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The CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is a scholarly review open to the discussion of all professional and societal problems, sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic politics.

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The editors require an original and two legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the reading process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the CSR is deemed unethical.

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Thematic Issue

Czech Values in the 1990s

Guest Editor

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Spring 2001

Editorial

This issue of the *Czech Sociological Review* deals with Czech values as they were recorded in two waves of comparative research called the *European Values Study* (EVS) in 1991 and 1999.[1] All the papers presented here are based on the Czech EVS data and their aim is to map whether there has occurred a change in value orientations during the 1990s.

We are aware of the fact that to make an inquiry into the values of individuals and the value orientation of populations is difficult.[2] Values are constructs that are not directly observable, the concept itself is not sufficiently defined – at least there is no broad consensus in the international community on how to define values. Moreover, from the methodological point of view, sociology has not given clear-cut instructions on how to measure them. We therefore understand those arguments that object to the possibility of inquiries into values,[3] the result of which was a certain retreat from value research during the 1970s and 1980s.

Nevertheless, the activity of scholars grouped around the European Values Study and the *World Values Study* (WVS)[4] seems to have revived the interest in values. A number of articles and monographs published from EVS (and WVS) data – the detailed list can be found on the EVS web pages (see http://www.kub.nl/faculteiten/fsw/onderzoek/worc/) – have made the enterprise famous, not only among social scientists but also among journalists and even politicians.

We regard research of values and value preferences as a very important social science topic. We hold the view that values are cognitive representations of human needs [Rokeach 1973] and that they "indicate preferences people share for certain types of outcomes in their lives and for certain types of conduct" [Ball-Rokeach and Loges 1992: 2222]. In other words, to hold a specific value "means a disposition, a propensity to act in a certain way" [Halman and de Moor 1994: 22]. Values are important elements of social structure, they are also thought of as a central part of cultures. Since values are dispositions of behaviour, we perceive values – together with van Deth [1995] – as phenomena crucial to the interpretation of social and political change.

Value change seems to be a substantial condition for any society that undergoes fundamental political, economic and social/cultural change. The difficulty and relative slowness of the process of transformation from a totalitarian society into a democratic one, as recorded in all former communist countries, is brought about, in our view, by the very value structures and by their inertia. Basic value structures and orientations are formed in individuals during their formative years of age, which is, according to Becker [1995], from the age of 10-25. As such they are relatively resistant to change – their

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[1]) A general description of the EVS is given in the next article of this issue by Jan Řehák.

[2]) Van Deth and Scarbrough [1995] made a comprehensive analysis of the concept of values, Halman and de Moor [1994] put the concept of values into a comparative research context.

[3]) Hechter [1992] made an excellent review of impediments to the study of values.

[4]) World Values Study is a similar enterprise to EVS, it is directed by the US scholar Ronald Inglehart.

change would mean the transformation of an adult's cognitive organisation, which could consequently produce deep uncertainty and anxiety [Inglehart 1990].

This does not mean, however, that to change these central parts of culture is impossible. However, as Inglehart reckons, it is rather a gradual process carried "through intergenerational population replacement than by the conversion of already-socialized adults" [ibid.: 19]. He therefore sent an indirect warning to transforming communist countries to halt their optimism with respect to the speed of change, saying:

> "...a culture cannot be changed overnight. One may change the rulers and the laws, but changing basic aspects of the underlying culture will take many years. Even then, the long-run effects of revolutionary transformation are likely to diverge widely from revolutionary visions and to retain important elements of the old pattern of society. Furthermore, when basic cultural change does occur, it will take place more readily among younger groups (where it does not need to overcome the resistance of inconsistent early learning) than among older ones, resulting in intergenerational differences" [Inglehart 1990: 19].

Dahrendorf, when commenting in one of his interviews on the revolutions in Central and East Europe and the breath-taking speed they took when occurring in 1989, compressed this notion bluntly and stated that politics can be changed within six months, the economy within six years, but culture within sixty years.

These ideas lead us to the view that values as conceptions of the desirable, appropriate, good or bad, can be understood as social facts which serve as a regulatory mechanism of people's behaviour – people's acts are determined by their values [Musil 2000]. The pattern of determination, some scholars believe, is not difficult to outline - for instance according to van Deth, the scheme is simple and only two assumptions are needed: "The first is that individual behaviour is determined by behavioural intentions, which, in turn, are shaped by values and political orientations. The second assumption is that people's values are highly influenced by the social environment and by their social position in that environment" [van Deth 1995: 5-6]. In his view, macro-level developments shape one's social position and these two elements influence his/her values. Values then determine one's political orientation, and these two are the co-determinants of behavioural intentions. Behavioural intentions are the direct determinant of one's behaviour. Van Deth stresses nevertheless that the central position in the link between macro-structural conditions and individual behaviour is occupied by values. Moreover, the whole process is of a circular character because individual acts shape macro-structural conditions.

This line of reasoning could suggest nevertheless a certain kind of structural determinism and, to the objection of many social constructionists, that people behave not with respect to the objective qualities of the world around them but with respect to their subjective perceptions. I am not going to pursue the never-ending polemics of 'objectivists' (structuralists) versus 'subjectivists' (phenomenologists) here. From my point of view, the centrist's approach could be interpretatively fruitful, and it could sound as follows: An actor (agent) is formed and shaped in his/her everyday behaviour by outside forces – not only in the sense of e.g. Marx's economic substructure or Bourdieau's first-order (social and economic) reality, but also, as evolution genetics and sociobiologists show, by biological/genetic forces – but the way he/she acts in concrete situations is influenced by his/her definition of a situation, by meanings, by cultural patterns, by his/her habitus.

"Neither cultural determinism, nor economic determinism", maintains Inglehart [1997: 12].[5]

To cut a long story short, people's values are important phenomena for the life of society. They belong to basic elements of social structure. Their knowledge – especially in a time series – can serve as important predictors of behaviour of different social groups and sub-populations. The importance of such knowledge is very high, especially in societies which transform themselves from communism to democracy. The success of the transformation depends heavily not only on economic advancement but also on the culture shift.

As far as the culture shift is concerned, Inglehart maintains that the culture shift consists in "gradual changes in prevailing basic values concerning politics, work, religion, the family, and sexual behaviour" [Inglehart 1990: 4]. Politics, work, religion, and the family are therefore the very topics which are dealt with in this issue. They are supplemented by analyses of Czech post-materialism, xenophobia and educational values.

Klára Vlachová opens this issue with her paper *The Legitimacy of Democracy and Trust in the Political Institutions in the Czech Republic*. She focused on questions that are basic to Czech democracy, namely what kind of support the democracy receives, how democracy is assessed, and whether the Czechs trust their institutions. Her finding that they regard democracy as highly legitimate (nine out of ten respondents considered democracy as the best form of government) sounds optimistic – even the fact that only 30 percent of respondents were satisfied with the development of democracy, which seems at face value to be a low proportion, has its positive side. The dissatisfied were mainly 'good democrats' who were critical of the current state of affairs and who were interested in the improvement of democracy.

The next paper by Blanka Řeháková, entitled *Who Are the Czech Materialists, Post-materialists, and Those who Are 'Mixed', and How Do They Differ in Their Opinions and Attitudes on Selected – Primarily Political – Subjects*, brings in an exploratory manner an analysis of Czech data with respect to what extent Inglehart's well known materialist, mixed, and post-materialist types differ. After Rabušic's [1990 and 2000] theoretical and methodological introduction of the 'post-materialism' concept, Řeháková's paper is the first detailed empirical analysis of the bearers of this typology within the Czech population (i.e. individuals who belong to these types). Contrary to doubts raised by Musil [2000], in his essay on Czech values, who refuses Rabušic's [2000] conclusion that the post-materialist dimension is present among the Czech population and that there has been a tendency toward a certain dematerialisation during the 1990s, Řeháková confirms that post-materialism does exist in the Czech Lands, and she moreover claims that there is a tendency toward its increase.

It has often been declared that one of the obstacles to Czech transformation and to the incorporation of the Czech Lands into international structures might be the certain inertia of the Czech population in their attitudes towards 'strange' foreigners, i. e. their

[5]) His theory of the *silent revolution* and of post-materialism, which Inglehart [1977] elaborated in the 1970s, is based, though, on certain economic determinism. He assumes that the unprecedented rise in the standard of living, prosperity and security has brought about substantial change in value preferences among young age cohorts (born in the 1950s) of advanced industrialised countries leading to the spread of post-materialist values.

xenophobia. In his paper, *Xenophobia among the Czech population in the Context of Post-Communist Countries and Western Europe*, Aleš Burjanek raises questions that are from this point of view very interesting for Czech society: How xenophobic the Czechs really are, and to what extent their degree of xenophobia differs from other European countries. As he says, despite some improvement, the Czechs were still much more xenophobic at the end of the 1990s than their counterparts in Western Europe. The fact that there were other countries (mostly, except for Italy, Belgium and Greece, from Eastern European ones) with a higher xenophobic index can be no consolation for the Czechs.

In the fourth paper, *The Czechs: Jobs and Work*, by Petr Mareš, we move from the realm of politics to the sphere of work. The author has focused on the meaning of work: what role do jobs and work play in the lives of the Czechs; which aspects of work do they regard as important; how satisfied are they with their jobs; do they feel secure with respect to their jobs and employment? The main findings reveal that work is highly evaluated by the Czechs and that they are quite satisfied with their jobs. However, in comparison with EU countries, the Czechs are less concerned with the social dimension of work as well as with the self-fulfilment one.

The next paper deals with a much discussed topic in the Czech Republic – religion. In *Religion and Secularisation in the Czech Republic* by Dušan Lužný and Jolana Navrátilová, the authors were mainly interested in secularisation, its form and its scope. They confirmed what has already been guessed – according to various indicators, the Czechs belong to the most secularised country in Europe. Czechs also have a low level of trust in church institutions; they think that churches do not deal with family and social problems. Moreover, the authors found a trend towards the privatisation of religion.

In the next paper, *Value Change and Demographic Behaviour*, Ladislav Rabušic seeks to find the causes of why there have been fundamental changes in the demographic behaviour of young Czech cohorts during the 1990s. He relates the changes to the deep value change of the young population with respect to the role of women, the role of children and the timing of demographic events (like marriage and having babies). The author assumes that the course of demographic development we are witnessing in the Czech Republic resembles the process labelled as 'The Second Demographic Transition', the beginning of which was observed in the Western European countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The final paper of this collection entitled *Which Qualities Should Children be Encouraged to Learn at Home*, by Milada Rabušicová and Ladislav Rabušic, deals in an exploratory manner with the educational values in the family preferred by Czech as well as some European populations. The authors discover that the structure of most preferred Czech qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home remained basically the same during the 1990s, and that it is more or less universally distributed across various social groups and categories. The structure of these Czech value preferences is similar to those in many other European countries.

The collection of papers presented here is the first batch of analyses based on EVS data. I personally hope that many will follow soon, especially now the Czech EVS team has made the Czech EVS 1999 data publicly available by placing them on the internet in the Czech Sociological Data Archive (see http://archiv.soc.cas.cz). Anyone from any part of the world can download them free of charge for scholarly purposes now. I believe therefore that there will soon follow comparative papers written either by bilateral or

multilateral international teams of collaborative authors in which the Czech scholars will have their place.

We are ready for such a challenge.

Ladislav Rabušic, the guest editor

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European Values Study

Information about the EVS project

The project of the *European Value System* (EVS) has long been well known among the sociological community in this country. The first wave of this research was carried out in 1991 and it brought out some of the first relevant data on a new era in a new society. It managed to capture the initial stage of development of the value system of the 1990s. The data was made available to sociologists for research and publications, but it has had an even more significant role as teaching material for the generation of upcoming sociologists as it has been broadly used for instruction in sociology departments in Prague, Brno and Bratislava. It has been influential both in terms of its content and its methodology. The international and cross-national aspects of the project have ensured its high level of methodology, and thus made it an appropriate model and a good example. In the opinion of this author, the data file created for this project was one of the most influential for the development of the profession in that period. There is thus even more reason to thank its sponsors who made the collection of data and the application of the demanding, internationally acceptable methodological requirements possible.

Now the second wave has arrived – at the end of the difficult and, in terms of development, precipitous decade of the 1990s. Over the course of that period much has changed, even in the value system of the population of the Czech Republic. The possibility to compare and study the development and changes is of high relevance. It also enables an evaluation of the data from 1991. The comparison of both waves is what makes the EVS project particularly valuable and significant.

The tradition of the European Value System project started in 1978. At that time a group of academics, mostly sociologists and theologians from various countries who had originally worked together informally on this topic, set up the foundation of the European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) in Amsterdam, the aim of which was to carry out large, international empirical studies on values. The originally European idea spread rapidly throughout the world (South America, North America, Asia, the Near East, the Middle East, South Africa, Australia). The project was prepared primarily through the systematic collection of all available literature, and later through the help of Focus Groups and in-depth interviews. The pilot study in 1980 was organised as a preparation for the large empirical survey of 1981.

Ten years later, in 1991, our republic joined the project in the second wave of research. This thematic issue is based on the third wave, which was organised in 1999 and co-ordinated by the University of Tilburg.

Thus the EVS project is today able to provide comparable data from three waves of research (in the Czech Republic, data from the last two waves is available), and can offer a view of the development of value orientations over the span of three decades. Above all, it is aimed at the values of work, family, marriage, leisure time, politics and civic involvement, religion and faith, morals, and tolerance.

In 1991, the study was planned and carried out in the Czechoslovak federation by a team in the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University (J. Řehák, I. Bártová, J. Kabele). Expenses connected with the research were covered

by the European Bishops' Conference and the Czechoslovak Bishops' Conference. The sample – n = 3,000 – represented the whole of the Czech Lands and Slovakia at that time. On the territory of the Czech Republic, n = 2,110 respondents were interviewed. The international co-ordinator of the methodology and empirical implementation was the Public Opinion Research Institute in Allensbach.

In 1999, 27 countries participated in the project. In addition to the Czech Republic, the list of countries included Austria, Belgium, Belorussia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Ukraine. The project was co-ordinated by the University in Tilburg (L. Hallman was the co-ordinator).

The Czech participation in the project was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (grant no. 403/99/0326), and by the EVSSG foundation. As a result of this support, it was possible to ensure sufficient means for a high quality collection of data and a sufficiently large sample, which enabled a deep analysis and a high degree of precision in population estimates. The research was carried out by two co-ordinating organisations: The Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University in Brno (grant co-ordinator – Doc. PhDr. Ladislav Rabušic), and SC&C Ltd., Prague (co-ordinator – Doc. RNDr. Jan Řehák). Both groups participated in the methodological preparation of data collection, which was carried out by the SC&C interviewer network.

As in the previous wave, the project was based on internationally agreed methodology, developed by consensus among the researchers. The methodology was naturally set up to provide the maximum degree of comparability with previous waves. For this reason the project preserved the previous operationalisation of the basic concepts just as they had been used before. Thus the questionnaire copies most of the questions from the previous versions. The Czech project used all the obligatory questions and some optional ones. The Czech team also proposed some useful additions to be introduced into the project, which were accepted.

Both co-ordinators placed high demands and requirements on all aspects of data collection, both on planning and realising the sampling, and on the quality, preparation and control of the survey work. The probability design of the survey sample was based on the SC&C design. The SC&C master sample ensures a degree of representation and provides the sample points; it is founded on a) stratification based on the regions, the size of the locality, and also on a special combination of social, economic, demographic and political indices; b) a multi-level selection of sampling points. The households were selected within these points through a systematic selection of addresses; the member of the household was selected with the aid of Kish tables. This sampling model was originally designed for the international research project SIALS, and was scientifically evaluated by its co-ordinator (Statistics Canada); moreover, it was verified through a detailed methodological control analysis for the collection of data in this project. It has satisfied the most demanding scientific criteria for the sampling model.

The data was collected in the period between March 21 and the beginning of May 1999. A total of 185 interviewers participated in the fieldwork. We have managed to complete 1,908 interviews with respondents, while refusals were recorded in 321 cases, i.e. the proportion of refusals in our conditions was unusually low: 14.5%. Both this and

also the overall positive reception by respondents testify to a large degree to the interest in this issue.

Overview of reasons for refusal:

Reasons for refusal:	number	percentage
1 not in the mood to answer questions	30	9.4
2 too busy	104	32.4
3 no interest in the research	124	38.6
4 no interest in the subject	5	1.6
5 not allowed in the household	1	0.3
6 other reasons	57	17.7
Total	321	100

The Czech data was weighted in order to fit its structure to the proportions of the micro-census of 1997, and was done for each region according to education, age, family status, and economic activity.

The data sets were cleaned by each participating team (including the Czech team). After, for the purpose of common international comparative use, national specificities and national coding of local characteristics were consolidated by the co-ordinator in Tilburg. After the complete data cleaning, the international data sets were released for general scientific use in the spring of 2001. The data are completely available to both the scientific community and students of social sciences. The Czech data have been deposited (along with data from 1991) in the Sociological Archives at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (http://archiv.soc.cas.cz), and the international data are to be found in the Zentralarchiv in Cologne n/R. Those who are interested can find a complete overview of the distributions, selected analytic tables, and selected comparative tables, 1991 and 1999, on the SC&C Ltd. website (www.scac.cz). The results of selected Czech analyses are presented in this issue of the *Czech Sociological Review*.

Both co-ordinators of this project believe that the availability of the Czech data in the Sociological Archives of the Institute of Sociology for the use of scientific research and study, and the fact that the basic results are being made available through the internet will have a strong impact on developments in the field of sociology – as strong as the first wave had in the past.

Jan Řehák

The Legitimacy of Democracy and Trust in the Political Institutions in the Czech Republic*

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Abstract: This article deals with legitimacy of democracy and its relationship to trust in political institutions in the Czech Republic. The introduction includes a recapitulation of the theories concerning the legitimacy of democracy, and on the conditions necessary for this legitimacy, which is what the subject of this article is then built upon. The author distinguishes between support for democracy as a form of government, and satisfaction with the development of democracy in a (particular) country, and searches for the factors which this depends on. As explanatory factors, the author first tests trust in institutions, then political culture and personal characteristics. The analysis showed that the legitimacy of democracy and the evaluation of the development of democracy are not in the Czech Republic mutually independent, and that they depend more on political culture than on trust in the institutions being researched. For the legitimacy of democracy, a significant effect was traced only in the case of trust in NATO – an institution that also became a value in the political culture. With the evaluation of the development of democracy, trust in institutions was more strongly felt – a significant effect was revealed by an analysis of the social welfare system, the army and the media. It is clear that the evaluation of the performance of institutions is rather more reflected in the system efficacy of the democracy than in the legitimacy of democracy as a system of government.
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Once the totalitarian regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had collapsed many people at that time posed the question as to whether the democracy that had been introduced into these countries would be strong and lasting or weak and also threatened with collapse. What influences the strength of democracy? Undoubtedly an entire series of institutional and systemic conditions apply. According to Linz and Stepan [1996] no modern *polis* can be a democracy if it is not a state, if it lacks a free and lively civil society, if it is not an autonomous political society, if it does not guarantee and protect civil rights, if it does not possess a bureaucracy working for the government, and if it does not have an economic society.

In addition to institutional and systemic conditions, democracy requires support on the part of its citizens – their trust in its legitimacy. Many people perceive democracy in two manners: as an ideal that must be striven toward, and as an existing form of government in a specific political system [Dahl 2000]. Trust in the legitimacy of democracy has two levels: general – democracy is the best (or the 'least bad') form of government among many; and specific – democracy in a particular country is despite its failings and insufficiencies a better form of government than any others that could be set up in the given country [Diamond 1998].

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In contemporary democracies it is common for citizens to feel dissatisfied with the way in which democracy works in their country, and at the same time to be convinced that democracy is still the best form of government [Diamond 1998]. According to how democratic a country is (and how democratic its citizens are) dissatisfaction with democracy may lead to two results: citizens may opt in favour of an undemocratic regime for their country,[1] or they may give preference to introducing democratic reforms. If trust in democracy is dependent on how people evaluate the democracy in their country, then it is not in itself a *value*, it is rather a *means* for ensuring the effective functioning of democracy. It is not real legitimacy – *autonomous legitimacy* [Maravall 1997: 203] that consolidates democracy, but *instrumental legitimacy*. Only when support for democracy has become unconditional and independent of the particular functioning of the democracy is it possible to consider a democracy as being consolidated. A democracy is consolidated not only when its support is unconditional, but also when it is shared by all the main political groups and movements.

Support for democracy takes shape on three levels [Dalton 1998]:

	Affective orientation	*Evaluations*
Community	National pride Sense of national identity	Best nation to live in
Regime: its principles	Democratic values	Democracy best form of government
Regime: political process	Participatory norms Political rights	Evaluation of rights Satisfaction with democratic process
Regime: political institution	Institutional expectations Support party government Output expectations	Performance judgement Trust in institutions Trust party system Trust bureaucracy
Authority	Identify with party	Candidate evaluations Party support
	General support	*Specific support*

One of the levels giving rise to support for democracy is the institutional one. Institutions are legitimate as long as citizens judge them to be suitable, which means the best possible ones for their society [Lipset 1981]. In one opinion, dissatisfaction with the performance of institutions can cause a long-term weakening of the trust of some citizens in democracy.[2] But, clearly, "no institution can avoid criticism from some sectors of the population. Consensus is the ridiculous claim of totalitarian regimes." [Dogan 1998: 16]. Both in old and in new democracies a weakening trust – 'confidence gap' – is referred to [Lipset and Schneider 1983]. But it is difficult to distinguish the weak popularity and legitimacy

[1]) The temporary restriction of democracy in Nigeria in the 1980s, in Thailand in 1991, or in Peru in 1992, accompanied by the expectation that the ensuing structural reforms would facilitate an improvement in the functioning of democracy.

[2]) Institutions must be capable of managing political conflict and must be democratic. Almond and Verba [1963] emphasise the degree of democracy of the structures of authority in the society. If these structures – the family, church, unions etc. – are democratic, then there is a greater likelihood that the country will also be democratic.

of an institution and trust in it, from the weak popularity of its office-holders and trust in them. Citizens are frequently dissatisfied with those who represent an institution [Dalton 1998]. The weak popularity of the representatives of a certain institution does not necessarily mean a lack of trust in the institution itself.

Rose, Mischler and Haerpfer [1997] claim that in order for a democracy to function efficiently it is not necessary for there to also be a high degree of trust in politics or even in institutions. The research that was carried out in the post-communist countries (The New Democracies Barometer) shows that the majority of the population has no trust in any of the fifteen political and social institutions. The highest level of trust is generally directed at the president, the armed forces and the church, though the last two mentioned here do not receive the trust of even half of the population. In the Czech Republic according to this research from 1995, the most trust is placed in the media, followed by the government, the president, the armed forces, the court system, the police, political parties, the church, and parliament [Gabriel 2000].[3]

If one considers what the alternative to trust in an institution is, it clearly is not distrust, but rather scepticism. Merkl [1988] believes that the ideal democratic culture is neither blindly trusting nor hostilely rejecting, but rather inquisitive and sceptical. Those who are dissatisfied may (reputedly) be good democrats who are simply interested in improving democracy. And as the manner in which people perceive the performance of a political system has changed during recent decades, the crisis in the degree of trust is primarily a sign of continuing political maturity and advancement [Dahl 2000].

Although the opinion continues to be raised claiming there is a relationship between trust in institutions and democratic legitimacy, the dominant view is that the legitimacy of democracy is to a certain degree independent of the performance of institutions. Dissatisfaction with the performance of institutions does not weaken the loyalty of citizens toward the existing regime. Responsibility for the unsatisfactory performance of institutions can in a democracy be ascribed to an entire series of sources: the economic system, the international situation, the government, employers, unions, etc. It is possible to change the government, but it is not necessary to change the regime. Dissatisfaction with institutions is entirely compatible with democracy.

When we speak of institutions whose legitimacy, or even only the affective orientations and evaluations directed toward which, are capable of having an influence on the legitimacy of democracy, we are above all referring to political institutions, in particular to the tripartite of state power: the executive – the president, the government, state administration in general, and the army and the police in particular; the legislature – parliament; and the judiciary – courts. Others generally included as being relevant in this case are the powerful and influential institutions characteristic of a civil society – the church, the media, unions, and in some cases political parties and businesses. This list goes to show that both political and economic institutions are relevant. It is not possible to discuss the legitimacy of a regime today without examining its socio-economic system [Linz 1988, Burkhart 2000]. Thus even those institutions that may be a part of both state administration and civil society – such as the education system, the social security system, and the health-care system – fall into the focus of consideration.

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[3]) The author is presenting the average level of trust in the institutions cited also for Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Belorussia, and Ukraine.

However, the legitimacy of a democracy may even be influenced by the type of economy. Democracy is frequently perceived in association with capitalism as a single entity, and according to Schumpeter [1975] democracy is indeed the product of capitalism. But it can certainly co-exist in combination with various types of economic system, similarly to an authoritarian regime.[4] Regardless of the economic system, democracy requires a certain degree of economic development, and economic development demands a certain degree of democracy.[5] In connection with the collapse of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, Maravall [1997] reached the conclusion that changes leading in the direction of democracy come about equally owing to the economic success of a regime as owing to its economic failure. Authoritarian regimes are just as incapable of managing a long-term excellent performance in the economic sphere as they are in managing economic crisis [Dahl 2000], and democratisation is the result of both the political and economic failure of dictatorships [Maravall 1997]. Unlike undemocratic regimes, however, a legitimate democracy can survive an economic crisis.

But how well will the new democracies, born out of economic crises, actually fare? As long as new democratic governments grapple more with problems that are economic in nature they will be unable to concentrate on the political ones. If they concentrate on political problems, while economic performance remains below standard, then economic failures may lead to a weakening of the legitimacy of some institutions or even of the entire regime. While Linz and Stepan [1996] do not believe that a worsening of the economy becomes an instrument in the erosion of support for democracy, according to Diamond [1998] it is primarily economic performance that influences the level of satisfaction with how the democracy is functioning. He concedes, however, that the political performance of the regime does have an influence on the legitimacy of the democracy.[6]

It is therefore both the economic and the political performance of a democracy that influences its support. However, also indicated as variables mediating between the economic and political performance of a democracy and the support it receives are the beliefs, attitudes and values that are shared by the citizens of a democracy [Inkeles and Diamond 1980, Inglehart 1990, Lipset 1981]: freedom, tolerance, trust, political efficacy, participation in politics and civic life, satisfaction in life, interpersonal trust, and the rejection of revolutionary change etc. These factors go into forming a political culture.[7] The legitimacy of democracy, or of others types of regime, is connected with political culture [Almond and Verba 1963], and it is political culture (i.e. the set of values, attitudes, opinions, knowledge and capabilities of citizens) that plays a significant role in the development and consolidation of democracy. It is formed in the sector located between the state and the individual, in the sector known as 'civil society'. Political parties, pressure

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[4]) Maravall [1997] summarises four varieties of relationships between political regimes and economic systems: the market requires a democracy, the market requires authoritarianism, the democracy requires a market, the democracy requires centrally planned and public ownership.

[5]) Nothing however exists that would guarantee that the advanced country would be democratic and the poor country authoritarian or totalitarian [Maravall 1997].

[6]) For example, the increase in the freedom of the individual, the way in which institutions perceive citizens and the degree of transparency of the activities of institutions can all have a positive influence. Conversely, the perception of corruption can have a negative influence.

[7]) In the Czech Republic, political culture is a concept thus far seriously reduced to a focus on the behaviour of politicians and political parties.

and interest groups, unions, the media, cultural foundations, professional organisations, academic societies, and commercial societies, all put forth their interests and interact with the state in this sector [Maravall 1997: 205]. It is here that democratic values are formed. However, they become anchored only over time. Democracy becomes mature at the earliest after two generations [Converse 1969, Maravall 1997]. This amount of time is necessary for the political socialisation of citizens in the new regime.[8] Until that time, democracy rests on unstable foundations.[9]

A brief excursion into the theory of the legitimacy of democracy serves to point out that this is an extensive and multifaceted subject. For this reason the questions that will be raised in this study cover only part of the background to the setting in which the legitimacy of the democracy in the Czech Republic stands. We are interested in determining what kind of support democracy in the Czech Republic is receiving, whether support for democracy (the evaluation of the principle) depends on an evaluation of the development of democracy here (the evaluation of the political process), and conversely what kind of role is played by trust in institutions.

Variables

We are going to work with two variables which in the analyses are both the 'explained' and the 'explanatory' variables. Legitimacy of democracy (the evaluation of the form of government) is measured by means of expressing agreement or disagreement with a statement such as 'democracy is the best form of government'. In the research conducted through the European Values Study in 1999, which is also the source of our data here, the following statement was used: *Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government* (agree strongly = 1, disagree strongly = 4). The system efficacy (the evaluation of the political process) of democracy is measured by asking whether citizens are satisfied with the way in which democracy works in their country. In the research of the European Values Study a similar question was posed: *On the whole, are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?* (very satisfied = 1, not at all satisfied = 4)

Other explanatory variables were represented by the expression of trust in the following institutions:

1. Institutions of state power: the legislature – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the executive – state administration and offices, the police, the army (trust in the government or in the president was not examined in this research), the justice system (a question on the court system was not raised in this research);
2. Some influential institutions of civil society: the press, churches, trade unions, major companies;
3. Welfare institutions: the social security system, the health-care system, the education system;

[8]) The process of democratisation is complicated, it brings about with it the socialisation of a new generation, but also the re-socialisation of the old generation.

[9]) Unanswered questions however remain as to whether the theory of political culture is capable of explaining a change in regime [Maravall 1997: 202], and whether changes in regime are preceded by changes in values and attitudes.

4. Subregional organisation of collective defence which the Czech Republic has membership in: NATO.

The explanatory variables were also formed from the values and attitudes that go into making up political culture (political, economic and personal), and from the personal characteristics of the respondent: four various government regimes – military, authoritarian with a strong leader, limited democracy with a government of experts, and democracy – were evaluated by the respondent as being suitable or unsuitable in the case of the Czech Republic; also evaluated were the communist political regime and the current system of running the country, a scale of liberal-paternalistic economic values, interest in politics, political orientation, sense of freedom, sense of satisfaction with life, interpersonal trust, the preferred means of bringing about change in society – revolutionary, reformist, and evolutionary – and finally also the subjective categorisation of the respondent into a social class, and the respondent's age and the level of education. An outline of the explanatory variables is presented in the appendix.

Legitimacy of Democracy in the Czech Republic

In modern age history the Czech Republic has had the longest experience (1918-1938) with democracy out of all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This experience with democracy was rooted in the democratic institutional and systemic framework characteristic for the Western countries (sovereignty of the people, democratic institutions, limitations on state power and the division of power, constitutionalism and rule of law, a parliamentary form of government, majority decision-making and the protection of minorities, unconditional and inalienable human and civic rights, political plurality). However, this twenty-year democracy was replaced with a fifty-one year period of undemocratic forms of government: first from without, through an occupational regime (the German Nazi protectorate), then from within, with the post-war limited democracy, which was replaced at the end of the 1940s with a totalitarian, communist regime. The latter eventually, after an unsuccessful episode of democratisation in 1968, changed into a post-totalitarian regime.[10] Linz and Stepan [1996: 42] refer to the regime of the second half of the 1980s, in the Czechoslovak and East German cases, as 'frozen' post-totalitarianism, in which, unlike the post-totalitarianism in Hungary or Poland, no marked political or economic reforms came about.

The legitimacy of Czechoslovak post-totalitarianism was quite low at the end of the 1980s. However, low legitimacy was definitely not in itself a cause of the collapse [Dvořáková and Kunc 1994], even though all the relevant social and professional groups in society were interested in changing the regime [Možný 1991]. But the international embeddedness of undemocratic regimes often plays a role in their long-term existence [Linz and Stepan 1996: 237-238]. In Central and Eastern Europe these illegitimate regimes were kept alive through their ties to the undemocratic hegemonic world power – Russia. Only once this great power had ceased to keep them under its protective wing did the illegitimate regimes fall, as there was no one even within the regime willing to struggle for their existence.

[10]) In the 1980s, with the exception of Poland, according to Linz an authoritarian post-totalitarian system dominated in Central and Eastern Europe, a system that did not have complete control over the life of its citizens outside the sphere of politics.

After the collapse of post-totalitarianism in Czechoslovakia at the end of 1989, the new political elite wasted no time in returning citizens their political rights[11] and freedoms, and carried out important political reforms (amendment of the socialist constitution), followed by economic reforms (privatisation, restitution, liberalisation of the market) and social ones. Democratisation resulted in the disintegration of the socialist federation [Pavlíček et al. 1998], the political division of the federal Czechoslovak state in 1992, and the creation of institutional and systemic foundations for the separate states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The economic transformation initiated by the reforms brought groups of citizens collective social mobility – both upward and downward – and a sense of both social and economic gratification and deprivation. The economy went through a transformation recession, a subsequent economic boom, and after a change in monetary policy in 1996, resulting in a fiscal crisis solved by restrictive government 'packages', another economic recession. This was accelerated by the political crisis that led at the end of 1997 to the fall of the centre-right government formed by ODS, ODA and KDU-ČSL, accompanied by some unconstitutional measures taken by the president. Subsequently a government composed of non-party experts and politicians from minor parties whose ministers had left the preceding Klaus government was set up to lead the country for half a year, the premier of which was the then governor of the central bank, Tošovský.

The 1990s were rocky years in the Czech Republic. Both economically and politically, the performance of democracy and the performance of democratic institutions represented a potential risk for the legitimacy of democracy as a form of government. Nevertheless, in 1999 people in the Czech Republic still considered democracy to be the best form of regime. Almost 90% (table 1) of respondents more or less agreed with the proposition that democracy is despite its problems the best possible form of government. Unlike many consolidated democracies in Western Europe – Denmark France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, where 48-71% definitely agreed with the statement that democracy is, despite its problems, the best possible form of government – this agreement was in the case of the Czech Republic less decisive: 40% of those asked definitely agreed. People in the Czech Republic evaluate democracy similarly to people in the countries of southern Europe, in which the authoritarian regime collapsed in the middle of the 1970s (Spain and Portugal) and in Ireland, Italy and Croatia, too.

