia and Slovenia.

[27]) According to [*Office*... 1997], early retirement and the recognition of non-contribution periods would be abolished completely. The so-called "principle of Notional Defined Capital" would be introduced into the first tier, relating retirement benefits closely to the virtual capital accumulated by the individual during working life. Benefit determination would be based exclusively on the total amount of paid contributions, divided by the average life expectancy at retirement, thereby adopting the pension formula introduced in Latvia in 1996.

[28]) See Kruse [1997] and Persson [1998] for details on the Swedish pension reform plans, which will include flexible retirement age, benefits affected by changes in life expectancy and partial funding.

second-tier institutions in both countries, private pension funds in Poland will be created as joint stock companies, whereas Hungarian second-tier institutions are being set up as voluntary mutual benefit (VMB) funds and thus have a co-operative-like corporate constitution.[29]

As regards underlying role models, it is obvious that the Polish and Hungarian reform concepts are not identical replications of the radical Chilean pension reform, since privatisation of old-age security is only partial. Rather, with their mixed set-up, they closely resemble its democratic version – the 'Argentine model', which reflected two years of political bargaining in the Argentine parliament when it came into force in 1994.[30] The mixed, Argentine-type approach followed by Poland and Hungary[31] has considerable political economic advantages over the full privatisation of old-age security. Among the political compromises that facilitated the acceptance of this mixed pension reform model, the following four are most important:

1) The public scheme is only partially replaced by the newly created mandatory pension fund pillar, while a complete opting-out of public old age security, as in Chile, is impossible. This makes the reform approach less iconoclastic, helping to avoid the image of an overly radical regime change. It could be successful in satisfying the egalitarian (the middle-aged upwards) and the anti-egalitarian (the young) part of the CEE population at the same time, so none of these factions would strongly oppose the reform.

2) Employers' contributions are maintained to finance the obligations of the public scheme, even if the respective employee chooses the FF pillar; thus, the fiscal burden resulting from the partial regime change from PAYG to FF financing is lowered. Maintaining the employers' contribution will also please the trade unions, who perceive it as more just if the contribution burden is 'shared' between both parties.

3) There are no interest-bearing recognition bonds to the acquired pension entitlements, but a compensatory pension solution, resulting in a lower fiscal burden because no interest has to be paid. More importantly, implicit public pension debt is not made explicit right away, as in Chile, but only step by step. This could have major fiscal advantages from the point of view of policy makers, compared to full privatisation.

4) The mandatory pension fund pillar is being built up rather slowly: only a quarter to one-third of the future pension amount will be from pension funds, if people choose to enter it at all. The slow-track choice seems more adequate in the light of still fragile capital markets and remaining two-digit inflation in CEE, two factors that might seriously hamper the pension funds' ability to maintain and increase the entrusted capital stock in real terms.

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[29]) It should be noted that supplementary pension funds, created from 1994 onwards in Hungary, have also been set up as VMB funds. According to political observers, the fact that the corporate constitution of the new, mandatory pension funds will also be of a VMB type is a political concession to the existing funds.

[30]) For a comprehensive comparison between the Chilean and Argentine pension reform see Arenas de Mesa and Bertranou [1997].

[31]) This comes as no surprise, as Argentine advisors have been involved in the Hungarian and Polish pension reform process. Moreover, for first hand information, World Bank and USAID sponsored trips to Argentina and Chile for Polish social security experts, journalists and members of parliament.

However, the negotiated agreement engenders path dependence, since the mixed model might have considerable secondary effects: as contributions will increasingly be drained away from the public system, it has a built-in mechanism towards shrinking the PAYG tier, making the public scheme ever more unsustainable, fiscally as well as politically. Moreover, even when pension privatisation starts off only partially, it changes the set of relevant political actors, resulting in a strengthening of the constituency in favour of radical reform, comprising those already affiliated to one of the private pension funds as well as fund managers. This implies that from a medium-run perspective, the mixed model is biased towards a gradual phasing-in of the 'Chilean model'.[32] The mixed model is, then, a useful intermediate stage from the radical reformers' point of view, rather than the ultimate paradigmatic outcome of pension reform.

5. The state of pension reform in the Czech Republic

Contrary to the Polish and Hungarian experience, there seems to have been little impact of the international pension reform controversy in the Czech Republic so far. Despite the ultra-liberal rhetoric of the former prime minister Václav Klaus ("market economy without adjectives"), the paradigmatic choice in old-age security has been well within the boundaries of the continental European welfare paradigm, at least up to now. Since 1990, the existing PAYG system underwent several reform measures, such as the abolition of branch privileges and the introduction of a separate pension contribution for employees. The most comprehensive reform package was passed in 1995 (see below).

The current system of old-age security in the Czech Republic consists of two main tiers, a public mandatory PAYG scheme that has been reformed and is still running a surplus,[33] and a voluntary private funded system, established in 1994 (see above). Concerning the current design of old-age security in the Czech Republic, the Welfare Ministry claims to have encountered a "suitable combination" [*Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs* 1996: 8] of PAYG and FF financing of pensions, trying to avoid inherent problems of both systems. By setting up a voluntary FF pillar instead of the mandatory one suggested by the World Bank, the Czech government decided to give the emerging local financial market – which is still far from well-established – a chance to cope with the influx of pension capital by lowering its amount considerably. Concerning the public PAYG system, the Welfare Ministry was well aware of the need to adapt its technical variables from time to time[34] and did not lack the necessary implementation power. There is a clear separation of competences: while the Welfare Ministry is directing the public scheme, the Ministry of Finance is responsible for pension funds. There does not seem to have been any major conflict of interests between both ministries so far – probably due to

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[32]) These considerations are in line with the World Bank's most recent recommendations for so-called "tactical sequencing" in order to achieve pension privatisation: "Allow participants to opt out of public scheme, then phase it out." [*World Bank* 1997: 145].

[33]) According to Lodahl and Schrooten [1998: 15], the annual surplus of the public pension scheme in the Czech Republic was 0.5% of GDP in 1993, 1.1% in 1994, 0.7% in 1995 and 0.3% in 1996.

[34]) For some tentative calculations regarding trends in the Czech pension system from 1996 to 2020 see *Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs* [1996]. To avoid deficits in the pension system from the year 2001 on, higher contributions, an increased retirement age, tightened eligibility criteria, and/or a partial funding of the scheme have to be considered.

the fact that current surpluses in the public scheme accrue to the general budget, which is facilitated by the lack of an autonomous pension administration. In addition, the World Bank did not have much chance to influence Czech pension reform discourse, since the debt problem was considerably smaller in the Czech Republic than in Poland or Hungary.[35]

That does not mean, however, that Czech society is unanimous about the design of old-age security. Heated debates preceded the major pension reform package of recent times, that is, the Pension Insurance Act. Strongest opposition was expressed by trade unions: apart from a symbolic strike in December 1994, the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) organised a huge anti-government rally in March 1995 – with almost 100,000 participants the biggest since 1989 – to protest against the raising of the pension age and to demand a separation of pension insurance from the state budget.[36] However, the government draft was passed with some minor changes in June 1995, reflecting the strength of the former Klaus government.

Although some debate about the introduction of a mandatory pension fund pillar started in early 1997, pension privatisation such as in Chile or Argentina are not on the agenda of the Czech Welfare Ministry today.[37] As Turnovec [1996: 17] demonstrates on the basis of a Median Voter's Analysis, "radical changes in the present design of social welfare in the Czech Republic... [are] politically infeasible". Rather, some observers expect the public pillar to be reduced gradually, in order to increase the scope for private pension funds. This, however, might imply the risk of individual undersaving with respect to old age.

6. Structural settings, actor constellations and paradigmatic choices in comparison

It has been shown that the pension reform path followed in Hungary and Poland differs considerably from the one in the Czech Republic. While reform measures in the Czech Republic remained well within the boundaries of the continental European pension paradigm, privatisation of old age security gained considerable importance in Poland and Hungary. A look at the structural settings and actor constellations[38] regarding the pension reform issue might help to explain the different paradigmatic outcomes, shedding light upon the political economy of pension reform in CEE.

It is interesting to note that in both Poland and Hungary, the finance and welfare ministries initially had divergent ideas about pension reform. Traditionally, social policy is certainly no responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. But as public pension systems in

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[35]) In 1994, foreign debt amounted to 70.1% of GDP in Hungary, to 46.2% in Poland, and to 29.7% in the Czech Republic [cf. *World Bank* 1996: 221].

[36]) For further demands of the ČMKOS campaign against the pension draft see *ČMKOS* [1994]. It should be noted that the Council for Economic and Social Agreement, a forum for tripartite dialogue between the employers, the trade unions, and the state, was suspended in 1994/95 for six months because of the pension reform issue.

[37]) For some advocates of radical pension privatisation in the Czech Republic see, for example, Jelínek and Schneider [1997] and *Liberální institut* [1997].

[38]) Only the most important political actors involved in the pension issue are included in this comparative analysis. Country-specific, more detailed analyses of the pension-related actors and their interaction have been conducted by Ferge [1997] for the case of Hungary and Golinowska [1998] for the case of Poland.

Poland and Hungary run deficits, which have to be covered by the state budget, the position of the Ministry of Finance regarding the pension issue is strengthened. It comes as no surprise that the Polish and Hungarian pension reform blueprints include a partial switch to a FF scheme, considering that the Ministry of Finance, the stronger of the portfolios, basically consists of neo-liberal economists interested in the macroeconomic advantages attributed to the switch to a funded system.

Moreover, the World Bank's paradigmatic influence has to be taken into account, facilitated by both countries' severe external debt problems. Even if it does not amount to a full replication of its radical reform agenda in CEE,[39] the World Bank seems to have endorsed the Hungarian pension reform. The Bank was looking for a pension reform precedent in CEE – and got it: "The passage of the Hungarian reform by Parliament has demonstrated the political and economic feasibility of this type of reform in Central Europe" [Palacios and Rocha 1997: 42].

But the pressure from this powerful external actor and its local allies in the ministries of finance is not the whole story: for years, the relatively weak post-communist governments of Poland and Hungary have experienced considerable resistance to a reform within the PAYG system. Although these reform measures might be characterised as moderate given the paradigmatic alternatives, they easily allow to identify individual losses and were thus generally perceived as a mere cutback of acquired entitlements – without anything in exchange.[40] Under the mixed reform packages, however, the difficult task of reforming the PAYG system is combined with the introduction of a mandatory private element. The latter has two major political advantages from the point of view of policy makers: It appeals to individualised, visible ownership claims[41] (individual pension accounts with private pension funds), and its weaknesses and transition costs are not transparent to the average citizen. The resulting fiscal illusion thus lowers resistance to reform.

The Czech case differs markedly from the Hungarian and Polish story, exhibiting a thorough reform of the public PAYG system, which remains the only mandatory pillar of old-age security. At the same time private FF pension funds were introduced on a voluntary basis. In fact, the Czech Republic is the only country where neither the 'Chilean model' nor its variations have been on the political agenda so far. Here, the absence of World Bank influence enabled a critical distance of Czech policymakers to the much-advertised Latin American role models. Until the 1996 elections, the Klaus government was strong enough to overcome the existing resistance against the reform of the public PAYG scheme, thus proving that reforms *within* the existing PAYG scheme were a feasible option in the Czech Republic, without having to resort to the 'Argentine package deal' with its still considerable fiscal costs.

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[39]) This would have included, on the one hand, downgrading any existing public PAYG pillar to the limited goal of poverty reduction, and, on the other, entrusting the private, funded tier with the whole of the mandatory earnings-related pension business.

[40]) See Holzmann [1994: 191]: "Given the starting conditions of these [transition] countries, in which any traditional reform necessarily means a cutback of 'acquired rights' for important segments of the population, neither a consensus nor a majority solution could be achieved so far.".

[41]) Graham [1996: 10] identifies the "concept of creating new stakeholders in the private system" as a political motive for introducing mandatory pension funds.

7. Concluding remarks

From the comparative analysis conducted above, it can be concluded that institutional choices made in old-age security differ according to the structural setting, constellations and interactions of relevant political actors. As to the structural setting, the financial situation of existing public PAYG schemes (deficit or surplus) makes an impact on the perceived urgency or needlessness of a radical pension reform. This might be unsurprising, as earlier research on the political economy of policy reform has shown that economic crisis can provide the impetus to get ambitious reforms started [cf. *World Bank* 1997: 150-151]. Interestingly, however, it also determines whether, apart from the Welfare Ministry, another political actor – the Ministry of Finance, inclined towards pension privatisation – enters the pension reform arena. Within the structural setting, there is yet another important factor, that is, the degree of external debt that conditions whether an important external actor gets involved, namely, the World Bank, with its policy advice modelled on the Chilean experience. It is important to note that the respective structural settings determine which actors are involved in the process of pension reform, as well as their relative strength, conditioning much of the paradigmatic outcome, the details of which are produced in the subsequent interaction process.

Even though this short review[42] of the recent Polish, Hungarian, and Czech experiences in pension reform has stressed the differences between the pension reform paths in the countries considered, there is also one common denominator: in paradigmatic terms, neither the sole reform of public PAYG schemes nor their replacement by mandatory private FF systems has proved to be a suitable reform option in itself. Rather, hybrid schemes that combine elements of both systems – a public-private mix as well as a PAYG-FF mix – represent viable alternatives in CEE, both politically and economically. Furthermore, they amount to a considerable departure from the monolithic institutional heritage in the region.

Still, it would be premature to attempt a definitive evaluation of the paradigmatic outcomes, as the process of pension reform is still in the making in CEE. Especially the Czech case turned unpredictable after the political crisis that led to the fall of Václav Klaus. However, in the light of the hybrid institutional choices in CEE pension reform, it seems that public PAYG systems will hold out for some more time, although their role in overall old-age security is being limited decisively.

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[42]) For an exhaustive analysis of the Czech, Polish and Hungarian pension reforms cf. Müller [1999].

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Table 1. Characteristics of public pension systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1996)

Characteristics	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland
Nature	mandatory	mandatory	mandatory
Financing principle	PAYG	PAYG	PAYG
Standardised contribution rates*	23.0% of standardised gross wage	26.5% of standardised gross wage	36.7% of standardised gross wage
Standardised employee vs. employer contribution*	5.8% vs. 17.3%	5.2% vs. 21.3%	0% vs. 36.7%
Ceiling on contributions	no	yes	no
No. of qualifying years	25	20	25/20 (men/women)
Structure of pension formula	basic + earnings-related component	basic + earnings-related component	basic + earnings-related component
Relevant earnings (in years)	last 10 (1996) last 30 (2016)	all since 1988	best 7 out of last 16 (1996) best 10 out of last 20 (2000)
Retirement age today (men/women)	60/53-57	60/55	65/60
Future retirement age (men/women)	62/57-61 (2007)	62/62 (2008)	65/60
Pension reduction in case of early retirement	yes	yes	no
Branch privileges	*abolished*	*almost abolished*	still existent

*) *Standardised contribution rates have been calculated on the basis of net wages including 50% of the total social insurance contribution, to eliminate those differences in the calculation base that are due to a non-proportional distribution of the contribution burden between employee and employer.*

Source: Own research

Table 2. Indicators of public pension systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (1995)

Indicators	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland*
Deficit/surplus (in % of GDP)	surplus (0.7)	deficit (-0.3)	deficit (-1.8)
Pension expenditures as % of GDP	9.1	10.6	14.6
System Dependency Ratio (pensioners as % of contributors)	61.0	82.0	60.7
Old Age Dependency Ratio (60+ as % of 20-59 year old)	32.5	35.9	29.8
Replacement rates (net old-age pensions as % of net wages)	56.6	58.0	74.5
Budgetary balance of pension insurance (in % of GDP)	0.7	-0.3	-1.8
Percentage distribution of pensioners, by type of pension			
– old age	59.2	53.8	35.2
– disability	17.6	24.3	28.6
– others	23.2	22.0	36.2

*) excluding KRUS
Source: Lodahl and Schrooten 1998; own calculations

Table 3. Private Pension Funds in the Czech Republic and Hungary (1997)

Characteristics	Czech Republic	Hungary
Existing since...	1994	1994
Type of enterprise	Joint Stock Companies	Voluntary Mutual Benefit Fund (VMB)
Financing principle	FF	FF
Nature	voluntary	voluntary
Government incentives	subsidy (40% of contribution payments, up to 120 Kč monthly)	tax credit on contribution payments (50%; up to 200,000 HUF p.a.)
Employer's contribution	yes, out of after-tax profit	yes, tax-exempt (main source of contributions)
Supervision	Ministry of Finance	special supervising agency
No. of pension funds	38	308
Total assets	150 million US$ (1995)	180 million US$
Real interest rate p.a.	-4.0 to 3.5	3.0 to 5.5 (1995)
Affiliates (million)	1.3	0.6
Affiliates (as % of EAP)	25	13

Sources: Vittas 1996; communications by Supervision of Private Funds (Budapest) and Allianz-Živnobanka penzijní fond, a. s. (Prague)

The Impact of Group Fears and Outside Actors on Ethnic Party Demands

Comparing Sudeten Germans in Inter-war Czechoslovakia with the post-1989 Moravian Movement

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Abstract: This paper seeks to address a significant gap in the current nationalist literature that has insufficiently examined the conditions under which an ethnic group or region will radicalise or, conversely, moderate its demands against the state centre. This study introduces a bargaining model to explore the process by which ethnic groups are mobilised and then de-mobilised, such that the extremity of their demands shift over time. Two arguments are given here. First, a group's structural characteristics (including its size and compactness) define the upper-limits of goals that groups are capable of pursuing against the centre. Second, the extremity of these claims is a joint function of: (1) the group's expected political or economic benefits of exercising its 'exit option' (the independent variable), and (2), the bargaining power and activities of a group's lobby state or organisation (the intervening variable). In putting forth this argument, I hope to explain how and why an ethnic group's demands can shift from extreme goals, such as broad territorial autonomy, to very moderate goals, such as affirmative action policies, and vice versa. Finally, this study suggests ways in which international organisations may intervene to ameliorate the intensity of ethnic conflict.

