CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Sociologický časopis



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*Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW je recenzovaný oborový časopis zaměřený na oblast sociologické teorie a metodologie, přinášející výsledky a interpretace sociologických výzkumů. Zaměřuje se na rozvoj oboru a jeho výuku a zároveň chce být užitečný při řešení praktických problémů české sociální a ekonomické politiky.

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Scope and Mission

*Sociologický časopis/*CZECH SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW is a scholarly review focusing on the field of sociological theory and methodology, and the dissemination of the results and interpretation of sociological research. Its attention is directed towards the development of the field and its teaching, while simultaneously striving to contribute to the solution of the practical problems of Czech social and economic policy.

Manuscript Submission

The editors require three legible copies, which do not state the name or workplace of the author, in order for the review process to be anonymous on both sides. The accompanying letter should contain a complete contact address, including telephone number and e-mail address. Submission of a manuscript to another journal, while it is under review by the *SČ/*CSR, is deemed unethical.

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Editorial decisions: Decisions are generally made within eight weeks from the date of the manuscript's arrival.

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Editorial

As of the year 2002 the *Czech Sociological Review (CSR)* has an international board and has come under new editorship. Together with *Sociologický časopis* it comprises a single journal that is published every two months - four issues a year in Czech and two issues in English. Each language edition has its own editor and editorial board.

The mission of the CSR is to contribute to the 'comparative knowledge' on transformation and to an analysis of the journey the Central-East European (CEE) countries are undertaking towards the advanced world. Simultaneously, it should also monitor the stronger integration of Czech and 'regional' sociology into the international context.

We would therefore like to invite contributions from authors worldwide, whether from the CEE region or from the West, who are interested in 'transformation issues'. Our aim is also to introduce post-graduate students from abroad to the local and regional public, as many young foreign researchers remain unknown to the local public, in spite of the fact their work is well done and often covers new research fields. We consider the inclusion of the article by Jonathan A. Terra in this issue to be a good start in this direction.

Equally, we intend to inform the international community about social and political research under way in the Czech Republic and the CEE region. 'Regional' sociology is rich and certainly has much to offer. It could become richer still through the use of all possible channels to connect it with the 'world'. The CEE region itself continues to constitute a major social experiment and offers itself as a challenge to sociological methods and imagination.

Hence we are calling for articles that contribute to the study of CEE societies, preferably those revealing new dimensions and facets of transformation. While we intend to present empirical analyses, we also wish to remain attentive to the development of a particular 'transition' theory and methodology. The comparative perspective and the integration of sociological and political knowledge into an international context represent areas of particular interest.

In this space I would like to take the opportunity to introduce the new CSR Editorial Board. First, its international members:

- Professor Joseph S. Drew is, alongside his many other activities, the editor of the *Contemporary Civilization Review.* He is strongly linked to the region currently as the President of the *Anglo-American College*, a small but promising and expanding private university in Prague.
- Professor Georges Mink is a specialist in post-communist issues who teaches political science at the University Paris X-Nanterre. Currently he is the Director of *Centre français de recherche en sciences sociales (CEFRES),* which is an establishment of the French government in Prague that hosts graduate students and organises conferences on various transitional topics (see the information in this issue).
- Professor Ivan Szelényi is an outstanding researcher of the post-communist transformation and comparative social stratification (see the review article of Petr Matějů in this issue). He teaches sociology at the University of California in Los Angeles (UCLA)

and is at present very active in establishing sociological studies at the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest.

- Professor Georg Vobruba is a prominent scholar in the field of social policy, in particular in relation to EU integration and the globalisation process (the review of his most recent book in German will be published in our next issue). He is currently Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Leipzig. Several of his articles have already been published in *Sociologický časopis* (in Czech).

The 'Czech section' of the board includes my closest colleague, Petr Matějů, who was of great help to me when the CSR was launched in 1991 (I was the editor of both language versions until 1993). The other members of the board are Zdenka Mansfeldová, who is Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences (the official publisher of the CSR) and Marek Skovajsa who, also as of this year, is the editor of the Czech edition of the journal (*Sociologický časopis*).

We very much hope that with the help of outstanding foreign scholars and Czech colleagues we will succeed in enhancing the standards of the CSR and increasing its attractiveness to both authors and readers. The list of foreign members of the editorial board remains open, and we are searching for other prominent scholars who are active in transformation research, and are training advanced students, as potential and very welcome authors, in the field that forms the subject of our interest.

Jiří Večerník
Editor-in-Chief

Political Parties, Party Systems and Economic Reform: Testing Hypotheses against Evidence from Postcommunist Countries*

JONATHAN A. TERRA**
Stanford University, USA

Abstract: Numerous scholars whose research focuses on the developed OECD countries, as well as the democratizing states of Latin America and East Asia, have attempted to answer the question "How do institutional structures affect political and economic performance in free-market, democratic societies?" These inquiries have yielded a rich and useful body of literature. By contrast, surprisingly few scholars have produced useful comparisons of political institutions and regime performance in postcommunist countries. Studies comparing postcommunist institutional performance usually suffer from an inadequate empirical treatment of cases. When studies are empirically rich and accurate, they tend to focus on a single case, and thus lack the insight of comparison. Testing hypotheses from the literature on political institutions and the political economy of democratic transitions against recent evidence from postcommunist cases allows us to gauge variations in the institutional correlates of reform in democratic systems in different regions at different levels of development. Analysis of evidence from postcommunist dual transitions, specifically from Poland and the Czech Republic, also forces us to consider the possibility that variables and causal patterns driving outcomes in one group of cases may be systematically different than variables and causal patterns in another.
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Introduction

Many scholars whose research focuses on the developed OECD countries, as well as the democratizing states of Latin America and East Asia, have attempted to answer the question "How do institutional structures affect political and economic performance in free-market, democratic societies?" These inquiries have yielded a rich and useful body of literature. By contrast, surprisingly few scholars have produced - or even attempted to produce - useful comparisons of political institutions and regime performance in postcommunist countries. In this paper I test hypotheses from the literature on the political economy of democratic transitions against recent evidence from postcommunist cases. Doing

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so with recent evidence in a paired-case comparison allows us to gauge variations in the institutional correlates of reform in democratic systems in different regions at different levels of development. Careful analysis of detailed evidence from postcommunist dual transitions, specifically from Poland and the Czech Republic, forces us to consider the possibility that variables and causal patterns driving outcomes in one group of cases may be systematically different than variables and causal patterns in another. The same evidence also suggests the need to rethink some important hypotheses from the literature on political institutions and democratic performance, and it allows us to assess the explanatory power of arguments from the literature on institutional design and economic reform.

First, I review various works on party system attributes and economic reform, while focusing on several well-known hypotheses concerning democratic institutional choice and political and economic performance. Second, I look at party system choice as a possible remedy for problems associated with political polarization and fragmentation. Third, I compare evidence from the first decade of reform in East Central Europe, focusing on party system attributes, modes of interest representation and economic reform. And fourth, I explore how political imperatives found in postcommunist systems create specific incentives for party-building strategies, and I look at the effect such strategies have on the quality of democratic political participation and the perceived legitimacy of political institutions.

Party system attributes and the empirical correlates of economic reform

As numerous authors point out [Shugart & Carey 1992; Haggard & Kaufman 1992; Bresser Pereira, Maraval & Przeworski 1993; Mainwaring 1993; Stepan & Skatch 1993; Horowitz 1993; Lijphart 1993a, 1993b; Linz 1993a, 1993b; Diamond 1999], the political institutions which structure contestation between social groups over economic reform policy, including privatization and the provision of a social safety net for citizens who are particularly vulnerable to market forces, must function properly for democracy to consolidate and for economic policies to bear fruit. In their broad-ranging study of democratization and economic adjustment in Latin America, East Asia and Turkey, Haggard & Kaufman [1995a] find that the characteristics of party systems have profound and predictable consequences for the ability of governments to formulate and implement reform policies. Unstable and fragmented party systems, they argue, tend to complicate the negotiation of stable agreements among interest groups, while simultaneously undermining coordination within the ruling coalition, between the legislative and executive branches, and among different parts of the state apparatus [see also Haggard & Webb 1994a]. How these effects operate depends to some extent on whether a system is parliamentary or presidential, as well as the degree of proportionality in the relationship between votes and seats.

In parliamentary systems with proportional representation (PR) rules and high proportionality, a large number of (often unstable) parties complicates coalition formation and duration. In some cases - as in Poland and the Czech Republic at various junctures since 1991 - parliamentarism with PR rules can result in weak minority governments which are unable to push through reforms authoritatively and rapidly, and which must enter into severe compromises in order to pass legislation. The case of Spain demonstrates the effects of both weak minority and strong majority government on policy making and the implementation of structural reforms: Under the first post-Franco government led by the cen-

ter-right Center Democratic Union (UCD), the minority government had difficulty in pushing through many aspects of its economic reform program; in contrast, the Socialist Workers' Party of Spain's (PSOE) legislative majority allowed it to pass a significantly more comprehensive reform program, despite its center-left ideological position [Bermeo & García-Durán 1994]. In addition to the problem of weak minority government, dividing cabinet posts among numerous parties in PR systems can undermine the decision-making and coordination capacity of governments. Furthermore, when party coalitions in proportional systems contain numerous members, "wars of attrition" may occur. In this scenario, observed in both developing countries and OECD states, small parties representing groups with conflicting distributional claims exercise their veto power over policy decisions, thereby complicating reform efforts [Alesina 1994, 48-51].

In presidential systems party fragmentation also increases the possibility that executives will lack the power and authority to pursue reforms. Moreover, under presidentialism small parties have fewer incentives to cooperate with governments, since there is no option to threaten early elections, and the potential for legislative blackmail is correspondingly high [Mainwaring 1993]. Irrespective of the organization of executive power, polarization and fragmentation affect the ability of governments to pursue economic reform polices in a variety of ways [Haggard & Kaufman 1995, 170-171]. When strong left-wing, populist or movement parties are competitive in such systems, implementing reform policies becomes more difficult, since they exacerbate partisan conflict and have the power to turn labor and the popular sector against reform. In contrast, where left and populist parties are weak or absent and polarization is not a factor, coordination problems may ensue from the struggle for patronage and pork-barrel expenditures, and incentives for cooperation on behalf of reforms providing public goods decreases. The combination of fragmentation and polarization also creates opportunities for anti-reform groups to increase distributional demands on the state. This tendency increases when left or populist movements are divided and compete for the support of trade unions and other groups linked to the popular sector. The combination of fragmentation and polarization also negatively influences the ability of governments to manage economic policies by exacerbating political-business cycles [Alesina 1994, 40-47].

Cohesive party systems correlate with decidedly different patterns of policymaking. In contrast to fragmentation and polarization [Sartori 1976, 132-37], which tend to correlate, the combination of cohesion and polarization in party systems is unlikely, since strongly ideological or radical parties generally remain uncompetitive in systems with a low number of parties. Incentive structures in two-party systems also tend to push left, populist and movement parties toward the political center. In two-party systems, inter- and intraparty structures create incentives for moderation. In these systems, parties compete for the support of swing voters who occupy the middle of the political spectrum; but when politicians "crowd the center", and the median voter or powerful interests oppose reform, such competition can postpone necessary policy adjustments and may lead to stalemates. Two-party systems also correlate positively with more moderate forms of interest aggregation, since interest groups are "forced to operate in the context of an encompassing coalition in which diverse interests are represented and among which compromises must be struck" [Haggard & Kaufman 1995a, 172]. Cohesive party systems with low polarization may also create opportunities for political patronage; when reform programs threaten patronage networks or pork-barrel programs favored by core constituents, party leaders are likely to oppose policy changes.

In contrast with the above dilemmas, catch-all parties in cohesive, non-polarized systems have advantages in generating support for initiating reforms during economic crises. They can also bolster subsequent support for economic reform after initial policies begin to produce positive results. Catch-all parties are also less likely than left-wing parties to adopt confrontational, polarizing policy positions when reforms fail to produce the desired outcomes. Left, populist and movement parties in both fragmented and coherent party systems are more likely than catch-all parties to launch a "principled opposition" to adjustment policies, and they are "more inclined to back these appeals with support for labor activism and other forms of social protest" [ibid., 173]. Moreover, in consolidated, cohesive party systems left-wing and populist parties have incentives to broaden their electoral appeal beyond their core constituency in order to display their moderation and convince voters of their ability to govern. The left-leaning Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) successfully pursued such a strategy during the 1998 parliamentary elections, despite the periodic instability of the Czech party system. This option has been less available to the Union of the Democratic Left (SLD) in Poland, since strong ideological polarization among the Polish electorate has created limits to the SLD's appeal beyond its core (but steadily expanding) left-of-center constituency (see below). In fragmented systems, however, movements toward the political center are more dangerous than in cohesive systems, since competing factions can appeal to more radical constituencies, thereby depriving moderating left or populist parties of votes.

Another potentially important advantage for governing left-wing parties in cohesive systems is that frequently observed corporatist links with organized labor and other interests threatened by economic adjustment can integrate labor into the political process "in ways that provide the basis for compromise, social pacts, and enhanced policy credibility" [idem 1994b, 17]. Corporatist links with labor in such cases may also make it easier for left-wing parties "to gain trust and negotiate compensatory agreements that permit reform to move forward" [idem, 1995a, 174]. Haggard & Kaufman cite Chile [ibid., 257-264; cf. Arriagada Herrera & Graham 1994, 274-276] as an example of this, while a similar pattern existed in Spain during the PSOE reforms of the 1980s [Bermeo & García-Durán 1994], Poland (from 1993-1997), and to a considerably more limited extent in the Czech Republic (from 1998-2001).

Although predictable patterns of relationships between party system structure and the ability of policy makers to implement economic reform programs may exist, the question "Which form of government is best for coherent economic management?" appears to have no correct answer. From their study sample of 12 cases, to which they add data from 11 others, Haggard & Kaufman conclude that "[t]here is no clear pattern differentiating presidential and parliamentary systems with respect to their capacity to manage the economy or undertake economic reform" [1995a, 352]. This result resembles Shugart & Carey's mixed finding [1992, 38-43] more than Stepan & Skatch's [1993] conclusion that parliamentary regimes are more durable than presidential ones (and hence offer advantages for policymakers pursuing reforms). In both crisis and non-crisis cases of economic reform, Haggard & Kaufman conclude, "some of the central difficulties of policymaking had less to do with the executive's relationship with the legislature than with the difficulty of securing the cooperation of business and unions. Parliamentarism offers no guarantees that these relationships would be handled more effectively" [1995a, 348].

While past studies suggest that no firm or systematic answers exist concerning the relationship between party system structure and the organization of executive power,

on the one hand, and economic reform outcomes, on the other, several findings from Haggard & Kaufman's study stand out. First, all severe cases of hyperinflation from their data set existed under presidential or mixed presidential-parliamentary systems. Second, economic performance (particularly with regard to inflation rates) in several "pure" Westminster systems was relatively positive; this, however, may be linked less to parliamentarism than to other British institutional legacies, including strong currency boards [ibid., 353]. Third, differences in economic performance among cases appears to be linked as much to the number of parties as to whether a system is presidential or parliamentary. Fourth, all cases in which high growth coexisted with relatively low inflation, be they presidential or parliamentary, resembled two-party or dominant-party systems. Fifth, as Mainwaring [1993] also contends, the "difficult combination" of presidentialism and polarized multipartism can be especially destabilizing; party fragmentation, however, has also caused serious problems for parliamentary regimes. Sixth, party fragmentation and polarization are both cause and consequence of poor economic performance; but this hardly negates the conclusion that the nature of the party system is "a crucial variable in understanding the possibility of reconciling democratic consolidation and economic reform". Finally, while constitutional change toward parliamentarism might create incentives for politicians to build stronger organizations and extend the range of possible parliamentary alliances, switching to parliamentarism - which, in any case, has never been attempted and appears highly unlikely to occur - would entail "serious risks" if it were not accompanied by simultaneous reform of the party system and the electoral rules on which that system is based [Haggard & Kaufman 1995a, 355]. A more realistic and hopeful strategy would instead focus on institutional reforms which "encourage the evolution of less fragmented party systems capable of aggregating interests and organizing consent" [idem 1995b, 12].

Is party system choice a remedy for the problems of political polarization and fragmentation?

Different types of party systems present different ways of dealing with the problems of political polarization and fragmentation. Two-party systems, which have a relatively strong record of macroeconomic performance and democratic stability, generally provide some role for labor, left-wing and various other minority interests, "but as distinctly junior partners to the elite-dominated centrist parties that compete for overlapping cross-class constituencies". Most new democracies, choosing representativeness over governability and efficiency, have adopted electoral rules which discourage two-party systems. Two-party systems have the potential for becoming dominated by elite-controlled party machines, which risks "undermining coherent economic policy and...taking on exclusionary features that can weaken support for the political system as a whole". The biggest challenge in two-party systems is to find ways of increasing participation and social compensation without resorting to institutionalized, and costly, patronage systems [idem 1995a, 355-357].

In multiethnic or regionally diverse societies, successful economic reform and democratic consolidation could possibly be achieved through consociational power-sharing agreements [Lijphart 1977] in which influential ethnic and/or regional groups secure a significant degree of autonomy. Aside from being a poor match for structural conditions in most postcommunist countries - including monoethnic Poland and the territorially and

ethnically coherent Czech Republic[1] - such systems run the risk of framing distributional issues along ethnic and/or regional lines, instead of the traditional left-right socioeconomic axis, and political mobilization campaigns are more likely to focus on distributive claims that resemble zero-sum struggles. Where one group dominates in such a system, it will likely attempt to monopolize the "political gains of office", as in Malaysia and Sri Lanka; in cases where ethnic or regional divisions are less disproportionate, "the political bargains required to sustain the system are likely to deepen fundamental economic problems", as in the case of Nigeria [Haggard & Kaufman 1995a, 358].

In contrast with two-party and consociational systems, center-right dominant and social democrat-dominant party systems present viable and (judging from the preferences of the vast majority of regional political elites) acceptable models for the development of postcommunist states. These two options are most likely to emerge where ideological divisions have been deepened by histories of strong partisan loyalties, "working-class subcultures", or recent worker mobilization, and the shape of the party system "will turn heavily on the political allegiances of the middle classes and rural sector" [ibid., 358]. As studies of class and democratization demonstrate [Ertman 1998], a rural-middle class alliance could create the basis for a powerful conservative coalition, while a rural-working class alliance could create the basis for a social democratic coalition. Either model could serve as the institutional foundation for postcommunist states in CEE, as in other regions undergoing structural adjustment.

One possible, and less desirable, outcome of the center-right system, according to Haggard & Kaufman, would be the emergence of a "Japanese model" in which business interests and investment are privileged over the working class, consumption and state transfers. Although this scenario would likely include strong central control over monetary and fiscal policy, it could also entail several potentially problematic developments, including the long-term relegation of labor to the status of democratic opposition, which could be reinforced by legal or political mechanisms which limit their access to power and the right to be fully "included" in systems of interest representation. Such a system resembles, in many important ways, that which evolved in the Czech Republic from 1993 to 1998. The exclusionary aspects of this model could complicate democratic consolidation and are likely to outweigh any alleged advantages in terms of promoting growth. Furthermore, a labor movement weakened by market conditions and legal or political restraints, and faced by an ideologically coherent right and a middle class unwilling to cooperate with the left, could become politically alienated as a result of its marginal status. This, in turn, could lead to political polarization and a search for quasi-authoritarian "solutions" to the problems of right-

[1] In obvious contrast to Czechoslovakia, which split into two sovereign states because of outstanding economic reform policy differences (namely the speed, scope, method and sequencing of restructuring and privatization) which fell along regional and ethnic lines and a formerly fictive Soviet-style constitution which, when it became a valid document, was ill-suited for resolving federal-level disputes. The most significant weaknesses in this regard were: (1) relatively small shares of votes in republic-level assemblies gave parties the power to block federal-level legislation; (2) each republican prime minister had *de facto* veto power over the other, which discouraged policy compromise; and (3), in contrast with Western and Northern European parliamentary systems, neither the federal prime minister nor the head of state could dissolve parliament in case of an impasse. On the break-up of Czechoslovakia, see the essays in Musil [1995].

left power asymmetry. Such risks are alleged to have existed at various developmental junctures in Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and Mexico [Haggard & Kaufman1995a, 359].

By contrast, Haggard & Kaufman argue, a social democrat-dominated party system would promote equity, welfare, employment, and could be based on a neocorporatist-style social compact in which labor exchanges wage restraint for participation in the formulation (and often implementation) of social, industrial and macroeconomic policies. When compared to center-right and perhaps even two-party-systems, they emphasize, "inclusionary features of the social democratic outcome could provide it with a relatively broad base of legitimacy and support". But it remains unclear whether or not a sustainable social democratic coalition is possible in CEE in an era of declining union density and a rapidly growing middle class. In order to be competitive and build durable coalitions, social democratic parties "will have to incorporate small businesses, the informal sector, or new social movements whose interests with respect to gender, employment issues, and the environment often conflict with the claims of the working-class base" [ibid., 361]. Thus, a paradoxical situation arises in which the best hope for a "strategic renewal", as Kitschelt [1994a, 1994b] describes it, and the creation of an enduring social democratic coalition in an era of structural shifts in the international economy and a changing electoral marketplace appears to rest on the de-emphasis traditional of labor concerns and a search for alternative sources of electoral success. The allegedly anomalous combination of ruling social democratic parties and orthodox trade and adjustment policies has been observed in numerous cases of transition to democracy and the market, including Spain, Chile, Argentina, Poland, Hungary, and more recently, the Czech Republic. But the correlation of social democratic parties in power and liberal economic reform should not surprise us in light of the evidence that conservative fiscal and monetary policy can coexist with activist labor market and investment polices when strong links exist between governing social democratic parties and centralized, encompassing labor unions which facilitate wage restraint and working class quiescence (Garrett & Lange 1991 [cited also in Haggard & Kaufman 1995a, 362]).

Party system attributes, interest representation and economic reform: Poland and the Czech Republic in comparative perspective

Empirical evidence from Poland and the Czech Republic lends mixed support to hypotheses concerning party system attributes and economic reform outcomes. In some instances, evidence appears to contradict existing arguments. For example, unstable, fragmented party systems are alleged to undermine policy coordination within ruling coalitions, complicate the negotiation of compromises between policymakers and interest groups, and increase tension between the executive and legislative branches of government. But the period of extraordinary policy consensus in 1990, characterized by a broad agreement on the need for radical macroeconomic stabilization [Balcerowicz 1995], meant that the combination of fragmentation and polarization did not have the hypothesized effect of increasing anti-reformist demands until roughly one year after the implementation of stabilization polices in Poland, after the social costs of reform had already risen sharply [see Johnson & Kowalska 1994]. By late 1993 the distributional demands of groups hurt by reform helped shape the policies of the left SLD-PSL coalition. The main

cause of this, however, was the temporary drop in material welfare associated with macroeconomic reform, not party system fragmentation. Fragmentation instead appears to have been a secondary factor which magnified policy-induced dissatisfaction among groups which suffered disproportionately as a result of the Balcerowicz stabilization plan. More important in terms of counterevidence, the non-cooperation of trade unions belonging to an ideologically divided worker movement with links to competing parties on the right and left minimized the hypothesized impact of left or populist competition for labor support, which tends to increase distributional demands on the state and dilute reform policies. In many instances policy adjustments were consistent with the stated policy preferences of both Solidarity and the "postcommunist" OPZZ, but workers actively opposed those policies if they were associated with their partisan ideological opponents.[2]

While populist and partisan cycles in fragmented and polarized party systems tend to produce significant policy reversals, in both Poland and the Czech Republic, as well as many other postcommunist countries, new governments have tended to make adjustments to policies inherited from their predecessors only at the margins [see Hellman 1998]. This pattern holds even when parties are ideologically polarized, as in the case of Poland under left government from 1993 to 1997, and again under right government from 1997 to 2001. The same limited, marginal adjustments also occurred in the Czech Republic after a social democratic government assumed power in 1998 (although the Czech party system is somewhat less ideologically polarized than the Polish party system).[3] Once a reform course is set in the context of dual transitions, major modifications or reversals are costly. The case of Slovakia, where the post-Mečiar coalition government which took power in 1998 had difficulty (but ultimately succeeded) in restarting a process of reform which had stalled under the preceding nationalist-populist government (*BCE: The Annual* 2000, 26), demonstrates this point. In addition, international pressures to maintain reforms in postcommunist countries create strong incentives to limit the scope of policy adjustments. These pressures are especially powerful in the case of EU accession states - be they part of the Luxembourg Group likely to join by 2005, or part of the larger group of countries likely to gain membership at a later date - where significant deviations threaten the process of international institutional integration.

Limitation of policy adjustments under new governments in the vast majority of postcommunist states - even when they are ideologically opposed to their predecessors - to the pace or sequencing of implementation, as opposed to wholesale adjustments to policy programs, forms a marked contrast to cases of economic reform in other developing regions. Also in contrast to most (but not all) cases in the developing world, left-wing parties have initiated radical reform policies in some postcommunist countries when right-of-center parties stalled. The case of Hungary under the social democratic government which took power in 1994 serves as the most commonly cited example; the left-wing SLD-UP majority coalition which won the September 2001 Polish parliamentary elections also promised necessary budget restraint and economic austerity during their successful electoral campaign (*WBTN*, July-Sep 2001). The ČSSD-led acceleration of difficult and polit-

[2] This occurred, for example, during negotiations on the Pact On State Enterprises in 1993 when representatives of OPZZ and Solidarity refused to sit at the same table.

[3] The social democratic minority government, for example, increased the pace of economic liberalization significantly in many areas in comparison with their *soi-disant* neoliberal predecessors.

ically-risky aspects of the privatization process in the Czech Republic also shows that left-wing parties may initiate radical reform policies in postcommunist countries when their right-of-center opponents fail to do so.[4] These examples also lend indirect support to the hypothesis that incorporation into government tends to cause left parties to modify their policy positions. While this is supposed to be more likely in coherent than in fragmented party systems, in both Poland and the Czech Republic moderating left governments continued reform programs in moderately fragmented systems - in the former with a strong majority, and in the latter under the auspices of the Opposition Agreement.[5]

Because of the generally perceived limits of what governments can do once they assume power in postcommunist countries, the hypothesis that left parties are likely to launch a "principled opposition" to reform polices needs to be qualified. When left-wing politicians have invoked "principle" in opposing existing reform programs it has been mostly during election campaigns. Such opposition has remained mostly rhetorical, and has almost universally waned once parties of the left assumed office. Both Poland under the SLD-PSL coalition and the Czech Republic under the ČSSD government demonstrate this trend. This pattern, however, has not prevented the emergence of a strategic political blame-game. In this commonly observed scenario social democratic governments pursing the same radical reform course as their ostensibly liberal predecessors attempt to deflect criticism from their constituents who voted for reform relief by claiming they need to "sort out the mess" bequeathed to them by the previous government. And the only way of doing so, according to the typical claim, is by accelerating certain aspects of free-market reforms. This happened in Poland after the rise of the left coalition in 1993, and again after the left assumed power in 2001. The same process occurred in the Czech Republic after the rise to power of the ČSSD in 1998 on the basis of the Opposition Agreement, and in Hungary after the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) won an absolute majority in the 1994 parliamentary elections.[6]

The case of Poland from 1991 to 1993 confirms the hypothesis that in fragmented presidential systems executives, namely prime ministers, are likely to lack the power and authority to pursue reforms effectively. When commanding a parliamentary majority becomes difficult, and small parties possess the power of legislative blackmail - a particularly dangerous threat in systems such as Poland's which permit non-constructive votes of confidence - the pursuit of reforms which require only a moderate degree of austerity may become difficult. The Suchocka government's loss of a non-constructive vote of confi-

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[4] This included, most notably, privatization of the banking, telecom and (to a lesser extent) energy sectors, as well as implementation of an incentive program for foreign investors, which lacked during the era of economic nationalism under the Klaus government.

[5] According to the Czech Opposition Agreement the ODS supported the minority ČSSD government in return for control over key parliamentary institutions (including the influential position of parliamentary speaker) and a coordinated attempt to alter electoral rules in a way which would favor the creation of a two-party system (to be dominated by ODS and ČSSD). The Czech Constitutional Court judged the attempt at the latter to be unconstitutional in January 2001. The terms of the Opposition Agreement were renewed and extended to new areas of policy bargaining with the signing of the so-called Edict of Tolerance in January 2000. See *LN* (11 July 2001).

[6] Despite winning an absolute majority of seats in the 1994 elections the MSzP formed a coalition government with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz), which effectively allowed them to "share the blame" for economic austerity policies.

dence (by a single vote) in May 1993 demonstrates this amply. After the introduction of electoral thresholds for the September 1993 elections and a resulting decline in party system fragmentation, the ability of the Polish prime minister to implement reform policies increased significantly, as the literature would predict.

Another well-known hypothesis states that left-of-center parties in cohesive party systems are likely to benefit from corporatist modes of interest bargaining which integrate labor and other groups threatened by radical reforms into the policy-making process. The case of Poland lends qualified support to this argument; the Czech case, however, lends only weak support at best. While, according to Orenstein & Hale [2000, 18], the first Solidarity-backed governments in Poland "put surprisingly little emphasis on bringing trade unions into the policy process in an institutionalized way" at the macro-level,[7] in early 1994 the left-wing coalition government successfully inaugurated macro-level tripartite bargaining in the context of a moderately fragmented party system. The range of issues discussed included state enterprise restructuring and privatization, bankruptcy protection, and state-sector wages. Although it is questionable to what degree macro-level bargaining contributed to the various policy successes of the SLD-PSL coalition, and despite the rupture between the largest participating unions (OPZZ and Solidarity) which refused to sign the same founding document, tripartism under a left-wing coalition government represented an important - although by no means the most important - element of Poland's relatively inclusive model of economic policymaking. During the 1990s this model included numerous, often informal, quasi-corporatist mechanisms incorporating both organized labor and business interests into the policymaking process through regular consultations at various ministries, as well as regular attendance during the proceedings of numerous parliamentary committees in the Sejm.

In contrast with the Polish case, attempts at corporatist bargaining in the Czech Republic date back to 1990. Although originally a result of a bargain struck between the social democratic and liberal wings of OF which liberals only grudgingly accepted [see Rutland 1992], it was the ODS-ODA-KDU-ČSL conservative coalition which used the so-called Council for Economic and Social Accord (RHSD) during the early transition period as a means of convincing labor to accept an anti-inflationary low-wage policy so reforms could continue. By 1995 trade unions within the Czech-Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (ČMKOS) began to reject government demands concerning wage restraint, and both government and union leaders began to view one another with increasing suspicion and contempt.[8] At first glance, Czech tripartism appears to lend weak confirmation to the

[7] This, of course, ignores the numerous modes of formal and informal interest representation at the firm- and sectoral-levels which *did* incorporate labor into the policy-making process during the entire first decade of transition in Poland. While liberal policymakers in the Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments may have feared the power of labor to reverse important stabilization measures, and therefore chose to exclude them from discussions over macroeconomic adjustment policies, to argue that labor was excluded from all important aspects of economic policymaking during the early transition process, as Orenstein & Hale appear to do, ignores copious evidence to the contrary - particularly at the enterprise level.

[8] In an internal ČMKOS memo from 1995 one union leader expressed outrage that the Klaus government was using the system of collective bargaining to humiliate labor publicly and make worker representatives appear unreasonable. Government cynicism and abuse of the system, in his view, jus-

argument that corporatist-style bargaining is likely to emerge in a cohesive party system controlled by left parties (since the Czech party system was reasonably cohesive from mid 1992 to early 1998, and corporatist structures initially evolved as a social democratic initiative prior to the breakup of OF). Upon closer examination it clearly does not. Despite its alleged role in promoting "social peace" and "including" workers in the reform process [Orenstein 1994], critical analysis and detailed interviews with participants from ČMKOS show that from mid-1992 to 1998 Czech tripartism did not primarily serve as a means of integrating organized interests into the policy-making process in any meaningful way.[9] The range of issues on the agenda was generally narrow, and it became even smaller as the Klaus government feared labor demands might go beyond what it deemed appropriate. Moreover, relations between "social partners" were highly asymmetrical, with the Klaus government exercising near-dictatorial control over what was supposed to be an institution aimed at making and implementing consensus-based decisions.

Parties, power and policy: State control and political survival in new democracies

As in all postcommunist dual transitions, during the initial phase of radical reform under the ODS-led coalition government the stakes of policy choices were exceptionally high, and opportunities for institutionalizing partisan influence over the economy and polity were numerous. For politicians and political parties alike, the most important variable was, and continually remained, power. Przeworski et al [1995, 40] write that "power is a natural monopoly, since it exhibits increasing returns to scale: directly, to the extent that incumbency gives advantage, and indirectly, to the extent that political power can be used to acquire economic power and economic power can be used to gain political power". This statement contains a major insight concerning the nature of influence and contestation in transitions from authoritarian rule, particularly during the early period where power configurations have yet to stabilize. In postcommunist societies, where the construction of political systems based on voter choice and economies based on private property resembles a large-scale natural experiment, the centrality of initial contestation and initial attempts to institutionalize power exceeded that in post-authoritarian states (for example, in Latin America and Southern Europe) where power configurations, although in flux, were generally much clearer and institutions - notably political parties - more developed. Understanding the relationship between political institutions and comparative regime performance under postcommunism requires consideration of this important point.

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tified union withdrawal from institutionalized collective bargaining structures. The union soon thereafter quit the tripartite talks. From 1995 to 1998 Czech corporatism was effectively moribund. In the second half of 1998 the social democratic government revived the consultation process which broke down under the previous ODS-led governments.

9/ Interviews which form the basis of this claim range from a discussion with the leader of the Union of Civic Employees and member of the Board of Directors of ČMKOS during the summer of 1995, to an interview with the vice president of the steelworkers' union (KOVO) in spring 2002 (Kateřina Mandovcová, Prague, 12 September 1995; Josef Středula, Prague, 3 April 2002). Frequent meetings with government and union representatives, as well as Czech scholars writing on tripartism, confirm the assertion that the Klaus government saw tripartism as a threat to its top-down view of economic policymaking, in which bargaining among organized interests did not play a significant role.

Domination of the state apparatus and public policy during the early transition creates the possibility of subsequent long-term increasing returns to scale from power. Members of the right-wing coalition government which exercised control over the Czech state from the birth of an independent republic in January 1993 until December 1997 understood this axiom better than their counterparts in other postcommunist countries.[10] Their governing strategy focused on maximizing central control over all important aspects of economic decision making, while simultaneously erecting barriers to participation for competing interests. Rapid liquidation in 1993 of the Privatization Commission inherited from the Czechoslovak federal state, which had previously increased the breadth of opinion taken into consideration when deciding on individual privatization projects in the context of so-called small privatization [Husák 1997, 134-139], serves as just one example of this strategy. The Klaus government's strategic, cynical approach to tripartism serves as another.