[11]) The right to gather in public places, to associate (both around the end of 1989) and the right to vote (in 1990).

Table 1. Legitimacy of democracy (%)
(Agreement with the statement 'Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government')

	Definitely agree	Agree	Disagree	Definitely disagree
Denmark	71.8	26.8	1.1	0.3
Greece	65.8	30.9	2.8	0.5
France	61.3	32.0	5.3	1.4
Austria	59.6	37.2	2.6	0.5
Belgium	58.4	33.6	6.2	1.8
Germany	52.5	42.8	4.1	0.7
Sweden	50.8	43.5	5.0	0.7
Netherlands	48.1	48.2	3.3	0.3
Malta	46.7	47.2	5.8	0.3
Bulgaria	44.0	40.3	11.9	3.8
Italy	43.7	50.6	4.8	0.9
Croatia	43.5	52.1	4.3	0.1
Spain	41.7	52.1	5.1	1.2
Portugal	41.6	51.0	6.1	1.3
Ireland	40.9	52.4	5.7	1.1
Czech Republic	***40.5***	***52.2***	***6.7***	***0.6***
Romania	33.9	44.3	14.9	6.9
Slovakia	31.9	52.5	12.6	3.0
Latvia	28.2	62.4	7.7	1.6
Slovenia	25.4	64.8	8.7	1.2
Ukraine	24.0	58.8	15.2	2.1
Poland	23.6	65.7	9.3	1.4
Lithuania	22.3	66.6	10.2	0.9
Estonia	20.3	70.0	8.9	0.7
Russia	11.9	50.5	31.8	5.8

Note: Countries are ordered according to relative frequency in the category 'Definitely agree'.
Source: EVS 1999.

While in the Czech Republic democracy is considered to be the best form of government by nine out of ten of those asked, only around 30% of those asked are satisfied with the development of democracy in the country (table 2). The Estonians are satisfied with the development of democracy to a degree similar to that of the Czechs, while Slovenians and Poles expressed slightly more satisfaction (45% and 43% of those asked). Satisfaction with the development of democracy is thus in the most successfully transforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe lower than in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe. In Western Europe, satisfaction with the development of democracy is expressed by between 50-78%. Of the countries surveyed in the European Values Study, France, Belgium and Italy were located at the lower end of this interval. But who is dissatisfied? Are they the critical but 'good' democrats, or those who would elect an undemocratic regime?

Table 2. Satisfaction with the development of democracy (%)
(Agreement with the statement 'On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?')

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Very satisfied	Rather satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied
Portugal	78.6	21.4	10.0	68.6	18.2	3.2
Malta	78.0	22.0	16.6	61.4	18.1	3.9
Austria	74.8	25.1	8.2	66.7	21.8	3.3
Netherlands	73.5	26.5	5.9	67.6	24.6	1.8
Germany	70.8	29.2	10.0	60.8	24.4	4.9
Denmark	67.0	33.0	12.3	54.7	30.0	3.0
Ireland	64.4	35.6	10.2	54.2	29.3	6.3
Spain	60.5	49.5	6.6	53.9	33.3	6.2
Sweden	56.0	38.0	2.9	53.2	32.4	5.6
Greece	55.3	44.7	7.5	47.8	35.8	9.0
France	49.4	50.6	4.4	45.0	39.4	11.2
Belgium	47.1	52.9	2.2	44.9	35.6	17.3
Slovenia	45.0	55.0	0.9	44.1	44.4	10.6
Poland	43.1	56.9	2.2	40.9	42.4	14.5
Czech Republic	***37.7***	***62.3***	***0.9***	***36.8***	***49.4***	***12.9***
Estonia	36.7	63.3	2.0	34.7	51.2	12.2
Italy	35.9	64.1	1.6	34.3	52.7	11.4
Lithuania	30.3	69.7	1.3	29.0	59.5	10.3
Bulgaria	28.5	71.5	2.7	25.8	49.8	21.7
Latvia	25.5	74.5	1.9	23.6	52.1	22.5
Slovakia	23.4	76.6	0.8	22.6	52.8	23.8
Romania	20.9	79.1	1.7	19.2	52.2	26.9
Croatia	17.9	82.1	1.7	16.2	55.7	26.4
Ukraine	15.4	84.6	1.3	14.1	48.9	35.7
Russia	6.9	93.1	0.5	6.4	42.0	51.2

Note: Countries are ordered according to relative frequency in the category 'Very satisfied' and 'Rather satisfied'.
Source: EVS 1999.

In the research conducted by the European Values Study respondents were asked how suitable they feel each of four types of regimes would be for their country: a regime run by the armed forces, by a strong leader, by experts, or a democratic regime. A military regime received support from not quite 3% of the population, 17% supported a regime with a strong leader, 53% agreed that a government of experts would be suitable, and 93% of respondents considered democracy to be the most suitable form (graph 1).[12] Democracy is considered as a suitable regime for the Czech Republic by 3% more respondents than those who consider democracy generally to be the best system. A similar disparity, in which more respondents consider democracy to be a suitable regime for their country than consider democracy generally as the best form of regime, was found, for example, in the case of Spain. Thus ten years after the fall of the undemocratic regime,

[12]) In Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia a relatively high level of support was found for restricting parliament, in favour of a strong leader, and for a return to communism [Diamond 1998].

democracy is, despite its vicissitudes, failings, and the political and economic crises, considered by the majority of the population to be the best form of regime in general and the most suitable regime for the Czech Republic in particular. The absolute majority of critics therefore clearly belong to the category of 'good' democrats who are interested in improving the way in which the renewed democracy and its institutions work.

Graph 1. Evaluation of political regimes as methods of running our country (%)



Source: EVS 1999.

However, in each country we come across an entire range of ideas on how to improve democracy and democratic institutions – each political party has its own idea. In the Czech Republic also satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions is a matter linked to political orientation, or to voting preferences. Crosstabs analysis shows that people who support right-wing political parties are more satisfied with the development of democracy in the Czech Republic than are the voters of left-wing parties.[13] Roughly 55% of ODS and US supporters are satisfied with democracy, while conversely 72% of ČSSD supporters and 80% of Communist party supporters are dissatisfied. If Citrin's [1974] claim is true, that the dissatisfied are usually those whose parties are in the opposition, then the greater satisfaction among right-wing voters in this case may stem from the fact that the right wing and the centre have had a greater period of influence on institutional and structural conditions in the country since the collapse of post-totalitarianism than the left wing has (by the year 2000 the ratio was 6 years to 2). Moreover the most significant and also politically the most controversial reforms (privatisation of state prop-

[13]) Conversely, in Spain those most dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy are people with a rightwing orientation [Diamond 1998].

erty, construction of the social security system, and some modifications to the health-care and other systems) occurred under the direction of the right and centre.

The fact that voters of different political parties differ in their degree of satisfaction with how democracy functions is nothing strange. Dissatisfaction and varying ideas on how democracy should work are reflected in various political programmes, and do not represent a risk to democracy. There is no risk as long as a large number of voters refrain from adopting the opinion that democracy is not the best regime for the Czech Republic. A risk could emerge if the political contest ceased to be one in which only various options for improving the functioning of the institutions and structural conditions of democracy compete, and instead became one in which the very existence of democracy itself entered into the competition. In the political 'market', it is the so-called anti-system parties, usually communist and fascist ones, that cast doubts on the existence of democracy. In the Czech Republic, this kind of anti-system party in parliamentary politics is typified in the Communist party (KSČM), and even though democratic rules of the game have been in practice for over ten years now, the communists still represent a group with a specific political culture. Around 26% of communist voters do not consider democracy as a legitimate regime, while there are significantly fewer voters of pro-system parties who share this attitude: ČSSD 6.5%, KDU-ČSL 4%, ODS 2%, and US 1.5%.

Graph 2. Trust in institutions (%)



Note: The sum of responses 'A great deal' and 'Quite a lot' of trust. The points 'Health-care system', 'Chamber of Deputies' and 'Senate' were present only in the questionnaire from the year 1999.

Source: EVS 1991, 1999.

As we mentioned in the introduction, dissatisfaction with the way democracy works (system inefficacy) is considered by some to be the result of the poor functioning of institutions, or of dissatisfaction with the functioning of institutions and a lack of trust in them. Graph 2 shows the level of trust in various institutions in 1999, and for a comparison in 1991, too. On the whole it is clear that trust in institutions since 1991 has primarily

fallen, and has grown only in the case of NATO and the press. Only one of the institutions here examined – the education system – has, despite the decline in the level of trust in it, managed to maintain the trust of more than half the population. In 1999 people showed the least trust in Parliament. The Chamber of Deputies maintained the trust of roughly 12% and the Senate of about 7% of respondents. We will not speculate as to the source behind the low level of trust in the individual institutions because there is not enough space here to take up this matter. But in the case of the Senate, we might point out that from its very foundation it was an institution with a very low level of legitimacy, and the majority of citizens had doubts about the purpose of its existence [Vlachová 2000].[14]

Table 3. Correlations

	Legitimacy of democracy	Satisfaction with democracy
Education system	-0.005	0.070**
NATO	0.409***	0.332***
Health-care system	0.053*	0.127***
Press	0.060**	0.139***
Social security system	0.137***	0.221***
Police	0.077**	0.186***
Armed forces	0.054**	0.144***
Justice system	0.064**	0.194***
Trade unions	-0.068**	0.026
State administration	0.080**	0.203***
Church	0.095***	0.081**
Major companies	0.035	0.167***
Chamber of Deputies	0.131***	0.201***
Senate	0.090***	0.189***

Note: *** – statistically significant at 0.001, ** – statistically significant at 0.01, * – statistically significant at 0.05.
Source: EVS 1999.

Diamond [1998] has found evidence to show that there exists a direct relationship between trust in institutions and the legitimacy of democracy, or, as the case may be, the preference for undemocratic alternatives of government. Those who place trust in institutions more often support the existing regime than do the sceptics. Table 3 shows the results of the correlation analysis for the Czech Republic. *The legitimacy of democracy (the evaluation of the form of government) is significantly correlated to trust in the majority of the institutions included in the survey*, with the exception of the education system and major companies. The five institutions with the greatest correlation (the correlation coefficient is statistically significant at the level of 0.001) between trust and the legitimacy of democracy are NATO, the social security system, the Chamber of Deputies, the church and the Senate. *Satisfaction with the development of democracy in the Czech Republic (system efficacy) is quite significantly correlated to trust in the majority of the institutions (included in the research).* A statistically significant relationship was not traced only in the case of trust in trade unions. Among the five institutions which show a strong correla-

[14]) Moreover, even from the viewpoint of political science, the second (upper/lower) chamber of Parliament, in which representatives of the states of the federation and representatives of the regions do not sit, is unique, and its significance is a source of contention.

tion between trust and satisfaction with the development of democracy in the Czech Republic are NATO, the social security system, state administration, the Chamber of Deputies, and the justice system, although a very significant correlation (significant at the level 0.001) was found in the case of other institutions also. Therefore it is true that satisfaction with the development of democracy is very significantly correlated with trust in institutions, and that people who have trust in institutions are more likely to consider democracy as being legitimate. However, it is necessary to take into consideration that although the above-mentioned correlation coefficients are statistically significant they are somewhat low.

The question as to whether trust or distrust in institutions has an influence on the level of satisfaction with the development of democracy in the Czech Republic, and the legitimacy of democracy in general, may be answered with the help of a regression analysis. The regression analysis may also help to answer the question as to whether the legitimacy of democracy in the Czech Republic is *autonomous* (independent of the evaluation of the development of democracy in the country) or *instrumental* (dependent on the analysis of the development of democracy in the country). Two models, containing explained and mutually explanatory variables, were tested by using the method of linear regression: satisfaction with the development of democracy (the evaluation of the political process) and support for democracy as the best form of regime (the evaluation of the principle). Other explanatory variables in this analysis include trust in individual institutions, and a set of political attitudes (political culture): the evaluation of the suitability of four types of regimes in the case of the Czech Republic, the evaluation of the current system of running the country, an evaluation of the communist political system, liberal-paternalistic economic values, interest in politics, political orientation, sense of freedom, satisfaction with life, interpersonal trust, the preferred way of bringing about change in the country, and finally the characteristics of the respondent: subjective social class, age, education.

The results of the regression analysis, in which *satisfaction with the development of democracy* in the Czech Republic figured as a dependent variable, can be seen in table 4. Satisfaction with the development of democracy in the Czech Republic increases primarily with the rise in satisfaction with the current system of running the country, with the feeling of greater life satisfaction, with the greater inclination toward economic liberalism, with the legitimacy of democracy, with dissatisfaction with the communist political system, with the rejection of revolutionary political change, and with rise in interest in politics. With respect to trust in institutions, a statistically significant effect was traced in the case of the armed forces, the press, and the social security system. In relation to these institutions, increasing trust had an influence on the degree of satisfaction with the democracy in the Czech Republic. Trust in other institutions did not have a statistically significant influence on the degree of satisfaction here. The analysis left trust in NATO within the regression equation, but the regression coefficient is insignificant. Among personal characteristics, a statistically significant effect was found with the variables of subjective social class and age. While with the rise in social class satisfaction with the development of democracy also increased, with the increase in age it fell.

The second regression analysis used *legitimacy of democracy* as the dependent variable. The analysis shows (table 4) that legitimacy of democracy is above all dependent on support for democracy as the suitable means of running the country in the Czech Republic, and on satisfaction with the way in which democracy functions here and the

rejection of the communist political regime. To a weaker degree it also depends on the rejection of a military regime. As the degree of economic liberalism and the interest in politics rise, so too does the legitimacy of democracy. With reference to trust in institutions, a statistically significant effect was traced in the case of NATO, and large businesses and companies. While the rise in the degree of trust in NATO is accompanied by a rise also in the legitimacy of democracy, in the case of major companies a negative re-

Table 4. Linear regression analysis, STEPWISE method

	Legitimacy of democracy β	Satisfaction with democracy β
Legitimacy of democracy		0.105***
Satisfaction with democracy	0.107***	
Regime: leaders		
Regime: experts	0.052*	
Regime: military	-0.052*	
Regime: democracy	0.300***	
Education system		
Health-care system		
Social security system		0.068**
Armed forces		0.061*
Police		
Justice system		
State administration		
Chamber of Deputies		
Senate		
Church		
Trade Unions		
Major companies	0.054*	
Press		0.056*
NATO	0.161***	0.052
Liberalism-paternalism	0.120***	0.114***
Today's political system		-0.282***
Communist political system	0.139***	0.083**
Interest in politics	0.065**	-0.058*
Left-Right		
Freedom		
Satisfaction		-0.143***
Trust		
Revolution		0.092***
Reform		
Evolution		
Class	-0.072**	-0.052*
Age	-0.048*	0.089***
Education		
R^2	0.388	0.338
Adjusted R^2	0.383	0.332

Note: *** – statistically significant at 0.001, ** – statistically significant at 0.01, * – statistically significant at 0.05.

Source: EVS 1999.

gression coefficient shows the reverse relationship. The correlation between trust in businesses and the legitimacy of democracy is, however, positive and (at the same time) statistically insignificant, thus given this conflict it would be better to move on from the matter of the effect of trust in large businesses and companies, and leave it to future research. Among the characteristics of the respondents, similarly as in the case of satisfaction with democracy in the country, a statistically significant influence was found with respect to social class and age: both the higher the social class, and the higher the age, the greater the legitimacy of democracy.

The analyses demonstrate that legitimacy of democracy is not entirely autonomous, i.e. is not altogether independent of the evaluation of democracy in the Czech Republic, while conversely, the evaluation of the development of democracy is not independent of whether people consider democracy to be legitimate. The correlation between the legitimacy of democracy and the evaluation of its development reached 0.32, which is somewhat more than in the countries of southern Europe, where the legitimacy of democracy had only a very weak relationship to the evaluation of the development of democracy and did not exceed 0.30 [Diamond 1998]. However, it should be noted that *the evaluation of the development of democracy is not the variable with the strongest effect on the legitimacy of democracy. Higher regression coefficients were found in the case of preference in favour of democracy as a suitable system for the Czech Republic, liberal-paternalistic values, the evaluation of the communist political system (table 4) and trust in NATO.* The evaluation of the development of democracy in the country is thus only one of a number of evaluative attitudes upon which the legitimacy of democracy is dependent.

If we look at the regression coefficients it is clear that *the legitimacy of democracy is more dependent on the political culture than on trust in institutions.* With the exception of trust in NATO (the regression coefficient is significant at the 0.001 level), the legitimacy of democracy is not dependent on trust in any of the other institutions. *Similarly, the evaluation of the development of democracy in the Czech Republic depends more on political culture than on trust in institutions.* Trust was found to have a significant effect only in the case of three institutions (the social security system, the armed forces, and the press, though the regression coefficients were relatively weak (they were all significant at the level 0.05).

With reference to the influence of the personal characteristics of the respondents we found that the legitimacy was dependent on, and the development of democracy was connected with the factors of subjective social class and age, though not education.[15] The effect of subjective social class was the same in both cases – the higher the class that the respondent felt he belonged to, the more he considered democracy to be legitimate, and the more satisfied also he was with development in this country. The information on how the individual social classes support democracy varies. The middle class is traditionally considered to be the class that stabilises democracy, while the lower and upper classes are not quite so unambiguous.[16] Democratisation literature [e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996] however presents the theory that in order for democracy to exist it also requires democratic elites – especially political ones – and not only at the outset of its existence. It is obvi-

[15]) Rose, Mischler and Haerpfer [1997] found a relationship in the post-communist countries between age and support for democracy. But for example in Spain this effect exists also.

[16]) In *Politics* Aristotle already makes reference to the middle class in this way.

ously favourable for democracy when it is supported by the middle and the upper classes, but also when it is supported by the lower class. A democratic political culture shared by all social classes is simply the most ideal situation for the existence of a legitimate democracy.

The effects of the factor of age on the legitimacy of democracy and on being satisfied with it were mutually conflicting. The older the individual the more he considered democracy to be legitimate and accepted it as the best form of government, while the younger the individual the more satisfied he was with the development of democracy in this country. The effect of education did not confirm itself. It is mentioned in some literature that support for democracy increases as the level of achieved education rises. Lipset [1981] discovered that education has a positive correlation with the kind of tolerance essential in a democracy, although a high level of education is alone not enough to stabilise democracy. Thus education is an essential condition in support for democracy, but it is by no means sufficient, and the insignificant effect of education in our analysis confirms this.

Conclusion

The evaluation of the performance of democracy, just like support for democracy in the Czech Republic, depends most on values and attitudes – on political culture – and less on trust in the examined institutions. However, exactly when the political culture that influences our support for democracy emerged, and how solid it is, are both questions. Diamond [1998] believes that it had already taken shape prior to the change from the undemocratic to the present democratic regime, through a transfer from generation to generation out of the democratic past, through social change and the process of learning and collective reflection in social groups. His assumption is that in the case of a formal transformation, a democratic political culture will lead a country to a certain degree of democracy. Political culture alone, however, is not sufficient to transform an undemocratic regime into a democratic one.

In the period between the two world wars the Czech Republic did indeed experience a democracy (unlike Hungary and Poland), but political development after 1945, and particularly after the introduction of the totalitarian system in 1948, was not exactly a consequence of democratic political culture. It is obvious that it is not possible to rely too much on a democratic past and the transfer of political culture.[17] Undemocratic regimes are capable of forcing people to change in their behaviour and in the expression of their attitudes. However, they may not have such a strong impact on political values, which together with a democratic political tradition, a positive social structure, and bad experience with an undemocratic regime influence the political culture which can be positive for democracy.

All this represents a 'legitimisation bonus' for the acceptance of the new regime. Democratic consolidation is not historically determined, but certain factors can help give it an advantage. The collapse of an undemocratic regime and the ensuing openness to democratic values provides these values with the chance to again take root. The initial legitimacy of democracy is usually influenced by how it has been formed by intellectuals, political elites and the mass media. The resulting support for democracy is then stabilised

[17]) On the attitudes of Czechoslovak citizens toward democracy in 1968, Brokl et al. [1999].

along with the stabilisation of politics, and along with the way in which the elites continue to accept the democratic rules of the game. Many countries have been helped along in this respect by the experience of alternating government, changing the political parties in power, and gaining the awareness that governments change but democracy remains. Linz and Stepan [1996] deduce that in the case of the Czech Republic the previous experience with a liberal government was a help to the legitimacy of democracy. It must be added that of doubtless significance also was the alternation of parties in power after the 1998 elections into the Chamber of Deputies, and even the fact that in the 1990s only rarely did the political elites display any kind of authoritarian behaviour.[18] Institutions were the sites of visible conflict (particularly parliament), but they did not undermine or subvert the existing form of government. Perhaps for this reason democracy remained legitimate, but dissatisfaction with institutions and with the development of democracy in this country emerged.

The analyses also examined that the legitimacy of democracy is not dependent on trust in the majority of researched institutions. But of real significance here is the matter of trust in NATO only. The interpretation of this relationship is not easy. The Czech Republic became a NATO member in 1999, so experience with the performance of this institution has not been long. Moreover, the question arises as to what extent NATO is perceived in this country as a democratic institution, and to what extent it is viewed rather as a value of democratic political culture. NATO is here considered to be a symbol of democracy, and NATO membership is fused with the idea of democracy as the system of government of the member countries. NATO was presented to the public in this way by the political parties that had included entry of the Czech Republic into this organisation of regional defence as one of the points in their party programmes. It was turned into even more of a value when the issue of the Czech Republic's membership became a subject of conflict between the pro-system political parties (ODA, ODS, KDU-ČSL and ČSSD), and the anti-system political parties (KSČM and SPR-RSČ). Furthermore, among those who share democratic political culture, NATO is also considered to be a symbol of having broken free from the influence of Russia and the end of the internationally anchored totalitarian system on the territory of the Czech Republic, and finally, it even represents a successful political performance by one of the democratic institutions – the government.

Linz and Stepan [1996] conclude that citizens of new democracies are capable of distinguishing between the economic and political dimensions of democracy and are able to appraise democracy according to political performance even when the economic performance is not at its best.[19] Although Linz and Stepan have found a relationship between

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[18]) President Havel received the most reproaches (for example, the fact that he announced the senate elections 1996 in the autumn instead of the spring, when they would coincide with the elections into the house of parliament, against the will of the prime minister who must countersign this decision and thus take responsibility for it; his acceptance of the resignation of the group of ministers from the Klaus government in 1997, not from the hand of the prime minister himself, but from the resigning ministers; his appointment of J. Tošovský as prime minister at a time when V. Klaus was prime minister of the government in demission, etc.).

[19]) In some post-communist countries they proved themselves to be more perceptive and realistic toward the economy than observers had assumed they would be [Diamond 1998]. They did not condemn democracy for the poor performance of the economy, but rather praised the freedom afforded by democracy, the possibility to meet freely, the freedom to think, travel, dwell and live

economic development, or economic growth, and support for democracy, they consider the political dimension to be much more important. Our data enabled us to examine the attitudes of the population and their relationship to the legitimacy of democracy primarily in terms of the political dimension of democracy.

From the economic dimension the only aspect included in the research was trust in major companies. However, the significant association – by no means a dependency – that was determined between trust in major companies and other, in particular welfare, institutions on the one hand, and satisfaction with the development of democracy on the other indicated that in the formation of satisfaction with the development of democracy and support for democracy a slight role is played by how people perceive the performance of institutions in the economic, political and social spheres. Support for democracy is not however based on trust in institutions. It is necessary to bear in mind that trust in the institutions within societies is to some degree structured by the cultural traits of that society. In the post-communist countries, the low level of trust in institutions could be a result of atomised structures and alienating experiences gained in the period of communism. This feeling may be deeply rooted, but there is nothing to rule out the possibility that political and economic development can bring about an increase in trust in institutions. The low level of trust does not have an influence on the transformation toward democracy nor on the ability of democracy to last, just as a high level of trust does not contribute to democratisation [Diamond 1998]. However, the presence of distrust in institutions within consolidated democracies supports the opinion that this is perhaps more a common trait among contemporary democracies.

Translated by Robin Cassling

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without fear of unlawful imprisonment, the freedom to decide whether to participate in politics, the freedom of religion. This led to the conclusion that ideas on the legitimacy of democracy are formed more by the political than the economic functioning of the regime.

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Appendix

Explanatory Variables

Regime: leader – 'Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections' Very good = 1, Very bad = 4.

Regime: experts – 'Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country' Very good = 1, Very bad = 4.

Regime: military – 'Having the army rule the country' Very good = 1, Very bad = 4.

Regime: democracy – 'Having a democratic political system' Very good = 1, Very bad = 4.

Trust in the education system, the health-care system, the social security system, the armed forces, the police, the justice system, state administration, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the church, trade unions, major companies, the press, NATO – A great deal = 1, None at all = 4.

Liberalism-paternalism – a scale constructed from a set of eight variables. Very liberal = 1 to Very paternalistic = 10.

Today's political system – 'People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going' Very bad = 1, Very good = 10.

Communist political system – 'Where on the scale would you put the communist political system?' Very bad = 1, Very good = 10.

Interest in politics – 'How interested would you say you are in politics?'. Very interested = 1, Not interested at all = 4.

Left-right – 'In politics references are made to the left wing and the right wing. Where on this scale would you rank your opinions?' Left = 1, Right = 10.

Freedom – 'Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.' None at all = 1, A great deal = 10.

Satisfaction – 'All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?' Dissatisfied = 1, Satisfied = 10.

Trust – 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' Most people can be trusted = 1, Can't be too careful = 2.

Revolution – 'The organisation of our society needs to be radically changed through revolutionary action' Yes = 1, No = 0.

Reform – 'Our society must be gradually perfected by means of reforms'. Yes = 1, No = 0.

Evolution – 'Let us leave society to develop peacefully on its own'. Yes = 1, No = 0.

Class – 'In which of the following social groups or classes would you say that you belong?' Lower class = 1, Upper class = 6.

Age – measured by date of birth and subsequently calculated.

Education – Uncompleted elementary education = 1, Higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate = 8.

Variables 'Liberalism-paternalism', 'Revolution', 'Reform' and 'Evolution' were constructed and all the variables with the exception of 'Age' were transferred into additive scales in order to make the scales comparable:

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* democracy and other regimes
recode q59 q63_1 q62_1 q62_2 q62_3 q62_4 (1=0)(2=33)(3=66)(4=99)
        into Satdem Legdem Rleader Rexpert Rmilit Rdemoc
recode q60 q61 (1=0)(2=11)(3=22)(4=33)(5=44)(6=55)(7=66)(8=77)(9=88)(10=99)
        into Dsystem Ksystem.

