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INFORMATION

APPENDIX

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SS 04:10
Hierarchy as the Strength and Weakness of Communist Rule IV: A Volume of Papers from the Seminar Held in Prague on September 11-12, 2003

Martin Hájek (ed.)

This volume of Sociological Studies is comprised of the papers that were presented at the seminar 'Hierarchy as the Strength and Weakness of Communist Rule', which was held on 11-12 September 2003 at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague. The general purpose of the seminar was to reveal and interpret, in so far as possible without misrepresentation or bias, the procedures on which the communist rule of society was based at the end of the 1980s. The papers delivered at the seminar and presented here in this volume can be divided into three thematic groups. The first group is made up of investigations into the methods and strategies of communist rule in general. This refers mainly to the legal framework of this rule, where it fits in among modern forms of government, which only with difficulty separate the political from the economic, and which often feature all-encompassing planning ambitions. This group of papers also covers the issue of the character of the rules and orders in 'really existing' socialism. The second group of papers is devoted to analysing the form of rule at the highest level, the district level, and the local level. The final and concluding section contains one paper, which deals with the subject of communist rule and individual and collective memory.

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Thematic Issue

Legislatures and Representation in Central and Eastern Europe

Guest Editors

Zdenka Mansfeldová, Lukáš Linek, and Petra Rakušanová

Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague

2005

Editorial

This thematic issue of the *Czech Sociological Review* focuses on legislatures and representation in Central and Eastern Europe, where democratic parliaments have now been functioning for almost fifteen years. There is a growing amount of literature on CEE parliaments, ranging from country studies to inter-country comparisons, and from institutional descriptions of individual legislatures to analyses of more specific features of CEE legislatures. Recent scholarship on CEE parliaments has been based on accounts of the post-communist transition and consolidation, and some say that CEE parliaments are now beyond transition. Current parliamentary research in the CEE region should therefore now more resemble that of Western Europe and should focus on typical issues in this field such as the role of committees, party discipline, electoral links or relations to interest groups and the executive. There have also been many empirical research projects on CEE parliaments employing either surveys of MPs or detailed analysis of activities of legislatures and MPs recruitment.

In addition to the article summarising the basic features of CEE parliaments and describing the most important changes that have accompanied the consolidation of parliaments in transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe since the start of the 1990s, and the article focusing on an analysis of the relationship between the legislative and the executive power in the Czech Republic, in this issue we have decided to concentrate on topics of *representation*. Representation is a traditional topic in the body of literature on Western parliaments but has been largely neglected by contemporary scholars of CEE parliaments, even though it relates to the core role of parliaments as places of representation and to the role of MPs as the people's representatives. We are interested in addressing a fundamental question that, even after decades of research and theoretical reflections, remains unchanged: whom do MPs represent? Some would answer that MPs represent the voters, either as a median, mean or something else expressed in voter preferences. Or at least this assumption is taken as the starting point of the analysis. This perspective emphasises the mass-elite linkage, where voters are the principals and the representative relationship is studied as a problem of either representation or accountability. Another school of thought notes that MPs have more principals than voters and analyses the relationship of MPs to party activists, who have a strong say in the reselection process, and the relationship to interest groups, which evaluate the quality of MPs' proposals and behaviour in different policy areas. The topic of *representation* in this issue encompasses more than just the question of whom MPs represent and also looks at the circumstances of representations.

The Sociology of Politics Department at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic has been studying and analysing parliaments in general and the Czech parliament in particular since the start of the 1990s. In 2000–2004 the department's researchers set up the *Documentary Centre for Research*

on Central European Parliaments – Parliamentary DICe (based on a research project supported by grant no. S7028003 from the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), the objective of which was to create an information database on the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe. Towards the conclusion of the project the research team reached the opinion that it was time to summarise and evaluate the fifteen years of research on parliaments conducted at the Institute of Sociology and other academic institutions in CEE countries, and establish research priorities for the future, in the context of EU accession and changes in the parliamentary agenda. The outcome of this endeavour is this thematic issue on legislatures and representation in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to the articles focusing on CEE parliaments the issue also contains an article on the German Bundestag, looking at the similarities and differences between East and West German MPs. Although German MPs in the new federal states constitute an 'exceptional case' in comparison with their colleagues from Central and Eastern Europe, given that they were faced with established structures and received enormous institutional support, they nonetheless for us represent a unique opportunity to study the influence of the transfer of institutions and transformation paths on the behaviour and attitudes of MPs.

This issue also contains a section with information on the numerous studies that have been conducted on the Parliament of the Czech Republic during the past fifteen years and particularly information on the *EurElite* project on European parliamentary elites, which is designed to make a comparative study of the similarities and differences between the personal characteristics and patterns of recruitment and careers among European representative elites and to create a database of this information as a research resource.

Editors
Zdenka Mansfeldová
Lukáš Linek
Petra Rakušanová

English Editions of Sociologické studie/Sociological Studies 2005

SS 05:1
Measuring Value Orientations with the Use of S.H. Schwartz's Value Portraits

Blanka Řeháková

The study acquaints readers with two methods of measuring value orientations developed by S.H. Schwartz. Attention is focused especially on the Portrait Values Questionnaire that was used in the European Social Survey in 2002 and 2004. The analysis in the study uses ESS 2002 data sets from ten selected countries (the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland) and creates four higher order value types (conservation, openness to change, self-transcendence, self-enhancement). It is then shown how strongly these types are represented in each of the countries included in the analysis and how the percentages of represented types change in relation to sex, age, education, and religiosity. For the Czech Republic the odds of each of the types are modelled in relation to age, education, and religiosity.

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Parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe: Changing Legislative Institutions*

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Abstract. Parliaments emerged as one of the key political institutions in the post-communist transition. Endowed with the significant power they acquired under the old communist constitutions, they were assigned the task of drafting and ratifying the new democratic constitutions in the transition period. Like most other institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, parliaments have undergone important changes in terms of how they function and in relation to their external environment. This article provides an introductory overview of the changing nature of parliaments in the region, focusing on two important areas of legislative studies. The first part of the article looks at the role of parliaments in representation. The second part offers several generalisations about the relationship between parliaments and their respective executive branches. By reviewing these two aspects of legislative process, some insights are also provided into the changing internal workings and procedures of CEE parliaments.
Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, 2005, Vol. 41, No. 3: 361–373

Introduction

Modern democracies are unthinkable without parliaments. Parliament provides the institutional platform for the interaction of intermediary agencies: the parties, interest groups, or social movements that link them to society. Parliament also links society with other democratic institutions, the executive, judiciary or state bureaucracy. In that sense, parliament is the key structure of representation. In every political system the parliament encompasses a wide range of institutions, rules and procedures, and political organisations, and as such it can be viewed as the focal point around which revolve all the crucial questions of political style, legitimacy and democratic accountability. In addition, parliament is multifunctional: it legislates (hence the frequently used reference to 'the legislature'), i.e. it makes laws. However, it is also the place where political elites are trained and socialised, where diverse

* This article draws on an earlier chapter by the author on post-communist parliaments, published in White, Batt and Lewis [see Kopecký 2003]. The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their comments.

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social groups and nationalities of one state are integrated, where national administration is subjected to an oversight, and where the interests of society interests, and frequently even public policies, are articulated.

The parliaments in communist Eastern Europe existed more or less as rubber-stamping bodies. Although no Eastern European communist regime abandoned its parliament, it was so subordinated to the Communist Party apparatus that particularly its legislative activities and oversight functions were minimal, at least until the 1980s, when communist leaderships throughout the region began to lose their grip on society [see Nelson and White 1982]. The wave of political change that swept across Eastern Europe in the early 1990s propelled parliaments almost overnight from institutions with very limited autonomy in decision-making into bodies that at least initially became one of the key political players in each country. There were at least two reasons for the pivotal role parliaments acquired. First, parliaments were handed the task of drafting and ratifying the new democratic constitutions. This presented them with an opportunity to cement a strong position for themselves within the emerging political system. Second, parliaments were endowed with significant powers from the start of the transition, as the previous communist constitutions had made parliaments powerful institutions (at least on paper), and it was these same constitutions that established the rules of the game under which the new parliaments began operating in the post-communist era.

However, like most other institutions in the region, parliaments have undergone numerous changes, both in their internal functioning and in relation to their external environment. They are clearly not the same institutions they were during and immediately after the uncertain and extraordinary period of transition to democracy (i.e. from 1989 to the mid-1990s). This article provides an introductory overview of the changing nature of parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe[1] (CEE), focusing on two important areas of legislative studies. The first part of the article provides a look at the role of parliaments in representation, while the second part presents several generalisations concerning the relationship between parliament and the executive branch. By reviewing these two aspects of legislative process the final aim is to provide some insights into the changing internal workings and procedures of CEE parliaments. It should be noted that in this article the similarities between CEE parliaments are emphasised rather their differences. This of course does not mean that there are no differences. CEE parliaments have always differed in many institutional and behavioural aspects and will continue to do so. However, by placing emphasis on similarities, the aim is to highlight the increasing degree of convergence between CEE parliaments and the parliaments in established (Western European) democracies.

[1] Central and Eastern Europe refers here to all eight new EU member states among the post-communist countries, plus the three Balkan EU-candidate states; e.g. Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. It thus excludes Russia and most other former Soviet Republics, and several of the Balkan countries.

Parliaments and representation

Parliaments are the symbols of representation, perhaps more so than anything else. Sometimes they are deliberately set up in such a way as to reflect a society's socio-cultural diversity. The communist legislatures tried to ensure the equal representation of women, peasants, workers, and national minorities, etc., and created parliaments that were supposed to be more or less a mirror of their respective societies. In most contemporary European democracies, it is political parties that are the key agents of representation. Parties select and campaign on behalf of and provide lists of representatives, who when elected sit in parliament and, if in control of a majority, also form the government. This is a party government model of representation, in which voters simply delegate their power to the political parties that best represent their political preferences. However, links between parliaments and the electorate can also exist, especially in between the elections, through various forms of constituency representation, wherein individual MPs promote the interests of particular geographical areas, sectors of society, or even individual constituents.

These different models of representation are not mutually exclusive, and in most political systems they to a large extent co-exist [see Andeweg and Thomassen 2003]. There is usually a set of informal practices that determine which particular form of representation dominates, or what happens if conflicts between various forms of representation arise; for example, if an individual MP is caught between the interests of his or her constituents on the one hand and those of the government on the other. Patterns of representation also depend on a range of formal political institutions, most importantly the kind of electoral system and the nature of political parties and party systems. In this the CEE parliaments are no exception: the development of their links to the electorate has been greatly influenced by the nature of post-communist parties, elections and electoral systems. It has also been greatly affected by the particular structure of parliamentary membership.

Parties and elections

Organised political parties emerged relatively slowly in post-communist CEE. Owing in part to the strong anti-party sentiments among both the population and the new political leaders [see Lewis 2000] and in part to the particularly suppressive nature of the communist regimes, the early transition period was dominated by broadly based anti-communist movements and umbrella organisations, such as Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence in former Czechoslovakia, the National Salvation Front in Romania, Sajudis in Lithuania, and Demos in Slovenia. With a few exceptions, like Bulgaria, it was these movements that also won the first freely contested parliamentary elections.

Parties began to emerge only as these broad movements started to break up in parliament during their first term in office. In this sense, parliaments performed one very important function in the early stages of post-communist politics: they became

the arenas in which new political alliances were forged and new political parties were established. Given that most of the newly established parties were formed from above and consequently lacked solid links with society on the whole, their survival would have been inconceivable without the institutional, logistical and often also financial support that was provided to them by parliaments.

However, the rapid and somewhat disorderly process of party formation had negative consequences for the links between parliament and the electorate. Many political parties disappeared during the first parliamentary term and other parties were formed instead. For example, in contrast to the initial eight parliamentary parties that were in the Federal Assembly in the former Czechoslovak Federal parliament in 1990, there were no fewer than sixteen parliamentary parties by the end of 1991. In Slovakia, eighteen parties and coalitions registered for the elections in 1994 but in fact represented 31 parties and movements. In addition, the composition of parliamentary parties (clubs) frequently changed: members either switched to another parliamentary group or became independent. In Slovakia, for example, 44 parliamentary seats (out of 150) shifted from one parliamentary party to another between the elections of 1990 and 1992; between the 1992 and 1994 elections 28 seats shifted from one party to another [Malová and Krause 2000]. The parties themselves often fractured into several sub-groupings, or disappeared altogether [Gillespie et al. 1995; Kask 1996].

The fragmentation of parties and the party system caused a good deal of confusion among voters and effectively prevented the formation of stable ties between the representatives and the represented. However, it also affected the internal functioning of parliaments because in the wake of such instability parliamentary party leaders had to struggle to impose the party line on parliamentary party members. Consequently, individual MPs introduced their own legislation, often against the wishes of their party or the government coalition they represented, more frequently than they tend to in the established parliaments of Western Europe.

The links between parliament and the electorate are also shaped by the electoral system. The system of proportional representation (PR) based on party lists combined with large constituencies generally favours representation by parties rather than the emergence of strong links between individual MPs and their constituencies. In contrast, the majority system with single-member districts, such as the British first-past-the post, is more favourable to the formation of such links. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have various electoral systems, but most have adopted, for elections to the lower house, either a PR electoral system (e.g. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic) or a mixed electoral system, where a part of the house is elected on the basis of a PR system and a part in single-member constituencies (e.g. Hungary, Lithuania).

However, the key problem with electoral systems in the region has always been the relatively frequent changes they have experienced. Manipulation of the electoral system has been most visible in connection with establishing the legal thresholds for entering parliament [see Shevtsova 1999]. For example, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland

all raised these barriers during the 1990s in order to reduce the number of parties in parliament. The Czech Republic has done so for coalitions of parties. The result of these changes has been a reduction in the number of (parliamentary) parties, which is certainly a positive development given the scale of party fragmentation that existed in some countries, such as Poland. However, other effects of this electoral engineering are somewhat more questionable, for example, the large proportion of votes 'wasted' on the small parties that did not make it into parliament. Most importantly, frequent tinkering with the electoral rules, for instance changing the size of electoral districts, or making changes in how preferential votes count, has also made it difficult for MPs to form links between themselves and their local constituencies.

Nevertheless, certain patterns are now emerging across the region as parties and party systems have relatively stabilised and as the institutional framework of the new democracies has become more and more settled. Parliamentarians are now primarily anchored in their political parties, not least because MPs now owe their career to the party rather than to their own personal qualities and personalities. Voters also note vote primarily for a political party rather than a particular individual. Parties are therefore slowly emerging as the key agencies of representation, as they are in most countries in Western Europe. Although the various forms of constituency representation tend to be relatively underdeveloped in the region, research in this area also suggests that some form of territorial and sectoral representation is becoming part of MPs' working routines, for example, in Slovakia [Malová and Siváková 1996] and Poland [van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 2000] and other countries that use the mixed electoral systems [see Birch 2001].

Members

Many of the deputies that were in the first post-communist parliaments in CEE came from the ranks of the opposition movements that existed in the region. In some parliaments these movements won a majority after the first free elections (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Poland), in other parliaments it was the (ex-)communist parties that dominated (e.g. Bulgaria). The opposition movements themselves were largely composed of intellectual elites, independent professionals and artists, who had constituted the backbone of anti-communist dissent. As a result, the early parliaments, especially those in which the opposition was victorious, managed to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the population, as former dissidents replaced the communist-era deputies and apparatchiks. In some cases, like in the former Czechoslovakia, the replacement process actually occurred before the first democratic elections, as a result of agreements between the outgoing communist regime and the opposition during round table negotiations after the Velvet Revolution. The Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National Councils purged themselves, and between one-third and one-half of the MPs in the federal and national councils were replaced by candidates supported by the anti-communist opposition.

However, the gains in terms of democratic legitimacy were offset by the inexperience of these new members in operating in a large organisation. Moreover, former dissidents were elected alongside a sizeable group of prominent actors and musicians, and their presence lent the electoral lists of newly formed and largely unknown parties extra visibility and popularity. Although dissidents and artists often displayed convincing rhetorical skill in parliamentary debates, they nonetheless had poor organisational skills, and the loyalty they had to organisations like parliamentary parties or parliamentary committees was weak. Ironically, it was the MPs of the (ex-)communist parties that often turned out to be the more effective parliamentarians, as they had already learned the necessary skills of negotiation, deal-making and constituency representation under the previous regime.