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I. Introduction

Modernisation theorists have long predicted that nationalism would fade away as a by-product of increases in democratisation, industrialisation, education and literacy rates throughout the world. The recognition that ethnicity has not declined in political importance, however, has spawned an entirely new research agenda which places an emphasis on investigating *nationalism* as a phenomenon in its own right, rather than as a mere indicator of the 'actual' causes of conflict. To this end, many scholars have contributed to our understanding of ethno-politics by creating typologies of different strains of nationalism, which are empirically associated with the creation of various types of states and societies [Gellner 1983, Horowitz 1985, Stavenhagen 1990], while other research hypothesises material conditions which lead a *proto-nation* or *ethnie* to assume nationhood in the modern sense [Smith 1989, Hobsbawm 1990, Nairn 1974, Gellner 1964]. However, these structural approaches fail to explain why nationalism emerges at one point in time rather than another. Structural theories also fail to explore the mechanism by which entire groups may become mobilised by nationalising elites. To address the latter gap in the nationalism literature, Anderson [1991] and Hroch [1993] have both elaborated upon the processes through which ethnic elites propagate national identities through successive

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social strata of an ethnic group.[1] Meanwhile, elite-based approaches have demonstrated the ways in which ethnic mobilisation can be seen as a outcome of rational cost-benefit calculations undertaken by nationalising actors [Fearon 1994a, Weingast 1994].

Importantly, however, none of the above approaches can explain why some national groups advance claims of political independence while other groups seek more moderate goals of political or cultural autonomy within the confines of a larger political unit. These studies also fail to explore the conditions under which a national group's political demands can become more or less extreme over time. I argue that this oversight is due to a lack of rigorous attention paid by scholars of nationalism to the process of bargaining between ethnic party elites and central state governments, on the one hand, and between these ethnic elites and their group constituencies, on the other. This paper explores the argument that political mobilisation of ethnic characteristics is positively correlated with the credibility of the threat posed by the central government toward the minority. The legitimacy of these threats increases when the central government fails to 'credibly commit' to protecting the group's political and economic position within the existing state framework. In sum, as the credibility of the threat of the centre to the ethnic group increases, ethnic leaders tend to advance more extreme political demands, and vice versa.[2]

In this paper, I put forth two main arguments. First, group structural characteristics (such as size and compactness) serve as *preconditions* to the *dependent variable* of the extent to which this group will advance claims representing exit from the existing system of representation. In order to test this hypothesis, I employ a typology of minority groups in East-Central Europe constructed on the basis of their structural features. These structural characteristics largely constrain the extent to which the goals of minorities can be sought outside of, as opposed to within, the existing system. Second, while particular structural characteristics serve as necessary but insufficient conditions to the advancement of extreme claims against the centre, the *likelihood* that a group will advance such goals is importantly influenced by (1) the group's expected political or economic benefits of exercising its 'exit option' (the independent variable), and (2), the bargaining power and activities of a group's lobby state[3] or organisation (the intervening variable).[4]

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[1]) The terms *communal* or *ethnic group* refer to any population within which there is a shared perception of common salient traits – whether cultural, linguistic, religious, or otherwise – which sets this group apart from others [Gurr 1993: Ch. 1]; identification with a 'group' on the basis of any one or a number of these traits may be termed 'ethnic identity'. While ethnic groups certainly predate the nation-state, it would appear that every group is to some extent transitory, as group identities shift and overlap throughout time. The existence of groups also depends upon the larger structure within which they are embedded. The existence of *minorities* illustrates this point nicely, since a group's minority status is wholly contingent upon the relationship between minority and majority groups that co-exist within a state framework.

[2]) Here, extremity of demands is measured in terms of the extent to which fulfilment of such demands represents a separation or exit from the existing state framework.

[3]) A 'lobby' state or organisation can be defined here as those which regularly lobby on behalf of an ethnic group (e.g., Hungary in the case of the Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe).

[4]) This model is not intended to explain ethnic identity formation, but rather, is an explanation of the conditions under which an existing identity will serve as a basis upon which a group will advance political claims against the state in which it resides.

The typology of ethnic groups used in this paper has been constructed solely on the basis of their structural features. In doing so, I draw from Gurr's global classification of 'communal' groups, using only the structural components of his definitions. I will then attempt to deduce the types of goals that will likely be advanced by groups based upon my arguments concerning the degree of bargaining leverage groups with differing levels of compactness and size have *vis-à-vis* their respective state governments. This hypothesis will then be tested with two cases of ethnic mobilisation: the Moravians in post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans in post-1918 Czechosovakia, using evidence accumulated through interviews and archival work concerning the claims that have been advanced by the 'ethnic' elites in each of the two cases.

This study addresses an important gap in the dominant constructivist literature concerning nationalist activities. This literature fails to explain the wide variation in the claims made by groups against their governments, but rather focuses on uniformities in the nationalist rhetoric utilised by political elites across cultures. In contrast, my approach predicts *variation* in ethnic group demands as a joint function of group characteristics and the bargaining games played between these groups and their central state governments.

I set forth the argument as follows: In Part II, I briefly review the recent work on nationalism relevant to the study of minorities in post-communist East Central Europe; in Part III, I specify the above hypotheses in further detail; and in Part IV, I test the following hypotheses using longitudinal analysis of two cases of Moravians in post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans in the First Czechoslovak Republic.

II. Prior Research and Theory

Since there are a number of theories that treat ethnicity as problematic, it may be useful to exploit the insights of earlier works in creating a typology of ethnic groups. Raimo Vayrynen notes the existence of three broad approaches to the study of ethnicity:[5] *primordialism*, *instrumentalism* and *constructivism* [Vayrynen 1994: 8], to which a fourth approach, *structuralism*, might be added. Primordialist scholars posit that there is some "immutable common ancestry, history and solidarity of the *ethnie* that are prior to any social interactions and structures" [Ibid.]. This approach treats the group as ontologically primitive and underivable. Primordialist explanations thus fail to take into account the ways in which the modernisation or industrialisation of societies create cross-cutting cleavages that break down or redefine ethnic communities. Further, they cannot explain how some 'nations' (e.g., Belorussians or Lithuanians) were artificially created by Soviet political elites [Suny 1993: 80]. Because of these empirical discrepancies, primordialism has been largely discredited in the academic community.

Pre-existing group identities appear, however, to play a role in nation-building. Miroslav Hroch and Eric Hobsbawm, for example, advance *structural* arguments to explain the ways in which nations are consciously constructed out of *proto-nations* or *ethnies*.[6]

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[5]) 'Ethnicity' can be defined as the "communal identity of people who are classed together by common history, territory, social customs and physical traits" [Vayrynen 1994: 3]. I use the terms 'ethnic groups' and 'communal groups' interchangeably.

[6]) Smith's "ethnie" (1989) or Hobsbawm's "proto-nation" (1990) refer to the pre-modern ethnic community which may be distinguished in a number of ways, including size, attachment to territory, secular versus religious identity, language, culture, and so forth, and which provide the raw material upon which modern 'nations' can be based.

These studies hold that prior group traits provide *necessary but insufficient* bases for the emergence of full nations [Hobsbawm 1990, Smith 1989, emphasis added]. Hobsbawm notes that primordial theories identifying sufficient criteria for the establishment of a nation – such as common language, culture, and ethnic traits – are contradicted by a preponderance of empirical evidence suggesting that none of these traits alone constitutes a sufficient condition for the founding of a nation. However, *some* set of pre-existing group characteristics appears to be necessary for nation-building. Hobsbawm builds on primordialist theories by identifying the circumstances under which certain pre-existing group traits have enjoyed dominance over other traits in the formation of a nation. He argues, for example, that the growth of 'ethnic' as opposed to 'civic' nationalism in the period of 1870-1914 was an outgrowth of modernising forces such as urbanisation, migration flows and the resistance of traditional groups to the growth of modernity. Groups subjected to such conditions were more likely to listen to arguments that the disruptions in their lives were caused by a "non-Ruritanian state or ruling class" [Ibid.: 109]. The structuralist approach is flawed, however, to the extent that these scholars fail to explain why political elites would actually *choose* to undertake nationalising projects. More importantly, structuralists view nationalisation as a process of gradual evolution and therefore cannot account for the rapid mobilisation and de-mobilisation of ethnic groups.

The *instrumentalist* approach to ethnic conflict goes further to address this gap by demonstrating how the ethnic features of a group may be used to obtain material gains. In this formulation, violence is one such tool that can be used to acquire certain material benefits such as territory, political and cultural autonomy, and so forth. This approach lends itself nicely to formal modelling. For example, it is possible to use the instrumental approach to model a two-player interactive game in which Group A will fail to co-operate with Group B if the total gains obtained from repeated co-operative interactions are not expected to outweigh the gains resulting from a single defection [see Axelrod 1984]. Some theorists have emphasised that, in light of the fact that one player is likely to defect based on the perceived probability that another player will fail to honour his or her pledge to co-operate, the key to bringing about the emergence of co-operation is to create a credible commitment to co-operate on the part of the second player. This can be accomplished through the formation of institutions that work to increase the probability of repeated plays between players, thus increasing the value of extended co-operation over one-time defect strategies [Keohane 1984, Weingast 1994]. Although this approach is generally used to explain ethnic conflict where economic gains are the primary issue at stake, it can easily be applied to cases in which ethnic groups are mobilised for non-material purposes such as linguistic rights or cultural autonomy.[7]

In this paper, I use a theoretical framework that joins certain aspects of the primordialist school (in terms of the role played by pre-existing identities) with an instrumentalist approach. My framework, consistent with the so-called *constructivist* position, holds

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7) Importantly, however, a purely instrumentalist framework constitutes an incomplete account of the phenomenon of ethnic mobilisation, since political or administrative 'choice' is insufficient to explain nationhood. I posit that there do exist objective criteria or 'proto-national' preconditions upon which national consciousness must be based, such as a common history, language or religion [Hobsbawm 1990: 7-8]. Moreover, elite activities do not capture the relationship between national elites and the mobilised group; a national identity is importantly *negotiated* between elites and the populations they seek to mobilise.

that nationalism is not a natural consequence or outgrowth of a shared culture which is deeply rooted in history. Nations are not so much 'discovered' as they are consciously created by intellectuals or ethnic entrepreneurs [Eley and Suny 1995]. On the other hand, the choices made by nationalising actors are significantly constrained, as "nationalists make their own history, but not entirely as they please; not with cultures of their own choosing, but with cultures directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past" [Ibid.: 39]. Finally, in order to demonstrate the mechanisms by which groups are mobilised by their respective nationalising elites, insights will be taken from the sociological literature to demonstrate the importance that social organizations play in mobilizing ethnic populations in each of the two cases [Gamson 1975, McCarthy and Zald 1986, Kitschelt 1993]. Social organisations serve as important devices through which ethnic party leaders mobilise their populations in an attempt to signal to the centre that the elites enjoy strong constituency support within the group. The credibility of such signals is crucial to increasing and sustaining the bargaining leverage of ethnic elites in their negotiations with the centre.

III. The Argument

Dependent Variable:

1) *The dependent variable in this study is ethnic group demands and the extent to which these demands are sought outside of rather than within the existing state framework.*

As stated earlier, the dependent variable of group claims can be seen as a continuous variable in terms of the extent to which a claim represents an attempt to exit the existing state framework. For example, a group demand for language rights or affirmative action is one which could be easily accommodated under existing state institutions. In contrast, the claim for territorial autonomy constitutes a search for some degree of separation from the existing state apparatus. Finally, a group claim for secession represents the pursuit of absolute separation from the state framework. The demands advanced by ethnic groups may shift up or down this continuum in response to variation in the independent and intervening variables.

Enabling Conditions:

2) *A group's structural features serve as the enabling conditions for the advancement of certain types of group goals; these features function as limits on the extent to which these goals can be sought outside of the existing framework of representation.*

A. Size. I posit that, other things being equal, the larger a minority group is *relative* to the state population, the greater the capacity of the group to exit or fundamentally alter the existing state framework. In making this argument, I draw analogies from the international relations literature that holds that larger states have greater say in determining the structure of international institutions [Waltz 1979, Snidal 1993]. Similarly, the greater a group's size relative to the dominant group of a state, the greater the minority's consequent bargaining leverage relative to that of the dominant group in negotiating over state institutions. The *absolute* size of a minority also appears to matter, as there appears to be a size threshold below which, other things being equal, a minority group is less likely to pursue sovereign state status. This is likely due to the recognition among national leaders of small groups that the minority in question is 'too small' to muster adequate military

defence against potential foreign attacks; likewise, small groups are unlikely to possess a functionally-differentiated economy capable of self-sufficiency.[8]

B. Density. I hypothesise that groups that are highly concentrated are also vertically and horizontally integrated such that they constitute potentially self-sufficient social and economic regions that can feasibly lay claim to political independence based on some degree of ethnic homogeneity within their borders. A group that does not constitute a clear majority within its borders is unlikely to seek political independence since it is unlikely to achieve electoral victory under minimally democratic elections. Further, if the said minority is not highly concentrated, then it is unlikely to sue for political independence upon a given territory, given its perception that the central government is unlikely to respond positively to its claims.[9] A classification of various ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and the goals they are likely to pursue on the basis of their structural characteristics is given in Figure 1.

Independent Variables:

3) *The dependent variable of extremity of group claims is importantly impacted by at least one independent variable, which influences the extent to which group goals are sought outside of as opposed to within the existing system of representation. This variable consists of the political/economic costs and benefits of opting out of the existing system.* This has at least two possible variants:

3.A The *ability of the state to 'credibly commit' to preserving the political or economic rights of a minority within its borders.* If the discretionary power of a state is not limited, the consequent inability of a state government to make its promises credible to a minority regarding the preservation of its political and economic rights will increase the probability that the group will pursue goals outside of the existing state framework in order to protect its rights from potential violations by the state [Root 1989; Weingast 1995, Weingast and Schultz 1996].[10]

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[8]) The existence of international organisations such as NATO and the EU likely mitigates the extent to which a community must be economically and militarily self-sufficient to become a viable state in the international system. If this is true, then the actual 'size' threshold for statehood is probably lower today than it was in the past.

[9]) This is because states are disinclined to permit the separation of a territory upon which many members of the majority group reside. Moreover, governments are generally unwilling to accept the loss of their territory for economic reasons as well as the fact that regional secession can be seen as a threat to the integrity of the state itself.

[10]) Weingast demonstrates the logic of the 'credible commitment' problem in a variety of different contexts, including political development, democratisation and ethnic conflict. For example, he notes that a central dilemma faced by governments is how a government strong enough to protect property rights can credibly commit not to confiscate the wealth of its citizens. He argues that "market-preserving federalism" serves as one institutional solution to this problem. In brief, the central government 'ties its hands' by devolving authority to local units, thus establishing a degree of regional autonomy on the local level. This induces competition among lower units of the federal structure, leading them to implement policies favourable to their local economies, thus promoting growth. The additional tax revenue generated through this economic growth means that it is in the central government's interest to preserve these federal arrangements. Thus, the central government has effectively made a credible commitment not to confiscate the wealth of its citizens – the institutions are self-enforcing [Weingast 1995].

Group Traits as Predictors of (and Limits on) Extremity of Ethnic Demands [Fig. 1]



In the context of this project, it is important to understand exactly how a credible commitment to non-aggression is made. I will determine the means by which a government makes its promises credible by investigating conditions under which governments have succeeded in scaling back the demands of national minorities as well as those in which the central government has failed to do so. 'Success' will be measured as cases in which a national minority has both the capacity and incentive to seek some separation from the state framework, but does not advance these claims due to promises made to this minority by the central government. A commitment to non-aggression can also be made more credible over time, as a government capable of aggressing against a minority is observed to fulfil its promises to protect the economic and political status of its minority. Under such circumstances an ethnic group will be less likely to pursue protection from the central government through some measure of separation from the state. The impact of this independent variable can best be measured through intensive case analysis.