* liberalism-paternalism
```

recode q54a q54b q54c q54d q54e2 q54f q54g q54h (1=0)(2=11)(3=22)(4=33)(5=44)(6=55)(7=66)(8=77)(9=88)(10=99)

into individual unemploy competit freedom income private retire housing

compute libepate= (individual + unemploy + competit + freedom + income + private + retire + housing)/8.

* institutions

recode q58_1 q58_2 q58_3 q58_4 q58_5 q58_6 q58_7 q58_8

q58_9 q58_11 q58_13 q58_14 q58_15 q58_16 (1=0)(2=33)(3=66)(4=99)

into church army schools press unions police PS admin securit NATO health legal business senat.

*interest in politics

recode q51a (1=0)(2=33)(3=66)(4=99) into polinteres

*left-right

recode q53 (1=0)(2=11)(3=22)(4=33)(5=44)(6=55)(7=66)(8=77)(9=88)(10=99)

into polor100.

*freedom and satisfaction with life

recode q9 q10 (1=0)(2=11)(3=22)(4=33)(5=44)(6=55)(7=66)(8=77)(9=88)(10=99)

into freedom satis.

* development of society

recode q54aa (1=100)(else=0) into revol.

recode q54aa (2=100)(else=0) into reform.

recode q54aa (3=100)(else=0) into evolu.

* interpersonal trust

recode q8 (1=100)(2=0) into trust.

* class

recode q110b (1=0)(2=20)(3=40)(4=60)(5=80)(6=100) into class6.

* education

recode q94 (1=0)(2=14)(3=28)(4=42)(5=56)(6=70)(7=84)(8=98) into edu.

Who Are the Czech Materialists, Post-materialists, and Those Who Are 'Mixed', and How Do They Differ in Their Opinions and Attitudes on Selected – Primarily Political – Subjects*

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Abstract: Research carried out over the last 30 years in many countries shows that there exists a relationship between post-materialist values and a wide spectrum of social issues, from protection of the environment at one end to voting behaviour at the other. The aim of this article is to verify whether the observed relationships in selected, primarily political issues are valid even in the case of the Czech Republic. The analysed data have been drawn from the European Value Study in the years 1991 and 1999, which provide us with the opportunity to trace changes over time. Among the issues studied here are xenophobia and ethnocentrism, relationships to the environment, voting behaviour, freedom, equality, and a just society.
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Introduction

At the beginning I would like to stress that within the framework of this article I do not intend to deal with either criticism or verification of Inglehart's well-known concept for measuring materialism–post-materialism. This task has already been taken up by other specialists. However, despite opposition to this approach I believe that there is sense in working with the typology comprised of materialist, post-materialist and mixed types, as it is a useful approach and I hope that the ensuing pages prove this point. Let those who are not convinced consider materialists and post-materialists to be the bearers of certain different value orientations, which for the purpose of briefness are referred to as materialist and post-materialist, though they could equally be termed otherwise.

In this article I will first pay attention to how the representation of the individual types within the population changes, and how this depends on factors of age, education and subjective social group. I will then move on to an analysis of the difference of opinions that are held by these value types with reference to homosexuals, people suffering from the AIDS virus, the Roma population, and the issue of foreigners and migrants who come to the Czech Republic in search of work, and in so far as possible I will also add a temporal comparison. Other subjects that will be involved include relationships to the environment, political orientation, voting behaviour in the early parliamentary elections of 1998, and the issues of personal freedom and equality, and notions of a just society.

I will address all three types, which means not only the 'pure' ones, i.e. materialists and post-materialists, but also the 'mixed' type, who although they represent the majority are at times overlooked by authors dealing with this subject. The analysis will be carried

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out primarily with the help of multinomial logit models, using various types of contrasts, primarily polynomial. The basis of the research will be three-dimensional and four-dimensional contingency tables, as given the size of the sample I am using, it is not possible to include more dimensions. In addition to the logit models I also use an analysis of variance in which the dependent variable will be a specific additive index.

The starting point for the definition of value types is found in Inglehart's four-item battery: the respondent must first of all select what in his opinion is the most important goal of his country (in this case the Czech Republic) over the next decade; then he must select what in his opinion is the second most important goal. The goals are described as follows: A) *maintaining order in the nation*, B) *giving the people more say in important government decisions*, C) *fighting rising prices*, D) *protecting freedom of speech*. Items A and C are connected with physical and economic insecurity and are considered to be materialist value priorities. Items B and D, which emphasise self-expression and quality of life, are considered to be post-materialist. A materialist is defined as someone who selects goals A and C, regardless of the order. A post-materialist is defined as someone who selects goals B and D, again, the order is not important. 'Mixed' is defined as someone who selects A and B, or A and D, or B and D, or C and D, the order of the selected goal playing no role. I should point out for those who do not know that these are Inglehart's definitions, not mine [see e.g. Inglehart 1997: 133].

In addition to the four-item battery there also exists a twelve-item battery. Rabušic [2000] has shown that the latter has not really proved itself useful in the case of the Czech Republic – though not only here – and for this reason he does not recommend it. However, I was spared the dilemma of choosing as even though both batteries figure in the research of the European Values Study of 1991, in the research of the same name of 1999 only the four-item battery appears. Because I would like, in so far as it will be possible, to compare the results over time, it was necessary to opt for the simpler, four-item battery. The European Values Study is an international research study of value orientations, which in the Czech Republic was carried out on randomly selected samples of respondents. In 1991 there were 2100 respondents in the group, in 1999 there were 1900.

1. The connection between the value typology and age, education, and subjective social group, and how it has changed over time

Inglehart's predictions, which have now been proved through research carried out over the last thirty years, claim that post-materialist values tend to increase with lower age groups, higher levels of education and better social positions [see e.g. Inglehart 1977, 1997]. This has been demonstrated throughout a wide spectrum of countries, including some post-communist ones, and for this reason I expect that it will again be confirmed. However, I am not so much interested in the confirmation of the given phenomenon as I am in ascertaining what possible changes have come about here since 1991.

Let us first look at how the individual types of the value typology were and are represented. According to research from 1991, the Czech Republic was made up of roughly 32% materialists, 62% 'mixed', and 6% post-materialists. The figures for 1999 were, respectively, 25%, 65%, and 10%. The relevant logit model shows that the ratios of post-materialists to materialists has roughly doubled, and the ratios of 'mixed' to materialists, and of post-materialists to 'mixed' has increased by about 1.4 times. This means that a significant shift toward post-materialist values has taken place. For comparison let me point out that in 1970 in western countries there were four times more materialists than

post-materialists. By 1990 this ratio was markedly altered, when for every four materialists there were three post-materialists. According to projections in the year 2000 there should be approximately the same number of materialists as post-materialists in Western countries [see Inglehart 1997: 35].

In keeping with the work done by Rabušic [2000], who also dealt with the connection between the value typology and age, I have used the following age groups: 18-29 years, 30-49 years, 50 and over. The results from the logit model are found in table 1. The model fits the data very well, and shows that the ratios of materialists to post-materialists decreased evenly with the increase in age, and this is true for both years of research. However, the decrease is faster in 1991 than in 1999. The same is true for the ratios of 'mixed' to materialists, and of post-materialists to 'mixed', even though neither their decrease nor the differences between the years are quite so great. The shift toward post-materialist values, which we can see in 1999 in relation to 1991, is the strongest for the age group 50 and over, and the weakest for the age group 18-29 years. This, of course, also means that the differences between the age groups have lessened.

We arrive at precisely the same results when the starting point for the comparison is not the same age of the respondents at the time of the survey but the same year of birth. The youngest group is made up of people born in the years 1962-1973, who in 1991 were 18-29 years old, and in 1999 were 26-37 years old. The middle group is formed by people born in the years 1942-1961, who in 1991 were 30-49 years old, and in 1999 were 38-57 years old. The oldest group is comprised of people born in 1941 or earlier, who were aged 50 and over in 1991, and in 1999 aged 58 and over. In this way, those who were aged 18-25 in 1999, i.e. people born in 1974 and after, who were aged under 18 years in 1991, disappear from the analysis. The shift toward post-materialist values was the strongest among those people born in 1941 and earlier, and weakest among those born in 1962-1973. Inglehart at first assumed that the materialist-post-materialist value system did not alter during life, but he later changed his opinion. Not only do people not become more materialist as they age, they in fact become even less materialist [Inglehart 1997: 136]. Our results also fully confirm this. The existing theory, however, does not help me at all to understand why it was the oldest who shifted in the direction of post-materialist values the most, and the youngest the least.

We will now move on to an evaluation of the connection between education and the value typology. Theory links post-materialist values to a higher level of education, even though the arguments that are used to support this link do not in the Czech Republic completely hold up. According to this theory the level of education perfectly reflects the level of economic security which the given individual feels during childhood and while growing up, because an economically well-situated family provides its children with better education than do families which in economic terms are worse off. And since post-materialist values are linked to a good level of economic security in childhood and youth, they are also linked to good education. In our country, between 1948 and 1989, however, the level of education was more dependent on the level of education of the parents than on the economic security of the families, among which there were no large differences. Education was cultural capital, not economic.

For whatever reason, our data unambiguously confirm the connection between post-materialist values and a higher level of education. We find that we cannot reject the model represented in table 2, in which the ratios of *'mixed'/materialist, post-*

materialist/'mixed', and *post-materialist/materialist* grow rapidly with the rise of the highest level of education achieved, and this holds true for both years of research. Further, in comparison with the results from 1991, the model also demonstrates that all education groups have shifted toward post-materialism, and have done so with the same speed.

At times the objection is raised that younger people are more inclined toward post-materialist values not because they are young but because they are more educated. To this discussion we can add a model in which age and education are both included, albeit in reduced form (see table 3). It is clear that the *ratios* presented in the table tend to a) grow equally quickly with the rise in education when age is controlled, and do so in both years of research, and b) fall with the increase in age when education is controlled, and do so more quickly in 1991 than in 1999. Of importance here is that the influence of age did not disappear when education was also included in the model. According to the model, however, education has a somewhat stronger influence that age does.

If we use subjective categorisation for the purpose of expressing one's social position in either a) the lower or working class, b) the lower-middle class, c) the middle class, or d) the upper-middle or upper class[1] we can see in the model (see table 4, model A) that the *'mixed'/materialist* ratio grows only among the first two groups and otherwise remains constant, and the *post-materialist/'mixed'* and *post-materialist/materialist* ratios grow at first, then fall and show no further changes. This would mean that post-materialist values are most strongly linked to the lower-middle class, less with the middle and upper classes, and the least with the lower and working class. This model fits the data very well, but there also exists another model, that cannot be rejected. According to this (see table 4, model B) the lower and working class would be the furthest from post-materialist values, and the other classes would not differ with respect to the value typology. In either case the relationship between subjective social group and the value typology was not proved in the way we would have expected according to the theory.[2]

2. Xenophobia and ethnocentricity

According to Inglehart, xenophobic thinking and ethnocentricity should decline with the increase in the number of selected post-materialist values in the battery (none, one or two). We begin with the following question: *What about people from less developed countries who come here looking for work. Which of the following approaches should in your opinion the government take?* Answers: *a) Let in anyone who wants in; b) Let in foreigners as long as there are enough jobs available; c) Introduce strict limits on the number of foreigners who are allowed in; d) Ban entry to people from other countries.*[3] The answers are ordered from most benevolent to the strictest. The most frequent response was the one recommending the introduction of strict limits. A total of 60% of respondents chose this option. Answer b) was chosen by 30% of respondents, answer d) by 7%, and the most benevolent answer a) was chosen by only 3%. Thus on the whole our society is not particularly open to the inflow of foreigners. As the extreme answers

[1]) This question was only asked in 1991.

[2]) The assumption that people who are better situated (measured by the overall net income per person of a household) have a stronger tendency toward post-materialist values was also not confirmed.

[3]) This question was only asked in 1991.

were few in number, and there are few post-materialists, I combined the first two responses which are more receptive toward foreigners, and the last two answers which are less receptive. The ratio of less receptive and more receptive answers according to the logit model is 3.12 for materialists, 1.87 for 'mixed', and 1.12 for post-materialists. No further comment is perhaps necessary.

Now we will analyse agreement and disagreement with the statement: *When there are not enough job opportunities, employers ought to give preference to Czechs over migrants.* In 1991, 80% of respondents agreed with this statement, and in 1999 the figure was 90%. The results of the logit model can be seen in table 5. In both years the ratios of responses in agreement to disagreement with the statement falls evenly with the increase in the number of selected post-materialist aims in the battery. However, even among post-materialists the preponderance of responses in agreement is large. We should also note that in 1999 the results were even more biased toward agreement with the statement than in 1991. The reason could be that in 1991 there was practically no unemployment in the Czech Republic, while today the state-wide average is almost 10%. Also, there was less experience with migrants. Age plays a large role here too, as is shown by the results of the logit model in table 6. The ratios of agreements to disagreements when value types are controlled increase evenly with age, and do so in both years of research. The strength of the influence of age and of the value typology is balanced.

Other statements that characterise the relationship to migrants again but from another point of view are: *A) It is better for the greater well being of society when groups of migrants maintain their typical customs and traditions; B) It is better for the greater well being of society when groups of migrants do not maintain their typical customs and traditions, but rather adopt the customs of the country to which they have migrated.* Respondents were asked to select the statement that best corresponds to their own opinion.[4] Statement A was selected by 31% of respondents, and statement B by 69%. The logit model again confirms the expected type of relationship: ratios B/A are 3.92 for materialists, 2.11 for 'mixed', and 1.14 for post-materialists.

Now we arrive at the analysis of the variable that Inglehart [1997: 390] refers to as ethnocentrism, and which he describes as the rejection of distinct groups. The instructions in the survey run as follows: *Various groups of people are presented in this list. Please select any and all of those who you would not wish to have as your neighbour.* There follows a list of fourteen groups, out of which Inglehart selects only three: migrants – foreign labourers, people with the AIDS virus, and homosexuals. An additive variable is created, which has a value of 0 when the respondent does not select any one of the mentioned groups, and the value of 1, 2, or 3 when the respondent chooses one, two or all three groups. The distribution of percentages for this variable was, respectively, 34%, 24%, 27%, and 15% in 1991. In 1999 there was a strong mitigation of ethnocentrism, the distribution of percentages being 62%, 21%, 11%, and 6%.

In order to carry out a deeper analysis with the use of the logit model, I combined categories 2 and 3 together, so that the new variable has only three values: 0 when the respondent does not choose any group, 1 when the respondent selects one group, 2 when two or three are selected. The results of the logit model are summed up in table 7. The ratios of the number of respondents who did not select any of the groups, and those who

[4]) The statements were presented only in the questionnaire in 1999.

selected one, rises in both years, from the materialists to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to post-materialists. The ratios of the number of respondents who selected one group, and those who selected two or three groups, grows from the materialists to the 'mixed', but then remains the same. On the whole then it is possible to say that the expected form of relationship between ethnocentrism and the value typology is confirmed.

Among the fourteen groups included in the questionnaire were also the Roma. In 1991 the Roma were designated as undesirable neighbours by 74% of respondents, while in 1999 by only 40%, which is truly a large decrease. The logit model again confirms expectations. In both years the ratios of the number of respondents who designated the Roma as unwanted neighbours and those who did not decreased from the materialists to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists. Specifically the ratios are 3.43, 2.63, 2.02 for 1991, and 1.06, 0.61, 0.35 for 1999. If we add age to the analysis we discover what seems to me a somewhat surprising fact. The results from the logit model, which fit the data really very well (the attained level of significance for the likelihood ratio chi square L^2 is 0.700), are found in table 8. What I cannot explain is the fact that, with only two exceptions (materialists and 'mixed' in 1991), the relationship to the Roma is the least favourable for the age group category 30-49 years. The age of materialists in 1991 in no way changed their relationship to the Roma, and in the same year in the case of the 'mixed' the age group category 30-49 was the most receptive toward the Roma.

3. Relationship to the environment

Inglehart determines the relationship to the environment and ecological thinking by looking at participation in unpaid work in voluntary organisations or ecological movements that are devoted to the protection of the environment or animal rights. In the Czech Republic this type of people represented 3% of the population in both 1991 and 1999, at least according to research information, and there is no evidence that post-materialists are more connected with this type of work than the others. Thus I used other available indicators: *I will now read out to you several statements concerning the environment. For each statement please tell me whether you definitely agree, agree, disagree, or definitely disagree: A) I would donate a part of my income if I could be sure that the money would be used for protection against environmental pollution; B) I would agree with increasing taxes if the money earned through them were to be used for protection against environmental pollution; C) The government must limit environmental pollution, but this shouldn't cost me any money.*

In 1991 26% of respondents definitely agreed with statement A, 60% agreed, and 14% either disagreed or definitely disagreed. In 1999 the corresponding figures were 17%, 61%, 22%, which demonstrates that the attitude toward the environment has changed for the worse. A similar picture is portrayed in the reactions to the other two statements. In 1991 16% definitely agreed with statement B, 58% agreed, and 26% either disagreed or definitely disagreed. In 1999 the figures had changed to 10%, 55%, and 35%. In 1991 12% definitely agreed with statement C, 32% agreed, and 56% disagreed or definitely disagreed. In 1999 the figures were 18%, 37% and 45%. The results from the logit models for statements A, B, and C are summed up in tables 9, 10 and 11. One comment will serve to sum up all three: Materialists have the worst relationship to the environment, 'mixed' have a better one, and the post-materialists have the best relationship. The worsening of the relationship to the environment that can be observed in the comparison of figures from 1991 and 1999 occurred among each of the types with the same

degree of intensity. Why has people's willingness to participate in the protection of the environment weakened? Has this ceased to be a value, or do people assume that everything is all right in this area? Unfortunately, the results of the survey provide no answers to these questions.

4. Political orientation and voting behaviour

With this subject we arrive at the first serious discrepancies with the information gathered from the nine advanced Western European countries in the 1970s, and even later. In these countries it became evident that the post-materialist type is more leftwing than are the other types, and this is true despite the fact that this type comes from the richer middle classes. I will not get into the theory of the new left and the decline in the significance of the left-right axis in the countries to the west. However, we should point to the fact that in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland, it was the 'pure' post-materialist type that figured in the largest percentage on the left half of a left-right ten-point scale [see Inglehart 1977: 63].

In the Czech Republic, the situation in both years of the survey was exactly the reverse. In 1991 58% of materialists, 46% of 'mixed', and 44% of post-materialists lay on the left half of the ten-point scale. In 1999 58% of materialists, 42% of 'mixed', and only 30% of post-materialists were located there. In 1991 the ratios of the left to right halves equalled 1.48 for materialists, 0.83 for 'mixed', and 0.78 for post-materialists. There was an insignificant difference between the 'mixed' and the post-materialists only. In 1999 the same ratios equalled 1.32 for materialists, 0.74 for 'mixed', and 0.43 for post-materialists. All types significantly differed between themselves in 1999. The shift toward the right side between 1991 and 1999 was an insignificant one among the materialists and the 'mixed', but significant among the post-materialists.

If we were to divide the ten-point scale between leftwing (1-4), centre (5-6), and rightwing (7-10), then in 1991 leftwing would include 20% of materialists, 17% of 'mixed', 19% of post-materialists, and in 1999, 32% of materialists, 19% of 'mixed', and 14% of post-materialists. The results of the more detailed analysis with the aid of the logit model are found in table 12. The materialist type demonstrates a significant decrease in the ratios for centre/left and right/left, which indicates a significant shift to the left. The 'mixed' type shows no major changes, but the post-materialist type has made a significant shift to the right. This means that, with respect to the left-centre-right division of political orientation, the individual types differed more from one another in 1999 than they did in 1991.

In the 1970s in advanced Western European countries (Great Britain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium) it was the materialists who were most likely to vote for political parties on the right [see Inglehart 1977: 230]. In the Czech Republic in 1998, according to our data, political parties on the right (Freedom Union, Civic Democratic Party) received votes in the parliamentary elections from 33% of materialists, 47% of 'mixed', and 54% of post-materialists. Table 13 contains the results of the logit model for the voting behaviour of the Czech voter in the parliamentary elections of 1998. The model incorporates both the value typology and political orientation in a dichotomous form, i.e. the left half of the ten-point scale (1-5) and the right half (6-10). The parties are ordered from left to right, and my comparison in each case involves only two neighbouring parties.

The results in my opinion are quite interesting. The ratios of votes cast for the Communist Party of Czech and Moravia (KSČM) and for the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) are the same for all three value types, and differ only according to political orientation. The left half is connected more with KSČM, and the right half with ČSSD. Equally, the ratios of votes cast for ČSSD and KDU-ČSL (Christian Democratic Union – Czech People's Party) also differs only according to political orientation. The left half is connected more with ČSSD and the right half with KDU-ČSL. For the ratios of votes cast for KDU-ČSL and US (Freedom Union) the situation is the reverse. Political orientation does not play a role. Only the value type is influential. The ratios fall evenly from the materialists to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists. This result is not surprising when we take into account that those who vote for US are younger and more educated than those who vote for KDU-ČSL [see Řeháková 1999], and that US is more liberal and more open to change.

The ratios of voters for US and ODS (Civic Democratic Party) alter both with the political orientation and with the value types. When type is controlled the left half is more strongly linked to US and the right half to ODS. When political orientation is controlled the ratios of US to ODS rise evenly from the materialists to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists. This is no doubt caused by the fact that US is politically more liberal, while ODS is politically more conservative. US is also on some issues rather more leftwing than ODS, for example, in its attitude toward the Roma issue or the internet, it is to some degree reminiscent of the attitudes found among American Democrats. Equally the fact that US voters are younger and more educated than ODS voters also plays a role here [see Řeháková 1999]. Can we perhaps refer to those who vote for US as the 'new right'?

If instead of dividing political orientation into two values we were to divide it into the three values of left-centre-right the outcome would be the same. The KSČM/ČSSD and ČSSD/KDU-ČSL ratios would change only with political orientation, so that with the shift from the left to the centre and from the centre to the right they would decrease. The ratios of KDU-ČSL to US would change only with the types, so that they would fall from the materialists to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists. The ratios of US to ODS would change with the types and with political orientation. When political orientation is controlled they would increase from the materialists to the 'mixed' and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists. When type is controlled they would decrease from the left to the centre and from the centre to the right.

If then we examine the influence of political orientation and the value typology on the decisions made by voters between political parties lying next to one another on the political spectrum, we reach the conclusion that decisions made by voters between KSČM and ČSSD are influenced only by the political orientation of the voter. The same holds true in the case of the choice between ČSSD and KDU-ČSL. The situation is reversed in the case of a decision between KDU-ČSL and US. Here the value typology is a strong factor, while the influence of the political orientation of the voter is insignificant. Both factors apply strongly only in the case of a choice between US and ODS.

5. Freedom, equality and the idea of a just society

The question of which is more important, freedom, or equality and the idea of a just society, is a matter that falls into the sphere of political issues. For this reason it may be expected that these subjects will be linked to political orientation, and clearly also to value

types. My assumption is that freedom will be connected rather with post-materialists and with the right, and equality rather with materialists and with the left. However, does the effect of the value typology or political orientation not vanish when they enter into a single model together? If not, which effect is stronger?

The questions presented are as follows: *Which of these two statements better expresses your own opinion? A) Freedom and equality are both important. But if I had to choose only one or the other I would consider personal freedom, which makes it possible to live freely and evolve without restriction, to be more important. B) Of course, both freedom and equality are important. But if I had to choose only one or the other I would consider equality to be more important. It means that nobody is disadvantaged and social differences are not so great.* In 1991 personal freedom was more important for 64% of those asked, and in 1999 for 63%. According to the logit model in 1991 the 'freedom is more important'/'equality is more important' ratios were 1.59 for materialists, 1.88 for 'mixed', and 2.54 for post-materialists. In 1999 a change can be recorded for the materialists alone, for whom the freedom/equality ratio significantly decreased to a value of 1.05. If we add political orientation (left-centre-right) to the model the effect of the value typology does not vanish, but it is somewhat weaker than the effect of political orientation. However, the effect of the year of research does disappear. In table 14 I therefore provide the results for the pooled sample 1991 and 1999. When value typology is controlled the freedom/equality ratios grow evenly from left to centre and from centre to right. When political orientation is controlled the ratios grow evenly from the materialists to the 'mixed' and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists.

It has already been frequently demonstrated that political orientation is an important factor for determining attitudes toward the size of income inequalities, toward guarantees that basic needs are met, toward being rewarded for results, and toward ensuring equal opportunities for education. I believe that it also depends on the value typology, which will be determined by grouping the leftwing and materialists together on one side, and the rightwing and post-materialists on the other. The question is again posed as to whether political orientation or the value typology has a stronger effect. *What must society go about ensuring in order for it to be considered as being 'just'? For each statement please say whether you consider it to be important or unimportant – 1 means very important, 5 means not important at all: A) Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens. B) Guaranteeing that basic needs are met for all, in terms of food, housing, clothes, education and health. C) Recognising people on their merits. D) Giving young people equal opportunity to pursue their education irrespective of family income.*[5]

The evaluation of the importance of the individual statements is divided into only two groups: very important, and otherwise when the respondent indicated any of the other possibilities, i.e. 2, 3, 4 or 5. Statement A was regarded as very important by 30% of respondents, statement B by 53%, statement C by 65%, and statement D by 79% of respondents. According to the logit model, statements A, B and C confirmed the connection with the value typology, while in the case of statement D (equal opportunity in education) the estimation of its importance does not change with the value typology. With statement A (eliminating income inequalities), the ratio of responses very important to otherwise decreases evenly from the materialists (0.73) to the 'mixed' (0.37), and from the 'mixed'

[5]) These statements appear only in the questionnaire in 1999.

to the post-materialists (0.19). The same type of connection is found for statement B (guarantee basic needs). The ratio of the responses very important to other is 1.59 for materialists, 1.07 for 'mixed', and 0.72 for post-materialists. With statement C (recognising merits) the connection with the value typology is reversed and weak. The ratios of the responses very important to otherwise are 1.54 for materialists, and 2.00 for 'mixed' and post-materialists.

Table 15 shows the ratio of the responses very important to otherwise for statements A-D in the logit models, in which both the value typology and political orientation are included at the same time. With statements A and B, when value typology is controlled, the ratios decrease evenly from the left through the middle to the right. When political orientation is controlled, the ratios decrease from the materialists, to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists. The effects of the value typology and political orientation are equally strong. With statement C, the effect of political orientation disappears in the case of materialists. Among the 'mixed' and post-materialists the centre and the right show no differences. When political orientation is controlled, the 'mixed' and the post-materialists do not differ. However, I am somewhat surprised by the fact that among these two types the ratios for the left are significantly greater than for the centre or the right. In the case of statement D the ratios decrease evenly from the left, through the centre, and to the right, as was expected.

The following statements deal with the issue of the relationship between the individual and the state with respect to responsibility, the degree of freedom provided to the unemployed in their selection of employment, opinions on the role of competition, the method of remuneration, and opinions on private property. Respondents were presented with a pair of statements which express opposite opinions on the arrangement of social relationships, and the respondents were asked to express their opinions on a ten-point scale, in which the submitted statements correspond to the beginning (1) and the end (10) of the scale.

Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves.	*The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.*
People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits.	*People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want.*
Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas.	*Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people.*
There should be greater incentives for individual effort.	*Incomes should be made more equal.*
Private ownership of business and industry should be increased.	*Government ownership of business and industry should be maintained as much as possible.*

As I am aware that in this country post-materialists tend to be young, educated, and have a rightwing political orientation, I assume that for each of these subjects their opinions are linked to the lower values on the scale, while in the case of the materialists the values

are rather higher,[6] and the 'mixed' are somewhere in between. I have created a new variable, defined as a sum of the original five variables divided by five, so that this new variable is a continuous variable, and acquires values in the range of 1 to 10. My assumption is that the lower values of this additive variable are connected rather to post-materialists. The observed averages in 1991 are 4.77 for materialists, 4.12 for 'mixed', and 3.79 for post-materialists. In 1999 the corresponding averages are 5.56, 4.47, and 4.37. The model of the analysis of variance is:

$$\mu\ (year, typology) = 4.411 - 0.686\ year + 1.087\ typma + 0.376\ typmi$$

The interactive effect of *year* × *typology* is not significant and for this reason has been left out of the model. *Year* equals 1 for the research from the year 1991, and 0 for the year 1999. *Typma* is 1 for 'materialists', and 0 for the other two types. *Typmi* is 1 for 'mixed', and 0 for the other two types. It is evident from the model that, when value typology is controlled, the averages of the additive variable in 1999 are significantly higher than in 1991, which indicates a shift in the direction of the statements presented on the right, i.e. toward statements emphasising the paternalistic role of the state, limitations on the freedom of the unemployed to select employment, and rejection of competition, income inequality and private ownership. When year of research is controlled the averages of the additive variable decrease from the materialists, to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists, and they differ significantly. This means that materialists are connected more with the statements presented on the right, and post-materialists with the statements on the left.

However, I cannot be sure beforehand whether the effect of the value typology will be significant when the role of other independent variables and at the same time political orientation are included in the model of the analysis of variance. The model, which describes the connection of the average values of the additive variable for the given year of research, the given value type and the given political orientation, is as follows:

$$\mu\ (year, type, pol.orient.) = 4.083 - 0.736\ year + 0.857\ typma + 0.276\ typmi + 0.948\ leftwing + 0.548\ centre$$

The interactive effects *year* × *typology*, *year* × *political orientation*, *typology* × *political orientation*, and *year* × *typology* × *political orientation* are insignificant, and for this reason have been left out of the model. *Year* equals 1 for the research from 1991, and 0 for the research from 1999. *Typma* equals 1 for materialists, and 0 for 'mixed' and post-materialists. *Typmi* equals 1 for 'mixed', and 0 for materialists and post-materialists. *Leftwing* equals 1 for a left-wing orientation and 0 for a centre or right-wing orientation. *Centre* equals 1 for a centre orientation, and 0 for a left-wing or right-wing orientation. From the model of the analysis of variance it is evident that when value typology and political orientation are controlled the averages of the additive variable in 1999 are significantly higher than in 1991. This indicates a significant shift in the direction of the statements presented on the right. When year and political orientation are controlled the averages of the additive variable decrease from the materialists to the 'mixed', and from the 'mixed' to the post-materialists, and they differ significantly, so that the materialists are linked more to the statements presented on the right and post-materialists to the

[6]) Opinions on the issue described in the second of the pair of statements were somewhat fuzzy. Without this pair the results would have been more convincing.

statements on the left. When year and value typology are controlled the averages of the additive variable decrease from the left to the centre and from the centre to the right, and they differ significantly. This means that people with a left-wing orientation are more connected with the statements presented on the right and people with a right-wing orientation tend toward the statements presented on the left. Thus the influence of the value typology is preserved, even with the inclusion of the influence of political orientation, and in terms of strength the two are comparable.

Conclusion

I believe that this article provides further proof that, as Rabušic [2000] has pointed out, the post-materialist dimension is certainly present among the Czech population, that it demonstrates a tendency toward increasing, and that the bearers of this dimension are primarily the youngest and, I add, the most educated members of the Czech adult population. I hope that the article also confirms that Inglehart's value typology is beneficial for understanding social phenomena, even in the case of the Czech Republic. However, it is also clear that the individual types do not always behave in the same way that their counterparts in Western European countries do, which is probably due primarily to the fact that in Western Europe post-materialists are connected with the left, while here they are connected with the right. It will certainly be interesting to see whether this is a phenomenon of temporary or permanent character. This work provided me with the first opportunity to examine the influence of the value typology on voting behaviour. The results I have reached strike me as both interesting and logical. I hope that they serve to deepen our understanding of the behaviour of Czech voters when deciding between parties located next to one another on the political spectrum.

Czech post-materialists, in comparison with the others, but especially with the materialists, are young and educated, less xenophobic and ethnocentric, they have a better relationship to protection of the environment, they are more rightwing and more liberal, they value freedom more, are less egalitarian and lay less emphasis on the paternalistic role of the state. Other analyses [see Řeháková 2001] show that the Czech post-materialists have less respect for authority, are more interested in politics, are more inclined toward unconventional forms of political participation, have a positive relationship to democracy as the means for running the country but also to democracy in general, and place more emphasis on individual development.

Not all the changes that appeared out of the comparison with 1991 can be termed as positive if our aim is to become a post-materialist society. Above all I have in mind the consistent lack of interest in work in voluntary organisations for the protection of the environment or animal rights, or engagement in ecological movements. Also disturbing is the decline in the willingness to financially participate in protection against environmental pollution. Unfortunately the survey did not include a question on whether the quality of the environment represents an important factor in a person's life. To some degree the fact that the youngest age group showed the least shift toward post-materialist values is also unsettling. We have become more receptive toward distinct groups in the sense that we do not mind having them as our neighbours too much. But discriminating attitudes remain, even among the post-materialists with reference to the possibility of 'others' gaining employment when it is not altogether easy even for 'us'. This gives rise to resistance to the inflow of foreigners on the whole, and demands for the introduction of strict limits. However, as Czech society has since 1991 passed through a period of some-

what stormy and not always positive development it is not possible to draw rash conclusions from the unfavourable changes discerned here. Let us wait another ten years for this.

Translated by Robin Cassling

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Tables