Consequently, the composition of the first democratic parliaments partly contributed to the comparatively high turnover of MPs that has occurred since then. Each successive parliament in the region has been largely comprised of different MPs, which undermines the ability of MPs over the long term to specialise in specific areas or issues and hinders legislative continuity and stability. Many of the former dissidents and the majority of artists did not view their position as MPs in terms of a life-long career, and they consequently did not even seek re-election. Moreover, the organisational instability of political parties and the relatively high level of electoral volatility has meant that incumbency rates among the CEE parliamentarians have remained relatively low, though perhaps not as low as in the early years of post-communist transformation.

For the most part there are no quotas pertaining to the representation of particular sectors of society in the new parliaments of the region. There are, however, several exceptions, as Poland, Hungary and Romania have introduced measures aimed at either guaranteeing or encouraging the representation of their ethnic minority groups [see Juberías 1998]. In comparison with the communist period the representation of women has suffered, but the number of female MPs in parliament is not uniformly low throughout all the CEE countries when compared to the European average. In June 2002, in the countries of Europe, including the Scandinavian states, the average percentage of women in both houses of parliament was 16.7% (see *www.ipu.org*). In the CEE countries, also in June 2002, this figure was exceeded significantly by Bulgaria (26.25%), Poland (21.62%) and Croatia (20.53%), and matched by both Latvia (17%) and Estonia (17.82%). However, both Hungary (9.07%) and Lithuania (10.64%) were well below the European average.

In CEE countries generally the position of MP is acquiring the attributes of political professionalism. The shift towards professional MPs and politicians has been furthered by significant increases in the salaries of MPs, the introduction of travel and accommodation allowances, and by a general improvement in their working conditions, for instance, with the creation of new parliamentary buildings. Croatia is a good example of dramatic developments, as the position of MP was given professional full-time status, accompanied by a full salary, in 1992, shortly before the elections to the second post-communist parliament. Until then, MPs had only been entitled to per diem payments and other small reimbursements of costs. These

changes mean that being an MP is now a lucrative job, which makes parliamentarians more dependent on their party organisations and also less likely to defect from the party or even to vote against it. In addition, professionalism empowers parliamentarians in the region to perform their representative duties on a more consistent and solid basis. It improves the conditions for serving both the sectarian interests of various social, religious, professional and sectoral organisations, and the territorial interests of an MP's constituency.

Finally, the institutional context in which individual MPs operate has been consolidated and is now fixed. It is more difficult now for an MP to leave a party and/or to set up a completely new party. In Hungary, for example, the number of MPs required to form a parliamentary party and thus also to receive a financial subsidy and other administrative support from the parliamentary budget was raised from ten to fifteen in recent years [Ilonszki 2000]. Similar measures have been introduced in the Czech Republic, where parliamentary parties newly formed during the legislative term do not moreover receive any financial subsidy from the parliamentary budget [Kopecký 2001]. In the Polish Sejm – the parliament perhaps most notorious for party fragmentation – the minimum number of MPs required to form a parliamentary party (*klub*) has also been increased, from the initial three to fifteen. It was in Poland also that during the second legislative term several MPs from every parliamentary party but one were expelled for breaking with voting discipline [van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 2000]. Indeed, expulsions of MPs have occurred in all countries in the region, and this indicates that parliamentary parties and their leaderships have obtained at least some leverage to control the behaviour of their members. The picture of flux and instability that dominated in most accounts of the first democratic parliaments in the region [e.g. Remington 1994; Ágh 1994; Longley and Zajc 1998] has now given way to accounts that stress the emergence of distinct parliamentary cultures, settled institutional structures and established parliamentary routines.

Executive-legislative relations

As in the relationship between parliament and the electorate, formal rules largely shape the development of executive-legislative relations. Interestingly, the dominant model of executive-legislative relations in the CEE region is the parliamentary system of government with a weak formal president (head of state) and a government that is dependent on legislative confidence. This development is opposite that in most Latin American countries and many of the post-Soviet republics. Indeed, in the CEE context Romania is an exception as a country with a semi-presidential system of government, in which the head of state possesses significant powers vis-à-vis both the government and parliament. Several other countries in the region, like Poland and Croatia, also initially adopted a semi-presidential system, modelled on the French Fifth Republic, but eventually introduced constitutional reforms (Poland in 1997 and Croatia in 2000) to create a parliamentary system of government.

It can generally be claimed that CEE parliaments enjoyed significant advantages over their respective governments in the early years of transition. This made legislatures appear stronger and more powerful in the matrix of executive-legislative relations than the legislatures of the established parliamentary democracies of Western Europe were. First, the parties that formed governing coalitions in the region were seldom able to achieve or impose party loyalty among their MPs. In addition, owing to strong political polarisation, coalition partners often quarrelled with each other, sometimes to such an extent that part of the government voted with the opposition in parliament. In some countries, such as the Czech Republic (to 1996) or Hungary, this did not lead to any significant governmental instability, but perhaps only because the parties in the opposition suffered even more from splits and flux than the parties in the government. However, in countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Poland, during the first post-communist decade the governments lasted on average less than one year, a figure well below the European average of 1.9 years [Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2001].

Second, the frequent domestic conflicts between the governments (prime ministers) and presidents in the CEE countries undermined executive cohesion. The highly charged relationship between the former Polish president Lech Walesa and several of the Polish governments between 1990 and 1995 is a good example [see van der Meer Krok-Paskowska 2000]. Arguably, these conflicts sent the Polish political elite back to the drawing board to alter the 'Little Constitution' so as to substantially curb the powers of the president. Disagreements over political issues, personnel questions and executive powers were also behind the destabilising conflicts that existed between, respectively, presidents and prime ministers Zhelev and Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Illiescu and Roman in Romania, and Göncz and Antall in Hungary during the first half of the 1990s [e.g. Baylis 1996]. The conflict between the former president Kováč and the former prime minister Mečiar in Slovakia between 1994 and 1998 led not only to changes in the constitutional framework, but even resulted in the government being implicated in the kidnapping of president's son [Kopecký 2001]. Parliaments of course benefited most from these conflicts, because in the absence of cohesive executive leadership they were less vulnerable to demands to cede powers to either presidents or governments.

Third, largely as a result of the communist legacy, the executive was not in a position to exercise effective authority in the political system [Goetz and Wollmann 2001]. The communist regimes established or often just extended the tradition of having a strong executive, with power concentrated in the hands of a small ruling elite. However, they also created (or continued) a system of government that comprised a massive network of bureaucracies, agencies and planning bureaus. Under communism, the chief task of the central bodies of government was to implement and administer policies that had been decided elsewhere. As a result, the post-communist executive was institutionally fragmented. The structures of central government had been subordinate to the parallel Communist Party apparatus under the previous regime and they were therefore poorly equipped to take the lead in government deci-

sion-making in the new regimes. In addition, state administrative personnel, heavily politicised by the previous regime, were not capable of providing the executive with sufficient support to draft and implement policies. Unfortunately, the administrative resources that parliaments as a whole and the individual MPs in particular had to draw on were no larger or better than those of the executive [Olson 1997].

This means not only that the governments or presidents were initially unable to create and maintain the executive dominance that is typical for the established democracies of Western Europe, but also that the overall quality of legislation has been poor, as is evident from the frequent amendments and changes to existing laws that characterises the legislative process in the region. The quality of the legislation was of course also not helped by the fact parliaments in the region were initially confronted with an enormous amount of legislation that they were required to process within a short period of time.

The civil service in CEE countries is still considerably politicised [Grzymala-Busse 2003]. Nevertheless, the position of governments has generally improved throughout the region, to the extent where the balance of power between the executive and the legislature increasingly favours the former. Several elements have been involved in this shift. First, as mentioned above, parties and party systems are much more stable than they were in the early years of transition. This has enabled political leaders to better organise the relationship between the executive and legislative branches and to impose some party discipline and cohesion [Ágh 1995; Malová and Siváková 1996]. The internal organisation of parliament has therefore also become gradually more stable, especially given the fact that parliamentary party clubs themselves dominate the party as a whole. Political party leadership often consists of a large group of members of the parliament, which means that conflicts between the parliamentary party faction and the external party are often less visible or less existent than in many established democracies.

The second key element in the changing balance of power between executives and legislative assemblies in the region has been the formation of the core executive, centred on the head of government. Reform of central government and state administration has been carried out to varying degrees in almost all the countries of the region. Its refashioning has enabled the executive to extend and consolidate its position around powerful institutions, most notably the council of ministers and the minister of finance [Goetz and Wollman 2001]. These changes at the executive level have certainly not led to the disempowerment of legislatures, which continue to wield at least some oversight authority over the executive branch. However, the institutional resources that are now at the disposal of the executives tend to outweigh the resources of the legislatures.

Finally, the balance of power between the executives and the legislative assemblies has been greatly affected by the processes of European integration. Most countries in the CEE region sought speedy accession to the EU. Eight post-communist countries joined in May 2004, while others, most notably Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia, are likely to join in or shortly after 2007. Preparing for accession to the EU

is, politically and administratively, a very lengthy and complicated process, which requires candidate states to comply with a host of conditions specified by the European Commission (the so-called Copenhagen criteria of 1993). EU membership is conditional on the adoption of the body of EU laws contained in the *acquis communautaire*.

This process had a significant impact on governance in CEE countries in general and on the reform of central administration in particular [Grabbe 2001]. For example, the EU demanded that candidate states implement reform to create a politically neutral civil service capable of both effectively transposing the *acquis communautaire* and providing efficient support for a democratically elected government [e.g. Verheijen 1999]. It is of course still too early to assess how well these reforms, now in effect in all the new EU member states, succeeded in achieving their objectives, particularly that of empowering the core executive. However, it is interesting to note, for example, that pressures to meet the demands from the EU has already led to the professionalisation of central administration in key policy areas, and this in turn has created 'islands of excellence' within the civil service [Goetz 2001].

The position of the executive in the region has moreover been significantly strengthened *vis-à-vis* the parliaments by the introduction of fast-track legislative procedures. This relates again to the transposition of the *acquis communautaire* and its 9000 items of legislation. It would be inconceivable for such a vast number of laws to be adopted through normal legislative procedures, especially those inherited from the communist past. The CEE countries that sought or are still seeking EU membership had to amend their rules of procedure (i.e. standing orders) and treat (some) EU-related laws as a legislative priority (Bulgaria), or even call extraordinary parliamentary sessions to speed up the process (Slovenia). In addition, the management of EU accession was itself highly centralised and it concentrated all responsibilities in the hands of the governments [Lippert, Umbach and Wessels 2001]. Taken together, it is not surprising that these procedures and processes privileged the executive branch and consequently reduced the independent policy-making capacity of parliaments.

Conclusion

The first post-communist parliaments experienced numerous problems that typically affect institutions in transition societies. They initially had to function under a provisional or highly disputed constitutional framework. They were constrained in their actions by their own as yet unsettled internal procedures, by the presence of inexperienced MPs, and by the fragmentary character of parliamentary parties at the time. They were also under significantly less external control from established political parties and powerful interest groups and less influenced by strong executives, as these institutions were still underdeveloped or in the process of transition. The bulk of scholarship on the first post-communist parliaments reflected this tran-

sitory state of affairs in research predominantly on the role of parliaments in the transition to democracy, in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and in establishing the norms and procedures of new democracy [Remington 1994; Olson and Norton 1996; Ágh and Ilonszki 1996].

The contemporary parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe are different. Their internal structures and procedures are more defined and settled. Legislative tasks are performed in an increasingly routine process. The system of parliamentary committees is in place. Large groups of MPs have by now served for one or more parliamentary terms, which together with the generally improved conditions for MPs' work have contributed to stability and continuity in the legislative process. Parliamentary parties have also become more accepted as the means whereby parliament and individual MPs organise the legislature's operations. It is partly as a result of these political developments that legislative studies on contemporary CEE parliaments have come to resemble studies on parliaments in already established democracies [Olson and Crowther 2002]. Indeed, this special issue of the *Czech Sociological Review*, focusing on a classic topic of legislative research, is a poignant reminder of how far legislative scholarship on the region has already become integrated in the mainstream of parliamentary research.

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SS 04:4
Structural Tensions in the Interface between the Labour Market and Social Policy in the Czech Republic

Jiří Večerník

Efficient policies must be based not only on mainstream economics but to a large degree also on the social sciences. This study tries to demonstrate the links between the social structure and social policies. While in traditional societies structures mostly precede policies, to a great extent it is the opposite that occurs during the transition from a command to a market economy. The post-communist state interferes more than other governments in the social structure, and it supports strong actors. This hinders the expansion of the main actor in a successful transition - the middle-class - whose stagnation or adverse development causes the social structure (disintegrated, polarised, and unstable) to become implicitly the main social problem, which in turn generates other 'minor' problems. The middle-class perspective provides the framework for many tensions and latent conflicts in the structure of society.

Using a socio-economic approach the study presents four types of socio-economic friction, which develop between the middle class and other groups, between the new and the old middle class, between pensioners and the economically active, and between people with employment and the non-working poor. The first involves insufficient incentives for middle-class expansion, which leads to a socio-economic trap: social polarisation. The second relates to tensions among various sections of the middle class, which result in a socio-structural trap: the autonomous corporatisation of sections of the middle class. The third is linked to the pension system, which can give rise to a socio-political trap: excessive redistribution. The fourth involves the effective ratio between the wages of low categories of workers and the guaranteed subsistence income, which creates a socio-cultural trap: the spread of dependency status.

Such controversies are observed also as examples of an integrative approach to human resources development and the process of social inclusion. Social cohesion cannot be reached only from without, i.e. by redistribution, which must remain within limits so as not to hinder social change by distorting individual motivation and personal effort. The delineation of such limits cannot be drawn from a rational economic calculation alone; the social structure and its political, economic and cultural dimensions must also be taken into consideration, as when certain of their limits are exceeded another type of redistributional trap evolves; one that in the end, however, leads to a similar type of stagnation.

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Role Perceptions, Party Cohesion and Political Attitudes of East and West German Parliamentarians Findings from the Jena Parliamentary Survey (2003–4)*

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Abstract: This article deals with similarities and differences in the orientations of East and West German MPs more than a decade after the unification of the country. Based on data from the Jena Parliamentary Survey, thus far the largest survey among German parliamentarians, carried out in 2003–4, the paper discusses three hypotheses. While differences between deputies from the East and the West are found to be significant for some dimensions, they are, in general, subordinate to if not derived from the inter-factional differences induced by party competition. In spite of this evident impact of partisanship, German parliamentary parties exhibit unexpectedly low levels of party discipline / party unity in their attitudes towards the party and policy preferences. This phenomenon is slightly more pronounced in East Germany than in the West. Viewed against the background of parties as monopolists in the recruitment process and the reward schemes for MPs, this represents the most surprising finding from the survey.
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Introduction: German unity as an experiment for parliamentary integration

The peaceful autumn revolution of 1989 not only paved the way for German unification it also led to the rebirth of parliamentary democracy in Eastern Germany after decades of dictatorship. The new parliamentarians from the East German states, though not necessarily complete political novices, were 'newcomers' to the world of

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representative democracy. As such they had hardly any experience with parliamentary politics. For this reason, not to mention their socialisation in political systems as divergent as those of the GDR and the FRG, the differences between East and West German MPs in the initial post-unification period were pronounced.

Consequently, East German parliamentary life in its early stages was to some extent a micro-level experiment, exhibiting some parallels with the 'great social experiment' of German unification. Learning by doing, the new MPs, as the actors in parliamentary democracy, had to define their roles as the elected representatives of the people and accustom themselves to the rules of the parliamentary 'game'. Against this background it comes as no surprise that parliamentary life has undergone some significant changes since 1990. The changes that deputies have undergone can be characterised as a shift from amateurism to a more 'professional' conduct, the blueprints for which were provided by West German MPs. They are best reflected in the career paths and career strategies of parliamentarians. Yet it remains uncertain to what extent the processes of adaptation and convergence have been accompanied by changes in role perceptions and political orientations. Almost fifteen years after the re-establishment of parliamentary democracy and after three legislative terms, the time seems right to take stock.

It is evident that the processes mentioned above cannot be addressed just by studying MPs' biographies or by analysing their voting behaviour. Proper answers require information that only the parliamentarians themselves can provide. Such information is available on approximately 900 Germans MPs, both from the Bundestag and from ten (out of sixteen) state legislatures, from the Jena Parliamentary Survey in 2003–4, the largest so far in Germany since the Second World War. The survey was conducted between September 2003 and February 2004 through telephone interviews (CATI); in this procedure a methodological innovation was introduced into representative elite research.[1] In comparison to previous research the overall turnout was satisfactory, with well over one-half of all MPs (57.4%) taking part in the survey. But state legislators are strongly over-represented (with fewer national MPs responding), and MPs from the communist successor party, PDS, are also clearly over-represented.[2]

[1] Within the framework of the Sonderforschungsbereich 580 it was possible to carry out 921 full interviews with an average duration of about 40 minutes each. Another 33 interview were conducted with German members of the European Parliament and yet another 550 interviews with former national and state legislators. For the purpose of this article these interviews are excluded from the analysis. For in-depth information on the concept and on the methodological aspects of the survey compare Jahr and Edinger [2005 forthcoming].