The ODS-led coalition sought not to increase the participation of organized interests in the policymaking process through collective bargaining but, paradoxically, to limit it. By 1995 both government and union behavior, as well as government and union perceptions of tripartism, indicated that the goal of the Klaus government to marginalize civil society in the formulation of key economic reform policies - particularly those concerning privatization - had been largely accomplished. By "including" labor in a narrow, but publicly visible, forum where the most important distributional issues on the reform agenda were not discussed - the most significant of which was the privatization and control of state-owned assets - the coalition government effectively excluded the single largest organized interest in society from taking part in determining "who got what" during the most critical phase of the construction of Czech capitalism [Terra 2002]. The Klaus government's public proclamations during 1995 that privatization and the macroeconomic transition were by-and-large "over"[11] correspond closely with the effective collapse of corporatist policy bargaining. Viewed from this angle, an ostensibly "failed" institution appears to have served the key strategic purpose its government custodians intended.

Privatization as a means of building more than markets

Understanding the policy-related goals of ruling parties and reform outcomes in the Czech Republic requires close examination of the privatization process during the Klaus era (1992-1997). A wealth of evidence made public through investigative reports in the mass media, the admissions of key figures, and the loosening of the Czech freedom of information law after the interim Tošovský government assumed power in early 1998, reveals a pat-

[10] And the signing of the Opposition Agreement shows that power concerns continue to trump all others. If a single core value can be said to exist in the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) under the leadership of Václav Klaus, it is that the status of powerless opposition must be avoided at all costs, and a loss of influence (or, preferably, control) over state institutions is politically calamitous.

[11] According to Mandovcová, by the summer of 1995 Prime Minister Klaus made it clear to Czech unions that the most important aspects of the economic transition were "over" and there was little or no need for regular negotiations. (Interview with Kateřina Mandovcová, Prague, 12 September 1995).

tern in which ruling politicians successfully used privatization as an important means of obtaining party funding. With numerically weak memberships and poorly developed legal donor networks, distributing former state assets in return for large donations served as a logical and effective means for party leaders to strengthen their organizations, and thereby ensure their future competitiveness in the struggle for political power. ODS and ODA, in particular, exploited this tactic for several years. Strong evidence exists, for example, that ODS engineered asset-for-donation quid pro quos during the sale of state shares in the telecom and steel industries,[12] among others. Another significant source of illicit party contributions came from both Czech firms seeking state protection from market forces, and foreign firms seeking favorable treatment and access to local consumers.[13]

Illegal party financing among members of Prime Minister Klaus's ruling coalition required a complex system capable of disguising efforts to strengthen partisan organizations. This included maintaining donor anonymity by dividing large contributions into smaller sums and attributing each "gift" to numerous, and sometimes fictitious, individuals (which had the added benefit of avoiding higher taxation rates), as well as maintaining foreign bank accounts protected by secrecy laws, from which "loans" were procured when necessary. [14] This strategy of organizational development and institutionalization eventually caused the collapse of the longest-reigning government in postcommunist Europe in December 1997, when revelations surfaced which detailed corruption during the privatization of a major steel mill and evidence of a linked Swiss bank account belonging to ODS.[15] The case made headlines not only for the systematic illegality it revealed, but also for the comical bungling of ODS officials during attempts at a cover-up, which included attributing large party donations made by Moravia Steel to a deceased Hungarian and a

[12] In an informal conversation in December 1998, the Czech head of the local branch of an American management consulting firm claimed to have seen "smoking gun", investigation-based evidence that a large side-payment was made by representatives of the Dutch-Swiss TelSource consortium during the privatization of the former fixed-line telephone monopoly SPT Telecom. The case of Moravia Steel making a large donation to ODS in return for guaranteed financing from a state-controlled bank and inside information on share auction pricing, which enabled a majority share purchase of a steel mill, remains the most famous case of illicit party funding (see below).

[13] ODA, for example, created a shell company called TMC based in the Virgin Islands which served as a cover for donations made by companies seeking access and anonymity. According to an investigation widely quoted in the Czech press, TMC "donated" CZK 6 million (roughly $200,000 at the contemporaneous exchange rate) which allegedly came from Philip Morris, the First Investment Fund, and the Vitkovice steel mill. See *Respekt* (9 Feb 1998, 16 Feb 1998). A former chairman of ODA, who requested anonymity, verified this in spring 2002.

[14] It should be pointed out that during the period 1992-1997 KDU-ČSL benefited considerably less from the abuse of privatization policy and access-for-money schemes than did ODS and ODA. Party leaders, however, were accused of counting large donations from wealthy sponsors as smaller "member contributions" during 1996 as a means of avoiding higher taxation and preserving donor anonymity. See *Respekt* (1 December 1997).

[15] The Czech press covered this scandal widely. See, for example, the issues of the weekly *Respekt* from 1 Dec 1997, 8 Dec 1997, 9 Feb 1998, 16 Feb 1998, and 2 April 2001. For broad coverage of many aspects of the privatization and party financing scandals emerging from "the Klaus era", see also the series of articles entitled "Zlatá horečka ("The Gold Rush") published in the weekly magazine *Týden* from 9 February until 16 March 1998.

surprised citizen of Mauritius. Subsequent investigations of the Moravia Steel case resulted in a high-profile trial in which the ODS vice chairman was accused of defrauding the state of CZK 1 million (roughly $35,000) in unpaid taxes from party donations. Both founders of ODS, including former prime minister Klaus, testified during the trial. Although the defendant was exonerated in November 2000 due to a lack of evidence, the justice minister serving at the time claimed that "it's certain that a criminal act took place, and we cannot be satisfied that the guilty were not caught" (*MFD*, 25 May 2001).

Although it appeared that an increasingly effective legal process had undermined a once-useful means of party financing, in May 2000 Czech MPs prevented the liquidation of a system which had served them well by voting overwhelmingly to abolish taxation of party donations. Passage of the law was purposely concealed, and several prominent legislators from left to right denied knowing the real purpose of the bill, or claimed to have "forgotten" how they voted. The new law effectively shut down investigations into secret party bank accounts and ended the slow reform process which began after the collapse of the Klaus government in December 1997 (*MFD*, 20 April 2001).

Successful efforts to render legal a formerly forbidden (but indulged) practice and decrease the transparency of party financing contrast sharply with Polish practices. Although questionable party fundraising and cronyism in government contracts has occurred since the founding of new democratic parties began in Poland in the early 1990s, Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Polish Constitution of 1997 emphatically states that "[t]he financing of political parties shall be open to public inspection". This constitutional provision severely complicates construction of a Czech-style system of party financing. Furthermore, relatively frequent government alternation, as well as a privatization process which involves a more diverse range of paths and practices than in the Czech Republic, has decreased opportunities for institutionalizing illicit party financing schemes. These factors also help explain the relative lack of corruption in party funding in Poland prior to the adoption of the 1997 Constitution. As a result of this system of effective disincentives, party machine-building through the distribution of state assets for side-payments has remained relatively unavailable in Poland as a feasible organizational development strategy. This reality has not, however, contributed to a significantly higher perceived legitimacy of political parties or the party system in Poland in comparison with the Czech Republic.[16]

Conclusion

Evidence from postcommunist countries lends mixed support to hypotheses from the literature on democratic transitions and economic reform. While the relationship between political institutions and economic reform appears at times to follow clear empirical pat-

[16] According to *Eurobarometer*, data from October 2001 indicate the level of trust in parties to be 12 percent in the Czech Republic, 14 percent in Poland, and 17 percent in Hungary; the average was 17 percent for EU members states and 13 percent for EU applicant countries. Levels of trust in parliament were 26 percent for the Czech Republic, 28 percent for Poland, and 44 percent for Hungary; the average was 40 percent for EU member states and 30 percent for applicant countries. See *Eurobarometer 2001: Public Opinion in the Countries Applying for European Union Membership* (Brussels: European Commission, March 2002) p. 24.

terns, it is often subject to variation according to the pretransition regime type. Fragmentation and polarization, for example, generally complicate attempts to reform economies in any transitional setting. In postcommunist systems, however, parties of both the left and the right tend to make only marginal adjustments to policies they inherit from outgoing governments. Reform course diversions are especially unlikely in postcommunist societies due to pro-reform pressures emanating from the EU and the regional political consensus in EU applicant countries that eventual membership will bring long-awaited economic, political, social and cultural benefits.

Policy disputes in postcommunist transitions tend to revolve around the sequencing or pace of reform, not the fundamental content or direction of reform policies. This contrasts markedly with numerous earlier cases of postauthoritarian democratic transition. Left-wing parties in postcommunist countries may be more aggressively reformist than their ostensibly pro-market conservative counterparts. Furthermore, because of the relatively weak position of labor in many postcommunist states, corporatist modes of policy bargaining are unlikely to form a viable long-term option, even when left parties govern. Where corporatist policy concertation does emerge as a way of promoting consensus-building on behalf of reform, it is unlikely to become institutionalized and it may be abandoned by governments which seek to marginalize labor for strategic reasons.

Postcommunist parties and party systems show marked differences when compared with parties and party systems that emerged from former authoritarian systems in Latin America, Southern Europe and East Asia. In addition to unstable voter preferences which undermine the traditional class basis of party and party system organization, the historical legacy of communist rule may create ideological divisions which severely limit the coalition-building options available in a party system and it may encourage unusual and electorally risky accords such as the Czech Opposition Agreement.

With the exception of a number of organizations with roots in the communist era, political parties in postcommunist systems have relatively few resources with which to increase organizational strength. Resource deficits in newly competitive political systems create a temptation for parties which gain power during the early transition period to siphon off assets from the state as rapidly as possible as a means of survival. Such a strategy of organizational development can adversely affect economic reform, in particular booty- and patronage-generating privatization, which is likely to become less popular as it becomes identified with corrupt party practices.[17] But since politically-motivated resource diversions are likely to occur before the legal and institutional bases of a market economy

[17] Public opinion data gathered in February 2002 indicated that 76 percent of Czechs believed that the economy should be under greater state control; 80 percent believed the state should maintain majority control of banks; 50 percent believed the state should prop up large enterprises; and 82 percent were dissatisfied with the privatization process. These findings represent a stunning contrast with the pro-market, pro-privatization euphoria in the Czech half of the Czechoslovak federation during the early 1990s. See *LN* (27 March 2002). Although findings may be biased slightly upward due to the appearance of divisive electoral campaign rhetoric in the national press by late winter 2002, we can safely assume this bias to be much less significant than that resulting from a severe political crisis, as in the case of Poland during the early 1990s. Attention to such factors, although generally absent in comparative political analysis, is essential if scholars value the actual ability of data and "evidence" to support their assertions.

are fully in place, recovery from this state of affairs - which negatively affects public trust in parties and parliaments, as well as economic performance - can be difficult. This pattern can be clearly observed in, among other countries, the Czech Republic and Russia [Black et al, 1999].

The stability of political systems during periods of rapid change also appears to correlate strongly with economic growth and progress along a series of economic variables. Economic progress brings clear advantages to reform projects, insofar as it improves perceptions of regime performance and legitimacy. By providing resources for targeted compensation, economic growth also decreases resentment arising from increasing income disparities among various social groups and professions. This, in turn, broadens the social base of regime support and helps institutionalize compromise. Other factors have also contributed to the stabilization of postcommunist systems. Success in achieving the stated goal of NATO membership, or making significant steps toward future membership, and progress toward full integration into the EU also reinforce the perception that postcommunist regimes have performed well. Further, in an age when democracy and the market have ascended as the favored development model and authoritarian options have been discredited, few feasible alternatives exist.

The presence of organizationally weak civil societies has also helped preserve stability in postcommunist systems. In the case where civil society has been most active in organizing opposition to various aspects of reform, namely in Poland, the broad population has arguably benefited more than anywhere else from postcommunist development. Superior growth in this case has acted as a clear counterweight to potential anti-regime threats, as it has provided the resource base for a generous (but typically inefficient) West European-style welfare state while increasing class-based support for democracy and the market among middle- and higher-income groups.[18] Although some claim that the use of social compensation as a means of neutralizing opposition to reform has "demobilized" society and produced a form of exclusionary democracy [Greskovits 1998], the actual causes of variation in the level of participation across postcommunist countries are probably more related to pre-transition historical and structural factors than to strategic demobilization. This is particularly true where the inclusion or exclusion of organized labor is concerned [Terra 2002].

Irrespective of normative judgements concerning democratic outcomes, pessimistic arguments that predicted poor economic performance and widespread rejection of reform appear thoroughly discredited. Surprisingly, such arguments have been laid to rest not only by evidence in cases where progress in economic reform has been the most substantial, but also by evidence in countries where economic growth and progress have been less impressive. Arguments predicting a flood of regional poverty and subsequent widespread re-

[18] Since 1994, economic growth and successful compensation in Poland also helped limit the intensity (and, with the exception of 1999) frequency of strikes. During interviews conducted in Warsaw in 1998, former prime ministers Józef Oleksy and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz made it clear to me how various Polish governments have deliberately used policy tools, including targeted compensation, to placate restive workers so policies could be pursued without the threat of disruption. It is also important to note that while Poland experienced an unusually high number of strikes in the early 1990s, and again in 1999, these actions have almost always focused on government policies, not on the legitimacy of democracy and the free-market system.

volts against reformist governments severely underestimated the so-called political economy of patience in postcommunist societies. Citizens in postcommunist countries, it seems, are more optimistic and patient than many scholars of postcommunist systems. Concerns about consumption, economic performance, and political participation in most of the former Soviet bloc are presently not much different than in Western Europe. This should be seen as a sign of success, not failure.

The original American English usage in this article has been preserved at the request of the author.

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Abbreviations

BCE: *Business Central Europe*
CR: *Czech Republic*
ČSÚ: *Český statistický úřad - Czech Statistical Office*
GUS: *Główny Urząd Statystyczny - Polish Statistical Office*
GW: *Gazeta Wyborcza (Poland)*
LN: *Lidové noviny (CR)*
MFD: *Mladá fronta Dnes (CR)*
WBTN: *World Bank Transition Newsletter*

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Sociology of the Transcendental Delirium World*

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Abstract: The author analyses the individual-empire relationship in the Soviet Union. The literary work Moscow-Pietushki, by Venedikt Yerofeyev, is treated as a superb instantiation of Soviet interaction rituals. The author rejects the Homo sovieticus model, the orthodox implementation of which leads to a recognition of individuals as puppets of the system. The analysis, inspired by Goffman's and Collins' findings, shows the social mechanisms which make possible the construction of a temporary world of transcendental delirium, located on the borderline of system reality. The constitution and duration of this anti-utopia system inside society reveal the relative autonomy of Soviet social actors: their conduct within this world is conditioned mainly by the availability of alcohol and the capability to play the 'parlour game'. Such analysis, which surveys the universal logic of interaction rituals, facilitates a reasonable comparison of the practices of Soviet actors with the practices of actors located on the 'friendly' peripheries of the system, and with the relevancy systems and the actions of the CEE and the Western bourgeoisie.

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Introductory Remarks

The aim of this paper is to attempt to employ interaction theory in order to characterise and explain the individual-empire relationship. By 'explanation' I mean the disclosure of mechanisms that underlie the behaviour of social actors, and the construction and maintenance of interaction orders and social structures. Taking up a tentative attempt at such an explanation, I shall here be using the concrete example of the literary work *Moscow-Pietushki,* by Venedikt Yerofeyev [1994] (MP hereafter), which is situated in the historical realities of the period of the duration and transformations of the Soviet empire.

I treat literary works as the products of the activities of social actors in relation to and within society. From my point of view they are social facts, just like other products and domains of social actors' activities. In this sense, persistence in the thesis that literary descriptions are fictitious is heuristically fruitless. This thesis is as equally idle or fruitless as statements about the fictitiousness of expectations that a 'full-blooded' actor will have a date with a virtual cyber-beauty or will discuss theological issues with a living St. Thomas Aquinas. I agree with Thomas J. Scheff [1997: 157ff] that, for example, the world of Shakespearean drama reveals, in an unmatched way, tensions and conflicts, and shame and

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anger on the manifold levels of social life: from male-female relationships to international conflicts. Literary works as documents of a certain age are well designed for sociological analysis if a sociologist is able to identify certain characteristic properties that refer to the social actors, interactions and structures in order to reconstruct, interpret and explain the relationships that connect the components of the socio-cultural universe.

The limitation of my own analysis to *Moscow-Pietushki* is deliberate. First, a sociologist interested in the construction of theory is not obliged to analyse all available empirical exemplifications to be able to grasp the structural properties of the phenomenon under investigation. Second, there is no obstacle to applying the analysis of the single case presented here to other 'documents' that deal with the Soviet empire, and then, homologically, in reference to other kinds of empires. Third, *Moscow-Pietushki* includes a condensed and perfect description of the interaction orders that are typical of Soviet reality and reveals a world of alcohol anti-utopia, a structural hole or gap within the overall architectonics of the empire, which is inexplicable on the basis of orthodox *Homo sovieticus* presuppositions. Fourth, this kind of analysis enables further studies comparing the habitus of the Soviet man with the habitus of the CEE bourgeois, which is typically treated as a kind of mixture of socialist and Western attributes, a simple product of transition processes or system and institutional changes in post-socialist countries.

Homo sovieticus vs. Homo sociologicus

Within the social sciences there is no lack of analyses concentrating on the phenomenon of the Soviet empire. Broad, intensive, interdisciplinary and well-financed Soviet studies provide the best evidence of this. However, what deters me from this kind of analysis is not only – as Randall Collins [1995] aptly notes – the relentless conservatism or anti-communism of sovietologists, but the principal lack of an answer to the question of the social mechanisms underlying the origin, duration or maintenance and collapse of the Soviet Union. In the best case one must deal with accounts which refer to concrete events, the specificity or exceptionality of a certain sociation form or institutional network, but without an explanation of such events through the theoretical categories of the social sciences.

However, in this flood of hyperfactualism one can still find a few islands of theory. In Theda Skocpol's analysis [1973], the Russian Revolution is treated as an actualisation of a revolutionary situation. The theoretical aspect of her analysis lies in the fact that she constructs analytical tools that can be applied not only to a single historical course of events, but also to a series of homologically unstable societies (e.g. France and China) [see also Staniszkis 1992; Tilly 1993; Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989]. Piotr Sztompka [1993: 301] treats revolution as an aspect of becoming a society, the most rapid and spectacular one, which evokes changes at all levels of social reality [see also Sztompka 1999: 151]. What is important here is that the actualised revolutionary situation creates a new structural arrangement of society, in the face of which social actors (individuals and collectives) elaborate new types of adaptation or at least modify current definitions of the particular components of their social settings.

In fact, the classic Durkheimian individual-society dichotomy is the metatheoretical framework of my own analysis. A human being is the user and modifier of social rituals, which manifest themselves not only through the strength of constraint or social inertia but

also in the form of components of definitions of life situations. Here I am interested in tracing how in fact it is possible to establish relationships between the structural constraints network and actions of actors who function in the predefined world of the empire and reflexively act on external situation patterns. The dialectical aspect of the relationship is crucial. If one neglects this dialectical aspect of the relationship between the empire and the individual, one may fall into a – politically correct but heuristically impotent – *Homo sovieticus* trap.

The concept of *Homo sovieticus,* proposed by Alexander Zinoviev [1984, 1986], is an object of varied, ongoing interpretation. The Soviet man is typically recognised as the next historical manifestation of the 'Russian soul', which is an especially attractive object for global social experiments. In this sense communist totalitarianism undoubtedly has its roots in the Russian mentality. But from here it is only a small step toward recognising the genesis 'from above' and the existence of communism in Russia; that is, to conceive it as it has been imposed by the elites, as a system of the organisation of social life. It leads to the creation of the orthodox image of *Homo sovieticus*, that is, the social actor conceived as a puppet of the system. This actor reproduces system components and completely fulfills the expectations of communist demiurges and anti-communist sovietologists. In my opinion, what is most important in Zinoviev's argumentation is the comprehensive presentation of the ways in which communist totalitarianism has been coming to be accepted by individuals and social groups, becoming a paramount, even single reality, within and toward which any social actors' activities can proceed.

Undoubtedly, it is easy to apply the orthodox interpretation of *Homo sovieticus* and explain the actors' conduct through presenting the irresistible influence of the imperial constraining network as paralysing, allegedly or actually, individual autonomy. But a question arises: why do social actors choose these and not other ways of conduct? Erik Olin Wright [1997] clearly sees it a danger to believe in the omnipotence of macro-structural explanations, contending (contrary to Marx's expectations) that the same class position does not produce equal class-consciousness. On the other hand, overemphasising the constructivist picture of society, as do Herbert Blumer [1969/1986] or Norman K. Denzin [1987, 1989, 1992, 1994], is also theoretically dangerous: comprehending actors' actions as a process can lead to a difficulty in deciding why the regularities in human behaviour within the Soviet empire system definitely differ from regularities stated in the practices of the Western or CEE bourgeoisie.

In this theoretical situation a sociologist has two choices. The first choice is to escape into contextualism, that is, the recognition of the characteristics of the context of a particular action as the primary task for the social researcher. It means in fact resigning from any theoretical attempt to account for social events, if sociological theory is understood as an effort to penetrate universal principles or rules underlying the functioning of society. The second possibility implies an immersion in a concrete social reality in order to find universal properties of human interactions, and especially the ways in which the social order is achieved on this level. In reference to my aim, it deals with a specification of the ways in which it is possible to create or construct alternative realities or, more generally, to construct a certain special world, as Norbert Wiley [2000] calls it. One can speak here of a relationship between code and the interpretation of the experiences and conditions of its usage, or – as it is sometimes called – between discourse and the narrations by which a given discourse becomes a social resource and theme for social actors' activities [see Alexander 1992;

Alexander & Smith 1993; Calhoun 1995; Kane 1996; Rambo & Chan 1990; Sewell 1992; Smith 1998; Sommers & Gibson 1994]. The construction of a certain special world, to refer directly to the idea of transposability presented by William H. Sewell, Jr. and Anne E. Kane, includes, first of all, the modes of application and change of socially available forms, contents and meanings in the process of their implementation within a new domain of social activity.

Rituals and Interaction Orders

The analytical starting point is social situations, or – as it is sometimes called – an actor-in-situation complex. This is the place in which the social order is 'refracted'; it is undoubtedly constructed, but this process, as I contend, shows a few universal properties which cannot be treated as glosses of the actualised components of macro-structure. The intercourse of individuals is regulated, and mutual responses as well as alternative expectancies are harmonised in the course of constructing social orders that determine actors' conduct. The substantive relevance of the interaction domain consists in the social location of individuals: they are physically present at a given place and time, but this presence is somehow structured. 'Situatedness' means that individuals are somewhat committed, involved or engaged in interaction, that they are not only present but also have some reasons to stay with one another. The range of this commitment is 'standardised'; it is an element of individual socialisation equipment that is available in the form of gestures, social habits, and types of communication with members of one's social setting. In the course of interaction, it deals with the co-ordination of actions regardless of whether they are intentional or undesigned. The consensus is elaborated in the interplay of cognitions, emotions, and modes or, finally, in the very tendency to co-operate – an effort of co-ordination that is taken by the actors. On the one hand, every situation is temporary and provisional; on the other hand, it can be replicated if interaction rituals are produced, ensuring continuity and meaningfulness in human activities. There are many interaction orders which are not a simple function of actors' acquired experiences, but the feature of meaningful relationships between what is acquired and what is the lived, 'here-and-now' of occurring events. The relationships can be moulded both with the aid of social (generalised) classifications and by means of applying unique (particular) descriptive categories. Thus, interaction rituals are not a direct expression of social structures. They are that which is revealed as an expression oriented toward those expectations 'from above'.

Exploiting the findings of Erving Goffman [1963, 1967/1982, 1974/1975, 1983] and Randall Collins [1981, 1987, 1998: 20], I treat the encounter as the basic analytical category. This reality returns periodically and is constituted around the negotiation and exchange of resources. Following Collins, I assume that two basic kinds of resources should be taken into account: a) cultural capital conceived as stored remembrances of previous interactions, vocal styles, types of knowledge etc., and b) emotional energy in reference to the level and type of effect experienced by individuals in a given situation. Also important is the distinction between generalised capital, which is available as impersonal symbols related (in a generalised way) to knowledge, position, authority, and group, and particularised capital, which deals with concrete individual remembrances of one's own features and the features of other specific persons. Interaction among people consists in conversa-

tion, in the course of which actors particularly invest their own cultural capital and emotional energy to gain the maximum possible payoff, for example in the form of specific group membership. What is important for me is to trace the process of achievement of group inclusion, the characteristic properties of levels of inequality in actors' resources, and the ways of consensus elaboration.

The Anti-utopia of Transcendental Delirium

The plot of the novel *Moscow-Pietushki* starts in Moscow, when the main character, 'Eternal' Vienitchka, arrives at Kursk Railroad Station. Led by angels, he is visiting places located en route where alcohol is sold. A small suitcase held to his chest - or rather the suitcase's contents - confirms that he is going to visit Pietushki to see his girlfriend. Presents and alcohol are the two precious goods that his suitcase contains. Entry into the train signifies the rapid acceleration of activity as the result of establishing contacts with other passengers, which is facilitated by the ubiquitous presence of alcohol. The trip between the two title railroad stations is a structural occasion or opportunity to carry on a 'parlour game', the stuff of which is the habitus of the Soviet male. At the same time, the parlour game, though it is sustained by means of props of systemic provenience, is ruled by its own laws, which are autonomous in relation to 'sober' or official Soviet reality. Alexander Zinoviev [1984: 36] aptly observes that drunkenness in Russia is "[...] a genuine national religion". The characters that appear on the pages of the novel are typical believers of this religion who, with the aid of alcohol, inaugurate and maintain a short-lived world of delirious anti-utopia. The novel discloses basic ways of adaptation and survival in the predefined paramount reality, not only through participation in rituals imposed 'from above', but especially through the construction of sub-universes (or micro-worlds) which are located on the edge of the architectonics of the system. Those interim enclaves are islands of exterior life within the system reality.

Interaction rituals used by Vienitchka are a kind of social adjustment that is not a common escape into alcoholism, a Mertonian 'retreatism' to the empire world, but is something of an innovation, a processing of the symbolic world of the empire into a carnival performance. The interaction scenario is a promise to access the charms of transcendental delirium (a world of anti-utopia) in which any rules of 'really existing socialism' are no longer in force. The only structural obstacle is the lack or temporary insufficiency of alcohol that is conceived as a constitutive precondition to initiate the alternative reality of delirious and semi-delirious states. What seems to be important in Vienitchka's confessions is the recipe to 'soften' (or 'dilute') the empire edifice. The architectonics of the empire predefine all social reality: beginning with the symbols of a class which fights for liberation, the pantheon of saints of communism and the iron laws of Marxism-Leninism, the ways of labour organisation and celebration, and finally the accustomed *savoir-vivre* under 'really existing socialism'. If this arrangement were treated statically, in orthodox *Homo sovieticus* terms, any endeavours to domesticate the empire would be impossible as the orbits of actors' actions would be exactly calculated and would fulfill the expectations of communist demiurges. However, the real orbits of actors' actions have a bizarre tendency towards perturbation, which can only be explained by the circumstance that those planned, 'from above' courses of actors' actions do not predict their intersection. If the

train on which Vienitchka travelled were a perfect reflection of the ideological structure of class formations, all passengers would take their seats supplied with tickets legitimating their ride, or more broadly – they would engage in appropriate interactions and get off the train at the proper railroad stations. Moreover, this originally unfocused interaction set cannot be ordered according to the systemic scenario, which would attract, like a magnet, actors to their places and induce them to play the roles of meek passengers.

The kingdom of randomness enters into the forefront. It is a kingdom in which the iron laws of social formations are presented as corroded leftovers encountered in the course of a struggle with a hiccup. This kind of turbulence resists any mathematics. Post-apocalyptic delirium requires special competencies that are released by the inseparable application of Kantian *an sich* and *für sich*: "And you will convince yourselves that it [hiccup] will start within an hour. When you hiccup for the first time you will be surprised at its suddenness and unexpectedness; then you will be surprised at the irreversibility of the second, third, and next hiccups" (MP: 45). The way to understand the hiccup, its unexpected beginning and equally surprising end, is the recognition of the almighty hand of God and the powerlessness of the actor. "We are flimsy worms, while it is ubiquitous. It, or the hand of God, is raised above all of us, in the face of which only fools and bastards do not wish to humiliate themselves. Reason is not able to comprehend Him, and therefore He is" (MP: 46). But this proof that God exists is at the same time an enrichment of the competencies of the actor, a change of particularised cultural capital. The hiccup of a man reconciled with the demands of non-communist transcendence becomes a rightful and self-evident component of rituals that are in force within the transcendental delirium sphere. It is not a *faux pas*. It is what is in terms of situation the social expectancy of the interaction participants, and what at the same time is surprising in the moments of their coming and going.

The subsequent events also disclose other details that can be treated as empirical replicas of the universal logic of interaction episodes. The way in which the interaction among passengers is initiated is characteristic. Each of them is interested in the maximisation of payoffs in cultural capital and the currency of emotional energy. Going by train creates this kind of occasion because the actors dispose of various resources that can be trumps in the process of the negotiation of group inclusion. The emotional attractiveness of Vienitchka is so high that it can be expected that it will inevitably attract the other passengers. But the statement that the attractiveness is constituted by the very fact of possessing huge alcohol resources would be a grave simplification. If it were so, the empire itself, as an independent alcohol monopolist, would be most attractive in the sense of delivering positive emotional energy. But the empire rather resembles a capricious fig tree, or a producer of bottlenecks of accessibility. The recognition of this is a social fact in the Durkheimian sense. Individual memory includes sufficiently numerous remembrances determined by the cadences of opening and closing liquor shops and joints, and the accessibility and inaccessibility of various brands of alcoholic fluids. What becomes important is the actor's proper planning of a delivery trajectory, as well as the skill to refine the state-owned selection by preparing mixtures and through the observance of consumption sequence. "And now, let us think of what I could create out of the shit that still remains in my suitcase?" – Vienitchka asks himself (MP: 50). The ability to make alcohol bouquets and the art of their consumption are a condition, the fulfillment of which creates the chance for a conversation. Possessing alcohol is a determinant of the actor's status, certifying that he/she is sufficiently intelligent, or that he/she can also provide other resources

that are worth negotiating for. The basic resource is usually social attractiveness, that is, an ability to carry on an interesting talk and share with the partner or partners the knowledge of how that attractiveness can be achieved or organised. The actor in the transcendental delirium sub-universe is a *bricoleur* in the midst of other *bricoleurs*, free riders produced by the system but also sufficiently autonomous to create their own situations. The mutual evaluation is the contribution of actors to initiating reciprocally profitable interaction. And it is not a zero-sum game: greater interaction competence on the part of the actor, as is the case of Yerofeyev, does not generate exploitative relationships.

A cybernetic control hierarchy determines the flows of information and energy in particular interaction episodes. Owing to this, Vienitchka is not a monopolist but, as a sophisticated heavy drinker, must seek energetic support, not only in alcohol, but also in other, less sophisticated or competent, interaction participants. Grandfather Mitrych and his grandson are looking after Vienitchka, and Vienitchka himself is required to search for an audience in which he has to play his prescribed role. Actors emit signals, unintentionally or knowingly, which certify their statuses. However, the statuses are not related to their age, income, social origin and race, as in normal sociological reality, but to alcohol and the parlour game resources which actors possess or aspire to possess. Vienitchka, as a possessor of these resources, is an object of desire for physiologically and interactionally starved lovers of alcohol and other people's properties. Hence Vienitchka's going out onto the car platform is a trigger for interaction and induces the Mitrychs' to penetrate the contents of his luggage. In this phase of interaction, Vienitchka is not looking to resemble his *bricoleurs*. The risk accompanying such an alternative initiation of interaction would be much more than in the case of the Vienitchka-Mitrychs interaction because it would require a greater investment of cultural capital and emotional energy from Vienitchka and his potential partner. That the Mitrytchs lick their lips, if we completely exclude incredible calculation or a genetic defect, is a visible symptom of their interest in entering into the interaction, even at the cost of an accusation of theft and drinking someone else's property. In the case of sophisticated *bricoleurs* such visible and legible symptoms of interest in contact either do not occur or they can provide a given person with an incentive to spend on adequately high investments into the process of the initiation of interaction.

From this moment, the plot gains a livelier tempo. Vienitchka not only scolds the Mitrychs, but also offers them to drink up the next fifty grams of alcohol to fix the thread of interaction bound in this way. This outwardly insignificant fifty grams is, in this moment, a crucial element in the definition of the situation, because it is a signal for other passengers who resemble Vienitchka that it is worthwhile investing their own resources. As young Mitrych croaks, a young man with a black moustache appears, whose entry indicates not only the cunningness of his visage but also the aristocratism of the owners of resources. "I suppose you won't decline mine, hmm?" (MP: 54) – this is the best possible legitimisation of the status of a newcomer. The interaction becomes irrevocably ritualised, the world is divided into - as Pierre Bourdieu would call it - those who are above and those who are below. But the occupation of the lower position does not mean a total degradation: even drinking from a mug brought out from between womb and diaphragm is done by craning one's neck as pianists do. To recapitulate: every interaction participant can find within the interaction a specific place in relation to the resources he/she possesses, and can play a role that consolidates the order, which is regenerated in the cycle of alcoholic toasts and incessant conversation.

It should be stressed that the constituted interaction order requires the persistent defining elements of the actor. The first danger is Amorac in the gabardine coat, silent until now and listening to the conversation between Vienitchka and the black-moustached man. Amorac, later nicknamed 'Decembrist', marks his participation by thwarting participants' expectations. The name of Alexander Hertzen is a word-detonator. The incorrectness of Amorac-Decembrist's reaction has two principal aspects. The first is an attempt at untitled intrusion into a conversational space without the previous declaration of readiness to offer resources. The second consists in an attempt to confuse two orders: the systemic and the interactional. Introducing some threads of the empire architectonics into the discourse dealing with the ontology of transcendental delirium is a common gaffe, which is the result of officiousness or rather a lack of sufficient competencies which would make a proper interpretation of the situation possible. Participation in interaction requires proper distance to the played role, or silence if one is not asked for one's opinion. Disobedience of these rules shows at the same time how strong group solidarity is, and how firm the membership of participants playing prescribed roles is. The short emotional explosion of the group, visible at least in the juicy response "Leave him alone, you fucking Decembrist!" (MP: 57), simultaneously pacifies Amorac-Decembrist, shows him his position in the interaction as a person who needs educational endeavours, and as a result increases the general level of positive emotional energy: "And all of us, all of a sudden and imperceptibly, have started to be tipsy; cheerfully and imperceptibly, imperceptibly and lewdly" (MP: 57). The group not only passes on the first designs of its disintegration by Amorac, it also comes out of this event strengthened. Nevertheless, Amorac also achieves success, because in the light of the previous ordering of the interaction space he could only succeed in this way and eventually gain group membership. The role of 'whipping boy' has been the only structural possibility produced by the interaction order. Increased social density, to formulate it in strict sociological language, increases the likelihood that human individuals will enter into interaction, even under conditions of inequality.