Table 1. The ratios for the value types in relationship to age and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Year	Age	Mixed vs. Materialist	Post-materialist vs. Mixed	Post-materialist vs. Materialist
1991	18-29	3.05	0.15	0.47
	30-49	2.03	0.10	0.21
	50+	1.36	0.07	0.09
1999	18-29	3.35	0.17	0.56
	30-49	2.80	0.14	0.39
	50+	2.34	0.12	0.28

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 2. The ratios for the value types in relationship to education and year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Year	Education	Mixed vs. Materialist	Post-materialist vs. Mixed	Post-materialist vs. Materialist
1991	Elementary	1.17	0.05	0.06
	Secondary (without graduation)	1.75	0.08	0.14
	Secondary (with graduation)	2.61	0.12	0.32
	Post-secondary	3.89	0.18	0.71
1999	Elementary	1.62	0.08	0.12
	Secondary (without graduation)	2.42	0.11	0.28
	Secondary (with graduation)	3.62	0.17	0.61
	Post-secondary	5.41	0.25	1.37

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 3. The ratios for the value types in relationship to education, age and year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Year	Age	Education	Mixed vs. Materialist	Post-material. vs. Mixed	Post-material. vs. Materialist
1991	18-29	without graduation	2.37	0.11	0.26
		with graduation	4.26	0.20	0.84
	30-49	without graduation	1.64	0.08	0.12
		with graduation	2.96	0.14	0.40
	50+	without graduation	1.14	0.05	0.06
		with graduation	2.05	0.09	0.19
1999	18-29	without graduation	2.67	0.12	0.33
		with graduation	4.80	0.22	1.07
	30-49	without graduation	2.24	0.10	0.23
		with graduation	4.04	0.19	0.76
	50+	without graduation	1.89	0.09	0.16
		with graduation	3.40	0.16	0.54

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 4. The ratios for the values types in relationship to subjective social categorisation (estimates from the logit model)

Model A

Class	Mixed vs. Materialist	Post-materialist vs. Mixed	Post-materialist vs. Materialist
Lower/working	1.62	0.09	0.15
Lower-middle	3.39	0.22	0.74
Middle	3.39	0.15	0.51
Upper-middle+	3.39	0.15	0.51

Model B

Class	Mixed vs. Materialist	Post-materialist vs. Mixed	Post-materialist vs. Materialist
Lower/working	1.62	0.09	0.15
Lower-middle	3.39	0.18	0.59
Middle	3.39	0.18	0.59
Upper-middle+	3.39	0.18	0.59

Source: European Values Study 1999.

Table 5. The ratios for agreement or disagreement with discrimination of migrants in relationship to the value typology and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Type	1991 Agree/Disagree	1999 Agree/Disagree
Materialist	10.46	13.76
Mixed	6.64	8.74
Post-materialist	4.22	5.55

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 6. The ratios for agreement or disagreement with discrimination of migrants in relationship to the value typology, age and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Type	Age	Agree/Disagree	Agree/Disagree
Materialist	18-29	7.73	10.01
	30-49	9.88	12.79
	50+	12.62	16.36
Mixed	18-29	5.12	6.64
	30-49	6.55	8.48
	50+	8.37	10.83
Post-materialist	18-29	3.40	4.40
	30-49	4.34	5.62
	50+	5.54	7.18

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 7. Rejection of migrants, people with the AIDS virus, and homosexuals in relationship to the value typology and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Year	Type	chose 0 groups vs. chose 1 group	chose 1 group vs. chose 2 or 3 groups
1991	Materialist	1.04	0.47
	Mixed	1.45	0.65
	Post-materialist	2.50	0.65
1999	Materialist	2.18	1.02
	Mixed	3.04	1.42
	Post-materialist	5.22	1.42

Source: European Values Study, 1991, 1999.

Table 8. Rejection of the Roma in relationship to the value typology, age and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

Type	Age	1991 chose/didn't choose	1999 chose/didn't choose
Materialist	18-29	3.42	0.89
	30-49	3.42	1.61
	50+	3.42	0.89
Mixed	18-29	2.99	0.53
	30-49	2.22	0.71
	50+	2.99	0.53
Post-materialist	18-29	1.62	0.29
	30-49	2.15	0.69
	50+	1.62	0.29

Source: European Values Study, 1991, 1999.

Table 9. Attitudes toward spending part of one's income to protect the environment in relationship to the value typology and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

	1991		1999	
Type	++/+	+/–	++/+	+/–
Materialist	0.30	3.31	0.18	2.00
Mixed	0.46	5.04	0.28	3.04
Post-materialist	0.71	7.68	0.42	4.63

Legend: ++ = definitely agree, + = agree, – = disagree or definitely disagree.
Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 10. Attitudes toward raising taxes in order to protect the environment in relationship to the value typology and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

	1991		1999	
Type	++/+	+/–	++/+	+/–
Materialist	0.20	1.78	0.13	1.16
Mixed	0.29	2.58	0.19	1.68
Post-materialist	0.42	3.73	0.27	2.44

Legend: ++ = definitely agree, + = agree, – = disagree or definitely disagree.
Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 11. The government must take care of the environment, and it shouldn't cost me anything. Attitudes toward this statement in relationship to the value typology and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

	1991		1999	
Type	++/+	+/–	++/+	+/–
Materialist	0.42	0.98	0.62	1.46
Mixed	0.33	0.49	0.49	0.73
Post-materialist	0.26	0.25	0.38	0.37

Legend: ++ = definitely agree, + = agree, – = disagree or definitely disagree.
Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 12. Political orientation left-centre-right in relationship to the value typology and the year of research (estimates from the logit model)

	1991		1999	
Type	centre/left	right/left	centre/left	right/left
Materialist	2.56	1.46	1.32	0.85
Mixed	2.56	2.42	2.14	2.19
Post-materialist	1.85	2.42	2.14	4.00

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999.

Table 13. Voting behaviour in relationship to the value typology and political orientation (estimates from the logit model)

Type	Orientation	KSČM/ČSSD	ČSSD/KDU-ČSL	KDU-ČSL/US	US/ODS
Materialist	Left	0.36	12.44	1.85	0.31
	Right	0.07	1.50	1.85	0.13
Mixed	Left	0.36	12.44	0.89	0.64
	Right	0.07	1.50	0.89	0.27
Post-materialist	Left	0.36	12.44	0.42	1.29
	Right	0.07	1.50	0.42	0.55

Source: European Values Study 1999.

Table 14. 'Which is more important, freedom or equality?' (estimates from the logit model)

	Freedom/Equality Materialist	Freedom/Equality Mixed	Freedom/Equality Post-materialist
Left	0.72	0.91	1.17
Centre	1.36	1.74	2.22
Right	2.60	3.31	4.23

Source: European Values Study 1991, 1999 (combined).

Table 15. Attitudes toward demands to A) prevent large income inequalities, B) guarantee basic needs are met, C) reward results, D) ensure equal access to education (estimates from the logit model)

Type	Orientation	A Very important/Other	B Very important/Other	C Very important/Other	D Very important/Other
	Left	1.11	2.21	1.54	5.15
Materialist	Centre	0.66	1.53	1.54	3.97
	Right	0.39	1.06	1.54	3.06
	Left	0.66	1.60	3.17	5.15
Mixed	Centre	0.39	1.11	1.89	3.97
	Right	0.23	0.77	1.89	3.06
	Left	0.39	1.16	3.17	5.15
Post-materialist	Centre	0.23	0.80	1.89	3.97
	Right	0.14	0.56	1.89	3.06

Source: European Values Study 1999.

Xenophobia among the Czech Population in the Context of Post-Communist Countries and Western Europe*

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Abstract: This article is based on data found in the *European Values Study* of 1999, and focuses on the following questions: (1) What is the degree of intensity of xenophobia among the Czech population in comparison with the states of Western and post-communist Europe? (2) How is the view of the 'foreign' ethnic group differentiated? (3) What groupings among countries may be identified if we examine the character of xenophobic attitudes among the population? (4) What factors influence the level of xenophobia of an individual? In concurrence with the observations of other authors the article confirms the overall high degree of intensity of xenophobia among the population of post-communist countries in comparison with advanced Western states. The intensity of xenophobic attitudes among the Czech population (measured through an overall index of xenophobia) roughly corresponds to the average of attitudes of the entire sample. From the viewpoint of attitudes toward individual 'foreign' ethnic groups (people of different race; Muslims; immigrants and migrants workers; Jews; Roma), the respondents expressed the strongest rejection of the Roma, and were the most tolerantly inclined toward the Jewish ethnic group. The EVS data essentially enabled a partial identification of traits for a profile of a xenophobe, as an older individual, with a lower level of education, and in a certain sense a marginalised 'victim' of the modernisation process (transformation), on the whole insecure, distrustful, and at the same time authoritarian in nature.

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Introduction

The findings of public opinion surveys in the Czech Republic during the last decade are unequivocal: Czechs cannot be said to be overflowing with love for the other ethnic groups living in this country.[1] Czechs are of course not the only ones whose relations with foreigners are less than warm; surveys in other post-communist countries have revealed similar attitudes there too [Večerník 1998: 330, Haerpfer and Wallace 1998,

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[1]) According to IVVM data, the percentage of inhabitants who acknowledge that their relation to the Roma is negative has fallen (from 70% in 1991 to 52% in 1998) [*Jaký*... 1998], but there is still a high level of inter-ethnic tension. At the end of 1999 only one quarter of Czechs believed that the majority of Roma were able to live in harmony with other people [*Vě ejnost*... 1999]. The percentage of people expressing negative attitudes towards people from the Balkans rose from 40% in 1993 to 44% in 1998. In 1993 approximately 39% of the population were hostile to the Vietnamese, while by 1998 this figure had fallen to 26%. In 1995 36% of respondents had a negative attitude towards people from the former Soviet Union, but in 1998 fully half of all respondents acknowledged such negative attitudes [*Jaký*... 1998].

Wallace 1999]. The clearest factor is the lack of acceptance of the Roma.[2] While Western Europe has accepted floods of foreigners in the post-war era, the closed communist Czechoslovakia had very little experience with other ethnic groups, with the exception of the Roma. The Marxist doctrine of the time, with its stress on class antagonism, hatred and struggle, left little space for developing friendly relations with foreigners. Dušan Drbohlav [1999: 1] sees the Czech Republic today as part of a region where for various historical reasons there has been an inclination more towards a model of 'ethnic purity' and 'cultural homogeneity'. The greater likelihood of Czechs rejecting foreigners, i.e. xenophobia, does therefore have a certain logic.

This article is an attempt to answer the following questions: (1) How strong is the xenophobia of Czechs in comparison with other Western European *and* post-communist countries? (2) How much do views of 'foreign' ethnic groups vary? (3) What groups of countries can we identify in terms of their xenophobic tendencies? (4) What factors influence the level of xenophobia felt by an individual? Before we begin to compare the data, it is worth considering the concept of xenophobia itself and its implications.

The Concept and Implications of Xenophobia

Xenophobia[3] as distrust, dislike of and even hostility towards foreigners or to anything and anybody from outside one's own social group, nation, country, etc. [Orenstein 1985, see also Hjerm 1998: 9] has been observed in a number of other living creatures, apart from humans. Among humans, fear of 'unknown' people can be seen even among babies less than three months of age [McEvoy 1995].

Xenophobia, as sociobiologists have noted, is by no means a *quite logical* strategy, at least from the point of view of the survival of the individual. If the history of the human race, as Chad McEvoy [1995] writes, is basically interwoven with constant skirmishing between different groups, then individuals long had (and in certain conditions still have) good reason to be wary of those who were seen as different or foreign. This is the meaningful protective function of xenophobia. An analogy for xenophobia can be found in the negative response of the human immune system. Just as the human body is best able to avoid a potential disaster caused by some foreign matter by rejecting it, so may an individual or a group be best able to avoid damage caused by foreigners by a tendency to distrust, avoid or reject individuals who seem 'foreign'.

The idea of xenophobia is bound up with the distinction between *us* and *them*. As Eric Hobsbawm [1992: 6] says, "'we' are French, or Swedes, or Germans or even members of politically defined sub-units like Lombards, but distinguished from the invading 'them' by being the 'real' Frenchmen or Germans or Brits, as defined (usually) by putative descent or long residence. Who 'they' are is also not difficult. 'They' are recognisable as 'not we', most usually by colour or other physical stigmata, or by language. Where these signs are not obvious, subtler discriminations can be made...". The opposition of *us* and *them*, adds Zygmunt Bauman [1996: 45], serves to distinguish between us, our benevolent and well-meaning nation, and them, our evil, aggressive and constantly intriguing neighbours.

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[2]) In the Czech Lands, tensions between the Roma and the majority population have been noted since the 16th century [Nečas 1991].

[3]) From the Greek *ξένος* = foreign, and *φόβος* = fear.

As Andrej Gjurič [1998: 42] says, xenophobia itself is an inclination, not an error or an illness. There are three further steps before it becomes a real illness and a dangerous fear, a pathological aversion, loathing – *xenoagression*. The first is if the distinction of the 'other' takes on a (clearly) negative connotation, becoming not just *us* and *them*, but *us* against *them*. The second is if *generalisation* comes into force and whole groups (Roma, Germans, Sudeten Germans) are unscrupulously branded in the same way. From there it is no great step to the category of collective guilt and collective punishment. The third step is *ideologisation*. "Ideology acquires a negative basis through not only justification, but also weight (...) As soon as these bounds are broached – if some government or group and its ideology justify the negative but concealed basis, or even elevates it to a principle, the road to hell is open." [ibid.].

From xenophobia to racism is a small step. I would follow Claire Wallace [1999: 5] in saying that xenophobia is a reaction against *foreigners* (however these may be defined), while racism is a reaction against a *generic group* (however defined).

Wallace also draws attention to another very important fact. Concepts of xenophobia generally refer to 'foreigners', i.e. to someone who comes from somewhere else. However xenophobia is not infrequently directed against groups of individuals who are citizens of a given country, as for example against Jews or Roma. As Wallace writes, "the 'oriental other' (...) representing the antithesis of the 'good citizen' (...) they not only 'threaten' the categories of normal, civilised life, but they also help to define it" [Wallace 1999: 4].

Explanations of the causes of xenophobia draw on a range of factors and influences. If, for example, we use the systematic overview provided by Wallace [1999: 8-19], the following factors can be seen to be involved: (1) *Migration* (a reaction to an increasing number of migrants, including both asylum seekers and so-called economic migrants); (2) *Socio-economic changes* (particularly in reaction to economic recession and unemployment); (3) *Social structure* (the influence of age[4] and a lower level of education); (4) *Globalisation* (a reaction to supranational institutions and the commercialisation of culture); (5) *Nationalism* (increasing in times/periods when national integrity is under threat, after the end of the Cold War, during the intensive process of integration into the EU, under the impact of globalisation); (6) *Right-wing movements* (become stronger when faith in democratic institutions is shaken; movements stimulate talk of foreigners as a threat); (7) *Uncertainty* (a factor which cuts across the others, linked with the sense of existential and emotional threat; fear of an 'influx' of foreigners, taking away jobs and introducing a different culture; overall, this is stronger in post-communist countries).

Andreas Wimmer [1997], for example, adopts a different approach to explaining xenophobic behaviour. He takes a wider viewpoint, seeking to clarify both xenophobia and racism. Starting from a survey of empirical studies, Wimmer sets out – with a wealth of critical commentary – four models of explaining xenophobia and racism. First, according to *the theory of rational choice* the majority see members of other ethnic groups primarily as rivals on the work and housing markets. Xenophobia is stronger among indi-

[4]) The link between xenophobia and age is not altogether clear. Studies carried out in Germany have repeatedly found a higher level of xenophobia among younger people [Wallace 1999: 14], while research from other countries has shown young people to be more tolerant than older people [e.g. Wallace 1999: 15, Nevitte 1996: 67, Gabal 1999: 75].

viduals who are in danger of losing out in this competition. According to the second model, which Wimmer terms *functionalism*, the conflicts between the majority and immigrants arise out of cultural differences. Displays of xenophobia are a reaction to difficulties in integrating minorities into the social structure and culture of the host country.[5] The main problem is therefore the 'foreignness' of the immigrant group. The third *theory of discourse* sees xenophobia as a product of the discourse of power groups, of their ability to define situations and label others. In this sense the presence of foreign ethnic groups can be seen as a source of political or economic problems in society. And finally, the fourth model, which Wimmer terms *phenomenology*, explains xenophobia as a product of repeated crises, for example the failure of the welfare state. The failure arouses anomic tensions in certain groups, due to their fear of losing their social position. Xenophobia and racism are interpreted as a means of re-establishing the weakened national identity.

Wimmer then puts forward his own hypothesis of the causes of xenophobia and racism. He says that xenophobia and racism can be understood as appeals to a pact of solidarity which forms the framework for the functioning of an ethnicised bureaucracy and national community, and which is at risk in times of social upheaval, particularly from the point of view of those groups whose position in society is under threat. For these marginalised groups inter-ethnic differences represent an insurmountable barrier, and they therefore do not see foreigners as legitimate competitors in the search for jobs and living space. Xenophobic discourse, writes Wimmer, does not only serve to reinforce identity in situations in which the nationalistic self-image is crumbling. It becomes a weapon in the political struggle for the right to concern on the part of parties and society as a whole: it is a competition for the collective *goods* guaranteed by the state. The contemporary form of xenophobia and racism is founded on collective identity and the guarantee of the right to participate, which are founded on the idea of a national community [Wimmer 1997]. It is clear that the explanations of xenophobia offered by Wimmer and Wallace have many points in common.

Xenophobic attitudes of groups and individuals are also related to the state's attitude to 'foreign' ethnic (racial) groups. As John Rex [1996] writes, in this sense the nation state can adopt one of four alternative types of policies towards minorities: (1) refuse to accept ethnic minorities on its territories and if necessary take direct action against them; (2) allow minorities to take up temporary residence, without any political rights; (3) accept minorities on the condition that their members renounce their own culture and the creation of a network of their own organisations; (4) try to integrate them into a multicultural society.

The first policy, says Rex, is acceptable for representatives of the extreme right, who generally defend their approach as protecting the domestic labour market and rejecting the way of life of foreign minorities. The second approach is that in force for, for example, *gastarbeiters* in Germany. Immigrants, however, become "second class citizens", in Rex's term. The third alternative is typical of, for example, France. While it may simplify naturalisation, it does not prevent migrants being excluded from education and

[5]) This is not the case with migrants from European countries. Migrants from Third World countries, however, are considered to be incapable of assimilating, since they come from societies with agrarian, quasi-feudal or feudal social structures. In addition to such elements of 'cultural incompatibility', lack of education and professional experience are also cited as obstacles to the integration of immigrants [Wimmer 1997].

the political sphere. The fourth approach is that adopted by countries such as Sweden, Britain or the Netherlands. They try, in principle, to protect cultural diversity and at the same time to encourage equality, at least in the social sphere. Rex, however, believes that the rhetoric of egalitarian multiculturalism often cloaks multiculturalism based on inequality.[6]

In the 1980s Western democracies witnessed a rise in intolerance towards ethnic minorities. The Dutch writers van den Broek and Heunks explain this partly as the increased sensitivity of some social groups to a potential threat to their individual interests, e.g. on the housing or labour markets, and partly as society becoming oriented towards self-centred rather than open forms of individualism [van den Broek and Heunks 1994: 77-78].

Eric Hobsbawm [1992: 7-8] presents a more common explanation of the dynamics of the growth of xenophobic moods. "Indeed, for most of the inhabitants of the countries in which xenophobia is now epidemic" says Hobsbawm, "the old ways of life have changed so drastically. (...) And this seems to me to be the clue. (...) All are comprehensible as symptoms of social disorientation, of the fraying, and sometimes the snapping, of the threads of what used to be the network that bound people together in society. The strength of this xenophobia is the fear of the unknown, of the darkness into which we may fall when the landmarks which seem to provide an objective, a permanent, a positive delimitation of our belonging together, disappear. (...) 'the nation', or the ethnic group" Hobsbawm continues, "appears as the ultimate guarantee when society fails. (...) You can't be thrown out. You are born in it and stay in it. (...) And because we live in an era when all other human relations and values are in crisis, or at least somewhere on a journey towards unknown and uncertain destinations, xenophobia looks like becoming the mass ideology of the 20th century *fin de siècle*."

To return to the Czech situation, Ivan Gabal [1999] and Jiří Buriánek [1999] have each contributed to the debate, both basing their ideas on repeated surveys of Czech public opinion towards foreigners in the 1990s.

Ivan Gabal [1999] notes that in the Czech Republic there is "a strong tendency on the part of the Czechs to reject foreigners and immigration as such, together with the related question of attitudes towards coexistence with the Roma minority" [Gabal 1999: 77]. These negative attitudes are stronger among older people, and Gabal has shown how adult Czechs basically distinguish three categories of foreigners. The first includes those 'capital' foreigners who are seen as acceptable in cultural terms (e.g. Americans, French, Germans), the second group is the so-called 'relations' (Slovaks, Czech émigrés, Jews), towards whom the attitude is somewhat mixed but who are still seen as acceptable although 'foreign'. The third group, however, is made up of "Arabs, Vietnamese, Chinese, people from the former Yugoslavia, Russians, Ukrainians, Blacks and particularly the Roma, who – despite their long residence and often Czech citizenship – are seen by Czechs today as the most foreign 'foreigners'" [Gabal 1999: 77-78]. Gabal sees Czechs' xenophobic attitudes as originating primarily in the ideal of cultural, ethnic and national

[6]) In Britain, for example, the ghettoising of ethnic minorities; in the case of the Netherlands a process of 'minoritisation' has been noted, in which people designated as a minority can expect sub-standard treatment; in Sweden the state has chosen older 'traditional' leaders for the dialogue with immigrants, as they can be more easily manipulated [Rex 1999].

homogeneity, from a degree of self-centredness and from a repressive approach to immigration and the settlement of foreigners.

Jiří Buriánek [1999] analysed xenophobic attitudes among Czechs primarily with respect to the Roma. He believes that Czech xenophobia has social and cultural roots, rather than ethnic ones. Among the more general causes of xenophobic behaviour Buriánek suggests the airing of individual frustrations or aggression on the 'scapegoat' principle. Attitudes towards the Roma are strongly influenced by negative personal experiences (experience of ethnic conflict) and by perception of a devastated community and generally unacceptable 'uncultural' environment [Buriánek 1999: 32-33]. Comparing data from the years between 1995 and 1998, Buriánek notes a positive change in Czech attitudes towards relations with the Roma minority. On a seven-point value index, there was shift from 2.1 in 1995 to 2.6 in 1998 [ibid.: 33]. Such a shift could of course be partly because antipathy towards 'foreign' ethnic groups is masked, or because respondents feel ashamed about their own xenophobic tendencies.

It should be recalled that the problem of xenophobic attitudes can be seen in different ways. The subject of xenophobia is often seen as an element of the concept of *tolerance* [Nevitte 1996, van den Broek and de Moor 1994, van den Broek and Heunks 1994] or *social exclusion*, as Rabušic [2000], for example, has shown.

Data

The rest of this article will be based on a set of questions asked in the *European Values Study (EVS)*[7] in 1999.[8] Respondents had, among other things, to mark those groups of people on a list whom *they would not wish to have as neighbours*. While the EVS questionnaire included a comprehensive list of such groups, I will concentrate here on those which could be considered as *foreigners*. The category of 'foreigners' in the EVS included five groups: (1) people of a different race; (2) Muslims; (3) immigrants and foreign workers; (4) Jews, and (5) Roma.

Results

a) The level of xenophobia among Czechs in comparison with the countries of Western and post-communist Europe

Table 1 provides an overview of the percentage of respondents of different countries who would not like to have members of the given group as neighbours. The countries in the

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[7]) The EVS (*European Values Study*) is a longitudinal *cross-cultural* comparative survey of value orientations. Its first stage was undertaken by the Dutch and Belgians in 1981 and was carried out in 26 European countries. The second stage was begun in 1990 and included 45 countries from throughout the world, including the former Czechoslovakia. The third stage of the EVS was undertaken in 1999. The Czech EVS survey was carried out in May 1999 on a representative *sample of Czech population* over the age of 18 (N = 1 909), under the direction of Jan Řehák and Ladislav Rabušic. Data collection was carried out by SC&C, spol. s r. o.

[8]) At the time of writing this article EVS 1999 data was available from 25 countries. Two countries were omitted as irrelevant to the subject (as unlikely to have sufficient Roma inhabitants), so 23 countries were included in the analysis. These are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Ukraine (n = 30 698). (All German data was included in the group of 'Western' countries.)

table are ordered according to the value for the group that elicited the highest level of dismissive responses, i.e. 'Roma', shown in the last column.

Table 1. Percentage of respondents in selected countries who would not like to have members of the given group as neighbours (1999)

Country	People of different races	Muslims	Immigrants and foreign workers	Jews	Roma
Slovakia	17.0	24.4	22.8	9.8	77.2
Lithuania	8.5	30.6	22.7	21.5	61.8
Italy	15.6	17.2	16.5	12.9	55.6
Bulgaria	26.7	21.3	23.4	17.1	53.5
Ukraine	10.5	24.2	14.8	10.4	52.7
Romania	24.2	31.4	21.1	23.2	51.5
Estonia	14.8	22.0	20.7	11.2	49.5
Russia	8.2	13.7	11.2	11.5	45.4
France	9.1	16.1	12.1	5.9	40.4
Czech Republic	***9.6***	***15.4***	***19.1***	***4.4***	***39.8***
Poland	18.1	24.7	24.8	25.8	39.2
Slovenia	12.0	22.6	16.0	16.8	36.6
Germany	5.9	12.5	11.0	6.8	33.9
Belgium	13.9	19.8	15.7	11.1	33.3
Portugal	6.7	7.6	2.6	10.7	33.3
Greece	14.4	20.9	13.7	18.7	32.8
Spain	10.3	10.8	9.3	9.2	28.0
Latvia	4.8	14.5	9.8	5.2	27.2
Ireland	12.3	14.4	12.5	11.4	26.5
Austria	7.9	15.2	12.7	8.8	26.5
Sweden	2.6	9.2	2.9	2.2	19.8
Netherlands	5.0	12.2	5.0	1.7	19.6
Denmark	7.4	16.3	10.6	2.5	15.3
Total average	11.4	17.8	14.4	10.9	39.9

Source: EVS data set 1999.

The data in Table 1 offer basic and relatively unadjusted information. At first sight it is clear that a higher level of rejection can be found among the post-communist countries and that the Czech Republic has around average values. The differences in the level of rejection of the five categories of 'foreigners' under consideration are clear. The following graphs provide an even clearer summary of the situation.

Figure 1 shows the overall ranking of countries according to the level of xenophobic attitudes. The ranking is given by the average values of the 'index of xenophobia', calculated from the acceptance or rejection of the given five groups of 'foreigners'. The index is on a range from 0 to 5. The higher the value of the index, the higher is the respondent's level of xenophobia.

Figure 1. Countries by index of xenophobia and country type



Source: EVS data set 1999

Figure 1 very clearly shows the higher level of xenophobic attitudes in post-communist countries, while respondents from the developed Western democracies were the most tolerant of 'foreigners'. This figure corresponds to findings about the higher level of tolerance in developed regions towards individuals who are in some way different. The Dutch writers, van den Broek and de Moor, for example, found that at the beginning of the 1990s the peoples of Eastern Europe showed a markedly lower level of ethnic tolerance than did those in Western Europe, while within Eastern Europe the highest level of intolerance was found among Slovaks and Bulgarians, with Poland and the former East Germany emerging as the most tolerant [van den Broek and de Moor 1994: 211]. Similarly, Haerpfer and Wallace in a survey of ten post-communist countries found "the highest level of ethnic tensions" in Slovakia [Haerpfer and Wallace 1998: 186]. The above ranking of individual countries is, however, somewhat different from Wallace's [1999] findings.[9] The differences are probably due to the use of different concepts in the research.

The decline of tolerance towards 'foreign' ethnic groups in Italy and Belgium, which had the highest index values among the Western countries in this survey, has also

[9]) Using the values of the index of xenophobia, Claire Wallace gained the following ranking of countries (from the highest level of xenophobia to the lowest): Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Croatia, Belarus, Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia [Wallace 1999: 64-65]. In her conclusions, however, Wallace noted that from the analysis of individual countries (rather than on the basis of indicators of xenophobia) Slovakia emerged as highly xenophobic [Wallace 1999: 88].

been noted by, for example van den Broek and Heunks [1994]. Also noteworthy is the position of Latvia, which differs from the average for the Baltic countries.

The Czech Republic had slightly below average values (from the countries surveyed) on the xenophobia index. Most of the other post-communist countries included in the survey emerge here as more xenophobic.

While this article does not include a comparison over time, it is worth noting the dramatic fall in the level of xenophobia among Czechs, from the earlier round of the EVS in 1991. The index of xenophobia in the Czech sample in 1991 was 1.54, i.e. approximately the same level as Lithuania in 1999.

b) Differentiation of views of 'foreign' ethnic groups

Figure 2 shows the differences in the level of rejection of the five 'foreign' ethnic groups by 'region'.

Figure 2. Proportion of respondents who would not like to have selected social groups as neighbours – by country (region)



Source: EVS data set 1999.

The data shows the massive rejection of the Roma population noted by other authors [Gabal 1999, Wallace 1999].[10] Of the sample as a whole,[11] four out of ten people on average would not like to have *Romas* as neighbours. When individual countries are consid-

[10]) These authors were working with a larger number of ethnic groups that were considered 'foreign'.

[11]) The average rejection of the Roma in this sample of 23 countries ranged from 15.3% to 77.2%.

ered, too, the *Roma* arouse the most negative feelings, except from the Danish respondents, who had one percent higher rejection of *Muslims*. The EVS respondents expressed the greatest degree of tolerance for *Jews*. The figure also shows the difference between the (more tolerant) Western countries and the (less tolerant) post-communist countries. The higher the level of rejection of an ethnic group, the greater is the difference between these two groups.

With respect to their relations with the different categories of 'foreigners', Czech respondents were somewhat closer to Western countries. As the figure shows, Czechs have a relatively positive view of *Jews* (in comparison with the countries surveyed), and there is a significant statistical difference[12] from the groups of both Western and post-communist countries. Czechs' declared attitudes towards *people of a different race* are very close to those found in the group of Western countries and are distinctively different from those of people in the group of post-communist countries. In their rejection of *immigrants and foreign labourers*, however, Czechs show higher levels than both groups (although the difference is statistically significant only for the group of Western countries). In their attitude towards *Muslims*, Czechs are again close to the Western countries and significantly different from the group of post-communist countries. And finally, in their relations to the *Roma*, Czechs' responses were significantly different from those of both groups. Rejection of the *Roma* on the part of Czech respondents was less clear than for the other post-communist countries, but still significantly above the Western European level.

c) Grouping of countries by the nature of people's xenophobic attitudes

Cluster analysis was used to gain an overview of the similarities and differences between the different countries surveyed from the point of view of respondents' attitudes towards 'foreign' ethnic groups. This made it possible to group the countries in such a way that each group included those countries that were most similar to each other, but that the groups would be as distinct from each other as possible.[13]

The dendrogram[14] in Figure 3 is one possible presentation of the cluster analysis. Countries are arranged in the form of a horizontal 'tree', with the 'trunk' on the right and the 'branches' going to the left. The further to the left the branches separate, the more similar are the countries (in terms of the criteria in question), and conversely, those branches dividing further to the right indicate the greatest dissimilarity between the countries.

The 23 countries shown in the dendrogram basically fall into two major groups. The first of these can be seen in the upper part of the dendrogram[15] and includes primarily Western countries, while the countries in the second group, lower in the figure,[16] are largely post-communist countries. The two closest countries are the Netherlands and Sweden, followed by the group of five countries from Austria to Germany, and then in the bottom group, between the Czech Republic and France. The last two countries shown

[12]) On the basis of the Mann-Whitney U test.

[13]) Data included in the cluster analysis basically correspond to those given in Table 1.

[14]) The variants of the cluster analysis were chosen for their relatively close correspondence with the values on the xenophobia index.

[15]) In the dendrogram from the Netherlands down to Portugal.

[16]) In the dendrogram from Greece down to Lithuania.

also demonstrated very similar values on the index of xenophobia, as do the trio of Estonia, Ukraine and Italy. Looking at the structure of the bottom group of countries, a distinct group can be observed in its lower part, including Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania. As seen in Figure 1, these three countries basically form the top of the scale of values on the index of xenophobia. Slovakia is only loosely linked with the groups. Its specific position is determined by the highest values on the parameters indicating rejection of the Roma, who already meet with the highest level of rejection among the five ethnic groups included in the survey.

Figure 3. Similarities and differences between countries according to the level of xenophobic attitudes



Source: EVS data set 1999.
The cluster analysis was carried out using the Between Groups approach.

The proximity matrix for the countries surveyed shows Sweden and the Netherlands as the most similar, while the greatest difference is between Sweden and Slovakia. The Czech Republic is, in this respect, 'closest' to France and relatively the furthest removed from its geographical neighbour, Slovakia. At least in this sense.

d) Factors encouraging xenophobic attitudes

The next step was to try and ascertain the relation between the level of xenophobic attitudes (expressed as values on the index of xenophobia) and a set of selected variables. The selection of variables was based on the findings of the following authors: Wimmer [1997], Haerpfer and Wallace [1998], Hjerm [1998] and Wallace [1999]. The variables considered can be grouped into the following blocks:

– *demographic variables:* sex, age;

– *variables indicating socio-economic status:* education, social economic status, unemployment;

- *variable indicating general political orientation:* orientation on the left-right scale, pride in one's nation, authoritarian features (belief in a strong leader), attitudes towards people from developing countries;
- *variables indicating personal features:* willingness to trust other people, overall satisfaction with one's own life.

The relations of these variables to the index of xenophobia was measured for the subgroups of Western and post-communist countries, for the Czech Republic, and finally for the entire set of countries. The values of coefficients measuring association, however, were less than 0.2.[17] *Therefore* an alternative approach was selected, involving the comparison of *means* and follow-up significance tests. The values of the independent variables were dichotomised or trichotomised[18] and the average values on the index of xenophobia between variants of the independent variables were compared. The results are shown in Table 2. Statistically significant differences are shown with black dots, while circles indicate that no significant difference was found.

As Table 2 shows, there was a statistically significant difference for all the variables tested, except for the first ('sex'). However, this was the case only with the Western countries. For the post-communist countries, including the Czech Republic, the following features emerged. First, the variables of 'unemployment' and 'right-left orientation' did not show any differentiation, which in the latter case may be due to the fact that understanding of the concepts of left and right is still not clear in the post-communist countries [van den Broek and de Moor 1994]. Secondly, the relation between the variable 'pride in one's country' and xenophobic attitudes appeared to be ambivalent: in the sub-set of Western countries individuals who expressed pride in their countries appeared to be more xenophobic, while for Czech respondents it was the reverse. Thirdly, for the Czech Republic the tests showed no relationship between xenophobic attitudes and the variables of 'age' and 'satisfaction with one's own life'. Nevertheless, if in this case we instead use the adjusted standardised residual from the contingency tables, a higher level of xenophobia is found among older Czechs and those less satisfied with their lives.

It can therefore be said that for the whole data set (of 23 selected countries), including the Czech Republic, a higher level of xenophobia is more likely among older people (particularly over the age of 50), among those with a lower level of formal education, of lower socio-economic status, among those who are prepared to believe in a strong

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[17]) Lower values were in the great majority in the distribution of the 'index of xenophobia'. This index was on a range from '0' (= no group was indicated as 'unwelcome as neighbours') to '5' (= all groups were indicated a 'unwelcome neighbours'). Around half of the respondents (51%) in the EVS set did not indicate any group as 'unwelcome neighbours', a quarter (26%) indicated only one group, 15% indicated two or three groups, and only 8% of respondents indicated 4 or all 5 of the groups of 'foreigners' in question.

[18]) The variables were dichotomised or trichotomised as follows: (1) *age* (18-30; 31-55; 56 or over); (2) *age at finishing formal education* (under 16; 17-20; 21 or over); (3) *social economic status* (half of the symmetrical four-point scale); (4) *unemployment* (unemployed; employed); (5) *right-left orientation* (half of the symmetrical four-point scale); (6) *pride in one's country* (half of the symmetrical four-point scale); (7) *willingness to believe in a strong leader* (half of the symmetrical four-point scale); (8) *attitudes towards people from developing countries* (half of the symmetrical four-point scale); (9) *willingness in trust others* (dichotomic variable); (10) *satisfaction with one's own life* (trichotomised ten-point scale: 1-3; 4-7; 8-10).

leader, those with a negative attitude towards people from developing countries, among those unwilling to trust others, and those less satisfied with their lives. In the sub-set of Western countries, the factors encouraging xenophobia also include unemployment, right-wing leanings and pride in one's country.

Table 2. The influence of selected factors on the level of xenophobic attitudes – results of significance tests[19]

	Significance of test			
	Western countries	Post-communist countries	Czech Republic	Total
(Variable = dichotomic):				
sex	○	○	○	○
social economic status	●	●	●	●
unemployment	●	○	○	●
right-left orientation	●	○	○	●
pride in one's own nation	●	○	●	○
willingness to believe a strong leader	●	●	●	●
attitude to people				
from developing countries	●	●	●	●
trust in other people	●	●	●	●
(Variable = trichotomic):				
age				
18-30; 31-55	●	○	○	○
18-30; 56 and over	●	●	○	●
31-35; 56 and over	●	●	○	●
age at leaving school				
16 or under; 17-20	●	●	●	●
16 and under; 21 and over	●	●	●	●
17-20; 21 and over	●	●	●	●
satisfaction with life:				
unsatisfied; so-so	●	●	○	●
unsatisfied; satisfied	●	●	○	●
so-so; satisfied	●	●	○	●

Note: ● statistically significant difference.
○ statistically insignificant difference.

In other words, the various features of the profile of a xenophobe, described in the literature as older people with a lower level of education, in some way marginalised, 'victims' of the modernisation (transformation) under way, generally uncertain, untrusting and at the same time authoritarian, could basically be identified in the EVS data. As I have already said, this should be seen only as a sounding, both with respect to the variables tested, and particularly with respect to the methods used.

[19]) As the distribution of the values on the index of xenophobia did not meet criteria of normality, it was necessary to use non-parametric tests (the *Man-Whitney* test for dichotomic variables and the *Kruskal-Walis* test for trichotomic variables).

Conclusion