[2] The over-representation of the Socialist MPs from PDS is less pronounced when East and West German MPs are analysed separately, as the PDS has no parliamentary representation in the Western legislatures and the response rates in East Germany were high across PPGs. The exact response rates by parliamentary level and by government/opposition are presented in Appendix 1; the rates for the parliamentary party groups and East and West German legislators are in Appendix 2. Given the focus of the analysis the decision was made against using party weights because throughout the analysis the comparison is always West, East

In spite of the fact that MPs are of obvious interest to at least two branches of political sociology, i.e. parliamentary research and elite studies, there is little literature available that this article could draw on.[3] Whilst German unification sparked off research on representative elites from East Germany, its focus was mainly on elite circulation and on the recruitment of Eastern state legislators.[4] In the early and mid-1990s systematic research into attitudes, and particularly role perceptions, was carried out almost exclusively by Werner Patzelt [Patzelt 1994].[5] Using survey data he was able to show that, as early as the first legislative term, the role perceptions of East German MPs had become similar to those of their Western colleagues [Patzelt 2001]. For the past ten years though no survey-based research has been undertaken that included more than one parliament.

The analysis in this article relies almost exclusively on data from the survey's telephone interviews. Taking some concepts from the literature on representation and party cohesion as inspiration for the analytical framework, the emphasis here is on analysing new data in order to identify zones of similarity and zones of difference between East and West German MPs. However, the analysis is not limited to a single dimension of comparison. Instead, it also comprises the reasons for the prevalence of differences more than a dozen years after German unification. The analysis is based on three hypotheses:

(i) With regard to political attitudes the integration of East and West German legislators lags behind the level of integration in terms of role perceptions ('the cultural lag'). Role perceptions of parliamentarians are shaped by the existing structure of opportunities. Since many components of the legal and political framework defining such opportunities are roughly the same in East and West Germany, MPs' role perceptions should have become more similar. This is not the case with regard to political orientations and to policy preferences in particular. These attitudes can be traced to political socialisation, and they are also influenced by the values and policy preferences of the electorate. With regard to both, obvious differences between East and West exist.

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without PDS and PDS, and because generally PPGs are controlled for. When distinguishing, for example, the PDS from the other parliamentary parties, it was possible to check whether its over-representation produced a major bias for the overall distribution or not.

[3] This observation obviously does not refer to the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and their members. Since this article deals only with German MPs, East and West German alike, almost no reference to the literature on CEE parliaments is made.

[4] The key finding of exceptional elite circulation [cf. Derlien 1997] was recently confirmed for the representative elite; compare Edinger [2004]. For the recruitment of East German state legislators see Lock [1998].

[5] Some aspects are also covered in the surveys carried out by Bernhard Wessels among members of the Bundestag in 1996 and in 2003 [Katz and Wessels 1999; Wessels 2005]. The focus of both surveys though was considerably different from the Sonderforschungsbereich survey, and the analyses of the findings have not yet included a systematic comparison of East and West German MPs.

(ii) Although differences between MPs from East and West are of some significance, party affiliation is a more distinguishing factor. As is common in a party democracy like Germany, political and parliamentary discourse is structured along party lines. Therefore, big differences between members of different caucuses are almost trivial. However, the argument here is that such differences also extend (a) to those orientations that are not related to political conflicts, and (b) to politics, that is, to matters of democratic decision-making.

(iii) In accordance with the pre-unification status quo the parties in parliament remain cohesive. Parliamentary party discipline, as documented by voting along party lines in committees and the plenary alike, rests on a broad set of shared beliefs and convictions held by MPs from the same party group. Strong party cohesion cannot be taken for granted, and even less so given that inter-party divisions (the topic of the second hypothesis) may also co-exist with moderate degrees of inner-party unity.

These hypotheses will not be discussed separately here or treated in sections because they are directly related to one another. Serving as 'underlying' hypotheses, they will be referred to throughout the text and they will be tested in any of the three following chapters where appropriate. Section two in the article is devoted to the role perceptions of German parliamentarians, addressing the focus of representation and parliamentary career ambitions among MPs. In the third section questions relating to parliament as an institution will be dealt with. The focus here is on the attitudes of MPs towards their own parliamentary party group (PPG), that is, on party discipline and party cohesion. Another aspect of PPG unity is analysed in the fourth section through an investigation into MPs' political convictions, politics orientations, and (some) policy preferences. Referring back to the hypotheses, the conclusion will present a discussion of the empirical findings and try to identify how different East and West German MPs (still) are.

Role perceptions: representation and career orientations

In *The Legislative System* by Wahlke et al. [1962: 8] the authors interpret the role of an MP as referring to "a coherent set of 'norms' of behaviour which are thought by those involved in the interactions being viewed to apply to all persons who occupy the position of legislator". The role concept is generally used to bridge the gap between the structural and the action-oriented approach to social reality. On the one hand, roles articulate the demands of the system through certain standards of behaviour. On the other hand, the behaviour is not fully determined by the role. Some scope remains for interpreting role expectations, which enables the deputy to respond to structural and situational conditions. In this analysis the role perceptions of MPs are therefore interpreted as an MP's generalised understanding of his or her own behaviour, shaped by both normative expectations and structural conditions.

One of the most important contexts is the generalised relationship between deputies and their constituents. In modern democracies this relationship ought to

Table 1. German MPs' focus of representation by PPG (%)

	East (n=430)	West (n=421)	Christian Democrats (CDU) (n=333)	Social Democrats (SPD) (n=299)	Liberals (FDP) (n=49)	Greens (B90) (n=43)	Socialists (PDS) (n=123)
Party	9	11	5	10	10	26	16
Voters	15	12	10	11	8	21	27
Constituency	21	29	33	28	10	5	9
Whole country	56	49	53	50	71	49	48

Note: When the sum of percentages does not equal 100 this is due to truncation.

constitute some kind of representation. As Hanna F. Pitkin pointed out, representation "means the making present *in some sense* of something which is nevertheless *not* present literally or in fact" [Pitkin 1967: 8–9]. Most of the literature on representation focuses on *how* something is made present, therefore often referring to Burke's distinction between trustee and delegate. Since Patzelt [1993: 181–219] has shown that this distinction is almost irrelevant for the daily work of German deputies, we must shift our perspective towards the object that is made present, i.e. the focus of representation.

In the survey a forced choice question was asked about whether MPs see themselves primarily as a representative of the whole country, of the constituency, of the MP's particular set of voters or of the party (see Table 1). The results may indicate some kind of social desirability, as the absolute majority of MPs perceive themselves as representatives of the whole country, while only a small minority claim to primarily represent their party or their own voters.[6] Representing the constituency is considered the priority by around one-fourth of the MPs. This amount is significantly related (Cramer's V: 0.23, $p<0.01$) to the conditions of candidature, whereby MPs who won a district directly are more likely to see themselves as representatives of that constituency. Given that the German electoral system, though largely proportional, also includes a majoritarian element, one-half of the seats in the national and a comparable proportion in most of the state parliaments have to be won in Single Member Districts (SMD)[7]. Deputies from small parties like Greens

[6] This result stands in sharp contrast to the preferences Czech MPs express on the focus of representation. In response to an almost identical question as the one used in this survey, only around one-fourth of Czech deputies in 2003 saw themselves mainly as representatives of all citizens. The authors thank Zdenka Mansfeldová for providing these figures.

[7] The 'personalised proportional' election system in Germany allows two different modes of candidature. Each voter has two votes. The second vote decides the proportional amount of seats in parliament a party could gain. The first vote decides the candidates, which are elected by a relative majority in each constituency. The mandates a party has gained directly are subtracted from all possible mandates for the party. Therefore, half of the seats are held by directly elected MPs, while the other half are held by candidates who ran on party lists. Most

and Liberals but also the Socialists, that is, the post-communist PDS,[8] are mostly elected on party lists and, therefore, they are more likely to see themselves as representatives of the party or of their voters than of any constituency.

Although party size matters, the East-West difference relating to the focus of representation does not stem from the PDS alone. The slightly stronger emphasis on representing the country in the East is caused by the Eastern MPs from the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU). Directly elected Western MPs at both levels are split between their role as representatives of the whole country or of their district, even when the mode of election is controlled for. Directly elected Eastern members of the national parliament (MNPs) clearly favour their constituency. The members of the state parliaments (MSPs), however, do not focus as much on district, but rather underscore the aspects of representing the whole country and – to a lesser extent – their own voters.[9]

While only subtle distinctions appear between East and West with regard to the focus of representation, the differences result from structural conditions rather than opposing concepts of representation. The stronger orientation towards the district among Eastern MNPs could be understood as an effect of their view of the mandate as the representation of special Eastern interests, which – in their view – still require particular attention.

Surveys conducted on MPs in West Germany before unification showed in general a stronger orientation towards the district among state legislators. This was explained by the smaller size of their constituencies, which is likely associated with having a closer relationship and greater integration [Patzelt 1993: 137]. This relationship does not, however, appear in the data from the project research. Most MPs at both levels see themselves as representatives of the whole country. But given that the question on the focus of representation was designed as a forced choice question, compelling respondents to make a decision between alternatives, the outcome could be interpreted as an attitude of putting 'shared interests first'. It implies that, in cases of conflict, the MP is expected to evaluate particular constituency interests as secondary. When related to incumbency, the proportion of MPs that represent the whole country increases and the proportion of constituency-oriented MPs diminishes, while support for the two other foci of representation remains stable. This relationship is not observed in the Eastern state parliaments.

MPs attempt to be nominated in an SMD *and* on a party list to increase their chances of getting elected. This system of election is used for the Bundestag and for most of the state parliaments in the survey, except for Baden-Württemberg and Saarland.

[8] It should be noted that the PDS has no parliamentary representation in West German legislatures and only two MPs in the Bundestag. Conversely, the Greens are not represented in East German state legislatures, and the FDP won mandates only in one out of five state legislatures (Saxony). Therefore, only CDU and SPD are represented in all eleven parliaments included in the survey.

[9] Whenever no distinction between MNPs and MSPs is made, and unless otherwise indicated, the findings reported refer to *all* MPs.

It is likely that the MPs who see themselves mostly as representatives of their district devote more time to constituency work, and this is also a matter of role perception as a deputy. Therefore, on the one hand there are MPs who are found to emphasise work within the parliament, and on the other hand there are MPs who are preoccupied with activities in the district, such as networking, offering services and explaining policies on the ground; in short, connecting parliament to the electorate. But such a distinction is more a question of graded differences than one of a clear-cut decision. When the MPs are classified into three categories – 'parliament workers', 'constituency workers' and those claiming an equal distribution between parliament and district work – it is evident that almost half of the deputies devote more time to work in parliament. As such, German MPs see themselves mainly as 'parliament workers', but working at the ground level also appears to be important. Deputies from the Eastern Länder still devote more time to parliamentary work as opposed to district work when compared to their Western counterparts, which confirms earlier findings from the mid-1990s [Patzelt 2001: 72].

There is no big difference in the distribution of working hours between MPs elected in SMDs and those elected on party lists. It seems that focusing one's work on the constituency is unrelated to the mode of election, but it is closely related to the MP's perception of representing primarily the constituency. However, the direction of the relationship is somewhat ambiguous. It could be argued that the more an MP works in the constituency the higher the amount of claming district representation, or the reverse could be true. The first interpretation is supported by the fact that Cramer's V is higher in the East. Therefore, MPs in the West may be linked to their constituency by slightly better developed networks which require the exertion of less personal effort by the MP. Their Eastern counterparts still have to invest more time into these networks,[10] and when they do they are more likely to have a district orientation. Thus, the relationship to the constituency is also built up *between* elections.

While the focus of representation is closely related to the distribution of working time, it is only loosely linked to role-perception views on politics as an occupation. The overwhelming majority of the MPs in the East and the West perceive politics as a genuine occupation. Nevertheless, only a minority of MPs had planned for a long-term political career when they first entered parliament, and the proportion is even lower in the East. When PPGs are controlled for it becomes evident that the PDS makes the difference. However, the party matters equally in the East and the West in terms of career orientation. The research results showed that deputies from the two major parties tend to focus more on their political career, whereas MPs from the Greens and the Socialists displayed the lowest ambitions.

The number of MNPs that plan a political career from the beginning increas-

[10] This is supported by the fact that Eastern MPs who once belonged to a of civil society organisation often serve as members of their boards or even as their presidents, while such a relationship is nowhere near as strong in the West. This is probably related to the rebuilding of civil society in the East, where representative elites are likely to also be found in prominent positions in civil society organisations.

Table 2. Demand for party discipline by focus of representation (%)

	All MPs (n=794)	East German MPs (n=384)	West German MPs (n=410)	East German MPs without PDS (n=281)	MPs from PDS (n=103)
Party	66	61	70	81	40
Voters	37	23	53	32	14
Constituency	58	55	60	61	11
Whole country	60	52	69	64	14

es in relation to how low their incumbency is (Cramer's V: 0.37, $p<0.01$), but this relationship is not found for MSPs. Holding a mandate in the Bundestag has since 1990 increasingly come to be viewed as a starting point for a political career, both in East and West Germany. Generally, once in parliament, most MPs in the East and the West would like to stand for re-election. However, the chances of getting re-elected depend both on how an MP behaves within the caucus and the MP's interaction with the electorate, and this points to the relationship between the focus of representation and party discipline. The demand that MPs toe the party line when it comes to votes in the plenary or in the committees can clash with the preferred focus of representation, as the interests of the PPG may not always be perceived as matching, for example, the interests of the constituency. To examine this we built an index of demand for PPG discipline.[11]

MPs that see themselves as representatives of their party are found to have the highest demand for PPG discipline, probably because party discipline is considered to be in the interest of the party, while MPs that are representatives of their voters are found to be significantly below average in this respect (see Table 2). Furthermore, the majority of district- and country-oriented deputies support PPG discipline. Therefore, one could argue that many MPs perceive PPG discipline as an essential mechanism for achieving political aims also for those they feel they ought to be representing foremost. Only in the East is representing voters seen to being tense relationship to party discipline. Among the PPGs only the deputies of PDS reject PPG discipline in the majority – no matter whom they represent.

This review of several aspects of role perceptions has revealed one clear tendency: most of the differences between Eastern and Western MPs are due to the distinctions of the party system or to slight differences in the general structures of opportunity than to fundamentally divided role perceptions. With regard to the focus

[11] This additive index was built out of two items. The first item measures the demand for coherent voting behaviour when important decisions are concerned, the second one, once recoded, measures the opposition to more autonomous voting for the individual PPG member. Respondents can reach between two and eight points on the party discipline index. MPs with six or more points are considered as strong supporters of party discipline, while all others show only weak support. The cutting point is identical with that after z-transformation when respondents above average are counted as favouring strong party discipline.

of representation, differences are somehow secondary in comparison with the overwhelming preference for representing the whole country – PPG affiliation and election as a district or a list MP are more decisive than East-West differences. A similar picture appears in terms of the distribution of work between parliament and constituency. Some tendencies that occur in the West are rather pronounced in the East, for example, tendencies found in the relationship between the focus of representation and party discipline, and it is this aspect that will be dealt with in the following chapter.

Party unity at stake: attitudes towards parliamentary party groups and parliament as an institution

While the relationship with the public is of crucial importance for deputies, much of their everyday activity relates to parliamentary work. The parliament as an institution, with its rules and procedures, consequently shapes the perceptions and the behaviour of its members. In the survey, we tried to capture MPs' views on parliamentary procedures and parliamentary reform through a set of questions related to the importance of parliament, problems of serving as an MP and reform proposals. A related topic, also covered in the questionnaire, is the relationship between the individual MP and the caucus. Do noticeable differences exist between MPs from East and West Germany regarding the relationship to their own PPG? Is it possible to detect varying degrees of party cohesion between caucuses?

There is a huge body of literature on party cohesion and party discipline and the topic has regained academic interest during the past couple of years [see e.g. Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999; Hazan 2003]. Nevertheless, the distinction between the two concepts more often than not seems insufficient. Another striking phenomenon is how much emphasis has been put on MPs' voting behaviour, and roll call analysis in particular, while other important aspects that could be associated with party cohesion (such as shared politics and policy attitudes) have been neglected. As Hazan points out: "examining voting behaviour is not enough, because we must look at (...) what takes place before voting decisions are made" [Hazan 2003a: 8]. In the light of such advice, this section presents an examination of the various orientations MPs maintain towards their parliamentary group, and which are interpreted as indicators of 'party unity'. For the purpose of this article, party unity comprises 'party discipline' (united voting plus directly related attitudes) and 'party cohesion' (shared attitudes).[12] Given that the analysis at hand is based solely on survey data, it also draws on reported voting behaviour[13] and the index on party

[12] It should be noted that, as a consequence, party unity is used here as the *genus proximum* for discipline and cohesion, and it is not used as a distinct analytical category as suggested elsewhere [Linek and Rakušanová 2002: 48-49].