Constructing the metaphysics of transcendental delirium necessitates confronting aporias, which, even if they are overcome on the spot, inevitably lead to disintegration. The first problem is the way in which teetotalers can be qualified. The scholastics of the black-moustached man's argumentation break down when somebody discloses that Goethe was a teetotaler. Fortunately, the scholastics of Vienitchka are sufficiently powerful to prevent this interpretative discrepancy in the doctrine. The doctrine proves its effectiveness after the recognition that Goethe's temperance was a symptom of latent and deep alcoholism, which was compelling him to teetotalism-suicide and to force the heroes of his works to drink. The second problem deals with the relationship between the ticket inspector and passengers. The ontology of the system is substituted with an analogous ritual of alcohol-kilometres. The ritual, in comparison with its systemic archetype, is much more flexible in application. Since none of the 'normal' passengers has a ticket, he/she may take out the right to ride when he/she offers the proper - in relation to the number of kilometres - amount of alcohol, or when he/she is able to use other resources, namely some substitutes capable of satisfying the expectations of the ticket inspector. The palette of possible payoffs is broad, and determined by the passengers' resources: from punching a passenger in the face, to standard amounts of alcohol, and stories that hit upon the emotional expectancies of the ticket controller. Vienitchka, as a component of the particular cultural capital of the ticket inspector, is defined as a deliverer of over-eroticised world history.

A special category of experiences included in the structurations that fix the stream of alcohol-laden courses of action is determined by the virtual or factual presence of women. One thing is common: the 'flapper' disturbs the idyll of delirious or semi-delirious states, is a structural inconsistency written in the world of transcendental delirium, and is a particularisation of a cultural resource which 'pushes' actors out of the area constituted by purely alcohol-driven expectancies. The first type is the woman as a transcendental value, an object that is both present as the leitmotif of Vienitchka's ride and absent or unavailable in concrete actions. The second type is the woman as an intervening variable, or more strongly: the woman who destroys the seemingly irrefutable universality of alcohol lemma, visualised in the form of a curve connecting the points of falling asleep and being roused from crapulence. "The lemma is universal until a flapper is not present" (MP: 61), the black-moustached man concludes. To paraphrase Gorky's famous maxim: one could say that the proof of any interaction in the world of transcendental delirium is the way in which women are treated. Although their presence is a source of structural discontinuity, they are functionally and interactionally indispensable. Women represent the gate to the system reality, buying back bottles and selling alcohol. They are anti-delirious revivers in situations of excessive sinking in the alternative world of alcohol banquets, but dialectically they also create situations in the sense that they induce the initiation of delirious interactions again. The third type is the representative of the empire. When such a woman becomes an interpretation dominant, the interactional anti-world of abstinence is established. It is an authentic Sovietisation of consciousness, the reshaping of an actor in the form of *Homo simplex,* pulled by the structural constraints of the empire. The functional equivalent of *Miss sovieticus* is a common prostitute or whore (the fourth type of woman), who 'uncorks' the actor's consciousness, as de-fetished goddesses of the empire. The system, as the woman, is powerful only as transcendence, and grows weaker when it is an element of 'full-blooded' interactions. The fifth type is the woman as a hybrid of masculinised femininity. Hybrids of this kind usually appear as the next actors entering into the interaction. "Appetising figures grow as eating proceeds", says Decembrist (MP: 67). They emit signals in the form of the lack of fore-teeth, the menopause moustache, and physical and emotional scars. On the one hand, women of this kind are sufficiently masculinised, that is, adequately drunk and non-erotic. On the other hand, they introduce a real threat to the interaction order when they emit particular layers of femininity, which demolishes the convention of drunken conversation. The sixth type is the woman in the dark, loving and suffering, an enclave of soberness and normality.

The interactional presence of virtual or imagined entities is nothing unusual in the world of transcendental delirium. The emergence of 'bloodless' actors is a function of the cultural capital possessed by the 'real' actor. The stock of cultural capital is determined by the level of the ability to construct an imaginative sphere of interaction. This experiential synthesis is also subject to ritualisation: the moments of initiation of such interaction and its course are not random. Angels are the actors who legitimate the correct course of 'real' interactions. They are equipped with instruments of symbolic violence and use them as a resource, and obtain in exchange subordination, confirming their high position in the relation network. The angels are inverted reflections of luminaries of the system. They do not offer only charms of pure transcendence; if it were so their attractiveness would be equal to the solemn prattle of Bolshevik ideologists. The angels are shields that disperse the 'normality' of the empire and produce an interaction superstructure, owing to which the actu-

ality of the socialist habitus is presented as unattractive or deprived of resources which are worth negotiating for. Satan is presented as a structuralised remorse of conscience, a tempter pacified by the simple exorcism of shame. The sphinx then symbolises the end of Vienitchka's efforts to arrive at Pietushki, it appears inevitably as a signal of the end of a series of interactions, the exhaustion of resources, and traffic-jams within channels of conversation. The effects of this interactional gallopade are the fast consumption of resources and the dispersion of the trajectories of particular actors. The involvement of actors within the interaction reaches its turning point, and its maintenance is gradually weakened along with the burning out of the potential of emergency definitions of the action situation. It is a structural property, written in the scenario of the temporality of the transcendental delirium world, as an in-between world that is located on the borderlines of the empire. Each of the actors, literally or virtually, in turn falls out of the train, lands back in the grip of the empire, but he/she is equipped with new components of cultural capital drawn from the just completed encounter. This means that the delirious interaction ritual will be resumed when a structural possibility for its enactment occurs. However, the particular components of the actors' cultural capital, not the paroxysm of the empire, are what motivate them.

The jaws of the empire Leviathan, which produce macro-structural framings for the activities of the actors, are still open, and this property is no paroxysm but is an immanent feature of the system. If the jaws were closed, the black-moustached lemma would cease to be in force, it would give way to the *Homo sovieticus* lemma, and the socialisation intestines of Leviathan would spit out only normative puppets of the system. The sub-universe of transcendental delirium is a reality placed 'between' what flows into the open jaws of Leviathan and what its guts are, which function as a factory for brainwashing and programming system automatons. Involvement in the reality of this sub-universe is a collective levitation, which makes it possible both to perceive the system interior from the removed observer's point of view and to be exposed to the reflexes of the external world, whether in the form of the 'friendly' periphery of the 'people's' democracy countries or in the form of the 'corruption' of the West. The levitational character of the transcendental delirium sub-universe means also its chronic makeshiftness and short-livedness: the logic of *bricoleurs* and the logic of the exhaustion of resources.

Final Remarks

It would be premature to formulate far-reaching conclusions on the basis of the analysis of a single case. I was aiming at a specification of typical features of Soviet man and the ways in which he/she has moulded his/her relations with the environment. A theoretical aspect of my own analysis was the implementation of universal instruments of social interaction analysis in reference to the *Moscow-Pietushki* piece. This made it possible to grasp a few puzzling regularities.

The centre of gravity of my analysis was the relationship sets that connected the individual and the empire. I was stressing that, in spite of the overwhelming pressure of structural factors, the Soviet social actor, as a theoretical construct, remains a basic agency force. This is possible because Soviet reality – whether on the analytical level or the factual one – does not determine *in toto* the activities of Soviet social actors. It generates, of course, impassable framings for actors' activities, imposes official interaction rituals, and

forces out testimony of loyalty to the system, but it shows its helplessness on the unofficial level. The actors are able to realise, within a limited range, their own purpose if they encrust their activities as 'quotations' taken from official reality, do not openly profane a corpus of systemic sacrum, or do not play the roles of its apostles. There is a certain kind of gentleman's agreement that determines the rules of the social game, including a permissible margin of freedom. Thus the system generates some emergency-valves, starting with the selection of alcoholic liquors and the ways of acquiring them, and ending with the construction of an alternative and short-lived reality of transcendental delirium. And dialectically, if such mechanisms actually are in force, they increase the autonomy of the actors.

If the hierarchic-nomenclature organisation of society is a normal element of the official reality of the system, then the hierarchy of actors as providers of desired resources within the transcendental delirium world becomes the equivalent of the former. The precondition for achieving the latter is an initial egalitarianism among alcohol consumers, which 'levels' the official social hierarchy. The actors' acceptance of that initial egalitarianism is an essential ritual of the passage from the official reality to the alternative one. The characters of Yerofeyev's novel, who aspire to participate in the world of delirium, leave their ordinary roles on the platform of the railway station, but also take them when getting off the train. None of the actors participating in the collective levitation withdraws permanently from the official reality. At the same time, he/she temporarily suspends being the Soviet man and remains yet the Soviet man. He/she does not become a rebel or contestant but is a *bricoleur* among other *bricoleurs* who are responsible for the course of alternative interaction. He/she knows that an alcohol-interaction order is only a moment in the face of the supposed eternity of the system. But he/she also remembers (which is a component of both generalised and particularised cultural capital) that the empire exists as long as the trains run, or, more precisely, until the empire generates structural opportunities of passage to the alternative world of delirium. An infringement of the equilibrium is simply unprofitable, an example of this being the prohibition practices introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985: perhaps, in contrary to the expectations of sovietologists, the Soviet empire collapsed because a of violation of the unwritten 'social contract' and not because of the second socialist revolution introduced 'from above', as Tatyana Zaslavskaya [1990] claims.

The last statement can support the formulation of more general statements that refer not only to the specificities of the Soviet empire but also homologically to other types of empire. The statement, that every empire if it wants to survive and reproduce the social order must generate structural opportunities of 'internal' alternative worlds, still needs to be verified in other empirical replicas. Any such research programme, in which this statement would be a heuristic principle, should embrace not only 'documents' dealing with the centre of the Soviet empire, but also 'evidence' referring to its periphery – countries formerly called 'people's democracies'. Studying Soviet society with the aid of 'documents' dealing with social life reveals defense mechanisms generated by the system [Mokrzycki 2001: 106-108]. 'Really existing' Soviet socialism, as a unique solution in the spheres of economy, culture and social relations, was a true centre, radiating outward in the organisation of social life in the peripheral countries. Studying the processes characteristic of the Soviet Union is thus a necessary condition for understanding analogous processes occurring in the 'friendly' peripheries of a people's democracy. A description of the transcendental delirium phenomenon should find and characterise its functional equivalents (e.g. the ways alcohol softens the system) and then trace whether they are still essential com-

ponents of the habits of the citizens in CEE countries. In this way the thesis on the macro-social consequences of 'really existing socialism' can be partially corroborated or refuted. In turn, it would be possible to apply theoretical findings to characterise different empire types and make a comparison of the practices of the empire man with the activities of the contemporary, Western and CEE bourgeois.

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

"Every society, like every individual, needs to stand back and examine itself from time to time. It is a moment when the question of identity merges with the capacity of projection into the future. If it is true that Czech historians are something like 'psychoanalysts' of society (putting old traumas as well as the recent 'white spots' in Czech history into a new context), then sociologists Jiří Večerník and Petr Matějů together with their colleagues are in a way the 'radiologists' of post-communist Czech society. Nearly ten years after the fall of the old totalitarian regime, they are now bringing a detailed and clear description of the changes that society has already gone through and still continues to go through including the basic economic and political transformation of the nineties." Jacques Rupnik

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Reflections on the Pros and Cons of State Regulation*

JOSEPH L. PORKET**
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Abstract: Societies need regulation of human behaviour and human social interaction if they want to maintain a system of ordered relationships and, thus, to survive and prosper. Inevitably, it raises the question of who regulates what, when, how, and why on the basis of what title, at what costs, and with what consequences. In modern societies, which are complex systems, an important role is played by state regulation, which may be more or less permissive or restrictive. In any case, it is a source of tensions and conflicts in society. Yet, permissive state regulation is preferable to restrictive. The reason is that by encouraging spontaneity, i.e. individual freedom and self-regulation, albeit within a stable framework of general *ex ante* rules, it positively contributes to prosperity and development and reduces non-compliance with government-made formal rules, such as second economy activity.

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Regulation of human behaviour and human social interaction is a universal feature of societies, whether traditional or modern. In the latter, on account of their size and complex role and subsystem differentiation, it inevitably takes place at different levels, albeit within the framework of state regulation. Consequently, these societies are characterised by a web of formal as well as informal regulation and self-regulation, by a plurality of regulatory systems. And this plurality of regulatory systems is an important source of tensions and conflicts in modern societies.

Currently, state regulation is a hot issue worldwide, both in theory and in practice. After all, it implies a tension between individualism and collectivism, being about the scope of political power and the role of the state in the economy and society, and hence about the degree of autonomy (freedom) enjoyed by the members of society. And since the world is undergoing rapid, wide-ranging, and pronounced change, this tension does not simmer under the surface, but is highly visible in all societies, be they developed, developing, or post-communist.

Rules and commands

Societies have to regulate human behaviour and human social interaction in order to maintain a system of ordered relationships and, thus, to maximise the probability of their survival and the attainment of their material and non-material objectives in the conditions in

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which they find themselves. In brief, they need regulation if they want to avoid disorder and disintegration and to survive and prosper.

Regulation is a process consisting of the making, application, and adjudication of rules governing human behaviour and human social interaction. A rule is a norm which prescribes or proscribes what a specified category of social actors should or should not do on all occasions of a specified kind or on all occasions without qualification.[1] Since prescriptions and proscriptions are expected to be observed, the only alternative the addressees have is to break them. A wider choice exists when, instead of prescribing or proscribing, rules express preferences or give permission.

Rules must be distinguished from commands. In contrast to a rule which is a norm applying to a general type of situation, a command is not a norm in this sense. It is an authoritative order addressed to a particular social actor or a particular group of social actors and defining what the addressee(s) should or should not do on a particular occasion. While in some cases it may be rule-based, in others it may break the existing rules, and in still others it may be a substitute for non-existing rules.

To be effective, both rules and commands must be enforceable. Consequently, if it were evident a priori that in practice a particular rule or command would be neither observed nor enforceable, or that the costs of enforcement would be excessively high, it would be politic to refrain from making or applying that rule or from giving that command.

Levels of regulation

Although the survival and prosperity of modern societies require state regulation, i.e. regulation which concerns the society as a whole, in these societies regulation is not confined to state regulation. Within its framework, formal and/or informal regulation takes place in various spatial social systems (such as subnational units, localities, neighbourhoods, and households) as well as in various functional social systems (such as formal organisations, informal groups, and families). Hence, different levels of regulation and self-regulation are to be found in modern societies, which means that the state is not a monopoly rule-maker and rule-enforcer.[2]

Since different levels of regulation and self-regulation are to be found in modern societies, the individual tends to be simultaneously subject to different and, not infrequently, conflicting regulatory systems, formal as well as informal. This is so because in most cases the individual is simultaneously a member of a number of social systems, including a family, various informal groups and formal organisations, a local community, and a society, each of which has a regulatory system peculiar to it. At the same time, the regulatory systems of face-to-face groups and small local communities may be more restrictive than that of the state.

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[1] In the formulation of F. A. Hayek [1976, 14], 'a rule refers to an unknown number of future instances and to the acts of an unknown number of persons, and merely states certain attributes which any such action ought to possess'.

[2] As put by Michael Laver [1997, 45], 'even in societies dominated by a Leviathan, much day-to-day social interaction is beyond the purview of the state and must perforce be governed along anarchistic lines'.

Regarding specifically the difference between regulation and self-regulation, a social system is a self-regulating system if it can make, apply, and adjudicate the rules governing the behaviour of and the interaction between its members, as well as its behaviour towards and its interaction with its social environment. In contrast, a social system is not a self-regulating system if these rules are imposed on it and enforced from the outside by another social actor. Thus, while in capitalist market economies private firms are self-regulating systems, in socialist command economies state enterprises are regulated systems.

Naturally, there are degrees of regulation and self-regulation. Even in free-market economies private firms' self-regulation is constrained by the legal framework within which they operate. Even societies are not completely self-regulating systems, because state regulation tends to be constrained by international law, treaties, and conventions, as well as by international organisations and transnational actors.

Types of rules

Irrespective of the level at which regulation and self-regulation take place within societies and between them, several types of rules may be distinguished.[3] The fundamental distinction is that between formal rules (such as statute laws, by-laws, and charters) and informal rules (such as common law, customs, and conventions). The difference between them lies in that the former are designed, enacted, and formally stated (i.e. made known in written form), whereas the latter come into existence spontaneously, without being designed, enacted, and formally stated.

As the case of traditional societies and that of informal groups in modern societies indicate, informal rules can be effective even in the absence of formal rules. In contrast, formal rules do not put an end to informal rules, as evinced by the persistence in modern societies of traditions, customs, and conventions, as well as by the occurrence in formal organisations of informal rules which support, supplement, obstruct, or supersede formal rules.

Whether formal or informal, rules are either constitutive or regulative.[4] The former are concerned with the structure of the system and the acquisition and exercise of power or influence, as well as with the system's boundary and membership. If they did not exist, there would be no systems and no institutions, the examples being the institution of property and the institution of the market. The latter are then rules regulating those instances of behaviour and interaction which are independent of them in the sense that they would take place even without them, an example being the rules of the road.

Besides being either constitutive or regulative, formal and informal rules are either permissive or restrictive concerning social actors' behaviour and interaction, including their goals and means. Although explicitly or implicitly both simultaneously prescribe what social actors should do and proscribe what they should not do, permissive rules are by their nature process-orientated and, hence, goal-independent, whereas restrictive rules are by their nature goal-orientated and, hence, goal-dependent.

3/ On the typology of rules see e.g. A. J. M. Milne [1988, 51-58] and Francis Fukuyama [2000].

4/ Douglass C. North speaks about constitutional rules and operating rules [1981, 203].

Since rules can be more or less permissive or restrictive, they may be located on a continuum ranging from highly permissive (which confine themselves to defining broad parameters within which social actors are free to make their own choices) to highly restrictive (which are highly specific as to both goals and means). The more permissive they are, the higher the autonomy of social actors, and vice versa. The more restrictive they are, the more they tend to shade into commands.

Not only rules, but regulatory systems, too, are more or less permissive or restrictive. Since individuals tend to be simultaneously members of a number of social systems, they are simultaneously subject to a number of regulatory systems, some more permissive, others more restrictive. In this respect, the distinction between compulsory and voluntary membership is of importance: when their membership in a particular social system is compulsory, individuals have no choice but to be members, irrespective of how permissive or restrictive it is; in contrast, when their membership in a particular social system is voluntary, their choice depends less on how permissive or restrictive it is and more on how it contributes to the satisfaction of their needs and wants, to their survival and prosperity.

State regulation

Like regulatory systems in general, also the state as a regulatory system can be more or less restrictive or permissive. How restrictive or permissive it is, depends on the extent and intensity of state regulation. At the same time, the extent and intensity of state regulation may vary from one sphere of human behaviour and human social interaction to another. Thus, the extent and intensity of state regulation may be located on a continuum ranging from highly restrictive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction at one extreme to highly permissive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction at the other.

When state regulation is highly restrictive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction, the degree of autonomy (freedom) enjoyed by the members of society is low and their dependence on the state high. In contrast, when state regulation is highly permissive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction, yet keeps anarchy in the sense of a state of disorder at bay, the degree of autonomy (freedom) enjoyed by the members of society is high, allowing self-assertion (the pursuit of self-interest, choice), but also requiring self-reliance.

Irrespective of its extent and intensity, state regulation is a source of tensions and conflicts in society, because while some members of society may favour the existing extent and intensity of state regulation, others may favour its expansion either generally or in a particular sphere, and still others may favour its contraction, again either generally or in a particular sphere. For example, one British report distinguished five categories of voters. Depending on their attitudes towards economic and personal freedom, voters consisted of conservatives (who favoured economic freedom but wanted state regulation of personal freedom, i.e. of individual choice in moral and social issues), socialists (who distrusted economic freedom but favoured personal freedom), authoritarians (who favoured neither economic nor personal freedom), libertarians (who favoured both economic and personal freedom), and centrists (who stood in the middle of the range on both economic and personal freedom) [Blundell and Gosschalk 1997, David Smith 1997, 40].

Going back to the differences in and consequences of the extent and intensity of state regulation, permissive state regulation is conducive to the autonomy (freedom) of the members of society and, hence, to self-regulation as well. Yet, *per se* it does not determine whether and how social actors will use their autonomy (freedom): while on the one hand they need not actually make full use of all the opportunities available to them, on the other they may show lack of self-restraint and take undue advantage of others. And while it is conducive to self-regulation, simultaneously it cannot dispense with it, albeit on condition that self-regulation is constrained by conventions, customs, and traditions and does not endanger society's cohesion and performance.

Restrictive state regulation, in contrast, circumscribes the autonomy (freedom) of the members of society and, hence, also self-regulation. Being extensive and intensive, it tends to have an adverse impact on flexibility, innovation, and efficiency; to increase the costs connected with rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication; and to lessen respect for rules and contribute to covert and overt non-compliance on the part of the members of society, one reason for non-compliance being compliance costs. Moreover, when state regulation is extensive and intensive, rules are prone to be specific rather than general, to suffer from inconsistencies, and to breed uncertainty because, besides often creating confusion, they have to be frequently modified or changed in response to both changing conditions and contingencies.

In sum, while permissive state regulation is a sign that the state is process-orientated, restrictive state regulation is a sign that the state is goal-orientated in the sense of being concerned with an end-state or final outcome. To use Giovanni Sartori's terminology, the former is characterised by the rule *of* law, whereas the latter is characterised by the rule *by* laws, which nears, albeit in disguise, the rule by men [Sartori 1987]. Expressed differently, the latter is characterised by an incessant flow of ad hoc (discretionary) political and bureaucratic decisions and ad hoc rules.

When state regulation is extensive and intensive and it becomes apparent that it neither works nor can work as expected, calls for deregulation are likely to materialise and grow. Its purpose is to increase the autonomy (freedom) of the members of society by curtailing government intervention in the economy and society. This requires reducing the existing amount of rules and/or changing the content of the existing rules, as well as putting a check on ad hoc political and bureaucratic decisions. In brief, this requires substituting general and abstract rules for specific and ad hoc rules or, in other words, process-orientated (goal-independent) rules of conduct for goal-orientated (goal-dependent) rules.

Besides these measures, deregulation may need a revision of the established rules governing rule-making. The need arises when the established rules governing rule-making enable a proliferation of ad hoc rules, so that goal-driven governments are able arbitrarily to enact ad hoc rules while nominally abiding by the established rules of rule-making.

Rule enforcement

Rules are expected to be observed, not broken. In the real world, though, they are not always observed, but often intentionally or unintentionally broken, sometimes even by the rule-makers themselves. In modern societies, which are state societies, this applies to rules at any level of regulation and, consequently, also to legal and bureaucratic rules.

If rules are to be observed by their addressees, they must be enforced, and their enforcement is to be achieved by the use of both positive sanctions (and the promise thereof) and negative sanctions (and the threat thereof). In other words, to encourage as well as reward compliance with rules on the one hand and to deter as well as punish non-compliance with rules on the other, rule-enforcement has to rely on a combination of physical, material, and symbolic means.

Although rules must be enforced if they are to be observed, some are more flexible (i.e. less rigorously applied and enforced) than others. Two main approaches to rule-enforcement may be distinguished, namely, the zero-tolerance approach (which punishes any violation of rules, however slight) and the zone-of-indifference approach (which tolerates minor violations of rules). The more extensive and intensive state regulation, the more problematic is the zero-tolerance approach and the more necessary is the zone-of-indifference approach.

Whether flexible or inflexible, rules may permit or require exceptions, exempting certain social actors from compliance with them. According to Robert B. Edgerton, it is possible to identify four general categories of rule exceptions: exceptions based on temporary conditions, such as temporary incapacity; exceptions arising from a specific status, such as infancy, disability, or old age; exceptions connected with special occasions, such as harvest or initiation rituals or funerals; and exceptions that apply only in certain settings, such as sanctuaries [Edgerton 1985].

Since government-made rules must be enforced if they are to be observed, effective rule-enforcement presupposes that rules are enforceable and that the government, besides being determined to enforce them even in the face of opposition and resistance, has at its disposal the requisite physical, material, and symbolic resources. At the same time, the less compliance with rules is based on normative grounds (commitment), the greater the importance of material and physical means in rule-enforcement. Yet, compliance based on utilitarian (calculative, instrumental) grounds is more fragile than that based on commitment, because it has a tendency to decline when the performance of the state declines, when its ability to gratify and enforce falls.

Thus, rule-making and rule-enforcement incur costs, which have to be covered by the revenue extracted by the state from the economy by means of taxation, direct and indirect. Inevitably, the more extensive and intensive state regulation, i.e. the more formalised and bureaucratised the economy and society, the more revenue the state needs and has to extract from the economy. In any case, revenue extraction incurs extraction costs, depends on the state's not unlimited extractive capabilities, and can give rise to tax avoidance (which remains within the law), tax evasion (which breaks the law), and other forms of tax resistance (such as delays in tax payment or tax revolts).

It follows that state regulation should take into consideration not only its expected short-term and long-term as well as material and non-material benefits, but also its expected short-term and long-term as well as material and non-material costs, trying to maximise the former and minimise the latter. It follows, too, that tolerance of non-compliance is likely to increase as the expected costs of rule-enforcement increase.

Constraints on state regulation

The extent and intensity of state regulation depend on the orientation of government, on whether it is process-orientated or goal-orientated in the sense of being concerned with an end-state or final outcome. In any case, though, there are limits to effective state regulation, so that the state is constrained in what it can do and attain.

Besides being constrained by the available resources and the costs of rule-making and rule-enforcement, effective state regulation is further constrained by three major factors. The first is universally valid economic and other laws, which no state regulation can put out of operation. The second is the existing political, economic, and civic structures: if they are to be preserved, state regulation must not encroach on them. And the third is the values of society: the more state regulation is at odds with the values of society, the greater the likelihood of covert and overt non-compliance. Hence, there is an important difference between *effective* state regulation and *nominal* state regulation. The difference lies in that the former leads to compliance with the designed, enacted, and formally stated rules, whereas the latter does not. That is to say, while the former regulates human behaviour and human social interaction, the latter fails to do so.

Yet although it is easier to make rules than to enforce them, even rule-making faces constraints. One of them is political constraints: by definition, rule-making is politically less constrained in authoritarian political systems than in democratic ones, and in democratic ones it is politically less constrained in the case of one majority party government than in the case of a coalition or a minority government.[5]

In democratic political systems, another constraint on rule-making is the constitution, which defines the parameters within which rule-making is to take place. In other words, constitutional rules are designed to control, *inter alia*, the exercise of political power and, consequently, rule-making as well. For that reason, they are also intended to be more costly to amend, modify, and replace than are operating rules.[6] A further constraint on rule-making in democratic political systems is judicial review, which means that courts are explicitly or implicitly empowered to invalidate laws and administrative actions: while in the case of constitutional review they rule on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, in the case of administrative review they rule on the legality of administrative actions. Besides, in democratic political systems rule-making is affected by the demands and activity of pressure groups[7] and social movements,[8] as well as by public opinion and the mood of the time. They can block change in state regulation on the one hand and enforce it on the other. Ultimately, the state may become a captive of narrow (special, sectional) interests that either defend the status quo or press for change.

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[5] Some propositions concerning the impact of the electoral system and the type of government on comprehensive public sector reforms and market-oriented reform policies can be found in Harrinvirta [2000, 143-147].

[6] On flexible and rigid constitutions see Arend Lijphart [1999, 218-223].

[7] See e.g. J. L. Porket [1998, xvi-xvii, 36-37, 116-117 and 255].

[8] According to Robert O'Brien et al. [2000, 12], social movements are anti-systemic and rely on mass mobilisation. However defined, though, they should be regarded as a subset of norm-setting pressure groups.

Compliance and non-compliance

Although there are limits to effective state regulation, governments may become obsessed with regulation. That is to say, they may develop a regulatory mentality, characterised by a belief that they are the best judges of what is good for society and that, by means of regulation, they can solve any problem and attain any political, economic, social, and cultural objective. The inevitable result of this belief in their omniscience and omnipotence is then extensive and intensive state regulation.

Being inimical to spontaneity, extensive and intensive state regulation noticeably circumscribes the autonomy (freedom) of the members of society. At the same time, it gives rise to uncertainty, because it has to be undergoing perpetual change. The reason is that whenever the existing rules do not produce the officially desired outcomes, on principle the remedy is sought either in their modification or in their replacement by new ones, not in their relaxation or repeal.[9]

Whatever the extent and intensity of state regulation, it incurs costs which must be covered by the revenue extracted by the state from the economy by means of taxation, direct and indirect. In addition, though, state regulation can impose costs on the economy by forcing economic actors (private firms in the first place) to take on certain duties, such as to clean the environment, introduce particular safety measures, maintain specific product standards, pay a minimum wage, provide benefits to employees, and collect taxes on behalf of government.[10]

In any case, state regulation affects all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction. In the economic sphere, for instance, it has an impact on productivity, competitiveness, competition, profitability, hiring and firing, unemployment, prices, and consumers' choice. Outside the economic sphere, it has an impact on, *inter alia*, access to information, communication, political activity and processes, marriage, divorce, provision of health care and education, social inclusion and exclusion, individuals' opportunities, privileges, crime, and immigration.

For society, the impact of state regulation may be beneficial or harmful, depending on its extent and intensity. In principle, state regulation is beneficial if it contributes to economic, political, social, and cultural development by being process-orientated and, thus, allowing spontaneity, albeit within the framework of general and abstract rules. In contrast, state regulation is harmful if it retards economic, political, social, and cultural development by being goal-orientated and, thus, putting fetters on spontaneity.

Yet, whether process-orientated or goal-orientated, state regulation is a source of tensions and conflicts in society. They arise because the interests of the members of society differ and because these interests determine attitudes towards the existing and the desired extent and intensity of state regulation as well as towards compliance and non-compliance with the existing rules. At the same time, the choice between compliance and non-compliance is affected by the perception of their costs, which need not be exclusively economic.

By definition, goal-orientated state regulation is more conducive to covert and overt non-compliance than process-orientated state regulation. The reason is that the former, be-

[9] As to specifically command socialism see J. L. Porket [1989, 186].

[10] Some estimates of the costs imposed on business by government regulation in a variety of countries and contexts are quoted by Graham Bannock [2001, 2-4].

ing extensive and intensive, is likely not only to be detached from reality, but also to suffer from inconsistencies, so that the observance of one rule precludes the observance of another. As a result, in order to avoid paralysis, at least some of the rules applying to particular situations must be broken. This means that goal-orientated state regulation contributes to the emergence and persistence of a culture of rule-breaking.

Pitfalls of state regulation

It follows from the foregoing that goal-orientated state regulation can fail to attain its objectives and/or produce unintended consequences. In other words, it can fail to solve existing problems, exacerbate them, and/or create new ones. Empirical evidence is not difficult to come by, as demonstrated by the selected cases presented below.

One example of the failure of state regulation is Prohibition in the United States. In this liberal democracy, a considerable proportion of the population had always deplored the use of alcohol. Under their pressure, the production, sale, and transport of alcohol were outlawed between 1920 and 1933. However, the ban did not stop people drinking. It merely drove them underground, i.e. to break the law, and gave rise to organised crime engaged in smuggling, illicit distilling, and bootlegging. These activities, not surprisingly, involved widespread corruption as well as the use of violence.[11]

Another example is the case of the communist systems established in the former Soviet-bloc countries. As variants of totalist authoritarianism characterised by authoritarian politics and political control over the economy and society, they were highly formalised and bureaucratized. Nevertheless, they had an informal dimension too, which was an unintended product of the formal system and deviated from it, in some respects complementing it, in others eroding it. Among its elements was the second economy, brought about by the bureaucratisation of the economy and chronic shortages affecting consumers and state enterprises alike.

Illegal second economy activities were not confined to communist systems, though. They are to be found in any established modern economic system, irrespective of its type. In capitalist market economies, for instance, they have increased considerably since 1960, their major causes being the tax burden, the complexity of the tax system, and restrictive state regulation. They are also far from absent in the developing countries,[12] as well as in the post-communist ones.

The last example concerns contemporary Britain. Since the 1997 general election, the Labour government has been obsessed with regulation. New regulatory measures have imposed additional compliance costs on business, estimated to reach £15 billion by January 2002 [Smith 2001].[13] They have also imposed performance targets on the health

[11] A less known case concerns off-course betting in Britain, which did not disappear between 1853 and 1961, although legally prohibited.

[12] In the developing world, according to some estimates, 50-75 per cent of all working people participate in the second economy, the size of which amounts to between one-fifth and more than two-thirds of the total economic output of the Third World. [Hernando de Soto 2000, 75]

[13] For estimates of the total additional cost to business, including tax increases, see Nicholas Boys Smith [2001].

service, social services, education, the police, and local government. Besides, they were becoming a threat to the effectiveness of the armed forces as well as to individual freedom.

Despite the sharp increase in red tape, by mid-2001 Britain was still regarded as having a more business-friendly environment than other European Union countries. Nevertheless, since 1997 its global competitiveness has been gradually falling. There have been troubles with targets, too, arising from their impact on the behaviour of individuals and organisations: targets may encourage cheating and rule-breaking, adversely affect performance in areas not covered by them, and reduce responsiveness to real problems.[14]

A number of factors have contributed to the proliferation of rules and targets. They have included the government's goal-orientation; its naive belief in the inherent effectiveness of rules and targets and, hence, of centralisation and micromanagement; its petty risk-aversion manifesting itself in, *inter alia*, its safety fanaticism; and the influence of regulation-demanding pressure groups and public opinion.

Between Leviathan and anarchy

The probability that goal-orientated state regulation will fail to attain its objectives and/or produce unintended consequences increases the more extensive and intensive it is. This means that there are limits to effective state regulation, to political control over the economy and society. Yet, even when state regulation fails to attain its objectives and/or produces unintended consequences, it still can be effective enough to keep anarchy (in the sense of a state of disorder)[15] at bay and to maintain a system of ordered relationships.

Situations can arise, though, when effective state regulation is practically absent either because government is unable and/or unwilling to enforce the enacted formal rules, or because the collapse of the hitherto established political and economic system has created a temporary systemic vacuum. Predictably, such situations tend to bring about an increase in self-regulation as well as an expansion of both the household economy and the second economy, and urgently call for effective (not just nominal) state regulation, for the rule of law.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, a tempory systemic vacuum came into being in the former Soviet-bloc countries as a result of the collapse of communism therein. As already noted, the communist systems established in these countries were characterised by a state regulation that was highly restrictive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction. Yet, they did not escape non-compliance (albeit mostly covert) in the form of, *inter alia*, productive second economy activity, corruption, patronage, and informal networks.[16]

[14] To give an example, the performance targets set by the Strategic Rail Authority have encouraged train operators to stretch journey times in their timetables to minimize the risk of trains arriving late, so that some journeys now take longer than they did 100 years ago. [*The Economist*, 9 June 2001, p. 47.]