What then does the EVS 1999 data tell us about xenophobic attitudes among Europeans? The expectation that the overall level of xenophobia is higher in post-communist countries than in developed Western countries was confirmed. The opposite ends of the xenophobia ladder are occupied by the countries of Eastern Europe at one end and their north-western counterparts at the other. Approximately ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the differences found can be seen as proof of the difficulties experienced by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe during their transformation into developed societies. The Czech Republic is in the middle of this xenophobic current. The last ten years have seen a noticeable improvement in relations with 'foreigners' in the Czech Republic [see *Jaký...* 1998, Buriánek 1999] which should be interpreted against the background of change or stability in the other countries surveyed, but this has unfortunately not yet been possible. The data showed significant differences in the acceptance of 'foreign' ethnic groups. The causes of the almost universal mass rejection of the Roma [see Wallace 1999, Gabal 1999] were not covered in this article, although they undoubtedly present a challenge to both sociologists and to those working in other disciplines.

Some of the predictors of xenophobia that have been identified in developed countries were not found to be significant in the post-communist situation, although this may well change with time. It should also be recalled that in the EVS xenophobic attitudes are indicated by only a limited number of indicators which certainly do not give a full view of this phenomenon in all its breadth and forms.

Society cannot just cure itself of xenophobia. As Drbohlav [1999: 2] fittingly noted: "It is not a case of eliminating xenophobia, which is logically bound up with the development of a person and which clearly has its 'positive' protective and stimulating side, but of how it can be cultivated and minimised." Or as the Bible puts it "You shall not harm or oppress a guest, since you too were guests in Egypt" (Exodus 23, 9). As the EVS data makes clear, Czechs and their fellow pilgrims from Eastern and Central Europe have some way to go in this direction. There is no reason for hesitating as all of us have at some time been guests in another's home.

Translated by April Retter

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Income Maintenance Policies, Household Characteristics and Work Incentives in the Czech Republic

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Summary: This paper investigates work disincentives imposed by the income maintenance system on the unemployed with certain household characteristics. It firstly specifies which parameters of the income maintenance system may impose work disincentives, and then attempts to identify the relationship between the work incentives and the household characteristics. It shows that the income maintenance system is more generous towards larger families with children.

The binomial logit estimation of outflows to employment using the Labour Force Survey Data evidences that between the fourth quarter of 1998 and 1999, marked as a recession period, the children characteristics were not the significant determinants of outflows from unemployment to employment. Nevertheless, the calculations of the gross probabilities show that Social Assistance recipients from the families with children have much lower outflow from unemployment.

Using the empirical results some passive labour market policy options are discussed.

The Czechs: Jobs and Work*

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Abstract: The Czech population attaches great importance to work in their lives, both as a source of income and as a sphere in which to realise their human potential. A factor analysis of work aspects identified three general factors in the aspects of work: an *'instrumental and trade-off'* factor (good pay and good job security; generous holidays, good working hours and not too much pressure; pleasant people to work with and good working conditions); a *'social'* factor (an interesting job, a useful job, a responsible job, a respected job and meeting interesting people); and a *'self-fulfilment'* factor (chances for promotion, possibility of achievement, opportunities to use initiative, opportunity to use one's abilities). The importance attached to individual work aspects differs among members of individual social classes, as well as between men and women within these classes.
Czech Sociological Review, 2001, Vol. 9 (No. 1: 69-84)

Introduction

Work has always seemed to be a fundamental human need, an indispensable social bond, a virtue, and the main source of self-esteem. However, Gorz [1999: 55] is right in saying that work that gave one membership of a given society (termed as 'wage-based' or 'salary-based') is clearly not work in the anthropological or philosophical sense. As a product of a given civilisation, today, it is paid work – a job. Giddens [1994: 176] says: "Most pre-modern societies seem to have no word for 'work', presumably because working wasn't readily distinguishable from other activities". According to Beck, the importance that work has acquired in industrial society has no parallels in history. "Wage labour and an occupation have become the axis of living in the industrial age" [Beck 1992: 139]. An army of workers totalling more than 380 million people live in the countries of Europe, including Russia [Gesano 1999].

Now, both the economic well-being and consumption habits of a family symbolise the success of one's own work. Men's success is essentially connected with their economic and professional achievements. Six key characteristics of paid work are relevant here. Money, activity level, variety, temporal structure, social contacts, and personal identity [Giddens 1989: 505].[1] Work also guarantees a fundamental social experience. It may be perceived as an *instrument* for gathering resources needed for a 'true life' beyond work (time after working hours on weekdays, weekends and holidays, as well as retire-

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[1]) Similarly, Jahoda suggests that work serves five psychological functions: First, it imposes a time structure on the day; second, it implies shared experience and regular contacts with people outside the family; third, it links an individual to goals which transcend his or her own; fourth, it defines aspects of personal status and identity; fifth, it enforces activity [Jahoda 1979b].

ment). A 'job' is an instrument for sustaining life and the individualisation of life styles. On the other hand, 'work' in the sense of 'working activity' may represent a *value in itself*. Above all, it is an instrument for the expression of human creative potential.

Paid work is important also from the perspective of society's progress towards democracy. Most human rights are linked to work. "Jobs as a key to life chances in the work societies were for a long time not merely the entry ticket to the world of provisions but also for entitlements to citizenship" [Dahrendorf 1989: 148]. Also, Beck states that "Democracy arose in Europe and America as a democracy of work in the sense that political freedom relied on participation in paid work" [Beck 1998: 11].

In early modernity, paid work became a powerful instrument of the emancipation of the poor.

> "The problem has been replaced by that of the labourers who ought to be treated, like all other groups, as rational subjects of exchange. They are not a special aspect of the wise administration of the state but individuals who, like all other property owners, pursue their self interest and seek to better their conditions, and those of their families, by the only means at their disposal and their only property: their labour" [Dean 1991: 135].

On the other hand, many authors (Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Durkheim, Weber among others) have described the process of a detailed division and standardisation of labour which led to its disintegration into simple working operations. Some authors perceived this process as a source of work effectiveness (Frederick Winslow Taylor, Max Weber); others later turned their attention to limits, both in achieving organisational goals and in terms of workers' satisfaction (Elton Mayo and Georges Friedmann). Fragmentary working tasks in industry often take less then a minute to perform, do not require any skill (deftness has replaced skill) and are monotonous and hard to carry out. Blue-collar workers in particular (but increasingly more often also white-collar workers) feel they have little control over their working conditions and are denied the opportunity to influence decisions about their jobs. As it only takes a few days to train a person in a single work operation, workers have become interchangeable and thus also expendable.[2]

In actual fact, work is usually not very attractive, gratifying, satisfying, or integrating. Divided work no longer pays off and is no longer rewarding for those who perform it [Friedmann 1970].[3] The human inner need for participation in active work has gradually been recognised as well. It is becoming increasingly more evident that people's attitudes to work and their social contacts with the other people in the workplace are reflected in their work performance.

Things are made even more complicated by the fact that "high unemployment in the midst of economic growth raises questions about economic development, the history of work, and citizenship" (see above) (...) "Modern societies are work societies, built

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[2]) Neo-Marxists [Braverman 1974], among others, have described what implications this has for the standing of workers in the labour market and what room it leaves for 'working under constraint'.

[3]) As a reaction to the above-mentioned situation, ideas such as corporate cultures concept, emphasis on human relations, management under conditions of chaos – Peters [1987], flexibility – Toffler's conception of adhocracy [Toffler 1985], and a reaction to the Japanese challenge – Ouchi's 'z-theory' [1981]) aiming at the activation of workers' creative potential, skills and knowledge.

around the work ethic and occupational roles, but they also seem to be driven by the vision and apparently increasingly realistic perspective of a world without work" [Dahrendorf 1990: 141-143]. However, opportunities for paid work are becoming increasingly scarcer. Bělohradský [1999] maintains that it is the deepest source of the disconcertion of post-industrial democracy that it fails to attach human meaning to a tendency which most typifies it as post-industrial – that is to 'job scarcity'. "In fact, from being a burden, work has become a privilege" [Dahrendorf 1990: 144].

The idea of moving beyond a wage-based society, where working time will cease to be the dominant social time, is discussed increasingly more often. Beck [Pongs 1999: 54] maintains that most people will lose their jobs in the future (capitalism without work has begun to emerge). He suggests separating material security from the monopoly of paid work and turning attention to diverse alternative activities. What is the solution to this situation? One of the considered options is a somewhat vaguely formulated idea of a leisure-time society.[4] According to certain authors, the ideology of work has begun to erode. People will recognise that the right to work and the right not to work are of equal importance. Nonetheless, most definitions of leisure time define it in relation to work (each of them losing significance in the absence of the other). Jahoda [1979a] arrived at a similar conclusion and suggested that being unemployed is different from having leisure time. The concept of 'civil labour' [Beck 2000] represents another possible alternative to paid work. However, a number of authors – for example Clauss Offe – are rather sceptical about this [Pongs 1999: 54].

In spite of both the contemporary evidence for alienation in the modern employment system (see critiques by Marx, Marcuse, Braverman and others) and assertions about a decline in job opportunities and the death of the work ethic (Dahrendorf, Bell, Beck, Bělohradský and others), most people continue to desire to hold a job [Marx 1978, Marcuse 1964, Braverman 1974, Dahrendorf 1990, Bell 1974, Beck 1998, Bělohradský 1999]. Moreover, they are forced to do so. Employment and jobs remain the determinants of their personal, family and social lives. People fear losing their jobs, and work conditions (economic, social and psychological) represent a means of evaluation. Individuals tend to be more or less satisfied with these conditions. Supposedly, the level of satisfaction varies according to individual personal characteristics, as well as in dependence on sex, age, membership of a social class, etc.

Utilising data from the European Values Study, this article aims at answering the following questions: Do the Czech people experience any form of job security? How satisfied are they with their job/work? What role does their job/work play in their lives and what is its relationship to the family, friends and leisure time? What aspects of work do they consider important and what general dimensions do these aspects form? To what extent are individual social classes in Czech society distinguishable with regard to the importance that they attach to various work aspects? Which general dimensions, based on these work aspects, are more representative of one class than of another? In what way does the situation in the Czech Republic differ from that in other European countries? Does it show similarities with the situation in other post-communist countries?

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[4]) Indications of such visions can be found in the social utopia of the 17th-19th centuries and with even more force in the 1930s [e.g. Keynes 1931] and the 1960s [e.g. Fourastié 1965]. Nonetheless, they did not acquire a more real form until related to the technological and social changes of the 1990s.

This article, as well as other ones in this issue, is based on the findings of the European Values Study from 1999 (a previous research wave was conducted, among other countries in the Czech Republic also, in 1991). The study consisted of an extensive questionnaire survey. In the Czech Republic, data collection was carried out by teams headed by Řehák and Rabušic under the support of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (grant No 403/99/0326 *"European Values Study – Czech republic 1999"*). Among the advantages, there ranks the possibility to compare the Czech Republic with other European countries. Disadvantages are twofold. First, the data is somewhat limited. It comes not from a special questionnaire but only from several scales included in a questionnaire of an omnibus type. Second, the author participated neither in the operationalisation of the original concepts, nor in the preparation of the questionnaire. He is only interpreting the data that is available.

The Importance of a Job and Work

The value of work is relatively high in the Czech Republic [*European...* 1999]. After all, this is also the case in other European countries.[5] In most of them, if not in all, work is considered an important or even very important component of human life. However, certain indicators suggest that individual countries' populations may be motivated differently in this respect. The majority of Czech respondents (96.8%) consider work important (53.0% even very important). These findings are analogous to those obtained in 1991 (93.6% and 59.7%, respectively). Most respondents (84.8% in 1999 and 87.6% in 1991) regard the possible decrease in the importance of work in the near future to be a negative trend. Members of all social classes, as well as both men and women, identify with this opinion. No differences in the evaluation of this trend were found among members of different age groups either.

Table 1. Importance of work, family and leisure in one's life – Czech Republic, 1999 (valid %)
"Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life."

		very important	quite important	not important	not at all important
work	count	1007	771	100	21
	%	53.0	40.6	5.2	1.1
family	count	1611	259	28	3
	%	84.8	13.6	1.5	0.2
leisure time	count	397	1100	366	31
	%	21.0	58.1	19.3	1.6

Source: [*European...* 1999].

Although no significant differences were identified in the perception of the importance of work by individual social categories, male manual workers do value work somewhat less

[5]) Among the countries where people attach greater importance to work (higher proportion of respondents who evaluate it as 'very important' in their life) are, for example, Sweden (89.7%) and Poland (78.1%). Among the countries where people attach lower importance to work (low proportion of answers 'very important') are Denmark (39.5%) and the Netherlands (47.4%). The situation in the Czech Republic (53.0%) is comparable with that in Ireland (51.1%), Germany (50.3%), Lithuania (54.2%), and Estonia (51.4%) [*European...* 1999].

than the others.[6] Also, the importance of work in one's life increases with age (41% of respondents in the 17-29 age group consider work important for their life, while in the 50-51 age group it is 60%). The correlation matrix of the importance of *'work'*, *'family'*, *'leisure time'* and *'friends'* in one's life revealed a medium correlation between work and family on the one hand (Spearman's $\rho = 0.220$; the correlation of both variables with the other items is significantly lower), and between leisure and friends on the other hand (Spearman's $\rho = 0.285$; the correlation of both variables with the other items is significantly lower).[7] Partial correlation coefficients controlled for sex and class suggest that both the variables slightly intervene with these findings. The link between the choice of work and family is stronger for men than for women (as well as for the lower class in comparison with upper-middle and upper classes). Overall, all the four above-mentioned items correlate more closely with one another with regard to their importance in life than does any one of them with the remaining two items, i.e. politics and religion. The results of a multidimensional scaling of all these items come unambiguously to the same conclusion.

Table 2. Reasons for taking a job – Czech Republic 1999 (valid %)
"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"

	agree	neither/nor	disagree
You need to have a job to fully develop your talents	79.5	12.0	8.5
It is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it	46.8	23.4	29.8
People who don't work turn lazy	79.0	9.8	11.2
Work is a duty towards society	63.0	19.5	17.5
People should not have to work if they don't want to	31.7	17.4	50.8
Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time	55.7	22.3	22.0

Source: [*European...* 1999].

Correspondence analysis of these items shows that the conviction *'work is a duty towards society'* functions as a creed of the middle class (both of men and women – particularly in contrast to lower-class men, where only 49% of respondents agree with the statement), as does the statement *'you need to have a job to fully develop your talents'*. The opinion that *'it is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it'* is typical more for lower-class women (63%, while only 33% of lower-class men share this opinion) who also tend to agree less than other respondents with the statement that *'People should not have to work if they don't want to'* (only 21%). Upper-class and upper-middle-class men share with lower class men a strong belief that *'Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time'*. Put differently: Lower-class men tend to agree less with the opinions that *'it is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it'*, *'work is a duty towards society'*, and *'people who don't work turn lazy'*. On the contrary, they are more likely to agree with the statement that *'people should not have to work if they don't want to'*. Holding these opinions, they differ not only from the other classes, but also

[6]) As we shall see later in the text, they perceive work rather instrumentally. They aim above all at a satisfactory wage and job security (and fear unemployment more than other population groups).
[7]) In the case of both pairs of items, the correlation is significant at the 0.005 level (2-tailed).

from women of the same class. These women appear to represent the opposite pole of the opinion spectrum. They tend to share with the middle classes the perception of work as duty and life without work as humiliating. What motivates middle-class members to work is thus above all a sense of social duty and the opportunity to make the most of their abilities (this is also stressed by middle-class women). Lower-class women tend to accentuate the humiliating character of unearned income. Upper-middle-class men associate their work motivation with a rather vague *'work comes first'*.

Do People Fear Losing Their Jobs?[8]

Satisfaction with job security is quite high in Czech society: 57.3% of respondents evaluate it as satisfactory (values 6-10 on a ten-point scale), 36.9% as very satisfactory (values 8-10) and 11.8% as absolutely satisfactory (value 10). Older people tend to express greater satisfaction with job security than younger people (values 8-10: 41% of respondents in the 50-59 age group, while a mere 27% of respondents in the 17-29 age group), as do upper-class and upper-middle-class members (values 8-10: 60%)[9] compared with the rest (values 8-10: middle-class, white-collar workers 40%, skilled and semi-skilled workers 27%, unqualified labourers 19%).

Data from public opinion polls conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Polls (IVVM) makes it possible to reconstruct the trend in the public reflection of the labour market after 1989. In April 2000,[10] only 12% of respondents were convinced that their employers were facing difficulties and an uncertain future (between 1992 and 2000, their proportion fluctuated between 10% and 20%, only in 1992 and 1993 did it increase to 27%). A mere 1% of respondents thought that the company where they were employed would close down (their proportion was about 1% or 2% between 1992 and 2000, in 1992 and 1993 it again increased to 5%). The proportion of respondents who believed that they were at risk from redundancy was not high either (12%) and has not changed much between 1992 and 2000. Job insecurity is more frequently found in larger enterprises than in smaller ones, and in private companies than in state-owned ones. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents expect further growth in unemployment in the Czech Republic (33% anticipate a sharp increase and 40% moderate growth).[11] At the same time, 31% of respondents are convinced that people remain unemployed because they *'are unable to find any work at all'*, 49% of them think that it is rather because these people *'are unable to find an adequate job'* and only 14% maintain that *'the unemployed simply do not want to work'*.[12] To complete the picture, it should be added that the average rate of unemployment in the Czech Republic was about 9% in 2000, with the most seriously affected re-

[8]) Data for this section were drawn from research carried out by the Institute for Public Opinion Polls (IVVM).

[9]) It corresponds with stronger job security certitude among people with a graduate degree (values 8-10: 52%) in comparison with elementary-educated people (values 8-10: 26%).

[10]) Institute for Public Opinion Polls (IVVM) at the Czech Statistical Office – April 2000 (representative sample of 1018 respondents, sampling error ± 3%).

[11]) Institute for Public Opinion Polls (IVVM) at the Czech Statistical Office – February 2000 (representative sample of 1045 respondents, sampling error ± 3%).

[12]) 40% of respondents demanded that the unemployed were obliged to accept any job (values 1-3 of a ten-point scale) and 20% of respondents conceded them the right to refuse an inadequate job (values 8-10 of the scale).

gions (the coal-mining areas of northern Bohemia) suffering from 15% unemployment. However, there are certain micro-regions in the country where unemployment amounts to as much as 35%, and even exceeds 50% in extreme cases. Respondents' opinions on prioritising Czechs (over foreigners) and men (over women) when it comes to employment, and changes in these opinions since 1991, are not without interest either.

Table 3. Who should be given priority in getting a job – Czech Republic (valid %)
"When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Czech people over immigrants" and *"When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women"*

		agree	neither/nor	disagree
give priority to Czechs	1991	84.6	3.6	11.8
	1999	84.0	7.1	8.9
	difference	-0.6	+3.5	-2.9
give priority to men	1991	49.8	8.3	42.0
	1999	18.4	15.8	65.9
	difference	-31.4	+7.5	+23.9

Source: [*European...* 1991, 1999].

Work Satisfaction and the Meaning of Particular Aspects of Work

Work satisfaction (measured on a ten-point scale) is relatively high in the Czech Republic: 79.1% of respondents identified with the positive half of the scale (values 6-10), 54.8% placed themselves in the significantly positive part (values 8-10) and 15.8% chose the extreme scale position (value 10). These findings fully correspond with data gathered in 1991 using the same measurement scale. Older people tend to be more satisfied with their job than younger people (values 8-10: 60% of respondents in the 50-59 age group and 46% of respondents in the 17-29 age group), as do the upper-class and upper-middle-class members compared with the working class (values 8-10: 69% and 49%, respectively).

Table 4. Job satisfaction – the Czech Republic (valid %)
"Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job?"

		dissatisfied								satisfied	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
legenda	1991	2.2	1.2	3.6	3.8	12.7	9.9	14.8	21.7	13.8	16.3
ten-point scale	1999	1.7	0.6	3.9	4.2	10.5	9.8	14.5	24.0	15.0	15.8
	difference	-0.5	-0.6	+0.3	+0.4	-2.2	-0.1	-0.3	+2.3	+1.2	-0.5
legenda	1991		7.0			41.2				51.8	
three-point scale*	1999		6.2			39.0				54.8	
	difference		-0.8			-2.2				+3.0	

*) This scale combines points 1, 2, 3 and points 4, 5, 6, 7 and points 8, 9, 10.
Source: [*European...* 1991, 1999].

A quarter of a century ago, Možný [1974] attempted to operationalise work in the Czech Republic in terms of its intuitively identified attributes. He correlated respondents' satis-

faction with individual work aspects.[13] The conducted linkage analysis [McQuitty 1964] in a correlation matrix resulted in dividing the work process into three general dimensions (the number of items was reduced in a similar way as when using factor analysis). Respondents evaluated their job according to:

1. the opportunity for personal fulfilment the work provides (interesting work, chances for promotion, opportunity to use one's abilities, wage and the closely related exertion required of the job).[14]
2. working conditions and environment (working environment, organisation of work, and a company's social policy).[15]
3. the social contacts which it imposes on people (colleagues and superiors).

The data collected by Možný twenty-five years ago deserves comparison with the current data. Our file does not include data on satisfaction with work aspects, but data on the importance which respondents attach to these aspects (the perspective has changed). Thus it is impossible to comment on the shift in content and try to compare the situation in pre- and post-communist Czech society. However, what does result, interestingly enough, from the comparison of both researches is that in both cases, analogical social groups are formed whose attitudes vary (with respect to the favoured aspects of work in 1999, and with respect to work aspects with which they are satisfied in 1974). As expected, the factors include sex, age and education (class membership was not monitored in 1974).

In the case of EVS data from 1999 we used a factor analysis. Only then did we present our findings on the importance attached to individual job aspects by the respondents knowing which factor individual aspects belong to (table 5). A factor analysis[16] of the evaluation of the importance of work aspects identified three factors.

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[13]) Respondents' satisfaction was measured on a set of Likert scales (one scale for each of the aspects). Contrary to the current focus on the importance of individual work aspects for an individual, the practice of real socialism was concerned with actual satisfaction with these aspects. This concern was motivated by the aspiration of enterprises at that time aspiration to stabilise their personnel (the 'hit' in those years was research into the causes of fluctuation which used to be perceived as a negative phenomenon).

[14]) The link between wages and the required exertion corresponds with the remuneration philosophy at that time. Rather than with job complexity and necessary qualifications, wage level used to increase with the required physical exertion.

[15]) The research was conducted in the real socialism era of the 1970s, when enterprises used to assume a number of social-policy functions typical of the welfare state.

[16]) Individual scales have the form of dummy variables. Factor analysis (Varimax rotation) seems to represent a relevant model for our data: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy = 0.862. The three identified factors exhaust 40% of the variance (each of them about 13%), Bartlett's Test of Sphericity: Sig. 0.000. Appropriate factor loadings are mentioned in brackets following individual items (table 5).

Table 5. Importance of certain aspects of work – Czech Republic (valid %)
"Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job."

Aspects of work	mentioned 1991	mentioned 1999	difference
Social aspects of work			
a useful job for society (.615)	51.8	32.4	**-19.4**
a respected job (.603)	44.5	35.2	-9.3
opportunity to meet people (.575)	44.0	34.0	**-10.0**
interesting job (.508)	64.6	56.7	-7.9
a responsible job (.455)	40.9	29.0	**-11.9**
good working environment (.508)	-	57.7	-
pleasant colleagues (.424)*	68.3	63.9	+0.6
Material aspects of work			
good pay (.557)	70.5	73.9	+3.4
good job security (.510)	54.6	52.2	-2.4
good working hours (.685)	38.8	31.0	-7.8
generous holidays (.667)	19.0	16.9	-2.1
not too much pressure (.459)	36.2	35.6	-0.6
Self-fulfilling aspects			
opportunity for achievement (.734)	48.1	38.1	**-10.0**
chances for promotion (.630)	25.3	24.3	-1.0
opportunity to use initiative (.661)	37.8	29.7	-8.1
opportunity to use one's abilities (.596)	67.9	56.1	-11.8

*) but .327 with regards to the second factor.
Source: [*European...* 1999].

It is evident that most respondents accentuate 'an interesting job', 'pleasant people to work with' and 'an opportunity to use one's abilities'. As well as this, they emphasise 'good pay' and 'good job security'. Contrary to earlier findings (research conducted in 1991), the importance of aspects related to work's social dimension and to personal self-fulfilment has declined. Conversely, material aspects of work have increased in importance (a job as a source of income and life security, working conditions). This development is due particularly to attitude changes among lower-class and lower-middle-class members.

Scheme 1. Links between individual attributes of work – the Czech Republic, 1999 (figures above the links represent relevant Pearson coefficient values)
"Here are some aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in a job."





Source: [*European...* 1999].

Linkage analysis in a correlation matrix (scheme 1) provides us with more detailed information about the links between individual factors. Nevertheless, these aggregate results are hardly more than illustrative since the importance attributed to individual work aspects depends on *gender*, *social class* and *age*. For instance, as far as age is concerned, respondents under the age of 29 are relatively more likely than older people to attach importance to 'good pay' (84.1% compared to 77.2% of respondents in the 40-49 age group and 70.6% of respondents in the 50-59 age group), 'possibilities of achievement' (51.5% compared to 35.6% of respondents in the 40-49 age group and 26.3% in the 50-59 age group), 'an interesting job' (66.1% compared to 58.0% in the 40-49 age group and 54.3% in the 50-59 age group), and 'an opportunity to use one's abilities' (62.1% compared to 57.8% in the 40-49 age group and 49.7% in the 50-59 age group). The effect of gender and social class is shown in the following scheme of the correspondence analysis results (see scheme 2). Both women and men from the upper and upper-middle class value the same aspects of their jobs (women are more likely to appreciate 'using one's abilities', 'opportunity to use initiative', 'chances for promotion', 'a responsible job', 'possibility of achievement', while men are more likely to value 'an interesting job', 'a respected job', 'a useful job' and 'meeting people'). Their choices differ from those expressed by women and men from the lower classes ('good working conditions', 'not too much pressure', 'generous holidays', 'good pay', 'good working hours'). Women and men from the lower-middle classes and middle classes make their own specific choices as well, with the difference between men and women being greater than in both the previous cases (women tend to appreciate 'a respected job', 'a useful job', 'pleasant people', possibly also 'an interesting job' and 'meeting people'; men value 'possibility of achievement', 'a responsible job', 'opportunity to use initiative', and 'chances for promotion' – in this respect, their preferences resemble those of higher-class-members – but also 'good pay', 'generous holidays', and 'not too much pressure' – and in this respect their preferences resemble those typical for the lower classes).

Scheme 2. Importance of certain aspects of work: Effect of gender and class
Czech Republic 1999



Source: [*European...* 1999].

Note: Correspondence data analysis was carried out with the use of the software LINDA (comparative factor analysis of profiles) designed by Jan Řehák (Institute for Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic).

The scheme makes it possible to determine in what way members of individual social classes differ in terms of the importance attached to various work aspects. The scheme also makes it clear that men and women within these classes differ in this respect as well – with the exception of the upper-middle class. A similar analysis can be carried out for individual European countries for which analogous data is available (the results of the correspondence analysis are shown in the following scheme).

Scheme 3. Importance of certain aspects of work – Europe 1999



Source: [*European*... 1999].

Note: Correspondence data analysis was carried out with the use of the software LINDA [comparative factor analysis of profiles) designed by Jan Řehák [Institute for Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic).

This scheme is somewhat complicated to interpret. However, it allows for the conclusion that in the post-communist countries greater emphasis is placed on *material* aspects, such as 'good working hours' and 'generous holidays', as well as on 'job security' and 'good pay'. This applies more to Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria (as well as to Spain and Portugal) than to the Czech Republic and Croatia (and it does not apply to Poland and Slovakia). The EU countries attach greater importance to *self-fulfilling* aspects, such as 'a responsible job', 'opportunity to use initiative', and 'possibility of achievement' on the one hand, and to 'pleasant people to work with' and 'meeting people' on the other hand (Denmark and Sweden; France and Ireland also value 'an interesting job' and 'good working hours').

Conclusions

All over Europe, work is the most important source of income in modern society. This, however, does not exhaust its social role and its role in the lives of individuals. Contrary to the simplified view that work is primarily a source of income and (according to the principle of meritocracy) thus also of social status and social inequalities, a rather different view has been emerging since the 1930s. This view highlights those aspects of work that reinforce self-fulfilment, self-respect and social bonds. Work is perceived as a way of being autonomous and creative, an instrument that enables individuals to express themselves, establish contacts with other people, and develop their skills. The orientation toward self-fulfilment stands against the instrumental orientation.[17] Besides, it is impossible to overlook the fact that work does not only determine one's nature of life (social status, life style and life chances), but also their standing in relation to the welfare state [Adriaamsens 1994]. All of this applies to Czech society, too, except for the fact that there is a third factor, 'social orientation', situated between the two mentioned above.

A factor analysis of work aspects identified three general factors formed on the basis of the differing importance attached to individual aspects by respondents. These factors could be labelled in the following way: first, an *'instrumental and trade-off'* factor (good pay and good job security; generous holidays, good working hours and not too much pressure; pleasant people to work with and good working conditions); second, a *'social'* factor (an interesting job, a useful job, a responsible job, a respected job and meeting interesting people); and third, a *'self-fulfilment'* factor (chances for promotion, possibility of achievement, opportunities to use initiative, opportunity to use one's abilities). The factor items do not have the same meaning in all circumstances. In accordance with a number of other conclusions [Halman 1996], the impact of age, social class and education proved decisive for work-value preferences in the Czech Republic in 1999. Lower-class members are more likely than the others to emphasise the instrumental side of work; lower-middle and middle-class members emphasise the social component and upper and upper-middle-class members the self-fulfilling function of work.[18] In the European context, these results correspond with greater emphasis on the instrumental dimension of work (with particularly strong importance attributed to 'good pay' and 'good job

[17]) According to Yankelowich [1985], this trend is reflected in the shift from instrumental towards expressive orientation in work values.

[18]) It is a pity that data on leisure-time activities and on certain taste preferences is not available at the same time, as this would make it possible to constitute a class space by combining all these aspects in a way similar to that used by Pierre Bourdieu [1994, 1999].

security') in poorer post-communist countries, as opposed to the greater emphasis on the self-fulfilment dimension of work in richer EU countries. In comparison with other European countries, the Czech population is less concerned with the social dimension of work ('a useful job', 'a responsible job'), and also with certain components of the self-fulfilment dimension of work ('chances for promotion', 'possibility of achievement' and 'opportunity to use initiative').

Even today, however, work is generally highly valued in Czech society (94% of respondents find it important and 53% even very important), as well as in the whole of Europe, not only for its instrumental character (source of income), but also as a social imperative (particularly in the middle class). Out of the surveyed dimensions of everyday life, only the family scored higher (it is very important for 85% of respondents). Both women and men, and members of individual social classes place great importance on work as a part of their life. A similar agreement was identified in opinions on leisure time (on average, leisure is important for 79% of respondents and very important for 21%), as the opposite of paid work. At the same time, the Czechs are relatively highly satisfied with their specific jobs. It is thus possible to say that the data do not indicate a decline in the importance of work.[19]

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[19]) After all, a number of authors have described the progressive importance of work (in terms of paid work). Wilson [1997], for instance, uses the example of the formation of an underclass in the United States to illustrate the role of job scarcity in this process and the associated changes in attitudes to work.

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Religion and Secularisation in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: Using an analysis of data from the *European Values Study* of 1991 and 1999 (together with data from the *International Social Survey Programme 1998 – Religion* from 1999, and data from other public opinion surveys), this article tries to suggest the scope of secularisation in the present Czech population. It documents how the process of structural differentiation leads to the declining significance of institutionalised religiousness and privatisation of religion, as well as to a growing belief among Czech citizens that it is inappropriate for churches to try to influence politics or the economy. The article also raises the issues of the number of believers and the forms of their beliefs. One of the results of our analysis is the finding that the Czech Republic might be the most secularised country in Europe at the present time.

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If we look at the theoretical reflections of the position of religion and religious values in Western Europe since World War II, we find that the most discussed themes have been the declining significance of tradition and secularisation. Religious institutions have lost their all-pervading influence over the lives of the majorities in these countries, the frequency of religious practice has dropped, traditional churches and denominations have declined in number and in their public impact, and hitherto common beliefs, rooted in religious (in this region Christian) worldview are also fading. This structural trend cannot be counterpoised even by a renewal of religious faith in small non-traditional communities. It is true that secularisation is a self-limiting process and that it supports religious innovation and import – i.e. the emergence and further existence of non-traditional sects and cults [Stark and Bainbridge 1996: 279-313]. However, at the same time it is equally true that these new religious organisations are not gaining economic, political and cultural significance [Wilson 1979, Hammond and Shibley 1993].

The situation in countries with communist governments was of course different given the fact that the declining significance of a long-term tradition of religious values and secularisation had been deliberately supported. Before 1989, all public functions of religion were suppressed on purpose, and religion itself was atheistically interpreted and devaluated as a mere 'anachronism'. A large range of priests were imprisoned or executed, church orders were abolished, church property was confiscated and the life of religious organisations was submitted to state surveillance. Religious life was pushed out of the public sphere into the private sphere of individual citizens or illegal structures. These practices naturally reaped results in the decline of religious beliefs and attitudes. Thus, according to some authors the development of the position of religion in post-communist

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countries cannot be viewed only through the narrow optics of secularisation but must always be completed by taking into account its peculiarities [see e.g. Tomka 1988].

Also specific is the situation after the fall of the regimes in Eastern Europe, which was often accompanied by a certain religious revival. In the Czech Republic, after the November 'velvet revolution', religion again became a firm part of public life and new expectations arose concerning the new place of religion in society. These expectations played themselves out on two levels. The first one was directed to the established traditional churches which have not, however, used the situation properly. They focused on their internal problems and in the following years reduced religious questions mainly to the issues of restitution of church property, of internal 'purification' from the 'co-operation' with the communist regime, or of 'purification' from 'parallel' church structures (the discussion on the legitimacy of the so-called hidden church). During these discussions, traditional churches did not represent themselves as structures capable of dynamic reactions to the rapidly changing conditions of a transforming Czech society.

The second level of expectations was not connected with the traditional form of institutionalised religiousness but rather, in the first years after November 1989, with a search for a kind of all-human and universalistic religion, the religion of tolerance and humanism. People did not seek any pre-defined religion but allowed themselves to be influenced by individual aspects of various religions, finding positive features in all religious trends. This side of religious expectation corresponded to the general atmosphere of the Czech (then Czecho-Slovak) society, which was marked by its openness, and the search manifested itself in many branches of life – from politics through economics to religion. Further development, however, confirmed the victory of utilitarian pragmatism that emphasised economically conceived material values. Thus, both levels of religious expectations from the beginning of the 1990s were not fulfilled, and the public significance of religion began to weaken.