3.B *Perceived value of an 'outside option'*. The greater the perceived rewards relative to costs of exiting the state framework, the greater the likelihood that the group will pursue this goal. Conversely, the higher the relative costs of opting out of the system, the higher the probability that this group will choose to pursue its goals within the context of the existing framework of representation [Vayrynen 1994: 18].[11] While the first variant

[11]) This is a different phenomenon from the credible commitment problem, in that there are cases in which the perceived value of an 'outside option' is so great that a minority will seek to exit a state framework regardless of the existence of a credible commitment on the part of the host state. Slovenia appears to be one such case, in the sense that Slovenia appears to have made the calcula-

above requires that the minority group and central government have a shared interest in maintaining the integrity of the state framework, the second variant accounts for cases in which there is no such shared interest. Rather, the national minority in question perceives that the minimum rewards of exiting the state framework are absolutely greater than the maximum rewards that can be achieved by remaining within the bounds of the existing state. Credibility of promises made by the government to protect the minority's status is thus irrelevant to this set of cases.

Intervening Variable:

3) *The bargaining strength and activities of an international organisation or a lobby state with which a group identifies*:[12]

If the lobby state has bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the group's host state (through, for example, possession of an ethnic minority belonging to the host state) and if the lobby state acts to support separatist or irredentist aspirations of the group, this will increase the likelihood that the group will assert its goals in a way that challenges the existing state framework. If, on the other hand, the lobby state has minimal bargaining power or fails to support separatist/irredentist or broad power-sharing goals of the group, this works to decrease the probability that the group will seek to advance its aims outside of the existing system.[13] Here, I will examine the ways in which an international organization or outside lobby state can assist a central government in making promises to protect the rights of its national minorities credible. See Figure 2 for a schematic depiction of these variables.

The interaction of the above variables and their impact on group claims is illustrated in Figure 3. There are two broad routes to the pursuit and radicalisation of group claims. In the first case, exiting the existing state may be the outcome of calculations by elites, and by the population at large, that the minimum expected economic and/or security rewards of exiting the state framework exceed the maximum expected costs of remaining within the borders of the existing state. If the expected costs of exiting the system are not prohibitively high (as in costly warfare with the rump state) and the expected benefits of exiting clearly outweigh the costs, the group is likely to advance more radicalised ethnic claims such as secession or irredentism. The actions and bargaining power of an outside lobby actor can act to moderate or radicalise these claims. A good

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tion that its entrance into the EU (upon which its leadership and population placed a high premium) seemed much more likely if Slovenia were to separate itself from the economically-backward Yugoslav state.

12) This variable has an important interaction effect with the above variables, in that the value that a group places on an outside option of irredentism is importantly mediated by the *availability* of that option. For example, following World War One, the Sudeten Germans placed a high premium on joining the Austrian state, but this possibility was ruled out soon after the peace settlement by the war-weary Austrian government.

13) Another possible activity undertaken by lobby states (as seen in the case of Hungary and ethnic Hungarian minorities abroad) is that of pressing for greater territorial or political autonomy for minorities that exist outside of one's borders. Although this may not directly challenge the *integrity* of the state's authority as would the support of irredentist or separatist impulses of minority groups, such goals constitute a less extreme, yet significant, challenge to the structure of the state in its existing form.

example of this phenomenon is the secession of Slovenia at the start of the 1990 Yugoslav War.

Independent Variables Impacting Extremity of Group Demands [Fig. 2]



The second route – and one that more broadly concerns this study – involves cases in which the group has a clear economic and/or political interest in remaining within the state framework, but cannot be assured that the central government will not aggress against them. In other words, the group and the state have a *shared* interest in remaining united. The central government therefore has an interest in credibly committing to protect the status of the group. Uncertainties generated by radical regime change or by a shift in political power from one communal group or class to another, however, often lead to ethnic mobilisation based on fear of the majority. This in turn generates a political elite who capitalise upon such fears who campaign upon the danger of government discrimination against the group. This elite will attempt to persuade its constituency that it is necessary to protect against government aggression through some degree of group autonomy.

Politicization of Ethnic Identity:
The Basic Model [Fig. 3]



When groups are successfully mobilised, the salience of ethnic cleavages increases, thus heightening fear on the part of the majority and, in turn, increasing the potential for actual government discrimination against the group. When awareness of potential discrimination is thus supplemented by acts of aggression against the group, minority fear of the centre is thus legitimated and the cycle is repeated. In this way, ethnic mobilisation escalates, leading to the advancement of political demands by ethnic elites who can now legitimately claim to represent the interests of the entire group. These demands become more radicalised with the escalation of this cycle of ethnic mobilisation. The actions and bargaining power of a lobby state or organisation then act as an intervening variable to either radicalise or moderate the extremity of ethnic claims. If, however, the cycle of ethnic mobilisation is broken through, for example, a lack of observed acts of aggression by the centre against the group, then members of the group will tend to politicise along dimensions other than ethnic identity. The political claims advanced by the ethnic leaders, now lacking support within the group, will tend to moderate and may even disappear. (The case of the Moravian movement of the early 1990's in Czechoslovakia illustrates this point nicely.) Further, unification of ethnic representation is impacted by the level of political mobilisation within a group. When a group's fear of discrimination by the government or majority is high, members of the group will tend to vote for ethnic parties, which typically form 'ethnic' platforms in an effort to attract the votes of the median member of the group. As fear of the centre dissipates, however, ethnic parties appeal to other identities in an effort to compete for the support of a group that has begun to vote along economic – as opposed to ethnic – dimensions. See Figure 4 for an illustration of this model.

Factors Impacting Political Unification within Ethnic Groups [Fig. 4]



IV. Testing the Hypotheses

A. Sudeten Germans:[14]

At the time of the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, the Sudeten German minority numbered over 3 million, constituting 23 per cent of the state population [Bugajski 1994: 294]. Within the German-speaking *Sudetenland*, Germans made up an overwhelming majority, making up 90 to 100 per cent of the population in many districts [1921 Czechoslovak census figures, as cited in Essler 1938: 1]. Given their structural features, this group had the capacity to seek extreme group goals of complete exit of the existing state framework.[15]

Having established that the Germans were capable of pursuing the most extreme form of autonomy on the basis of its structural features, we can now attempt to predict the circumstances under which the group would actually advance such goals. I argue that the first route to advancement of political claims as represented by 'perceived rewards of exiting the state framework' in Figure 3 does not usefully apply to the Sudeten German case because it is clear that the group had a clear interest in remaining within the Czechoslovak state. Particularly in the years following World War One, it became apparent to German industrialists – and to German workers – that the Czechoslovak government was

14) The term 'Sudeten Germans' has, since World War Two, been used to refer to Germans within the borders of the Czechoslovak state [Wingfield 1989: xv.]. I have adopted this definition for the purposes of this paper.

15) Although the geographical concentration of the Sudeten German group along the borders of Bohemia and Moravia effectively prevented the group from realistically pursuing goals of political unification necessary to achieving sovereignty, this group was capable of suing for extreme political separation in the form of *irredentism*, as Sudetenland bordered upon the co-ethnic states of Austria and Germany.

far more likely to protect the interests of industry than either Austria or Germany. These two states were mired in social and economic instability, threatened as they were by communist forces, which industrialists in particular viewed with mistrust. Further, Sudeten German industries and their workers produced materials for an internal Czechoslovak market, thus depending for their livelihoods upon the cohesion between the Sudetenland and the Czech interior. Most Sudeten German industrialists also wished to avoid competition with the Reich's industry and therefore opposed the separation of *'Deutschböhmen'* from Czechoslovakia [Kopecek 1996: 67; *Lidové noviny*, 9 December 1918]. In fact, the growing influence of German bourgeois interests ultimately provided crucial support to pro-capitalist German parties such as the Agrarians, the first Sudeten German party to lobby for true co-habitation within the Czechoslovak state.

Disincentives to remaining within the Czechoslovak state primarily involved fears that the new government would discriminate against the Sudeten German minority on an ethnic basis. The Sudeten German case thus follows the second route to advancement of ethnic claims, given the failure of the Czechoslovak government to credibly commit to preserving the economic and political rights of the Sudeten German minority. This commitment problem was all the more salient given justifiable fears that the Czechs would utilise their new-found power to redress the perceived inequalities between Czechs and Germans under the Habsburg Monarchy.

Sudeten Germans enjoyed extensive economic, cultural and political privileges over Czechs under the pro-German monarchy. Although the working class in the Czech lands was composed of both ethnic groups, Sudeten Germans dominated ownership and management positions and held a disproportionate share of the wealth in the region [Wingfield 1989: 5]. Further, those without a command of the German language were barred from the better-paid civil posts and more prestigious occupations, over which German government officials and businesspersons enjoyed a near monopoly. The Sudeten Germans also had significant electoral advantages in both the Bohemian Diet and in the *Reichsrat*; German votes were weighted in such a way that they would never be outvoted by Czech deputies in the Bohemian Diet. They were thus in a position to use their dominant political power to protect their economic privileges in the Czech lands.

Sudeten Germans' economic privileges under the Habsburg regime were therefore contingent upon their political dominance, which in turn was due to: (1) pro-German domination of the territory in which they resided, and (2), their numerical majority relative to the Czechs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire at large (and therefore within the *Reichsrat*). I hypothesise, therefore, that the Sudeten Germans would be likely to advance claims outside of the framework of representation (through irredentism or broad territorial autonomy)[16] *once these conditions no longer held*, largely because the Sudeten Germans could not be certain that the Czechoslovak state would not infringe upon their pre-World War One economic, political or cultural status. The extent to which this group will seek such claims, however, is importantly mitigated (1) by the activities, and (2) power of a 'lobby state' (in this case, Germany and Austria). In other words, as the lobby states' bargaining power efforts to secure autonomy for the minority increase, Sudeten German claims should become more radical, and vice versa. Having established that the Sudeten

[16]) As mentioned earlier, I argue that *separatist* goals were unlikely to have been advanced by the Sudeten Germans. This is due to the impracticality of such a goal given the geographical spread of the Sudetenland.

Germans were likely to attempt to exit the Czechoslovak state at the close of World War One, I will now test this hypothesis against the evidence.

The Sudeten Germans, anticipating the creation of a pan-German state that would encompass the Sudetenland, were stunned by the rapid political events that reduced them to a national minority in the newly-formed Czechoslovak state. Only months after Allied recognition of Czechoslovakia in 1918, the Czechoslovak government began to occupy all the German towns in the Sudetenland. In the meantime, the Sudeten Germans set up provisional governments in Reichenberg, Troppau, Krumau and Znaim. These governments were conceived as transitional arrangements until the hoped-for *Anschluss* between Austria and Germany was to occur, at which time the Sudeten Germans would be incorporated into a new pan-German state. Some of these regional governments requested "negotiations" with the Czechoslovak state in order to "sustain peace and order between the two nations" [*Lidové noviny*, 8 November 1918].

The Sudeten German people supported these governments and their goals of joining Sudetenland with Austro-Germany. Despite this, when the Czechoslovak authorities occupied the Sudetenland and dissolved the governments, the ethnic German population acquiesced peacefully. There are two main reasons for this. First, the Germans were profoundly war-weary following the close of World War One, as Bohemian Germans had shouldered a disproportionate amount of the war burden relative to their Czech compatriots. More importantly, the German population clearly calculated that engaging in violence against the Czechs would damage their case for irredentist arrangements at the Paris Peace Conference which was already underway [Campbell 1975: 52; Wiskemann 1938: 84]. Despite their failure to rise forcefully against the Czechoslovak 'occupiers', ethnic Germans supported their leaders' irredentist goals regardless of class. Even German industrialists, for whom separation from Czechoslovakia represented serious economic costs, came out in favour of national self-determination during a meeting of leading German industrialists in Liberec. Clearly, the prospect of becoming a national minority in a Slavic state must have been extremely unattractive – and the pressure from their fellow Germans at the time extremely strong – for Germans who had a clear economic interest in co-operation with the Czechs to advocate separation following the establishment of the Czechoslovak state [Campbell 1975: 50]. Radicalisation of the Sudeten German minority was thus a clear outcome of a commitment problem on the part of the Czechoslovak government at the close of World War One.

The threat of the centre was doubly salient following the overt establishment of a "Czechoslovak" national state. Although he later proved himself a defender of national minority rights, Czechoslovakia's first president Tomáš Masaryk confirmed Sudeten German suspicions that the new Czechoslovak state was hostile to their interests when, in his first political message upon returning to Czechoslovakia from the Peace Conference, he referred to the Germans as "immigrants and colonists" [*Lidové noviny*, 23 December 1918]. In response to this, the *Prager Tagblatt* wrote that there was nothing for the Germans to do at this point but wait for the final outcome of the Peace Conference. Meanwhile, the Bohemian-German Territorial Assembly called the central government occupation of the Sudeten land "illegal," vowing that the German minority "would fight until victorious" [*Lidové noviny*, 29 December 1918]. During this time, Sudeten German leader Rudolf Lodgman called on the German population to resist the construction of a Czechoslovak state. Obstructionism among Sudeten Germans was perhaps at its peak during this time and reflected the very visceral reaction of ethnic Germans to the estab-

lishment of a national state ostensibly for Czechs and Slovaks over citizens of other nationalities. No matter how liberal, no minority treaty could neutralise the threat implicit in the construction of such an explicitly exclusionary state. Sudeten German fears were given further validation during the failed negotiations between ethnic German leaders and the Czechoslovak government in 1918 when Czech leader Alois Rašín supposedly greeted German Social Democratic Party (DSAP) leader Josef Seliger with the remark, "We don't negotiate with traitors!" Seliger later used Rašín's remark to successfully rally a German audience against the Czechs several days later. By continually reminding their constituency of such incidents, Sudeten German leaders thus evoked secessionist interests even among Germans who stood to lose by separation from Czechoslovakia.

Social organisations served as important mobilising devices in this context, as evidenced by the German Social Democratic Party's overwhelming victories in the Sudetenland in both the 1919 communal elections and later in the 1920 national elections. DSAP success cannot be explained merely by an attractive electoral platform, as virtually *all* Sudeten German parties advocated the same goal: national self-determination. Rather, having taken the lead in establishing the regional Sudeten governments, the DSAP already held dominant positions in local government, press and community organisations. Control over these social networks critically assisted them in maintaining a lead position in the Sudeten German nationalist movement, – the DSAP leadership could use these resource networks to draw on the support of their constituency when needed [Kitschelt 1993].

Although the Czechoslovak government had promised to preserve the economic and political rights of the Sudeten Germans on September 1919 in the form of a minority treaty that gave ethnic Germans the right to hold public office, receive education in their native tongue, and conduct official business in their native language [Wiskemann 1938: 93], promises to preserve Sudeten German rights were clearly not perceived as credible among the Sudeten Germans, the majority of whom, "regardless of their politics and class background, wanted to remain part of Austria" [Wingfield 1989: xiv]. At the same time, it had become increasingly evident to the Sudeten Germans that the Czechoslovak government was not about to permit the Germans to pursue irredentist goals. The Czechs had demonstrated that they would use military force to ensure that such aspirations be held in check. More importantly, the Austrian and German governments had responded negatively or not at all to the Sudeten Germans' irredentist claims. After Sudeten German 'authorities' attempted to arrange for German military assistance against the Czechs in 1919, they were told by the war-weary Reich that "the Sudetendeutschen must satisfy themselves with (territorial) autonomy" [Wiskemann 1938: 95].

Austria, whose premier persistently appealed to Peace Conference powers for unification with Germany as well as the Sudetenland, had meanwhile been forbidden by the Allies to create a pan-German state. The Allied powers maintained that Austria must remain a neutral state under the supervision of the League of Nations [*Lidové noviny*, 5 May 1919]. Significantly, when Germany and Austria signed the Treaty of Versailles in the summer of 1919, surrendering territorial claims upon Czechoslovakia, Sudeten German parties and local German representatives uniformly scaled back their political demands against the state from irredentism to territorial autonomy. During this time, the Sudeten German newspaper *Morgenzeitung* wrote that the Germans must fight to the last moment against being united with Czechoslovakia, but that if the Peace Conference decided against them, they would have to fight for autonomy within the boundaries of

Czechoslovakia [*Lidové noviny*, 3 May 1919]. Other Sudeten German representatives echoed this sentiment, saying that "nothing now remained for the Germans but working to achieve autonomy and civic freedom (within Czechoslovakia)" [*Lidové noviny*, 11 May 1919]. Even Lodgman, the radical proponent of *'Deutschböhmen'* and Sudeten irredentism, proclaimed that territorial autonomy was now the only viable option for the Sudeten Germans.