[13] The item reads: 'Did you ever vote against your own PPG in an important vote even though voting with the PPG was expected'.

discipline (see above) to measure party discipline. Party cohesion can encompass shared political orientations (comp. section 4), but here we are looking more specifically at attitudes on parliament as an institution.

Parties in the German parliaments traditionally exhibit relatively unified behaviour. Faction splits and mergers happen rarely, inter-faction mobility is usually low, and voting against one's own PPG is considered a serious violation of internal norms unless issues of high ethical importance ('questions of conscience') are at stake.[14] Still, some disunity did occur during the first term of the new state legislatures (1990–94), when parliamentary democracy in East Germany was still in its formative period. Since then, however, the situation has changed and the new parliaments have become much like their counterparts Western.[15]

When considering the initial differences between East and West it is highly relevant whether the evident changes in parliamentary party discipline are also reflected in MPs' perceptions. Our findings confirm the actual voting behaviour in at least one respect: a much higher proportion of East compared to West German MPs report having at least once voted against their PPG in an important vote, even though they were expected to adhere to the party line. Obviously, longstanding MPs report deviating from their party group more frequently than newly elected MPs. It nonetheless comes as a surprise that statistically significant differences also exist between newcomers. Regardless of how long respondents held a parliamentary seat, the percentage of East German MPs with a record of deviant voting was always higher than among West Germans. Even more surprisingly, the gap between the two groups is barely shrinks even when the PDS are excluded from the analysis.

Although the proportion of dissenters increases the more the notion of party discipline is challenged (Cramer's V: 0.29, $p<0.01$), it is striking how widespread the phenomenon of (occasional) PPG disloyalty has become. Four out of ten strong supporters of party discipline have dissented from their faction in an important vote at least once during their parliamentary career. Even among the respondents who showed maximal support for party discipline this figure amounts to 27%.[16] While the East-West divergence in reported voting discipline is not caused by differences between the East and the West German party system, the weaker support for party discipline among Eastern MPs is clearly related to the PDS. The low party discipline among Socialist MPs may appear puzzling at first glance, especially when one takes into account the history of the PDS as a hegemonic state party, but it somewhat corresponds to the heterogeneous composition of its caucuses. On the one hand the PDS recruits its MPs from among the GDR sub-elites, on the other hand it deliber-

[14] It should be noted that the situation was rather different during the first two terms of the Bundestag when up to eight factions existed in the national parliament and when the party system had not yet been stabilised. The relevant figures are found in Schindler [1999: 938-42, 1781-87]. For a general analysis of the structural incentives for party cohesion and party discipline in Germany see Patzelt [2003].

[15] For empirical evidence see Davidson-Schmich [2003].

[16] Maximum support for party discipline is given when respondents reach all eight points on the party discipline scale.

Table 3. Demanded and reported party discipline by PPG (%)

	Party discipline			
	Strong demand*[17]	Reported	Demanded but not reported (as % of PPG members with strong demand)	Demanded but not reported (as % of all PPG members)
CDU (n=330/355)	59	46	45	27
FDP (n=51/51)	51	41	46	24
SPD (n=305/326)	73	54	38	27
B90 (n=42/44)	48	71	20	10
PDS (n=118/128)	21	35	46	9
Total (n=851/907)	57	49	41	23

* See footnote 11 on the construction of the party discipline index and the cutting point.

ately promotes candidates affiliated with certain groups in society and with specific socio-demographic features, for example young candidates, women and also non-party members.

While reported PPG discipline is lowest among the Socialists, it is well above average for parliamentarians from the Greens. Yet their deputies do not consider strong party discipline to be particularly important, as unity in voting may be taken for granted. The Greens consequently displayed the lowest proportion of inconsistent responses, i.e. MPs who demand strong party discipline while having themselves dissented from the PPG in at least one important vote. The strongest demand for party discipline was voiced by the Social Democrats, although their reported discipline is only slightly higher than the average. In spite of this, inconsistent responses are no more common among the SPD than among Christian Democrats and Liberals. As illustrated in the last column of Table 3, one out of four respondents from those three long-established parties (or rather their caucuses) demands what he himself or she herself is not willing to fully comply with: party discipline. The figures for PDS and Greens are much lower but for different reasons. Whereas

[17] It is worth noting that Czech MPs in 2000 showed much more support for party discipline, though the Rice Index for the Czech Chamber of Deputies is considerably lower than for German parliaments [Linek and Rakušanová 2002: 35 and 50-51]. The lesson to be learned from these contrasting cases at two slightly different points in time seems to be that the less party discipline that exists, the stronger the demand for it, and the more party discipline is adhered to, the less it is appreciated.

Figure 1. Attitudes towards two parliamentary reform proposals by East/West German and majority/opposition MPs (%)



among the Green PPGs the demand for discipline is much lower than what is actually practiced (reported), among the PDS there are few candidates for inconsistency, because the voting discipline is relatively low.

How relevant are PPGs to the differences between East and West when the focus of the analysis turns to MPs' views on parliament as institution? East-West differences exist to some degree – and so do variations between PPGs – but we find the more visible dividing line between government and opposition MPs. While two out of three MPs in an opposition party view the influence of parliament as one the decline, this view is held by only 43% of deputies from the government benches. The gulf between majority and minority MPs corresponds with the logic of parliamentary democracy based on the nearly complete fusion of the executive and the legislative powers (Bagehot), or in other words on the notion of the 'governing majority'.

Still, out of the four reform proposals deputies were asked their opinion on, only one is a source of serious controversy between the parliamentary majority and the opposition: the quest for stronger reporting obligations for the government (see Figure 1). As expected, members of the majority PPGs attach little importance to this reform issue, while for MPs from the opposition it ranks first in importance. Huge differences between government and opposition MPs also exist within every single parliamentary party. For example, the Social Democrats in the opposition are

much more in favour of such a reform than the Social Democratic members of the governing PPGs.

While the right of parliament to gain earlier and more comprehensive information on government activities marks the dividing line between MPs from the governing and the opposition parliamentary parties, East and West German MPs are split over the importance of work resources. Whereas better resources, be it more personnel or better parliamentary facilities, are of some importance to many West German MPs, this is clearly not the case with MPs in the new federal states (see Figure 1). It seems that East German deputies do not attach much meaning to institutional support. This contrasts with the frequent complaints over insufficient time for reflecting on political problems and for private life. Judging from the experience of one of the best-equipped parliaments in the world, the US Congress, it comes as a surprise that particularly East German MPs do not expect benefits from improved work facilities. They seem therefore to neglect a relevant part of the institutional conditions that 'frame' their activities as elected representatives of the people.

With regard to members of the Bundestag, the item battery on parliamentary reform provides a rare opportunity for a comparison over time. Therefore, the survey also used questions reproduced from an earlier survey of German national MPs carried out at the end of the 1980s by Dietrich Herzog and his research team. The findings are intriguing as they show both high levels of continuity and tremendous changes over a time span of fifteen years. Almost the same proportion of national MPs as a decade and a half ago consider more information rights for the Bundestag and better public relations work as the most urgent reform issues. The opposite is true for the two other reform proposals at stake. Whereas a considerable proportion of the members of the 11th Bundestag voiced strong support for better parliamentary resources and for more rights to individual deputies, these are no longer matters of priority. The parliamentary infrastructure still concerns at least some members of the Bundestag, though less so the state legislators. Nevertheless, the status of the individual MP, which spurred much debate at the time and even led to rulings from the constitutional court, has completely vanished from the reform agenda.

The shift of the focus of parliamentary reform, as illustrated by the figures in Table 4, takes us back to the relationship between MPs and their factions. While every second deputy feels that individual MPs are hardly ever capable of changing the status quo, in the new data this no longer results in a quest for institutional change (in favour of the MP as an individual), which may have been the case in the past. Instead, MPs in 2003–4 turned to their parliamentary parties but at the same time they expressed less support for party discipline. They even expressed the freedom to dissent on rare occasions from their PPG in an important vote.

The analysis in this section places a question mark behind the seemingly clear-cut issue of party discipline in German parliaments,[18] albeit only at the level of atti-

[18] Recent anecdotic evidence justifies the question mark. In March 2005 Heide Simonis failed to obtain re-election as Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein in four subsequent parliamen-

Table 4. Parliamentary reforms considered to be most urgent by MNPs (%)

	11th Bundestag 1988/89*	15th Bundestag*** 2003/04 (West/East)
Stronger reporting obligations of government to parliament	30	29 (28/34)
Improved public presentation of parliament	37	38 (38/37)
More parliamentary staff and better facilities in parliament	35	19 (19/20)
Extended chances of political initiatives and more speaking time for individual MPs	39**	6 (5/7)

* Data taken from Herzog et al. [1990: 126].
** Item phrased slightly differently: strengthening of the position of individual MPs.
*** n = 154 to 156.

tudes. More importantly, it reveals the varying degrees of relevance that the regional background of MPs has on different dimensions of party unity. Party discipline, both as reported and as demanded by parliamentarians, is still much stronger among West German deputies. The East-West gulf is not bridged even when controlling for the PDS. In sharp contrast to the findings on party discipline, the regional background is of limited importance for party cohesion. Overall, PPG affiliation is highly relevant for both discipline and cohesion, though in some instances the majority-opposition divide is more decisive. The next section will examine whether similar patterns can be found in yet another dimension of party unity: shared political orientations.

Political attitudes: convictions, politics and policies

Three types of political orientations will be discussed in this section, so it is first necessary to sketch how basic convictions, attitudes on politics, and policy preferences are inter-related. Political convictions can be understood as the very foundations of political attitudes. As such they should allow for a proper distinction between parties, while at the same time they are capable of serving as a formula for integration within parties. Generally speaking, this is less the case with political procedures. Questions of decision-making (politics) are usually only of limited use in party competition. In addition, some of them touch upon the basic rules of the political game and therefore should find broad agreement across party lines. Finally, policy preferences are frequently rooted in political convictions. As these prefer-

tary votes because, most likely, a member of her own PPG dissented. In the state legislature in Saxony, on various occasions at the end of 2004 (most likely) members of the governing coalition, made up of CDU and SPD, voted for candidates of the extreme right NPD.

ences are more closely connected to current political conflicts they can be expected to be the biggest source of controversy between PPGs.

In the survey, there are two items that can be considered as measuring 'basic convictions': a forced choice question on freedom versus equality, and the self-ranking of MPs on a ten-point left-right scale. The latter is obviously not a political conviction in itself but rather a proxy for it. First of all, there is virtually no difference in the self-ranking of MPs in the East and the West. This is *prima facie* a rather puzzling finding because the party systems in each part of Germany are different, and it could be expected that more leftwing positions would be found among East German MPs. The explanation for the similarity between East and West comes from the long-established (parliamentary) parties. Their East German members position themselves more to the right than their fellow PPG members in the West, on average by almost half a scale point. This difference can be attributed to the type of party competition: with the PDS as a dedicated leftist competitor, East German MPs from the other parties may feel the need to distance themselves from the Socialists and therefore opt for a more rightist position on the left-right scale.

While the general relationship between PPGs on the left-right MP scale offers no surprises, an interesting East-West difference does surface. Generally, among

Table 5. MPs' self-ranking and the ranking of their party on a ten-point left-right scale by PPG (means & standard deviations)

	Self-ranking of MPs		Party ranking by MPs	
	Means	STDDEV	Means	STDDEV
CDU				
East (n=175)	6.47	1.12	6.20	1.08
West (n=174/173)	6.09	1.18	6.29	1.06
FDP				
East (n=15)	5.60	1.12	5.67	0.90
West (n=34)	5.29	1.27	5.62	0.78
SPD				
East(n=129/130)	4.12	1.50	4.43	1.18
West(n=191/194)	3.64	1.22	4.37	1.17
B90				
East*	-	-	-	-
West (n=39)	3.56	1.07	3.87	1.03
PDS				
East (n=128/127)	2.58	0,95	2.76	0.97
West*	-	-	-	-
Total				
East (n=445)	4.68	2.02	4.77	1.79
West (n=450/452)	4.69	1.69	5.08	1.47

* not reported because n < 15.

Eastern MPs almost no difference exists between the actual position of deputies and the perceived party position, but the West German MPs tend to see themselves somewhat to the left of their party. This observation is particularly striking in the case of the Social Democrats, an obvious sign that the programme changes introduced by the party leadership after winning the 1998 Bundestag elections have not been fully accepted among the party's state legislators in particular.

The position on the left-right scale strongly correlates with the forced choice question on freedom and equality (Eta^2: .33; $p<0.01$). More egalitarian views coincide with rather leftist positions. The 'egalitarians' among the MPs have a mean of 3.2 on the left-right scale, whereas those that give freedom priority over equality are far more on the right (mean: 5.0). The differences between East and West are modest, with MPs in and from the new Länder having slightly more egalitarian convictions. Since no East-West divide exists within the two major parliamentary parties and the Liberal PPGs, the PDS is clearly an outlier here. Only a relative majority of their MPs express a preference for freedom, with 28–29% respectively either egalitarian or undecided.

East-West differences in political convictions are small compared to inter-party divisions, but how much does this picture also apply in the case of *policy preferences*? The survey contained four questions explicitly referring to politics: on the importance of compromise and on the role of parties in provoking conflict (the consent-conflict dimensions), and on direct democracy and on political leadership (input-output dimensions). Strong support for two of these questions was observed among the respondents: first in support for compromise, but also in support for direct democracy. The two other items are sources of controversy.

Statistically significant differences between East and West German deputies exist over the issue of the importance of direct democracy and over the statement that parties unnecessarily provoke political conflicts. MPs in the East support the former and agree with the latter to a larger extent than their counterparts in the West. However, in the case of direct democracy this divide stems from the different PPG composition in both parts of the country. Inter-party differences are strongest here (Eta^2: .24; $p<0.01$), with the Christian Democrats split over this politics issue and all other factions (very) strongly in favour. The slightly more positive attitude of Eastern Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals towards direct democracy might be interpreted as a legacy of the peaceful revolution in 1989, when citizens' active involvement in politics spurred the process of democratisation. PPG affiliation is also significant for MPs' attitudes in relation to the statement that a democracy in the long run is only possible when strong political leadership wards off conflicting group interests.

Leaving out the PDS as a specifically Eastern party, overall the regional background is only meaningful for one of the politics-related questions: the item on party democracy. Almost fifteen years after unification, East German MPs are still slightly more sceptical about the role of political parties. However, a closer look at the differences by PPG reveals that a significant gap exists only in the case of the

Social Democrats. PPG differences seem to have on the whole a much stronger impact than regional background in the input-output dimension of politics. Given that (parliamentary) parties are so relevant to policy preferences, we would expect them to be almost dominant with regard to policy orientations, as these lie at the heart of what parties regularly dispute over.

Out of the roughly one dozen questions on policy preferences in the survey, this analysis limits itself to looking at just two dimensions, which may be considered the most relevant for testing the stated hypotheses.[19] The first dimension refers to the support for state activity, determined through two items – on job creation and on the responsibility of citizens for social security – combined into an unweighted additive index.[20] The second index comprises two questions, both of which refer to a libertarian-authoritarian, or rather freedom versus security dimension.[21] In the case of both indexes the items have a strong positive correlation (with Pearson's r: 0.27 for the security-freedom index, and 0.51 for the state activity index).

East German MPs differ from their West German colleagues in relation to both dimensions by taking slightly more pro-state and pro-freedom stands. At least for the security versus freedom dimension the positions are reversed once deputies from the PDS, with their strong pro-civil rights views, are excluded from the analysis. The differences between the old and the new states are overridden by lines of conflict between parliamentary parties. The PPG division is somewhat pronounced, and it appears to be stronger on the security-freedom dimension (eta^2: 0.52; $p<0.01$) than on the state activity index (eta^2: 0.39; $p<0.01$). On state intervention, the biggest mean difference is between Liberals and Socialists, with Christian Democrats close to the FDP and Social Democrats almost exactly in the middle. The SPD is the only PPG whose Eastern members are less positive about state activity than its members in the West. Furthermore, the SPD is distinctive in that intra-party differences between Easterners and Westerners exist on both dimensions. On the security-freedom dimension, PPGs are grouped differently. Here the Christian Democrats with their pro-security orientation are set far apart from the other parliamentary parties.