This implies a certain return to the secularisation trends from the former era. The biggest impact on this development can be ascribed to the three following factors: a) the anti-Catholic attitudes of the Czech public (their influence can be traced back to Hussite movements, through the national revivalist movement and the resistance against the Hapsburg monarchy, to communist atheism); b) secularisation tendencies given by the structural differentiation of modern societies; c) the atheistic propaganda of the communist regime.

The Concept of Secularisation

Despite the fact that the post-communist countries have specific features, they cannot be excluded from the European region. The region can be characterised – as opposed to most other regions in the present world – by a considerable decline of religions, often interpreted within the concept of modernisation. According to classical sociological theories, the modernisation process is closely connected with the changing place of religion in the life of society. Among the key features of modernisation is the process of structural differentiation, in which the various spheres of society (such as politics, economics, law, family, religion etc.) become structurally separated and formulate rules of their own which they then follow. These rules are not transferable to other spheres.

Secularisation can be defined as a process in which religious institutions, action and consciousness lose their social significance. This process also includes the loss of

property and the political power of religious subjects, a shift from religious control to secular control, a decrease in the amount of time, energy and other means that people devote to supernatural things, and the replacement of religious commandments by demands corresponding to strictly rational, empirical and technical criteria [Wilson 1992: 149]. However, secularisation is not a process resulting in the decline or even demise of religion. It affects mainly traditional forms of religion and in particular those forms that are connected with a strongly institutionalised religiousness typified by churches. Secularisation can thus be viewed as a continuing decline of the power of religious organisations, which has another aspect – the growing popularity of non-church religiousness and non-traditional religious groups, a religious revival and experimentation [Stark and Bainbridge 1996: 293, 304].

This process is the result of a strong specialisation of religion that has limited religious life only to forms that take place in a religious organisation and have an institutional character. Official religious life was closed within churches, and thus separated from other spheres of society. The counter-reaction then consisted in the development of unofficial, strongly private, 'invisible' religiousness [Luckmann 1967].

This article is directed at the two accompanying phenomena of secularisation that have already been mentioned: the decline in the importance and power of religious organisations, and the privatisation of religion. We will try to address the question as to whether after 1989 the Czech Republic witnessed a process of unchurching and privatisation, by using empirical data gained from the two *European Values Studies* (EVS) carried out in 1991 and 1999, and by comparing and complementing them with the data of *The International Social Survey Programme 1998 – Religion* (ISSP) also from 1999 [see also Hamplová 2000], as well as data of the Institute for the Research of Public Opinion (IVVM).

Our interest in this article is focused on one fundamental question: Is it possible by means of using the mentioned surveys to determine the form and scope of secularisation in the Czech Republic? For this purpose, we understand secularisation as a process with two basic levels – institutional and behavioural.[1] Secularisation at the institutional level means structural differentiation (i.e. the structural emancipation of social spheres in modern society, which is – in societies of the Western type – connected to the process of the decline of the societal significance of traditional churches), and at the behavioural level refers to the privatisation of religion.

The results presented in this text, rather than being an integrated empirically proved concept, are initial hypotheses that try to show possible changes in the religious life of Czech citizens. These hypotheses have to be empirically tested in further (both quantitative and qualitative) research.

The Number of Believers, People with Denomination, Religious Practice

As one of the most basic indicators of religiousness we can take the religious self-declaration of respondents, i.e. declaring oneself as a religious person or as belonging to a religious denomination (or confession), belief in the existence of God (or some other

[1]) Secularisation has also a third level, which is the rationalisation of consciousness – i.e. the growth of trust into rationalistic explanations of the world and 'de-enchantment' of the world. This level will be mentioned here only marginally.

traditional beliefs) etc. Making a quick comparison, it is possible to claim that the Czech Republic is, according to these indicators, one of the most irreligious countries in Europe, along with the countries of former Eastern Germany, and with Estonia. In Western Europe, examples of the least religious countries could be Netherlands or Sweden.[2] However, to render a more animated picture, it is necessary to describe the measured values more concretely and to investigate possible trends.

From a certain point of view it can be said that religiousness in the Czech Republic is growing. Independent of the practice connected to a given denomination, an entire 40.4% of respondents regard themselves as religious people (believers),[3] while this number has increased a little when compared with the year 1991 (see Table 1).

Table 1. Respondent's sense of religiousness (in %)
"Apart from the fact of whether you attend religious services or not, could you describe yourself as:"

	1991	1999
Believers	37.4	40.4
Non-believers	47.4	45.4
Atheists	4.9	7.7
do not know	10.2	5.3
no answer	0.1	1.1

Source: EVS 1991 and EVS 1999

Conversely, a slight decrease can be documented in the number of people claiming to belong to some denomination (church) – in 1999 this was 33.5% of population, while in 1991 it was 39.4%. Logically, there must have been a decrease in the number of Christians, since they form 97.5% of all people belonging to denominations (the Roman-Catholic church itself counts for more than 84% of respondents from this group). Jan Spousta [1999: 74] documents a one-fifth decrease in the number of church members in our country on the basis of a cohort comparison of the age structure of people belonging to a denomination in 1991 and 1999. Although a kind of general religiousness has thus remained or has even grown, the religiousness measured by membership in denominations or by beliefs in concrete Christian dogmas seems to be declining.

Faith and denomination do not exactly overlap, which can also be supported by the fact that only 71% of people declaring themselves believers at the same time belong to some religious denomination. Before we come to explore the circumstances of this statement, it is necessary and useful to compare the groups of religious people with regard to their age structure. The tie between age and religious beliefs and attitudes is very strong as the demographic change of generations constitutes one of the most frequent causes of the decline (or transformation) of religiousness, mainly in its Christian and church-oriented forms. Equally, the data from the latest surveys in the Czech Republic confirm

[2]) If one compares the affirmative answers to the question about the belief in God (yes-no answer) from EVS 1999, the Czech Republic comes out as the least religious country of all, when we do not count former Eastern Germany [see also Štampach 1999: 66]

[3]) The Czech translation of this question uses the word 'believer' or 'believing person', not 'religious person', and therefore we shall use the former to respect the meaning difference these terms have in Czech.

that religion – especially Christian denominations – is a matter for older people belonging to the generations born in the first half of this century. This is also visible from the finding that in the group of religious/believers (or, in the group of people belonging to some denomination, or group of people believing in God, etc.), the average age is approximately ten years higher than in the group of non-believers. There is also a higher percentage of women among the groups of religious people in the Czech Republic, which can only be partly explained by their prevalence in the higher age categories.

Let us compare the answers to the question of the respondent's sense of religiousness, (variants used: believer, non-believer, atheist, DK) laid out in EVS in 1991 and 1999. Among groups of the same age, we clearly see that as the oldest generation dies, the religiousness measured by this question is decreasing in the older age groups, since the successive generations lack that high percentage of believers (see Table 2). At the same time, this religiousness grows among younger generations, mainly among people under 30 years of age. From the comparison of the same cohorts, which can illustrate the development over the years since 1991, one can see that the percentage of believers increased in all age groups born after 1943. The numbers of respondents in all the cohorts being not very high, we cannot overestimate the explanatory value of this comparison.

Table 2. Sense of religiousness (percentage of believers)
"Apart from the fact whether you attend religious services or not, could you describe yourself as:"

Comparison of same age groups				Development of the same cohorts			
1991		1999		1991		1999	
Groups	believers	Groups	believers	Cohorts	believers	Cohorts	believers
18-25	20.6	18-25	32.6			18-25	32.6
26-33	22.2	26-33	34.1	18-25	20.6	26-33	34.1
34-41	24.3	34-41	36.9	26-33	22.2	34-41	36.9
42-49	39.7	42-49	35.3	34-41	24.3	42-49	35.3
50-57	60.0	50-57	45.9	42-49	39.7	50-57	45.9
58-65	62.8	58-65	55.3	50-57	60.0	58-65	55.3
66+	74.5	66+	63.1	58-65	62.8	66+	63.1
Total	37.4	Total	40.4	66+	74.5		

Source: EVS 1991 and EVS 1999.

Nonetheless, part of the future trends will probably be the demise of religious denomination, in our country massively corresponding to church membership and religiousness. An almost dramatic decline can be observed, if one takes into account the percentage of people belonging to some denomination in 1991 and 1999, among groups of people older than 42 years of age (see Table 3). On the one hand, the comparison of the same cohorts can illuminate the extent to which these low numbers result from the exchange of generations. However, at the same time, it confirms the general decline, since even the slightly growing number of people belonging to denominations among younger groups cannot counterbalance the high church religiousness of older generations.

Table 3. Belong to a denomination at present time (yes-no answer)
"Do you belong to any religious denomination?"

Comparison of same age groups				Development of the same cohorts			
1991		1999		1991		1999	
Groups	YES	Groups	YES	Cohorts	YES	Cohorts	YES
18-25	14.2	18-25	19.5			18-25	19.5
26-33	20.1	26-33	18.8	18-25	14.2	26-33	18.8
34-41	21.5	34-41	24.9	26-33	20.1	34-41	24.9
42-49	43.9	42-49	25.9	34-41	21.5	42-49	25.9
50-57	58.8	50-57	38.7	42-49	43.9	50-57	38.7
58-65	62.1	58-65	53.5	50-57	58.8	58-65	53.5
66+	70.8	66+	56.5	58-65	62.1	66+	56.5
Total	33.5	Total	39.4	66+	70.8		

Source: EVS 1991 and EVS 1999.

As far as this indicator is concerned, the Czech Republic once again emerges as the least religious country in Europe (according to EVS from the year 1999). The only region with a lower level of religiousness, measured by this question, is former Eastern Germany, where this number is only 34%, and among the countries in Western Europe, the Netherlands coming close with its 45% of people with a denomination. Comparing this with other countries, in former Western Germany the number was approximately 86% (the number for the whole Germany is 60%), in Austria 87%, in Slovakia almost 77%, and in Poland 96%.

To complete the picture of self-declared religiousness and religious denomination, it is useful to present data stating the frequency (equally self-declared) of attendance at religious services. Although more than one-third of people claim to be believers (or claim to believe in God or belong to a religious denomination), only 11.5% of Czech citizens can be regarded as regular church-goers, attending services at least once a month. Those who go to church on a weekly basis count for less than 7%. This percentage is naturally higher among older people – among people older than sixty years of age, 16% attend religious services at least once a week. Although these indicators also make the Czech Republic the least religious European country, the decline in the attendance of church and religious services does not correspond to the decline in the number of people belonging to religious denominations. Jan Spousta explains this fact by stating that the difference is caused by lukewarm church-members who do not claim their denomination any more [Spousta 1999: 77].

To answer the question of how many people tie their religiousness to practice and how many believers (or members of denominations) are not among the lukewarm ones, it is possible to look at the percentage of regular attendants at religious services in relevant groups. One discovers that the number of more or less regular church-goers is 28% in the group of believers and over 34% in the group of people with Christian denominations[4] (in 1991, this was 30% of believers and 28.5% of Christians). The percentage of weekly

[4]) For illustration we choose Christian denominations, and not all, since the form of the question (in Czech: 'God's service') suits them best. Apart from this, people of Christian denominations comprise 97.5% of all people with denomination (in 1991, it was almost 99%), and thus we shall use Christians in our comparisons.

regular attendants is then approximately 17% of believers and one-fifth of the Christians. It can be stated at the same time that among Christians the percentage of weekly churchgoers is not declining (on the contrary, the lukewarm ones fall away). The lower frequency of attendance at religious services among self-declared believers might correspond to the decreasing number of people belonging to denominations in this group.

The description of religiousness cannot be concluded without taking into account the place of religion in society. We can at least look at the answers to the question in which the respondents had to express the importance of selected areas of society in their own lives. If we construct a hypothetical scale from the results of these answers, religion is at the very end of this scale of importance. (The order would be the following: first is family, then work, friends, leisure time, politics, and religion. In this succession, our republic does not differ from other countries – the only difference is the very low level of the importance of religion.) Religion was considered to be important in the lives of 19.4% of people, and unimportant in the lives of 79.2% (in 1991, the ratio was 26.5% to 72.3%). At the same time there was a slight decrease in the number of people who considered it very important, and a remarkable increase in the number of those who considered it not important at all. This might be a reflection of the demise of the hopes and expectations that had been put into religion after November 1989.

Since 1991, the general trust in churches (or the church) decreased. Although churches score just immediately after the educational system (and before government, parliament and business), the prevailing attitude towards them is a lack of trust. Czech citizens also started to lose their initial opinion that churches are dealing with problems other than spiritual ones (such as moral, social or family problems) in people's lives. While in 1989, a whole range of people were sympathetic to church religiousness and regarded religion as an important part of social life, the following years – in which discussions on the restitution of church property also took place – have not confirmed this favourable trend. Church belongs among the institutions (after the Senate and the House of Representatives) in which people show the least trust (according to both value distributions and means in EVS 1999).

The methodologically problematic identification of religion in its church form is evident also from the results of research study ISSP 1998, carried out in 1999. Only 9.4% of people in this survey clearly stated that they regard themselves as religious persons living according to church doctrines, while 28% admitted that they are religious in their own way (26.5 % could not decide and 32.9% declared themselves as non-religious). The mentioned data indicate that only a relatively small part of believers take into account the official form of their religion, which might document a declining institutionalised (church) control over the content of religious belief. This fact can be explained by the changing situation of religion in a modern, functionally differentiated society, in which churches have lost their dominant position in questions of worldview interpretations, and institutionalised religion has become 'just' one societal sub-system among others. The results of this demonopolisation of religion are religious pluralism and its companion religious competition [Berger 1967: 137]. In the market contest of religious ideas, isolated and detraditionalised elements of various religions are offered in such a way that they can be individually consumed in privacy. Their hybridisation is an interrelated phenomenon. As a result, we have 16.5% of Czech Christians believing in reincarnation (EVS 1999), which is a concept foreign to the official doctrines of Christian churches.

The situation in other countries is similar, when 'reincarnation is integrated into the belief system of 20 percent of practising Catholics in Belgium' [Dobbelaere 1993: 24].

Form of Religiousness

Self-declaration of faith or denomination, as well as the proclamation of ritual behaviour (religious practice) are of course not the only measures of human religiousness. It is equally relevant to ask about the form of belief and other views and attitudes that are (either traditionally or newly) connected with religiousness. These latter indicators, however, bear a close relationship to the former ones [Dobbelaere 1993: 21], and thus can serve as a useful complement.

As an introduction to the forms of beliefs, we would like to point to a couple of illustrative figures. While in 1991 more than 85% of the people who declared themselves as believers claimed to belong to some religious denomination, by 1999 their number decreased (as we noted earlier) to less than 71%. The rest, 29% of believers, can hypothetically be considered (on the basis of their subjective view of themselves as believers) to represent some non-traditional religiousness without denomination. To complete this, we can add that, in 1991, only 81% of people of Christian denominations regarded themselves as believers, and in 1999 this ratio slightly increased to 85%. This could correspond to the thesis according to which after the November revolution of 1989, many 'formal' Christians (i.e. people who derive their denomination from the act of being baptised) claimed their denomination but, later on, failed to claim it any more [see also Spousta 1999]. The groups of believers and Christians can be used when we want to document some shifts in religious views and attitudes.

Taking into account the predominance of Christianity in the European region, it becomes relevant to explore the opinions of the Czech population on the existence and image of God. The 1999 EVS survey (using a yes-no question) has shown that an entire one-third of respondents believe in the existence of God, while one-half does not believe, and around 15% of people cannot answer the question. A similar number of believers could be derived from the ISSP 1998 survey, according to which – answering another, more differentiated question – over 30% claimed they believe in God (even if sometimes with doubts). These figures also do not differ very much from those acquired in the 1991 EVS survey. What changes is the form of God in which people believe (the image they have in mind. If we turn to EVS 1999, only 18.5% of people who said they believed in God state in another question that they believe in a personal God, while more than two-thirds of people from this group incline towards the existence of some spirit or life force.[5] The following table is a good illustration of the growing complexity of contemporary religious life.

[5]) When interpreting this question as speaking about the 'form of God', there is a need for a certain caution. It does not state anything like this explicitly (the question is: *"Which of the statements is closest to your beliefs?"*), it only implies that the respondent is choosing a form of God.

Table 4. Statement of respondent's belief (in %)
"Which statement is closest to your belief?"

Group	Existence of personal God	Existence of spirit or life force	Really do not know what to think	I do not think there is God or any life force	DK or NA
1991 – all people	11.0	35.8	25.4	22.4	5.2
1991 – believers	26.0	44.2	19.3	5.1	4.6
1991 – Christians	24.2	41.5	22.1	8.1	4.1
1999 – all people	6.3	48.5	20.2	21.5	3.5
1999 – believers	15.0	67.0	11.4	4.7	1.9
1999 – Christians	18.1	58.9	14.5	5.9	2.6
1999 – believers in God	18.5	68.7	9.0	2.5	1.6

Source: EVS 1991 and EVS 1999.

We can see that only 6.3% of respondents (in 1991 it was 11%) identify with the belief in the existence of a personal God. The ratio is, naturally, higher among believers or Christians (it is 15% and approximately 18%, respectively). However, even among these groups, the belief in a personal God has declined since 1991 (at that time, this statement was chosen by 26% of believers and by approximately 24% of Christians). The remarkable weakness of this belief in our country can be confirmed by the data from other countries, where even within the whole set of respondents a much larger number of people identified with the belief in a personal God – it was 23.5% in the Netherlands, around 29% in Germany (with 36.7% for former West Germany, and only 20.5% for former East Germany), 31% in Austria, 34% in Slovakia and a total of 82% in Poland [see also Dogan 1998: 78-79]. In the Czech Republic, such a high percentage of people believing in a personal God cannot be found even among the age groups of people over 65. On the other hand, one does not find a high percentage of people who do not believe in any God or life force – its only a little above one-fifth (21.5%), while, for example, in former East Germany, this group represents more than one-half of the population (53%). Therefore, the distribution of answers to this question could indicate a high extent of privatisation of religion in the Czech Republic, or a weakened influence of the education of believers in churches and other religious groups, where this traditional belief can be mutually strengthened.

Quite an interesting group from this point of view is comprised by the 29% of believers (according to their subjective categorisation) who do not belong to any denomination. A total of 78% of them assumed the existence of a spiritual or life force.[6] These people also fail to hold other traditional (i.e. Christian) European religious dogmas. Although there are many of them who believe in the existence of God and life after death (in the first case, over 52% people said yes, in the second, over 42% of them), they usually do not believe in the existence of heaven or hell. Equally, the attendance of religious services among them is minimal, which again supports the thesis that regular church attendance is closely connected with the belief in a personal God and with other traditional Christian beliefs [Dobbelaere 1993: 21].

[6]) Only one respondent from this group of 223 people expressed an opinion on the existence of a personal God; 13% did not know what to think, and 6.4% did not believe in any divine, spiritual or life force.

Thus, we come to the question of how strong these traditional Christian dogmas in the entire set of respondents are, or how strong they could be (as a result) in the Czech population. For this purpose, we constructed an index of Christian orthodoxy (using the questions about the belief in God, life after death, hell, heaven and sin [see Halman et al. 1999: 148]) that has values from 0 to 1, from the absence of faith in any of these items up to belief in all five of them. We discovered that the mean of this index is 0.288, which makes the Czech Republic the second least orthodox country in Europe (just after former East Germany with the value 0.172). Just for illustration, in the Netherlands the mean value of this index is 0.382, in Austria 0.488, in Slovakia 0.563 and in Poland 0.756. However, one can get a better image from the following table (Table 5), which presents the successive categories of the constructed orthodoxy index in selected countries.

Table 5. Index of Christian Orthodoxy: Percentage of people in successive categories
(zero: belief in 0 items, very weak: belief in 1 item, weak: belief in 2 items, medium: belief in 3 items, strong: belief in 4 items, very strong: belief in all 5 items)

	zero	very weak	weak	medium	strong	very strong
Czech Republic	37.2	25.4	15.6	8.7	4.2	8.9
Germany (former East)	58.5	12.6	5.4	3.1	1.2	7.7
Germany (former West)	16.4	15.7	13.8	8.9	5.7	15.2
Netherlands	27.6	21.1	17.4	11.7	11.1	11.2
Austria	11.8	22.1	19.7	17.2	15.2	14.0
Slovakia	17.3	13.2	16.4	11.2	7.9	34.0
Poland	2.7	9.0	13.3	10.1	12.3	52.6

Source: EVS 1999.

Of course, a different level of orthodoxy will be found in the groups of people who claimed to belong to some of the Christian denominations – the mean value in the group of Czech Christians is 0.536, and a high percentage of them falls into categories of strong or very strong orthodoxy (almost 33% together). However, the ratio of the orthodox believers among Czech Christians is still lower than, for instance, among the whole population of Poland. The belief in some of the offered dogmas is rather low. Czech Christians usually believe in the existence of sin (78.5% of them) and God (73.3%), while the rest of the beliefs – in life after death (47.4%), in heaven (40.6%), or even hell (28% only) – are not held by a majority of them any more.

Structural Differentiation

The basic structural trend of religious life in modern society is the process of structural differentiation, which also includes the decreasing importance of a firm denominational tie to big traditional religious organisations typified by churches. The consequences of this process are reflected both in the individual lives of citizens and in the life of society as a whole.

Individual citizens no longer feel a strong necessity to be tied to a church (of any religious traditions) and to participate in its activities. According to the 1999 EVS survey, only 2.8% of people performed some unpaid work for a church. The frequency of attendance at religious services can also serve as an illustration of the above-mentioned trend –

only 6.8% of people visit church at least once a week; 4.7% once a month; 13.2% several times a year, usually on the occasion of some religious holiday; 9.1% go once a year; and a total of 56.9% claim that they never visit religious services (the question excluded the occasions of weddings, burials, etc. when people go to church more out of family reasons). In comparison with 1991, there has been a slight decrease in the frequency of attendance (see Table 6).

Table 6. Attendance of religious services (in %)

	1991	1999
more than once a week	2.1	1.8
once a week	6.3	5.0
once a month	3.4	4.7
Christmas/Easter day	13.3	10.6
on other specific holidays	4.0	2.6
once a year	6.3	9.1
less often	11.3	8.0
never, practically never	53.2	56.9

Source: EVS 1991 and EVS 1999.

Thus, among those who attend religious services are predominantly people who visit church only on the occasion of some holiday or perhaps to secularise important passages in life, such as marriage, birth, death, etc. However, when people had to express how important they regard religious services on these mentioned occasions, they claimed them less important than in the year 1991. Today, the religious service at birth is important for 38.2% (in 1991 it was 44%), at marriage for 37.2% (in 1999 it was 45.9%), and at death for 46% of people (in 1991 it was 51.7%).

The process of structural differentiation (or secularisation) is clearly manifested in the opposition of citizens towards church influence over political or economic life. Only 5.9% of people agree with the opinion that a politician who does not believe in God is not suitable for public office, and only 8.5% think that it would be better for the Czech Republic if more religious persons held public offices. An absolute majority of citizens agree with the statement that churches should not influence voting behaviour (78.3%) or the decisions of the government (71.3%). At the same time, over 51% of people think that churches have influence over contemporary political life.

Churches are being pushed out of public and political life into the sphere of charity. To illustrate this, let us point to the fact that while 69% of Czech citizens in 1999 regarded the existence of churches to be necessary or useful for the care of old and sick people (in 1993 it was 78%), only 37% of them (or 47% in 1993) thought that they are necessary or useful in accomplishing the good education of children (data from IVVM surveys). These data are of a high explanatory value, since the care of the old or the sick (who represent groups of 'inferior' individuals from the point of view of an economically oriented society) does not take place in households (i.e. the intimate sphere of everyday life), but is delegated to special institutions.

Other indicators of the decreasing social importance of churches are the opinions of citizens related to the church property. We can gain a good picture if we compare the opinions of people on financial self-dependence of churches with the opinion on the return of church property. According to the IVVM survey in 1997, a total of 48% of Czech

citizens were convinced of the fact that churches should be financially self-reliant (one year before, this opinion was held by 52% of people), while only 8% of people would agree with returning all of the property that the churches owned in the time of the First Republic (i.e. before World War II), and 19% of them would agree with returning the property held by churches before 1948. Further, 25% of people would return only something, and 35% were convinced that churches should not be returned anything at all. At the same time, the last opinion is not held only among non-believers – every sixth believer also expressed the opinion that nothing should be returned, as well as an entire one-third of people who were not believers but conceded the existence of God.

Therefore, if citizens do not incline towards the restitution of church property, but at the same time want churches to be financially self-sufficient (and all this with the absence of any tax advantages for churches), then there might exist an unwillingness to concede bigger economic influence to religious organisations. Only 3% of people think that churches should be totally financed by the state, and a further 35% agree with the opinion that state financing should represent a certain part. However, those who agree with state support want it to be used for charity purposes (25%), or for the renewal (21%), or for the upkeep (21%) of existing church buildings and other monuments.

There is an obvious conclusion to be made from the mentioned trends – people would not like to see rich and influential churches, but they would leave to them all the care of the old, the sick or the poor (or the care of cultural heritage).

Summary

The data gained in EVS (and in other mentioned surveys) document the scope and nature of the secularisation of Czech society. At a structural level, it can be supported by presenting the opinions of respondents concerning the separation of religion (or better, churches) from the spheres of political and economic life in the Czech Republic. These views are accompanied by a relatively low level of trust in church institutions (only 20% approximately), by the belief that churches do not deal with social or family problems, and by a low frequency of attendance at religious services. Hand in hand with the decrease in the social significance of institutionalised forms of religion, or the decrease in the social importance of churches and other plausibility structures, comes a decrease of their social control over the forms of faith. The consequence of this is a privatisation of religion, also manifested by the deviance from traditional forms of belief – which can be clearly observed in the decrease of belief in a personal God [cf. Dobbelaere 1995]. Similar conclusions can also be found in other studies [i.e. results from ISSP 1998, see Hamplová 2000].

The significance of these findings deepens with an international comparison. It can be stated that in all indicators of religiousness (such as the orthodoxy index, frequency of attendance at religious services, ratio of believers, etc.), the Czech Republic shows the second lowest or even the lowest scores (Tables 5 and 7). The image of the Czech Republic as the most secularised country in Europe can be mostly confirmed (when the region of former East Germany no longer counts as a separate state).

Table 7. Comparison of several indicators of religiousness among selected countries (in %)

	believers	people with denomination	believers in God	Attending religious services at least once a week
Czech Republic	40.4	33.5	33.1	6.8
Germany (former East)	27.6	33.9	30.2	5.8
Germany (former West)	58	85.6	69	15.8
Netherlands	60.7	44.9	58.0	13.9
Austria	75.0	87.0	82.7	22.7
Slovakia	76.7	76.8	75.9	40.5
Poland	91.8	95.7	96.2	58.7

Source: EVS 1999.

This fact can to a large degree be explained by the historic development of the Czech state. It should be noted that in other post-communist countries (with the exception of former East Germany) such dramatic declines in the social significance of religion did not occur. We can assume that our history created the hidden potential for secularisation (which need not be a specific feature of the Czech Republic) which fully materialised only in the atmosphere of state atheism. The data from the earlier censuses conducted in this century document that there had been a high and relatively stable number of believers/church members in years 1921 (92.82%), 1930 (92.19%) and even in 1950 (93.9%), and only a low percentage of people without denomination. However, the data from 1991 show a completely different picture of religiousness – 43.91% of believers and 39.92% of people without denomination [see *Nábož enské...* 1995].

The analysis of quantitative data from EVS and other surveys has revealed the need for further quantitative and qualitative research of religion in the Czech Republic which would focus on the non-institutionalised diffuse religiousness of a privatised type (both within the traditional forms of religions, as well as in connection with the emergence and existence of new religious movements, which have a low statistical significance but a high social impact). It is also necessary to verify some methodologically important aspects of the research of religion under the specific conditions of the Czech Republic, such as varying connotations of the terms 'religion', 'religious person', 'religious belief', 'believer', etc. This clarification would be useful for further adequate use of standardised questionnaire forms within the international research of religion and religious values.

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Value Change and Demographic Behaviour in the Czech Republic*

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Abstract: The deep structural changes witnessed in the Czech Republic in the past decade, that is, the establishment of a democratic political regime and market economy, and the transformation of the social security system, could not have steered clear of the everyday life and behavioural patterns of the Czech population. One of the areas that have been profoundly affected is demographic behaviour. Marriage and fertility rates in particular have decreased to an unprecedented level. The main thesis of this paper is that the demographic changes in the Czech Republic result from a condensed progress of the second demographic transition, which was triggered off by a value change in young age cohorts born in the 1970s and early 1980s. The new value orientations of these cohorts, which were latently present even before the political change, manifested themselves fully in the free environment of the new democratic society. The paper will present evidence of the value changes by utilising data from a comparative sociological research titled the European Values Study which was carried out in Europe in 1990/91 and in 1999. It is argued that the coincidence of value and demographic changes can hardly be regarded as accidental.
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1. Introduction

The political, economic and social changes witnessed in the Czech Republic in the past decade are so deep that they could easily be labelled as paradigmatic ones. The establishment of a democratic political regime and market economy, and the transformation of the social security system, could hardly have steered clear of the Czech population's everyday life and behaviour.

One of the spheres of behaviour where the depth of change is easily measured and therefore well documented is demographic behaviour. Czech demographic vital statistics reveal that changes in fertility, marriage and mortality patterns are as profound as those which occurred in the Western countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the main thesis of this paper is that the demographic phenomenon witnessed in the Czech Republic is in fact a second demographic transition (SDT) started in the mid-1990s. Its causes – as in the West [see e.g. van de Kaa 1987, 1994, 1997; Lesthaeghe 1995] – can be attributed to deep changes in the value preferences of the new age cohorts. While in the Western countries it was the cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s who were the bearers of the SDT, in the Czech Republic it is the cohorts born in the mid 1970s and early 1980s.

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Among the main features of the Czech demographic trends, one that has been much discussed in the media, belongs a gradual, year by year decrease in the number of births in 1992. The Czech fertility rate belongs among the lowest ones in the world nowadays. It seems as if kids have been disappearing from the Czech social space. Many Czech politicians and some demographers have already expressed their anxiety about the situation and have even called for action – for the introduction of pro-natal population policy measures.

The causes of the currently low Czech fertility (and low nuptiality as well) have been sought by many Czech analysts, see e.g. Rychtaříková [1996, 1999, 2000], Kuchařová and Tuček [1999], Fialová, Hamplová, Kučera and Vymětalová [2000], Možný and Rabušic [1999] and Rabušic [1996, 1997]. Their views differ, but basically they form an axis, of which one pole is made by explanations based on the hypothesis of the accelerated second demographic transition, and the other pole is made by explanations stressing economic hardships which stem from the transformation of Czech society. Advocates of the first approach, myself included, maintain that the primary cause is the deep value change among the young cohorts. Advocates of the second approach (Rychtaříková) believe that the main cause of changes in marriage and fertility rates are factors of economic crisis: unemployment of the young, the decreased level of social security and the decreased level of the living standard. They regard therefore the behavioural change as a pragmatic reaction to the high costs of transformation.

No camp has managed to bring persuasive evidence so far. However, it is quite clear that the debate follows the interpretative demographic transition scheme established by Jean-Claude Chesnais [1992, quoted by Rychtaříková 1999]. Chesnais showed that the first demographic transition evolved within the framework of modernisation whose three main components were technological change, structural change (higher living standard, the establishment of social security, increased education) and cultural change (principles of democracy and equality, secularisation, personal freedom). Later on, Van de Kaa [1994] applied this view also to demographic changes recorded during the 1970s and the 1980s, which he labelled as the second demographic transition. According to Van de Kaa [1999], in both demographic transitions cultural changes, i.e. changes of value structures and of people's ideas, played the key role.

From this point of view the Czech debate is carried on in the dimension of structural versus cultural aspects of demographic change. I advocate – without underestimating the importance of structural aspects – factors of culture. Among them I regard especially value change as the primary cause of the current low level of Czech fertility.

I shall argue in this paper that the current Czech demographic transition is a logical, necessary and even unavoidable effect of the Czech 'velvet revolution' and of the subsequent transformation process. It is logical and unavoidable because – as I shall show – its protagonists are the young age groups born in the late 1970s and early 1980s whose value orientations are quite different from those of the older generations. Owing to the conditions of collapsing socialism in the second half of the 1980s and the freedom inherent in the new social order after 1989, these young age groups have gained a totally new experience incomparable to that of previous generations. Their value patterns concerning marriage, the family and children have been changing, and have started to resemble those typical of Western democracies.

It is thus no coincidence that the 1989 'velvet revolution' was triggered off by the generation born in the late 1960s and socialised during the 1970s. These young people who were brought up in a milieu of relative economic affluence[1] developed new *value structures* and *value preferences* that led them finally to break the communist regime. They paved the way for their followers. While this cohort's values brought about a political revolution, the values of the next cohort, born in the mid-1970s, brought about a demographic one.

My aim is to show the depth of changes which have occurred in the value structures of the Czech population with regard to marriage and family formation and which have had – in my view – a strong impact on recent demographic development. By stressing a value change as the prime cause of a demographic change I am pursuing the line of reasoning advocated for example by Preston [1986], Van de Kaa [1987 and 1998], Kirk [1988] and Lesthaeghe [1995]. The main method I apply is a cohort approach to survey data gathered in the two waves of the *European Values Study* (1991 and 1999). The presentation of evidence showing value change in the youngest Czech age cohorts will enable me to explain the Czech demographic trends.

2. Values

The concept of 'values' belongs among concepts that are used quite often in the social sciences, but as well as many of the other concepts it lacks a universally accepted definition. For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to use the same simple concept of a value as is proposed by Van Deth [1995].[2] I assume here that individual behaviour is determined by motives and intentions which are shaped by values and value orientations. Individuals' values themselves are influenced by the social environment in which they live, especially during their formative years. Values are perceived by Van Deth and Scarbrough [1995: 46] as "conceptions of the desirable which are not directly observable but are evident in moral discourse and relevant to the formulation of attitudes". Among the attitudes, a process of patterning takes place. Meaningful patterns of attitudes are called 'value orientations' by Van Deth and Scarbrough. By means of measuring them we can identify the intentions of human behaviour – and not only that. Hechter, Ranger-Moore, Jasso and Horne [1999: 425] maintain that values do matter, and they even suggest that "values can be incorporated into explanations of macrosocial phenomena".