Irredentism had thus been ruled out by the German minority and its leaders as a viable option. Indeed, by 1920, aside from a few renegade bases in Bohemia aided by pan-German military extremists on either side of the German border, the majority of Sudeten Germans had resigned themselves to residing within the borders of the Czechoslovak state [Bugajski 1994: 295]. The extent to which this minority sought to exit the existing state framework had been clearly circumscribed by the activities of their potential lobby states, Germany and Austria. Despite this, the Czechoslovak government had yet to credibly commit to protecting Sudeten German rights within the Czechoslovak state. The German minority therefore continued to seek protection from the state through territorial autonomy, as a lesser protection than complete separation. As the most popular Sudeten German party during this period,[17] we can use DSAP claims as a loose proxy for the goals sought by Sudeten Germans as a whole. The DSAP party program of 1919 supported the borders of the existing Czechoslovak state, but called for extensive autonomy for the state's national minorities. DSAP Chairman Josef Seliger advocated the creation of a "corporate body through which each nationality would govern itself by means of a national council and a government." These 'governments' would be responsible for "legal regulation of the nationalities, administration of the educational system, and maintenance of ethnic culture" for each nationality. The DSAP platform thus favoured broad territorial autonomy on the part of the Czechoslovakia's national minorities, confirming the above hypothesis. In fact, the majority of Sudeten German parties echoed these goals in their electoral platforms.

Due to their growing recognition that continued lack of participation in Czechoslovak politics was hurting their cause, Sudeten German parties ultimately decided to run in the 1920 national elections, winning seats in the Czechoslovak National Assembly. However, continued obstructionism toward the Czechoslovak government, together with calls for broad territorial autonomy from the Czechoslovak state, continued until 1922. At this point, Sudeten German parties representing industrial interests broke with more radical nationalist parties over co-operation with the Czechs. The move toward greater co-operation by moderate German parties was largely in response to the state's proven commitment to protecting industrial interests in the Czech lands, in contrast to shakier relations between the state and private enterprise in Austria and Germany. The government's pro-market track record gradually decreased the perception among Sudeten Germans that the centre represented a threat to German industrial interests. This led to a split in the Sudeten German parliamentary club over the desirability of co-operation with the Czechoslovak government.

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17) The German Social Democratic Party enjoyed the most significant political support among the Sudeten Germans at this time, capturing one-half of the German vote in Bohemia in the first Czechoslovak communal elections of 1919 and taking control of several municipal governments [Wingfield 1989: 14-15].

The Czechoslovak government was finally able to fully commit to protecting the Sudeten German minority in 1925. This commitment provided the basis for an overall moderation in Sudeten German claims, and was accompanied by the relative political de-mobilisation of the German ethnic identity. Just weeks before the 1925 national elections, Germany concluded a treaty with France (Czechoslovakia's political patron) and Great Britain. The treaty included a timetable for Germany's entry into the League of Nations. This ushered in a period of German-French rapprochement. With the growth in Berlin's diplomatic power and consequent Czech concern over the reliability of their French ally as a balance against Germany, the Czechoslovak government had a clear incentive to court Germany's favour by seeking to improve relations with Sudeten Germans. This could best be achieved by drawing the Sudeten Germans into government. Czechoslovakia's new international constraints thus provided a credible promise to the Sudeten German minority that the government would protect the group's political and economic rights with certainty. The results of the November 1925 elections demonstrated that the Sudeten Germans now viewed the central government as non-threatening and consequently favoured co-operation with the Czechoslovak state. Indeed, the most pro-Czechoslovakia German party achieved a huge victory in 1925, while pro-autonomy German Nationals and German National Socialists lost support. Interestingly, though extremist Sudeten German leaders continued to rail against the Czechoslovak state and the danger of co-operating with Czechs, the most extremist parties lost electoral support in the 1925 elections. This demonstrates that elites by themselves cannot mobilise a population if there is no sound basis for believing in the 'threat'. The state's credible commitment to protect the Sudeten Germans resulted in the further fracturing of Sudeten German political representation, as ethnic German voters began to vote along economic as opposed to purely ethnic dimensions. Sudeten German platforms consequently multiplied in an effort to compete for the German vote [Wiskemann 1938: 131]. Further, the most popular Sudeten German parties during this period generally sought more *moderate* claims against the state including linguistic rights and cultural autonomy for the German minority, revealing a further moderation of minority claims against the state in line with a radically diminished Sudeten German fear of the centre. Electoral support for Sudeten German parties in the First Czechoslovak Republic is given below.

Table 1. Election Results to Czechoslovak House of Representatives

Party	1920	1925	1929	1935
National Social Workers Party (later Sudeten German Party)*	5.3	2.4	2.8	15.7
German Nationals*	-	3.4	2.6	-
German Social Democrats	11.1	5.8	6.9	3.6
Bund der Landwirte	3.9	8.0	-	1.7
German Christian Socials	2.5	4.4	4.7	2.0

*) These parties remained negativist in their approach to Czechoslovakia.
Source: 1938 Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook.

The above chart illustrates the impact that 'fear of the centre' had on the mobilisation and de-mobilisation of the Sudeten German identity. The Germans voted as a bloc in 1920 for German parties calling for broad territorial autonomy from the Czechoslovak state during the time that fear of the state was high. Results of the 1925 elections – when fear of the

state was relatively low – demonstrates the phenomenon of relative ethnic demobilisation as Sudeten German parties began to advance a variety of different platforms in order to attract a constituency that had begun to vote along an economic dimension. Interestingly, the Sudeten German minority voted again as a bloc for the extremist Sudeten German Party in the early 1930's, as the credibility of Czechoslovakia's promise to protecting Sudeten German rights faltered in the wake of worsening relations between Prague and Berlin. This was largely due to the resurgence of Germany as an expansionist power, accompanied by calls for annexation of ethnic German areas. The destabilisation of the centre's commitment to this group thus re-mobilised the group, while the world recession created the basis for Sudeten German fears that the Czechoslovak government would react to economic difficulties by violating the rights of its German minority.

This analysis of the Sudeten German claims demonstrates that the above two variables, (1) the credible commitment of the centre toward protecting group economic and political status, and (2), the activities and bargaining power of the group's 'lobby' state(s), had a significant impact on the extremity of group claims advanced against the centre. In examining the Sudeten German case immediately following the establishment of the Czechoslovak state, I was able to control for such variables as group-specific traits, leadership, and other cultural variables in order to assess the independent effect that bargaining relations between the centre and the group as well as the activities of outside actors had on the extent to which this group would seek to exit the existing state framework. The effects of the above two variables on group claims in this case are significant and in the predicted direction.

B. Moravians

Moravians constitute 13 per cent of the population of the Czech Republic according to the 1991 Czechoslovak census. Moravia is one of the two Czech 'historical lands', and makes up the eastern half of the Czech state. Historically, the two regions have coexisted peacefully, and in 1918 the Moravian and Bohemian Czech lands merged with Austrian Silesia and the territories of Slovakia and Ruthenia to create the Czechoslovak Republic. The Moravian region is sufficiently large – according to the above model – for the advancement of more extreme claims against the state, but it is difficult to determine how "compact" the group is given the weakness of 'Moravianness' as a political identity. Traditionally, Moravia has been perceived as a mere region within a homogenous Czech nation. However, according to the 1991 Czechoslovak census, 13 per cent of the Czech population declared themselves to be "Moravian" for the first time since World War Two [Bugajski 1994: 293]. The remaining indigenous inhabitants of Moravia overwhelmingly claimed Czech nationality (roughly half of Moravian inhabitants declared themselves to be "Czech" in the 1991 census).[18] In sum, while this 'group' is sizable, 'Moravianness' does not appear to be an identity uniformly felt among inhabitants of the region. Therefore, unlike the Sudeten Germans, the Moravians can only be loosely categorised as a large ethnic group based upon its structural characteristics. Consequently, a *complete* exit of the system is probably not feasible for the Moravian minority. I will now investigate the Moravian group in post-communist Czechoslovakia in terms of the above two vari-

[18]) The Moravian identity did, however, gain salience in the region after the fall of communism, primarily in the regional capital of Brno and surrounding area of South Moravia [Bugajski 1994: 111].

ables in order to determine the extent to which this regional group is likely to advance goals outside of the framework of the Czechoslovak state.

To begin with, the first route to the advancement of ethnic claims does not apply to the Moravians, primarily because a complete exit from the Czechoslovak state is not a feasible goal for the group, given: (1) the weakness of the Moravian identity following the Velvet Revolution, (2) Moravia's geographical location sandwiched between two constituent members of a 'federal' state, and (3), Moravia's economic dependence on the larger Czechoslovak market. The Moravian case thus applies to the second route of nationalism, provoked by fear of government discrimination against the region. Advancement of ethnic claims in this case therefore crucially depends upon the ability of the Moravian political elites to mobilise the population upon fears of the central government. Success of this mobilisation, in turn, depends upon substantiation of the perception of government threat, through actual acts of government discrimination against the group. However, unlike the Sudeten German case – in which successive land, educational and economic reforms fed the perception that the central government constituted a threat to the Sudeten Germans – the Moravian political elites had little concrete evidence of government persecution against the region that could be used to substantiate claims of discrimination. As seen in the chart given below, unemployment differentials between Moravia and Bohemia (the other 'historical' Czech land) at the time of the fall of the communist regime were negligible.

Table 2. Unemployment by region in the Czech Republic

Unemployment	1990	1991	1992
Czech Republic	*0.73*	*4.13*	*2.57*
Central Bohemia	0.66	3.99	2.71
North Bohemia	0.65	4.19	2.89
West Bohemia	0.55	2.85	2.08
South Bohemia	0.77	4.24	2.26
East Bohemia	0.62	4.09	2.26
South Moravia	*0.70*	*4.76*	*2.97*
North Moravia	*1.18*	*6.17*	*3.98*

Source: Labor and Unemployment in the Czech Republic, Czech Statistical Office, 1994.

The absence of clear economic inequities between the Moravian and Bohemian regions meant that political elites could only mobilise the group on the basis of fears of *future* economic shocks to the region resulting from post-communist reforms.

A second constant on Moravian nationalism is that it has no lobby state that ethnically identifies with the region and that is committed to lobbying on its behalf. In the early 1990s, either Czech or Slovak Republics could have lobbied for Moravian autonomy within the Czechoslovak federation, but such support occurred only when it was perceived to serve the interests of one or both sides in the context of Czech-Slovak negotiations over the construction of a new federal state. This contingency means that the window of opportunity in which Moravian political elites could obtain broader goals – such as tri-federalism – was limited to the 1992 deadline for establishing the new federal constitution. The unconsolidated nature of Moravian political identity – together with the absence of an outside state or organisation that consistently lobbies on its behalf as well

as the lack of evident discrimination on the part of the state – leads to the prediction that this group is significantly less likely than the Sudeten Germans to pursue ethnic claims outside of the existing state framework.

In their efforts to mobilise residents of this region after the fall of communism in 1989, Moravian political elites *have* in fact accused the central government of "regional discrimination". These elites have consistently maintained that, although Moravia contains 39 percent of the Czech population, the region receives only *32* percent of state subsidies [Bugajski 1994: 307]. In reality, however, there is no concrete evidence indicating that Moravian districts are systematically discriminated against when compared to Bohemian districts.[19] Further, since the Moravian economy is structurally similar to that of Bohemia, it was well-positioned to benefit economically from free market reforms. Consequently, the prospect of continued liberal market reforms (an expected outcome of the post-1989 era, given the electoral strength of pro-reform Czech parties) did not pose the same level of threat to Moravia as they did to Slovakia. Unlike Slovakia, Moravia was not expected to suffer under market liberalisation.

In order to examine the variation of Moravian claims against the state, I will use as a proxy the demands advanced by the HSD-SMS (Movement for the Self-Governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia), which was the party with the most significant electoral support in Moravia (representing fully 10 per cent of the vote in the entire Czech Republic in the July 1990 general elections). This party was formed with the primary aim of replacing the dual Czechoslovak federation with a tripartite system in which Moravia and Silesia[20] would together constitute a third "autonomous republic", receiving a proportionate share of state funds. Indeed, the realisation of a 'just distribution' of state allocations was the primary component of the HSD-SMS 1990 campaign platform.

By most accounts, Czechs were surprised by the relative success of the movement in 1990. As in the Sudeten German case, the success of the movement depended critically upon the organisational structures of HSD-SMS – an outgrowth of the Moravian cultural organisation (MOH). MOH had been established well before 1989 and was headed by Dr. Boleslav Bárta, who was held in high esteem by Moravian inhabitants as the historic champion of Moravian regional interests. Bárta, widely viewed as 'the father of Moravian nationalism', had pushed for a Czech-Moravian-Slovak tri-federal state during negotiations over a new federal constitution in 1969. With this legacy, Bárta was seen as the champion of Moravians interests, while other post-communist leaders – themselves involved in internecine fights within the Civic Forum – were viewed as self-interested Prague centralists. With "autonomy from Prague" as his rallying cry, Bárta successfully organised meetings and protests in Brno – the capitol of Moravia – at which Bárta and other regional elites argued for the establishment of Moravian regional autonomy along the lines of what was enjoyed by the Slovak Republic. One observer of the Moravian movement recalled rallies organised in the months leading up to the 1990 elections in which people proclaimed that "what those people do in Prague (in the revolution) is in

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[19]) Interview, Professor of Sociology Tomáš Sirovátka, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic 9 February 1998.

[20]) Silesia forms another 'historical land' within the Czech lands, comprising the farthest northeast corner of the Czech Republic.

Prague. We have our fields and our factories and wine. Let Moravia be for Moravians."[21] During this time, Moravian political elites continually made anti-Prague statements on the television and radio, claiming that Moravia was economically better-off than Bohemia, and that more money in taxes was sent Prague than was returned in the form of state subsidies. Political elites argued publicly for the establishment of autonomous political and economic institutions as well as an independent tax authority for Moravia, so that "what was produced in Moravia would remain in Moravia."[22] These public statements, appearing continually in the newspapers and on television, arguably resulted in the questionable belief by a majority Moravian inhabitants that Moravia was making net transfer payments to Bohemia, and that Moravian political autonomy would result in greater regional prosperity. Further, the desire for regional autonomy was linked with a feeling of 'Moravian identity' in the minds of most of the movement's supporters. In fact, there is a positive correlation between self-identification as 'Moravian' in the national census and support for HSD-SMS in 1990 national elections. Also, the highest concentrations of HDS-SMS support and Moravian identification were to be found in the Brno area, which was HSD-SMS's organisational base. This clearly demonstrates the importance that organisational resources play in fomenting social or, in this case, ethnic movements [McCarthy and Zald 1986: 20].

Having galvanised substantial regional support for their aims, HSD-SMS obtained 22 seats in the Czech National Council in the national elections of 1990 and was invited into the Czech government.[23] In August 1990, the party put forth a proposal for the establishment of Moravia as a constituent member of the federation. This proposal was rejected, although their coalition partners assured party representatives that Czech leaders were in favour of Moravian regional autonomy [Mareš 1998]. Meanwhile, articles ran in the mainstream Czech press throughout the early 1990s, calling the movement 'artificial' and arguing that 'Moravian' identity did not exist any more so than did 'South Bohemian' or 'East Bohemian' identities [*Lidové noviny*, 31 January 1990, 17 March 1990].

In the face of Czech opposition, splits thus began to appear in Moravian political representation as well as within HSD-SMS itself. Controversy emerged over Bárta's suspected collaboration with the StB (the communist-era secret police), as well as over the desired goals of the Moravian movement. Ivan Dřímal, chair of the Moravian National Party (MNS), and Bárta disagreed over the best means of achieving a working tri-federation. Bárta supported a more gradualist approach of obtaining Moravian territorial autonomy within the framework of the Czech Republic, while Dřímal favoured the more radical approach of seeking tri-federal status for Moravia as an independent member of the new federation. Some deputies from the Slovak Republic (including future Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar) openly supported the more radical approach inviting Dřímal and a delegation of Moravian political elites for discussions in Bratislava with an aim of jointly agreeing on some tri-federal structure. This was done in the hope of drawing

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[21]) Interview, Professor Miroslav Mareš, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, 10 February 1998.

[22]) Interview, Professor Tomáš Sirovátka, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic, 22 December 1997.

[23]) Although the party also won seats in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, the party was relatively weak in the bigger body and thus constrained in its efforts to carry out the goals of the movement.

Moravia into the Slovak camp, thus diluting Czech political influence in a '2 against 1' tri-federal system. In the end, Bárta's more gradualist approach (which the Czechs favoured) prevailed within the Moravian movement, with the result that Moravian elites completely lost Slovak support. This was due to the Slovak perception that this seemingly pro-Czech gesture meant that Moravia would be allied with the Czechs on all substantive matters in a *de facto* '2 against 1' "anti-Slovak" tri-federation (Interview, Ivan Dřímal, 10 February 1998). Ironically, the Czechs harboured similar fears. Although Czech deputies paid lip-service to the ideal of achieving greater Moravian autonomy, Czechs were haunted by the prospect of a Moravian-Slovak coalition, which could reduce their power to one-third under a tripartite system.