So far in this section, party unity – as related to political attitudes – has been examined by comparing PPGs and by studying their homogeneity. The next step in the analysis changes the perspective from PPGs as a given parliamentary entity to individual MPs in search of the right group to join in parliament. The more homogeneous a PPG is, and the more PPGs differ from one another, the easier it is to assign an MP to his or her PPG. Therefore, the percentage of MPs correctly assigned

[19] As with any such analysis, the selection of items to some extent determines the results. It must be noted that by covering two dimensions the most divisive issue between East and West German MPs is not included: the introduction of nationwide, centralised A-level exams.

[20] The items are 'Creating and preserving jobs is primarily a task of the state' and 'The state should give citizens more responsibility for their social security'. The latter item was recoded.

[21] The items are 'Considering the threat posed by terrorism, the restriction of basic rights is acceptable' and 'Germany should restrict immigration from non-EU countries'.

Table 6. MPs correctly assigned to their PPG by discriminant analysis (%)*

		Politics	Policies		
		Input/Output	Policy I: state activity	Policy II: security / freedom	Policy I & II combined
West	CDU (n=169 to 175)	71	90	84	86
	SPD (n=187 to 194)	67	57	79	81
	Wilk's Lambda first function** (p<0.01)	0.78	0.67	0.49	0.41
East	CDU (n=171 to 177)	74	90	85	81
	SPD (n=125 to 129)	27	24	33	48
	PDS (n=115 to 1119)	71	66	75	80
	Wilk's Lambda first function** (p<0.01)	0.68	0.53	0.43	0.36

Note: The results for Liberals and Greens are not reported here because, due to their small size (low a priori probability), each of them would be assigned to their closest partner even if they could be relatively well discriminated [Klecka 1980: 46–47].

* The leave-one-out method was used to assign the observations. As a result, the discriminating functions are generated out of N-1 observations, and the left-out case is classified on this basis.

** Wilk's Lambda measures the amount of variance within each group that is left unexplained by the discriminant function. That means the lower the Lambda the better the classification.

to their PPG is used here as one indicator of PPG unity. This approach requires use of discriminant analysis, a statistical tool that makes it possible to examine the simultaneous influence of several variables on the distinction between PPGs, and to maximize the probability of correctly assigning observations to their pre-determined groups [Klecka 1980]. The analysis is performed using three sets of variables that separately encompass attitudes on politics[22] and the two policy dimensions relating to state activity and to security/freedom.[23]

The first result, equally valid for East and West, is the difference in the ability of each of the three sets of variables to generate a correct classification of MPs (see Table 6). As illustrated by Wilk's Lambda, the index on politics contributes least to explaining party differences. In contrast to politics, the two policy dimensions, especially if combined, serve the purpose much better. Interestingly, the discriminating power of all three dimensions is generally higher for MPs from the new Länder. This contrast is most pronounced in the state activity dimension.

Among the PPGs, Christian Democrats in the West are slightly more homogenous than their colleagues from the SPD on two of the three dimensions. Only on

[22] It comprises the following two items: 'In the long run, democracy is only possible when strong leadership repels conflicting group interests' (output) and 'Referenda (initiated by the people) are a necessary supplement for representative democracy' (input).

[23] For the wording of the items, see footnotes 20 and 21.

Figure 2. Territorial map of group centroids for PPGs (all MPs)



Note: The results for Liberals and Greens in the East are not reported here because of their small size.

the state activity dimension are they substantially more united than the Social Democrats. A somewhat different picture emerges in the East. Whereas the CDU appears just as homogeneous as in the West and represents by far the most integrated party, the SPD seems rather more heterogeneous. The majority of Social Democrats are not properly classified in relation to any of the dimensions.[24] Most of the SPD deputies wrongly assigned appear as Christian Democrats, but except for the state activity dimension the share of those classified as Socialists is only marginally lower. The evident difficulty in assigning East German Social Democrats correctly somewhat reflects the precarious position their party occupies in the middle of the regional party system, which can be illustrated by mapping the relative distance between parties in a two-dimensional space (see Figure 2).[25]

This constellation causes centrifugal tendencies within the SPD. As a result, some of its members lean towards policy preferences characteristic for the CDU, whereas others tend towards positions frequently held by the PDS. This is simply

[24] It is worth noting that the discriminant analysis refers not only to the homogeneity within a party but also to the relative distance between parties. That is why the figures presented in Table 6 should not been regarded as the sole indicator for the homogeneity of a party.

[25] Therefore, the two policy dimensions were combined and rotated in order to obtain two discriminant functions, which make up the axis of the system. For these it is possible to calculate the average score of every PPG, i.e. 'the group centroids', resulting from each score their MPs get on the functions.

not possible in the West due to the lack of a strong leftwing party. This kind of intra-party division is also reflected in the coalition preferences. The majority of East German SPD deputies are able to find at least one acceptable coalition alternative. The Christian Democrats (with a minimal acceptance rate of 79%) are somewhat favoured as a prospective partner in government over the Socialists (58%) – a difference that corresponds very well with the results of the discriminant analysis. The greater homogeneity of CDU and PDS parliamentarians in the East is likewise a reflection of their parties' positions in the regional party system. Unlike the Social Democrats they can be incorrectly assigned only to one other party: the SPD. Indeed, assigning Christian Democrats to the PDS and vice versa is a rare occurrence and is no more frequent than the mutual acceptance as coalition partners, which is clearly below 10%.

The overall picture emerging from the survey data is that West and East Germans rarely show strong dissent over the various aspects of political orientations. Significant differences can be found on some policy issues. However, (parliamentary) party membership has a much stronger impact on all three dimensions of political attitudes discussed in this chapter. While PPGs are relevant, they are anything but united on a number of issues. Within the parties both East-West divisions and general patterns of heterogeneity emerge. The Social Democrats, especially their East German parliamentary groups, are the most affected by a lack of inner-party cohesion on political attitudes.

Conclusion

This article explored the attitudes of East and West German MPs on a variety of issues thirteen years after unification. Of particular interest in this respect are the deputies elected in East Germany, where the re-emergence of parliamentary life happened amidst an equally rapid and comprehensive transformation process, characterised by the massive import of institutions, elites and norms already established in Western Germany. Unlike their colleagues in Central and Eastern Europe, German MPs in the new federal states were faced with pre-established structures, and they received enormous institutional support. East Germany must therefore be considered a specific case.

However, the entry of MPs socialised in a communist regime into new institutional settings is also interesting from the perspective of EU enlargement, for which the integration of representative elites constitutes a major challenge. In the processes of unification and enlargement both, Western institutions are joined by MPs from a different cultural background, where some other form of institutional logic existed. Integration requires that MPs both adapt themselves in response to the institutional challenges and also modify the institutional settings in order to make them better fit the political and social context in the East. Without this, either the too rigid institutions would force MPs to become fully assimilated, or the institutions would lose their capacity to shape the behaviour of the political actors.

In reference to the hypotheses presented above, the key findings will now be summarised in order to estimate the overall level of integration between MPs from the new and the old federal states. The first hypothesis emerged from the assumption of greater East-West integration when institutional incentives are strong, as could be the case for role perceptions. Less integration seems likely when social contexts are different and institutional incentives are low, as is the case with political attitudes. An interpretation of the results of the 2003–4 survey shows that the level of integration does not depend that much on whether role perceptions or political attitudes are compared. While MPs from the new and the old Länder are somewhat similar in the preferences they expressed regarding the focus of representation, the same is also true for basic convictions, most politics items, and even some policy orientations. Interestingly, even for topics that could be associated with different socialisation processes or related to the differing socio-economic situations in East and West Germany (e.g. the demand for state activity) only a moderate amount of dissimilarity could be discovered. In contrast, striking differences exist with regard to party discipline, where one could have expected a high degree of similarity given that normative expectations are well established.

East-West divisions, as pointed out at various points in the analysis, may emerge from two sources: from a gap that cuts across the PPGs, or from the existence of the PDS as the East German equivalent of a post-communist successor party. The very fact that the PDS produces some of the variance between East and West is not meant to imply that these differences should be overlooked. On the contrary, the PDS is the most visible reminder that, more than a dozen years after German unification, East and West have not yet fully converged. In general, differences between representatives in the new and the old Länder prove important in relation to some dimensions, and are sometimes more pronounced as intra-party and sometimes as inter-party differences. However, they are not the main differences even when we distinguish between different dimensions such as role perceptions and political orientations. Therefore, our first hypothesis is not confirmed.

Conversely, the second hypothesis seems to fit nicely with the empirical findings: (parliamentary) parties matter far beyond the realm of policy preferences. PPG affiliation is important for attitudes on politics and for role perceptions. The position of one PPG and its distance from other caucuses differs depending on the dimension of comparison. Whereas MPs' political attitudes are largely a matter of party ideology, role perceptions are influenced more by institutional constraints such as the electoral system. Despite the at times pronounced differences, there is some common ground between the parliamentary parties, too. Almost all MPs agree, for example, on the general preservation of the federal system in Germany and, more importantly, on the need to seek compromise. The general consent on the latter topic, especially, indicates the prevalence of a unified elite in Germany [Hoffmann-Lange 2001: 206]. This kind of basic consent among elites has not only been crucial to the stability of German democracy since the Second World War, it is also considered to be a *conditio sine qua non* for successful consolidation in the post-communist countries of Central and East Europe [Higley and Lengyel 2000: 1].

The assumption that the observed distinctiveness of PPGs is to some degree based upon intra-party homogeneity leads us to the third hypothesis that parliamentary groups represent cohesive actors with strong party discipline and party cohesion. However, the findings from the survey reveal instead considerable intra-party differences if not dissent. They extend to quite a number of policy and politics issues, and they are even reflected in the frequent dissenting votes reported by the respondents. Whether altogether they indicate changes in the relationship between MPs and parliamentary parties is an open question as long as the effects on the observed voting behaviour (like a lower Rice Index) remain unclear.

However, some of the intra-party differences illustrate one of the most surprising findings from the interviews: the 'alienation' of German MPs from their own party. While this process is silent and somewhat hidden, the evidence for it is substantial: In addition to the dissentions and the low support for party discipline, few MPs considered themselves as representatives primarily of their party, few reported that party activities were decisive for their nomination, and almost every second deputy was critical about the role of parties in provoking conflicts. Such figures remind us of the fact that parties "are internal coalitions, comprising factions as well as fragmented and non-aligned tendencies" [Hazan 2003a: 8]. They must be interpreted against the background of recruitment processes that are monopolised by the parties. Although MPs owe almost every position in their political career to their party, many present themselves as somewhat detached from it, whether in an effort to emphasise their autonomy or as a response to perceived anti-party sentiments in the electorate.

Judging from the test of the three hypotheses, how much integration of East and West German MPs is there? Whether differences are considered small or big considerably depends on one's expectations. Those who focus on the institutional framework may have expected greater similarity here, whereas researchers who see MPs' orientations as rooted in socialisation must be surprised that both groups of deputies share so many views. Considering these contrasting approaches, no definite answer to the question is possible here. When differences between PPGs are found overall to be more pronounced than East-West divisions, this suggests that elite convergence after unification has occurred to some degree. And this remains true even if the situation is much more complex, with Eastern and Western deputies being somewhat estranged on some dimensions and issues while rather close on others.

At the same time, the social experiment of German unification since 1990 offers no blueprints for elite convergence on the European level, as integration occurred under extremely favourable conditions. Judging from our data on MPs' biographies and political careers, parliamentary stabilisation and professionalisation occurred with much greater speed in East Germany than in other post-communist societies. Nevertheless, the direction of developments seems to be roughly the same. This preliminary evidence suggests that the convergence of representative elites in Europe is not only an effect of the transformation path but also a matter of time.

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Appendix 1. Response rates by parliamentary level and by government-opposition affiliation

	Number of deputies	Number of interviews	Response rate [RR] (%)	RR for governing PPGs (%)	RR for opposition PPGs (%)
All state parliaments	1.001	765	76.4	71.5	83.1
East German state parliaments	482	384	79.7	74.2	88.6
West German state parliaments	378	265	70.1	62.7	78.5
Berlin Chamber of Deputies (West and East German MPs)	141	116	82.3	84.4	79.7
European Parliament (German MEPs)*	99	33	33.3	-	-
Deutscher Bundestag	603	156	25.9	26.8	24.9
Total	**1703**	**954**	**56.0**	**56.0****	**59.1****

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* Disregarded for the purpose of this article.
** Basis: All MPs in the sample parliaments without MEPs.

Appendix 2. Response rates by parliamentary party groups and by East and West German MPs

	Number of deputies	Number of interviews	Response rate [RR] (%)	RR for East German MPs (%)	RR for West German MPs (%)
CDU (Bundestag: CDU/CSU)	683	357	52.2	68.4	42.1
SPD	566	326	57.6	71.6	50.9
FDP	104	52	50.0	62.5	46.3
PDS	142	131	92.2	92.3	91.7
B90/Die Grünen	96	45	46.9	62.5	45.5
Others	13	10	76.9	70.0	100
Total*	**1604**	**921**	**57.4**	**74.4**	**46.9**

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* MEPs excluded.

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Metropolitan Areas in the Czech Republic - Definitions, Basic Characteristics, Patterns of Suburbanisation and Their Impact on Political Behaviour

Tomáš Kostelecký, Daniel Čermák

This study is based on the first stage of research on political change in metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic, conducted within the framework of the International Metropolitan Observatory Project (IMO). In the first part of the study, the authors examine how metropolitan areas are defined. Given that there is currently no official definition of metropolitan areas in the Czech Republic, criteria for their delineation were developed on the basis of existing definitions of metropolitan areas in other countries participating in the IMO project and with the use of available data. The application of these criteria to the Czech Republic produced a provisional delineation of four metropolitan areas within the country, centred on the cities of Prague, Brno, Pilsen, and Ostrava. The basic characteristics of these four metropolitan areas are outlined in the second part of the study, including data on populations and population density, migration patterns, housing development, and basic data on spatial differences in social structures. Special attention is devoted to the process of suburbanisation as it evolved in the post-communist period, and patterns of the process are compared with the 'typical' North American model. The authors conclude the paper with a study of selected aspects of political behaviour in relation to socio-spatial changes in the metropolitan areas.

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Is Consultation Everything? The Influence of Interest Groups on Parliamentary Working Bodies in Slovenia

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Abstract: Empirical data gathered from surveys of MPs and interest groups in Slovenia reveal that the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia is a relatively powerful and accessible political institution. Parliamentary working bodies are perceived by MPs and interest groups as the focal point of their contacts. While MPs find interest groups to be both valuable sources of input into the legislative process and relatively influential policy actors, interest groups are relatively happy with how accessible MPs are, though they are less happy with their own impact on parliamentary decision-making. Despite the direct exchange between MPs and interest groups, political parties still play an important gatekeeping role. The identified factors of the impact of interest groups on the legislative process include the formally defined roles and competencies of parliamentary working bodies, policy sector variations, European interest-group networking, and the leadership styles of those who chair the working bodies.
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Introduction

Consultation between policy-makers and interest groups is usually seen as an important part of democratic politics. Still, the question remains of whether this is sufficient for ensuring its truly democratic character. Mattila [1999: 21] stressed that "it is not enough that public actors 'listen' to various actors – they should also give attention to views that differ from their own opinions". This article focuses on the relationships between interest groups and parliaments (especially their working bodies) in the policy-making process.

Parliamentary openness (its accessibility) is usually understood as a pre-condition for successful interest group activities. However, is it simultaneously a necessary and sufficient pre-condition for interest groups' impact on parliamentary decision-making? In the case of Slovenia a preliminary answer to this question may be

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based on findings from the following empirical research conducted within the framework of the Centre for Political Science Research at the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana:

a) a survey of all MPs in 1991, 1994 and 1998;[1]
b) a survey of MPs who were members of parliamentary working bodies[2] in 1992;[3]
c) a survey among the leaders of parliamentary party groups and the chairs of parliamentary working bodies in 2000;[4]
d) a survey conducted in 1996 among the 70 most active interest groups in 11 policy fields;[5]
e) a survey to determine the influence of interest groups on parliamentary working bodies that was conducted in 1996 among chairs, secretaries and experts–advisers to working bodies;[6]
f) sectoral and other case studies;[7]

[1] The head of the 1991 survey (of MPs in the old assembly) was Danica Fink-Hafner, and the response rate was 55%. The 1994 (81.1% response rate) and 1998 surveys (57.7% response rate) in the newly established National Assembly were headed by Drago Zajc.