Values, as experts agree, are relatively stable entities. However, some value clusters can change, and they gradually do – were it not the case, no social change would be possible. In this context, the concept of cohorts is important. Some thirty-five years ago, Ryder [1965] speculated about a cohort, i.e. a group of people who have a certain vital event in common, and social change. He stated that due to the fact that each cohort established new contacts and encountered a specific social heritage, cohort members shared similar behavioural patterns. Thus, in his view, they permit social change. Later on, Riley [1987] expressed the view that cohorts actually contributed to social change on the basis

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[1]) They were often called *Husák's children* after the communist leader Gustáv Husák, who with his comrades tried to increase the subjective average living standard in the 1970s by 'investing' into consumer durables instead of the Czech infrastructure in a desperate effort to make the Czechs forget the Prague Spring of 1968.

[2]) Van Deth presents a comprehensive review of the concept in one of the chapters of the quoted book [see Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995].

of a "principle of cohort influence on social change" [ibid.: 4]. Since cohorts are socialised under new social conditions they introduce new patterns of behaviour, many of which become new social norms. Van de Kaa [1997] goes even further. Criticising Ryder for a 'dangerously narrow' approach, he claims that "cohorts do not only permit change; they create the options succeeding cohorts have to choose from" [ibid.: 3]. By making choices, people group themselves, according to Van de Kaa, into 'mental cohorts' whose characteristic feature is that "they have acquired a similar approach to life. They share a common outlook and tend to make choices (stereo) typical for that mental cohort" [ibid.: 4]. In my view, the concept of mental cohorts is highly relevant for understanding the abrupt changes in demographic behaviour of the young Czech age cohorts.

Values are constructed and deconstructed, cultures and social groups influence individual behaviour, but at the same time individual value preferences and corresponding behaviour do influence group values. The pace of value change has become faster in contemporary modern societies due to the pervasive influence of mass communication and mass media – the media bring contents of behaviour to large segments of society, thus allowing for greater homogenisation of attitudes and value patterns [Preston 1986] and for a more rapid formation of mental cohorts.

Values are guides of behaviour, including demographic behaviour. Political and economic changes in the Czech Republic have brought about new concepts of the role of individuals in society, of their rights and obligations, and of individual goals and aspirations. Many of them have had a profound impact on demographic behaviour, especially on the establishment of new marriages and on fertility.

3. The values shift and demographic change

The Czech Republic, as well as the other countries of the former socialist block, used to be characterised by a unique extensive population regime which differed to a great deal from that established in modern democratic societies. The adjective 'high' was typical for this regime [Vereš 1991]: high marriage rate, high abortion rate, high birth-rate (often realised at the very beginning of one's reproductive period), high divorce rate and high mortality rate. It can be maintained, I believe, that this state had a general and complex cause, and that was the very existence of totalitarian socialism.

The Czech Republic, which from a demographic perspective used to belong to a regime west of the Hajnal's line prior to the totalitarian era, shifted gradually toward the Eastern European regime after February 1948. The mechanism of this shift is apparent. The deeply rooted mechanisms of socialism caused the family to assume a crucial position in the life of an individual, given the social capital (connections) it provided. Socialism, despite being governed by 'the avant-garde force of the working class' and its 'vanguard – the Communist party' who were supposed to guide it to a new modernity, represented in fact a steep regression back to traditional society, where the decisive role pertained less to an individual and an individual's performance than to family networks, clientele and patrons who facilitated the barter trade of services and commodities.

Since every single newly born person used to become the property of the communist state from his/her school-days, there was little leeway for free and independent activ-

ity.[3] Boredom was the rule in Czechoslovakia and thus the only authentic act left at the discretion of young people was entering into marriage and giving birth to some two or three children. And so they did. This practice did not change until the outset of the social transformation in the early 1990s when the boredom was (hopefully) over once for all, and the process of establishing a new state and rebuilding capitalism was initiated. It is no coincidence that we have been recording sharp changes in demographic trends since the early 1990s.

3.1. Changes in the marriage rate

Childbearing in the Czech Republic usually follows after entering into marriage. Even though there has been a continuous increase in the proportion of children born out of wedlock in the 1990s (from 10% in 1991 to 21% in 1999), the majority of Czech children are still born to married spouses. The level of the marriage rate is thus regarded as one of the crucial factors in determining the current fertility rate. Czech demographers even assume that unless it increases the birth rate is not likely to increase either [Kučera 2000]. If this is the case and marriage must still be considered the first step to starting a family, it can be deduced from these data that hesitation about marriage results in fact from low fertility aspirations.[4]

There has really been quite a clear-cut change in the process of marriage formation. The number of marriages has been on a continuous decrease in recent years (see figure 1), the age marriage pattern has been changing (see figure 2) and the average age at first marriage has been increasing.[5]

[3]) The communist government used to determine young people's life paths, for example, by shamelessly imposing a quota on the number of children who were to attend vocational schools after having completed elementary education. Access to secondary schools was limited, quota on admission to grammar schools were very low. The ratio was strict: 60% must have attended vocational schools, 40% other secondary schools.

[4]) This would mean, as Hans Joachim Hoffmann-Nowotny [1987] interestingly puts it, that the dropping marriage rate is not a cause but a result of the declining willingness to start a family. If this is the case it would mean that the causal relationship between the marriage and fertility rates is converse to what Czech demographers assume: low fertility aspirations lead to a low marriage rate.

[5]) While in the course of the 1980s the average age of single brides was about 21.7 years according to one-way marriage tables, and the age of grooms was 24.5 years, it increased to 26.2 and 28.5 years, respectively, by 1999. In Western Europe, both figures are still two years higher on average.

Figure 1. Crude marriage rate in the Czech Republic, 1950-1999
(number of marriages per 1,000 population)



Source: Vital Statistics by the Czech Statistical Office.

Figure 2. Never married women as a share of all women, Czech Republic 1991-1995



Source: [Kučera and Šimek 2000].

The Czech marriage pattern has shifted from Hajnal's Eastern European marriage regime to the Western one. Why has the marriage rate dropped so suddenly? As expressed in my central thesis, the answer must be sought in a value shift. A very important structural factor appears significant for Czech demographic behaviour: the establishment of a

democratic, liberal and permissive society has made individualised and free decision-making possible. Large segments of the Czech adult population – especially the young ones – have become persuaded that they have a great deal of control over their lives (see table 1). The importance of individual development is stressed by the majority of population (see table 2).

Table 1. Percentage of people who feel that they *have a great deal of free choice and control over their lives* by age in 1991 and 1999

Age groups	1991	1999
18-25	47	55
26-33	51	60
34-41	43	56
42-49	37	51

Note: Only age groups within the period of demographic fertility are shown here.

Source: *European Values Study* data file, the Czech Republic 1991 and 1999.

Table 2. Percentage of people who think that *if greater emphasis was placed on the development of the individual, it would be a good thing*

Age groups	1991	1999
18-25	87	86
26-33	89	90
34-41	86	88
42-49	88	87

Note: Only age groups within the period of demographic fertility are shown in the table.

Source: *European Values Study* data file, the Czech Republic 1991 and 1999.

A great many young Czechs thus find themselves with the power to decide their own fate. In addition to the newly opened broad opportunities for exercising one's natural desire for authenticity, this caused the act of entering into marriage and starting a family – formerly the only act of authenticity – to lose its exclusivity. Therefore marriage ceased to be attractive for a significant part of young Czechs. A certain part of society (approximately 20% in the youngest age groups of the adult population) even considers marriage an obsolete institution (see figure 3).

Figure 3. *Marriage is an outdated institution*, Czech Republic 1991 and 1999. Share of respondents who agreed with the statement by age groups



Note: Only fertile age groups are presented, older age groups are omitted.
Source: *European Values Study* data file, Czech Republic 1991 and 1999.

These value shifts are further reinforced by factors of a structural nature, with which we are familiar owing to international literature which coped with this problem as late as two decades ago. An original explanation scheme of the theory of behaviour in the marriage market and of the rise of unmarried cohabitation – which in many countries accounts for the decrease in the marriage rate – was proposed by Garry Becker [1981]. Let us summarise his main points. Becker grounded his explanation in the economic exchange theory. He started from the assumption that marriage is in fact a business transaction for men and women – they marry because both of them gain more by establishing a marriage (making business) than by remaining single (not trading). In order to maximise profit from marriage, a partner with complementary qualities and skills is usually sought in the marriage market. However, this mechanism changed in the 1970s. Becker suggests that in a situation when women's participation in the labour market is on the increase, and so are their earnings and economic independence, the overall gain associated with marriage decreases. It follows that people have become rather reluctant to seek a match (a business transaction) and it takes them longer to find one. Becker thus believes the growing economic participation and independence of women to be the key factors that lead to postponing marriage (and help to undermine the stability of marriage). According to Westoff [1983], a situation in which it no longer holds that women offer childbearing and household service to a husband in exchange for protection and economic status (derived from the husband's status), marriage loses its rationale.

Also, Oppenheimer [1988] applied the exchange theory to explain new kinds of bonds. She maintains that their rise is related less to the conditions in the labour market than those in the marriage market. Women's higher education, higher employment rate and growing financial independence have pushed up the norm of a match's quality and have altered the image of a *minimally acceptable match*. From this perspective, it is pos-

sible, according to Oppenheimer, to perceive the protracted dating period and unmarried cohabitation as an expression of more selective matching.

All these mechanisms obviously could hardly work in the era of egalitarian real socialism. Firstly, there was no real labour market, because getting a job as well as positions within the occupational structure were determined by a number of non-market factors (one of the most important being the loyalty to communist rulers). Secondly, setting up a family relatively early in the course of life – with the least delay possible – was a reasonable coping strategy.

The fact that marriage is no longer a necessary condition for regular sexual activity in contemporary society has also contributed fundamentally to the decreased value of marriage.[6] At the same time, marriage itself is not a necessary qualification for living together with a partner either since has been replaced – particularly in the period of searching for a stable match – by unmarried cohabitation. Unmarried cohabitation does exist in the Czech Republic. The first Czech data about this phenomenon date back to the mid-1980s owing to research conducted between 1985 and 1986 among engaged couples who were about to marry [see Možný 1987]. The same research was repeated between 1990 and 1991. In 1985-86, the proportion of couples who had cohabited for a certain period of time before getting married was 46%. This proportion even somewhat increased and reached 48% by 1990-91 [Možný and Rabušic 1992].[7] In research from 1997 [Fialová et al. 2000] focusing on attitudes of single people aged 18-29 toward marriage and the family, as much as 67% of men and 70% of women stated that they would marry only after having cohabited with the partner. These are cogent indicators of the fact that unmarried cohabitation has become a routine part of intimate life styles in the Czech Republic. And unmarried cohabitation always pushes up the average age at first marriage.

The transformation of attitudes towards marriage and childbearing is certain to reflect what Caldwell calls "westernization" [Caldwell 1976], that is, the fact that owing to global communication, Western ideas and behavioural patterns diffuse internationally. Global communication networks entered the Czech Republic after 1990 and their contents introduced and/or reinforced patterns of late marriages, unmarried cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing. In this respect, the Czech Republic has become a "Westernized European" country characterised by corresponding demographic behaviour in the course of the 1990s.

Another macrostructural factor which contributes to postponing marriages and which is, surprisingly enough, highlighted rather rarely in Czech population development analyses[8] is the increase in the number of persons who have not yet completed their edu-

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[6]) And not just that. It appears that the proportion has decreased of those young Czechs who regard sexual harmony as a very important condition for a successful marriage in the 1990s. As the EVS data from 1991 and 1999 show, while in 1991 as much as 77% of single respondents in the 18-25 age group considered this aspect important, the proportion dropped to 67% by 1999.

[7]) Interestingly enough, the research falsified the hypothesis that couples who had cohabited before marriage would be more likely to marry because of the bride's pregnancy than those who had not cohabited before marriage. The proportion of pregnant brides among couples who had cohabited was 32% in 1985-86 and 30% in 1991-91, while among couples who had not cohabited before marriage the proportion of pregnant brides was higher: 42% and 38% in respective years [Možný and Rabušic 1992].

[8]) With the exception of Kuchařová and Tuček [1999] who pointed to the fact as well.

cation by the age of twenty – and attend one of the forms of tertiary education.[9] Such educational opportunities have considerably improved during the 1990s. Absolute numbers of students have increased correspondingly (see table 3) although the figures remain rather low compared with Western European countries. The increase from 89,000 students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate study in 1989, to 188,000 in 1999 is greater than twofold.

Table 3. Numbers of students in tertiary education as a share of the 18-24 population, CR 1985-1999

School year	Students at three-year colleges (non-university education+ (a)	University full-time students (b)	Population aged 18-24 (c)	Share of students per 100 population aged 18-24 (a+b/c)*
1985/1986	x	87,748	963,007	9 %
1989/1990	x	88,751	980,920	9 %
1991/1992	x	94,723	1,034,569	9 %
1994/1995	x	115,888	1,189,558	10 %
1996/1997	13,294	136,763	1,249,182	12 %
1999/2000	27,930	159,661	1,181,171	16 %

+) This type of school was established only in 1995/1996.

*) There are some students, not many, who are older than 24. This fact though is not a serious distortion of the meaning of such an indicator.

Source: Statistical yearbooks of the Czech Republic.

The fact that 188,000 young people aged 18-24, that is 16%, are currently enrolled in a tertiary study programme does not leave out the question of marriage behaviour. With respect to marriage and fertility rates, a high level of education constitutes an important determinant, particularly among women. Educated women find themselves in no need of seeking a match in the marriage market who could facilitate their social, economic and status advancement – they find themselves high enough in terms of status even without such a mate. From this perspective, these women do not essentially need marriage at all. Such a shift in women's life orientation is considered by many authors to be one of the most important factors for explaining the overall changes in family structures [see e.g. Westoff 1983, Lesthaeghe 1991-2, Hoffmann-Nowotny 1987, Keyfitz 1987]. The Czech family sociologist Možný [1999] maintains that the value of marriage decreases for a female professional with the level of her professional success, and that the joy of motherhood can be compensated for by her meaningful job. As figure 4 illustrates, the number of women who regard their jobs as an important factor in gaining their independence has been increasing during the 1990s in all age groups. This fact can have an indirect connection with lower levels of marriage and fertility rates.

[9]) By tertiary education I mean any type of study after the completion of secondary education.

Figure 4. Percentage of respondents who agreed with the statement *Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person*



Source: *European Values Study* data file, Czech Republic 1991 and 1999.

Another structural factor is influential as well, and that is a threat of unemployment among young people. The Czech unemployment rate has been fluctuating around the European average in the recent few years. However, as a phenomenon which is new in the Czech Republic and which impacts the young population in particular[10] – and let us note that above all young people with low education – it can raise a certain level of anxiety regarding young people's future life plans.

All the above-mentioned arguments clearly demonstrate why we have been witnessing a low marriage rate since the second half of the 1990s. In my view, a low marriage rate appears to reflect a logical and inevitable phase of Czech society's transformation. A low marriage rate is simply an immanent quality of advanced societies since social and economic advancement necessarily brings about a change of demographic behaviour patterns – the second demographic transition.

In the context of the Czech demographic debate, I hold the view that no one and nothing should be blamed for the low marriage rate. It is hardly caused by the current economic and political situation in this country. It would have occurred even had there been an economic paradise here, had politicians born nothing else in mind than public interest, had social security been unswerving and welfare benefits as generous as 'in a fool's paradise'. The transformation of Czech marriage trends has been grounded on a

[10]) In the late 1999, 120,234 persons in the 20-24 age group out of the total of 889,266 persons of this age were unemployed. In the 25-29 age group it was 63,563 persons out of the total of 825,430. Of all persons aged 20-24 years 14% were unemployed and of those aged 25-29 it was 8%. However, these figures cannot be regarded as equal to the unemployment rate since the absolute figures include students and women on maternity leave. If their number was known and was deducted from the total of persons in the given age groups, the proportion of the unemployed would increase.

new perception of how a young person should handle his/her life – this new social construction of reality, the newly formulated pattern is rather contagious and mental cohorts of this kind are becoming larger and larger. The fact that the contemporary young generation prefers *exploring life* and providing for oneself over getting married at a low age can be perceived as an expression of their new responsibility regarding their own life and – after all – the life of their as yet unborn children.

Obviously, not all young people postpone marriage and not all young people postpone childbearing. Rychtaříková's [1996] finding holds true saying that two models of procreative behaviour continue to mingle in this country: an older one, established in the past and fading away with the generation of 'older' women, and a new one, resembling the Western one, introduced by the strong generation born at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s and in the first half of the 1970s. Demographic development proves right her proposition that the older model is fading away, and the new one is gaining in its force.

3.2. Fertility

Much of what was said about the reasons for the decline in the marriage rate applies naturally to the decline in the fertility rate. Not only that young Czechs postpone marriage, they also postpone childbearing. The result is a steep decline in natality (see figure 5) and fertility (see figure 6). In 1999, the lowest number of children ever recorded in the history of Czech demography was born: (89,471 live births), while at the same time it was the forth year in a row with live births fluctuating around 90,000. This is not much compared, for example, with figures from the 1970s or the pre-war years, when there were about 200,000 live births in this country each year.

Figure 5. Live Births in the CR 1920-1999



Source: [Kučera 1994: 168-170 for the period of 1920-1992, *Populač ní...* 1999], Czech Statistical Office's Internet pages.

With respect to the total fertility rate, there have been on average 1.2 children born per woman in the recent four years (see figure 6), so that in this respect Czechia presently belongs among the countries with the lowest number of children in the world.

Figure 6. Total fertility rate in the CR 1950-1999 (average number of live births per woman)



Source: [Kučera 1994, Kučera and Šimek 2000].

This statement, and figure 6, both require some important commentary. Total fertility rate (TFR) is a great indicator, however, it is not particularly suitable in a period when for whatever reasons sudden changes in the birth-rate occur. This follows from the very definition of this indicator according to which TFR is an estimate of the average number of children born to each woman assuming that the current birth rate *remains constant*. It is highly likely that the current generation of young women who are to give birth to 1.13 children on average by the end of their reproductive career according to this indicator (since such was the TFR level in 1999) will have more children in the end. Women who postpone childbearing to older age usually tend to squeeze bearing children within a narrow time interval – it is a so-called *catching up effect*. However, according to Frejka's [2000] cohort fertility analyses, the fertility rate of women born in 1970-71 was, at the age of 26, lower by 23% than that of the age group born ten years earlier. The age group born in 1975-76, was, by the age of 21, 54% below the level of the age group born in 1965-66, and there are good reasons to believe that this cohort is likely to wind up with extremely low fertility, he says. What the cohort's completed fertility rate is going to be, will be known in 2020 when the necessary data is available.

A significant feature of Czech reproduction is that fertility shifts from younger to older age groups.[11] In the 1980s, children were born to very young spouses so that in many cases in fact it was *children who were having children*. Figure 7 illustrates this fact. It shows specific fertility in two countries which have already gone through the second transition, Sweden and the Netherlands. While most Dutch women give birth to their

[11]) This is indicated by the growing average age of mothers at the birth of the first child: 24.8 years in 1989 and 26.6 years in 1998.

children after reaching the age of 30, the majority of Czech women were still having children between the age of 20 and 25 in 1999. Nonetheless, the shift of fertility to an older age is still clear compared to 1986. The fertility curve has started to resemble the Swedish one. It will be even more obvious in the next few years, when women who have so far been postponing childbearing and who are currently about 25-26 years old will start having children. They will shift the peak of the specific fertility curve further to the right and closer to the Dutch model.

Figure 7. Age-specific fertility (live births per 1,000 women) in selected countries



Source: [*Populač ní*... 1994, Kučera and Šimek 2000].

The decline in fertility went hand in hand with a decline in the abortion rate in this country during the 1990s (see figure 8). The fact that the lower fertility rate is accompanied by a lower abortion rate indicates that Czech men and women increasingly more often prevent conception by using effective contraceptives. Figure 8 shows that in this respect we are getting nearer to the standards typical of advanced countries where women resort to abortion only in the most inevitable cases and where the abortion index fluctuates between 10-30%.[12] This can be perceived as an indicator of the above-mentioned young generation's more responsible attitude to life in general.

[12]) E.g. 11% in the Netherlands, 13% in Spain, 16% in Finland and Germany, 23% in France and Norway, 25% in Great Britain, Italy and Denmark [*Populač ní*... 1997: 86].

Figure 8. Abortion rate in the Czech Republic, 1958-1999 (number of abortions per 100 live births)



Note: The abortion rate always depends on legislation. Liberal abortion laws, leaving it to women's free discretion whether to have an abortion or not, was enacted in 1986 in the Czech Republic.

Source: [Kučera 1994, *Populač ní...* 1999, Kučera and Šimek 2000].

In searching for reasons why there are so few children born in this country, a number of arguments come to mind. For the modernising Czech society, Dumont's (1890) [in Weeks 1999] old propositions about social capillarity are certain to still hold true. He says that the decrease in the number of births must be attributed to individual social mobility aspirations since these can only be fulfilled with zero or a very low number of children. Also Leroy-Beaulie's (1913) [in Weeks 1999] opinion that low fertility results from individual social aspirations, that is, their pursuit of social advancement (and desire for comfort and luxury), holds equally true.

Desire for success, which naturally includes advancement within the social hierarchy, belongs among the strongest motivations of human activity. As 'to be successful' means 'to be much better than the others' in something, pursuit of success implies competition and triumph. Real socialism blocked natural paths towards success and social mobility based on knowledge, skills, performance and luck. These paths have reopened for the current young generation and it is absolutely understandable that they have been exploring them to the fullest with vehemence peculiar to young age. Postponing conception and lowering the number of children is only a logical consequence of such exploration.

Life of the current young generation is full of opportunities and potentials. Analyses of the value of the child show that emotional gratification represents a key motive for childbearing in modern society [see e.g. Rabušic 2000]. However, as young people's life activities bring about a good deal of satisfaction, the youngest age cohorts no longer derive life fulfilment inevitably and exclusively from having children as is evident from a variety of research data. For instance the EVS data can be the source of such evidence on

how the context of the value of children and their meaning for individuals has been changing.

In 1999, a total of 60% of respondents agreed with the statement *A man needs to have children in order to be fulfilled.* However, figure 9 shows that this attitude differs across age groups.[13]

Figure 9. The share of Czech respondents who agree with the statement that a man needs to have children in order to be fulfilled



Source: *European Values Study* data file, Czech Republic 1999.

Yet, a much more significant shift was recorded in the distribution of answers which measured to what extent respondents associate the meaning of female life with children (see figure 10).

[13]) The young respondents' answers depended on whether they had children at the time of the research or not. While 46% of childless respondents in the 18-25 age group agreed with the statement, it was only 28% in the 26-33 age group and 30% in the 34-41 age group. It is highly probable that the rather significant difference is due to the fact that childless respondents aged between 26 and 41 consider children important neither for a person's life in general, nor for their own one.

Figure 10. The share of Czech respondents who think a women has to have children in order to be fulfilled, by age groups in 1991 and 1999



Source: European *Values Study* data file, Czech republic 1991 and 1999.

The figure shows a deep decline both from the cross-sectional and cohort perspective. Several findings are evident from figure 10. First, from the analytical point of view, attitudes of the 18-25 and 26-33 age groups, that is peak fertility age groups, are important with regards to fertility level and its future development. We can see that a considerable shift has occurred in the course of the 1990s: while in 1991 as much as 53% of respondents at the age of 18-25 agreed that women need children in order to meet their function, the proportion decreased to 33% by 1999. The decrease in agreement was even more apparent in the 26-33 age group: it dropped from 61% in 1991 to a mere 31% in 1999.

A generation attitudinal shift is also apparent. In the environment of a society in transition, the youngest category (18-25 years) have not kept the opinion that they held in 1991 and have changed it. From the original 53% of those who considered the existence of children significant for women to find meaning in life, only 31% expressed this attitude eight years later. A similar shift occurred practically in all age groups.[14]

The differences in the young generation's attitudes apparent from figures 9 and 10 are sociologically significant. While only a third of young people aged 18-33 (and only 27% among childless respondents in the same age group) associates having children with a sense of fulfilment in women's lives, almost a half of the young generation at this age (and 42% of childless respondents) associates children with a sense of fulfilment in hu-

[14]) Attitudes of men and women do not significantly differ – the identified four percent difference is negligible in a survey of a representative sample of respondents. However, respondents' opinions differ in dependence on their marriage status: married spouses were more likely to agree (65% in 1991 and 47% in 1999) with the statement that a woman needs to have children in order to meet her role than those who were not married (45% and 34% in the respective years). A certain correlation was identified with regards to whether a respondent had children or was childless. In 1999 a mere 27% of childless respondents aged 18-33 agreed with the opinion, while it was 33% of respondents with children.

man life in general. This data signals two messages. Firstly, it suggests that significant changes have occurred in the perception of the female role in Czech discourse. The influence of the feminist debate about *gender* and women's social standing in Czech society is certain to have played a role in this respect. The assumption that children are no longer necessarily associated with female fate, that *biology is not a destiny* any more, is further reinforced by another finding shown in figure 11. The proportion of respondents who strongly agree with the statement that women do not actually long for work but for children and a home has decreased really sharply in the course of the past eight years. The fall of strong affirmative answers is especially remarkable in the 18-25 age group.[15]

Figure 11. Percentage of respondents who strongly agree with the statement *A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children*, Czech Republic, 1991 and 1999



Source: *European* Values *Study* data file, Czech Republic 1991 and 1999.

Figures 10 and 11 show quite clearly that the meaning of a woman's life ceased to be perceived by the young Czech population as something which is associated with children and motherhood. This social stereotype has been to a great extent deconstructed and is no longer shared by large segments of the young.

Those who have already started to panic and think that young Czechs have developed anti-natal attitudes could feel alarmed at the second message. Given that 41% of childless respondents aged 18-33 associate children with one's sense of life, it might seem – on the face of it – that a great proportion of young people are not going to ever have children as they do not consider children necessary for meeting a person's sense of fulfilment. But such causality must not be constructed from the data. Even those who are

[15]) In the youngest age group, the number of respondents who gave an 'agree' answer has decreased as well (18-25: from 62% in 1991 to 57% in 1999). Among respondents aged 26-33, the share remained more or less the same: 57% in 1991 and 55% in 1999.

not quite persuaded as to whether children are inevitable in order for one's life to be meaningful do not necessarily have to remain childless for their lifetime.

The fear of the low level of the future birth rate could even intensify if we consider other data in this context, that is, data from a survey conducted in 1997 on a sample of young people aged 18-30 [Fialová et al. 2000]. When asked about their life plans in the horizon of the following few years with regards to having children, a third of the young said 'rather no' and a fifth said 'definitely no' [Kučera 2000]. Nonetheless, these responses do not unambiguously indicate an anti-natal attitude either. A young person today faces a great many things which they want to experience – Kučera [ibid.] is right in saying that the most fundamental difference in the conditions of demographic behaviour before 1989 and today consists in the opportunity to choose among a variety of activities. This has a crucial impact on the timing of life events. Many of such activities, Kučera says, are so attractive that they are preferred over getting married and having children.

Nevertheless, it is likely that a good many of nearly a half of those young who reported in 1997 not planning to have children in the nearest future will conceive a child in a certain phase of their life cycle. What leads me to this conviction is for example the fact that, according to the 1999 EVS data, 93% of single respondents believed children to constitute an important prerequisite of a happy marriage. In addition, 95% of single respondents said that the family was important in their life (EVS 1999). If Foster [2000], who put forth a challenging thesis about the existence of a maternal instinct, is right in proposing that low fertility in advanced countries "is unlikely to fall any lower because women have a biologically based predisposition toward nurturing or maternal behaviour... resulting, in most cases, in a conscious motivation for bearing at least one child" [ibid.: 214] then the gloomy picture of societies full of never married and childless individuals, who react in this way to the demands of modern capitalism and its markets on men's flexibility [Beck 1992], does not necessarily need to materialise.[16]

4. The meaning of the changes

What do all these research findings suggest? They suggest that the impact of the transforming social and economic conditions and the political shift from a communist rule towards a democratic one on the population and reproductive attitudes of the young generation is undeniable. Young people started to believe that having a child is not an essential condition for the fulfilment of a woman's role, neither is it necessary for the fulfilment of human life in general. In this context, it is then possible to regard the current low marriage rate as an indicator of low fertility aspirations in the first place, an attitude expressed for example by Hoffmann-Nowotny [1987].

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[16]) To state that there is a biological predisposition to certain kinds of human behaviour does not mean that such behaviour cannot vary and that it is necessarily immutable. This is a frequent error made by non-biologists in the understanding of 'predispositions' and 'instincts'. I regard the bio-social approach to fertility as very important, nevertheless many conclusions of evolutionary biologists are not without contradictions. Therefore, we can expect a reaction to Foster's thesis quite soon. A partially opposing thesis already exists. In the same journal, three years earlier, Potts [1997] claimed that unrestrained access to fertility control and abortion which is a characteristic feature of some of the contemporary societies leads on average to very low – i.e. well below replacement level fertility. Voluntary childlessness is one of the causes.

The woman is the carrier of fertility. Thus the changes brought about with modernity and late modernity are important especially for women. Life chances have opened up enormously for them. Besides, the image of a woman socially constructed by feminist ideology makes women turn away from the orientation to early marriage and to early motherhood. I hold the biologists' view that a woman's reproductive strategy differs from that of a man [e.g. Tiger 2000, Ridley 1993]. The female strategy contrary to the male consists in reducing the number of children. Therefore, in such a context, Badinter's [1998] proposition, that once a woman embraces certain social, intellectual and professional ambitions and has resources available to meet these ambitions, she becomes much less attracted by the option of investing time and energy into child care, seems very plausible.

Thus, while the family and motherhood used to be a woman's destiny, they have become a choice nowadays. Women have their fertility perfectly under control owing to modern contraceptive technology[17] and liberal abortion laws which guarantee that, if a woman does not want to, she will not get pregnant or will not give birth to the child. Emancipated women find marriage to be of little attraction and realise that motherhood and a professional career necessarily rival each other.

Young Czech women used to be acquiesced since the 1950s to the prospect of both being employed and bringing up children at the same time in a certain phase of their life cycle. Socialism with its extensive economic system was in need of great numbers of working people. In the early 1950s, women became a stable component of the work force. The socialist regime did its best to make women not only work but also bear children – the future soldiers and work force ready to protect and build up communism.[18] Indeed, the family and motherhood were rather a destiny than a rational choice under socialism. However, already then there existed a perceived conflict between motherhood, employment and household work which was further reinforced by the fact that there was basically no service sector in Czech society.[19] Women tried to minimalise the conflict by having children soon after getting married and with short intervals between individual births – according to the strategy *'to do away with childbearing as soon as possible and be done with it once for all'*.

In the more or less 'normal' society in which we have found ourselves since the early 1990s, among other things, rationality has been introduced. In line with a rational way of thinking, young men and young women themselves deliberate their future, and it is understandable that they are considerate and cautious in deciding about childbearing.

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[17]) Možný [1999] maintains that the importance of this invention for humankind is as epochal as mastering fire or inventing the wheel. He believes this invention has brought about a deep civilisation change the impact of which we are as yet unable to fully reflect and comprehend. I fully agree.

[18]) There was one more reason why the establishment found it convenient that young people used to hurry with entering into marriage and starting families: Nothing is better for a totalitarian regime than to prevent spontaneous and revolting political activity which is natural for young people by having them be responsible for a partner and children.

[19]) Možný [1983] presented convincing evidence in the early 1980s. He found that in the case of university educated couples, the woman had often chosen to only have one child, a so-called status child, which had help her gain the status of a mother while sustaining professional performance and aspirations.

Even this can be understood as an expression of the greater responsibility of the current young generation. The effort to secure good conditions for one's prospective children and a good starting position for life is an important moment.[20] However, this is nothing else than an effort to produce quality children, which according to the microeconomic theory of fertility results in a low number of children. The fact that each generation of Czech women is ever more educated than the previous one increases their opportunity costs which again leads to a reduction in the family size. In line with Ariès's [1980] thesis, in the Czech Republic also, the child has ceased to represent an imperative for sexually active partners and has become one of the possible components of the meaning of human couples' lives.

Conclusion

In modern societies, life styles and social institutions have changed over the past several decades. Increasingly, cultural factors have become some of the main determinants of change. Ideals of self-betterment, freedom, equality and democratic participation introduced by Western civilisation in the past two or three centuries, have gradually become universal mobilising processes of social change and patterns of human behaviour in most regions of the world [Giddens 1993]. This cultural trait of modern societies has gradually been established so firmly that it is perhaps possible to think of them in terms of a new cultural universal (in Murdoch's sense[21]). These cultural factors found their expression in the transformation of marriage and family life patterns and were conceptualised as the second demographic transition.

In this paper, I tried to show that in the Czech Republic, as in other European countries, the second demographic transition has been taking place. As elsewhere, its main cause is a value change in young age cohorts. If we accept Van de Kaa's idea that the second demographic transition is a logical and necessary outcome of modern European development, then the very fact that the Czech Republic has been experiencing this transition as well can be perceived as another indication that Czech society has really been undergoing transformation, and has been entering the family of modern European countries.

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[20]) Many informal discussions about this issue which I had with young women, both with childless women and mothers, confirm this conclusion.

[21]) Social anthropologists define *cultural universals* as such institutions and patterns of behaviour that are found in all known cultures. Anthropologist Peter Murdoch [1945] identified over sixty cultural universals, such as a social status system, marriage, body adornments, dance, myths, incest taboos, puberty customs, inheritance rules, religious rituals.

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Which Qualities Should Children Be Encouraged to Learn at Home?*