Support for HSD-SMS – and for Moravian parties in general – thus began to decline with clear emergence of *both* Czech and Slovak opposition to a tri-federation. Continued conflicts in HSD-SMS, again surrounding Bárta, resulted in further division of the party into two parliamentary clubs: HSD-SMS1 and HSD-SMS2 in early 1991, after which Bárta withdrew from the ČNR government coalition, reasoning that he could better mobilise public support for the Moravian movement outside the Czech government. In April 1991, Bárta led demonstrations in Brno in support for Moravian autonomy, claiming that Moravia was losing its critical chance to obtain political power under new federal structure. This bid for public support temporarily boosted HSD-SMS's standing with the government. However, their small increase in support was cut short with Bárta's subsequent death, after which the Moravian movement lost the core of its support with the loss of Bárta's charismatic leadership [Mareš 1998]. HSD-SMS again won seats in the Czech National Council in the June 1992 elections, but public support for the movement in Moravia continued to dwindle, dropping to just over 2 percent of the vote in communal elections in the fall of 1992. Following June 1992 Mečiar-Klaus talks, resulting in the dissolution of the federation, Moravian political elites accordingly scaled their political claims back to regional autonomy *within the framework* of the Czech state. In the meantime, the Moravian movement continued to lose support in Moravia as its inhabitants viewed the Czech-Slovak split as a object lesson on the negative consequences of ethnic mobilisation. These views were continually reinforced by articles in mainstream Czech press.

Perhaps most importantly, however, the central government's economic reforms had so far *failed* to produce a clear economic cleavage between Moravia and Bohemia. The lack of evidence of regional discrimination by the central government thus disrupted the cycle of ethnic mobilisation in Moravia, and its inhabitants increasingly began to vote along economic and social – as opposed to ethnic – lines. In an effort to attract the votes of their former constituency, Moravian parties began to multiply, split and form new coalitions with various other parties. In the elections of 1996, Moravian parties finally failed to meet the 5% threshold for entering Parliament and disappeared from the Czech political scene.

Table 3. Moravian Parties and Election Results

Party	1990 Federal Elections	1990 Local Elections	1992 Federal Elections	1994 Local Elections
HSD-SMS	10% to ČNR; 8% to SL and 9% to SN	4%	5% (coalition with MNS)	0.8% (now Czech-Moravian Party of Middle – ČMSS)
MNS	-	-	-	0.4%
HSMS	-	-	-	0.4% (coalition of members from MNS and ČMSS)
MOH-KDU	8% to ČNR (MOH got only one mandate)	0.02%	-	-

Sources: Miroslav Mareš, Czech Statistical Yearbook 1996.

The above chart illustrates the growing competition among Moravian parties, as their leaders attempted to attract voters in the context of dwindling support for the Moravian movement. As seen in Figure 4, unification of the Moravian movement disappeared as relative distrust of the central government decreased. This case also demonstrates the important role played by a lobby state in the success of this movement, as Czech and then Slovak opposition to the tri-federation – and ultimately the Czech-Slovak split – led Moravian political elites to scale back their demands to regional autonomy within the framework of the Czech state. The cycle of political mobilisation in the case of Moravia was thus ultimately disrupted by the Czech-Slovak split, in the context of a lack of evidence that government reforms were harming the Moravian economy. For these reasons, the Moravian-Czech cleavage lost salience in post-1989 Czech politics.

VII. Conclusions

I have argued that ethnic goal differentiation is a function of both differing structural characteristics and the implicit bargaining games that take place between the central government and its national minorities. In testing these hypotheses, I have utilised longitudinal analysis in the cases of Moravians in post-1989 Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten Germans in the First Czechoslovak Republic in order to examine the causes of shifts in ethnic claims. This analysis has ruled out pre-existing cultural variables such as ethnic identity, leadership skills and historical grievances as alternative explanations for these shifts. Instead, the radicalisation of ethnic claims can be seen as a function of variations in (1) a group's perceived political and economic cost-benefit calculations to remaining within the state framework, and (2) the actions and relative bargaining power of lobby states on behalf of the group.

In testing these hypotheses against the above two cases, I address an important gap in the nationalism literature that has failed to examine the reasons as to why one ethnic group seeks guarantees of cultural autonomy from its state government while another minority attempts secession. This study has also shown how an ethnic group's claims against its central government may become more or less extreme over time as well as how elites utilise social organisations and fears of the centre to mobilise a population

along ethnic lines. I argue that an understanding of the causes that produce a shift in group claims of secession to milder demands of cultural or political autonomy will afford insights into how a central government may act to moderate a minority's demands such that ethnic interests can be peacefully accommodated within existing states.

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The European System of Governance and the Eastern Enlargement

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Abstract: Although it is important to eliminate the illegitimatising undemocratic heritage of the European institutional framework, any attempt to use the institutional reformist process as a means to delay the eastern widening of the European Union could endanger not only the democratic consolidation of the Central and Eastern European societies, but also the security and stability of the continent. Moreover, what it is more worrying, it could jeopardise the unity of the European integrationist project, as countries such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Finland lose interest in building Europe in favour of a greater bilateralism in their relationships with their Eastern neighbours.

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1. The European Union: An International Organisation or a Supranational Entity

Though the European Union is considered as a supranational organisation, it was created with the structures and task assignments of a traditional international body. However, after the approval of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), its supranational elements are now approaching a quantity which suggests that it has already obtained the quality of a federal body in large parts of its substance. Between 1945 and 1955, the European federalist movement, led by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, constituted an important coalition which pushed the issue of European integration to the forefront of political agendas. Throughout Western Europe, the integration was supported in the belief that the establishment of a federal European government would end the long-established pattern of wars between European, sovereign nation-states. Consequently, after the Second World War, Western Europe underwent a remarkable institutional transformation from a collection of divided nation-states to a partially amalgamated community for pragmatic political and economic reasons. Since 1957, the institutional framework and policy competence of the European Community has gradually been consolidated and extended beyond the provisions of the original treaties thanks mainly to two events: the approval in 1986 of the Single European Act (SEA), and in 1992 of the Treaty on European Union. With both events, there has been the creation of a unique European system of governance which now embraces citizenship and monetary union, so empirically it is beyond dispute that the European Union level is now where a high proportion of what used to be regarded as purely domestic policy-making takes place. The locus of power and decision has shifted. Hence, even if the European Community was born as a peculiar form of international organisation, the peculiarities of its unique institutional structure and its unprecedented law-making and judicial powers make it seem more like a federal state, that is, a supranational entity where national governments undoubtedly play an important and crucial role

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in the process of regional integration. The achievements of the European Community have, in practice, strengthened rather than weakened the nation-state, as the successes of the *functionalist approach* have been associated with a weakening rather than a strengthening of the vision of a politically united Europe. Moreover, if in legal terms, the member states have lost part of their national sovereignty in joining, in terms of political reality, they have become potentially much stronger, as the Community was in practice built upon those nation-states that some say it was intended to replace.

From the very beginning of the European project there has been a continuous debate between the integrationist and the inter-governmentalist methods. The first method is exemplified by those who argue that there has been a real loss of power of the member states to Community institutions, that is, a transfer of powers from the national to the EU level in a zero-sum fashion, due to the existence of some kind of co-operative federalism that typifies the decision-making of the European Union. A process of decision-making characterised by a cumulative pattern of accommodation, in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromises that upgrade common interests. The second, inter-governmental method, is defended by those who argue that the member states have used the Community framework as an instrument to enhance their interests and where the national component in EU decision-making is still vital and preponderant based on a *pooling of sovereignties structure*, like in the activities of most international organisations where the nation-state is the main political unit.

The European Union in its present shape is neither a conventional international organisation nor an emerging state based on co-operative federalism, but a new system of governance. It is an unprecedented form of institutional innovation used to serve certain national and Community interests, involving the interaction of a political process described by the supranationalism tendency and a *pooling of sovereignties* framework always resting on a set of inter-governmental deals. It is a halfway-house between confederacy and federation, a strange hybrid where there co-exists an inter-governmental decision-making process, with a supranational normative law in certain areas of Community competence. Nevertheless, this mixed system of a compromised balance of national and Community level competencies, which can be found in Monnet's and Schuman's policy-making model for Europe, has been the result of a distribution shift of powers between these two levels of government. The resulting process shows that the European model is one based on concurrent jurisdiction where the institutions of both levels, supranational and intergovernmental, are deeply engaged in joint tasks, joint sharing of competencies, and participate in shared problem-solving exercises. Under this unique scenario the European Council is the key forum, as it addresses the sovereignty versus interdependence dilemma by co-operative federal means.

It is a mixed, unique system of policy-making cohabitation, where each element has become essential to the survival of the other, but has created a hyper-complex structure of policy-making encompassing a much wider range of public and private policy actors. A unique and flexible system of governance, more tightly organised than a typical international organisation, one which accumulates new functions from time to time, as judged to be necessary by its member states. It is a system that will likely promote the processes by which its supranational-integrationist approach will prevail to the detriment of the eroding of national autonomy and the inter-governmental method, since EU policy-making is a collective exercise involving large numbers of participants, often in intermit-

tent and unpredictable relationships, and given the difficulty in maintaining stable national coalitions. This is one idea that seems to be reinforced in the major amendments to the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act and the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, since they avoid overall constitutional matters and are concentrated on the elaboration of concrete programmes of joint action by member states in specific economic and social areas increasing co-operation and harmonisation. In this respect, we must understand the institutional structure of the Union, as a specific set of institutions optimal for outlining these programs: the Commission to ensure that the programs that they have mapped out and agreed to follow are in fact implemented; the Court to ensure the legality of the process; and the European Parliament (EP) to ensure that it is in some sense democratically supervised. It is a pragmatic, flexible and problem-oriented functional type of government focused at those points within and beyond national or state boundaries where needs converge, but always based on a messy compromise between the federalist model of Europe and the intergovernmental co-operation approach. To prove this, we can turn to the innovations of the TEU. It can be stated that TEU marked yet another step in the process of strengthening the federal-constitutional spirit of European integration, bringing agreement on the European Monetary Union timetable, establishing an institutional framework for foreign policy and defence co-operation, introducing the concept of European citizenship, laying down a fundamental constituent act with article A stressing "By this Treaty the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves an European Union", extending the fields covered by qualified majority voting, creating the co-decision procedure to reinforce the European Parliament's legislative role, introducing the Committee of the Regions to represent local and regional authorities in EU decision-making, increasing the competencies of the Community in fields such as education, vocational training, youth, social policy, public health, consumer protection, environment, research and technology, and trans-European networks, and reinforcing the *power from below* with the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity. But at the same time, even after this constitutional revision, the intergovernmentalist co-operation model rests intact with the formal recognition of the second and third pillar ruled by inter-governmental methods: justice and home affairs and common foreign and security affairs, and with the establishment, for the very first time, of opt-outs for the United Kingdom and Denmark in certain fields.

2. The Democratic Deficit in the European Institutional Structure

The European Union is a genuine public power structure in such a way that European citizens are directly subject, at least at two governmental levels, Community and state. A Euro-constitutionalism which has adapted its judicial-political structure to meet the guiding principles of national democratic constitutionalism. Already, as Ortega stated in the *De Europa Mediato Quedam*, there exists an inveterate European society which only lacks the mantle of a continental ultra-nation, since Europe is characterised by a desire to overcome the limitations of national units. However, after an initial illusion of euphoria, the construction of Europe seems to be losing devotees. Europe has lost the moral high ground and seems to be advancing without a clear objective and under the shadow of dissension. Perhaps, this is due to the elitist character of this project, where only the political and financial aristocracy, and eurocrats of high standing seem to take advantage, and where ordinary people are passive spectators. In this light Maastricht and Amsterdam were the anti-European vision of yesteryear for our continent. Thus, what is required is a

more legitimate and democratic Union, which can only be achieved with strong popular support, given that anything built on a base of arrogance and contempt of the populace will inevitably collapse. The enlightened despotism with which Europe was built, with an almost exclusive inter-governmental presence, must give way to the regional, national, and European parliaments and end the imbalance between institutions, the opacity, inter-governmental secrecy, confidentiality, the impenetrable character of the debating system and the taking of decisions at a European level. There is an urgent need to demystify and clarify what happens at Brussels. The task is, therefore, to bring to an end the lack of democracy of Maastricht, since Europe is being formed from neither a close relationship between its peoples, nor on the basis of decisions taken close to the citizens, as proclaimed in article A of the Treaty on European Union. In Brussels we are consolidating a bureaucratic Saturn about to eat our children.

To a unified economic power there is an unavoidable need for a political capacity for control and to execute the desires of its citizens. One should not think of Europe as a natural and inevitable reality. Europe, by the will of its members, should be ruled by frequent plebiscites, this is the basis of a common future and a liberating constructive desire. The evolutionary process towards a political Union based on the principle of the division of powers in the manner of democratic countries and the division of responsibilities needed to foment the supranational unit has an uncertain future; since it does not agree with the institutional structure of national parliamentary systems where each preserves its sovereignty. The process of reform of the Treaty of the Union, through the Inter-Governmental Conference in 1996 (IGC-96), tried to fulfill a crucial objective: it was to improve the functioning of the European Union, as well as its efficiency and transparency, simplifying and bringing nearer to the citizen and his priorities the process of decision-making in the European area, and adapting the institutional structure for future eastern expansion. The objective was eastern enlargement without converting the EU into a simple forum for inter-governmental co-operation among nations forming a free trade area. The objective was to reform the common policies and prepare public opinion for a more unified approach in the new areas such as crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, organised crime and international fraud. Despite this, the results of the discussions in the Reflection Group, a guidance group of national renowned experts whose task was to prepare the negotiations for the IGC-96 instituted at the Corfu Summit, only served to make clear the differing concepts of European construction held by each country, and to consolidate a political-federal centralist view which conceals the supremacy of German interests in the integration proposals. The major difficulty in achieving a European political Union is that democracy and the legitimacy of a government in a society form a delicate web where each element is a vital support to the rest, making the creation of a federal multi-national and multilingual nation an uncertainty.

It is absurd to warn that the consolidated and delicate equilibrium of European institutions, which were originally products of the creation of the Union, and which have enabled it to function with reasonable efficacy, should be changed to make room for the new members, thereby affirming that there exists a critical level or number of members at which the Union needs substantial changes in its institutions, as was agreed at the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon. At this meeting, it was agreed that prior to any expansion of Europe, there was a requirement for a radical change in the structure, institutions and common policies of the European Community to rebalance the internal power structures and eliminate the illegality underlying the institutional structure of the EU from

its beginnings. This was an unjust and perverse declaration, if we take into account that for more than four decades, the criticisms of lack of institutional democracy were ignored, despite Europe being described as a community of rights with its constitutional rules defined by the founding treaties and the later amendments. It was stated that the Community structure was in no condition to take in the Central and Eastern European countries, because its structure had reached the limit of its capacity, although the real reason was that formerly this mattered less because of the more or less economic, political, cultural and social homogeneity.

In this way, the continuous and delicate technical complications, both legal and political, which crop up in any European summit when it comes to the question of the reform of the European institutions should be seen either as a strategy to transfer power to where it really belongs, or as an attempt to gain time and delay as long as possible the widening eastwards. At the IGC-96, it was proposed to end the perverse system of unanimity which paralysed the Union, to break the traditional unacceptable balance between large and small countries in the weighting of voting power in the Council of Ministers, and to adjust the final number of national commissioners, as irrevocable conditions for any eastern expansion. However, for forty years this disproportionate over-representation of the smaller countries in the institutions, of the fields ruled by unanimity, and the excessively high number of commissioners, curiously worked, survived and functioned right up until the applications to join from the south and east of Europe. But now it is claimed that this reform is fundamental because on it will depend the capacity and the resulting legislation of the Union, and because if not, we would see the Lilliputians overrun the Gullivers. Now, the difficult challenge of applying Monstesquie's tripartite model to the Community's organic structure is unavoidable.

Just after the tortuous ratification of the Treaty on European Union, the complex IGC-96 started, in order to be able to accept the new and poorer candidates, with their differing political histories and with interests and priorities of very different and often antagonistic characters. The paralysis and clogging up of the institutional system and the decision-making in Europe must not be seen as due to the eastern expansion of the EU, but rather as a consequence of the obsolescence of the recently created TEU, which after various crucial events, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Soviet Empire, did not know how and did not have time to adapt to the new geopolitical context of Europe. This disorder has brought to the surface growing discrepancies and disputes among the member states in the fight for their own national interests. The problem of Europe is deeper than the simple institutional reform required to allow further enlargement. The institutions are important, but if reforms are not initiated to win the spirit and hopes of European citizens, these reforms will be meaningless and the project will die slowly from within.

3. The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the Eastern Enlargement

With these ideas in mind, it is important at this point to analyse what the Treaty of Amsterdam, following the legal institutional reform negotiated in the IGC-96, has meant for the challenge to Europe, its eastern enlargement, and for the crusade against the political-institutional illegality from which it suffers. To be able to analyse the effectiveness of the IGC-96, formalised by the approval of the new Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997 by the heads of state and governments of the fifteen member states, we must judge just how far the proposals of the reflection group, which aimed at pin-pointing the institutional re-

forms needed to enable the Union to expand both south- and eastwards, were approved. It is necessary since at the European Council in Essen in December 1994, it was stated that the IGC-96's principal mission was to eliminate the institutional barriers for eastern enlargement, and to incorporate into the EU institutional scheme a functioning structure of checks and balances demonstrating its political legitimacy.