[15] In the parlance of libertarianism and anarchism, though, the term 'anarchy' is merely another name for spontaneity. The former argues that the role of the state should be confined to the protection of individual liberty and private property, while the latter advocates the abolition of the state and its replacement by a free and spontaneous cooperation among individuals, groups, regions, and nations.

[16] Patronage and informal networks in the party-state are the subject-matter of a special issue of [*Contemporary European History*, 2002). See also Alena V. Ledeneva [1998].

Basically, the temporary systemic vacuum brought about by the collapse of communism meant an anarchic situation in which the hitherto established system of state regulation was not functioning any more, but an alternative system of state regulation still was not in place. Consequently, it was far from clear which government-made formal rules were in force, and this uncertainty inevitably had an adverse impact on both rule-enforcement and law-abidance. Thus, one of the problems facing the post-communist countries right from the beginning was to build an effective system of state regulation that would put an end to the existing systemic vacuum and ensure stability.

Since state regulation is a question of the *scope* of political power and the role of the state in the economy and society, the problem was to define both. And since effective state regulation is not possible without rule-makers and rule-enforcers, the problem implied defining the *structure* of political power as well. In sum, the problem was to define formal rules governing the behaviour of and interaction between social actors in post-communist societies, including the acquisition, exercise, and accountability of political power, revenue extraction and spending by government, the allocation of resources and tasks, and the distribution of outcomes.

Not surprisingly, in practice some post-communist countries have dealt with this problem more successfully than others. That is to say, while some already have built an effective system of state regulation compatible with democracy and market capitalism, others have failed to do so hitherto.[17] Among the latter, the most prominent stragglers have been Russia,[18] Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as Bulgaria and Romania.

A number of intrasocietal (country-specific) and extrasocietal factors have encouraged or retarded the building of an effective post-communist system of state regulation and affected the extent and intensity of state regulation. To name a few, the former have included post-communist governments' determination, orientation, policies, and capabilities, the party and electoral systems, the influence of pressure groups and social movements, the values of society, voters' manifested preferences, and the mood of the time, while the latter have included, at least in the case of the applicants for membership in the European Union (EU), the EU's requirement that the applicants implement a prior wide-ranging harmonisation of their legal standards and institutions with those prevailing in the EU.

Even when the post-communist countries have succeeded in building an effective system of state regulation, though, they have not been able completely to eliminate non-compliance with government-made formal rules. Consequently, they have not been able to get rid of informal economy activity (fraud, tax evasion, corruption, organised crime,[19] and so on) either. However, its extent has varied considerably from one

[17] See e.g. Adrian Karatnycky [1997].

[18] In post-communist Russia, for instance, 'The problem is not an absence of legislation, but an absence of enforcement and an associated absence of expectations for the rule of law to be established in the near future' [Stefan Hedlund, 1999, 261].

[19] The bearers of organized crime are known as mafias. Two types of mafia organisations may be distinguished, namely, the mafia as a profit-maximising firm and the mafia as a government. The latter plays a rule-making role in a given territory, be it geographically or functionally defined, and imposes regulations on legal and/or illegal firms. Thus, it provides a rule of law of a sort and a system of dispute settlement, i.e. a relatively stable framework for economic activity.

post-communist country to another and, within the same post-communist country, over time.[20]

While it is likely that in the post-communist countries the extent of informal economy activity will contract somewhat in the future, it is unlikely that they will see this marketed albeit illegal and unrecorded economic activity to disappear totally. After all, the informal economy is a universal feature of modern (state) societies as well as a cross-system phenomenon.

Conclusion

Whether they are traditional or modern, societies need regulation of human behaviour and human social interaction if they want to maintain a system of ordered relationships and, thus, to survive and prosper. Hence, regulation matters. More specifically, it matters who regulates what, when, how, and why on the basis of what title, at what costs, and with what consequences.

In modern societies, one of the rule-makers and rule-enforcers is the state. This raises the important question of its role in the economy and society at large, because the role it actually plays in the economy and society has an impact on the degree of autonomy (freedom) enjoyed by the members of society and, at the same time, is a source of tensions and conflicts in society. These tensions and conflicts arise from differences in social actors' interests. Social actors, be they individuals or social systems, are motivated first and foremost by their own interests, and their pursuit of self-interest then determines their attitudes towards the role of the state in the economy and society at large and, thus, towards the extent and intensity of state regulation. And since social actors' interests differ, also their attitudes towards the extent and intensity of state regulation differ.

As a result of these tensions and conflicts, the extent and intensity of state regulation undergo change over time. In fact, over the last five centuries modern societies have experienced regulation-deregulation cycles, with regulation-orientated periods (characterised by governments obsessed with regulation) followed by spontaneity-orientated periods (characterised by governments showing regulatory restraint) and spontaneity-orientated periods giving way to regulation-orientated periods.

While temporary fluctuations in the extent and intensity of state regulation tend to be triggered off by contingencies such as war or natural disasters, regulation-deregulation cycles reflect mood swings (change in preferences) brought about by social actors' perception of a widening gap between their expectations and reality. Regulation-orientated periods begin to come to their end when the enforcement costs of state regulation begin to exceed its benefits, when state regulation begins to fail to attain its objectives, and when non-compliance begins to be common rather than rare. In contrast, spontaneity-orientated periods begin to

[20] On the size of the second economy in the post-communist countries between 1989 and 1995 see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [*Transition Report 1997*, p. 74, and Mária Lackó, 2000, 117-149]. On the level of corruption in selected post-communist countries see [Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, 1998, 221, Table 10.1], and on the level of corruption in developed, developing, and post-communist countries see Vito Tanzi [1998, 559-594].

come to their end when state regulation begins to be regarded widely as a panacea and when security (protection against any contingency) begins to be valued more than freedom.

Neither regulation-orientation nor spontaneity-orientation is peculiar to a particular type of modern political system. That is to say, the extent and intensity of state regulation do not depend on whether the established political system is authoritarian or democratic. Both can be either restrictive or permissive, albeit with the proviso that authoritarian political systems are by their nature always restrictive in the political sphere.

Although the extent and intensity of state regulation can give rise to tensions and conflicts in any type of modern political systems, in democratic political systems they can also give rise to a tension between democratic procedures of governance and goal-attainment. The reason is that in these systems the goal-orientation of the elected government can lead to the subordination of democratic procedures of governance to goal-attainment, to an authoritarian, stealthy, or control-freak style of governance which does not hesitate to discard those democratic procedures of governance that inhibit goal-attainment.

In contemporary societies, not surprisingly, state regulation continues to play an important role in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction. Yet, and again not surprisingly, governments are not monopoly rule-makers and rule-enforcers. Whether elected or not, they inevitably have to compete with a wide range of other rule-makers and rule-enforcers, intrasocietal as well as extrasocietal, who act as constraints on their rule-making and rule-enforcement.

Both permissive and restrictive state regulation continue to have their ardent proponents and opponents, with the proponents of state regulation demanding more state regulation and the opponents of state regulation demanding less state regulation. However, since about the mid-1990s demands for more state regulation, for activist government, have been growing, partly as a response to economic liberalisation and globalisation.[21] In other words, belief in the inherently beneficial effects of state regulation remains widespread in many societies.[22] At the same time, most governments still have a penchant for incessant meddling, tinkering, and regulative activity, and an aversion to spontaneity and, thus, to deregulation.

Yet there are compelling reasons for encouraging spontaneity, i.e. individual freedom and self-regulation, albeit within a stable framework of general *ex ante* rules. Modern societies are complex systems. Moreover, the world is currently undergoing rapid, wide-ranging, and pronounced change, which creates problems calling for a solution. But different social actors face in different circumstances different problems which need tailored solutions. Therefore, problems should be solved at the level at which they arise by those who experience them and have an interest in their effective and efficient solution as well as the requisite knowledge and capabilities.

Since extensive and intensive state regulation stifles spontaneity, it inevitably retards societal development, both economic and non-economic. On top of that, it can fail to attain its objectives and/or produce unintended consequences, one of them being covert and

[21] Globalism's challengers are discussed by Manfred B. Steger [2002], who makes a distinction between left and right anti-globalists.

[22] According to Kate Hudson [2000, 16], 'the new, post-1989, anti-welfare face of capitalism is far from being welcome to a very large part of the population'. On contemporary economic anti-liberalism see David Henderson [2001].

overt non-compliance with government-made formal rules. Expressed differently, it can fail to solve existing problems, exacerbate them, and/or create new ones.

At the same time, state regulation takes place in a world which is interdependent, made up of nation-states pursuing their own interests, and differentiated in economic, political, social, and cultural terms. This diversity of national interests and conditions constitutes a constraint on the extent and intensity of effective supranational (regional and global) regulation, even in the case of the European Union with its superstate tendency. Just as individual societies, the world too is characterised by a web of formal and informal regulation and self-regulation, by a plurality of regulatory systems.

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Income Maintenance Policies, Household Characteristics and Work Incentives in the Czech Republic

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Summary: This paper investigates work disincentives imposed by the income maintenance system on the unemployed with certain household characteristics. It firstly specifies which parameters of the income maintenance system may impose work disincentives, and then attempts to identify the relationship between the work incentives and the household characteristics. It shows that the income maintenance system is more generous towards larger families with children.

The binomial logit estimation of outflows to employment using the Labour Force Survey Data evidences that between the fourth quarter of 1998 and 1999, marked as a recession period, the characteristics on children were not the significant determi-nants of outflows from unemployment to employment. Nevertheless, the calcula-tions of the gross probabilities show that Social Assistance recipients from families with children have much lower outflow from unemployment.

Using the empirical results some passive labour market policy options are discussed.

Opinions of Czechs about the Welfare State*

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Abstract: The post-communist countries are searching for social policies that would meet the requirements of social justice without hindering rapid development of market relationships. This article examines the links between three levels of legitimacy of the concept of the welfare state: the level of preferred principles, the level of attitudes toward specific policies, and the level of desired solutions. It is based on two representative surveys of the Czech population, carried out in 1998 and 1999, on family budgets data from 1989 to 1998, and on some international comparisons, in particular with the Netherlands. The author attempts to explain why and in what respect Czech citizens consider the current social policy to be ineffective: it is mainly owing to the perceived lack of reciprocity between its benefits and its costs, and because individual gain is the predominant motivation behind support for social policy among the great majority of Czech citizens. The author claims that this causes them to lose trust and interest in the government's social policy and leads them to search for other, more efficient solutions through private insurance systems, which promise them protection against growing social uncertainty while providing less solidarity.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2002, Vol. 38, No. 3: 327-344

1. Introduction

The issues concerning the legitimacy of the welfare state, and its importance for the legitimacy of the social and political system, have long been in the spotlight of the discussion on the current development of the welfare state. This discussion clearly demonstrates that citizens strongly support the general principles and measures of the welfare state in (post)modern society. However, somewhat volatile opinions have formed over the question of the desired type of social policy and its specific measures: what matters is the political affiliation, class (social group), or labour market status of the respondents, as well as the type of social policy programme. Owing to the way actual changes in policies are reflected, the opinion on specific measures is also dynamic over time [cf. particularly Taylor-Gooby 1985, Ringen 1987, Taylor-Gooby 1991, van Oorschot 1997, Svalfors and Taylor-Gooby 1999, Svalfors 1999].

In post-communist countries, the legitimacy of principles and individual measures of social policy appear to be even more important owing to the fact that the criteria of social (distributive) justice are being redefined over the course of the social transformation [Matějů

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1997] and the social policy measures are being rebuilt accordingly. In the process of the 'recommodification' of life under enormous economic and social pressures, the overall scope of redistribution however has been limited. Consequently, as surveys in the Czech Republic have shown, the public has adopted a quite critical view of the current social policy [Purkrábek 1996, *Sociální...* 1998, Rabušic and Sirovátka 1999, van Oorschot, Sirovátka, and Rabušic 1998]. However, demands for increasing the range of social benefits have not been made with regard to all social policy programmes. Also, the link between the legitimacy of social policy and the legitimacy of the political elites, the political system and overall political stability has not been very strong in the Czech Republic, as the political preferences of voters appear to be relatively stable - at least in terms of the left-right dichotomy of the political spectrum [Vlachová 1999]. In this paper, we will try to examine what it is that Czech citizens actually expect of their welfare state, and how these expectations correspond to the more general preferences of the public, and to the experiences the Czech public has had with actual social policies.

2. Research Questions and Data

The concept of social policy and its related demands tend to take shape in the minds of citizens on at least three levels. The first level consists of its basic principles, i.e. solidarity and its motives, as well as overall perceptions of social justice. The second level involves its specific solutions, i.e. how the citizens view the current social policy programmes and their legitimacy. The third level entails the notion of legitimate and desired solutions, which result from a confrontation between the principles and the reality of the social policy and its programmes.

Three questions consequently arise: What are the main principles of a just and legitimate social policy that the Czech public cherishes? How are the current social policy in general, and its individual programmes in particular, viewed by citizens? Which specific solutions and measures of social policy are citizens willing to support? If it is assumed that the legitimate concept of the welfare state determines the actual type of welfare state in a democratic society, such questions are of paramount importance.[1]

The data presented here are drawn from the Czech representative surveys entitled 'Impacts of Social Policy Transformation' (June 1999; 1319 respondents) and 'Legitimacy of Social Security' (June 1998; 1351 respondents), which the author conducted in co-operation with the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IVVM). These surveys were inspired in part by the Dutch TISSER Solidarity Study [van Oorschot 1998], and several questions in the Czech surveys were adopted from the Dutch one, which enabled a comparison to be made of the two countries. In addition, an analysis is made of the Family Budget Surveys, collected by the Czech Statistical Office for the period of 1989-1998.

A comparison of the social policy of the Czech Republic and that of the economically much more developed Netherlands is feasible and may contribute to a better under-

[1] The classification of the welfare state is actually based on this assumption. Citizens end up with the type of welfare state they support through their political preferences, as the modern state is democratic by institutionalising the principle of opposition. However, the legitimacy issue remains a permanent problem [cf. Habermas 1976].

standing of the factors that influence the formation of claims made on the Czech welfare state. Despite the social, cultural, economic and political differences between these two countries, the transformation of social policy during the past ten years has followed a similar pattern in both countries. This trend has led to restricted generosity and weakened solidarity, with an emphasis on greater individual responsibility. The level of social protection benefits (as replacement rates to wages) has dropped and the benefits have become less entitlement-oriented and more income-tested [van Oorschot, Sirovátka, and Rabušic 1999].

3. Some Hypotheses about Citizens' Support for Social Policy

According to Habermas, the level of principles is more important for policy legitimacy than the level of evaluation of specific policies, as legitimacy conflicts of a political system develop mainly over the issue of principles [Habermas 1976]. On the other hand, the legitimacy of principles may be weakened by a low degree of effectiveness of specific programmes and of the institutions that are supposed to enforce these principles [Ringen 1987]. Thus it is necessary to focus both on the preferred principles and goals and on the actual and desired solutions.

The changing support for the basic principles of the current welfare state may be perceived from a number of perspectives. Here, attention is paid mainly to those seemingly of increasing relevance for the post-communist countries in the process of transformation. Rose and Peters [1978] assert that public support for social policies declines in periods of economic recession, when real incomes decrease. This particularly relates to the middle and upper income categories of respondents. Wilenski [1975] predicted that a new 'middle mass' - rising as a result of economic development, the growth of new industries, and expanding educational opportunities - would refuse to pay taxes since they would see no benefits for them in the welfare state. Changes in social policy accompanied by an increase of social inequalities also affect the support given to the principles of the welfare state. According to some researchers, the welfare state became popular, particularly among the middle class, when it was flourishing most strongly [Baldwin 1990]. Hence the more recent decrease in benefits (and their increased targeting) is expected to erode its foundations. Offe [1996: 176] points out that "...'flat rate' policies would alienate the better-offs whose income would be used to subsidize the transfers to the well-to-do."

Similarly, we have to take into account the decisive role that the media and public opinion leaders play. Here, the hypothesis of 'issue attention cycles' may be worth considering, particularly given the neo-liberal ideology that asserted itself in the public debate during the first few euphoric years of transformation.[2] Finally, economic shortages and striving for individual consumption (the scarcity hypothesis) in the post-communist coun-

[2] According to Pettersen [1995: 202], Anthony Downs' theory of 'issue attention cycles' seems appropriate for analysing the changes of the 1970s and 1980s when the 'new right' movement was initiated and grew in vitality. This theory explains that attitudes of the public on political issues (including welfare state) are cyclical being influenced by an introduction of the political novelties by opinion leaders and mass media.

tries may lead the public to reject the principle of collectively sharing risks which are in fact individually diverse.[3]

Based on the above assumptions, one could expect that during the transformation period general public support for generous social policies (which were in place in the past) would fade. On the other hand, one could also expect that some public expectations regarding the welfare state would increase owing to the need to absorb transformation risks [Offe 1996]. In either case, growing social inequalities and an unequal distribution of transformation risks can be expected to differentiate society in many respects: in the support for solidarity and the principles of social policy, in the evaluation of existing social policies, and in the expectations from the welfare state.

4. Support for the Principles of Social Policy

Solidarity and sharing the risks

Van Oorschot [1997] identified four main motives of solidarity: first, belonging to and identifying with a community; second, moral obligation towards the needy members of a community; third, individual long-term self-interest; and finally, an accepted authority (enforced by the authority). The principle of solidarity that constitutes the basis of social policy enjoys significant support in Czech society. The support is based on all the above-mentioned motives of solidarity. Their relative strength and ranking resemble the situation in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s. Like the Netherlands, individual self-interest is the strongest solidarity motive in the Czech Republic.

All the motives that underpin solidarity are relatively strong in Czech society as a result of a widespread feeling of threat from the transformation risks: uncertainties caused by the changing labour market and growing unemployment, a long-term decrease or an insignificant increase in real incomes, the relatively common feelings of subjective poverty and, the loss of significant savings or financial assets suffered by many citizens in the bankruptcies of banks or investment funds. That the structure and the strength of the motives are similar throughout the social strata, irrespective of the political preferences of respondents, could serve to confirm the hypothesis of a general threat (regardless of individually diverse social risks).[4]

However, the predominant motive of the expected individual benefit to be had from the welfare state may weaken attitudes of solidarity and the requirements for broad collective protection against risks and uncertainties. According to Offe [1996], when differences in people's opportunities are on the rise and an economic crisis sets in, the rational

[3] In accordance with the European Value Study, the post-materialism index equalled 2.01 in the Czech Republic in 1991 while the average for the West was 2.56 [cf. Ester, Halman, and de Moor 1994: 214]. This finding fits to the scarcity hypothesis (material deprivation strengthens the effect of material values).

[4] It has been emphasised that social cohesiveness and solidarity becomes stronger when in jeopardy. The welfare policy was born due to deprivation and a need for collective protection from risks faced by modern society [cf. Heclo 1981]. This explains the willingness to share individually diverse risks irrespective of existing social differences.

Table 1: Solidarity motives (% of positive answers)
Question: *'Paying taxes and social security contributions is compulsory. However, people may have different reasons for paying them. To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following reasons? Do you pay social security contributions and taxes because of...?'**

	Czech Republic 1999**	Netherlands 1995***
Potential (future) individual benefit	78	82
Moral duty to the needy in society	61	64
Sympathy for the lot of beneficiaries	59	42
Benefit to society	56	n/a

* In addition to the motives presented by van Oorschot, the motive of contributions being beneficial to society is used (e.g. the notion of solidarity as an investment into the future of society, i.e. its productive function, integrity, etc.). No question was presented on the forced solidarity that results from accepting the authority of the state.

** Data from June 1999 (N = 1,319).

*** TISSER Solidarity Study 1995 (N = 1,403).

Table 2: Willingness to redistribute the individually different risks: Which groups should pay higher contributions to social security? (% of negative answers)
Question: *'Do you think that people in the following categories should pay higher contributions to social security and/or higher taxes?'*

	Czech Republic 1999	Netherlands 1995
Employers in sectors suffering from higher unemployment rates	40	62
People with higher risks of unemployment	61	76
Workers in sectors with higher unemployment rates	65	n/a
Employers in sectors with higher sickness and invalidity	31	40
People facing a higher risk of sickness and invalidity due to their life-style	34	41
People facing a higher risk of sickness and invalidity due to their job	59	59
People facing a higher risk of sickness and invalidity due to their biological/genetic determination	71	80
Women because on average they live longer than men	82	89

motivation of solidarity gives way to individualistic attitudes. The rise in social inequalities, the differentiation of social risks, and the reformulation of social policy, away from universalism and toward benefit targeting, all take place at the same time within the transformation period. As a result, in comparison with developed market democracies, the consequences are more intense and have a more significant impact on the perception of opportunities in life. The foundations of solidarity that constitute the basis of the welfare state are thus subject to a number of pressures.[5] Therefore, even though solidarity enjoys strong support at the level of principles, the willingness of Czech citizens to share and redistribute individually differing risks through social policy measures is rather low at the level of specific programmes. This fact stands out clearly in comparison with the Netherlands. Unique to the Czech Republic is that the distribution of these attitudes throughout different social strata is quite similar, irrespective of the political orientation of respondents.

Social justice

According to Miller [1976], the imperative of social justice is always comprised of several principles: rights (guaranteed and equal individual rights and freedoms for everybody), deserts, and needs. Different societies attribute different weight to each of the above principles in their contribution to social justice.[6] Deutsch [1975] defines several principles of distributive justice, such as equity, equality and need, i.e. reciprocity, equality and neediness. These principles may be considered as complementing one another. For example, in social policy, reciprocity is emphasised more strongly in social insurance systems, whereas equality is stressed more in providing defined categories of the population with 'demogrants' (child benefits, services or social benefits provided to the large groups or to the public), while neediness is accentuated in social assistance programmes (which provide entitlements based on income or other specifically defined handicaps). The above principles are also to some extent competing with each other. The question is which one will be the strongest. Matějů [1997] emphasised the initial 'split of consciousness' and only a gradual crystallisation of the legitimate principles of distributive justice in the post-communist societies.

The analysis confirms that, with respect to the preferred aspects of social justice in social policy programmes, the Czech public supports different and sometime contradictory principles of social policy at the same time. However, the emphasis placed on individual principles differs according to the type of social policy programme. In general, the principle of need is stressed rather strongly, as is the guarantee of a minimum standard of

[5] Ferge [1997] mentions the process of the 'individualisation of the social'.

[6] The Relationship between these principles and the egalitarianism requirement is not simple. There are two core issues in social policy: the provision of equal opportunities and a decrease of inequalities of outcomes, guaranteeing a minimum standard. Its level is, however, subject to discussion. Both of these goals are to some extent related to the principle of need and the principle of rights. In addition, the libertarian requirement of individual freedom is also egalitarian in a sense, by virtue of demanding equal rights to individual freedom for everybody [on ideas of egalitarianism see particularly Sen 1992].

Figure 1: Goals - principles of providing selected welfare benefits

The question was: *'Different people believe that social security benefits should follow different goals. Which goals do you think should be followed?'* (Data from June 1999).



living (subsistence level). However, the principle of deserts (in terms of social reciprocity) is also stressed very strongly, articulated in terms of high personal merit, such as taking care of the family and exerting individual efforts. On the other hand, the principle of decreasing inequalities of wealth is emphasised less strongly. This configuration of preferred principles - goals of social justice among Czech respondents - reveal an inclination towards a concept of a rather 'limited' welfare state at the level of principles.[7]

The structure of the principles applied in social assistance does not differ significantly from the structure of principles related to social insurance (pensions and unemployment benefits). They do differ in the stronger emphasis on job achievements with regard to pensions, the stronger emphasis on needs with regard to social assistance benefits, and the stronger emphasis on individual efforts with regard to unemployment benefits. These modest differences correspond largely to the character of the particular benefits.

The emphasis the Czech public places on the principles of need, the guarantee of minimum subsistence, and individual effort and reciprocity, combined with less of a stress on the principle of decreasing inequality, may stem from a realistic awareness of the restricted resources available for social policy programmes (while demands to expand the scope of interventions are rising) among the respondents. This conforms to the hypothe-

[7] In this case, we prefer not to use a notion of liberal or residual welfare state because this notion includes other dimensions than only the principles or purposes underlying the delivery of the benefits.

sis concerning the significant impact of the economic recession in the Czech Republic from 1997 to 1999 (the second period of GDP decline after 1990). With regard to the hypothesis of 'issue attention cycles', it might be worth noting that the social policy strategy had been presented to Czech citizens, at least up until 1993, as a form of assistance provided to the 'needy', i.e. as a social safety net, and not as a matter of a right to an entitlement.

4. The Evaluation of Czech Social Policy by the Public

Development of social policy and the level of expenditures

In general, the Czech public perceives the recent changes in social policy as a deterioration, and the current level of social policy expenditures as low.

More than half of the respondents stated that the social policy had deteriorated since 1990, and found the government social policy expenditures too low (one-third of respondents were unable to answer these questions). Only 10% of citizens stated that the social policy has improved, even though this percentage was somewhat higher for health care and pensions. Only 4% of citizens found the social policy expenditures relatively high. Housing support, employment policy and health care were subject to the most severe criticism (deterioration in the given area and the insufficient provision of funds in this area).

The respondents' evaluation of general trends in social policy and of the overall level of social policy expenditures correlates with their subjective feeling of poverty, their self-ranking in the social strata, and, above all, with their political orientation. People who feel poor, members of lower social strata, and respondents who support left-wing political parties take a more critical attitude to social policy trends and the level of social policy expenditures.[8] However, the percentages of the negative evaluation of social policy developments and, in particular, the current level of social policy expenditures, are relatively high overall, even among well-established citizens and supporters of right-wing parties.

Individual gains and losses stemming from social policy measures

Given the fact that individual self-interest is predominant among solidarity motives, we also need to focus on the individual gains and losses that stem from the social policy measures. While disregarding the one-fourth of respondents who were undecided, five times more respondents felt that they had lost as a result of the social policy changes in the Czech Republic (almost half of all respondents) than those who felt that they gained. The strength of this feeling of loss as a result of redistribution through social policy measures may be surprising. By comparison, the ratio of negative answers to the same question in the Netherlands was only slightly higher than that of the positive answers, while feelings of balanced gain and loss prevailed in the opinions of Dutch citizens.

[8] The Spearman's coefficient of correlation between the preference for a political party on the left-right scale and the evaluation of social policy development equalled 0.29 (significance 0.000). The correlation between the preferred party and opinion on the social policy expenditures equalled 0.26 (significance 0.000).

Table 3: Evaluation of changes in social policy and of the current level of expenditures
(% of negative answers; '*I cannot tell*' in parentheses)
Question: *'How has the situation changed since 1990 in the following areas?'* and *'What is the current level of government expenditures like in the following areas?'*,
Czech Republic, June 1999 (N = 1,319)

Area	The level (significantly) deteriorated		The level of expenditures is (very) low	
Housing support	54	(23)	62	(22)
Employment policy	53	(27)	52	(27)
Pensions and security for the elderly	43	(17)	41	(15)
Healthcare	42	(6)	55	(9)
Family related benefits	39	(28)	46	(24)
Education development	38	(20)	49	(20)
Unemployment benefits	36	(41)	34	(29)
Illness, injury and disability benefits	35	(21)	52	(19)
Guaranteeing subsistence level	32	(30)	36	(29)
Social policy in general	56	(13)	59	(16)

Figure 2: Evaluation of social policy by political orientation



Note: Data from June 1999 (N = 1,319).

In contrast to the differences in the evaluation of the social policy trends and the level of social expenditures based on political and class affiliation, in the Czech Republic the mostly negative evaluation of individual gains and losses was not affected by political orientation, subjective feelings of poverty, or by the self-ranking of respondents among the social classes.

Feelings of individual loss as a result of social policy may help to explain the prevailing negative evaluation of the developments in Czech social policy and of the current level of its benefits. Two objective circumstances seem to be important in this respect, the first of which is the overall generosity of social policy. The share of social expenditures in GDP in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands differs sharply: 20-22 per cent in the Czech Republic in the long run, and 29-30 per cent in the Netherlands; the level of most benefits relative to wages is lower in the Czech Republic [van Oorschot, Sirovátka, and Rabušic 1999]. The second reason is probably more important. In the Czech Republic, the social strata with the lowest incomes have suffered a decrease in their real incomes during the 1990s when compared to 1989, and this loss has only been partially compensated by social security benefits. Due to a relative increase in the tax burden and social security contributions, compared to the social benefits provided by the social policy system, the middle-income groups lost the most in relative terms during this period [Sirovátka 1998, Večerník, Burdová 1999]. These losses were a result of the diminished average real value of benefits provided to the family and the diminished average relative value of social insurance benefits when compared to wages, while the shares of the income tax and social security contributions in the gross real income of employees have increased only slightly.

The Czech population could rightfully anticipate (in line with the liberal principles of social justice declared by the highest political representatives) the elimination of universal social security policy provisions and the generally decreased availability of social benefits. However, having been presented with liberal policy promises ('more money in the pockets of citizens and less money redistributed by the state') the Czech population was not prepared for such a remarkable deterioration in the ratio between the payments it made to the state and the social security benefits received from the state. Their trust in the ability of the government to use taxes and social insurance contributions properly and effectively in social policy was weakened as a result.

The administration of social policy and the trust of the public

Solidarity, whether based on a common identity, the mutual usefulness of citizens, or a rational calculation of individual benefits, may give social policy its strong foundations, but only on the condition that the participants in the collective protection system trust each other. In addition to this mutual trust, trust in the state is also very important, as the state acts as the guarantor or the manager of the system by being able to suppress the potential individualistic tendencies that could harm others [Ringen 1987].

It is a widespread belief in the Czech Republic (but not only there) that the beneficiaries of social security benefits abuse them. This is particularly the case with respect to the unemployment benefits provided to the people who are working in the 'grey economy'. In contrast to the Netherlands, however, respondents in the Czech Republic do not anticipate as much abuse of other social security benefits, most likely owing to the fact that

Table 4: Are you personally gaining or losing as a result of the social policy?
Question: *'Thinking about all the benefits and advantages resulting to you from the government social policy on the one hand, and about the taxes and social security contributions you are paying on the other hand, do you think you are gaining or losing?'*

	(Definitely) Gaining	Neither gaining nor losing	(Definitely) Losing
Czech Republic 1999	9	23	46
Netherlands 1995	21	37	29

Note: The answer *'undecided, I cannot tell'* represents the percentage remaining to reach 100%.

Figure 3: Social transfers compared to taxes and social security contributions by deciles from 1989 till 1998 (in %, employees' households only)



Notes: Total taxes and social insurance contributions for each decile = 100. Deciles based on the net disposable household income per capita.

Source: Czech Statistical Office; Family Budgets 1989-1998; own calculations.

Table 5: Misuse of social security (welfare) benefits (% answers of often or very often)

Question: *'How frequently do you think people abuse social security benefits?'*

The type of benefits	Czech Republic 1999	Netherlands 1995
Unemployment benefits	54	46
Disability benefits	34	50
Social assistance benefits	30	43
Child benefits	23	22
Old-age pension benefits	10	4

Question: *'How often do the following situations occur?'*

Kind of misuse of benefits	Czech Republic 1999	Netherlands 1995
Benefit recipients are working illegally	54	72
The unemployed are too passive when looking for a job	49	50
People find it easy to take sick days	37	52
People hide cohabitation to be eligible for benefits	36	52
It is too easy to be deemed disabled	12	50

Czech social security benefits are less generous and attractive, and there are stricter procedures in place for claiming them.

Also, the quality of management of the social policy system is evaluated in the Czech Republic as mostly negative. This fact has significant implications for the perception of social justice in the social policy system, as well as for the evaluation of its cost-effectiveness. In June of 1998, 67%, 61% and 59% of respondents considered the system to be too costly, poorly managed, and unjust respectively. In the Netherlands, the responses to similar questions were significantly lower: 57%, 37% and 30% [van Oorschot, Sirovátka, and Rabušic 1999].

5. Preferred Solutions

If self-interest is predominant among the motives of solidarity, if the willingness to share risks collectively is not high among the Czech public, and if the feelings of individual losses stemming from actual social policies and of dissatisfaction with these policies tend to prevail among citizens, what solutions would the Czech public prefer in the area of social policy?

According to Večerník [2002: 11], the Czech population has a tendency to support increases in welfare state expenditures and taxes as opposed to decreasing them. It appears that the expectations of the Czech public related to redistribution by the state would be difficult to meet. If they were met, these expectations could indeed lead to an increased tax burden or social insurance contributions, with all the ensuing negative impacts (i.e. increasing labour costs, inflation pressures, rising unemployment, limited investment funds and a slowdown in economic growth).

Table 6: Requirements of citizens concerning the relationship between social security contributions and benefits (% of negative answers)
Question: *'Would you agree to significantly higher benefits/standard for those who pay higher contributions to the social security fund?'*

Benefit	Czech Republic 1999	Netherlands 1995
Old-age and disability pensions	27	59
Sickness benefits	30	56
Unemployment benefits	37	53
Healthcare standard	47	n/a

However, when the question was posed in a different manner, so as to correspond to the choices the government makes in the area of social policy,[9] we discovered that the Czech public's support for an increase in welfare state expenditures is actually not that high. The public evinces a strong realistic attitude, and proves itself aware of the number of economic restrictions on welfare state expenditures, though they might be desirable in some areas. Moreover, the Czech public has experienced losses as a result of the social policy over the course of the past few years.[10] Therefore, it prefers the option of avoiding an increase in taxes and approves the increase in welfare expenditures only on the condition that savings be made in other areas. When asked this question, 56% of the Czech population agreed with the above-mentioned option, while only 17% of the public opted for increases in welfare expenditures even at the cost of increasing taxes, and 8% selected cutting down on taxes even at the cost of reducing welfare benefits. Neither social class nor the political orientation of respondents had an effect on these expressed preferences. By the same token, the fact that citizens believe expenditures in a given social policy area to be insufficient does not necessarily mean that they want these expenditures to rise.

The types of social policy benefits and the deservingness of different social groups also play a crucial role in the opinions of the Czech public when making their claims on the welfare state. Even though the average level of all types of social security benefits, when compared to wages and total household income, was decreasing over the course of the 1990s (except for pensions), as many as 70%, 63% and 56% of Czech citizens called for increases in child benefits, parental benefits and sickness benefits respectively. However, less than 50% supported increases in old-age pensions, 45% increases in social assistance benefits, 36 % increases in social benefits, housing benefits and widow(er)s' pensions, and only 27% of respondents demanded an increase in unemployment benefits [Rabušic and Sirovátka 1999].

While the demands related to expenditures on social policy are not extraordinary, what the Czech public is actually demanding is reciprocity between the gains derived from the social policy system and the payments made to the system. In this respect, they show less support for redistribution within the system than the population in the Netherlands.

[9] Actually, the choice is not as simple as making a decision between higher taxes/higher social expenditures or lower taxes/lower social expenditures. The tax revenue is also used for other public policies, such as state admninistration, defence and other public goods. Therefore, it is a matter of the choice of preferences made by the state.

[10] The public appears to be well aware of the situation, as Figure 3 indicates.