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Abstract: This paper uses the survey data of EVS 1991 and EVS 1999 and in an exploratory manner it seeks to find answers to four questions concerning qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home: (1) Has there been a change in preferences of these educational values during the period 1991-1999 in Czech society, which has been undergoing a deep political, economic and social transformation? (2) Are these preferences structured along the social and demographic characteristics of the Czech population? (3) Is there a general pattern in educational preferences among the Czech population and if so, is it traditional or modern values that are being preferred? (4) What is the position of the Czech Republic among other European countries with respect to these preferences?
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Introduction

This paper deals with educational values, concretely with educational values in the family as an institution that plays a major role in the upbringing and socialisation of children and adolescents. The way in which children should be brought up in families and the qualities they should be encouraged to learn are eternal questions that are not easily answered. Generations of parents have been dealing with them, and they search again and again for their own solutions because there is no simple and easy 'parental' recipe which they could learn from somebody else. The variety of opinions and attitudes held by parents as well as a number of different theories that deal with upbringing in the family play a role. Certain models for upbringing are offered by pedagogy and psychology. Some models for upbringing are certainly also provided by the family of orientation, whose attitudes regarding upbringing in the family are then confronted with the family of procreation. The opinions of other families belonging to the same generation that are passed on and shared in the process of communication at friends' meetings also have an influence. However, in the end, the specific style of upbringing which becomes dominant in the family depends on the parents and the educational values they incline toward.

The aim of this paper is to find out which educational values were preferred by the Czech population in the 1990s. The questions asked in this text are the following: (1) Can educational values in the family be considered together with the institution, the family in

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which they are practised, to be more long-term in character with a high rate of generational transmission? Or, in contrast, have people's opinions regarding what should be passed on in families as educational values undergone a radical shift during the economic and social transformation? Is this shift passed on from generation to generation and can it be already traced within a nearly ten-year time span? (2) Are there any differences in preferred educational values in the family that are related to basic socio-demographic characteristics and to relevant attitudes regarding this question, such as, for example, religious faith or the perception of the parental role? (3) Is it possible to talk about a general model of educational values which is prevalent in contemporary Czech families? Can this model be characterised more as a traditional or as a (late) modern one? (4) Finally, can the position of the Czech Republic among other European countries be identified according to preferred educational values? Are there any continuities traceable in the common social and political development of post-communist countries compared to Western European ones?

Data

Answers to the questions outlined above are based on data from the international comparative study EVS1991 and EVS1999.[1] Within its framework populations of participating countries were also asked about values that children should be taught and encouraged to learn at home. The question had the following form:

> *Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five. (Indicate five only.)*

	Important	Not mentioned
A Good manners	1	0
B Independence	1	0
C Hard work	1	0
D Feeling of responsibility	1	0
E Imagination	1	0
F Tolerance and respect for other people	1	0
G Thrift, saving money and things	1	0
H Determination, perseverance	1	0
I Religious faith	1	0
J Unselfishness	1	0
K Obedience	1	0

Each issue is a dichotomous variable here. For each a score was computed denoting how many times it was selected by respondents.

1. Are educational values that are preferred in Czech families of a changing or permanent character?

It could be expected that the influential social and political changes occurring during the past decades in Europe and during the last decade particularly in the countries of the former socialist bloc will in some way be reflected also in changes of opinions and attitudes.

[1]) Detailed information about the research project EVS – *European Values Study* can be found in the paper by Jan Řehák in this issue.

Opinions and attitudes are an outward expression of values which people believe in and respect. Becker [1995] explores this expectation of changes on the basis of a number of relevant theories (generational theory, theory of individualisation, theory of post-adolescence) to argue that people acquire essential values during their formative period in the life course and they prefer a number of these values for a long time.[2] It evidently does not mean that they cannot change later on, but the basis of value direction is actually laid at the age of 10 to 25. Thus during this period, the conditions – social, cultural, economic – in which an individual is growing up are the most important ones. "If major events in society and substantial transitions in the life course of cohort members coincide in time, new formation of values is to be expected." [Becker 1995: 290].

Preferences of educational values in the family as expressed by Czech respondents are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Czech Republic 1991 and 1999 (in %)



Source: EVS CR 1991 and CR 1999

[2]) For example, Ingelhart's [1990] concept of postmaterialism is largely based on the thesis of the formative stage.

Table 1. Selection of values which children should be encouraged to learn at home according to age cohorts in the years 1991 and 1999 (%).

	Manners		Hard work		Independence		Responsibility		Tolerance		Unselfishness		Thrift		Determination		Obedience		Imagination		Religious faith	
	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99
18-25	86	90	***72***	***86***	70	64	58	59	69	58	35	29	***32***	***43***	***31***	***10***	23	21	6	4	***4***	***14***
26-33	85	87	***76***	***86***	70	61	61	59	65	58	38	39	***57***	***39***	***35***	***20***	17	23	7	5	***5***	***14***
34-41	90	94	81	83	72	71	62	66	69	66	37	29	31	35	***31***	***22***	13	17	5	3	5	6
42-49	86	86	84	76	66	66	65	72	68	60	32	37	34	31	25	25	18	15	5	8	8	5
50-57	91	88	91	77	64	72	61	67	71	68	34	41	34	25	18	27	15	14	5	7	***12***	***4***
58-65	92	88	***88***	***72***	***63***	***73***	***51***	***68***	66	60	35	33	***44***	***32***	***21***	***32***	27	18	2	7	***14***	***3***
66+	89	83	***93***	***60***	***52***	***70***	***52***	***65***	58	65	***29***	***40***	***48***	***30***	***19***	***39***	***31***	***17***	3	9	***22***	***6***
Total	88	87	83	73	66	69	59	66	67	63	34	37	35	32	26	29	20	17	5	7	10	7

Source: Data file of EVS-CR 1991, 1999.

Note: The categorisation of age groups is determined by the eight-year interval between each phase of the EVS research.

First of all we can see that the rank-order of selected values has remained almost the same during the nearly ten-year period, with the exception of *tolerance*, which in 1991 ranked third while in 1999 it scored fifth, and *religious faith*, which changed from the last but one position in 1991 to the last in 1999. The five most preferred qualities remained the same in both researched periods. These were *good manners*, *hard work*, *independence*, *responsibility* and *tolerance*. Regarding the frequency of preferences, these five are clearly marked from the others.

The differences in the preference for the same issues in 1991 and 1999 were minimal, and apart from *hard work*, the preference for which fell by ten percentage points, they are on the edge of sampling error. In other words, regardless of important changes in various areas of social life, preferred educational values, expressed as the choice of the most important qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home, remained constant. If we understand these values more in a sociological rather than a psychological sense, that is, as people's opinions about what is desirable, appropriate, good or bad, we can argue that in the Czech Republic *good manners*, *hard work*, *independence*, *responsibility* and *tolerance* have been unquestionably considered to be desirable and appropriate.

Let us now look at how this consistency in time sequence demonstrates itself from a generational perspective (Table 1). First we concentrate on a cross-sectional comparison, that is we compare the values within the same age groups in 1991 and 1999.

It is generally true that the biggest shifts occurred with respondents in the age groups above 58 and with the youngest age groups (18-25 and 26-33 years), while relatively stable attitudes to educational values were expressed by respondents of middle age and late middle age (34-57 years).

The support for qualities like *good manners*, *responsibility*, *unselfishness* and *obedience* remained in 1991 more or less the same regardless of the age cohort of the respondents. On the other hand, among the qualities such as *independence*, *hard work*, *determination*, *religious faith* and *thrift* we can detect differences between certain groups. In 1991 younger age groups valued *independence* and *determination* – these can be described as qualities underlying individual development of personality – rather more, while older generations tended to put more emphasis on *hard work*, *thrift* and *religious faith*, which can be understood as more traditional and possibly less dynamic qualities.

A somewhat different model emerged from the data collected almost a decade later. While in 1999 *good manners* remained a highly valued quality throughout all age cohorts, *hard work* as an important quality was in this case, unlike in the previous one, stressed more by younger people. *Responsibility* and *imagination* were in contrast emphasised by older people. *Thrift* underwent an interesting change. While in 1991 it was valued only by the two oldest age groups (58 years and older), in 1999, in contrast, only by the youngest group (18-25 years). Similarly, perception of *religious faith* went through a radical change in relation to the age structure of its supporters. In 1991 it was selected by people over 50 (and mainly by the group of over 66), while in 1999, by exactly the opposite, the two youngest groups, that is, ages 18 to 33. Another example of change is the support of *determination*. At the beginning of the 1990s, it was especially younger respondents who considered it important to encourage this quality in their children, with increasing age, such 'enthusiasm' was decreasing. At the end of the 1990s the situation was reversed, such 'enthusiasm' was growing with age.

A comparison of the 18-25 age group would provide the most informative viewpoint. In 1991 this group included respondents born between 1966 and 1973, in 1999 then those born between 1974 and 1981. While the first cohort experienced its whole formative stage in the period of 'real socialism', the second cohort lived through a part of its formative stage under the changed political and social circumstances of the 1990s. Nonetheless, this difference did not have a major influence on the preference of educational values, with both groups the majority of values were within the interval of sampling error, larger differences were only recorded with some qualities. These involved *hard work*, preferred by 72% of the young cohort in 1991 but by already 86% in 1999. Other differences include *religious faith* (in its case a growth in preference occurred from 4 to 14 percentage points), and *thrift* (an increase from 32% to 43%). A decrease in preference occurred in the case of *determination* (from 31% to 10%) as well as with *tolerance* (from 69% to 58%). Nonetheless, the five most preferred qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home were the same in these two groups in both researched years and corresponded to the distribution of the whole sample.

A cohort comparison makes it possible to compare the development of opinions over time within the age cohorts. Again the most interesting finding for us concerns the analysis of the youngest cohort which changed from the original 18-25 year cohort in 1991 to the 26-33 year cohort in 1999. A shift was found regarding *hard work*, which was in 1991 preferred as an important educational value by 72% of respondents aged 18 to 25. In 1999, when this group grew older and became the group of 26-33 year old, 82% of respondents wanted to encourage their children to acquire the quality of hard work. So in the process of ageing a change in attitude occurred in this cohort.

Similarly, regarding *independence*, *tolerance* and *determination* there occurred a cohort shift in opinions, in this case the ageing of the 18-25 year cohort brought less support for these values. The ageing of this cohort, in contrast, contributed to the growing share of respondents with a positive swing toward opinions about practising religious belief. The share of young people who preferred this value increased from 4 to 14 percentage points between the two periods in which the research was carried out. In the case of the age groups of older respondents (50 to 57 and 58 to 65 years), in contrast, ageing brought about a decrease in these preferences (from 12 to 3 and from 14 to 6 percentage points respectively).

On the whole, however, the correlation between age groups and preferences of educational values was quite small, and it was within the 0.04-0.18 interval in 1991 and the 0.03-0.22 in 1999.[3]

What has been argued so far can be summarised and an answer to the first question can be formulated. During the 1990s there did not occur any marked shifts in opinions about educational values in the family, expressed by preferences of certain qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home. As the analysed data suggest these opinions remained more or less constant within the Czech population regardless of the contextual changes which the Czech Republic underwent during the last decade, and no significant differences were found among age groups. This finding corresponds rather well with the already mentioned theory of a 'formative stage'. A large proportion of

[3]) Thanks to a rather large sample (N = 1,809) all correlations whose value was higher that 0.03 are statistically significant.

Czech respondents experienced their adolescence and young adulthood in the same era, i.e. in the era of the 'construction of socialism' and in the era of 'real socialism'. The formation of their values thus occurred in the framework of more or less identical social representations.[4] No significant change has so far occurred in the group which lived part of its formative stage through the conditions of a free and democratic society. It appears as if even the youngest generation somehow has been reproducing the educational patterns which members of this generation themselves experienced at a young age in their families.[5]

Theoretically speaking, if the educational values of *good manners*, *hard work*, *independence*, *responsibility* and *tolerance*, which are most preferred by the Czech population, were to be fully implemented, in the near future a truly ideal individual would appear in Czech society. An individual who fulfils the requirements of a complex performance-oriented society: a well-mannered person who is working hard, making independent decisions, feels responsible and shows tolerance to all others. A practical implementation, however, can be, as sociology demonstrates well, a completely different 'cup of tea'.

2. What influences the preference of educational values in the family?

Research on attitudes and value preferences regularly concludes that these structures are influenced by certain socio-demographic characteristics, usually including the gender, education and age of the respondent. In this regard we have as well conducted an analysis of relationships between preferred educational values on the one hand, and corresponding independent socio-demographic characteristics on the other. The independent variables were broadened to include political preferences, religious faith, whether or not the respondents have personal experience of parenthood, as well as opinions about the role of parents in relation to their children.

The findings of this analysis are in the table of intercorrelations (see Table 2), which includes findings only for the year 1999. Surprisingly, we found that preferences of qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home do not show any relation with the characteristics which we considered to be bound to influence them. Thus, for example, the correlations between the educational issues and age groups ranged within the 0.1 to 0.22 interval. The correlations of these values with a respondent's gender were basically nil. Moreover, we found no relation with education, with the exception of opinions about *obedience*. People with higher education consider *obedience* a quality that

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[4]) The theory of social representations came into existence in French social science. In the presentation of its author Serge Moscovici [1984] it attempts to explore how various concepts, images and classifications come into life and exist in society and how these structures influence people's common knowledge. In other words, social representations are shared forms of knowledge (that come into existence due to socialisation) which influence the perception of everyday reality.

[5]) In this context, one of the anonymous reviewers suggests that it is unclear whether answers of older-cohorts-respondents really reflect their older value patterns and asks whether their answers had not been influenced by their views on what is most important for the present. This is a legitimate question. However, despite the fact that we have no data for comparison with the pre-1989 period, we interpret the very fact that views of cohorts aged 42-57 remained more or less the same between 1991 and 1999 as an indication of stable value patterns which have been formed in pre-transformation periods.

children should be led to at home less frequently (-0.18) than respondents with lower education. The right- and left-wing political orientation is not related to the preference of certain educational values either. Nor did *religious faith* sort our sample in relation to educational values, apart from one understandable exception: respondents with an inclination toward religious faith preferred education to *religious faith* more often. The fact whether the respondent had or did not have children did not play a role either, neither did the general attitude to the role of parents.[6]

Table 2. Correlations between educational preferences and socio-demographic variables (Spearman's ρ), CR 1999

	Age	Gender	Education	Political orientation	Religion	Having kids	Role of parents
Manners	0.06*	0.02	-0.07*	-0.00	-0.04	0.04	-0.02
Independence	-0.06*	-0.04	0.07*	-0.02	0.14*	-0.02	0.02
Hard work	*0.22**	0.00	-0.01	-0.08*	-0.02	0.13*	-0.08*
Responsibility	-0.04	-0.01	0.11*	0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.03
Imagination	-0.08*	-0.04	0.04	0.03	-0.02	-0.05*	0.00
Tolerance	-0.01	0.12*	0.05*	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02
Thrift	0.07*	0.03	-0.11*	-0.05	0.00	0.02	0.00
Determination	*-0.16**	-0.07*	0.13*	0.06	0.10*	-0.10*	0.05*
Religious faith	0.10*	0.02	-0.09*	0.11*	*-0.30**	0.06*	-0.10*
Unselfishness	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.06*
Obedience	0.02	-0.03	*-0.18**	0.06*	0.01	0.03	-0.02

Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Measurement: Political orientation measured as 10 point scale from left to right; Having kids: dichotomous variable with alternatives 0 = no kids, 1 = one or more kids;
Religion measured by question: *Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are*: 1. A religious person, 2. Not a religious person, 3. A convinced atheist;
Role of parents: measured by question: *Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents' responsibilities to their children? (Indicate one only)*: 1 - Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; 2 - Neither; 3 - Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children.

These findings not only miss our expectations but at the same time they refer to a somewhat different pattern from the one common in a number of other European countries. Stenberg [1997] tested correlations between education, age, profession, gender and practice of religious faith and educational values using data from EVS 1990 in the following countries: Sweden, Denmark, France, the Republic of Ireland and the United States of America. In each of them certain correlations were found, at least regarding education, age and the practice of religious faith, and they demonstrated the existence of a relation-

[6]) This was expressed either by an inclination toward the opinion that parents should fully sacrifice for their children, or, in contrast, to the opinion that parents have their own lives and do not have to do so. In both years when the research was conducted only 25% of parents were of the opinion that they do not have to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children.

ship and a certain regularity between these socio-demographic characteristics and educational preferences.

Only one regularity occurs in Czech society, and it is the fact that opinions about which qualities children should be encouraged to learn at home are universally shared by the Czech population regardless of whether they are male or female, people of higher or lower education, individuals who already have or do not have experience with the upbringing of their own children, regardless of religious faith, etc.

The fact that no pattern according to which certain characteristics of a respondent would be associated with certain educational preferences was found in the Czech Republic leads us to the statement that with respect to preferred educational values Czech society is very homogeneous. At least at the verbal level, that is, in communication with the interviewer asking questions, various social categories of Czech respondents chose the same educational values which, as we have already suggested in the previous sub-chapter, are close to a personality ideal. This homogeneous educational ideal, although found only on a symbolic level, is a very interesting feature of Czech society of the 1990s. The fact that notions about reality recorded in sociological research are far from the reality itself is, of course, a routine sociological experience, and thus, we should understand our results from this perspective.

3. What is the prevalent model of Czech educational values in the family like?

The list of eleven discussed qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home in the EVS questionnaire has been constructed by its authors mainly along the tradition/modernity axis. This involves an *a priori* research construct that needs to be tested under various circumstances. Akker, Halman and Moor [1994] consider good manners, obedience, hard work and thrift to be traditional values. In our opinion, it is also possible to add religious faith to this group. Among qualities that reflect modern values these authors list independence, imagination and determination.

Let us consider to what extent these *a priori* constructs correspond with Czech reality, respectively, how these presuppositions are filled with Czech data. In order to explore whether the empirical solution corresponds with our model, we selected the method of hierarchical cluster analysis[7] to group the variables. Within its framework we decided to resort to correlational measures instead of the common distance measure of similarity to define intervariable similarity. This decision was influenced by the fact that our goal was to uncover latent structures between variables. If we decided to use distance measures, e.g. Euclidean distance, which focus on the magnitudes of the values, we would basically repeat the structure which we have already outlined in Figure 1. Findings of the cluster solution are presented in Figures 2 and 3.

[7]) With this type of assignment, factor analysis is commonly used. In this case, however, it could not be applied here as the relevant data that entered analysis were of a dichotomous nature.

Figure 2. Cluster analysis of characteristics that children should be encouraged to learn at home. Dendrogram of the characteristics in 1991 (Dendrogram using Average Linkage Between Groups)



Source: Data file EVS CR 1991

In 1991 the variables were divided into two main clusters. The first one consisted of four qualities: *imagination*, *determination*, *independence* and *responsibility*. We believe that this cluster can be called the cluster of modern educational values. Stenberg [1997], who carried out the same analysis for Western European countries, reached a very similar cluster, which she labelled 'late-modern values'.

The second cluster is made up of five plus two qualities. We named it a traditional cluster, as it includes educational preferences such as *religious faith*, *obedience*, *good manners*, *hard work* and *thrift*. It includes qualities that can be considered to be of a constant nature and universal validity. According to Stenberg [1997], who comments upon the Swedish experience, these values have their roots mainly in religious morality, and they last also in a highly secularised and modernised culture. In the Czech case these are supplemented with *tolerance* and *unselfishness*, and these two formed a specific, partly independent substructure. We can refer to it as a 'pro-social' one.

In 1999 the cluster structure of all eleven qualities was basically accurately replicated (it does not matter that in Figure 3 the mirror image of the clusters is shown). The striking consistency which we have already noted in the case of preferences for individual qualities (see Figure 1) means that during the almost ten-year period the position of the individual qualities forming these clusters did not change at all. In other words, even this sophisticated analysis confirmed the already mentioned fact: ideas about educational patterns in the Czech population remained basically the same throughout the 1990s.

Figure 3. Dendrogram of the characteristics in 1999 (Dendrogram using Average Linkage Between Groups)



Source: Data file EVS CR 1999.

Let us consider what happens when, based on this information of empirical foundation, we create three types of values – modern, traditional and pro-social[8] – and we explore whether these types fit certain socio-demographic characteristics or not. As shown in Table 3, the modern type of educational values was in 1991 more frequently preferred by respondents of younger age, higher education, and without religious orientation.

Table 3. Correlations between clusters and socio-demographic variables (Spearman's ρ)

Type of values	Age	Gender	Education	Political orientation	Religion	Having kids	Role of parents
A) 1991							
Modern	-0.17**	-0.10**	0.27**	-0.09**	0.21**	-0.02	0.04
Traditional	0.25**	0.07**	-0.28**	0.09**	-0.24**	0.08**	-0.04
Pro-social	-0.07**	0.00	0.12**	-0.05*	0.08**	-0.01	0.01
B) 1999							
Modern	-0.15**	-0.06*	0.17**	0.06*	0.13**	-0.06*	0.05*
Traditional	0.20**	0.00	-0.19**	-0.06*	-0.11**	0.10**	-0.08*
Pro-social	-0.05*	0.09**	0.04	0.04	-0.03	-0.01	0.03

Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (two tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.5 level (two tailed).

On the other hand traditional values were more frequently preferred by the elderly, less educated, and with a religious orientation. Other characteristics, as we have already detected also in previous analyses, did not have any influence on adopting respective attitudes. Pro-social qualities did not follow such a pattern. In 1999 the respondents' value distinctiveness depending on age, education and religious belief decreased in the case of the modern and the traditional educational type. Moreover, the decrease was significant in the case of religious orientation. Correlations with the pro-social type again remained basically nil.

Educational values in the family can certainly also be considered in other respects and dimensions than the traditional – modern. Stenberg [1997], for example, uses all the

[8]) Individual types were created as composite indices of the issues which clustered together. The higher the value of the index, the more preferred the given type.

eleven researched qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home as a starting point for a wider discussion about the consequences of modernity and indicators of individualisation. She achieves this on the basis of moral, mainly religious, values in five selected countries of different denomination (Sweden, Denmark, France, the Republic of Ireland and the United States of America).

Piet van den Akker, Loek Halman, and Ruud de Moor [Akker, Halman and Moor 1994] give an account of educational values in the family based on the first two phases of EVS research (1981 and 1990) under the heading of children's socialisation. They analysed the results of the selection of qualities that are considered important in the family and which children should be encouraged to learn at home using factor analysis (although in our opinion it is not an adequate technique for this set of variables), which pointed out two significant dimensions. One dimension was labelled the dimension of conformity, and the second was labelled self-centred achievement. An indicator of conformity, according to the authors, was the appreciation of qualities such as good manners and religious faith or, in contrast, the low regard for qualities such as independence, imagination and determination. These were indicators of non-conformity. The second factor, that of self-centred achievement, was fuelled by positively accepted qualities, such as hard work and thrift, that is, qualities needed for achieving a better life and upward mobility on the social ladder. The adjective 'self-centred' was used by the authors owing to the fact that qualities such as tolerance (show respect to others) and unselfishness negatively correlated with this factor. The factor of self-centred achievement thus reflects more of an egocentric rather than an altruistic effort.

Let us attempt to combine the approaches of Stenberg and Akker et al. and use them in our interpretation of findings from the Czech Republic. We used multidimensional scaling which usually can arrange analysed variables according to their similarities into a framework that can be interpreted in a sensible manner. The results can be found in Figures 4 and 5.

Figure 4. Grouping of educational preferences using multidimensional scaling, CR 1991



The grouping of individual educational values suggests that the dimensions, which were discussed on the one hand by Stenberg and on the other by Akker et al., are not present in the Czech educational environment. Self-centred achievement should include *hard work* and *thrift*. These qualities, however, do not appear together. Neither do the qualities that should be the opposite of self-centred achievement, namely *unselfishness* and *tolerance*, get together – they placed themselves in different quadrants.

If we are to answer the question which appears in the title of this section, namely, whether there exists a general model of educational values in Czech families, we can argue, based on cluster analysis, that basically there are three models. The first model is labelled the model of traditional values, the second of modern values and the third of pro-social values. In order to be able to reach an argument about which of these models prevail we have to relate the findings of cluster analysis to the concrete qualities that are most preferred in upbringing in Czech families. We can see that out of the five most frequently selected qualities, *good manners*, *hard work*, *independence*, *responsibility* and *tolerance*, two belong to the traditional type (*good manners* and *hard work*), two to the modern (*independence* and *responsibility*) and one to the pro-social type (*tolerance*). They were also selected in this order. According to our interpretation this means that preferred educational values in Czech families are a mixture of traditional, modern and pro-social orientation. Regarding the dimension of individuality and sociability, or the axis of self-centred achievement and altruism which was found in Western European countries, it is impossible to reach a more precisely formulated model based on our findings, as the case appears to be more of both types of qualities appearing next to each other in a disor-

derly fashion. Preferred Czech educational values can thus according to this perspective be labelled as a mixture of values aiming at the same time at the individual and the society.

Figure 5. Grouping of educational preferences using multidimensional scaling, CR 1999



4. What is the position of the Czech Republic among other European countries according to preferred educational values in the family?

The most frequently mentioned and the least preferred qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home are rather similar in European countries (see Table 4). If we first compare the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, in 1991 the average rank-order of the most preferred values in the listed Western countries was as follows: 1. *responsibility*, 2. *tolerance*, 3. *good manners*, 4. *independence*, and 5. *thrift*. In Eastern European countries it ran as follows: 1. *good manners* (3rd in the West), 2. *responsibility* (1st), 3. *tolerance* (2nd), 4. *hard work* and 5. *independence*.

Table 4. Preferences of educational values in European countries in 1991 and 1999

	Responsibility		Tolerance		Good manners		Independence		Thrift		Obedience		Determination		Imagination		Hard work		Unselfishness		Religious faith	
	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99	91	99
France	72	73	78	84	53	69	27	27	36	38	53	36	39	39	23	18	53	50	40	40	13	8
Germany	85	84	77	73	67	62	73	70	45	35	22	11	49	46	32	30	15	24	8	6	20	15
Austria	85	86	66	71	78	78	63	71	55	48	25	17	39	36	24	24	14	10	7	5	23	20
Italy	82	81	66	75	79	75	31	41	29	35	34	28	27	34	15	12	27	36	39	41	37	31
Spain	80	85	75	82	83	86	36	34	27	33	44	48	21	27	41	33	29	21	5	3	28	20
Portugal	77	60	69	85	82	77	24	22	31	36	45	39	23	24	20	15	67	69	28	40	26	24
Netherlands	85	87	87	91	79	80	48	54	29	21	33	25	31	35	22	32	14	14	22	28	15	9
Belgium	72	80	69	83	72	78	36	41	36	43	37	43	39	44	18	23	36	38	28	29	16	14
Denmark	86	81	81	87	66	72	81	80	19	10	20	14	30	32	37	37	2	2	50	56	9	8
Sweden	89	87	91	92	78	70	36	69	48	30	25	12	33	30	40	41	5	4	29	33	6	5
West-mean	**81**	**80**	**76**	**82**	**74**	**75**	**46**	**51**	**36**	**33**	**34**	**27**	**33**	**35**	**27**	**27**	**26**	**27**	**26**	**28**	**19**	**15**
GDR	84	79	74	70	87	67	67	70	58	44	24	17	54	51	28	27	16	20	9	12	16	6
Poland	68	73	76	80	45	57	12	22	44	38	42	32	27	35	10	13	87	85	9	12	63	43
Bulgaria	68	75	52	59	72	69	62	42	39	39	19	16	41	56	16	19	91	86	22	14	11	15
Czech Republic	***60***	***66***	***67***	***63***	***88***	***87***	***66***	***69***	***35***	***32***	***20***	***17***	***26***	***29***	***5***	***7***	***83***	***73***	***34***	***37***	***10***	***6***
Slovakia	62	67	52	57	88	73	59	61	32	39	35	26	24	25	8	3	82	75	20	19	32	33
Slovenia	71	76	75	70	89	78	33	70	58	35	40	25	42	54	10	12	32	29	33	38	21	18
East-mean	**69**	**73**	**66**	**67**	**78**	**72**	**50**	**56**	**44**	**38**	**30**	**22**	**36**	**42**	**13**	**14**	**65**	**61**	**21**	**22**	**26**	**20**

In 1999 these preferences remained basically the same in Western countries, only *thrift* was substituted by *determination*. In Eastern countries the order was as follows: 1. *responsibility* (2nd in 1991 in Eastern Europe), 2. *good manners* (1st), 3. *tolerance* (3rd), 4. *independence* (5th), and 5. *determination*. So the substitution of one value, that of *hard work* by *determination*, also occurred in this case.

Data in Table 4, which show the distribution of individual qualities, are supplemented by the multidimensional scaling figure, which places each country in two-dimensional space according to the similarity of preferences of educational values. Figures 6 and 7 show the findings for both compared years. In both periods the Czech Republic appears close to Slovakia and Bulgaria. Countries like Sweden and the Netherlands are situated opposite this group, while at the end of the 1990s they were joined by Denmark. In 1991 countries like Spain, Italy and Slovenia were related to these countries in an even looser way. France and Portugal together occupied 'their own' quadrant, and Poland was joined to them, probably due to the inclination toward religious values. The remaining quadrant is mostly occupied by countries from the German-speaking world – Austria and both Germanys. In 1991 Denmark was added to them, while in 1999 Slovenia moved to join them.

Figure 6. The position of selected European countries in relation to preferences of educational values in 1991 – multidimensional scaling



Note: Stress = 0.16, $R^2 = 0.90$

Figure 7. The position of selected European countries in relation to preferences of educational values in 1999 – multidimensional scaling



Note: Stress = 0.13, $R^2 = 0.91$

According to the vertical axis (Dimension 2), the Czech Republic was positioned in 1999 in the group consisting not only of the geographically close Austria, both Germanys and Slovakia, but also including Bulgaria and Slovenia. From a cultural perspective the influence of these countries on Czech history and vice versa certainly cannot be omitted. It seems that in the context of educational preferences the influence still continues to be present. If we exchanged the rather static view of Figures 6 and 7 for a dynamic one, throughout the 1990s only Slovenia and Denmark provide cases in which, from the perspective of educational value preferences, a shift occurred to other quadrants and thus to other imaginary neighbourhoods of values. The position of other countries remained more or less unchanged. In 1999, the Czech Republic became somewhat distant from its Slavic neighbours (Slovakia and Bulgaria), while the latter became more tightly linked. Overall, in 1999, the formation of European countries acquired the appearance of some kind of a necklace, with different European countries hanging on it as pendants. However, the inner formula for their hanging arrangement cannot be deduced from the figure.

In order to see how the depicted similarity is filled with empirical data, we regrouped the data from Table 4 in a way that enables us to put the countries in a sequence according to the results of multidimensional scaling. The result is shown in Table 5, though due to austerity measures we only deal with data from 1999.

Table 5. The similarity of European countries according to preferred educational values in 1999

	Respons-ibility	Tolerance	Good manners	Independ-ence	Thrift	Obedience	Determin-ation	Imagin-ation	Hard work	Unselfish-ness	Religious faith
Cluster 1											
Austria	86	71	78	71	48	17	36	24	10	5	20
GDR	79	70	67	70	44	17	51	27	20	12	6
Germany	84	73	62	70	35	11	46	30	24	6	15
Slovenia	76	70	78	70	35	25	54	12	29	38	18
Mean	**81**	**71**	**71**	**70**	**41**	**18**	**47**	**23**	**21**	**15**	**15**
Cluster 2											
Czech Republic	66	63	87	69	32	17	29	7	73	37	6
Bulgaria	75	59	69	42	39	16	56	19	86	14	15
Slovakia	67	57	73	61	39	26	25	3	75	19	33
Mean	**69**	**60**	**76**	**57**	**37**	**20**	**37**	**10**	**78**	**23**	**18**
Cluster 3											
Denmark	81	87	72	80	10	14	32	37	2	56	8
Sweden	87	92	70	69	30	12	30	41	4	33	5
Mean	**84**	**90**	**71**	**75**	**20**	**13**	**31**	**39**	**3**	**45**	**7**
Cluster 4											
Netherlands	87	91	80	54	21	25	35	32	14	28	9
Belgium	80	83	78	41	43	43	44	23	38	29	14
Italy	81	75	75	41	35	28	34	12	36	41	31
Mean	**83**	**83**	**78**	**45**	**33**	**32**	**38**	**22**	**29**	**33**	**18**
Residuals											
Spain	85	82	86	34	33	48	27	33	21	3	20
France	73	84	69	27	38	36	39	18	50	40	8
Portugal	60	85	77	22	36	39	24	15	69	40	24
Poland	73	80	57	22	38	32	35	13	85	12	43

It seems to be that from the perspective of dividing countries into those 'in transformation' as opposed to Western European societies other factors rather than such a dichotomy play a role. These include geographic, linguistic, religious and general cultural circumstances. The clusters of individual countries clearly suggest this. Only in the case of the value neighbourhood of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Bulgaria might, apart from these circumstances, their common 'socialist' past also play a role. However, Poland, as well as Slovenia and the former GDR, do not fit this interpretation.

In answering the question whether any continuities are detectable from the social and political development in post-communist countries as compared to the countries of Western Europe, we can therefore state that the expected continuities were not found.

Summary and discussion

In this paper we dealt with the question of how qualities which children should be encouraged to learn at home are preferred in the Czech Republic as well as in other European countries. We have reached the conclusion that, in the field of education, the Czech population prefers the following qualities: good manners, hard work, independence, responsibility and tolerance. It is clear from this structure that we are dealing with a mixture of traditional, modern and pro-social qualities. An important feature of Czech educational preferences is the fact that their structure has remained the same during nearly ten years of transformation, that is, from 1991 to 1999.

Another finding that we reached is that in the Czech Republic no formula according to which educational value preferences were sorted was found. This fact leads us to the conclusion that with regard to educational values Czech society is markedly homogeneous.

We also found that the structure of the five most preferred educational values that we detected in the Czech Republic is similar to the structure of preferences in other European countries. Nonetheless, in terms of the overall structuration of preferences of educational values, individual European countries differ. In 1999 the Czech Republic was positioned in a space between Bulgaria and Slovakia on the one hand, and Germany, Austria and Slovenia on the other – a space that we called German-Slavic.

In her work dealing with a similar topic, Stenberg [1997] uses Hall's concept of 'late modernity', which reflects a kind of transitional phase between the modernity of industrial society and the post-modernity of post-industrial society. In terms of values this means, on the one hand, the reflexivity and fragmentation of value systems, and at the same time, on the other hand, a tendency towards the globalisation of values. In Hall's [1992] terms this involves a tendency toward global homogenisation and at the same time toward local differentiation. It would probably be possible to interpret our findings, which present a European 'map' of educational values in the family, on the basis of this viewpoint.

Preferred educational values in the family are, as we suggested at the beginning of this paper, an individual matter of each family alone. However, it has become clear that the educational environment of the Czech family is influenced by universally shared notions about what children should be taught and how they should be brought up, because, as the findings of this paper suggest, the structure of preferences is the same in various social groups of Czech society.

If we were too optimistic, in a pedagogical sense, then we would probably believe that the found repeated preference of *good manners*, *hard work*, *independence*, *responsibility* and *tolerance* could be a certain promise that new generations of Czech citizens will be well-mannered and independent individuals who will show tolerance towards their surroundings. This together with their hard work and responsibility could perhaps one day lead the Czech Republic to belong among the most developed European societies.

However, as long as we are sociologically realistic we know that the selection of ideal educational values from the battery of offered issues during sociological research is guided by different rules than real everyday education in the family. Therefore, we will not be surprised if future generations of Czechs in the end acquire qualities that differ from those that their parents verbally preferred in the 1990s.

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