Firstly, it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the institutional reforms approved in favour of the European Parliament (EP). This task was, without doubt, the real priority of the institutional reform intended to promote the democratic legitimacy of Europe by putting an end to the European Parliament's regulatory weakness in the European decision-making process. This is because the process of integration is based on the superimposition of the Community law over the rights of the member states, under the banner of supranationality, and because the weak attempts of previous Treaties to eliminate these delegitimising defects were insufficient. In this respect, the star novelties of the Treaty of the Union, considered as the life-jacket for the lack of European democracy, were, on the one hand, the legislative co-decision procedure, found in article 189B of the Treaty, and on the other, that the legislative initiative ceased to be a prerogative of the Commission, since the Strasbourg Assembly was authorised to request the managing organisation to prepare proposals for the carrying out of the Treaty. However, when analysing them in depth we find that they are not so life-saving. On the one hand, this process of regulatory co-decision, extraordinarily complex with triple readings which substitutes in many fields for the former co-operation procedure, firstly increases its participation in legislation by conferring the power to veto new legislation together with the Council of Ministers in fourteen new areas of regulation, such as the harmonisation of the internal market, freedom of movement for labour, environmental protection, the pluriannual plan of research and development, and so on. However this co-legislative process has little importance for several reasons. Firstly, the Council keeps the agenda-setting power when proposing the final text to the European Parliament following the conciliation committee. Secondly, the Commission is a much weaker actor under co-decision compared with the previous co-operation procedure. And finally, as with most of the subjects foreseen for its study, the single market, had been concluded, at least in theory, by the beginning of 1992, just before the Treaty took effect. On the other hand, the same inefficiency can be said about the second innovation of the Treaty, since if the Commission ignores a proposed initiative in favour of the Parliament, it cannot denounce the Commission to the European Court of Justice. Then came the Amsterdam Summit in 1997, where the European Parliament achieved a better position in the European supranational institutional framework, as it was decided that in the future it will have a maximum of 700 EMPs, independent of the number of member states that join. Moreover, the areas of policy where the EP has legislative powers was increased, the process of co-decision was simplified by the elimination of the third reading, and the areas of its application were extended and widened to include social policy, transport, the fight against fraud in the budget of the EU, incentives for employment, statistics, the establishment of an independent data protection agency, equal opportunities, cooperation between customs, public health and interventions and principles to foment transparency and openness in the European institutions.

On this first point, despite these apparent improvements in the participation of the EP together with the Council in the legislative process, they were in fact ridiculous and insufficient. This criticism is not only due to the EP's small area of participation in the

co-decision procedure, and that it can only exercise this regulatory power through a veto of the Council's legislation, all of which leads to a major log-jam, but also because these timid improvements in favour of the EP could be countered by the introduction through the TEU of up to twenty regulatory procedures and numerous voting systems. This new decision-making system based on a greater complexity and disfunctionality further increases its distancing from the European citizen and goes against the object of the exercise, a greater efficiency, transparency and democracy to reinforce the imbalance in the national democratic parliaments. These reforms only served to convert the Community regulatory process into an authentic procedure maze that reinforces the popular image of the EU as a technocratic fortress which confuses, deceives and hounds the European citizen. More democracy in the workings of the Union, as was attempted in the TEU with the co-decision procedure, the principle of subsidiarity, the European Ombudsman, the EP temporary investigation commissions, or publication in the EEC official bulletin, is not enough, when it comes at the expense of transparency and simplification, and severely complicating the decision-making process. An objective seen crucial and fundamental to the Community is to be open to public debate, more relevant and comprehensible in the actions of its institutions, and with the European legislation closer to the European public, as officially proposed at the European summit in Birmingham on 16 October 1992. Only by bringing nearer to the people this process of deliberation and decision-making, can one say that there is efficiency and democracy in the heart of the EU. The EU does not need more powers, as it intends, it needs more parliamentary democracy and greater functional transparency. It needs a new institutional balance so as to be able to act with efficiency and with democracy in its decisions.

In second place, there came the institutional reforms introduced in favour of the European Commission and aimed at compensating for the regulatory supremacy of the Council of Ministers. On the one hand, to build a truly democratic institutional Europe, the Commission should play the part of the executive organ of the EU government, under the control of the legislative authority, as the guarantor of the working and development of the common market, and of the application and implementation of policy in the framework of the Community. A body of non-elected bureaucrats held up as the guarantee of the right of initiative together with the EP, in defence of the Treaties and as the executor of the new pillars of the Treaty of Maastricht. To achieve this within the IGC-96, and confronted by the priority of the institutional reform to facilitate and allow the eastwards expansion of the Union and to avoid this making even worse the complexity, opacity, inefficiency and illegitimacy of the decision-making process, several reforms were proposed affecting the European Commission. Firstly, there was the need to reduce the excessive centralised bureaucracy, to avoid changing the status quo in relations between member states, and to guarantee efficient operation before the proposed enlargement of the EU by reducing the number of commissioners, or by differentiating between full and associate members given the supposed independent character of the nationality of its members. Secondly, the Commission, and its commissioners were to be individually and politically responsible to the EP, which would also control the monopoly it has in the legislative structure by setting out from the start the limitations of the programme on which the Commission bases its proposals. Thirdly, there was to be a conference including the reform of the European Commission in order to avoid the conflict of roles it suffers.

On the other hand, the Council of Ministers, an organ which represents the member states and made up of national leaders, monopolises and concentrates power, without democratic political control, in contrast to what occurs in their national capitals. This super-executive, both of national and supranational legislation, whose members do and undo, build and demolish, resolve fundamental problems, whom direct and stimulate Community action and define the direction of general policy and who possess the supreme power, puts in danger the balance of power within Europe. In order to prevent this, first, there must be an end to the fact that transparency is relegated to oblivion by the incomprehensible secretive formula in its decision-making, which is the Committee Session of Permanent Representatives, COREPER. This is a committee that meets to prepare the work of the Council and is formed from a group of national civil servants, on the basis of co-ordination and coherence, and which takes the majority of the decisions of the Council without having them discussed by the Council and unhindered by democratic control. Secondly, a change in the voting system on the Council is required, to reduce the subjects that require the unanimity rule, which threatens to paralyse the life and working of the EU, and which gives priority to state sovereignty over that of the citizens. It is necessary to extend the qualified majority voting system, even at the risk of allowing the perverse game of block voting and the correlation of forces within the EU, which would result from the expansion of the EU, as the veto enables a minority to play the balance of power between states. Thirdly, it is urgent that the system of weighting given to the votes in the Council of Ministers is changed to give it greater democracy and relation to the population so as to make the EU more efficient, democratic, and to guarantee a greater voting balance between large and small member states. And finally, as was stated before, the Council should share with the EP the legislative power or give greater importance to the national parliaments, carrying out procedures of pre-consultation in the national parliaments prior to the vote in Council, so that its actions at an European level would have the immediate political approval of European public opinion.

Nevertheless, at the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997, as far as the proposals for the reform of the functioning of the European Commission and of the Council of Ministers is concerned, an agreement was reached to block and postpone any debate and decision on these questions because of the entrenchment of the different attitudes with the larger member nations in opposition to the smaller ones over the numbers of commissioners, over the rule of qualified majority voting, and with regard to the weight of votes in the heart of the Council of Ministers. Given the impossibility of reaching an agreement on the main objective of the conference, which was to agree the new institutional rules to allow the eastern and southern expansion of the Union, surprisingly, it was decided that there was no need for a new debate, if in the first round of expansion there were not more than five new members. The larger nations such as Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Spain, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, tried to compensate for the loss of a commissioner, to keep the final number at twenty, one per nation, in exchange for more power in the votes in the Council of Ministers, that is, in exchange for becoming guardians of the rule of unanimity. Meanwhile, the smaller countries, led by expert and aggressive Belgian Prime Minister, Jean-Luc Dehaen, refused to cede on the weighting of votes in the Council unless the system of qualified majority voting was extended to new areas such as research and development, culture, industry, and so on, in opposition to the unanimity defended tooth and nail by Germany. Only a document of intent was obtained, by virtue of which the larger states agreed to accept the loss of one of their existing commis-

sioners, in favour of the new members, except Spain who demanded as a condition of her approval the equalising of the power of its vote with that of the 'big four', and the smaller countries accepted the need for a revision of the weighting of votes in the Council to take into account the population factor, and as a result the 'double majority' began to be talked about. And finally, only a modest advance was reached towards the extension of the system of qualified majority voting in new fields such as the policy of stimulating employment, social exclusion, equal opportunities between men and women, public health, transparency, the fight against fraud, statistics, data protection, the outer regions and the start of a new foreign policy. In the final moments of these negotiations, the German government excluded from this extension the policy on the right of movement and residence, social security, culture, industry and the environment, and the recognition of professional diplomas.

From all this, it must be concluded that despite this crusade for institutional reform intended to advance towards a full legal democratic right in Europe's institutional web, the triangular structure of unequal forces in the European institutions is still maintained. It moves us ever closer to an institutional imbalance and a democratic deficit that is evident even if it is without demagoguery. It is necessary to involve the founding parliaments of national cultures in the mechanisms of decision-making to avoid the process of European construction being limited to a process of general deterritorialisation of industries, capital and residents, and at the same time to have an EP with more power and credibility, leading to a more transparent and democratic EU, since there is no democracy without dialogue and no transparency without a representative institution near and open to the people and their problems. As Maurice Duverger stated, "the constituent power of Europe is at once absurd, anti-democratic and inefficient. It is absurd at present because its decisions are carried out through diplomatic negotiations between member states. It is anti-democratic because the elected representatives of the people do not participate, except at the end of the process through block votes difficult to refuse. And at the same time, it is inefficient since it only needs the refusal of one state to block everything, contrary to the rules adopted in the great world confederations such as Switzerland and the United States". We must avoid the co-existence of the two working systems of governance, communal and inter-governmental, to prevent a problem of lack of coherence and harmony between the different pillars of the European political framework for decision-making in Europe. In this sense, the institutional reform should enlarge and intensify the legal controls and quality of these institutional decisions. This shift in favour of the EU exposes the massive problem of legality and legitimacy: the political implications of the European states becoming secondary elements of federal power.

4. The Institutional Reform and the Eastern Enlargement

It is important to analyse how this institutional reform paralysis of Europe, due to differences between the fifteen, places in danger the true challenge to the Union which the eastern enlargement represents, as Jacques Santer warned on 18 September 1996 at the EP, and as proved at the Amsterdam Summit which led to an increasingly nationalist view of Europe. The risk of disagreement between the member states over the details of the process of institutional reform and Community policy to enable the acceptance of the Central and Eastern European countries into the EU, could block or paralyse the process of widening. It could convert the political and economic enthusiasm in favour of enlargement, thereby creating stability and security in the whole continent, into defensive

nationalist attitudes which take no account of the enormous economic, political and security benefits for the member states and for the candidates for membership.

Following the initial euphoria over fall of communism, and while the Central and Eastern European countries suffered the transitional shock therapy and awaited admittance to the European economic club as a way of relieving the pain of transition, the EU and its member states became profoundly introspective about the project of integration itself, relegating the Community interest below their own national interests. Europe is much too interested, preoccupied, and self-centered in its own objectives and internal problems and is not paying sufficient attention to the Central and Eastern European countries, thus endangering political, economic and social stability within these societies and the emerging regional markets they represent. This European introspection towards the profound integration process, consolidated by the unification of Germany, the creation of the European Economic Area signed on the 2 May 1991, the establishment of the single market in 1992, the ratification of the TEU, the negotiations for the Treaty of Amsterdam, the process of Monetary Union, and finally the Agenda 2000, has been the escape valve of distraction from the true challenge to the EU, which is the enlargement. A challenge that must be considered as the moral obligation of the West, given the pain of transition in the return to Europe. Despite the moral and political obligation to take in the former communist bloc, the priority is to put our own European house in order and to carry on with the in-depth integration by the institutional reform set out in the IGC-96. The priority is to preserve the achievements of the Union and avoid a wilting of the communal spirit. A European attitude that reinforces the principle of exclusivity and the image of the EU as a besieged fortress devalues the European tradition of hospitality, solidarity and generosity.

This delaying and obstructionist strategy ahead of the challenge of EU enlargement has been carried out with an obsessive tendency to overestimate the cost and danger of the eastern expansion of the EU. The studies and analysis of cost and benefits lay bare the animosity to the enlargement proposal, based on fears of an institutional imbalance and decision-making inefficiency which would be even more difficult for negotiations because of having to accommodate different interests and making it more difficult to arrive at definition of common European positions. But the clearest example of this new European attitude is the fact that the Union has opted for an overloaded agenda of work for the coming years, which threatens to hold up the project of enlargement to the East. The single European currency, the negotiations for budgetary proposals for the seven-year European budget 2000-2006, the reform of the great common policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy, the cohesion funds, the structural funds, the institutional reforms required to face the problems of the existing balance and democratic legitimacy, and so on, can all lead to the failure of the enlargement, to its delay or postponement. The overload of obligations all requiring a consensus on the model of European integration to be used, one which at present does not exist, threatens to turn expansion into a mere public gesture of little impact. This European introspection has been moulded very clearly in the successive European summits centered on the same internal questions repeated again and again, without any conclusive results, showing an egotistical vision of Europe. It is the product of the irremediable decadence of the European construction diluted in an atmosphere of indecision and in a mire that surrounds the decision-taking process, where the question of the enlargement is avoided for fear of the economic and political sacrifices, engendered by the proliferation of heterogeneous national visions of Europe, built on

differing interests and priorities. An unmanageable Europe from a political standpoint. One clear and recent example of this was at the European Council summit in Cardiff. In this summit, the triumphalist announcements of a new integrationalist momentum, following the approval of the Euro, met with clear signs of division. It was a summit at the lowest common denominator and which endangered the consensus, unity and enthusiasm required to proceed towards the challenge of the enlargement. This bickering over the narrowest of national interests, this disparity in integrationist philosophies among the member states, and this overload of future reforms for the EU widening heralded the first confrontation between member states, especially Spain and Germany, over the first proposals for maintaining the maximum contribution at 1.27% of GDP, the creation of a fifth resource related to the relative wealth of each country, over the reform of the system of financing the European budget, on the new weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, on the number of national commissioners in this body, and so forth. Controversies that meant that the discussion of the crucial matters of the enlargement had to be put off again until the recent extraordinary summit held in March of 1999 in Berlin, that is, only after the German legislative general elections and the complete process of ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. But once more, at this Berlin summit a new split appeared between the cohesion countries, led by the EP, and the so called 'group of four' (Austria, Germany, Holland and Finland), led by the European Commission, over the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural and cohesion funds, which blocked progression the expected substantial reforms of these common policies to make possible the eastern enlargement.

To conclude it should be asserted that the EU cannot close in on itself, pleased with itself, with its prosperity, proud of its magnificent history and its present security, since this would lead to a dead end, to the refusal to contribute to the progress of human history. We urgently need an Europe which is bigger, with no fear of changes in its strategic center of gravity nor the adoption of positions be they central, northern or southern. We should not be pleased with membership for mere economic and commercial logic, as occurred with the United Kingdom and Denmark in the 1970s, neither for the logic of a country redefining its power and influence with its voice in the Community and international institutions, as occurred with the Nordics and Austria. Uppermost should be the logic of the guarantee of political stability, as well as for communing with the international community to definitely consolidate a return to the millennial, foundational, democratic tradition and to forget fears from the recent past. There will be an arduous and complex process of negotiations for the new CEE countries with very clear advantages for the EU and its members, while the applicants will be in a very weak negotiation position that will force them to make difficult concessions when dealing with crucial sectors of their economies; there will be tough requirements and long transition periods. The most important challenge in the process of the European integration is to avoid a cold and unconcerned cost-benefit analysis on the enlargement by each one of the member states, and to design the right strategy of approximation to guarantee the democratic consolidation of these societies of Central and Eastern Europe, because that, at the same time, will guarantee the EU's own security and prosperity.

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Youth in the Processes of Transition and Modernisation in the Slovak Republic

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Abstract. The first post-communist generation of youth in Slovakia set out on its path by making decisions on professional orientation at the age when encounter and experience are perceived as an important and controversial dimension of one's own *personality*. The second phase, consisting of decision-making on social breakthrough into labour market, has been shifted into *another civilisation time-space* through the transformation of real socialism into real capitalism. Unemployment as a social threat and as a life experience is an element of youth individualisation which is demonstrated through the acceptance of flexible solutions, including the readiness to change place of residence and professional qualifications. A comparison of surveys in 1993 and 1995 indicates that the initial shock of unemployment has been overcome.