Table 7: Supporting a private supplementary programme of social security
Question: *'To what extent do you support individual, private supplementary insurance against certain risks that would complement the current compulsory system of taxes and social benefits?'*

Czech Republic, June 1999 (N = 1,319)

Individual supplementary insurance for:	Prefer	Accept	Refuse
Higher pension	35	48	6
Early retirement	23	49	11
Better sickness benefits	22	50	14
Better healthcare	17	45	25
Security during unemployment	14	44	25
Secured income when taking care of small children or following a divorce	15	42	20

Note: *'Undecided'* represents the percentage remaining to 100 %.

The requirement of reciprocity does not significantly differ according to the social characteristics of respondents, and depends only slightly on their political affiliation, with the demand for reciprocity being somewhat stronger among the right-wing respondents.[11]

Provided that the reciprocity of contributions and benefits is maintained, the Czech public shows comparatively greater willingness to share individual risks[12], and thus its notion of solidarity in the social policy appears to depend on the reciprocity of social provisions among the public. While the Czech public strongly emphasised reciprocity of social policy measures, in the 1990s the actual reciprocity between social security contributions and social benefits was in fact declining.[13] This has given rise to a relatively high need for individual, supplementary methods of insurance against social risks outside of the state social security system.

The majority of citizens find these methods to be a suitable complement to the basic system guaranteed by the state. The percentages of expressed support for private pensions and health care in the Czech Republic are significantly higher then they were, for example, in the United Kingdom at the end of the 1980s. Approximately 83% of Czechs accept private supplementary insurance for old-age pensions, while only 63% of citizens in

[11] The Spearman's correlation coefficient equals 0.21 (significance 0.000).

[12] The Spearman's coefficient of correlation between the *reciprocity index* and *risk sharing index* equals 0.32 (significance 0.000). The *reciprocity index* was calculated as the average of requirements of reciprocity for individual benefits (as listed in Table 6). In the same fashion, the *risk sharing index* was calculated as the average of requirements of sharing risk for individual areas (as listed in Table 2).

[13] This is due to the relatively low 'ceilings' that hold for calculating social insurance benefits (unemployment, sickness and maternity benefits) or due to the principle of reducing the applicable income in the case of pensions. But in October 1999, the Czech Social Democratic government, with the support of the right-wing opposition in the Parliament, adopted a provision that leads to an increase in the sickness and unemployment benefits, particularly among the middle and higher income groups.

the U.K. agreed to this idea in 1989. Moreover, 62% of Czechs accept private supplementary insurance for health care, while only 49% of U.K. citizens in 1989 approved this idea [Taylor-Gooby 1991: 116].

Political orientation, opinions on the quality of the current social insurance system, and the requirement of reciprocity, form the guidelines for citizens' decisions about supporting private, supplementary methods. There is a clear general inclination to accept private insurance against social risks as a supplementary option; this tendency is in line with the trend towards a modest concept of social policy which was found at the level of principles and goals.

7. Conclusions

In this paper, the links between the preferred principles of social policy among the Czechs, their opinions on actual social policy, and their claims on the welfare state have been examined, and hypotheses have been presented on the factors influencing the concepts of legitimate social policy in the Czech Republic: social risks introduced by the recent transformation, increasing social inequalities, some restrictions on public budgets and social expenditures, and a radical shift in dominant political ideologies.

At the level of the general principles and goals important for social policy, the Czech public shows moderate demands regarding the scope of redistribution, and prefers redistribution principles that correspond to the concept of a limited (modest) welfare state: guaranteeing minimum subsistence; emphasising need, merits and individual efforts; expecting less elimination of inequalities through social policy measures. Individual gains prevail among the motives underpinning solidarity, though motives such as sympathy for the beneficiaries, feelings of moral duty toward society, and perceived benefits to society are also very important, particularly at the level of social policy principles. At the level of specific programmes, however, the willingness of Czech citizens to share social risks that differ on an individual basis is rather limited. While the structure of the motives of solidarity is very similar the motives discovered in the Netherlands, the willingness of the Czechs to redistribute individually different risks among those who are relatively more disadvantaged is somewhat lower than among the Dutch public.

Most citizens express a rather critical evaluation of trends in social policy and social policy expenditures. Social policy is thought to be deteriorating and expenditures are considered insufficient in many areas, though the views expressed by respondents depend on their political orientation. The great majority of Czechs complain about individual losses from redistribution within the social security system; this finding contrasts with the situation in the Netherlands, where the public's opinions are balanced around an average. The complaints Czechs make are apparently based on objective reasons, as the ratio of contributions paid to benefits received by citizens declined during the 1990s in all income groups.

The strong subjective feelings of individual losses stemming from social policy measures compared to the costs incurred by social policy suggest that citizens share moderate demands for the improvement of existing social provisions guaranteed by the state, despite their belief that welfare expenditures are insufficient. The Czech public - like the Dutch public - assumes that the welfare state is quite frequently abused. However, they do not - in contrast to their Dutch counterparts - believe that the state system of social protection

is well managed, effective or just. Czech citizens also show relatively strongly support for the introduction of private supplementary methods in the most costly areas of social policy, i.e. old-age pensions and health care. This is related to the fact that Czech citizens call for a higher degree of reciprocity between the individual costs of social policy and the individual benefits derived from it, more so than the Dutch public.

We can conclude that if the solidarity of citizens in social policy is motivated to a large extent by the assumption of individual gains to be had from social policy measures, each individual loss derived from the comparison between the payment made to the system and the individual benefit received from the system not only leads to a negative evaluation of the system, but also decreases the amount of trust and interest in it. Consequently, it leads to a search for other, more effective solutions, particularly in the form of private systems (with less solidarity), which protect individuals against rising social uncertainties. Moreover, the experience with implemented policies and their impact affects the trustworthiness of the entities offering and implementing the given programmes, i.e. the state and its institutions, and also affects the faith that the citizens have in their effectiveness.[14] A cluster of mutually linked attitudes is then formed out of the relatively widespread belief among citizens in the frequent abuse of the welfare state system, the negative evaluation of the quality of the social policy programme and its management, the ability of the government to put social justice into practice, and subsequently, the decreasing willingness of citizens to share risks that differ on an individual basis.

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[14] In this respect, it is important to note that a number of polling organisations have found that the trust in the state and public administration institutions (for it does not apply only to the social policy administration) has generally been low in the Czech Republic since 1990 [cf. Ester, Halman, and de Moor 1994].

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Changes in Religious Values in the Czech Republic

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Abstract: The article provides a brief sociological description of the religious development in the regions of Bohemia and Moravia over the past centuries and a more detailed analysis of the recent trends based on the data of the European Values Study from 1991 and 1999. The main conclusions for the present situation of the country are: (a) The secularisation continues, but not as quickly as 30 or 40 years ago; (b) Religious ideas of average citizens differ more and more from the traditional Christian dogmatic or atheistic ideology - religious syncretism and Far East inspirations are widespread in the Czech Republic now; (c) The paradoxical character of current trends in the Czech Roman Catholic church is stressed - threats to and the chances of the main Czech religious society have been dramatically altered since the revolution in 1989.
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The term 'religion' encompasses a rather complex set of opinions, attitudes, values, usages, rituals, organisations and political or economic interests. It is not possible to understand the role of religion in a society by concentrating on only one of its aspects or functions. The main objective of this article is to evaluate the short-term trends in religious development in the Czech Republic as presented in the data of the European Values Study (EVS) of 1991 and 1999 (the number of respondents in each year was 2110 and 1908 respectively). Taking the above points into account, I regard it necessary to complete these survey data with some brief information on the historical and social context. With this background the changes in religious practices and value orientations can be interpreted in a more fruitful and inspiring manner than would be possible merely on the basis of data drawn from a quantitative survey.

Christianity, the traditional religion in the Czech Republic, has been declining since the 19th century. From a position of an almost monopolistic faith, broadly present throughout society, which at least formally it still occupied around the year 1900, Christianity has reached a situation where more than one-half (according to the EVS study in 1999, maybe two-thirds) of the population in this country are no longer church members, and only about 5% of citizens participate regularly in church life. In addition, the centre of gravity of the population of believers lies among the older age groups, and it can be expected that the secularisation process will probably continue as the people in these age groups die.

In addition to confirming and elaborating generally known facts, this article provides the following information on religiousness in the Czech Republic:

- A distinction is made between developments in particular churches ('popular' churches are differentiated from 'confessionary' ones - the latter are more immune to the process of secularisation), and there are also important transformational processes within the

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churches themselves. Overall, the data indicate that the secularisation process is already slowing down, continuing more through inertia, and decelerating or ceasing in some areas.

- The continuing decline of traditional Christianity and of the ideas it preaches does not also mean the disappearance of religious faith generally. On the contrary, in the last decade a more syncretic form of religiousness has started to appear, less fixed on the church, and containing ideas rather reminiscent of the religiousness of the Far East.
- These new religious directions address the current members of Christian churches as well as former atheists. The main difference between 'Christians' and 'non-Christians' has started to shift slowly away from the area of ideas and values toward the area of religious practice itself: people from these two groups are showing a convergence of religious beliefs and basic life values, but a difference remains in the matter of participation in church life, that is, whether they are socialised in the Christian religious tradition or not.

1. Historical Context

From the 16th until the beginning of the 20th century the current territory of the Czech Republic was a part of the Habsburg monarchy. A particular consequence of the rigorous re-catholisation of the state in the 17th century was that the absolute majority of the population - formerly Utraquists and Protestants (Lutherans or Brethren) - joined the Roman Catholic Church. Outside of Roman Catholics, the only other religions on Czech territory were the remaining Protestants and a Jewish minority. These minorities gained certain rights again at the end of the 18th century. However, for complete equality they had to wait a further one hundred years. In 1918, when the Austrian monarchy disintegrated and independent Czechoslovakia emerged, the majority of residents in all regions of the new state professed at least formal affiliation with Catholicism. Nevertheless, the position of the Catholic Church had by that time, particularly in the spheres of the intelligentsia and the working class, already been considerably weakened. The identification of Catholicism with the unpopular Habsburg state, and the rapid industrialisation particularly in the northern and western parts of the region, led to a relatively quick decline in church loyalty. Soon after the revolution in 1918, this caused a decline in religious practice and the influence of the Catholic Church, its partial disintegration (the departure of a part of the clergy and about 10% of the members of the Catholic Church, and the rise of the competitive Czechoslovak Church) and the spread of anti-clerical and anti-Catholic moods. The Catholic Church came to find itself on the defensive, even though it still included more than three-quarters of the population,[1] owned considerable property, and in the democratic circumstances of the years 1918-1938 was in a position where it could still have done something to counter this trend; and throughout the rest of the 20th century the decline in the number of its members and its power continued.

[1] According to the census in 1930 it was 78.5% of the population; in 1950 the share fell slightly to 76.4% of the population [see *Sčítání*... 1994: 71]. Indeed, the membership of many individuals was rather a formal, traditional matter, as is proved by the sharp decline in church religiousness during the second half of the 20th century, induced primarily by political pressure.

The totalitarian regimes ruling intermittently during the years 1939-1989 engaged in violent anti-religious politics: In 1939-1945, Nazism annihilated or expelled the majority of the Jewish population, while during the 1950s the communists fought with particular aggression primarily against Catholicism. However, other religious organisations were not spared either. Consequently, in 1991 under one-half of the citizens of Bohemia and Moravia, mainly senior citizens, belonged to any church (the census in 1991 reported about 44%).[2] Given the deeply eroded process of religious socialisation, new members of churches are now not being acquired in proportion to the mortality rate, and the share of members of traditional churches in the population will therefore probably continue to fall.

According to the theory of T. Luckmann [Luckmann 1991: 117], in the Czech Republic there were also attempts to establish an alternative institutionalised *Weltsicht* or 'world-view', which would replace the waning Catholic Church in its role as the bearer of the primary sense of life. According to this theory, these attempts to unseat the Catholic Church as ideological monopolist were unsuccessful, but two such efforts were still of great significance:

1. The different political ideologies of the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938), crystallising above all around the personality of the first president, the philosopher and sociologist T. G. Masaryk (1850-1937), were supported by political institutions as well as by organisations like the Czechoslovak Church (today called the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, which arose in the years 1920-1921 through the secession of a part of the Catholic clergy) and Sokol (a nationalistic sporting organisation). The mentioned organisations still exist today, but they evidently have their zenith behind them.
2. Communist ideology, officially ruling from 1948 to 1989, sustained heavy ideological and political losses, first in 1968 (the suppression of the 'Prague spring' through Soviet military intervention) and second in 1989 (the 'velvet revolution' which restored the democratic regime). It can therefore be considered as having been discredited among the majority of the Czech population. But even today, preferences for the Communist Party hover at around 15%. Although there are protest voices and peripheral groups behind them, the importance of communist ideology cannot be underestimated, even in the form of inclusive ideological residuals among individuals who have already rejected this ideology.

Particularly after the fall of communism (1989), which made way for a plurality of ideological and religious opinions, the behaviour of the population in these areas has come to increasingly resemble the situation in Western European countries, in the sense of the

[2] Today, church membership in the Czech Republic is officially indicated on the basis of self-declarations in census questionnaires. These data are in this a way loaded with the subjective feelings of respondents and can depend upon immediate changes in the image of the church. 'Objective' data from church registers of baptisms would probably show a considerably higher share of Christians in the population, because in practice there is no mechanism (e.g. an obligatory church tax) motivating the non-practising members to formally secede from the church in the Czech Republic. However, the church registry is currently in a very poor state (often lacking records on the deaths of members, or their emigration or transfer to another church) and has not - as far as I know - been processed as a whole. Data from censuses in 1950 and earlier are of course based on 'objective' church membership and therefore are not fully comparable with data from the years 1991 and later.

growing religious diversity and the development of new forms of religiousness in addition to traditional church religions. Through the clear recovery of institutionalised religions and quasi-religions, the main, organised bearers of partial 'world-views' are institutions specialising in matters other than religion or ideology: media and pop-stars, marketing and institutionalised consumerism, political leaders and sports representatives. An individual is able to choose from the pluralistic selection and assemble post-modern ideological collages.

2. Churches in the Czech Republic

In the 1991 census, most people (99.6%) who registered themselves with a denomination were members of a Christian church, predominantly the Roman Catholic Church (88.9% of believers). The Evangelical Church of Bohemian Brethren (4.5% believers) and the Czechoslovak Hussite Church (3.9%) were also numerically significant. Church members were on average older and less educated than the segment of the population without any denomination. Believers were geographically concentrated particularly in the south and the east of the Czech Republic (regions often characterised by delayed industrialisation or agrarian regions), while in large cities and in the north-west part of the country the level of religiousness was lower.[3] Also, there were far more female than male church members (in 1991 there was about 8% more women than men in the entire population, and about 22% more among church members).

Therefore, it is necessary to take this heterogeneous distribution of believers into account in the evaluation of the religiousness of the Czech population and its consequences. Our findings could be biased by age, class, region, gender, and educational differences between people not declaring any denomination and church followers.

In addition, we have to remember that, at present, institutions which are formally associated with only a small number of followers or which sometimes do not even call themselves churches at all have an undeniable influence on religion in the Czech Republic. These are in part small but active religious groups, and are often ideological extremists ('sects'). Jehovah's Witnesses are the best known among them in the Czech Republic. In addition, there are movements of various gurus and hermetic or mystic paths, which need not be founded on the membership principle, but act rather through the dissemination of particular literature and music, the profession of a specific life style, the organisation of lectures and meetings, and so on. They aim especially at the younger and educated urban population, where the established churches have comparatively little credit.

[3] According to a comparison of the results of the EVS studies in 1991 and 1999, it seems that this religious polarisation between the north-west and the south-east of the Czech Republic is still deepening: while in relatively religious parts of Moravia the progress of secularisation has seemingly slowed in the 1990s, on the contrary, the share of church members is henceforth quickly falling in north-west Bohemia and in Prague.

2.1 Qualitative Changes in the Czech Roman Catholic Church after 1989

After the 'velvet revolution' in 1989, churches in the Czech Republic underwent deep changes. The most important are the metamorphoses of the Roman Catholic Church, because it is by far the largest Church and its internal changes were noticeably significant. From the qualitative viewpoint the following points in its decade-long evolution are particularly important:

- Renewed freedom of action: this brought about an immense expansion of activities into many areas (church order, editing religious literature, education, charity [Hrudníková, Krejčíř, Pala 1995]), the possibility to resume contacts abroad (Vatican, local Catholic Churches in neighbouring countries).[4]
- The possibility to obtain considerable influence in the life of local communities again, particularly in rural regions with a bigger share of Catholics: this is also linked with the recovery of parish life, the construction of new churches,[5] the emphatic role of KDU-ČSL (a traditional Christian party, supported above all by the Roman Catholic electorate) in local politics, and the possibility to act directly on school-age youth.[6]
- The consolidation, restructuring and increase of the power of the control structure in the church: new bishops[7] were nominated and the worst collaborators with the old regime[8] were purged from the church power structures, while merited, but inadaptable pre-revolutionary dissidents, inhibiting the establishment of the new status quo, were dismissed.[9]

4/ The political easing also made the life of other religious communities easier. But with the exception of those that were prohibited before 1989, the newly acquired freedom evidently did not cause any such radical changes in the life of any other large church.

5/ With several exceptions, in 1989 the youngest Roman Catholic church buildings in the country dated from the 1930s. The great majority of these buildings however are over 200 years old (and often still in bad technical condition). During the past hundred years, the geographical distribution of the population changed dramatically, and therefore the accessibility of churches was quite unsatisfactory in many places in 1989.

6/ Teaching religion was not formally prohibited in schools during communism, but the regime tied it to too many obstacles, so it was - especially in the 1970s and 1980s - mostly stopped or seriously reduced.

7/ The communist regime inhibited rather successfully the nomination of new bishops to vacant places, or it was ready to accept 'reliable' candidates only. All the vacant episcopal seats were soon occupied after the revolution, and through the division of actual dioceses two new ones gradually came into existence, in Plzeň and Opava-Ostrava.

8/ These priests were generally deprived of higher church offices and were displaced to positions of administrators of less important parishes. But almost no one was ever completely excluded from the clergy or severely punished in another comparable manner. This was probably owing to the 'velvety' spirit of the whole change in regime and the critical lack of priests.

9/ This refers especially to some priests secretly ordained during the period of communism. For instance, theologians such as Tomáš Halík, Jan Konzal and Ivan O. Štampach worked in the Roman Catholic Divinity Faculty of Charles University in Prague soon after the revolution. However, later co-operation with them was withdrawn and they were replaced by people admittedly less charismatic but more conforming. As far as is known, this primarily resulted not from their theological departures from official church teaching, but rather from the personnel politics of the authorities. In this case we can obviously see an exhibition of the victory of conservatism over reform in the gov-

- The transition from the post-revolution state of ecstasy and relative openness toward the church to the long political conflict over the place of the church in the political life of the nation and over the restitution of property secularised after the communist take-over in 1948.
- The weakening of the monopoly over religious issues. The communist regime certainly persecuted the Catholic Church, but it also strenuously obstructed the appearance of any alternatives in the area of religion. Thus Christianity and particularly Catholicism essentially occupied a monopolistic position in the field of religious interpretations of the world. Only the newly installed democracy allowed missionary campaigns of non-Catholic and sometimes also non-Christian movements into Czech territory. In many Czech bookshops today, the shelf-space taken up by esoteric and alternative religious literature far exceeds the space devoted to Christian literature.
- The origin of an embryonic 'public opinion' on the Roman Catholic Church and the initiation of a discussion process in the church. It also brought about the formation of separate opinion streams and/or the surfacing of ideological conflicts. We can distinguish at least three main opinion groups inside the active core of the church now: (1) Moderate conservative, connected with the official power structures of the church. It seems that its main problem is the absence of a good conception and an attractive vision. (2) Radical conservative, refusing any compromises with today's world and with different religions. Its advantage is the connection to traditional devotion and its striking simplicity; its main problem is obscurantism, sectarian thinking and the tendency to produce conflicts. (3) Moderate progressives, struggling for reform and the convergence of the church and the world, gravitating toward a liberal approach and open ecumenicity. The latter group has the least church influence of the mentioned streams, and also lacks a powerful vision. Thanks to its personalities, however, it is able to come across better in the media and among the public than the moderate or even radical conservatives do.[10] A 'radical progressive' stream, similar to the group in Germany centred around people

erning body of the Czech Roman Catholic Church. Paradoxically, it seems that the removal of former dissidents was often more harsh than the punishment of former pro-communist traitors. This can be explained in the fact that opportunistic collaborators, aware of their total defeat, mostly fell in line quickly and without resistance and tried to incorporate themselves, for which they obtained understanding and pardon, while many dissidents were active in asserting various alternative visions of the church, which could be felt as a threat by church leaders. [See Corley 1993, Putna 1994, Hanuš 1997, Konzal 1998, and Fiala and Hanuš 1999.]

[10] Because the inducted streams are not institutionalised in the form of factions, there are no clear demarcation lines between them. For instance, we can find a whole scale of positions from extra conservative to rather open-minded in the Catholic charismatic movement. In my opinion the best criterion for the identification of the opinion directions in the Czech Catholic Church is currently perhaps their stance toward Vatican Council II. For the moderate conservatives the Council is a basic guideline, which they aim to introduce into practice, and they are receptive to the Council's conservative propositions. The radical conservatives criticise the Council from the right or ignore it - their spirituality and practice are oriented toward the pre-Council period (emphasis on the cult of revelations and wonders, assertion of the Latin liturgy and so on). Conversely, the moderate progressives accentuate first of all the liberal and renewal parts of Council resolutions, and demand a continuation further in this direction, that is, to go even beyond the Council (they are discussing e.g. the problems of compulsory priest celibacy, the admission of women to church functions, the radical advance

like Eugen Drewermann, is still not present in the Czech church, except for individual rebellions. One of a number of explanations may lie in the fact that fifty years of oppression served to strengthen the allegiance of church members.

At present, the state of the Czech Roman Catholic Church seems to have been 'conserved' but not stabilised. The church suffers from a shortage of clergy[11] and is unable to stop the gradual decline in its importance. However, they take hope from the large number of religious, charitable and cultural initiatives arising mainly from the church base, and from believers and the lower clergy.

2.2 Development of Church Membership and of Ecclesiastical Practice

The empirical analyses in the following text are based on the two surveys of the European Values Study of 1991 and 1999 (EVS 1991, EVS 1999). The use of the same methodology and the same core questions in the surveys enables a comparison between the two time points. All of the following tables and graphs are based on these two surveys.

From a comparison of the surveys of the EVS in 1991 and 1999 (see table 1) it is evident that the share of church members in the population is continuing to decline. Since the bearers of ecclesiastical religiousness are primarily senior citizens in the Czech Republic, this development, caused by the natural mortality rate, is not surprising. More interesting is the juxtaposition of both years of surveys by cohorts.

In the course of the continuing decline in church membership among the older part of the population (which is surprising because on average men die younger than women, who are the main bearers of religiousness[12]) we can see a certain revival of 'churchmanship' among people who were born in the years 1960 to 1972. The process of secularisation continues in the sense that the percentage of church members falls with the decrease in age in the entire surveyed population, but this decline is more moderate among the younger citizens of the Czech Republic.

An analysis of the data of the EVS study shows that the decline in church membership applies above all to the Roman Catholic Church and to the Czechoslovak Hussite Church, thus to the traditional folk churches, whilst the share of evangelical members and the members of small denominations is clearly not falling or is even growing. The EVS data of course do not allow for an assessment of any small denomination individually - the statement is related to the total sum of the membership of small religious groups.

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in ecumenism, and so on). The fundamental difference between the stated streams is not in the interpretation of the Council, but is equally cognitive (through a distinctness in the conception of religion and society), sociological (through the position in society and in the church, through the link to different social groups) and psychological (the type of personal religiousness). [See Halik 1995.]

[11] Which they try to solve through a mass import of priests from Poland; the disadvantages of the different mentality and different language of the Poles, and also the uncertain future of this help, are however quite manifest. [See Fitych 1995.]

[12] One possible explanation is that older people still displayed greater openness toward the church in 1991, motivated by the last echoes of the revolutionary mood from the year 1989, whilst in 1999, when the image of the church was rather poor in the media, many respondents no longer wished to report their church membership.

Table 1: Belonging to a religious denomination by age cohort

Question: *'Do you belong to a religious denomination?'*
(% of positive responses)

	1991	1999	Difference
born 1973 and later	-	18.4	
born 1960-1972	15.5	23.1	+7.6
born 1948-1959	25.9	24.7	-1.2
born 1936-1947	49.7	46.0	-3.7
born 1924-1935	64.0	55.4	-8.5
born 1923+	71.9	-	
Total population	40.4	33.2	-7.2

Figure 1: Attendance at religious services now and at age 12, by age cohort



Another important indicator is attendance at church ceremonies. In the EVS 1999 survey (see figure 1) a question was posed concerning the frequency of attendance at religious services (except weddings, funerals and christenings) at present and at the time when the respondent was 12 years old. The share of individual groups, according to the year of birth[13] of respondents, was smoothed with the use of the T4253H method[14] and standardised to the sum of 100%. The results are presented in Figure 1. The category 'at least occasionally' covers everyone who attends services at least once a year but not as frequently as once a week.

The largest percentage decline in religious practice in comparison with childhood is recorded among respondents who were born before the year 1945. Of the war generation, today roughly only one-tenth of respondents are attending church services at least once a week out of those who did so in the time of their childhood. On the lowest absolute level is the periodic attendance at religious services by persons today 25 to 40 years old, who however did not usually attend services even as children. In the youngest cohort, the attendance figures captured by the survey are higher again. However, there is the question of how attendance at services will evolve further among this not yet fully mature generation.

The maximum attendance at religious services is found among people who lived a part of their childhood during the war, i.e. the generation of the 1930s. The data indicate[15] that there might be a temporary intensification of religious practice, induced possibly by the political situation. Conversely, a decline of publicly practised religiousness in the period of childhood can be recorded among the people who were born in the years 1940-1953, and once again among those born in the period of 1960-1968. The former reached 12 years of age in the period between 1952 (the peak of the Stalinist oppression) and 1965 (the political thaw before the Prague spring), and the latter between 1972 (the successful completion of 'normalisation' and the entry of the domestic communist reaction supported by the Soviets) and 1980 (the time when the internal weakness of the regime had been slowly uncovered and a hidden religious recovery was observed). Conversely, the end of the 1960s brought with it a religious resurgence, which proved able to temporarily restore the church with part of its lost position. Although it cannot be declared with complete certainty, owing to the fogginess of temporal identification in reminiscences from childhood,

[13] Answers have been recoded for the purposes of data processing into three categories: weekly and more often; less than weekly, but at least once a year; less than once a year or never. For processing data aggregated by the year of birth, SPSS software was used.

[14] The T4253H smoother that was used "starts with a running median of 4, which is centered by a running median of 2. It then resmooths these values by applying a running median of 5, a running median of 3, and hanning (running weighted averages). Residuals are computed by subtracting the smoothed series from the original series. This whole process is then repeated on the computed residuals. Finally, the smoothed residuals are computed by subtracting the smoothed values obtained the first time through the process." (Explanation cited from the SPSS Help.)

[15] The answer to the question of attendance at religious services at age 12 can be read also as a record of the development of church attendance in the past, in the time of childhood of the respondents. Different reasons make it impossible to reconstruct the attendance history from the responses exactly, but the main trend is recognisable. We can trace a maximum decline in churchgoing occurring in the decade around 1960, and again in the 1970s, and conversely, a certain renaissance in attendance during the war (1938-1945), around the year 1968 and then after 1989. The least church attendance perhaps in all of Czech modern history falls into the decade of 1977-1987.

the data create the impression that after the regime began its fight against religion, the level of the religiousness practised remained at least at times approximately on the original level for several years, and the retreat was then stopped by the mere foretaste of the ensuing political warming.

The share of periodic attendance at religious services did not decline in as explosive a manner as regular attendance did.[16] In the younger generation, people who had discovered occasional churchgoing, though they did not have this tradition in their families, even approximately balanced those who had grown up in the tradition of church attendance, but abandoned it.

From the perspective of current church attendance, the population can be divided into four rather homogeneous groups according to age and based on the mentioned results:

1. The First Republic or pensioner generation, which was born up until the year 1938: Church services are regularly attended by about 15% of this generation, and sporadically by every second person, and 80% of this generation have some church education.
2. The senior middle generation, which was born in the years 1939-1962: About 5% of this generation regularly go to church, and 30% go sporadically. About half of this generation, rather the senior part of it, have experience with the church.
3. The junior middle generation, which was born in 1963-1977: Roughly 2% of this generation regularly attens church, though again about 30% only sporadically. About the same ratio have experience with church services from childhood.
4. The younger generation, which was born after 1978 (people who celebrated their twelfth birthday after the 'velvet revolution' in 1989): About 8% of them attend church regularly, and about 35% sporadically. About 30% have church experience from childhood. With respect to attendance at religious services they are the second most active group after their grandparents in the oldest generation.[17]

A closer look at the behaviour of these four groups from the viewpoint of church attendance can be obtained through the juxtaposition of the behaviour of respondents at age 12 and now. The following table differentiates between five patterns of behaviour:

- Apostasy: respondents attended church at least occasionally at age 12, but they never attend church today;
- Slackening: respondents attended church at least once a week at age 12, but attend it only sometimes today;
- Without changes: respondents' behaviour in this area today is roughly the same as at age 12;
- Convergence: at age 12 respondents almost did not attend church at all, but today sometimes attend church;
- Conversion: respondents go to church at least weekly today, although at age 12 they went less often or not at all.

[16] The Roman Catholic Church requires its members attend mass at a minimum of once a week. This limit divides the active members from the members on the margin, who do not follow this instruction. The EVS data from 1999 indicate that it may be easier to root out regular 'ostentatious' religious rituals than a vague sense of church membership demonstrated by episodic church attendance.

[17] Of course, we cannot extrapolate far-reaching conclusions about the start of a return to traditional religion from this finding. We can rather anticipate that church attendance will somewhat decrease in this generation, as soon as people lodge families and are exposed to heavy workloads.

Figure 2.: Changes in church attendance by age cohort



In general we can talk about a gradual stabilisation of religious habits in the Czech Republic. The share of people who have not changed their behaviour since age 12 is increasing constantly. The share of apostasies is definitely decreasing. The rate of conversions (defined as described above) is constantly very low. Among the weekly church visitors in the generation that was born in the years 1963-1977, however, the share of converts is by no means negligible.[18] There is an implication that Christianity in the Czech Republic is increasingly losing the character of a popular, traditional religion, and is becoming a personal option among those who have accepted it.

3. Religious Values among the Czech Population

Although the share of Church members fell by roughly 7 percentage points (from 40% to 33%) between the years 1991 and 1999, according to the EVS data, the share of respondents who declared themselves as believers remained unchanged at the level of 43%. This means that the share of believers without a church background has grown considerably.

3.1 Concept of God

This point also corresponds with the quick dissemination of religious conceptions without a church background. At first we will concentrate on the changing concept of God, which we may regard as a good indicator of religious sentiments and at the same time as the fundamental element of an individual's religious value system. Table 2 shows that the idea of an impersonal power or spirit is currently obtaining adherents at the expense of traditional Christian theory (supported so far by only a small minority) and religious agnosticism.

[18] In the Czech sample of EVS 1999, five out of a total of twelve periodic church visitors from this generation did not attend church at age 12. The other seven attended church at least weekly at age 12 as well as at the time of the survey.

Table 2: Changes in the belief in God
Question: *'Which of these statements comes closest to your beliefs?'*
(percentage of population)

	1991	1999	Difference
There is a personal God[19]	12.2	6.5	-5.7
There is some sort of spirit or life force	37.7	50.2	+12.5
I don't really know what to think	26.8	21.0	-5.8
I don't really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force	23.3	22.3	-1.0

These changes are related very strongly to age, as table 3 proves. The data testify to the progressive weakening of the traditional institutionalised types of belief in God (that is, either belief in a personal God, promoted by the Christian church, or no belief in any spiritual principle, propagated especially by the former communist regime). Conversely, new convictions are becoming widespread that do not overlap with any of the traditional options, and their content lies roughly between the two.

In addition to age, other demographic variables also play a considerable role, above all education and gender. People who believe in a personal God very often have only elementary education. Conversely, this idea is rarely encountered among people with a vocational and secondary school education. Among those with post-secondary education, this belief is represented to a slightly higher degree, but it cannot be statistically differentiated from that of the average population. Almost two-thirds of those who believed in a personal God a decade ago were women, but today the gender ratio of theists is far more balanced. The decrease among women who hold this belief is occurring faster than the decrease among men.

The existence of a spiritual or life force is the idea frequently indicated by the most educated part of the population - people with secondary school and post-secondary education. Conversely, people with lower education do not indicate this belief as often, although even in this category it is the most frequent opinion on transcendental matters out of all four choices. A decade ago, it was rather men who believed in this idea, but today women are outbalancing them in this category. This means that they are the ones who have primarily attached themselves to this viewpoint during the past decade.

The view 'I don't really know what to think' is distributed in another way among the population - if is often the answer of people without a university education. Among university graduates only few people think this way. Thus it is not a matter of true philosophical agnosticism, but rather of the religious disorientation of this part of the Czech population. The above-mentioned fall in the share of respondents in this category can then

[19] In 1999, the wording of the first offered response to this question was slightly altered: instead of 'There is a personal God' (as in 1991), the version 'There is a God as a person' was used. The reason was that the phrase 'personal God', traditionally used in teaching catechism, was by some people understood as 'my god, owned by nobody else'. In contemporary Czech, the adjective 'personal' is used mainly for an appropriation of the subject by the speaker, not in the philosophical sense 'to be like a person'. The change of wording could have caused a drift in the distribution of responses between the first and second possible responses. However, the fact of the growing superiority of the 'impersonal' concept of God over the orthodox Christian one cannot be denied.

Table 3: Belief in God and age cohort (in %)

	1991	1999	Difference
Personal God			
born 1973 and later		4.7	
born 1960-1972	6.9	4.2	-2.7
born 1948-1959	6.2	5.2	-1.0
born 1936-1947[20]	13.6	4.8	-8.9
born 1924-1935	16.2	15.3	-0.9
born 1923 and earlier	27.7		
Total population	12.2	6.6	-5.7
Spirit or life force			
born 1973 and later		51.5	
born 1960-1972	36.6	50.5	+13.8
born 1948-1959	38.6	52.5	+13.9
born 1936-1947	40.0	49.0	+9.0
born 1924-1935	35.9	47.8	+11.9
born 1923 and earlier	36.6		
Total population	37.7	50.2	+12.5
There is no spiritual power			
born 1973 and later		20.7	
born 1960-1972	29.0	25.2	-3.8
born 1948-1959	29.2	23.4	-5.8
born 1936-1947	21.5	21.0	-0.5
born 1924-1935	15.6	18.6	+3.0
born 1923 and earlier	13.8		
Total population	23.2	22.3	-1.0

be explained by the higher ideological disorientation of people during the unstable period after the 'velvet revolution' in 1989.