[2] Committees and commissions are established in the Slovenian parliament and the name commonly used for both is a parliamentary working body. While committees are established according to the policy fields covered by an individual ministry or for policy fields covered by two or more ministries, commissions are established for the purpose of investigating common questions (for example, the Commission for the Rules of Procedure, the Commission for Mandates and Elections), or to investigate certain affairs (for example, the Commission for Supervision of the Security and Intelligence Services, the Commission for Budgetary and Other Public Finance Control).

[3] A survey by Drago Zajc et al., with a 81.6% response rate. The total number of respondents was 26.

[4] The head of the survey was Drago Zajc, the research results were presented by Drago Zajc and Damjan Lajh [2000]. The response rate was 90.3%.

[5] The research was conducted in June 1996 and encompassed 70 interest groups in the following policy fields: economic and social policy, housing, agricultural policy, the disabled, ecology, health care, education, culture, sport, marketing and PR. In the field of economic and social policies, interviews were conducted with all employer organisations and all the main trade unions. In other policy sectors, interest groups were selected that had been identified in other research (e.g. a survey of MPs who were members of parliamentary working bodies conducted by Zajc in 1992; a survey of all MPs by Zajc in 1994) as very active in the field or had been suggested by other respondents in the same field as very important interest groups. Therefore, the respondents represent the most active interest groups in the chosen policy fields and are not a representative sample of all interest groups in Slovenia.

[6] A survey headed by Danica Fink-Hafner of key people in the leadership of all twenty-three parliamentary working bodies (of twenty-three interviewees, 30.4% were the presidents of working bodies, 60.9% were secretaries and experts – advisers to the working bodies, and 8.7% did not clearly define their roles).

[7] Fink-Hafner 1995; Pacek 1996; Vončina 1996.

g) a survey among members of selected parliamentary working bodies and representatives of interest groups, supplemented by interviews with three lobbyists and a representative of one big interest group in 2003.[8]

This examination of the impact resulting from formal changes to the role of parliamentary working bodies (the Slovenian National Assembly's statutory rules were amended in 2002) will also test a hypothesis about the importance of the policy-making competencies of formal working bodies for the impact of interest groups on parliamentary decision-making.

Policy-making processes and actors

Policy-making processes are usually longer, institutionally and procedurally defined processes in which, as a rule, many policy actors are involved. Normally, policy actors with formally and legally defined policy-making competencies are part of these processes. Alongside them, other policy actors are often included, or they at least try to gain access to these processes in an effort to influence decision-making processes and consequently also public policies.

Parliaments are among those policy actors that have formally and legally defined competencies. Still, it should be stressed that parliaments in various countries have different roles in policy-making processes. According to Mezey [1979] and Norton [1994] there are three types of parliaments: parliaments with strong policy-making power; parliaments with moderate policy-making power; and parliaments with little or no policy-making power.

In many countries interest groups are frequently involved in policy processes in pursuit of their interests. This is primarily why they try to influence powerful policy-makers in particular. For estimating the power of specific policy-makers it is clear that formally defined competencies are important [Ippolito and Walker 1980;

[8] The research was headed by Alenka Krašovec. Three parliamentary working bodies and their members were included in the survey: the Committee on Infrastructure and the Environment, the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled, and the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy. They were selected on the basis of previous research on how open (the Committee on Infrastructure and the Environment, the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled) or closed they were (the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy) to consultations with interest groups. In addition, an effort was made to avoid parliamentary working bodies with more or less the same MPs comprising their members. The response rate varied among different working bodies. In the case of the Committee on Infrastructure and the Environment and the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy it was 44.4% and in the case of the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled it was 37.8%.

A sample of interest groups was created on the basis of answers gathered in the survey among members of selected working bodies on the most active and/or most influential interest groups.

Etzioni-Halevy 1983; Richardson 1993]. "Since government, parliament and bureaucracy have necessary formally defined policy-making competencies" [Ippolito and Walker 1980: 270] they are, as a rule, the main targets of interest groups' activities. But this is not the only criterion used when interest groups select their targets. The openness (accessibility) of potential targets is also important [Presthus 1974; Grant 1989; Richardson 1993; Howlett and Ramesh 1995]. Policy actors with the most influential role in policy-making processes are not necessarily at the same time the ones most open (accessible) to interest group activity, and vice versa [Ippolito and Walker 1980; Howlett and Ramesh 1995]. Given that interest groups want to maximise their interests, they seek to influence various policy actors at the same time [Richardson 1993]. In order to maximise their interests they present their ideas, views and policy solutions to policy makers. Nevertheless, in each case lobbying targets are selected according to the specific circumstances.

Parliament as a lobbying target

Parties, government, bureaucracy and interest groups usually have ties to parliament [Olson and Mezey 1991]. The interest of these actors in becoming involved with parliament greatly depends on parliament's role in policy-making processes [Norton 1999]. Where parliament does not play even a modest role in the policy process, other actors tend not to have any substantial interest in it. Usually, interest groups are most interested in establishing links with parliament because they have no formally defined policy-making competencies themselves [von Beyme 1998].

On the other hand, parliament also needs connections with other actors and this is reflected in its openness or accessibility [von Beyme 1998]. Parliament is usually interested in gathering additional and various types of information, knowledge and expertise [Grant 1989; Patzelt 1997; Norton 1999]. For parliaments, interest groups are among the richest sources of information, knowledge and expertise [Norton 1999: 12; Patzelt 1997: 59], which may be partial or incomplete. But it is up to MPs to decide how, to what extent and what kind of support, knowledge and expertise delivered by interest groups to use in their own work. Norton [1999] has pointed out that interest groups and their information, knowledge and expertise also help MPs control the work of the government. As a rule, parliament uses interest group support to legitimise its actions and decisions [Grant 1989].[9] In fact, parliaments and interest groups have mutual interest in co-operation [Norton 1999].

[9] In 1994 Patzelt conducted a survey among MPs in the German Bundestag. His results indicated that two kinds of support were the most valuable: expertise and moral support, while just a few MPs answered that interest groups offered them help in organising political events and even fewer answered that interest groups had offered them financial support [Patzelt 1997].

Parliamentary working bodies as the focus of interest group activity within parliament

Connections between parliaments and interest groups have most frequently been established in: a) the working bodies of parliaments, as they are usually the main target of interest group activity [Olson and Mezey 1991; Norton 1994; von Beyme 1998], especially if working bodies have a great influence or significant role in policy-making processes; and b) public hearings organised by parliamentary working bodies [von Beyme 1998]. Since parliaments in the modern world have many functions and obligations, it was necessary to introduce a division of labour and legislative specialisation [Norton 1994]. This is primarily expressed in the establishment and activities of parliamentary working bodies.

Given the division of labour, specialisation, and the establishment of parliamentary working bodies, interests groups and MPs with interests in the same policy fields are usually the main actors in these bodies. Working bodies are the key venues for interest group activity and link the two actors, especially if the following conditions are met:

a) If parliamentary party groups have introduced a division of labour at a relatively advanced level. Individual MPs are responsible for certain policy fields, and other MPs from the same parliamentary party group are willing to listen to them and adhere to the notion of party discipline.

b) If working bodies operate on a relatively permanent basis. This means that individual working bodies are established consecutively in many legislative periods and are responsible (repeatedly) for almost the same policy fields, while the composition of members does not change much [Olson and Mezey 1991]. The continued duration of working bodies helps them accumulate expertise and knowledge from a particular policy field and to establish connections with (neutral) suppliers of such support. This also enables MPs who are not specialists in a certain policy field to accumulate and upgrade their knowledge [Olson and Mezey 1991]. In addition, it encourages the development of a common spirit within the working body [Norton 1994]. Olson and Mezey [1991: 15] added that all of this can lead to the increasing independence of a particular working body and consequently to its enhanced role in policy-making processes.

c) If working bodies are created according to the policy fields of ministries. Since the Second World War working bodies have been created more and more in accordance with the policy fields of individual ministries [Zajc 2000: 176]. Consequently, individual working bodies work in the same policy fields as the individual ministries of a government. Laws are mainly proposed by the government, but they are subjected to a more in-depth examination by working bodies. This usually allows working bodies to have a greater role in policy-making processes.

d) If working bodies have important formal competencies in parliamentary decision-making. In modern parliaments, parliamentary working bodies are usually the venues where the majority of parliamentary policy-making processes take place [Olson and Mezey 1991]. Several authors [Polsby 1975; Olson and Mezey 1991; Norton 1994; Von Beyme 1998] have linked the performance of working bodies and their role in policy-making processes with parliament's role in these processes. According to these authors, when working bodies occupy a more important role in policy-making processes this also indicates that parliament has a more important role in such processes. The most important formal competencies of working bodies include: the capacity to amend proposed laws (to change laws proposed by the government) and the right to submit laws.

General perceptions of the importance and accessibility of the Parliament of Slovenia

Common perceptions

As defined in its Constitution Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy. In practice the Slovenian parliament has succeeded in developing a reactive and even a substantial initiating capability [Zajc 1996]. Interest groups usually select lobbying targets according to their estimate of the potential target's power in specific policy-making processes. Slovenia's lower chamber (the National Assembly – mostly referred to as the Slovenian parliament) is usually regarded as relatively powerful in relation to the executive and other state actors, including the upper chamber (the National Council). The survey conducted among the 70 most active interest groups in 11 policy fields (1996) revealed that they perceive the government to be the most powerful public policy actor (80.9% estimated that the government is very powerful), but at the same time 73.9% stated that the National Assembly also holds a very significant amount of power. The mass media was ranked third, but not that far behind parliament (72% of respondents thought it has a very significant amount of power).[10]

MPs' viewpoints

Data from the 1994 parliamentary survey (headed by Zajc) reveal MPs to be relatively open to consultative politics. In general, MPs thought that interest group involvement could improve the quality of their policy-making.

Up to 59.7% of respondents in the 1998 parliamentary survey declared that contacts with interest groups are very useful for MPs. In this respect interests

[10] The same scale of measurement was used for all policy actors: a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 'no power at all' and 5 meaning 'very big power'. The percentages quoted are the sums of answers indicating a 4 and 5 on that scale.

Table 1. Frequency of contacts between MPs and interest groups (% of MP-respondents)

	1994	1998
Daily	11.0	11.5
Weekly	37.0	59.6
Monthly	35.6	17.3
Less than monthly	9.6	11.5
No answer	6.8	0.0

Sources: The 1994 and 1998 surveys of MPs headed by Drago Zajc.

groups are comparable to the importance of parliamentary materials for the work of MPs (60.8% of respondents regarded these materials as very useful).[11] According to the 2000 survey by Zajc and Lajh, conducted among the chairs of parliamentary working bodies and leaders of parliamentary party groups, contacts with professional associations, economic organisations and trade unions are the most useful. It is interesting that while 76.9% of MP-respondents regarded contacts with the specified interest groups as useful to an important extent,[12] only 57.6% of respondents shared the same view when only the general name 'interest group' was used in the question instead of a specific list of interest groups.

In spite of some negative experiences, 69.9% of MPs surveyed in 1994 did not agree with the statement that the influence of different organisations, associations and groups could jeopardise democratic policy-making, although 9.2% still thought it could. The chairs and secretaries of parliamentary working bodies interviewed in January 1996 (a survey headed by Fink-Hafner) almost unanimously agreed with the idea that consultation with interest groups should be encouraged in the work of parliamentary bodies in the future.

As early as in 1994 MPs were reporting close contacts with interest groups (11.0% had daily contact, 37.0% weekly and 35.6% at least monthly). They indicated especially links with organised interests in their profession, place of residence and personal interests (such as culture, sport, and hobbies). In a spring 1994 survey, MPs listed only eighty-six interest groups they considered important in their own specific policy fields. Among the most frequently named were trade unions, farmers, the disabled, the Chamber of Commerce, health care institutions and organisations, local communities, the retired, economic organisations and universities.

On the one hand, the number of interest groups the MPs cited as influential is

[11] MPs estimated the usefulness of specific information sources for their work on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 meant 'the source is not useful at all' and 7 meant 'the source is very useful'. The quoted data include answers indication 6 and 7.

[12] In the 2000 parliamentary survey a scale from 1 to 5 was used, where 1 meant 'the source is not useful at all' and 5 meant 'the source is very useful'. The quoted data include answers indicating 4 and 5.

very small in comparison with the 52 179 organisations and enterprises officially registered[13] in December 1993. On the other hand, 71% of MPs felt that the number of organisations, associations, societies and groups seeking to influence parliamentary decision-making was growing. A January 1996 survey of the chairs and secretaries of parliamentary working bodies (research by Fink-Hafner) confirmed that representatives of certain interest groups were regularly invited to participate in meetings and that other interest groups occasionally asked if they could participate in working sessions. But even though the intensity of mutual contacts between interest groups and MPs was perceived by both MPs[14] and interest groups as growing, political parties (at least according to some research[15]) remain the gate-keepers, which can selectively strengthen or weaken the voice of interest groups in policy-making.

Interest group viewpoints

It is no surprise that the data indicated above show that interest groups in the 1996 survey regarded the government (specific ministries within it) as the most important and the National Assembly as the second-most important lobbying target. Nevertheless, differences in the level of accessibility of the two political institutions help define the practical strategies of interest group lobbying. According to the 1996 survey among the 70 most active interest groups in 11 policy fields the government was seen as the least accessible institution (36.8% of respondents thought it was – almost – inaccessible).[16] In fact, in Slovenia a negative correlation between power and accessibility can be seen in the case of the executive. The parliament is perceived to be both a relatively powerful and relatively easily accessible public policy actor.[17]

Obviously, co-operation between parliament and its working bodies on the one hand and interest groups on the other is not important for interest groups alone. In the 1996 survey 10.3% of interest group representatives answered that co-operation was established on the basis of the initiative of parliament or its working bodies, while 19.1% of those surveyed indicated that co-operation had been established at the interest group's initiative. The majority (47.1%) of interest group representatives answered that who actually initiated co-operation between the two actors depended on the particular case.

[13] Official data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.

[14] In 1994 71.0% of the surveyed MPs judged that the number of interest groups trying to influence policy-making processes was growing [Fink-Hafner 1996], while in 1998 73.1% of the surveyed MPs thought so [Zajc 1999].

[15] For example, research in the field of agricultural policies [Fink-Hafner 1995] and the survey among 70 interest groups in eleven policy fields [Fink-Hafner 1996].

[16] The scale used in the survey was from 1 to 5, where 1 meant the 'actor is easily accessible' and 5 meant the 'actor is not accessible'. The data cited in the text represent answers 4 and 5.

[17] A total of 36.8% of the surveyed representatives of interest groups saw the parliament as relatively easily accessible (answers 1 and 2).

The 1996 survey of interest groups conducted by Fink-Hafner also shows that international networking (especially European) and support for Slovenian interest groups do in fact make a difference in the Slovenian policy arena, including the parliamentary arena. In many cases, it is precisely the support from the EU that makes Slovenian interest groups significantly more successful in asserting their interests than interest groups without any European links.[18]

The impact of interest groups on parliamentary decision-making

The formal role of parliamentary working bodies in the Slovenian legislative process

Formally, parliamentary working bodies have had a key role in the inclusion of interest groups in parliamentary decision-making since the first mandate of the National Assembly was established on the basis of the 1991 Constitution. Already in the first Statutory Rules of the National Assembly (1993) working bodies were assigned many important formal roles and competencies, such as the capacity to amend bills, to put issues on the parliamentary agenda, to take issues off the parliamentary agenda, to issue opinions on amendments by other actors, and to issue reports on bills in different stages of the legislative process.

The 2002 Statutory Rules added some formal competencies to working bodies in the legislative process, while simultaneously shortening it. According to the majority of parliamentary experts these new Statutory Rules have significantly empowered the parliamentary working bodies. However, at first sight comparisons between the old and new rules (Table 2) do not really reveal any big changes.

However, it also needs to be noted that in 2002 working bodies received some very important competencies in the first and second stages of the legislative process. According to the new rules the first stage of the legislative process is complete when parliamentary materials are distributed to both MPs and working bodies. The only exception is if MPs in a certain period demand a plenary session. In the second stage working bodies are (according to the new rules) entities that have

[18] The research also showed that European 'empowerment' is not equally dispersed among various types of interest groups. Economic groups get more information, analysis and expert help from their EU counterparts. They are also more successful in employing representatives of their European counterparts to advocate their interests in communications with Slovenian decision-makers.

Another survey, focusing on economic interest groups (the 2000–2001 survey by Fink-Hafner, Krašovec and Stanonik) revealed that there are important differences even within that cluster (between employer and employee organisations). At first glance it may be said that employer organisations have better resources of their own and privileged access to and influence on Slovenian policy actors in the area of EU integration policy-making than do employee organisations. The empowerment employee organisations get from the EU does not seem to make a big difference in this respect (although there are also important variations between employer organisations). For more on all these findings see Fink-Hafner [2001].