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Introduction

It appears that the political, economic and social changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe present a new opportunity to verify K. Mannheim's thesis on the inevitable link of generations with the dynamics of social reproduction and change. What determines our approach to youth issues as issues of generations must be the unusual, historically unique dynamics and extent of the social change [Machonin 1996].

In international research projects of sociologists in post-communist countries, the feature of the transformation and processes of individualisation of the first post-communist generation of youth [Roberts, Jung 1995: 11] represent, in author's opinion, an important signal on the future of the new Europe.

The transition of the political and economic system of Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland is only a part of the birth of a 'new Europe', which opens up new perspectives for a broad process of economic, political, social and cultural integration. "Nobody can predict the direction of these changes. One is, however, certain: they will deeply influence human lives, above all of those that are children and young people to date." [Chisholm 1995: 1]. The emerging European youth policy sensitively articulates fears that the present and future generations of children and youth in a new Europe will be more subject to segregation and marginalisation and their life perspectives will be determined by structural inequalities from their early ages.

1. Individualisation of Youth and Modernisation Theory

Not all Slovak sociologists in the field of youth issues link transformation processes in the sphere of political (pluralism tendencies) and economic (market tendencies) life with

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such a typical element of modernisation as information technology. J. Suchý, in the introduction to his text 'The Situation of Youth in the Transformation of Slovakia' delivered in a lecture as early as autumn 1992, complained that information technology had entered the life of Slovak society in a rather inconspicuous way and somehow too much in the shadow of democratisation and privatisation. [Suchý 1992: 8]

In a society of the classic type, the transformation process, along with its attributes of democratisation and market economy or, of late, processes of European and trans-Atlantic integration, with modernisation strategies such as information technology, rationalisation, mobilisation and secularisation [Martin 1996], brings not only the inevitable social risk and social problems of growing youth unemployment but, simultaneously, opens up an unprecedented chance for development in utilising the unleashed creativity of individual personality as an inexhaustible source of social prosperity.

An inspiring work in developing the issues of the relationship of social context and individualisation of the first post-communist generation of youth is the theory of Ulrich Beck, the author of the monograph *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne* (Society of Risk. On the Way to Some Other Modernity) [Beck 1986]. This highlights contradictions between the production of economic resources (wealth) and the production of social risk in developed Western industrialised countries.

A new image of youth began to appear in the 1980s as interpreted by youth sociologists in Germany (T. Ziehe and J. Zinnecker) which was based on Beck's thesis of individualisation. The social situation in all rich Western industrialised countries, especially in Germany, appeared as a situation of a relatively high material living standard and far-reaching security. As a consequence of all this, according to Beck, a historic discontinuity arose through which people were uprooted "...from traditional class conditions and family care and their dependency on the labour market with all the risks, chances and controversies of true individual destiny increased" [Beck 1986].

A decade later, I. Richter in his brief theses [Richter 1995: 64] was able to outline this concept of youth:

Family – marriages concluded at a later age, an increase in young people living by themselves, the transformation of marriage into partnership.

Education – the diversification of educational career and a prolongation of the phase of education, a democratisation of the pedagogical approach.

Job – new bonds of education, unemployment, life-long education, accent on individual self-realisation in one's job.

Culture – a peer group life of youth of a religious, sporting, and political nature is influenced by multidimensional relations mediated through the mass media and network systems, which simultaneously bring about drawing closer and separation.

Politics – individualisation in this sphere is demonstrated above all through lower participation in creating political will.

Everyday Existence – in fashion, sexuality and communication, forms of behaviour often described as hedonistic that are presented through the mass media.

Discussion over the issue of whether such an image holds even at present, of whether it is scientifically correct to apply in this case Mannheim's terminology (1928) of a 'generation form' and to speak about the generation of the 1980s as an environmentalist genera-

tion [Richter 1995], has continued up to this day. K. Roberts queried an interpretation of the concept of individualisation as a destructuration of the situation of young people, in which prolonged transition into the world of labour and adulthood creates a 'moratorium' during which young people may escape from the old determinants of their life chances, such as gender, social class origins and the achievements of secondary education. "In practice, however, the old social predictors remain in sound world-wide working order. Young peoples' situation and future prospects continue to be governed by their family origins, school records, gender and places of residence." [Roberts 1995]

L. Siuralla has recently responded to a popular topic of verifying post-modern changes with a question: are traditional background variables losing their explanatory power? [Siuralla 1996: 63] Empirical verification of modernisation theory under the conditions of Finland indicated that the process of breaking lose from traditions and from collective guidance is a slow one: "...the social-class background, regional background and separate male and female cultures seem to have maintained their strong position as guiding forces in the socialisation process and in mediating traditions. Similarly, educational, consumption and leisure choices are still largely made in accordance with these background factors." [Lähteenmaa, Siuralla 1992: 128]. It is, however, beyond any dispute that some changes in the way of life with contemporary youth in Finland can be well explained by modernisation theory. Individualisation processes do not hold generally, but according to Finnish experts they can be related above all with metropolitan regions, consequently with regions where there is some accumulation of modernisation changes creating a wider selection of life chances to choose from.

The fact that the disintegration of family, neighbourhoods and religious communities should increase young people's sense of personal responsibility for their own conditions of living and for shaping their own future constitutes an important factor of the times, be it designated as modern or post-modern. O. Stafseng believes that a programme of getting free from conventions and traditions as well as from any mechanical form of collectivism, that is, a programme of the modern individual through which young people themselves determine their own life, has its older sources. Those who named it as being post-modern (T. Ziehe) created, in his opinion, only a vague theory by which the attempt to disguise that citizenship as a legislative and political basis for a modern individuality in terms of personality was originally only defined for men and persons that belonged to 'well-to-do' classes of society. [Stafseng 1995]

In spite of these doubts, it is necessary to admit that a tendency to individualisation in modern Western societies and also in transforming European societies is a consequence of the partial subversion of traditional class distinctions based on an ascriptive status and a traditional lifestyle. Individual performance has a growing importance in the diversification and individualisation of lifestyles in transition, where the conditions have arisen for such a shift through modernisation (industrialisation, urbanisation, information technology, secularisation). This development reflects the rise of new chances and freedom of choice, but also of new forms of threats and compulsion.

The fact that patterns of youth transitions from childhood into adulthood are more pluralist-like and the life experience of young people confirms a shift from traditional normative expectations is the main hypothesis of youth research in Europe at present. This change occurs in major building blocks of youth transitions such as school education and occupational training, separation from the family of origin, friendship and partner-

ship, entry into the labour market, leisure, consumer activities, and civil and political participation [Chisholm, Hurrelman 1995: 133].

Over the course of the century, the significance of education and vocational training has grown to the detriment of employment, and thus also the process of integration of a larger part of youth into the youth subculture and partner patterns has accelerated. And as the process of physical maturity accelerates likewise, in the opposite direction, a larger space has been created for youngsters to remain young for a longer time when compared to the previous period.

An important fact for understanding individualisation is that in some areas young people acquire a high standard of autonomy, and a possibility to choose from alternatives or the individual shaping of everyday existence (fashion, music, leisure activities, the culture of speech, political articulation). All this, however, takes place in an unstable social context in which the social position of an 'adolescent' or of a 'young adult' is temporary and uncertain, especially because the certainty of materialising life plans in the future does not exist. Young people, therefore, can gain autonomy and can take over responsibility in areas where it is typical of adults (for example, in consumption or in partnership) but they have not yet acquired the status of adults for good.

Above all, the discontinuity (sequencing, making steps) and inconsistency of the process of transition from adolescence into adulthood represent a fundamental risk factor. All young people, irrespective of their social origin, are in a way thrown "into structural contradictions" of their adolescence phase of life. It remains also a fact that they gain the possibility to optimise their life chances. However, it is important that "...where personal competence and social resources are available and sufficient, young people can and do find productive ways of negotiating youth transitions successfully, thereby establishing healthy adult personality and development. Where competence and resources are insufficient, the results may be a transiting into poor well-being." [Chisholm, Hurrelman 1995: 152]

The causes and effects of youth individualisation have also become a cardinal issue of the current youth research in countries that are transforming their political and economic system. In Slovakia people are interested in what marked changes are taking place in the social structure of youth, which specific groups of youth are influenced by this development, and in what way.

2. Sociological Contexts of Youth Individualisation in the Slovak Republic

The age-group of 20 to 24 year-olds that was studied in the empirical sociological research (by the Sociological Institutes of the Academies of Science in Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland in 1995) is characterised by several differences in the socialisation context.

From a demographic viewpoint, especially in the case of Slovakia, it is a generation group whose potential has recorded no historical parallel as yet. L. Pisca claimed that the census in 1970 exactly indicated the social consequences of the decrease in the birth-rate in the period after 1953 in the Czech Lands and after 1957 in Slovakia [Pisca 1980a: 23].

The system of social precautions in 1970 brought about a change in the birth-rate for a whole decade ahead, whereby there was a decrease in families with one child, in favour of families with two or even three children, along with increased qualification and

employment of women. In 1980, the negative effects of the renewed population vitality were also registered [Pisca 1980b: 524].

Difficulties accompanied especially the first five years of children born in the period 1971 to 1975 throughout their life cycle, because the material infrastructure which should have met their basic needs of life was introduced with a minimum three to five years delay. They were born into families that were entitled far later, namely as families with two or three children, to obtain a better placement on the social urgency lists for state-owned or co-operative flats, they experienced the stress of their working parents for want of vacancies in crèches and in kindergartens, they tried going to school in afternoon shifts, especially in the housing estates of large towns, they receptively responded to the endless efforts of the whole family clan (that is, the social network) in seeking patronage to be able to enter a secondary school or a university.

From a sociological viewpoint, a generally extended feeling of social security in the sphere of basic needs, especially as far as the possibility to get an education and a job, which followed from an interaction of mutually intertwined systems of paternalism, state care and support and protection by parents, was typical of the young generation that lived their childhood and adolescence before 1989. This system revealed itself in the extreme dependency of young people on the state and family, especially in their attempts to get a flat of their own, to establish a family or even to gain a higher social status. W. Adamski [1987: 37] reminds us that, as a result of the dominating ideology of equal chances, the aspirations of youth in the socialist countries depended a great deal less on the structural background than in the countries of Western Europe. In the socialist countries the influence of the state in production relationships, in systems of social increase and in professional careers created a social socialisation context for the solution of contradictions between the aspirations of youth and the possibilities of their materialisation, and thus determined the course of socialisation processes.

A great number of young people even in the planned market of education in Slovakia created unique competition and a deepening of the contradiction between increasing subjective aspirations and the objective possibilities to satisfy them. Restricted chances to be admitted to grammar schools, and especially to secondary technical or commercial schools with general certificate of education, pressure to attend preparatories for worker professions at secondary apprentice training centres, a restricted number of vacancies for freshmen in the most attractive branches of study at universities or technological institutes – all represented a barrier for youth individualisation. This generation with atypical tension between aspirations and their satisfaction in the sphere of education therefore represented not only a detonator, through their wider families, but also formed a strong background of social resistance against totalitarian political power in the period before 1989.

The first post-communist generation of youth in Slovakia started on this way by making the decision on its professional orientation (1985-1990) at the age when encounter and experience are perceived, according to A. Melluci [1996: 3], as an important and controversial dimension of one's own *personality*. Its second phase consisting in decision making on social breakthrough into the labour market has been shifted into *another civilisation time-space* through the transformation of real socialism into real capitalism.

We have not yet managed to realise the core and manifold chances challenging young people as a result of the break with the vision of 'socialist modernity'. C. Wallace

denominates it not too flatteringly as an antiquity of 'modern' society based on intense industrialisation typical of the end of nineteenth century and collectivisation, which produced huge enterprises and concentrations of employees in huge housing estates. People were divided into large groupings based on 'classes' and 'age', which were rigorously institutionalised, and they supported their collective identity by celebrations with rituals, slogans and gatherings. *"The type of subjectivity which was encouraged was one of the passive individual dependent on external institutions, who led a stable life and was neither geographically nor professionally mobile. Critical thinking was strongly discouraged."* [Wallace 1997: 4] This is the very reverse of the 'reflexive individualisation' that takes place in late capitalism, as here such external institutions determining, for example, how, where and when to start one's job, when to get married and have children, where and with whom to spend one's leisure time, are mostly absent. All this is replaced by the necessity to make one's own choice among various alternatives and thus to form one's own individualised style of life, to cope critically with self-evaluation and even gradually develop a sceptical approach to one's environment in which old values and certainties lose their influence.

To Wallace's credit (an English sociologist with a deeper knowledge of the situation in the Czech and Slovak Republics acquired during her stay at the Central European University in Prague) she does not deny existing elements of individualisation tendencies and some manoeuvring space for individualisation in this "gigantic apotheosis of modernism and fordism". How could then such sociologically reflected phenomena of "the household working scheme" [Roško 1995], or other known forms of the grey economy extending into the sphere of the lifestyle (gardening, cottage-going) that were widely known but not considered to be self-destructive for the system arise? They (for example, the household working scheme) were tolerated, or even supported (for example, cottage-going) as suitable instruments for the venting of individualisation tendencies. This naturally does not change Wallace's justifiable argument that the very insufficiency of flexibility of the old system and its resistance to 'reflexive individualisation' may be considered as the cause of its collapse. In a comment on the changes of 1989, V. Mináč, a keen observer and commentator on the same reality from within, spoke about the efforts to support a collapse of the state paternalist system by the management and technocratic layer of the party *nomenklatura* that was fed up with obscuring and concealing the source of its wealth and strove to make its élite position apparent. Simultaneously, this opened up a possibility for new individual expansion that stopped being contrary to the ideology of socialism, but became compliant with the ethical code of a meritocratic capitalist society.

It may then be accepted that the first post-communist generation of youth was socialised in two qualitatively different social contexts. It is therefore not only a generation intensely endangered, but simultaneously, of immense, historically unique chances for life careers with unusually manifold possibilities of social and space mobility. At the same time, it represents a generation that must overcome a value hierarchy suitable for a different system of social structure. It often recalls in a Jeremiah way how excellent, without problems or conflicts everything used to be in the recent past, because it was stable and contained no risk once one learnt the ropes and the ways of getting around the rules.

For verifying structurations of adulthood with the post-communist youth generation, data from the survey *Transformation and modernisation 1995*, facilitate the clarifi-

cation of one area in decisive stages of transition, especially *the entry into the labour market.*

3. The Challenge of Market Economy

From the most important results of empirical surveys of value orientation of youth before 1989 comes the acute awareness that especially two values – the development of science and technology, and the exploitation of human ideas and creativity – had their specific place in its structure. *"The opinion is relatively more frequently represented that in these values capitalism is commensurate with socialism, there are even quite a number of people who believe that capitalism ensures even more successfully the materialisation of these values. The comparison of the past ten years makes it possible to state that critical attitudes of youth have deepened in the above area."* [Macháček 1988: 136-137].

Even in this period, it was already apparent that the image of bringing together advantages of two faces of the coin, that is, the creative application of ideas and invention, and the minimum social risk in life was a typical schizophrenic characteristic of the then socialist generation of youth. Young people entered the transition phase after 1989 with an analogical vision of the 'human face' on both sides of the coin, now, however, it was capitalism [Macháček 1995: 39]. This explains the surprising and complex reactions over unemployment as a first visible systemic social consequence of the liberal economic reform, the side of the transformation and modernisation coin which presents Janus's face of 'risk and threat'.

This happened in spite of the fact that measures supporting the employment of graduates of universities, technological institutes and all sorts of secondary schools were effected on the basis of decrees of the government of the Slovak Republic and adequately reacted to the 'shock' of young people and their parents. There were sometimes not systems measures compatible with market economy.

The Government Decree No. 275/1990 allowed the withdrawal of 2,500 graduates of universities and technological institutes from the labour market and to grant them an additional specific term of studies with a scholarship amounting to 1 400 CSK (Czechoslovak crowns). This made it possible for this group of young people to create not only better conditions for finding a job in the labour market. It helped to give a signal that the political representatives would not allow the revolutionary young generation to be forced from universities by the market economy. From a pragmatic viewpoint, extending the time limit occurred in order that the arising market economy could absorb the first graduates from universities.

The Government Decree No. 428/1990 was also implemented aimed at helping graduates of secondary schools, universities and technological institutes to find jobs through better co-ordination in requalifying (an inter-ministerial board for the requalification and further education of youth and adults was founded) along with measures stimulating employers to engage graduates (the employers were motivated by remission of income tax payments, social insurance contributions, by the possibility to exceed budgeted limits for salaries in governmental organisations, and by granting tariff pay to graduates or a part to employers for a period of six months). According to the relevant analysis of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in the period concerned these supporting measures were exploited by 3,800 graduates from a total of 30,220 graduates. About 34 million CSK was paid out on salaries and compensation of salaries.