Finally, true atheism today is above all the domain of people with vocational education - they formed one-half of the advocates of this view in 1999. In comparison with 1991, the number of people with secondary-school education who shared this opinion declined. In 1991 they made up 33% of the atheists, but in 1999 only 25%. These former atheists have probably transferred mainly to the group 'I don't know what to think'. This is a prediction of the distinct weakening of the social support for atheism in these circles. The decline is especially evident among women (the share of women among Czech atheists has declined by about 7.5% over eight years).

[20] The eminently large difference in this cohort, still educated in large part by church teaching, can perhaps be explained partly by the change of wording in the question. But it illustrates the poor quality of religious socialisation of this generation.

Table 4: Religious ideas
Question: *'Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?'*
(percentage of positive responses, sorted by the difference between 1991 and 1999)

	1991	1999	Difference
Life after death	22.7	35.8	**+13.1**
Reincarnation	11.1	23.1	**+12.0**
Sin	55.9	58.7	+2.8
God	36.7	38.9	+2.2
Hell	11.6	13.1	+1.4
Heaven	23.5	20.6	**-2.9**
Telepathy		73.0	

3.2 Other Religious Ideas

In addition to the concept of God, views on other religious ideas were also surveyed. The considerable growth of heterodox religious views is confirmed in table 4. The differences in bold print are statistically significant at a 95% significance level. The opinion on telepathy was not a part of the questionnaire in 1991.

There has been an explosive development of convictions about the after-life fate of man: fewer people believe in heaven, but there are quickly spreading beliefs in life after death and in reincarnation. This 'life after death' of course cannot be pressed into the traditional concept of heaven and hell. Instead, people obviously help themselves with religious ideas borrowed from Indian civilisation.

3.3 A Typology of Religious Value Systems

According to the attitude towards religious issues and religious practices outside the church (well-being from religion, prayer/meditation), the Czech population can be divided into four basic types:[21]

1. The traditional believer - practises a religion and believes above all in ideas based on the Christian spiritual tradition. The strong influence of Eastern spiritual ways (reincarnation, no belief in a personal God) can also be found in this group, but the character of the spiritual world of this religious type is rather occidental and Christian.
2. The atheistic type - marked by an almost pure lack of belief in religious content and by a very low level of practising meditation or having pleasant feelings from religion.
3. Life after life - is a religious type defined through a belief in some spiritual world and reincarnation theory, without accepting the belief in a personal God, but as a rule believing in some spiritual force. Therefore the idea of the 'beyond' does not usually contain the features of the Christian heaven or hell. At the same time, belief in life after life is the central and main motive of the person's religiousness.

[21] For the segmentation the K-means procedure of the SPSS statistical packet was used.

Table 5: Religious types - percentages of positive answers

	Traditional believers	Atheists	Life after life	Meditative
Personal God	**39.7**	1.4	0.6	5.4
Some sort of spirit or life force	40.0	16.6	**87.8**	**80.5**
There is no spiritual force	2.6	**40.8**	2.1	2.1
God exists	**96.7**	8.6	35.7	**70.0**
Life after life	**85.3**	6.3	**69.8**	25.7
Hell	**67.9**	3.1	14.2	8.0
Heaven	**89.6**	6.2	23.6	19.1
Sin	**95.4**	33.5	63.1	76.9
Reincarnation	**42.3**	6.0	**67.9**	17.9
Gets comfort and strength from religion	**90.7**	3.0	6.1	**53.0**
Practising prayer/meditation	**88.1**	4.6	22.3	**80.5**

Notes: Figures in the table indicate what percentage of members of the religious type believe or practise in the way indicated in the line heading. In bold are the values particularly specific for the type.

4. The meditative type - is a type that practises religion, but who, outside of belief in a higher being and a moral imperative, does not accept most traditional theology. He or she thinks little about life after life; his/her 'profit' from religion is rather earthly and often lies in spiritual well-being. It also corresponds with the frequent practice of meditation or prayers.

People with basic education, older people and women (although their predominance is gradually lesseing) tend more often to be traditional believers. People of this type naturally belong very often to some Christian denomination. Members of this group are mostly found in Moravia and in small communities. Men and people with only vocational education make up the majority of atheists. In 1991, young people especially were atheists, while now it is mostly middle-aged citizens who are. Atheists typically live in Bohemia, outside Prague, and in smaller towns. In 1991 it was usually men who belonged to the type 'life after life', but today there are more women in this category. Overall, they more frequently have secondary education, and in 1999 also tertiary education. Paradoxically, there are very often young people in this group. They are usually not members of a church, and they are found most often in Bohemia, outside Prague.

Women often belong to the meditative type. In 1991 there were primarily university graduates in this group, but today the type is no longer so crystallised along the lines of education. However, somewhat frequently, people with secondary education are found in this group now. The majority of people in this type are older, and its members usually also belong to some Christian denomination. Their typical place of residence is in Prague.

As table 6 shows, the share of some of the mentioned types in the population is now distinctly changing. The differences in the first and in the last type are small and statistically not significant. However, during the last eight years a very large transfer from the category of 'atheists' to 'life after life' was recorded. This points to one of the main forces be-

Table 6: Share of religious types in the population (in %)

	1991	1999	Difference
Traditional believers	19.2	17.4	-1.8
Atheists	55.5	45.1	-10.4
Life after life	8.1	18.2	+10.1
Meditative	17.2	19.3	+2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	

Figure 3: Religious types and their changes



hind the present religious changes. Radical atheism offers its backers a cheerless perspective on their individual destinies, and it probably sank in appeal at a time when the attraction of utopias for a better collective fate dried up. Books like the one after which the type 'life after life'[22] is named offer people a more optimistic view of their fate after death, without requiring that they bind themselves to the hard to accept tradition of current Western religious systems. It is enough to accept the idea of the existence of some higher force - perhaps the law of karma - or to draw on medical research about dying.

Among the above-mentioned types there are two 'original' or 'pure' ones - traditional worshippers and atheists. They are original in the sense that they were formerly large and widespread, in the sense of their institutional support, and in the sense of the formal education of the Czech population in one of these two positions. The remaining two types can be described as 'hybrids': worshippers who do not want or cannot accept maximalistic church teachings about life after death, but retain some elements of religious practice, transfer into the meditative type. Conversely, atheists, unsatisfied with the minimalistic atheistic view on the same matter, gradually move toward the type 'life after life'.

[22] Works like Moody's *Life after Life* began to spread and received a great deal of attention after 1989, and became very popular in some circles. Such books had been more or less inaccessible to a wider audience before.

Figure 3 depicts the situation graphically. It is obvious that at present the main borderline (see the dotted line in the graph) between the two worlds of 'believers' and 'non-believers' is not the belief in God itself or the belief in life after life, but the tradition of religious practice. The current most important changes in religious values run parallel to this line - it is seemingly easier for people today to change views on God and the eternal life than to change their personal life style firmly formed by the Christian or atheist tradition.

3.4 Religious and Life Values

Another question is how strongly the religious values presented here are connected with other components of the value system of individuals. The EVS above all established how important work, family, friends and acquaintances, leisure time, politics, and religion are for respondents (answers on a four-point scale).

From the exploratory analysis it follows that except for the item 'religion' the fundamentals of the value systems of the four religious types are quite similar. Possible differences given by the religious make up of respondents are furthermore often eclipsed by differences given by their socio-demographic dissimilitude. The foundation of the secular part of the value system of the Czech population is basically shared regardless of religious attitudes. However, sub-populations defined by religion can vary in partial questions, e.g. of an ethical character.

In the course of further analyses of the relationship of data on life values and the types of religious value systems, the influence of gender, age, education, the size of the town, the region (Bohemia/Moravia) and the year of the survey has been removed using multidimensional regression. An analysis of the regression residuals was also made, the result of which is that the importance of work, family and leisure time does not relate significantly to the type of religious value system. The mean of residuals for the remaining three items is indicated in table 7. The dramatic difference in attitudes towards religion is not surprising because the respondents were classified into four groups according to their religious attributes. In the remaining two items the differences are not too large (η^2 is 0.3% for the item 'friends and acquaintances' and 0.5% for the item 'politics', whilst for the item 'religion' the value is 41%). In both cases, atheists separate themselves as a group, for which the item *ceteris paribus* is least important. Thus it seems that atheism would lead to a distance not only from religious values, but (although to a far smaller extent) also from other values that are fundamental for human society on the whole. After the exclusion of atheists, the opinions of the remaining religious types in the rest of the investigated data

Table 7: The mean residuals after controlling the influence of socio-demographic variables

	Religion	Friends	Politics
Atheists	-46.3	-3.0	-5.7
Life after life	-6.3	+7.8	+3.3
Meditative	+24.3	-0.5	+8.4
Traditional believers	+107.6	+3.2	+5.0

Note: Figures in the table are multiplied by 100 for the sake of legibility.

set are homogeneous for $\alpha = 0.05$ with the item 'politics', and also with the item 'friends and acquaintances'. This suggests the applicability of Durkheim's theory of anomie to Czech society.

4. Trends in Religious Development

The history of Czech religion and the church in the 20th century has brought long-term changes to these areas, among the deepest and most dramatic in the entire history of the country. Although the last decade of the century brought about some reduction in the rate of secularisation and even a foretaste of a religious renaissance in some areas, the retreat of traditional church religion has continued. We can see this in two areas:

1. Membership in traditional churches (and the Christian population as a whole) has continued to decline owing to the *mortality rate of the oldest believers*, who constitute the greatest portion of traditional church membership. This is combined with the problematic religious socialisation of youth. Although there are indications of some improvement, churches have been unsuccessful at removing this problem and it remains one of the key problems related to the future function of churches in Czech society.
2. The tendency to abandon church teachings persists primarily among people of upper middle age. These people, often only weakly linked to church traditions, somewhat withdrew from the church during the last decade of the 20th century. It is of course possible that, after reaching retirement age and experiencing the related changes in life style, many of them will move closer to the church again. (Local religious communities of the Czech Christian churches often work as a sort of club for pensioners, offering social support and help in solving difficult problems related to old age and approaching death.) It is possible that the above-mentioned increased distance from churches is also linked to the political and ownership conflicts in which the Roman Catholic Church was entangled in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this tendency is not too strong and seems to be a secondary problem.

On the other hand, the start of new forms of religiousness that have been foreign to local tradition up until now can be seen. From the EVS it is possible to discern a spreading belief in some higher power over human life. Belief in this power or in God is linked either with an openness toward ideas of reincarnation and belief in a life after life, and/or with a religious stance in everyday life, finding expression in meditation, attendance at religious ceremonies, and a sense of an ethical imperative etc. In any case, these models of religiousness are undermining the position of 'pure' atheism, which is clearly becoming slowly marginalised.

The above-mentioned phenomena do not exhaust the whole area of basic life values. In contemporary society, things which are deeply defining and maintain a human being in his or her individual and social existence, which establish basic norms and life goals and confirm the identity of the social actors, do not always have the face of religion in the common sense of the word. However, the examination of these phenomena - although important even in the context of the sociology of religion - exceeds the framework of this article. Nevertheless, it is necessary to mention that there was rapid development in these areas also after 1989. A new position and new possibilities in politics, personal careers, consumption and marketing, leisure time, culture and sports, the decline of Marxism, and con-

versely, the explicit preaching of utmost sexual satisfaction and/or the accumulation of property and enjoyment as definitive targets of human life: altogether these are far more relevant changes in the life values of the Czech population than a moderate advance in the ecumenical movement or the foundation of a local branch of the Church of Scientology. And we can assume that these changes have and will continue to have a far-reaching influence even on religion in the normal sense of the word.

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Monitoring the Transition in the Czech Republic: Data, Surveys and Studies*

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Abstract: The description of post-communist societies is still insufficient and contrasts with the rich knowledge on Western societies. The focus is still on economic and, in particular, macroeconomic data, while social data and reports are rather scarce. With regard to socio-economic studies and analyses, the Czech Republic is even lagging behind the other transition countries of Central Eastern Europe. To ease the access to basic social knowledge on Czech society, the author presents an overview of information sources including references to surveys and institutions. Among them, the author refers to analyses of international bodies, as well as to domestic efforts to launch more comprehensive social reports. The Czech government's recent projects regarding the visions, strategies and priorities for further development of society are referred to also. Surveys already collected in the 'Sociological Data Archive' and available to the public provide a good opportunity for developing the study of Czech society from various angles.
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Since 1989, social reporting and social indicators research in the strict sense has not yet become well established in the Czech Republic. This can mostly be attributed to a generally underdeveloped discipline, as Czechoslovak sociology was more harshly reined in by the communist regime than was sociology in neighbouring 'socialist' countries. In Poland, sociology actually continued during the 1950s and even began to flourish again one decade later, whereas in Czechoslovakia it was completely removed from teaching, research and public life until the mid-1960s. In Hungary, sociology expanded without a significant break from the 1960s onwards, while in Czechoslovakia it was energetically frozen in the aftermath of the 1968 Prague Spring, a period referred to as 'normalisation' and characterised by stringent ideological control over the social sciences.

This legacy is still apparent in the relatively low level of lively sociological debate as well as the lack of comprehensive research activities devoted to social indicators and reporting. Nevertheless, social statistics have maintained a relatively high-level tradition, with several report-like activities being developed in a variety of forms and institutions since the mid-1990s. The slowly rekindled interest in social reporting peaked in 1998, when two documents seeking to map the post-1989 changes from different angles were (coincidentally)

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released almost simultaneously: the Social-Democrat governmental report 'on the state of Czech society' and the academic sociological report 'on the development of Czech society'.

In the following sections of this study, we overview the principle aspects of reports published and several important survey resources provided by Czech institutions, in conjunction with governmental, academic or international organisations. Mostly, but not exclusively, we refer to reports that are publicly available, at least in Czech. In the final sections, we outline the *Social Trends* project, the aim of which was to establish social reporting as a regular activity in the country.

1. The Czech Statistical Office

In the general field of information about the economy and society, the Czechoslovak Statistical Office (CSO) has continued to publish the *Statistical Yearbooks of Czechoslovakia* (since 1993, of the Czech Republic). The contents have gradually been enlarged to encompass the new political and economic situation, with new indicators and entire sections added, including 'currency and the capital market' and 'the organisational structure of the national economy'. Immediately after 1989, a bilingual (Czech and English) description of the tables was introduced.

For the general public, the Czech Statistical Office publishes yearly booklets entitled *The Czech Republic in Figures,* presenting brief key demographic, economic and social indicators on the country. Basic information with a comparative perspective on the transition countries is provided by the quarterly *CESTAT Statistical Bulletin* (covering the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia). More detailed and structured information is made available by the quarterly *Indicators of Economic and Social Development in the Czech Republic.*

In individual fields, the Czech Statistical Office publishes a quarterly series on wide-ranging issues such as the labour force (with tables on employment, unemployment and labour mobility), or on family budgets (with information on household incomes and expenditures). Similarly, multiple series on demography and other issues are also published regularly. Periodically, time series are published on the labour market (*Time Series of Basic Indicators of Labour Statistics*), family expenditures (*Statistics of the Level of Living of Households*), and other topics.

In 1997, a summary report entitled *Facts on the Social Situation in the Czech Republic* was published in Czech, containing commented statistical data on the level of living of the population and related issues, provided by social statistics, as well as several results from surveys of opinions conducted by the *Institute of Public Opinion*, an affiliate of the Czech Statistical Office at the time. So far, however, there has been no sequel to this report, nor is one planned for the current year.

There are three main regular statistical sample surveys on population:

The *Microcensus Surveys* started in 1958 as regular income surveys conducted every 3-5 years on 1-2 percent samples of households. Data on wages were provided by employers, while pension benefits were provided by post-offices. In addition to income data, the surveys include information about housing and household property. The transition period is described in the three most recent surveys:

- Microcensus 1989 was conducted on a 2 percent random sample (N = 69,912) in March 1989, and included yearly incomes of households in 1988;
- Microcensus 1992 was conducted by the CSO on a 0.5 percent random sample (N = 16,234) in March 1993, and included yearly incomes of households in 1992;
- Microcensus 1996 was conducted by the CSO on a 1 percent random sample (N = 28,148) in March 1997, and included yearly incomes of households in 1996.
- the next Microcensus is planned for March 2003, inspecting yearly incomes of households in 2002.

The *Family Expenditure Survey (FES)* was established in 1958 as a regular survey, based on a quota-sample of roughly 0.1 percent of households of manual workers (the working class), non-manual workers (employees) and co-operative farmers, with pensioners (only households of pensioners without economically active members) added later. Unlike FES in other countries, the survey is conducted as a permanent observation based on daily records of all household incomes and expenditures. After 1989, the category of self-employed was also included and a special sub-sample of low-income families was added, aiming to over-represent the number of households living below or close to the legal subsistence minimum in order to enable a more detailed analysis of this population category. For financial reasons, the size of the sample was considerably reduced in the 1990s, from about 3500 to about 2000 households. Following EUROSTAT recommendations, quota-sampling is to be replaced by random-sampling in the near future.

The *Labour Force Survey (LFS)* was piloted in the last quarter of 1992 and introduced in 1993 as a quarterly survey on a rotated sample of about 60 thousand persons (0.7 percent of households). It is a standard LFS, shaped strictly according to EUROSTAT recommendations since its inception. On the basis of each survey a standard publication is released, containing basic results, regional cross tabulations, as well as time series covering all surveys from the previous year.

2. The government and governmental bodies

Until recently there were no regular reports by the Czech government on economic and social development in the country. In early 1999, however, the new Social-Democrat government, in keeping to its pre-electoral promises, released a *Report of the Government on the State of the Czech Society*. This 200-page internal document encompassing all basic fields of economic and social life contains plenty of data but also many assessments and is highly critical of the 1990-1996 policies.

In late 1999, the *Government's Council on Social and Economic Strategy* launched a project to elaborate the 'National Vision of Development of the Czech Republic' with the release of a series of studies on reproductive behaviour and family, regional and local development, globalisation, the information society, human capital, economic competitiveness, social values, ecological sustainability, social cohesion, and civil society. In the meantime, the research was transferred to the Centre for Social and Economic Strategies (CESES) at Charles University. There, a small team led by Martin Potůček synthesised previous activities in a comprehensive study (Vize, 2001).

While much narrower in scope and ambitions, the project to design a 'social doc-

trine for the Czech state', backed by Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, is similar in character. It was discussed in the Council of Social and Economic Agreement, and it was promised to be submitted to the government. It is not available as a separate publication as yet, only in a preliminary form at www.socioklub.cz.

Individual ministries are active in reporting on their own activities. Thus, the *Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs* publishes on employment protection and welfare, the *Ministry for Regional Development* issues surveys on housing, the *Ministry of Education* documents the education system, the *Ministry of Culture* reports on the protection of cultural heritage, while the *Ministry of Environment* publishes yearbooks on the state of the environment and environmental protection [*Statistical...* 1999]. The activities of ministries affiliated to special research institutes are reported in greater detail in section 5.

3. International organisations

Prior to its full membership in the OECD, and during its time as an associated country, the country's economy was analysed in a standard OECD survey on Czechoslovakia, issued in 1991 [*OECD...* 1991]. After the split of Czechoslovakia, a joint report on the Czech and Slovak republics was released [*OECD...* 1994]. Another (highly optimistic) report was issued in 1996, after the admission of the Czech Republic into the organisation at the end of 1995 [*OECD...* 1996]. The other regular report was published in 1998 [*OECD...* 1998] and the most recent in 2000 and 2001 [*OECD...* 2000; *OECD...* 2001].

The OECD has published special reports on the Czech labour market [*Review...* 1995], the education system [*Review...* 1996], and the environment [*Environmental...* 1999]. The Czech Republic was also involved in a comparative analysis of national systems of social protection and the battle against exclusion [*Battle...* 1998].

The World Bank, which has published extensively on poverty in Hungary, Poland and other CEE countries, has not paid this kind of special attention to the Czech Republic (fortunately, this is not due to oversight, but to the much better economic situation in the country). However, an extensive special report, *Czech Republic: Towards EU Accession*, was produced and released in 1999. The report assesses the country's economic performance, fiscal and financial problems, enterprise reform, agriculture, environment, public administration, social conditions, health care and its infrastructure.

In relation to the accession process, the statistical service of the European Commission also included candidate countries. Since 1999, a *Statistical Yearbook on Central European Countries* has been published, and since the 2000 edition the EUROSTAT statistical yearbook has been devoting one chapter to candidate countries. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London has since 1994 annually published *Transition Reports,* which include, alongside a general assessment of reforms, economic data on the country and a description of recent 'key reform challenges'.

With regard to databases and surveys, we can mention the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) surveys carried out on behalf of the European Commission between 1990 and 1997 in up to 20 countries. In the Czech Republic, this survey was conducted annually between 1992 and 1997 on a sample of 1000 respondents. A new series of surveys, the Applicant Countries Eurobarometer (ACEB), began in October 2001 in 13 accession countries (see www.gesis.org/data_service/eurobarometer/ceeb/index.htm).

The Innocenti Research Centre of UNICEF in Florence compiled the MONEE (Monitor the Social Conditions during the Transition to a Market Economy) time series of indicators, published as statistical annexes to the regular Regional Monitoring Reports (UNICEF 2001, and www.unicef-icdd.org/publications/pdf/monee8/eng/index/htm).

4. Commissioned and comparative research

Several comprehensive projects have been initiated and/or financed by various international bodies and completed by domestic scholars, both with and without external assistance.

One of the first commissioned studies was written in the early 1990s, within the framework of the comparative project *East-Central Europe 2000*, commissioned by the European Commission DG XII [see van Zon 1994]. The aim of the project was to make a comparative assessment and forecast beyond the year 2000 concerning the four 'Visegrad' countries with respect to their prospective entrance into the EU. Various studies by Czech authors were collected in an unpublished volume [Illner et al. 1993], with a selection of them finalised and published in a special issue of the *Czech Sociological Review*, number 1 of 1994.

In 1996, the Czech Republic began publishing the *UN National Human Development Report*. The first report was prepared by a team led by the demographer Zdeněk Pavlík (HDR 1996), the second by a team headed by the sociologist Michal Illner (HDR 1997), and the third by a team headed by the economist-journalist Eva Klvačová (HDR 1998). Most recently, the 1999 report was prepared by the Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs (Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), headed by Martin Mácha and Aleš Kroupa (HDR 1999).

An important comparative project was started with the *Social Costs of Transformation (SOCO)*, initiated and co-ordinated by the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna. In addition to other activities, an empirical survey of households (1000 in each country) was conducted in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and later East Germany. An internal national report [Matějů and Večerník 1996] was distributed in domestic circles. The SOCO project continues its activities through the support of individual research projects focused on selected topics - most recently, on regional disparities, gender in social policy, and social policy on a micro-level.

The SOCO project has also initiated and financed the START foundation, which was established in late 1993 and headed by Jiří Večerník. During its three years of activity, research in the field of social policy was conducted by a number of scholars from various institutions, most of which was published in the series of START Research Papers, which were distributed among the communities of academics and policy-makers. The activities of START were overviewed in a brief report [Večerník 1995], and some of the START papers were also published in Kovács (1996), with many more made available on the Web (www.univie.ac.at/iwm/).

Following the OECD study on education [*Review...* 1996], the study *Czech Education and Europe* was written and published in 1999, in both Czech and English, with the financial support of Phare. In particular, this study provides an overview of the functioning and results of the Czech education system from a 'European' perspective.

The study *Human Resources in the Czech Republic* is similar in character. Commissioned by the Institute for Information in Education and the National Education Fund, a small team of experts formulated a description of life-long education, employability and the labour market, human capital and skills, and motivation structure. The study was financed by Phare and published in early 2000 in Czech and English [Human Resources 1999].

In the framework of the project 'Public Policies and Social Conditions: Monitoring the Transformation to the Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe', UNICEF commissioned the *Report on Social Policy and Social Conditions in the Czech Republic.* This report was published in Czech in the trade union review *Pohledy* (Views) and in a revised English-language version as a UNICEF Innocenti Occasional Paper [Hiršl, Rusnok and Fassman 1995].

Important projects have also been linked to comparative surveys. Among them, at least five international projects in which the Czech Republic participates merit attention.

Social Justice 1991 and 1995. This survey was conducted in 1991 within the framework of the 'International Social Justice Project', the aim of which was to compare perceptions of social inequalities and social justice in 13 countries (USA, Japan, West Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Russia, Slovenia and Estonia). In order to describe the changes that had occurred since the first year of transformation, the survey was repeated in 1995 in the Czech Republic and in 1996 in Bulgaria, Hungary, Russia, and East Germany. In a 1999 survey, the core questions of the project were repeated, together with the ISSP Social Inequality module.

Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989 (SSEE) and the Survey on Elites. This survey was conducted on large samples (3-5000 respondents) in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia (all in 1993), and in Poland in 1994. Donald J. Treiman and Ivan Szélenyi conducted the international comparative research project from the University of California in Los Angeles. The questionnaires used in individual countries included fully comparative questions, out of which an international file was created. Along with the survey of representative samples of the populations in Hungary, Poland and Russia (all in 1993), and in the Czech Republic in 1994, a survey on elites was conducted which compared the situation before and after 1989. The use of the large survey was less major than expected, but more importantly, the survey of elites resulted in a book in Czech, written by the team led by Petr Matějů and Klára Vlachová (1999), and was also largely utilised in another book (Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley 1998), which is reviewed in this issue.

International Social Survey Program (ISSP). This long-term international research project originated in 1983 and is based on international and inter-project co-operation among interested institutions in the areas of the social sciences. It has four founding members: the Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) of the United Kingdom, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in the USA, Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) of Germany, and the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University. Since 1983, the number of participants has grown continuously, reaching 38 in 2001. Each year, research on one topic is conducted in all participating countries within the framework of an ongoing survey. Individual modules are then repeated after a specified period and new topics are introduced only when they are considered to be important and applicable in international and temporal comparison.

European Values Study/World Values Survey. This large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal research programme focuses on changes in political and economic orientations,

family values and religious norms, their impact on economic growth, strategies of political parties, and democratic institutions. The first survey in 1981, was initiated and organised by the 'European Value Systems Study Group' in nine West European countries. During the 1980s, researchers from other European and non-European countries joined the project and the study was extended to 23 nations. The second wave of the European/World Values Survey was carried out between 1990 and 1991, with participation from a total of 43 nations. The third survey was conducted between 1995 and 1998 among 92 nations or regions. The last wave of the European Values Study took place in the period 1999-2001, covering 36 nations. Surveys in the Czech Republic were collected in 1991 and 1999.

International Adult Literacy Survey. The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) is a large-scale co-operative effort by governments, national statistical agencies, research institutions and the OECD. Development and management of the survey were co-ordinated by Statistics Canada and the Educational Testing Service. In 1994, nine countries (Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the US) conducted the survey [*Literacy...* 1995]. Five additional countries or territories (Australia, the Flemish community in Belgium, Great Britain, New Zealand and Northern Ireland) decided to administer the IALS instruments in 1996 [*Literacy...* 1997]. Finally, eight other countries (the Czech Republic, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway and Slovenia) participated in 1998 (SIALS). Three domains of literacy skills are investigated through the survey: prose literacy (the knowledge and skills needed to understand and use information from texts), document literacy (the knowledge and skills required to locate and use information contained in various formats) and quantitative literacy (the knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations). A report covering results from all three surveys was published by OECD/Statistics Canada in 2000 [*Literacy...* 2000].

Last but not least, we should also mention the New Democracies Barometer (NDB), a survey which was fielded in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1995 under the leadership of Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer. Its results were largely published in the University of Strathclyde's Centre for Public Policy working papers series and in articles by both authors. The data can be analysed using a special tool on the Internet, which is accessible on the www server of TÁRKI Budapest. Data sets have not been made.

5. Academic and research institutions

In the demographic field, the series published by the Czech Statistical Office are paralleled by a regular series entitled *Population Development of the Czech Republic* (first edition in 1994, editor Zdeněk Pavlík), published by the Chair of Demography and Geodemography of the Faculty of Natural Sciences of Charles University, Prague. Here we should also mention a synthetic, collective work of Czech historical demography, entitled *The Population of the Czech Lands* [Fialová 1996].

In the economic field, the joint institute of the Academy of Sciences and Charles University, CERGE/Economics Institute, started in 1996 to produce an annually released, standard booklet in English, which provides basic information on economic development in the country [Turnovec 1997, 1998, 1999; Hanousek and Münich 2000]. The most wide-ranging book on the economic transition provides an extensive summary of articles from various fields, published in Czech (by the publishing house Academia) and English [Svejnar 1995].

A representative publication in English produced by a team of specialists in various fields, led by Bedřich Moldán, head of the Charles University Environment Centre, is of particular importance. It provides well-documented explanations involving economic issues, environment, and the quality of life, and stresses the positive features of the country and society. This is based in particular on manifest success in the area of the environment, which since 1989 has experienced improvements and has had an impact on other areas of society (Ten Years On 2000).

In the sociological field, we should draw attention to the publications of Pavel Machonin and his team, who have continued work initiated in the book on social structure originally released in the late 1960s [Machonin et al. 1969] and have carried it into the 1990s [Machonin, Tuček et al. 1996]. In the most recent publication, the structure and methods of the original book were partially reproduced. The database of the analysis rests upon two surveys of social stratification conducted after 1989, which are compared with several pre-1989 surveys.

Another comprehensive publication is the book *Markets and People. The Czech Reform Experience in a Comparative Perspective* [Večerník 1996]. The main aim of the publication was to show the socio-economic transition in the Czech Republic 'from below', as it is viewed by individuals and households and through differences and inequalities. The author thereby intended to fill the gap between, on the one hand, the relatively frequent macroeconomic description of the transformation and some microeconomic insights (on the part of firms and the labour market), and on the other hand, the rather scarce analysis of the acceptance of and participation in the socio-economic transformation on the part of ordinary citizens and their groupings. The book was extensively re-written and updated for the Czech edition [Večerník 1998].

In 1998, a large conference, entitled 'Czech Society at the End of the Millennium', was organised for the 650th anniversary of the founding of Charles University. Polished conference contributions were published in their original languages (mostly Czech) in two volumes entitled *Czech Society at the End of the Millennium* [Potůček ed. 1999]. A broad range of topics was presented within four sections:

A. Vision for the Czech state (chairman Martin Potůček)
B. Macroeconomic transformation in the context of societal changes (chairman Milan Sojka)
C. Problems in Czech society (chairman Jiří Kabele)
D. Problems in the Czech and Slovak states (chairman Jiří Musil)
E. Ways to improve the environment of the Czech and Slovak republics (chairman Bedřich Moldan).

In 1998, a summary article describing the vast field of transitional changes - with rich documentation and references - from the perspective of the concept of the quality of life was published in *Social Indicators Research* by Michal Illner [Illner 1998].

Academic and research institutions also conducted several series of surveys comparative in time, which are rather scarce in the Czech Republic. The most important of these are:

Czechoslovak and Czech Social Structure and Mobility Surveys. The first Czechoslovak social stratification survey was conducted in 1967 by a team of sociologists led by Pavel Machonin. In 1978 and 1984, during the 'normalisation' period, two surveys

entitled 'Class and Social Structure of the Czechoslovak Population' were conducted by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Academy of Sciences. The field of interest covered the economic and social positions of the household head and other active members, the basic intra- and inter-generational mobility data of all adult members of the household, income, housing conditions, leisure time, attitudes and value orientations.

After 1989, an extensive survey on the 'Transformation of Social Structure in Czechoslovakia' was organised by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Socio-Political Sciences of Charles University. It focused on demographic and family status, education and 'cultural capital', economic position and occupation, assets and income, position in decision-making, the standard of living, consumption and life style, inter- and intra-generational mobility, the subjective perception of the social structure, value orientations and political preferences, attitudes towards political changes and economic reforms. The most recent survey, entitled 'Ten Years of Social Transformation in the Czech Republic', was conducted in November/December 1999, in mostly a way comparative with its predecessors.

Family 1989-1998. This longitudinal panel survey project was organised by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences. The original intention was to observe the life and professional careers of children leaving primary school. The main waves of the interviewing took place in 1989 (children and parents), 1992 (parents), 1993-1994 (children finishing secondary school) and 1998 (children and parents).

Economic Expectations and Attitudes (EEA). Surveys of the Czechoslovak and later the Czech population started in May 1990 and were conducted at first biannually (1990-1992) and later annually (1993-1998). Surveys were organised by the socio-economics team of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, headed by Jiří Večerník. The questionnaires include a wide range of items concerning the perception of the general and one's personal economic situation, household finance, poverty, labour market participation and related attitudes, political opinions, class self-identification, etc.

The regular monthly *Trends* was launched by the Centre for Empirical Research STEM as surveys on hot issues. Since some topics recur and certain basic questions (such as voting preferences) remain constant, the survey enables the compilation of trends in various opinions. Part of the social research of this very active agency was summarised in the booklet, *Czech Society in 1998* [Hartl, Huk and Haberlová 1999]. Another study summarising the main time series since 1990 was published in Czech under the title *Where to Now?* [Hartl et al. 2000].

The two other main public opinion agencies, the Research Institute of Public Opinion (affiliated to the Czech Statistical Office until mid-2000 and a part of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences since) and Sofres-Factum, also publish regular opinion series on political and economic issues. Synthesising publications are rather scarce, though one compilation was made by the agency Median (Friedlanderová et al. 2000). More is to be found in various internal editions and 'grey literature' (see e.g. Tuček et al. 1999).

6. The *Social Trends* project

The project *Social Trends: Research - Archives - Publications - Training* was financed by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic between mid-1996 and the end of 1998. It was conceived by researchers from four institutions: the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences; the Faculty of National Economy of the Economic University in Prague; the School of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno; and the Centre for Educational Politics of the Pedagogical Faculty of Charles University. The aim was to bring together economic, demographic, sociological and pedagogical institutions. The project was headquartered in the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, under the leadership of Petr Matějů and Jiří Večerník.

The project arose out of the idea that the integration of the Czech Republic into Euro-Atlantic structures also entails its integration into international networks of information, including the regular monitoring of economic, social and political change. While a strong base for this has already been built in other transition countries (especially Hungary and Poland), the Czech Republic has lagged rather far behind. The project was designed both to meet the demands of international institutions, and to address the substantial domestic audience for such information, which ranges from governmental institutions and Parliament to the interested public. Indeed, wide interest was stimulated through preparatory publications - eight-page bulletins for the wider public and comprehensive working papers aimed at specialists.

The intention of the project was to initiate the publication of a series of national *Social Reports* aiming to systematically map the development of society from economic, social and political points of view. The authors proposed publishing regular social yearbooks providing an overview of basic information and data, with simple analysis and brief commentaries, in a relatively comprehensive, historical and comparative form. The core of such studies was to be the description of socio-economic and political structures and the behaviour of the population, both placed within their macroeconomic and demographic contexts. The planned publications were to enable the description of society as a multi-dimensional and dynamic socio-economic and political entity, and to place emphasis on several of these facets of society.