Table 2. Comparative view of the role of parliamentary working bodies according to the 1993 and 2002 National Assembly Statutory Rules

	1993 Statutory Rules	2002 Statutory Rules	Working bodies' gains? 1993–2002	Working bodies' losses? 1993–2002
Standard procedure of the legislative process	three-stage	three-stage	yes	no
Putting issues on the parliamentary agenda	yes	yes	no	no
Taking issues off the parliamentary agenda	yes	yes	no	no
Issuing reports on bills in separate stages of the legislative process	yes	yes	no	partly*
Proposing amendments to bills	yes	yes	no	no
Issuing opinions on amendments proposed by other actors	yes	yes	no	no
Control over implementation of decisions made by parliament	yes	yes	no	no

* The working body does not have the right to issue a report on a bill in the third stage of the legislative process.

to create opinions on proposed bills first. After the discussion, working bodies can propose that parliament continue a legislative process or stop it. If working bodies propose that parliament stop a legislative process MPs can at a plenary session merely vote on the proposal; they cannot discuss the proposal. In fact, the new Statutory Rules replaced the consultative status of working bodies in all three stages of the legislative process with the decisive role they are given in the first two stages (with some exceptions).

After the 2002 Statutory Rules were put into practice, in the 2003 survey conducted by Krašovec the majority (85.4%) of respondents from the three selected working bodies and from the representatives of selected interest groups believed that the working bodies had sufficient formal powers. However, there are relatively large differences between the opinions of MPs (members of selected working bodies) and those of interest groups. While 92.6% of MP-respondents thought that working bodies had enough formal powers, 'only' 69.2% of respondents representing interest groups held this opinion.

The practical role of parliamentary working bodies in the legislative process

Our research found that working bodies are focal points where interest groups and MPs meet. According to the 1996 survey among the 70 most active interest groups in 11 policy fields, interest groups are more focused on specific working bodies than on individual MPs or parliamentary groups. The 2003 survey of members of three selected working bodies and of representatives of selected interest groups also shows there is almost no difference between the predominant view of MPs and interest groups that working bodies are the focal points of co-operation between MPs and interest groups.

Although the majority (75.6%) of the respondents from the selected working bodies and from the interest groups in the 2003 survey thought that the practical role of working bodies in the legislative process was sufficient, there is an obvious difference between their formal roles and their practical roles. In addition, there are still some visible differences in the views held by various policy actors. As much as 88.9% of the respondents from the three selected working bodies thought the practical role of working bodies was sufficient, while the interest group-respondents who participate in the activities of these working bodies were more sceptical – only 46.2% of them thought the practical role of working bodies sufficient, even though 69.2% of them estimated their formal powers as large enough.

As the data in Table 3 show, in 1998 and 2000 the two specific populations of MPs surveyed mainly assessed the strength of the influence of parliamentary working bodies on the legislative process as 'medium', while extremely low or high estimates were very few. For methodological reasons we cannot say whether the posi-

Table 3. Practical parliamentary working bodies' influence on policy-making processes (answers in %)

Practical PWB influence on policy-making processes	All MPs survey 1998	PWB presidents and PG leader survey 2000	Selected PWB* survey 2003
No	2.0	0.0	0.0
Little	25.0	19.2	22.0
Medium	50.0	57.7	41.5
Big	17.3	15.4	29.3
Very big	5.7	7.7	7.3

Sources: Zajc [1999]; Zajc and Lajh [2000]; Krašovec [2004].

Note: PWB = parliamentary working bodies.

PG = parliamentary groups.

* The three selected PWB were: the Committee on Infrastructure and the Environment, the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled, and the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy.

tive shift in the average estimate of working bodies' influence as shown in the 2003 by Krašovec (only three selected working bodies were investigated) applies to all parliamentary working bodies.

General estimates of the impact of interest groups on parliamentary decision-making

According to the research findings from the 1996 survey among the 70 most active interest groups in 11 policy fields (as presented above), the National Assembly is relatively open and accessible to interest groups and is a quite important target of practical lobbying. As noted above, within this broader picture interest groups are somewhat more critical than MPs in their evaluation of the openness (accessibility) of working bodies. The 2003 survey of members of three selected working bodies and interest groups involved in the activities of the three selected working bodies shows that almost all MPs assessed the openness of the working bodies to the activities of interest groups as sufficient, whereas interest groups were slightly more sceptical (Table 4).

In either case, the number of interest groups trying to influence the legislative process, and the frequency of contact between interest group representatives and MPs have been growing. While MPs consider interest groups an important source of information necessary for parliamentary work, the question of the impact interest groups have on parliamentary decision-making remains open.

The survey among chairs of working bodies' and leaders of parliamentary party groups' in 2000 and the survey among interest groups in 1996 reveal certain differences between the perceptions of the 'influence' of interest groups' and the perceptions of their 'effectiveness'. In the 2000 survey a large majority assessed interest group influence as strong (15.4% of respondents thought it was very strong and 57.7% as strong[19]). Data from the 1996 survey also confirm the relatively impor-

Table 4. Are working bodies sufficiently open (accessible) to the activities of interest groups? (according to members of working bodies and interest group representatives, answers in %)

	Working bodies	Interest groups
Yes	92.6	69.2
No	7.4	30.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Krašovec [2004].

[19] Given that the survey population consisted of 26 respondents, 15.4% actually means four respondents and 57.7% fifteen respondents.

Table 5. Estimates of the influence of interest groups on policy-making processes (according to members of working bodies and interest group representatives, answers in %)

	Working bodies	Interest groups
Very big	4.5	0.0
Big	59.1	15.4
Little	36.4	76.9
No influence	0.0	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Krašovec [2004].

tant influence of interest groups. These findings show interest groups have been particularly efficient when trying to put issues on the parliamentary agenda or taking issues off that agenda.[20]

However, it is evident from the 2003 survey among members of three selected working bodies and selected interest groups that there are still important differences between the quite optimistic views of MPs and the very critical estimates of interest group representatives regarding the influence interest groups have on policy-making processes (Table 5).

As the survey shows, even after the 2002 Statutory Rules provided working bodies with formal empowerment no significant changes occurred in the influence of interest groups on policy-making processes.

Sectoral differences

Meso-level empirical research on the emerging policy networks in Slovenia shows that civil society is still relatively weak compared to other policy actors (especially the executive, parliament and political parties). However, in certain sectors more powerful segments of civil society (above all economic groups) have succeeded in establishing themselves as partners in institutionalised forms of consultative politics. In other policy fields, the emerging policy networks differ considerably and have less stable structures.[21]

[20] A total of 64.7% of respondents answered that they had been successful in efforts to put issues on the parliamentary agenda, while only 45.6% of interest groups had been successful in such efforts. On the other hand, 29.4% of respondents reported success in their efforts to take issues off the parliamentary agenda and 25.0% had been successful in taking issues off the government agenda.

[21] The factors that led to the disintegration of the old policy networks and various practices when policy networks were being (re-)created during the transition to democracy in Slovenia

For example, the 2003 survey confirmed that the working body responsible for finance and monetary policy has been much more closed off to interest group activity than the working body responsible for infrastructure and the environment or the working body responsible for health, labour, the family, social policy and the disabled.

The data in Table 5 reveal the differences in opinion between the members of the three selected working bodies and the interest group representatives. Therefore, the findings presented in Table 6 are not too surprising. It is evident that almost all interest groups think their influence should be bigger, whereas just 42.3% of the members of working bodies hold this opinion.

However, there are also differences between the selected working bodies. Since the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy is much more closed to interest groups than the other two working bodies, it would be possible to expect that the interest groups involved in work with the Committee on Finance and Monetary

Table 6. What influence should interest groups have on policy-making processes? (according to members of working bodies and interest group representatives, answers in %)

	Working bodies	Interest groups
It should be bigger	42.3	92.3
It is appropriate (should remain the same)	57.7	7.7
It should be smaller	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Krašovec [2004].

include the following [Fink-Hafner 1998; Mandič 1998]: the old socialist political system and to a significant extent the planned economy was replaced by a multi-party system and a market economy; political elite changes brought about discontinuity in government attitudes towards consultation with interest groups; especially the new elite which came into power in 1990 deeply distrusted some of the old well-established interest groups; during the transition many important systemic changes had to be put into place (introducing many new laws, including the new Constitution, and establishing all the institutions necessary for a newly independent state), which were predominantly issues of party politics and to a lesser extent policy issues the new elite wanted to consult interest groups about; the oppositional society of the 1980s partly transformed itself into political parties, partly into civil society interest organisations and partly disappeared; some old interest organisations adapted themselves to changes in the environment; new interest groups appeared during the process of many reforms (especially privatisation and denationalisation); given that many previously existing policy networks ceased to exist the newly emerging ones first started mainly as personal networks; interest groups with more independent resources and greater power (especially economic interest groups) have succeeded more in their pressure to create more institutionalised policy networks with an important influence on behalf of non-state actors.

Policy have less influence than those interest groups involved with the other two working bodies. Surprisingly, there appear to be no significant differences in the influence of interest groups on the work of the three committees. Nevertheless, for 50% of the survey respondents the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled clearly stands out, as they estimated the influence of interest groups on that body as very strong or strong.

When the members of the three selected working bodies and of the interest groups involved in their work were asked whether interest groups should have more or less influence, then the expected differences between working bodies did emerge. A total of 75.0% of respondents estimated that the interest groups should have 'more' influence in the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy, while 'only' around 50.0% of those surveyed believed the interest groups should have more influence in the other two working bodies.

The leadership style of the chairs

Formal rules are not the only variables that can determine the quality and intensity of collaboration between interest groups and parliamentary working bodies. The respondents from the three selected working bodies and the selected interest groups in the 2003 survey by Krašovec[22] unanimously agreed that the quality and intensity of co-operation between MPs and interest groups also depend on the leadership style of the chair of a given working body.

In interviews conducted in 2003 with three lobbyists and a representative of one big interest group the above-mentioned opinions of members of selected working bodies and selected interest groups on the importance of the chair's leadership style were confirmed. According to four respondents, the dependence of interest groups on the chair's leadership style is most obvious in the chair's decisions about who is ultimately invited to a working body session, and who receives the opportunity to speak. One respondent shared his experiences from the mid-1990s and indicated that, while at the time the same legal rules applied for all working bodies, there were nonetheless differences between them and it was the chairs of the bodies who were the sources of these differences. All working bodies had the opportunity to invite representatives of interest groups to working body sessions. However,

[22] Three parliamentary working bodies and their members were included in the survey: the Committee on Infrastructure and the Environment, the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled, and the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy. The response rate varied between individual working bodies. In the case of the Committee on Infrastructure and the Environment and the Committee on Finance and Monetary Policy the response rate was 44.4%, while for the Committee on Health, Labour, the Family, Social Policy and the Disabled it was 37.8%. A sample of interest groups was created on the basis of answers gathered in the research among members of selected working bodies on the most active and/or most influential interest groups.

this practice was only adopted in some working bodies and not all. Some working bodies were sending parliamentary materials to the interest groups, others were not. Given that the system allowed for both options, the decisions to deliver parliamentary materials or to invite interest groups to participate in working body sessions clearly depended on the individual working body's chair.

The consequences of changes to the formal role of working bodies for the impact of an interest group

The National Assembly's Statutory Rules were amended in 2002. As already noted, these changes included enhanced formal competencies of working bodies in the legislative process and a shortening of that process. The shorter legislative process allows less time and fewer opportunities for interest group activities in parliamentary decision-making.

According to the 2003 survey (including MPs in the three selected working bodies and the interest groups involved in their activities), 45% of all respondents estimated that the influence of working bodies on the legislative process had increased, while 50% thought it had remained the same (despite frequent differences between the opinions of MPs and interest groups no significant differences were detected between them in this respect). It was expected that the above-mentioned change would be reflected in the number of interest group attempts to influence parliamentary decision-making and in their greater impact.

a) Number of active interest groups

The majority (65.9%) of the MPs in the three selected bodies and interest group representatives involved in their activities responded that the number of active interest groups had approximately remained the same, whereas 29.3% thought the number of active interest groups had increased.

As the data in Table 7 show, the interest groups especially noted an increase in the number of active interest groups. This can at least partly be explained by the fact that they are more sensitive to (new) competition.

The majority of those who believed the number of active interest groups had increased saw the main reason for this as lying in the boosted formal and practical competencies of working bodies. On the other hand, those who estimated that the number of active interest groups had stayed approximately the same were for the most part convinced that changes merely to formal roles cannot significantly affect the activity of interest groups. For them those interest groups that wanted or endeavoured to co-operate with working bodies had already established co-operation before the mentioned changes.

Table 7. Number of active interest groups after the new Statutory Rules were introduced (according to members of working bodies and interest group representatives, answers in %)

	Working bodies	Interest groups
The number has increased	25.9	38.5
The number is approximately the same	70.4	53.8
The number has decreased	3.7	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Krašovec [2004].

Table 8. The impact of interest groups before and after the new Statutory Rules were introduced (according to members of working bodies and interest group representatives, answers in %)

	Working bodies	Interest groups
Bigger before the change	11.5	8.3
Stayed approximately the same	69.2	83.3
Bigger after the change	19.2	8.3
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Krašovec [2004].

b) Interest group impact

The majority (74.4%) of all surveyed members of three selected bodies and the selected interest groups estimated that the impact of interest groups had stayed at approximately the same level. Only 15.4% of them thought the impact of interest groups had increased, while 10.3% thought they had a bigger impact before the new Statutory Rules were introduced.

MPs are obviously more sensitive, as 19.2% of them believed that interest groups had a bigger impact after the new Statutory Rules were introduced, while 11.5% thought their impact was bigger before the new rules were introduced.

c) The intensity and quality of co-operation between working bodies and interest groups

The amendments to the Statutory Rules have not brought any important changes to the intensity and quality of co-operation between working bodies and interest groups. In 2003, 35% of all surveyed members of the three selected working bodies and the interest groups involved in their work assessed the mutual co-operation prior to the changes to the Statutory Rules as good, while 41% also assessed their co-

operation after the introduction of the new Statutory Rules as good. More in-depth analysis of the intensity and quality of co-operation between the two actors revealed that members of selected working bodies are the ones who tend to be more satisfied with the intensity and quality of the co-operation. MPs from the majority of working bodies judged the co-operation to be very good or good, while the majority of interest groups assessed the co-operation as acceptable or poor. The difference between the two actors is probably not a big surprise.

d) The relevance of interest group activities

Data on the openness (accessibility) of working bodies, on the impact of interest groups on policy-making processes, and on the intensity and quality of mutual co-operation between working bodies and interest groups are obviously (at least) partly also connected with the perception of the importance of co-operation between the two actors in policy-making processes. In 2003, 56.1% of all surveyed members of three selected working bodies and interest groups thought that co-operation is very important, and 39% thought that co-operation is important. The fact that none regarded co-operation as unimportant is telling. MPs and interest groups revealed some of the reasons why co-operation is (very) important: it is a way of searching for consensus when important questions have been raised; MPs are not necessarily experts in all policy fields and interest groups can usually supply their expertise, knowledge and information; interest groups are able to warn MPs about practical aspects or issues that remain unresolved, and this usually leads to the easier implementation of decisions made by MPs; co-operation with interest groups can introduce different aspects and possibilities into policy-making processes; interest group activity can de-politicise some issues.

Intensive consultation with a mid-range impact

The rich variety of research presented in the discussion above points to the following key findings:

a) The mutual exchange of information, knowledge, legitimacy and influence between Slovenian MPs and interest groups does occur to a significant extent.

b) Despite the predominant view that the Slovenian parliament is relatively powerful[23] and at the same time relatively easily accessible to interest groups, these phenomena do not directly translate into the relatively big impact of interest groups on parliamentary decision-making.

[23] Zajc [2000] found that the Slovenian parliament can be primarily described as a parliament with moderate policy-making power. Nevertheless, it can sometimes also be regarded as a parliament with strong policy-making power.

c) While parliamentary working bodies are the key venues for MPs and interest group representatives to meet, and they have relatively important formal competencies and roles, their practices are still not in line with the expectations of interest groups.

d) Although the formal powers of parliamentary working bodies are also important factors in the influence of interest groups on parliamentary decision-making, the formal empowerment of parliamentary working bodies does not automatically result in interest groups having a bigger impact on the legislative process.

e) Despite the fact that MPs tend to view interest group expertise and information as the second-most important source of information and knowledge used in their decision-making (nearly as important as parliamentary materials), the respondents from interest groups had the impression that they are not very influential.

f) In addition to the general impression that interest groups have a 'mid-range' impact on Slovenian parliamentary decision-making, and alongside the discrepancies between the views of MPs and interest group representatives, there are several other variables that add to the variety of experiences in parliamentary working bodies, specifically, sectoral variations (variations between specific policy sectors covered by different working bodies), variations in interest group empowerment via European networking, and the leadership style of the chairs of working bodies.