In 1991 the government of the Slovak Republic issued Decree No. 361, on the basis of which tariff pay was compensated to employers through labour agencies from the state budget for the active policy of employing graduates for a period of twelve months from the moment young people took up their jobs (3,500 CSK per each university graduate and 2,650 CSK per each secondary school graduate). The total sum amounted 97.8 CSK million, which represented 2.6% of finances allocated to active employment policy.

In my paper on the consequences of the development of the market economy on youth behaviour in the case of unemployment [Macháček 1994], I anticipated that young people would begin to design their professional and employment strategies in a flexible way and that parents and the public would accept this strategy. What I had in mind was the acceptance of unemployment and the drawing of unemployment benefit, as well as exploiting chances of vocational requalification courses, of various forms of language and professional education and their interfacing with part-time jobs as 'normal'. This group was characterised also by the highest preference from among all age-groups to include even the tactical alternative – "to draw on unemployment benefit and hope that the situation will be resolved somehow" in their standard behaviour on the labour market for a period of at least the first six months. The first post-communist young generation simply viewed unemployment as a new attractive element of lifestyle, by which a free citizen may solve his/her situation on the labour market. All the more that their parents still remember the notorious mechanism of planned economy for regulation of the labour force on the 'labour market' and its symbol – 'allocations' to particular enterprises or organisations. It has been confirmed that unemployment is a social experience that is accepted differently according to age in this historically unique time-space of the economic system transformation in the Slovak Republic. Even according to statistical tests, this experience occurs much more frequently with the youngest generation (CC = -0.24 in 0000*1). In the age-group over 44, 13% admitted they were unemployed for at least two months, in the age-group between 30 to 44, it was 25%, in the age-group 25 to 29 it was 35%, and for people between the ages of 18 to 24 it was 44%. Likewise, in Slovakia the loss of one's job was expected least by persons aged over 44 (34.5%). The age-groups under 24 (50%) and from 25 to 29 (62%) expected the loss of their jobs in 1995 to a considerably larger degree.

A comparison of data from empirical research carried out in 1993 and 1995 shows some change in the strategies of solving unemployment. In Slovakia, there was a sharp decrease in reliance upon the state unemployment benefit. From the former 67.5% of those ready to accept unemployment benefit there remained remarkably only 34% of young people in 1995. In the Czech Republic, young people began relying on unemployment benefit more frequently in 1995 (38%) than in 1993 (27%). The results obtained indicated that the readiness to solve unemployment by undertaking private business activities could be expected especially from young people aged between 18 to 24. A similar change between 1993 and 1995 occurred also in the attitude towards business activities (entrepreneurial activities), which are considered to be a modernisation life strategy under the conditions of a market economy. In the Czech Republic, there was a decline in preferences for this strategy of solving unemployment both within the whole population (from 40% to 30%) as well as young people (from 47% to 36%). In Slovakia, an unimportant decrease in the total of the population was registered (33-30%), however, young people aged under 24 strengthened their orientation towards business activities (from 31% to 37%).

Table 1. Strategy of Solving Unemployment in the Slovak Republic (SR) and in the Czech Republic (CR): 1993-1995

		18-24		W	
		SR	CR	SR	CR
Attitudes of various groups		N = 134	N = 316	N = 956	N = 1,206
I shall requalify	1993	72.7	63.4	68.3	58.8
	1995	73.0	69.0	55.0	54.7
I shall seek a temporary job	1993	66.7	48.3	65.2	44.1
	1995	52.6	40.6	49.1	36.7
I shall apply for	1993	67.5	27.4	58.3	31.9
an unemployment benefit	1995	34.0	38.0	28.8	33.8
I shall try starting	1993	30.7	47.5	33.1	40.3
business activities	1995	37.2	36.6	29.6	30.7
I shall live on other income	1993	8.6	5.5	10.2	7.7
	1995	8.9	11.7	9.3	9.7

Table 2. Strategy of Seeking a Job and Locality

		18-24		W	
		SR	CR	SR	CR
Attitudes of various groups		N = 134	N = 316	N = 956	N = 1,206
I would seek a job in my					
speciality and locality	1993	45.2	43.1	51.7	42.9
of residence	1995	90.0	88.6	88.0	86.1
I would seek a job in my	1993	71.3	44.6	51.7	50.5
speciality anywhere	1995	62.4	46.2	88.0	52.0
I would seek any job in the	1993	50.0	46.3	48.1	37.8
locality of my residence	1995	68.9	37.8	57.2	31.8
I would take any job	1993	58.8	25.7	48.5	28.1
anywhere	1995	44.0	16.6	31.4	15.6

The most remarkable change in comparing data from surveys in 1993 and 1995 is the return to the most rigid variant of seeking a job in the place of residence: *I would seek a job in my speciality and in the locality of my residence.*

It appears that the shock from the unexpected consequences of unemployment has been overcome and was confirmed in the return to a variant preferring all advantages of such a job that stresses a regularly obtained qualification and profession and that reduces to a minimum expenses related with the change of one's residence. There was a variant preferring locality of residence even to the disfavour of qualifications and speciality: 10% of the total population and 18% of young people chose this. High expenses on travelling or no possibility to get accommodation probably eliminate all the advantages of a job in one's speciality outside the parents' residence. This tendency of the *entrenching of Slovak youth in the locality of their residence* is also confirmed by the fall in preference for seeking a job in one's speciality anywhere: from 71% in 1993 to 62% in 1995. The final variant is seeking *any job anywhere*, which lost its attractiveness both in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic. Older (31%) but especially younger Slovaks (44%) however realise that competition in the labour market will require acceptance of even this least popular strategy.

The objective of Government Decree No. 666/1993 was to motivate employers to create new jobs – socially purposeful and publicly useful for graduates who were registered with employment offices as unemployed. An employer received a financial subsidy for a period of 12 months if the graduate got a newly created job, or even for 18 months if the job was vacant due to the retirement of an employee. The employer was obliged to employ a graduate in a qualified vacancy and to give him/her a wage not in the amount of the subsidy but in a higher amount, that is, in compliance with his/her job assignment. In 1995, 3,797 million SKK (Slovakian crowns) was spent on active employment policy, of which 2,698 million SKK was used for socially purposeful jobs. According to the data of employment offices, a further 6,935 purposeful jobs were created for graduates and adolescents by way of an irretrievable contribution of 66 million SKK.

There was also created the possibility to obtain a contribution from an employment agency amounting to 200,000 SKK for creating a self-employed job for starting an independent business activity. The contribution was to be used for acquiring the tangible or intangible assets necessary for the activity or for settling a rent for leased premises or land, or for paying back interest or loans. The condition for granting such a contribution was to carry out the agreed independent activity for a period of two years. A whole range of forms to activate young people in engaging (in socially purposeful and publicly useful jobs, the contribution for self-employment, requalification, protected workshops) were included in the new Act on Employment that was passed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic in December 1996.

As a result of improving the quality of instruments of the state employment policy, passive reliance on the care of employment offices and social welfare departments has been decreasing. Especially with the young generation, orientation towards business activities has been gradually increasing. It could therefore be stated that the trend towards a change in life strategies has obtained a modernisation dimension during the recent period and is appropriate to the exacting character of market economy under conditions of integration into the European Union market.

The overall absence of linkage between the economic transformation in the sense of market principles and the housing market is the biggest obstacle to the effectiveness of all other measures of active employment policy. Put concisely, Slovak youth is entrenching in the locality of their residence and their readiness to move for a job has declined. It must therefore be stressed that this trend in life strategies has no necessary modernisation dimension and under the given conditions it can scarcely have any. The change of attitudes of young people to include in their flexible life strategies the alternative of seeking a job outside their residence probably cannot be achieved by relying only on the instruments of state employment policy.

Conclusion

The challenge to transform a planned economy into a market one, and a totalitarian political system into pluralist democracy means for the first post-communist generation of youth a thorough social change that is demonstrated in a different structuration of transition into adulthood in the most important sphere – in entering the labour market.

Contrary to the planned economy under real socialism, where after the education process was over a phase of finding one's place in the labour sector fluently followed, in attaining the status of an adult even in the most important sphere, the transformation-

modernisation process brings uncertainty in materialising life plans. Unemployment and, within its framework, requalification with partial contractual work engagements has put discontinuity into this process and inconsistency, that is to say transition becomes individualised.

The first post-communist generation of youth experienced prolonged school holidays in this process, a phase of several months seeking a job with the help of the state, attempts at studying or short-term employment abroad, periods of business activities and falling through into the social network of state and non-governmental charity organisations. In order to understand the social behaviour of youth in the Slovak Republic, it is necessary to know more thoroughly the rules of the state employment policy. Graduates did not take up their jobs immediately after finishing their studies mainly because until 1996 it was possible for them to draw a state benefit while seeking a job immediately after they were registered. Since 1 January 1997 they have been able to obtain a state benefit while job searching only after 6 months have expired.

Unemployment as a social threat and as a life experience is an element of youth individualisation which is demonstrated through the acceptance of flexible solutions including the readiness for a change in living place and professional qualification. The comparison of surveys in 1993 and 1995 indicates that the initial shock from unemployment has been overcome. It is confirmed by a growing tendency to draw unemployment benefit in the Czech Republic and by an increased preparedness to engage in business activities in Slovakia, as well as in the preference to look for a job in one's line and in the place of one's residence even longer rather than take any job anywhere.

On the whole, it may be stated that transition into adulthood with the first post-communist generation is a specific process that paves the way for better understanding the problems of subsequent generations of youth. Analysis of citizens' behaviour in the labour market as well as the preferences of modernisation strategies intensify the overall impression that all generations are confronted with the transition in 'adulthood'. It appears that even the older and oldest generations have squared up to the 'transition' not badly. Acceptance of social change brought about by transformation is more intensive with younger generations. However, in the case of important dimensions such as privatisation, democratisation and integration into Europe, it would be difficult to find statistical bonds of importance to age groups.

Transformation and modernisation seem to represent a civilisational-cultural process whose breakthrough is reflected in attitudes and opinions of all generations in a relatively similar way. If we return to the beginning of the essay on understanding transformation and modernisation as a certain historical dividing line with a generational dimension, it may be concluded that social changes are of such systems importance that practically all generations have to cope with them jointly. A hypothesis for future research may be inferred from what has been said that the mere shifting of the first post-communist generation of youth along the age stages into adulthood and old age will not bring any principal/substantial change either in civil potential or in the economic prosperity of our society.

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Denis B. Shaw: The Post-Soviet Republics: A Systematic Geography

Harlow, Essex, Longman Scientific and Technical 1995, 173 p.

Any attempt to write a geography of the post-Soviet republics or present-day Russia should be seen as a remarkable and brave act, especially when it aspires to provide a more systematic or broader approach in the study of this vast and rapidly changing area. The changes that all the post-Soviet republics have undergone are so profound that neither geographers nor experts in other fields are sufficiently able to explain their geographical aspects in such a way that would acquire a general and long-term validity.

The main problem is due to the speed of change, another is the lack of adequate statistical data for all of the new states. Yet another factor is the unpredictability of the further development in the political, economic and social spheres. The economic collapse affecting all post-Soviet republics has brought about profound changes in the geographical pattern of all activities and severed many important relations. As a result, the map of the former territory of the USSR has changed dramatically. Statistical data from 1992 and 1993 show that whole industrial branches collapsed in some of the new states, so it can be presumed that on a regional level these changes will be even more profound and regional disparities deeper.

The book is divided into ten chapters in more or less logical sequence. To a certain extent it is possible to perceive it as an anthology of individual articles. Denis Shaw as editor contributed five of the chapters: (1) *The post-Soviet republics: environmental and human heritage*; (2) *Ethnic relations and federalism in the Soviet era*; (8) *Urban development*; (10) *Fifteen successor states: fifteen and more futures?*; and was co-author of (4) *Industrial policy and location* with Robert N. North, who was author of (5) *Transport*. The other contributors are Graham Smith with (3) *Ethnic relations in the new states*; R. A. French with (6) *Demographic and social problems*; Judith Pallot with (7) *Agricultural and rural development*; and Michael J. Bradshaw with (9) *Foreign trade and inter-republican relations*.

The introduction to the first chapter is a brief account dealing with the geo-political heritage of the world's largest state, which, in fact, describes the history of the expansion of the Russian empire. Unfortunately the essential geo-political aspects of the disintegration process of the USSR are not discussed. The natural rather than environmental conditions are described from the viewpoint of their determining effect on the development of the society and economy.

Unconventionally, this part also deals with the economic backwardness of the former-USSR and Russia, which is considered the result of disadvantageous natural conditions and geographical position. In this context, the presented data rather paradoxically document the progressive narrowing of disparities in economic and industrial performance between the USSR and the USA in the period after 1913. However, it must be stated that in the case of the USSR data on industrial production, particularly GNP, are very unreliable.

Logically, special attention is given to ethnic relations, which are presented in two chapters. The first of these deals with the history of the multi-ethnic state and the dominant role of the Russians within it, the foundation of the Federation, a comparison of the approaches of Lenin and Stalin to the ethnic question, and finally addressing the roots of the present inter-ethnic problems and violations. The second of the chapters devoted to ethnic relations concentrates on the complex problems connected to the disintegration of the USSR, to the explosion of nationalism, and relations between Russians and the other nationalities. However, the part concerned with extensive ethnically motivated migration lacks any comment on the impact of migration on changes in the ethnic structure of many republics. These chapters are characterised by the presentation of ethnic relations in the broader geo-political and cultural context and a more systemic approach to the problem than is common in Czech textbooks.

The fourth section dealing with industrial policy and location contains analytical and critical evaluation of the development of in-

dustrial policies during the Soviet era and their results and geographical impacts. Figures on the production of selected industrial products in 1913, 1940, 1955, 1975, and 1986 provide valuable information. Unfortunately, the most recent data presented here, are, considering the latest development, rather dated.

The authors correctly point out in contradiction to Soviet propaganda (in several of the chapters) the lack of self-sufficiency of some of the economic regions (rayons), and the fact that these complexes had never actually been complex structures. Notable by its absence is information on the armaments industry, which was the largest branch of the Soviet economy.

The fifth chapter on transport well illustrates changes in the use of all kinds of transport. Numerous figures show the development of transport networks and their uneven spatial coverage and density. The demographic situation before the dissolution of the USSR is briefly analysed in the sixth chapter. An approach that stresses the political, cultural and social consequences, as well as the basic prerequisites of demographic differentiation is the most valuable part of this.

Besides information on agricultural policy, the seventh chapter contains interesting and useful information on environmental aspects of agricultural production (for example, the degradation of arable land), and, in particular, an extensive passage dealing with the development of agriculture after the USSR fell apart and the development of agriculture reforms – including the advance of private farming.

In less traditional order comes the chapter on urban development and the situation of Russian and post-Soviet cities. This contains minimal statistical data and concentrates on evaluating changes in urban life under the conditions of deep and painful transformation of society in its economic, political, administrative and social aspects.

The following chapter deals with the inter-republic and foreign trade of the new post-Soviet states. However, the main part of this describes the development of Soviet foreign trade in the 1970s and 1980s, with a smaller part devoted to the foreign trade of the post-Soviet republics in the first year of their independence. Useful information here shows the development of foreign economic collaboration, joint ventures and free economic zones. In the final chapter Shaw gives a brief geographical outline of all fifteen successor states and sketches their likely future development.

I feel that the title of the book fails to reflect its content. The main body of the book is concerned with the whole of the former USSR and much of the information describes the period prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the attempt to present a comprehensive picture of development in all spheres of human activity and society, and the connection with the current difficulties faced by all post-Soviet republics, all chapters dwell heavily on the history (which is nevertheless valuable information in itself).

As the book was written in 1994, it might have been possible to incorporate some of the later data from various sources, at least for Russia and the Baltic states. This goes for information on demographic processes, when Russia and other European post-Soviet republics have recently been experiencing demographic development unprecedented in modern history.

The most important contribution of this book lies in its conception stressing a more profound and systematic explanation of causes of the current state and development of politics, society, economy and their geographical patterns and disparities evolving among the successor states. It differs from other textbooks that have been published in the Czech Republic which have been traditionally oriented towards geographical description without any ambition for a broader approach. Another important feature is the provision of numerous tables and statistical data covering a long historical timespan, sometimes going back to 1913.

On the negative side, the graphic quality of the figures is not very good, some of the maps have only negligible information value, and there are often missing names, which holds true for figures on climate conditions and transport, where the names of important junctions and oil and gas fields are sometimes omitted. A significant defect is the improper usage of shading on maps, and at times some of them are very difficult to make out.

Nevertheless, in conclusion, this book provides the essential spatial and developmental background necessary to understand the present-day problems of the region. It focuses on the transition from command to market economies, and the associated ethnic, political, and social developments, and also considers the far-reaching consequences of such changes in terms of political alignment, economic restructuring, and territorial adjustment. The enormous significance of such changes are examined in their significance for Europe and, more generally, for the future of international relations. Given the dearth of geographical publications, and especially textbooks, on Russia and other post-Soviet republics, here is a book which provides a good source of information in this field.

Jiří Tomeš

CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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