This core objective could only be achieved through supporting and complementary projects. The first of these was the foundation of the *Sociological Data Archive*, similar to those already functioning in all advanced and some transition countries. The purpose of such an archive is to make the original data files easily accessible to students, researchers and all private interested parties, to be used for their own analyses according to their research hypotheses. This type of archive is not only an important resource, for those who are already aware of such research projects, but may also serve as an inspiration to all those who are interested in formulating research problems or providing empirical support for their hypotheses.

The second supporting project was to secure participation of the Czech Republic in the *International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)*. This participation allows not only the regular flow of internationally and temporally comparative data, but also co-operation with prominent sociologists from around the world, which puts necessary pressure on the standards of Czech sociological research. Thus the goal is to create conditions for the maintenance of a high standard of data from the Czech Republic and, at the same time, for the

more intensive use of ISSP survey data in domestic research projects and university teaching.

The third supporting project aimed at using international data and shared work on Social Reports for the *training of young researchers*. This aim arises out of the conviction that the present separation of teaching and post-graduate education from research is unfortunate. The new generation of specialists in social research is isolated from the core research projects with which the Czech Republic is entering into international co-operation. On the one hand, students generally have scarce access to empirical sources of good quality and analytically oriented specialists, and on the other hand, research projects are conducted in the absence of post-graduate students and promising young researchers. For this reason the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University set out to create a *seminar* for the comparative analysis of data from social research projects.

Although this long-term (as originally planned) project was involuntary terminated after the first two-year period, its goals were met to the greatest possible degree - with the exception of the seminar. The Czech version of the Social Report was published in 1998 (according to plan), and has already attracted the attention of a large audience. The English version was published in 1999. Within the project, three ISSP surveys were conducted: *The Role of Government* (1996), *Work Orientations* (1997) and *Social Inequalities* (1998). One survey from the series, *Economic Expectations and Attitudes,* was also conducted. In addition, the *Sociological Data Archive* was successfully opened and has generated increasing interest. Further information about the project may be found at www.soc.cas.cz/ trends.

7. The Social Report of the Czech Republic

Despite the availability of particular publications in the field of social reporting, a more extensive 'social report' on Czech society was lacking until some years back. Thus, the main task of the project *Social Trends* was to launch a series of social reports aiming to understand ongoing social change in its widest variety. The underlying idea was that social trends are more than just averages and aggregates in the forms usually documented by statistics. In other words, society should be seen not as an accomplished structure but as a living and profoundly diversified organism. As such, the purpose of a social survey is not to serve merely as a 'sociographic' gathering of data, but also as authentic research in the sense of data analysis, their interpretation and the subsequent presentation of the most important knowledge in the most condensed and clear form.

The report was first published in Czech, under the title *Report on Development of the Czech Society in 1989-1998* [Večerník ed. 1998]. The English version was published in 1999, under the title *Ten Years of Rebuilding Capitalism: Czech Society after 1989* [Večerník and Matějů (eds.) 1999]. The intention was to present Czech society in all its multifacetedness and motion, rather than as a list of social issues and societal pathology. The authors declare themselves as being committed to monitoring society as an active entity and not as the object of paternalistic care and extensive social engineering.

The first section reports on human resources, especially in relation to education, business, and the family, as the tools and the environment in which human activity is gen-

erated, developed, and applied. The second part is devoted to economic inequality and its formation mechanisms, the individual's ability to climb the social ladder and the 'division of territory' between the market and the state. The social structure, which is formed by economic and other human activities, not only tells us about living standards and life styles. It also greatly contributes to the structure of political orientation and behaviour, which, in a democratic society, results in the way in which a regime is defined and thus the general environment for the generation of human resources. The third part deals with the relationship between social and political structures, which is an attempt to create a sort of arch, returning us to the start of the explanations, and to complementing the context of the issues discussed there.

8. Conclusion

In this document, we have compiled a comprehensive (but probably not exhaustive) overview of the main undertakings in social statistics, sociological surveys and analyses that are in some way oriented towards social reporting. A great deal has clearly been accomplished in the past decade. Yet in terms of the criteria for social reporting suggested by Heinz-Herbert Noll (the combination of 'objective' and 'subjective' indicators, multi-dimensionality, continuous reporting, representative samples, observations of state activities and the priority of reflexive functions [Noll 1999]), most of the documents cited here do not meet even a selection of them. Probably only the *Social Report* [Večerník and Matějů 1999] manages to meet most of Noll's criteria.

We cannot therefore conclude that Czech research or the activities of public institutions in the field of social reporting and continual social surveys are flourishing. While research teams have managed to participate in several international projects (ISSP, European Value Survey, SIALS), they have not participated in other important and quite common projects (household panel surveys, general population surveys, Euromodule). Despite the good research background established in communist times [Illner and Foret 1980], no especial theoretical efforts have been made since 1989. By terminating the *Social Trends* project, a serious attempt to partially institutionalise social reporting was halted. Unfortunately, activities related to *Human Development Reports* (quite uneven in their shape and quality) have not been used to establish systematic social reporting with wide public availability either.

While the academic and applied social research is somewhat atomised in space and discontinuous in time, the current (1998-2002) Czech government seems to be more committed to undertake synthesising and forecasting activities. The Social Democrats have put such notions such as 'the state of the nation', 'societal strategy', 'national vision' or 'social doctrine' on the table, and aim to design comprehensive documents. Unlike the first governmental report 'on the state of the society', the envisaged documents might be more balanced in their coverage of individual fields of economic and social life, better supported by empirical analyses and less politically biased.

Activities related to EU accession may also be conducive to better social information. While the OECD reports give a comprehensive picture of the economic arena and social protection, thorough analysis of social and value structures is as yet incomplete. However, two new and important surveys conducted in 1999 are to be analysed in the year

2000: the Czech part of the *European Value Survey* and the new social stratification and mobility survey titled *Ten Years of Social Transformation in the Czech Republic*. Along with surveys already stored in the *Sociological Data Archive*, there is certainly enough data to be summarised and analysed. In addition, strong political backing of such new efforts to provide a summarising picture of society may prove the hopes for the future active development of social reporting in the Czech Republic to be well founded.

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Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Szelényi's Homage to Bourdieu's Theory of the Forms of Capital

Many sociologists have been trying to draw from Bourdieu's very rich theoretical treasury, particularly students of the reproduction of educational inequality and scholars engaged in social stratification research. Bourdieu's theory of various forms of capital, one of his shortest (and sharpest) works, has found its heartiest response among scholars striving to understand the post-communist transformation. Bourdieu's concept of convertibility among economic, cultural and social capitals has given birth to a number of vital hypotheses on the change in social stratification, determinants of life-success, and the formation of new elites in transforming societies.

Those who have ever tried to test hypotheses derived from Bourdieu's theory are aware of the great difficulties involved in doing so. Bourdieu's thoughts, penetrating the deepest layers of social reality, are not easy to transform into testable hypotheses, and even success in the first step of empirical verification does not necessarily lead to the accomplishment of the whole exercise, because even the most suitable data and the finest analytical tools may still be unable to reach the substance of the processes of social reproduction which Bourdieu addressed. This shows that an equally important condition of success in dealing with such hypotheses is the researcher's courage and passion to go beyond the data and apply the kind of sociological and historical insight that touches the substance and reveals the story of the interaction between the social, economic, cultural and political dimensions in social reproduction.

If one had to name the best example of success in the application of such a demanding approach, the book *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists. The New Ruling Elites in Eastern Europe*, written by Gil Eyal, Iván Szelényi and Eleanor Townsley, would certainly rank very high among the favourites in this contest. This is no surprise. Iván Szelényi has been one of the most passionate students and commentators of communist political regimes and societies. In the times when reliable empirical data on communist societies were rather rare, his books and articles, based on sharp sociological and political insights, were for decades a source of irritation for communist leaders. His first book, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, which he wrote with George Konrád and which was published in 1979, indicated what would be his main scholarly and research interests for many years to come: the reproduction of social inequality, the formation of class structure and political systems in communist and post-communist societies. Most of his publications on state-socialist society e.g. *Social Inequalities in State Socialist Redistributive Economies* (1978), *Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project* (1986), *Socialism in an Epoch of Crisis* (1988), *Socialist Entrepreneurs* (1988)) addressed the key issues which sociologists who had to live, work and publish in communist countries were prevented from addressing without ideological constraints.

When the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed in 1989, Szelényi became an equally zealous student of the post-communist transformation, which in fact has been an ideal laboratory for testing Bourdieu's hypotheses regarding the role of various forms of capital and their conversions in the reproduction of inequality and in shaping life-success. Szelényi's contribution to the study of transforming societies consisted not only in his research, sharply focused on the most important processes that have shaped post-communist societies (market transition and its consequences for the development of inequality and social stratification in the early stage of the transformation, the formation of new political, economic and cultural elites, the crystallisation of the new political culture, the political spectrum and the development of patterns of voting behaviour), but also in introducing his post-graduate students to research projects addressing this unique process.

The book *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists*, which Iván Szelényi wrote with Gil Eyal and Eleanor Townsley, arose out of an extensive comparative research project entitled 'Social Stratification in Eastern Europe and Circulation of Elites' which Szelényi directed together with Donald J. Treiman. However, aware of the complexity of the phenomena they set out to explain (and not only describe), the authors did not limit themselves to the empirical data on elite re-

cruitment in five post-communist countries. Instead, they set for themselves a much more ambitious plan: "[to] offer a new theory of the transition to capitalism, by telling the story of how capitalism is being built without capitalists in post-communist countries". (p. I).

Indeed, a novelty the theory the authors offer is its provocative hypothesis that capitalism built in post-communist Central Europe, at least in its initial stages, is historically a new form of 'capitalism without capitalists', or capitalism built on the 'spirit of managerialism'. In their view, the post-communist transformation is a "distinctive new strategy of transition adopted by technocratic-intellectual elites in societies where no class of private owners existed prior to the introduction of market mechanisms". (p. I).

From the theoretical point of view the book aspires to arrive at a synthesis of two competing theories of social change applied to the post-communist transformation: *evolutionary theory* (state-socialist institutions are replaced by new ones known to work in market economies, and the system begins to work in a similar way because the actors learn how to operate within the new constraints) and *path-dependency* theory (the functioning of new institutions is constrained by the values, habits and patterns of behaviour inherited from the old system).

To achieve the promised synthesis, the authors draw on Bourdieu's theory of the forms of capital. Their central claim is that "those who maintained their relative social trajectories in the face of change were those who possessed more than one kind of capital, and were able to convert resources when the social assets defining 'success' were altered. [....] The logic and laws of Central European social stratification have changed profoundly in this century. People who are now over fifty or sixty years of age have lived in at least three distinct social structures: in pre-communist society, under communism, and since 1989 [...] in post-communism. These three different 'space structures' were characterised by strikingly different criteria of ascent and descent, so a person would have had to possess quite different types of capital to remain successful over time. In order to stay on a trajectory to the 'top' an individual had to learn to navigate these changing 'space structures': to learn how to dispose of devalued types of capital and acquire those types of capital that had increased in value; they also had to learn how to convert old, now devalued capital into a new, more valued type." (p. 22).

Simply put, applying and slightly reworking Bourdieu's theory of various forms of capital allows the authors to build on the general assumption that in the course of the transformation, people try to reshuffle the portfolio of various forms of capital (economic, cultural, social, political), to get rid of forms of capital which are losing value (former political capital), and to convert them into forms that are becoming more valuable (e.g. economic capital). Thus, in contrast to the evolutionary theory, the authors emphasise that in order to succeed, individuals should be able to adjust their social trajectory and behaviour to the new conditions, in which elements of the past are still present.

Five main theses are presented and elaborated to support the proposed theory. The first thesis actually builds on the role of 'learning' to cope with the new conditions: 'learning is not *copying* but *coping*', the authors argue, and present the hypothesis that cultural capital is the main source of power, prestige, and privilege at the early stage of the post-communist transformation. Addressing the advocates of 'political capitalism' (who argued that the old cadres would become the new capitalists simply by converting former political capital into economic capital), Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley (EST hereafter) emphasise that the possession of economic capital (regardless of its main source) places actors only in the middle of the social hierarchy, and that the direct conversion of former political capital into economic capital is only exceptionally a successful strategy. Success in the conversion of communist privilege into its post-communist equivalent comes only if social actors possess a significant stock of cultural capital (education). Less educated cadres of the nomenclature who relied just on the direct conversion of their former political capital without being able to adapt to new conditions were more likely to experience downward mobility or early retirement.

The emphasis EST put on the role of cultural capital is consistent with their second the-

sis, according to which the leading group of the early stage of the post-communist transformation recruited primarily from among the intellectuals and the well-educated former socialist technocrats. As an explanation for this proposition they argue that state socialism constrained the development of a class of private proprietors, and the 'cultural bourgeoisie' had to assume the historic mission of creating capitalist society and a corresponding economic order.

To understand this argument and the very nature and role of the 'cultural bourgeoisie', whose mission was already anticipated in Szelényi's first book (*'The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power'*), EST make a historical excursus to the role of the 'Bildungsbürgertum', a social class whose importance in the history of Central Europe has been emphasised by the German historian Jurgen Kocka. Intellectuals in Central Europe, as Kocka argued, have long been attracted to various ambitious historical projects of modernisation through reshaping their societies. The first 'project' of this educated middle class aimed at fostering the modernisation process of the 19th century, when the 'Wirtschaftsbürgertum' (the business middle class) was still too weak to fulfill this role alone.

The second historical project of the 'Bildungsbürgertum', this time inspired by Marxism, aimed to promote the idea of modernisation through bypassing capitalist development. The anti-bourgeois ideology found very strong support after World War II particularly in East Central Europe. Finally, the third intellectual modernisation project undertaken in Central Europe was conceived during the communist era by dissident intellectuals. Their aim was to overthrow the communist order and to modernise society by creating capitalism without capitalists.

The collapse of the communist regimes in fact opened the door for this third historical project of the Central European educated middle class. However, it very soon became clear that no single segment of the 'intelligentsia' could undertake it alone. For this reason, an uneasy alliance of former dissidents, reform economic technocrats (monetarists), and former socialist managers was formed. The dissidents had the *moral* legitimacy to become the political leaders of the transformation, and economic technocrats possessed the *theoretical* know-how for the economic transformation (monetarism), while former managers of socialist enterprises offered their *practical* experience to run the enterprises and to navigate them through the stormy waters of the privatisation period. This uneasy 'marriage of convenience rather than love', as EST describe this 'coalition', gained the necessary power to become the leading force behind the transformation.

The third thesis claims that this alliance of dissidents, economic technocrats and former socialist managers, gave birth to a spirit of managerialism - the specific ideology of the post-communist transformation. As EST emphasise, managerialism does not necessarily mean that managers or economic technocrats actually govern, it rather means that acting together they generate a particular *govern-mentality*. Managerialism found its main inspiration in the monetarism developed by the Chicago school in the early 1970s. The idea was to pursue the 'liberal art of government' by reducing government's economic role, which has to be limited in order to use monetary means in the regulation of the economy. Also, many social phenomena can get a monetary representation to become 'self-regulated'. Monetary control 'from afar' assumes that individuals are entrepreneurial, efficient units that seek to appraise their human and economic capital, so they will react appropriately to the opportunities offered by the monetary rules. As a consequence, monetarism has led to the concentration of real economic power in the 'hubs' of monetarist technology and the centres of 'economic truth': banks.

Another important condition that enabled the spirit of managerialism to thrive was the ideology of civil society. EST argue that since socialism has been delegitimised as an irrational system based on command and communist paternalism, the civil society, which is to flourish on its ruins, will be the very opposite: a society governed by reason and procedural rationality, a society of adult citizens who follow the intellectuals, whose only mission is to *light the way* and *reveal the truth*. This particular idea of civil society in fact led to the birth and growth of an ideology of anti-politics, which had a good deal in common with the monetarists' idea that by

making room for the operation of monetary rules in order to reveal the *economic truth* the government's economic policy would become largely superfluous. In other words, the authors come to the conclusion that the *monetarism* of economic technocrats and the *anti-politics* promoted by dissident intellectuals had one common denominator: the key condition for making the transition successful is to offer people 'living with the truth'. Their only mission is to create conditions in which individuals will be able to govern themselves: through *rational prices* and the *morality of civil society*. Once these conditions are created, individuals as 'adult citizens' will be able to make meaningful decisions and the transformation will be accomplished.

What may have looked like an ideal project for creating a new (modern) version of capitalism ran into two obstacles: managers and citizens. The latter soon learned that the new system is not new enough to prevent them from employing old habits and strategies. One should not be surprised then that most institutions remained governed by the same or similar spirit as that in the old regime. As for the managers, the third partner in the 'uneasy coalition', they pushed the political elites to limit the leverage of the true market and monetary rules. Their bargaining position was strong, since - unlike the economic technocrats who possessed only symbolic mastery of economic rules - they possessed one of the most valuable commodities of post-communism: hands-on knowledge of state firms, without which the political elite would be unable to convert privatisation from lofty theory to pedestrian practice.

This is why it was this particular segment of the post-communist elites - managers, mostly former communist functionaries, and members of the nomenclature - who brought the elites to a compromise. The nature of the compromise between technocrats and managers consisted in the establishment of two conditions under which managers were willing to continue playing their role: a) maintaining the soft-budget constraints by preventing market mechanisms from replacing a hidden budget-bargaining, and b) preventing privatisation from a real takeover of the firm by the new 'strong' owner. The state-owned banks which remained heavily under the control of the political elite made fulfilling the first condition possible, while the privatisation process designed by the same political elite allowed for establishing and maintaining a dispersed property model, stalling the birth of a true capitalist class. Managers, who obtained what they needed to secure their power and privileges at the expense of establishing capitalism with real capitalists, generously sponsored the political elite.

For these reasons, according to the fourth thesis, the big winners in the post-communist transition were the former managers of socialist enterprises. Unlike the members of the communist elite, who lost their privilege, power and prestige, the younger, well-educated managers and 'lower level cadres' of the communist regime were most likely to be found among the real winners in the transition. The data showed that five years after the collapse of the communist regimes most of the economic command positions in the post-communist corporate sector were occupied by former communist technocrats, who were younger and better educated than the senior cadres - their former bosses - who in turn were generously offered to enjoy early retirement. Thus, not even the group of successful managers followed the path suggested by the theory of political capitalism. It is true that they were installed to exercise managerial authority, but there is little evidence that they have become large proprietors and members of a true capitalist class.

The fifth thesis concludes that the formation of classes during the post-communist transformation is a highly contested process. Though there are many candidates who could constitute a new propertied class - a technocratic-managerial elite, foreign investors, and small entrepreneurs striving to become larger - its re-birth has been put off. Thus in 1998, when the book was published, the evidence was still in favour of the hypothesis that the real winners in the transformation were the members of the technocratic-managerial elite who, although the banks have been gradually privatised and pushed out of the political game, were able to maintain their positions, power and privileges without having to take the responsibility of real owners.

From the point of view of social stratification, the book offers a highly consistent and creative application of Bourdieu's theory of the var-

ious forms of capital. It explains why the real winners in the transformation were those who were able to combine the political capital of the past (nomenclature cadres, communist technocrats) with cultural capital (education, knowledge). Political capital made it possible to build social networks and useful ties. Cultural capital made people flexible enough to put all these assets to work under the new conditions.

The chosen topic, along with the way in which provocative hypotheses are presented and elaborated, make this book one of the best sociological pieces written on the post-communist transformation. The advantage of the book is that its style makes it potentially attractive to scholars and students, sociologists, historians and political scientists. There is, however, one group whose members might feel irritated by the presented arguments and conclusions: members of the ruling elites in post-communist countries, who only with great difficulty will be able to hide their indignation over how close Szelényi, his co-authors and his former graduate students have come to the truth in their description and explanation of the strategies that the old and new elites chose to create 'capitalism without capitalists'.

Indeed, the many facts and suspicions surrounding privatisation, as well as evidence only now fully revealed on the role of the banks, on the real destination of classified loans and credits, and on the decisions to provide state subsidies to inefficient semi-privatised enterprises, and the truth on investment funds and yet to be clarified cases of political-party financing, are all particular and seemingly unrelated pieces of evidence that can form a single sensible story if we take into account the hypotheses and explanations suggested by Szelényi and his colleagues.

The book therefore shows that sociology may enter the domain of public debate and take a critical stance while still remaining on scientific ground. The authors themselves admitted that they were balancing at the very edge of the dividing line between academic sociology and investigative journalism. "Our search for answers [...] transformed us from empirical sociologists into detectives. As we gathered and began to analyze data, our list of suspects began to grow, but the culprits continued to elude us. We kept reformulating our hypotheses, and we are still in the process of doing so. We invite our readers to join us for an hour or so - or for however long it takes to solve this mystery - in our search for Whodunit (and what did they do)? To put it in Goffman's terms: although book usually present readers with the 'front stage' of the drama [...] we would like to invite you to come 'backstage'. [...] Instead of showing you the most polished theory supported by the data available to us, we want to document the process of how one theory after another collapsed, as we dug deeper into the data, and suspect after suspect was eliminated. Indeed, as we write this chapter we are still digging. We do not claim to have arrived at the final truth. To be frank we do not believe in final truth. The great historical transformation we are studying is still unfolding" (p. 115).

Reading these words, another book on the post-communist transformation came to my mind, one equally challenging and equally difficult to classify - Dahrendorf's *Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe*. Addressing the development after the fall of communism, Dahrendorf was in 1990 already able to write: "What we are facing here is one of the more vexing issues of modern history, which is the relationship between political and economic reform, with social change thrown in at both ends" (Dahrendorf 1990:82). Like Szelényi and his colleagues, Dahrendorf rejected the idea pushed forward by the political leaders of the transformation that the historical task of the transition from socialism to capitalism can be accomplished once freedom has been guaranteed by the new constitution, the market has replaced the plan, and privatisation has re-established private property. Szelényi and his colleagues, equipped with Bourdieu's theory, valuable data, historical knowledge, and courage to tell the whole story rather than remaining within the conventional limits of academic sociology, have made a very significant step forward in exploring the forces that render the process of transformation open to various paths.

The plan to tell the main story by emphasising the shared elements of elite formation in post-communist countries overshadowed some important cross-national differences. A more extensive presentation of the survey data and the

interpretation of differences in patterns of elite recruitment among individual countries could have brought greater satisfaction to those readers who do not rely on historical interpretations and wish to check them against empirical evidence. The lack of sophisticated analytical evidence to support the hypotheses and conclusions, and relatively little attention devoted to cross-national differences could be seen as the main weaknesses of the book.

One of the differences the data show actually provides even stronger support for the hypothesis of the 'path-dependent' character of the transformation. The data suggest that, indeed, the transformation of ownership has not occurred in Poland and the Czech Republic, where only a small fraction of the elites in privatised companies report even partial ownership of a business. In Hungary, however, the story was different: a larger proportion of the directors of state and privatised companies reported such ownership. This suggests that the economic reforms which were implemented in Hungary before the collapse of communism had the effect of decentralising the power over economic resources, allowing managers to dominate the privatisation process once the collapse of state socialism occurred. It shows that the transformation of Eastern European elites into a propertied bourgeoisie was also very much a path-dependent process, in the sense that the ability of elites to acquire productive assets rested on policies which were enacted during the state socialist period. Failure to enact economic reforms, as in the Czech Republic, has largely prevented elites from acquiring individual ownership rights over productive assets. For the same reason it would have been worthwhile to show that the extent of elite circulation in the post-communist period was directly related to the extent of elite circulation that took place in the last decade of communist rule. Circulation before 1989 had the effect of improving the technical competence of elites, increasing their likelihood of surviving the transition to democracy and markets, and diminishing the likelihood of a skilled counter-elite coming into existence.

Survey data actually support this hypothesis. Hungary, which experienced greater elite circulation during the 1980s than either Poland or the Czech Republic, also displayed higher rates of elite reproduction than either of the other countries and among both the political and the economic elites. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, which experienced relatively low rates of elite circulation in the 1980s, also displayed the lowest rates of elite reproduction after 1989. These cross-national differences in elite circulation and/or reproduction in different stages of development may contribute not only to a better understanding of different methods of privatisation, but also to the explanation of current differences in the economic performance of individual countries. Companies which were privatised by selling to the new (foreign) owners, no matter what kind of deal was made between the 'old' manager and the new owner, today demonstrate a significantly higher economic performance than companies in which the shareholders are not strong enough to eliminate the dominant role of the state, even in the position of minority owner.

Including these details could have made the book more informative, but probably also less 'dramatic'. Certainly it could not have changed anything in the main message of the book. Though the path leading to *capitalism with capitalists* seems to be the most likely one for all post-communist countries, there is no clear answer to the question of when this process will be accomplished. As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, in spite of the fact that most banks have been privatised and the political elite has lost control over their operations, not much has changed with respect to the creation of a genuine capitalist class since the book '*Capitalism without Capitalists*' came out.

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Vladimír Rys: La sécurité sociale dans une société en transition: l'expérience tchéque. Quels enseignements pour l'Europe?
Lausanne: Réalités sociales 1999, 254 pp.

The debate on social policy is one of many that started only after November 1989. The communist regime contented itself with stale sloganising about social welfare and only rarely surprised its citizens by raising pensions and child benefits, or the introduction of maternity benefit - moves always kept secret until the last minute. The real debate started in 1990, rather surprisingly set off by an out-of-the-blue burst of rhetoric about the social safety net ("Your ears do not deceive you, it really is William Beveridge once again addressing Central Europe after half a century", writes Rys on p. 47). Since then, of course, discussion has been in full swing. The Czech Sociological Review has been one of those to contribute, for example in an issue wholly devoted to the theme in 1993. Today we have a range of books on the subject at our disposal, notably those by Martin Potůček and his colleagues. Essential contributions have also come from the Brno sociologists Možný, Rabušic, Mareš, Sirovátka and Musil. The journal *Social Policy*, published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, has been devoting itself to the theory and practice of this important field very systematically.

While our sociologists had to wait until the establishment of a free state to teach themselves the vocabulary of social policy, their once unknown colleague Vladimír Rys had long been fully equipped. After emigrating from Czechoslovakia in 1948, he studied at the London School of Economics and the Sorbonne and has devoted most of his life to work in the field of social welfare in international organisations, most recently as General Secretary of the International Association for Social Security (ISSA). It is nonetheless a pity that he has not entered the Czech debate more frequently and urgently. He has lectured in comparative social security at the Law faculty of Charles University, and has occasionally expressed himself on topical questions in the daily press, He has also followed events in the Czech Republic from his Swiss retreat near Geneva, where he wrote the publication under review here, with the support of a Swiss research fund.

According to the author, the aim of the book is not to describe the structure and functioning of the institution of social security, but to answer the question of why it has developed as it has. The account is therefore guided by this aim, and is for the most part chronological. After a short chapter on the social policy of the communist era, it deals first with developments in the years 1990-1992 and then with the social reforms of 1993-1995. This is followed by a consideration of the individual determinants of social reform. The historical account ends with 'an epilogue instead of a conclusion', devoted to the end of the Czech economic miracle in the period after 1996, but the book does not end here, since there is an additional chapter on post-communist experience as a 'lesson for Europe', and a postscript by P-Y. Greber on the need for social security in the Europe of tomorrow. An appendix presents a detailed description of the reformed social security system in the Czech Republic.

Rys does not see the communist system of social security as in any way idyllic. He is well aware that 'social protection served to lull to sleep the political consciousness of society', and of the 'machinery that led from legitimate interest in the social situation of workers to the violation of human rights'. He shows the trap into which the regime fell as its own increasing social obligations were in ever more stark contrast to the stagnation of economic performance (pp. 31-33), but he moves quickly from this still under-described period to the period after November 1989.

Here I cannot omit Rys's telling parallels as he defines individual years in post-totalitarian development - the first of the main chapters is devoted to 1990 (the year of mercy), 1991 (the year of searching for identity) and 1992 (the year of truth). The author describes the individual measures and the difficulties in getting major changes through in the hectic period before the division of the Czechoslovak federation. He records the "progressive sliding away from the scenario of 1990, which had been closely linked to the reform efforts of the Prague Spring, to a more liberal conception" (p. 84). He claims a complete absence of public discussion of social policy, which he attributes to the inexperience of citizens, journalists and politicians. He draws attention to the problem of drawing on the past,

since it is not clear which traditions from the preceding republics should be revived.

The years 1993 (the year of scepticism), 1994 (the year of the neo-liberal offensive) and 1995 (the year of reform and compromise), represent the next phase. The author describes Klaus's hostility to the concept of social justice and his pushing through of a policy of targeted social benefits, with no attention to the prevention of poverty. Rys characterises the formulation of government measures as 'fumbling' and criticises the neglect of corporative mechanisms (employers' pension funds) in the new system of provision for old age. This essentially checkmated important future social actors in advance - a theme the author considers crucial and to which he devotes the most detailed treatment in his analysis of clashes between the government and the unions. Here as in all chapters he also deals with the reform of a health-care system hanging 'over a precipice'.

The answers to the question 'why' are summarised in a further chapter divided into treatments of internal demographic, economic, sociological, and political factors, with short references to a series of external factors. Some conclusions from the historical account are systematically presented here, with all the 'hard facts' subjected to political assessment: the author does not believe demographic structure (including socio-demographic structure) to have been a fundamental influence on social policy during the period, as compared to economic factors, which were for example crucial to the decision to leave pension insurance payments in the state budget rather than set up a social insurance company. He naturally devotes the most attention to the 'sociological factor' by which he means above all the social actors, who were unfortunately conspicuous in their absence. While the beginnings of reform were entirely in the hands of the bureaucracy, with the arrival of the Klaus government the unions appeared on the scene. Rys notes the emergence of other interest groups (employers' associations, chambers, pensioners' associations), nevertheless he concludes that in post-communist societies only the major political parties have the power to influence social legislation (p. 170).

In the epilogue the author does not hide his disagreement with the 'aggressively implemented neo-liberal doctrine' and shows the reactions to it that that inevitably led to the strengthening of social democracy. The unfavourable economic trend once more brought the economic factor in social policy to the forefront. This has not, however, essentially changed the 'liberal' approach which has left untouched some residua of communism, such as tax-free pensions and state payment of insurance for persons not in economic activity. In the end, Rys claims, the required 'normalisation' of social standards to adjust to the EU, including the reduction of benefits, will paradoxically be implemented by a left-centre government (p. 192).

With an appeal to Pierre Laroque, the author claims that social policy always involves finding a balance between individual freedom and the limitations imposed by society. He therefore rejects the idea that it is excessive social welfare that produces mass unemployment in European countries. It is not social but economic policy that has taken the brakes off the globalisation process without introducing the necessary adaptation mechanisms. Social protection in both the reforming and advanced countries lacks a consistent conception and consensus that would be economic, political and social at the same time. Economics does not provide a complete understanding of reality, claims Rys, thus aligning himself with the critics of the 'Washington Consensus', which has reduced economics to a few macro-economic indicators.

Vladimir Rys brings an experienced and erudite view of the past development of our social policy, and his analysis is enhanced by a certain distance and broader perspective. I regard it as a great pity that the author did not participate in drawing up the changes in this field, since his ideas and approach to the problems are informed by deep understanding of the 'European dimension'. In his book, passages of pure description alternate with pragmatic criticism of individual politicians and with a general overview of (mostly absent) concepts, actors and consensus. The fact is that sometimes he moves too quickly from one level of the account to another, and this makes considerable demands on the attention of the reader. The book's aim of identifying all aspects of 'why' the contemporary social system of the Czech Republic is as it is could not, however, be fulfilled. One reason

might be that it is not only under communism that social legislation is forged in the twilight of party offices. The book is, however, valuable for its reflective insights and is also an abundant source of information. It definitely deserves a wider audience than can be addressed in its French version.

Jiří Večerník

Jean-Michel de Waele: ***L'émergence des partis politiques en Europe centrale***
Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 1999, 354 pp.

This important book is a revised version of the doctoral dissertation the author defended at the Free University in Brussels. It deals with the emergence and further development of political parties and party systems in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and also, after the division of the latter, in the separate countries of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The book is based both on thorough research of theoretical literature, and on a serious understanding of the individual countries involved in the research. One of its strongest traits (and what distinguishes it from the majority of publications devoted to this subject in English) is that the author is fully aware of the relatively fast and substantial transition over the course of only several years which the parties and party systems in these countries have had to undergo. The author is loosely inspired by the idea, stressed in particular by Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, that the means behind the transition are able to considerably influence the resulting type of democracy that emerges. However, the author correctly points out that transition typologies worked out in other contexts (southern Europe, Latin America) cannot be precisely applied to the countries of Central Europe. He also correctly includes analysis of the influence of the differences between the 'communist legacies' of the individual countries.

De Waele distinguishes between three types of political transition: (1) negotiated transition, which includes, among others, Poland (this corresponds to what Guy Hermet referred to as 'managed transition'), (2) implosion transition, which includes East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and finally (3) forceful transition, an example of which is Romania. Unlike some Western political scientists who know very little about Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Schmitter), de Waele has not contented himself solely with working on data drawn from the Eurobarometer polls and from the elections in the individual countries, but has thoroughly submersed himself in the historical and social development of these countries, and has accurately grasped (as has the Polish sociologist Jerzy J. Wiatr) that Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic especially, should not be tossed into the same category as Poland.

The author has also attempted to periodise the formation and stabilisation of parties in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe: (1) the formation of anti-communist fronts for democracy (in the Czech lands - Civic Forum), (2) the break-up of these umbrella political institutions, (3) parliamentarisation (this phase being characterised by the formation of parliamentary groups or clubs over the course of the legislative term and not as a result of the elections, which leads to strong volatility), and finally (4) the consolidation of the party system (in the Czech lands it is possible to speak of the beginning of this phase from the time of the 1996 parliamentary elections).

De Waele has also devoted a great deal of attention to the issue of cleavages. Unlike some other authors, who do not sufficiently distinguish between temporary 'issues' and more lasting 'cleavages', this book has avoided this mistake. The author recognises the following cleavages: (1) urban/rural, (2) maximalist/minimalist (this term has been borrowed from D.-L. Seiler and involves the matter of a liberal/social division; at the beginning it is related to the rhythm of economic reform and gradually it crosses over into the classic right-left dimension of owners/workers), (3) centre/periphery, (4) authoritarianism/democracy (this cleavage is particularly strong in Slovakia).

In the conclusion to this valuable book, the author emphasises that the lessons of failure to be had from post-party organisations such as Civic Forum in the Czech lands are important even for Western democracies in connection with what is usually and exaggeratedly referred to as the 'par-

ty crisis'. Parties remain an essential means for democracy. What if some of the traits of these parties formed after the break-up of post-party organisations in Central and Eastern Europe were actually to prefigure and anticipate the development of parties in established, Western democracies?

Miroslav Novák

Dirk Taenzler (ed.): Der tschechische Weg. Transformation einer Industriegesellschaft
Frankfurt/Main; New York, Campus Verlag 1999, 244 p.

Once again a new book in German is contributing to the transformation literature of East Central Europe and, in this particular case, of the Czech Republic. This allows us to ask what the special contribution of this treatise is within the range of the sociological, political and economical literature that has already dealt extensively with the topic of Czech society's modernisation through transformation.

The recession in 1997 challenged the success of this modernisation by revealing the contradiction between shock therapy and the neglected reforms of socio-economic institutions. On the basis of the book's essays the editor, Dirk Taenzler, intends to demonstrate that the crisis must not be reduced to the political failures of the last ten years. In contrast, it results from the interaction of the political strategy, the economic power structures, and the socio-cultural behavioural patterns that have their origins in the pre-socialistic beginnings of Czech modernisation and industrialisation.

The book contains ten essays written by sociologists, historians and economists, who trace the Czech path over three stages, as affected by modernisation on the one hand, and stagnation on the other:

1) industrialisation before 1918 and the formation of an informal network of banks, businesses and the state during the First Republic
2) economic centralisation into huge sector units during socialism, which led to the development of their autonomous organisational culture
3) restructuralisation, or the preservation of socialistic economic structures in their interdependence with neo-liberal macro-politics after 1989.

Each essay deals with a partial problem of the economic and social relations according to a defined period of time. In addition, the essays complement each other, and read as a whole, they create the innovative idea of the book. Each article analyses the development of traditionally resistant behavioural patterns and political-economic organisation structures. In this way the book conveys a basic comprehension of the reasons why the Czech transformation from a socialist to a capitalist society evolved the way it did and not in a different way.

One formal problem of the book is that a few essays (Clark and Soulsby; Keilhofer) are based on macro-theory, and the others are orientated strictly around empirical cases (Taenzler and Mazálková-Hollerová). As the majority of the authors are micro-orientated, their macro-economic conclusions often remain limited. Therefore, an analytical linking of the empirical cases to continuities and determinations in social behaviour and economic structures would have been helpful.

The three parts of the book (I. industrialisation and the First Republic, II. socialism and company transformation, III. the results of the transformations according to economic growth and social structure) reveal chronologically the sequence of economic systems, but the second part deals with more than the planned economy. Here, the authors look at the organisational culture of socialist companies from the viewpoint of its consequences for the restructuralisation of the combined collectives.

However, in the first part the authors (Eduard Kubu, Christoph Boyer and Peter Heumos) strictly concentrate on the analysis of the political and economic culture of the First Republic without connecting their results to the present situation. Nevertheless, while reading Kubu's essay it becomes conspicuous that the economic restructuralisation since 1989 correlates with the structures that Kubu has already stated relating to the First Republic. (Owing to the traditional networking of universal banks and industry the bank cartel influenced the financial and

interest policies. On the other hand, through a short-term profit orientation, the banks as creditors and shareholders impeded the modernisation of Czech industry.)

Christoph Boyer and Peter Heumos deal with the control of industrial culture by party-political organised interest groups. The bargaining procedures of a politically fragmented society, which were even complicated by conflicts with ethnic minorities, made it more difficult to achieve a stringent liberal economic policy. Against this background, Boyer analyses the German contribution to the economic development of Czechoslovakia. The economic nationalism at that time supported the development of the informal-corporate culture of the First Republic, which even today influences the transformation.

Peter Heumos explains how the conservative type of Czech proletarian could have developed. The interest of the political elite in social stabilisation meant that workers became used to a system of subsidiarity and self-administration. For this reason the social conflict could be localised on the internal level of companies through personal bargaining procedures. Thus the classic type of Czech proletarian was the entrepreneur and patriotic employee in one person. From the 1960s the socialist model of production units tried to increase the worker's patriotism and decreased his independent engagement, which was 'activated' in other spheres of life.

Now the managers of transformation have to reactivate this engagement and feeling of responsibility for the company in order to achieve a successful inner restructuralisation of the former production units.

The essays in the second part examine how the concentration of market power on industrial sectors and the former social position of the new managers in the centralised economy determined the management of the companies under market conditions.

Jan Vlácil demonstrates how the new group of managers and entrepreneurs, by using their social capital, rise from the middle management of public companies and are established as leading actors within the take-over of these companies and their adaptation to competition. However, they failed in the realisation of their new orientations toward efficiency and profit on the internal level, because their old authoritarian habit hindered them from permitting the necessary participation of employees in decisions and innovations in production. In this Vlácil demonstrates that the inner restructuralisation of the companies depends on the manager's psychological disposition.

Proceeding from the same idea, Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby analyse the indirect process of the divisionalisation of the former production units orientated toward the Western divisional model run by the new managers. On the basis of three examples from the sphere of mechanical engineering they prove that the managers who were promoted from the second to the first level suffered from a deficit of social appreciation. The adaptation of the reliable Western divisional model promised short-term economic success, and in this way also the best chance to save their social legitimacy. When this decentralisation led to technical resistance and social opposition, the managers were forced to adapt the new multi-divisional form to the inherited centralist structures in order to be able to solve the problems of efficiency.

Dirk Taenzler and Ivana Mazálková-Hollerová, once again with the help of their case study on the reorganisation of a Bohemian mechanical engineering trust, give support to the thesis that the strategy of recentralisation is subsequently used to stop the subsidiary's tendency toward disintegration.

Petra Bouché's essay can actually be assigned to the third part of the book, which from a macro-perspective deals with the economic and social consequences of the neo-liberal transformation policy. Bouché points out how the huge socialist research institutes were forced to adapt to the industry's decreasing demand for innovation because of restrictive financial policy. This led to a big loss in personnel and research capacity, resulting in a long-term reduction of innovation potential in Czech industry.

Franz X. Keilhofer analyses in a somewhat confusing manner, with twenty theses, how the trusts' market power influences the macro-economic development of the Czech transformation affected through political shock therapy.

According to Keilhofer, market liberalisation was favoured and foreign trade opened on the one hand, while the state neglected to establish institutional market regulations on the other, which led to a strengthening of the old market power structures and a sector reorientation towards low valued export products. The result is a long-term economic structural trap based on profitable labour-intensive production, which is also exploited by foreign investors. Only effective institutional control by the state, connected with structural policy in order to support new, financially powerless business, could lift the sector out of a downward trend. High-value products would be able to guarantee on a long-term basis the economic growth of the export-orientated Czech national economy.

The last article, written by Ilja Srubar, focuses on the reorganisation of the social structure, as induced through the mode of privatisation. In a comparison with East Germany he stresses the motivational effect of the Czech population's extensive participation in privatisation: Traditional small-scale entrepreneurship comes to life again and reveals a potential for innovation in the service sector; in addition it is able to absorb a large portion of the unemployed. Thus Srubar points to Peter Heumos, who described the typical Czech industrial worker of the First Republic as conservative-oriented, because of his self-understanding as an entrepreneur.

Even though these historical connections are not always clearly shown, the book's innovative contribution is to state through the arrangement of the articles that the special Czech transformation results from structures, which are rooted in the people's pre-socialist traditions and experiences. At the same time, Taenzler (as in the study about the reorganisation of the mechanical engineering trust) presents the importance of long-term analysis for science as well as for political strategies, in order to avoid the simple transfer of new Western models to deal with traditional structures, which can in the end lead to negative side effects.

Tanja Taeubner

The Tenth Anniversary of CEFRES in Prague

The French Centre for Research in the Social Sciences (CEFRES) of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established in Prague ten years ago (www.cefres.cz). The centre has two main missions: the representation of the French social sciences in the Czech Republic (and more widely in Central Europe) and the constitution of an observatory of the transformations that have taken place since the end of the Soviet-type system. Successively, under the direction of Marie-Elizabeth Ducreux, Françoise Mayer, Antoine Marès, and most recently Georges Mink, CEFRES has organised approximately 23 international conferences, 50 round table meetings, and more than 200 conferences, and it has hosted 58 PhD students (21 supported theses, several about to be completed). CEFRES has also published 29 studies in its collection '*Cahiers du CEFRES*' (mostly in French and Czech), and 20 working papers ('*Documents de travail*', in French). In addition, two members of CEFRES have produced documentary films.

In honour of its tenth anniversary, in March 2002 CEFRES organised a conference on the topic 'social sciences in the face of post-communism', in which French, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Polish researchers from various fields (history, sociology, political science, geography, demography and economy) participated. They assessed the consequences the post-communist period has held for their fields, the development of subjects, and the use of sources and theoretical tools.

The conference opened with inaugural statements by three personalities of Central Europe active in dissent before 1989. Jan Sokol (philosopher and currently Dean of the Faculty of Human Studies, University Charles) presented a kind of warning addressed at the younger generation, which arguably lacks an appreciation of the value of freedom. Elemér Hankiss (sociologist, member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) added a rather nostalgic assessment of the emergence of the 'ideas of the past' (implying those of the former dissidents). He drew a picture of the evolution of the social identity of the intellectuals engaged in sharp debates on politics and society before 1989 and now entrenched in the role of experts. Adam Michnik (historian and currently head of the daily newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*) had no regrets about the type of sociological research conducted during the time of the 'totalitarian constraint'; but underlined the fact that the social sciences had left 'heroic' endeavours behind them and that they are now working in normal conditions which should enable them to be considered equal to 'Western' social sciences.

The current director of CEFRES, George S. Mink (CNRS-LASP), who opened the conference, initiated a discussion about the role of researchers during times of change. He recalled the principal attitudes that social science students adopted with regard to the change in 1989. First, researchers are victims of the 'complex of preaching' amidst the sudden breakdown of communism. Second, this phenomenon was accompanied by distress vis-à-vis the event itself. Third, if communism had caused a questioning of sociology of action, in the sense of Alain Touraine, post-communism was accompanied by the strong reintroduction of Bourdieu's theory of capitals. Though East European researchers do not miss the debate on paradigms, it should be recalled that Włodimierz Wesołowski from Poland and Ivan Szelényi from Hungary were at the source of the development of a sociology of the elites, while the application of the theory of path dependency to institutional actors was developed in particular by Laszlo Bruszt, a Hungarian sociologist. In these terms, Mink began the debate on the function of researchers during this time of change.

The conference continued with seven meetings, most of which were chaired by the former directors (Marie-Elizabeth Ducreux, EHESS, Françoise Mayer, University of Montpellier, Antoine Marès, INALCO). The contributions were oriented around three main discussion points: first, post-communism did not cause 'trauma' (we are referring to the title of Miloslav Petrusek's contribution, 'The Traumatism of Czech Sociology') in the social sciences from the point of view of the development of the discipline; second, it did not cause a paradigmatic revolution; and third, it implies a fine analysis of diversity and ambivalence towards the legacies of the past.

From the point of view of the disciplines, the Czech historian Oldřich Tůma (director of the Institute of Contemporary History, Academy of Sciences) stressed the consequences (deontological in particular) that historians could encounter with the opening of the Communist archives, and the possible political uses of history, thus initiating a wide-ranging and animated debate. The Czech sociologist Miloslav Petrusek, and the Hungarian politologist Peter Kende met in the analysis of their respective disciplines. They showed that sociology, like political science, had particularly been marked by the rupture that the imposition of Marxism-Leninism in the social sciences had signified in general. For Petrusek it is moreover here that the principal trauma of Czech sociology is found, in particular since 1970 and the policy of 'normalisation'. Nevertheless, he specified that the normalisation of sciences did not lead to the institutional disappearance of this discipline - in contrast to Peter Kende's report on political science - but to an impoverishment of the discipline through the ousting of the best sociologists. He mentioned the isolation of Czech sociology in both the Eastern and the Western countries, whereas Peter Kende underlined the way in which Western social sciences fed 'the intellectual challenge to communism during the two last decades of the regime of János Kádár'.

The situation of these two disciplines was thus distinct in 1990: Hungary could be characterised as having experienced a revival of political science, both from the point of view of teaching and research, while in the Czech lands institutional structures were preserved and the 'velvet revolution' prevented 'sociologists-normalisers from being traumatised'. Finally, the two speakers converged towards the idea that their disciplines treated the new social 'traumas' in the Czech case (unemployment, reduction of privileges for certain categories, particular use of privatisation, rising criminality and the appearance of new forms of social deviances), and the 'singularities of the Hungarian policy' (an ideological cleavage between a nationalism strong in discourse but intellectually weak and the current liberal-universalist dominating, strong abstentionism, the volatility of the electorate and governmental clientelism). The Slovak politologist Miroslav Kusý (Faculty of Letters of Komenský University in Bratislava) mentioned the delay of his discipline in this country and its re-depreciation, owing in particular to the fact that journalists are usurping the legitimacy of the politologist.

From a theoretical point of view, the period of post-communism did not bring about the creation of new paradigms or new schools of thought. On the other hand, it carried out a re-evaluation of those existing in the perspective of the processes of transformation or the absence of phenomena that were expected, such as the consolidation of 'new social movements' (Michel Wieviorka) and 'the emergence of a civil society' (Dominique Colas). The economist Bernard Chavance (University of Paris VII), and the geographer Marie-Claude Maurel (EHESS, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales) presented the two principal theoretical currents, which were mobilised in the analysis of the transformations post-socialists take into consideration in their subject of study. Their problems in common related to the manner of apprehending the legacies of the past. Marie-Claude Maurel concluded with the fact that 'the post-socialist transformation would be accompanied by a re-arrangement of the regional structure through the modification of relative positions'. According to Bernard Chavance, there was no uniform evolution of the economic situations. The economist criticised the doctrine of transition and its theory of convergence and indicated also some evolutionist approaches, which in his view seem to neglect the importance of 'futurity' i.e. the weight of the actors' anticipations in a context of 'systemic uncertainty' and their role in 'path shaping'.

Another issue came up in several contributions. This concerned the way of restoring at the same time the heterogeneity of the socialist past and its effects on the current period. The politologist Dominique Colas (IEP, Paris), the sociologist Michel Wieviorka (EHESS), and the demographer Alain Blum (EHESS-INED) dealt with this topic. Indeed, Dominique Colas recalled the way in which two contemporary intellectuals, the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski and the anthropologist Ernest Gellner, approached the Soviet-type system through the concept of 'civil society'. While for Kolakowski civil society relates to the part of society that

Marxist theory melted into the political society, thus providing totalitarianism with legitimation, for Gellner it indicates a specific type of society. Dominique Colas showed that for Gellner civil society was the type of society in which the economy is at the same time separate from the remainder of society but maintains a position of high priority, and in addition where coercion is practised by a Weberian type of state. It nonetheless seems to Dominique Colas that the post-communist situations are turning more to the opposition pointed out by the politologists Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, between the political civil society and the non-political civil society.

Michel Wieviorka, who attempted to draw up an assessment of the theories on the new social movements, beginning with the communist and post-communist experiments, also treated this articulation between the social and the political. He in fact defended the thesis of the attenuation of social movements following the end of communism as a result of the disappearance of a single political adversary. Focusing in particular on the Russian case, he presented the assumption of the 'rejection of any project of change through collective action', i.e. a kind of 'exhaustion of the political'. He believes that this phenomenon marks the failure of the theories of resource mobilisation whereby authors can link social and political spheres. In addition he underlined the limits of 'Tourainian sociology'. Alain Blum, while also analysing Russia, arrived at the 'significant synchronism in the Soviet space from the point of view of social dynamics', thus demonstrating the shift between Russia and Central and Eastern Europe. His approach, cutting across sociology and history, tends toward an understanding of how the 'ascribing identities', particularly according to the categories of Soviet administration, are integrated and re-evaluated in the construction of individual biographical identities. Distinct from statutes, positions or social classes, they in fact translate the heterogeneity of practices and trajectories that could exist under this type of system.

The conference allowed a connection to be made between different disciplines in the social sciences and a synthesis of the contributions to the understanding of post-communism. This prospect was also dealt with in the two round tables which began and ended the conference and which discussed, respectively, the creation of a European research space and the contribution of the research centres to training in the social sciences. The following individuals spoke about these topics: the geographer Violette Rey (École normale supérieure of Fontenay), the politologist Jacques Rupnik (CERI-Paris), Lenka Rovná (titular of the Jean Monnet Chair), Jean-Yves Potel, cultural adviser of the Embassy from France in Warsaw, previous and current doctoral students affiliated with various research centres (Catherine Perron, CEFRES, Dorota Dakowska, Centre Marc Bloch of Berlin, Jerôme Heurtaux, Atelier of Social Sciences of Warsaw, EHESS), the director of the Centre Marc Bloch of Berlin, Catherine Colliot-Thélène, the vice-rector of the College of Europe of Natolin, Piotr Nowinka-Konopka. Also contributing were individuals in charge of French institutions with which partnerships have been established: Christian Lequesne, director of CERI, and Gérard Wild, a researcher at CEPII (Centre d'études prospectives et d'informations internationales).

The conference also made it possible to draw up an assessment of the field of social sciences as it stands more than ten years after the fall of the Soviet-type systems. It gave rise to the idea that researchers in various disciplines confronted similar problems and had recourse to many common theoretical referents. It also indicated the interest in comparative settings and empirical research, in order to grasp the entire complexity of post-communism. Finally through this international conference, CEFRES demonstrated that it plays an experimental role in the area, 'synergising' with other centres. It contributes in particular to the co-operation between French researchers and researchers from other countries of the EU or applicant countries from the point of view of the establishment of a European research space.

Sandrine Devaux

Pierre Bourdieu: Sociologist of Dominance and of the Dominated

On the night of Wednesday January 23, 2002, sociology lost one of the living legends of sociological theory, professor at the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales and the Collège de France, Pierre Bourdieu. His death brought to a close four decades of scientific work during which Bourdieu authored or co-authored more than 40 monographs and countless articles and papers. His death also brought an end to the heated disputes, which had flared especially during the 1990s, concerning Bourdieu's opinions, and often also his person. Pierre Bourdieu was a prime example of a sociologist in action, a sociologist not limited to the pure observation and study of social reality but one actively involved in this reality. His interventions were based on his personal and political beliefs, as well as the results and conclusions of expert analyses.

Bourdieu's life is sometimes described as a journey 'from the periphery to the centre' (Šubrt 2000: 129). Born in the rural region of Béarn, he came to Paris to study at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, one of the most prestigious schools in France. He soon became aware of the difficulty of his position - he found himself in the midst of students from more educated families and with a higher social status, whom he later came to call the 'inheritors'. 'Inheritors' take a condescending view of the 'scholars' and make them feel they are somewhere they do not belong. Inspired by this experience, Bourdieu later developed his brilliant analysis of the French education system.

Instead of setting out along the traditional path of an academic, Bourdieu decided to continue his social studies in Algeria, where he embarked on an ethnological study of the Kabyl society. His observations led him to a critique of the ruling Lévi-Straussian approach in anthropology. Under the guidance of Raymond Aron he then turned to the sociological analysis of cultural practices and the education system. He later distanced himself from Aron, who at that time was already the director of the Center for European Sociology at the Ecole des hautes etudes en sciences sociales, and in 1975 established his own review *'Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales'*, his own publication collections ('Le sens commun' at Minuit, then 'Liber' at Seuil), and his own association for political activism ('Raisons d'agir'). In 1982 he became professor at the Collège de France and in 1993 received the CNRS gold medal, an award rarely bestowed on social scientists.

Bourdieu's 'grand theory', which was closely linked to empirical research, strives to answer almost all the key questions that were posed in sociology in the second half of the 20th century. The central motif of his work is the issue of social dominance: Bourdieu shows in what manner social relations are established based on the unequal distribution of economic, political and symbolic power. Related to this is the study of social reproduction, symbolic violence (in particular within the framework of the French education system), cultural practices, social classes and their strategies, and many other sociological issues.

In his analysis of power and dominance, Bourdieu places critical emphasis on the mechanism of legitimation. Actors involved in one activity clash in a struggle for scarce holdings in an imaginary space, which Bourdieu calls the 'social field', where the actors strive for a dominant position.

He says that the objective is not only to enforce obedience from other individuals or groups, or the acquisition and preservation of a dominant position, but also an attempt to redefine the core of the struggle, i.e. the values on which the legitimacy of dominance is based. More precisely, the struggle is between two segments of the ruling class, one of which has superior economic power and the other superior intellectual power; these two classes clash over the issue of whether greater value will be attributed to economic or to cultural capital. The violence through which power is exercised is not physical in nature but symbolic, invisible to the eyes of the dominated who often themselves actively participate in their own subjugation (Bourdieu 1980: 209-231).

In his 1998 work titled *La domination masculine*, Bourdieu points to the fact that there is a certain type of dominance which may be understood as a model or archetype of all other types: that of men over women. This dominance combines with other types of dominance and rein-

forces them. Taking this type of dominance as an example, it is possible to show sociologically the workings of biologisation and the incorporation of this dominance, whereby the appearance of the naturalness of such dominance is constructed. "The power of the masculine order is clear from the fact that it does not need any justification: the androcentric perception of the world is imposed as neutral and does not require any legitimizing discourses" (Bourdieu 1998:15). This dominance also makes it clear how symbolic violence gradually forces the dominated to accept their subjugation. Dominance is related to forgetting the past, giving it the appearance of a universal truth - thus inequality becomes permanent and natural. It becomes embedded in the spirit and in the body, and it continually reinforces itself.

Bourdieu defines social relations as a struggle between actors, which leads to an accumulation of a certain type of capital; in this struggle, individual actors are motivated by unconscious strategies of profit maximisation. With respect to the economic vocabulary preferred by Bourdieu, the question arises as to what is the role of Marx's theory in Bourdieu's thought. Bourdieu himself does not reject the 'Marxist' label. However, he surpasses Marx in that he attempts to apply the logic of economy to symbolic property: the power of one over the other does not necessarily have to be mediated through wealth or work, as Marx believed, but is often exercised in a different manner - for example, by imposing certain types of concept and terminology schemes. Correspondingly, Bourdieu defines capital differently than Marx. At first Bourdieu identified only economic capital and symbolic capital; later, he reached the conclusion that there were as many types of capital as there were 'fields' (Bourdieu 1980:191-207), where actors clash in a struggle for scarce holdings and legitimacy.

It is precisely Bourdieu's thesis on the conversion of types of capital that penetrated the world of sociology most and which inspired contemporary Czech sociology - it may be used to explain the change from a socialist to a capitalist society. Bourdieu studied the issue of the reconversion of types of capital, especially in connection with the analysis of social changes, which have resulted in the transfer of importance from economic capital to cultural and educational capital. Bourdieu's former student, François de Singly, began with the conclusion Bourdieu reached while studying the Kabyl society and the agricultural society in Béarn (Bourdieu 1980: 249-333): in all societies the family fulfills its basic function, which is the transfer of capital from one generation to another with the goal of preserving or advancing the position of the family as a whole. Thus, the family participates in social reproduction. During the course of history, this function of the family has not changed; what has changed is the character of the transferred capital. In view of the fact that contemporary societies are no longer as dependent on land and inherited property, they strive to convert economic capital into other types of capital, particularly educational capital (De Singly 1993:21-26).

With respect to the social transformation at the beginning of the 1990s, a different type of reconversion of capital was involved. Bourdieu, in fact, did not pay much attention to the analysis of the situation in Eastern European post-socialist countries, and he only mentioned it briefly in a lecture presented on October 25, 1989 in East Berlin (Bourdieu 1998). He questioned whether his theory of capital and social classes may also be used for an analysis of Eastern Germany, and pointed to the main difference between the Western capitalist and Soviet socialist regimes. This difference lies in the fact that here "economic capital - private ownership of production tools - was *officially* (and to a large extent also in reality) outside the game". This led to the fact that other types of capital grew in importance: cultural capital, and, in particular, 'the specific political capital of the Soviet type' which instituted a new type of differentiation and in some ways enabled those who exercised it to privately own assets and public services. "The social capital of the political type, acquired through trade unions and party apparatuses and handed over through a network of family relations, leads to the creation of real political dynasties", says Bourdieu (Bourdieu 1994:33-34).

According to Ivo Možný's essay from *Why So Easily...* (Možný 1991), in some ways Czech society functioned as a pre-capitalist society during the communist regime. Just as in the Kabyl society, money played a negligible role, the state

was weak, laws did not apply to everyone equally, and social position was based on ritualised prestige, i.e. symbolic capital. To a large extent everyday life was ritualised and the social position of the parties involved was continually confirmed through rituals. Relationships of dominance had to be continually produced through and with the help of interactions between individuals. This system, archaic and too expensive, could no longer fulfill its basic function and sooner or later a change had to occur. The members of the ruling class were facing the problem of how to retain their social and economic position during the transition period, i.e. how to convert their political and social capital into capital whose value was less unstable - economic capital. According to Možný, this demanded a renewal of the institution of private property and in particular an increased transparency of ownership relationships with the objective of making these relationships controllable. It was also necessary to change the mode of domination, which involved a transfer from symbolic dominance to subtle economic dominance, also in the interest of the further self-reproduction of the system (Možný 1991:61-68).

In their book, *La grande conversion*, Georges Mink and Jean-Charles Szurek set out from Bourdieu's concept of capital conversion (Mink and Szurek 1999). They analysed the process whereby members of the Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian communist *nomenklatura* managed, in the course of the social transformation after 1989, to ensure and retain high political and economic positions, i.e. they managed to carry out a successful political and economic conversion and finally the conversion of historical memory - to create a new acceptable interpretation of their own communist past.

It remains a fact that Bourdieu's primary interest is not the analysis of social change. The central theme of his sociology is social reproduction. Bourdieu's political activity clearly shows that the analysis of reproduction mechanisms in a society does not necessarily lead to the resignation of any attempt to change the system. On the contrary, theory should help propose and implement forms of social organisation and activity which would be capable of shaking up the institutions that participate in the reproduction of the system (Bourdieu 2000a: 7-8). Bourdieu's theoretical system allows us to understand and explain various sociological problems and issues - from social stratification, through the education system, to the analysis of artistic production. "Bourdieu's work, which has won international acclaim and which warrants international discussion, marked the birth of a critical sociological school, an academic involvement which has recently been accompanied with growing involvement in social movements", wrote *Le Monde* in reaction to Bourdieu's death (Ferenczi, 2002).

Testimony to the significance of the 'Bourdieu phenomenon' in France may also be found in the fact that French cinemas - in reaction to Bourdieu's death - began showing the documentary film dedicated to his sociology, *Sociologie comme un sport de combat*, during prime showtimes. The strongest moments of the film are those that show Bourdieu as a politically involved intellectual who strives to contribute to alleviating the 'misery of the world' with his ideas. His public activities often made the French forget that Bourdieu, pejoratively dubbed the new 'guru' of the radical left, was also a sociologist and the author of many works, in which he offered a dazzling and well-grounded analysis of the operations of society. Bourdieu's star first came to prominence in the media and the political scene during the 1995 strikes. After that he took part in many public debates and his popularity soared. His polemic essays as well as those of his disciples were met with great acclaim (e.g. *Sur la télévision* or *Contre-feux*).

The significance of Bourdieu's legacy is indisputable. The questions he asked are likely to remain topical for all who consider themselves intellectuals, regardless of how they may answer these questions: "I think that the efforts to launch a European social movement are today still quite uncertain. Which leads me to the following question: what can we, intellectuals, do to contribute to this movement, which seems necessary to me in view of the fact that - contrary to the neo-liberal conviction - all social gains have been achieved through struggles and clashes. If we want to have a 'social Europe', as is often said, we have to have a European social movement. But I think - I have this feeling - that intellectuals bear the basic responsibility for creating such a movement because the power of the dominant group is not only economic but also intellectual, and depends on faith and per-

suasion. And therefore I believe that it is necessary to 'open one's mouth' and try to restore utopia (...)" (*Pierre Bourdieu et Günter Grass - la tradition „d'ouvrir sa queule"*, 1999).

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From Economic Planning to 'Historical Social Science': Professor Jaroslav Krejčí at 85

Jaroslav Krejčí, professor emeritus at Lancaster University, Great Britain, and director of the Centre for Research into Socio-Cultural Pluralism of the Academy of Sciences in Prague, has recently - in full health, vitality and scientific activiteness - reached the age of 85. He studied law and economics in Prague and was one among those who prepared the first plans of economic development of the Czechoslovak Republic after World War II. His orientation toward the modern schools in economy was the most important grounds for his inprisonment by the communist régime in the 1950s. After his release at the beginning of the 1960s he quite unexpectedly wrote two interesting studies devoted to the sociological theory of revolutions, which were published in the Czech Sociological Journal. After the defeat of the Prague Spring through Soviet intervention, he withdrew into exile and spent decades in research and teaching at Lancaster University. During this time and over the course of the 1990s, when he worked by turns in Great Britain and the Czech Lands, he continued along with other activities in sociological research and publishing. In the early 1960s he wrote a book on social stratification in Czechoslovakia, in the early 1970s he wrote another analysing social structure in divided Germany. He was also the author of a paper on sociology and the future (in which he invokes the spirit of the complexity and synthesism of the work of J. M. Keynes), and another on Czech elites. He also co-operated on several projects with Czech sociologists, and on a book about Czechoslovakia 1919-1992 as a laboratory of social change. This is the reason why this jubilee year is being commemorated not only by Czech economists but also by the sociological community.

During the past decade of his scientific work, professor Krejčí wrote a series of books and papers devoted to the topics of great revolutions compared, societies in global perspective, Asian civilisations, the human predicament, human rights and responsibilities, economic developments and ethno-politics in the Czech lands and Slovakia, and some studies devoted to the methodology of the social and human sciences.

An as yet incomplete overview of Krejčí's writings characterises him first as an efficient scholar, determined under any circumstances to continue work begun with only one end in sight: to enrich the available knowledge concerning human society, with special regard to his country of origin. It is also clear that he is a bright thinker, capable of transfering theoretical and methodological knowledge and skills from one scientific branch and specialisation to others. Partly compelled by the hard conditions of his life, but mainly owing to his inclination towards polyhistorism and to the abilities mentioned

here, he became one of the rare scholars to aim at and really formulate senseful syntheses of knowledge accumulated in a series of scientific branches, such as the economy, statistics, demography, ethnology and ethno-politics, historiography, cultural anthropology, religionistics, structural and historical sociology, ethics and law, political science and analyses, and social philosophy. In his works he refuses all kinds of onesided determinisms without abandoning the strenuous endeavour to learn the essential characteristics of social orders and the regularities of the historical dynamics of individual societies, as well those of human evolution as a whole. He belongs to the not too large group of economists, sociologists, historians and social philosophers who are at least able to address and understand one another and to assist in the enrichment of common knowledge in the social sciences and humanities as a whole. Krejčí's syntheses - mainly the sociological and historical ones - are still being developed, their author coming up with continously new incentives, aiming recently at the ideal of 'historical social science'. His work certainly cannot be avoided by the emerging generations of scientists, though the individual results of this endeavour can of course become a subject of dicussion and lead to possible criticism of individual hypotheses.

Professor Krejčí's first specialisation was that of an economist and statistician, engaged in economic planning. For me as a sociologist, the mystery of his relatively sudden turn to sociology was always of great interest, and it obviously opened the way for his subsequent work in other specialisations, as well as his later work on an elaborated interdiciplinary orientation. This mystery was revealed by one of his former students, now professor emeritus of economy, Jiří Vysušil, at a seminar devoted to the jubilee of Jaroslav Krejčí in April 2001 in Prague. Professor Vysušil saved his teacher's notes, recorded in prison in the form of his own manual transcription (a copy of Krejčí's manuscript). One of the main parts of these notes represents the fruits of Krejčí's scrutinising and critical study of international sociology. From the piece of writing titled 'Introduction to the Sociological Study of Social Change', one learns that the list of authors studied at that time by the political prisoner, mainly in the 1950s, includes the following names: Comte, Condorcet, Durkheim, Espinas, Ginsberg, Gurvitch, Hegel, Kaplan, Laswel, Le Bon, Mannheim, Marx, Merton, Ogburn, Pareto, Parsons, Riesman, Sorokin, Spencer, Schumpeter, Tönnies, Toynbee, M. Weber, von Wiese, and others. This is a remarkable selection of sociological and social philosophical works amidst the conditions of that time in Czechoslovakia, and many of them were clearly studied from publications in the original languages! All this means that the first factor which assisted in turning an economist toward sociology was serious erudition in sociological, socio-philosophical and historical literature on social change.

However, his strong interest in neighbouring fields, which is far from common among specialists in economy, necessarily had a powerful subjective motivation. In Vysušil's copy one can find in between the manuscript mentioned above ('Introduction ...') and the other, preceding, original manuscript, called 'The Frame of Macrosociology' (incidentally full of historical comments and ammendements, including also the first outlines of historical schemes of the Great French and the Czech Hussite revolutions), dated 1954-1960, three pages with the inscription 'The Formalisation of the Main Economic Relations'.

This short text represents an original analysis of the general concepts of gross national product and its increase over time, national wealth, the productivity of labour, and all factors influencing their developments. In this analysis one can find coefficients such as the 'non-effective part of national wealth', 'the advance of price changes over wage changes', and the 'increase of the concentration of capital'. At that time these could have been considered immeasurable. Another group of coefficients represent those cosidered as being not only immeasurable, but at the same time as exceeding the purely economic horizon of thought. These include 'fertility and access to natural resources', 'conjunctural expectations', and 'autonomous decisions of the public hand'. Though now, after more than forty years of experience with both a state-socialist and a modern market economy, the list of items belonging particularly to the second group could be easily multiplied and some new ways of measuring certain variables have been found, the conclusion made then by the author of the

manuscript is still quite clear and persuasive. Professor Krejčí added to his formalisation esquise the following words:

'The presence of the immeasurable (partly meta-economic) coefficients shows the limits of quantitative (and, eventually, pure economic) analysis as such.'

Professor Vysušil quite correctly deduced from this remark that the existence of meta- or extra-economic factors influencing what seem to be merely pure economic variables was one of the most persuasive reasons for the shift of a rationally thinking economist and statistician, with experience in practical planning, in the direction of sociological factors and, finally, to sociological and other societal phenomena in general. Jaroslav Krejčí, who was present at the seminar convened in his honour by the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University and Hlávka Foundation in Prague was at first slightly surprised by Vysušil's conclusion. However, after only short hesitation, he agreed with the interpretation of the shift in his thought - at least partially resulting from his economic analyses - which had occurred several decades before his anniversary.

Both factors mentioned here - the study of kindred disciplines together with the statement of the lack of information resulting from the limited possibilities of the economy - lay behind Professor Krejčí's decision to enter the field of sociology and, further on, to continue on the way to some kind of inter-disciplinarity. These kinds of developments occur of course at times among other scholars, both in the natural sciences and in the social sciences and humanities. This was the case of Krejčí's favourites, Keynes and Toynbee, or of my own favorite, Max Weber. However, in Czech scientific tradition this kind of tresspassing the 'forbidden' bounderies that separate academic branches does not happen too often. Moreover, it seems to be of great significance for the present study of the problems of the social transformation and the modernisation of post-socialist societies. The example of Jaroslav Krejčí could therefore represent a useful challenge to those middle-aged scientists who are already attaining the peak of their careers in their specialisations and are ready to broaden their horizons, and in this way reach a more complex and consequently more profound knowledge of contemporary life in society.

Pavel Machonin

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