While Slovenian MPs consider interest groups to be active and influential, interest groups believe their interests should be even further incorporated into parliamentary decision-making. In order to obtain a clearer picture, however, international comparisons with the experiences in Slovenia are necessary. However, the fact should not be overlooked that the role of MPs is complex. They need to take into account the many determinants of their decision-making behaviour apart from interest group activities, such as ideological beliefs, and in addition to party policy and the interest in winning the next elections.

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Contents:

Theory of Science (The Theory of Science, Technology and Communication) is the only periodical in the Czech Republic devoted to systematic and integrated research in the field of science and technology. The journal focuses on the philosophical and methodological foundations of scientific knowledge and the relationships between science, technology and society. The journal publishes from a broad range of fields dealing with the scientific analysis of science and technology: philosophy, sociology, and economics of science and technology, scientific policy, and technology assessments. In recent years the journal's content has also been proportionately devoted to the growing impact of new communication technology. Four issues of *Theory of Science* are published annually, two in English (Nos. 1 & 3) and two in Czech.

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Why Czech Parliamentary Party Groups Vote Less Unitedly. The Role of Frequent Voting and Big Majorities in Passing Bills*

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Abstract: The article aims to explain voting unity in the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic based on data from the years 1998–2002. It introduces the basic terminology and theoretical framework used in literature on the behaviour of parties in parliament and the basic institutional rules that should result in the unity of political parties in the Czech parliament. It then presents the data used to measure the unity of Czech parliamentary party groups. The initial assumption that specific institutional factors found in parliament and in political parties would lead to greater PPG unity in the Czech Republic was not confirmed. Although the institutional incentives are similar to those in Western European countries, they do not secure the same level of voting unity in Czech PPGs. The authors conclude that the relatively low party unity is caused by the size of the voting coalitions that pass individual bills.
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There is a tendency to describe contemporary democracies as party governments [e.g. Castles and Wildenmann 1986], where political parties play a key role in organising the election contest, selecting candidates for public office, and forming a government on the basis of a parliamentary majority. These roles are codified and documented in the constitutions and laws that regulate the election contest and the way in which political parties operate. Theories of parliamentary democracy and party government assume the existence of unified voting blocks in parliament, or, more precisely, unified parliamentary party groups (PPGs[1]). Shaun Bowler, David

* The work this article is based on was supported by research project no. AV0 Z70280505 'The Sociological Analysis of Long-term Social Processes in Czech Society, 2005–2010'. This article is an abbreviated and in places substantially re-worked version of a study, to which the authors sometimes make reference for more detailed description or argumentation [Linek and Rakušanová 2002].

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[1] Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole [2000b: 249] define parliamentary party groups as "an organised group of members of a representative body who were elected either under the same

Farell and Richard Katz [1999] pointed out that for most authors this assumption has acquired a normative status. The unity of PPGs and parties is considered a precondition for the functioning of basic democratic mechanisms like representation and accountability. If the elected MPs of one party are to represent the programme that they were elected to promote and advance, then they should assert it jointly and in union. It should not be that one group in a party advances the opposite of that which the second group is promoting. Moreover, if the mechanism of accountability is to be applied, then parties ought to be trying to seek re-election and the renewal of their mandate. But how can voters evaluate the activity of political parties in elections when it is impossible to detect from the actions of their MPs which viewpoints they represent, and when one section has supported something other than another section [e.g. Mulgan 2003; Przeworski 1999]?

The main objective of this article is to examine party unity and to explain the reasons that lie behind the voting unity of Czech PPGs. The article is based on voting data from 1993–2002 and data from a longitudinal survey conducted among the MPs of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament during the same period. It begins by introducing the basic terminology that is used frequently in debates on the behaviour of parties in parliament, i.e. the concepts of unity, cohesion and discipline, and the methods used to measure these concepts in parliamentary research. This is followed by an explanation of the article's theoretical framework, which suggests possible reasons why parliamentary political parties vote in unison. This theoretical framework draws mainly on the work of Reuven Hazan [2004] and Shaun Bowler [2002], and is based on the idea that MPs' role perception, and therefore also their behaviour and voting, is shaped by the structure of opportunities that exists for meeting their basic strategic objectives, which are re-election and advancement up the parliamentary party ladder. In the next section the authors present the basic institutional rules, which determine the success of MPs in achieving their aims, and which should produce unity within political parties in the Czech parliament. The authors also present data on the unity of Czech PPGs to introduce and discuss the factors that contribute to reducing voting unity.

Semantics and the theoretical approaches used to conceptualise the unity of PPGs

In parliamentary and party research there are several terms that are used to describe the unity of action of a group of MPs: party unity (as opposed to party dissent), party discipline, and party cohesion. In this article we re-conceptualise the semantic

party label or under the label of different parties that do not compete against each other in elections, and who do not explicitly create a group for technical reasons only". In references to PPG the authors have in mind the equivalent of the Czech term *poslanecký klub* or *senátorský klub*, the German *Fraktionen*, and the English terms *parliamentary parties, parties in parliament* etc.

foundation and arrangement of relationships between these terms as put forth by Ergun Ozbundun. Ozbundun defines party cohesion as "the extent to which, in a given situation, group members can be observed to work together for the group's goals in one and the same way" [Ozbundun 1970: 305], while in his opinion, party discipline means that "followers regularly accept and act upon the commands of the leader or leaders". Party discipline also refers to the "ways and means of inducing recalcitrant members to accept and act upon (leader's) commands". Therefore, discipline "refers either to a special type of cohesion achieved by enforcing obedience or to a system of sanctions by which such enforced cohesion is attained" [Ozbundun 1970: 305]. Ozbundun uses the first term to define the second term and vice versa, and arranges these two terms in a hierarchical relationship where discipline is subsumed in cohesion, i.e. he sees discipline as part of cohesion. In his view then cohesion means "an objective condition of unity of action among party members, which may or may not be the function of disciplinary repressions" [Ozbundun 1970: 305].

Ozbundun does not terminologically address the possibility that a PPG may act in unity without needing to employ discipline. But if the aim is to understand how PPGs function and to analyse the unity of PPGs, it is hazardous to neglect this possibility. For the purposes of this article [see also Hazan 2004] Ozbundun's terms are re-conceptualised so that party unity means the observed unity of party members' actions or the unity of PPG actions (Ozbundun's cohesion). Party unity may then be the result of both party cohesion and party discipline. Cohesion and discipline should and must be differentiated as terms, but it is hard to agree with Ozbundun's proposition that discipline is a special type of cohesion, a subgroup of cohesion. As terms, cohesion and discipline differ analytically because they conceptualise party unity from two complementary, but nonetheless different points of view. If party unity is a result of party cohesion it is a consequence of an un-coerced decision by PPG members resulting from the fact that they hold similar opinions. It entails objective unity in the sense that it does not have to be coerced. However, if party unity is the result of party discipline then it is a consequence (1) of the use of coercive means that either the party executive or the PPG leadership have at their disposal to enforce unity/discipline, or simply (2) of how MPs perceive these means or the opportunity structure.

When a PPG acts in unity, it may be because its members agree on the party position (party cohesion), or it may be because they were forced to act that way, even though their personal preferences were different (party discipline). There are many ways of persuading MPs to vote in a way other than their original intentions: party or PPG leadership recommendations, motivating MPs with rewards in the form of appointments or election to a position, or motivating MPs with rewards from interest groups, etc. This conceptualisation has the advantage of differentiating analytically between the terms cohesion, unity, and discipline.[2] Ozbundun's co-

[2] A disadvantage of this conceptualisation (and of Ozbundun's) is its static nature, and as a result it is unable to address the fact that the unity of parliamentary party groups in voting

hesion, which encompasses unity and cohesion, as used here, provides no analytical tools for understanding un-coerced unity of attitudes. In our notion, party cohesion is understood as a condition of collective action, where the party or PPG leadership does not have to work to ensure unity. This kind of collective action is far less costly in terms of the transaction costs for the party leadership, and as such it may be given deliberate priority. Conversely, by introducing a specific agenda it is possible to ensure that no issues on which a party is not cohesive, and which would entail large transaction costs for the leadership in trying to achieve unity, are presented in parliament.[3] These three concepts can be examined and measured with different tools. For example, cohesion can be studied through questionnaire surveys of MPs designed to reveal MPs' attitudes toward individual public policies. By classifying the responses according to their PPG membership, it is possible to create a map of party cohesion. It is possible to measure unity using Rice's Index of Party Cohesion or using other indexes [see Appendix 2 in Linek and Rakušanová 2002]. Discipline can be analysed by examining the tools used to maintain unity among MPs (see Figure 1).

Reuven Hazan [2004] linked the theoretical distinction between cohesion and discipline as two sources of unity with two basic theoretical approaches traditionally used in parliamentary research to explain party unity. He terms the first the sociological approach, which stresses norms and roles. According to this approach MPs act in unity for normative reasons, for example, owing to ideological conviction, political socialisation, or party solidarity. Authors who support this approach underline the role of informal rules, such as loyalty and solidarity, which restrain MPs' behaviour. Conversely, the institutional approach stresses strategic incentives and restrictions and finds the main cause of party unity in the formal arrangements of political parties and parliaments and in the rational conduct of MPs aimed at maximising their utility. Parliaments and parties control the distribution of influence, benefits and re-election. According to Hazan [2004], PPGs achieve unity provided that their members share sufficiently strong views in common; these are non-institutional reasons (the sociological approach). When party cohesion begins to

is a dynamic phenomenon, where cohesion and discipline combine with internalised norms of partisanship. This internalisation refers to the fact that MPs generally do not question or contemplate voting in unity because they consider it right and normal to do so. While MPs give strategic consideration to deviating from a party position, and thus breaching the partisanship norm, they do not contemplate their regular conformity. The partisanship norm can be understood as the exercise of disciplinary power [e.g. Weber 1972: 681–682; Foucault 1975: Chapter 3], i.e. the uniform and general, rationalised and methodically practised execution of accepted orders without the least sign of criticism. In a sense this involves both cohesion (the un-coerced decision to act in unity) and the exercise of discipline (the partisanship norm puts external pressure on MPs' conduct).

[3] It may be expected that party A will intentionally introduce an agenda on which party B is not cohesive and it will consequently force the leadership of party B to either demand a unified vote from its MPs or consent to disunity.

Figure 1. Conceptualisation of the terms *unity*, *cohesion* and *discipline*



break down, there is a need for institutional mechanisms to keep the party together, and this is where discipline comes into play (the institutional approach).

Unlike Hazan, Shaun Bowler prefers the institutional approach and does not consider the sociological approach to be relevant for explaining the unified behaviour of parliamentary party members. Bowler divides the explanations that Hazan includes under the institutional approach into two groups, according to the arenas in which they seek to explain parliamentary party unity – a two-arena model and a one-arena model [Bowler 2002]. The one-arena model highlights the role of incentives and instruments within parliament to explain the unity of parliamentary party groups (the legislative arena). These incentives include nominating members for particular positions, procedural advantages that make it possible to influence the agenda and thus also policy, and benefits and offices. The two-arena model stresses the importance of the electoral competition as the factor that shapes the behaviour of politicians. Unified PPGs are seen as a consequence of the need to compete and win the elections, and political parties provide the basic tools for doing this: a label, funding, advice or organisation (the electoral arena explains the legislative arena). Bowler demonstrates that the two-arena model is capable of explaining the existence of party unity in parliaments when it also focuses on the incentives provided by the candidate selection process within party organisations [Bowler 2002: 176–179].

In this article Bowler's analytical framework is used to analyse the unity of Czech parliamentary parties, taking advantage of the fact that the shared norms and

attitudes (party cohesion) may but need not necessarily contribute to party unity. Conversely, if there is less cohesion, institutional incentives should ensure unity of PPGs. The focus therefore lies on the key elements in the one-arena and two-arena models, i.e., the political and electoral systems, the process of candidate selection in political parties, and parliamentary procedures. These are the institutions that make it possible for MPs to achieve their three basic strategic objectives: re-selection, re-election and advancement up the parliamentary party ladder [Gaines and Garrett 1993: 116].

Institutional and procedural incentives for party unity

The electoral arena: the political and the electoral system and the candidate selection process in Czech parties

The Czech Republic has a parliamentary system and a cabinet structure of government. On the basis of the results of an election political parties negotiate over the construction of a cabinet, which must be capable of securing majority support in the Chamber of Deputies [Mansfeldová and Müller-Rommel 2001]. Jan Kysela describes the Czech political system as parliamentarism without the rationalising elements that strengthen the position of the cabinet in relation to the Chamber of Deputies [Kysela 2003]. Therefore, it is crucial to the formation and maintenance of the cabinet that there is united support for the cabinet in the ruling PPGs. After winning a confidence vote the government is faced with the task of governance, which in modern societies is exercised primarily through the passage of acts and through legislation in general. Consequently, here again the government is dependent on the support of the PPGs and remains so for its entire electoral term. This dependence grows in relation to the position of the government in the legislative process; neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Procedure ascribe any formal privileges to the cabinet in proposing and negotiating acts [see also Kopecký 2000].

After the 1998 elections in the Czech Republic the minority Social Democratic cabinet managed to hold office for the full duration of its term (1998–2002) with the help of the 'Agreement on Creating a Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic', which was signed between the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). For ČSSD the agreement guaranteed a stable cabinet and that ODS would neither initiate a vote of 'no confidence' against the government nor support any such vote. For ODS the agreement guaranteed its involvement in the appointments to important political positions, consultations with the government prior to their making important decisions, and above all, the consent of ČSSD for the expansion of the majority elements in the electoral system and a limitation on the powers of the President of the Republic. The government was put in a position that forced it to negotiate support for each bill in the Chamber of Deputies.

In 1998 MPs were elected under the Electoral Act of 1995, in a proportional system with eight electoral districts and with between 20 and 60 candidates on par-

Table 1. The composition of PPGs in the third electoral term (1998–2002)

Party	Number of members
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	63
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	24
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	74
Christian Democratic Party – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	20
Freedom Union (US)	19 (18, 17)
Total number of MPs	200

Source: Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.

ty lists, depending on the size of the district (see Table 1 for the composition of the Chamber of Deputies). This proportional system was based on the Hagenbach-Bischoff electoral formula applied in two scrutinies. Candidates could only be put forth by political parties, political movements, or coalitions of the two. Parties had to obtain at least five percent of the votes nationally, a coalition of two parties had to gain seven percent, a coalition of three nine percent, and a coalition of more than four eleven percent of the votes. The party lists were binding but not strictly binding. A voter could vote for only one party list but within that party list could state his/her preferences for as many as four candidates. In the 1998 elections, if a candidate received more than ten percent of the preference votes, the candidate was considered to have won a preferential mandate in the given district. In 2002 MPs were elected according to similar rules.

Candidate selection in individual political parties is a reflection of the electoral system, and political parties prepare party lists according to the number of electoral districts. The political parties represented in a given term in the Chamber of Deputies employ a process of decentralised candidate selection, where county and regional party organisations select candidates and determine their rank, with a lesser or greater degree of interference from the central bodies. Between 1998 and 2002 parties adopted two basic candidate selection models: (1) a decentralised decision-making model, where a regional nomination convention or party members in the electoral district decided on candidates and their rank (KDU-ČSL, US-DEU); (2) a pyramid model with three or more selection levels (from local through county, regional and national levels), in which a large role is played by party executive bodies at each level (ČSSD, KSČM and ODS) [Saxonberg 2003; Outlý 2003]. In all parties, the support of regional leadership or the support of members at the regional level is crucial for an MP's re-election, and this applies even when national party bodies interfere in the candidate selection process, as they are large party bodies whose formation is based on regional representation. This means that MPs who oppose the party leadership or PPGs, but whose position in the regional party organisation is at the same time strong, can be re-selected for the party list.

In sum, the functioning of the political system requires and assumes the unity of PPGs, otherwise the position of the cabinet would be weak and the cabinet would be unable to push policies through the legislature. An electoral system in which the only way to be able to stand for office is to be selected for the party list strengthens the dependence of MPs on political parties. On the other hand, an electoral system that has preference voting and a candidate selection process does not necessarily require that MPs only vote in line with party leadership. The strong position of some MPs in regions means that it is possible to ensure re-election despite disagreement with the party leadership or the parliamentary party group.

The legislative arena: procedures, voting, and appointments in the Chamber of Deputies

Within the legislative arena there are many parliamentary rules and institutional structures that have the capacity to increase the unity of parliamentary political parties. Here we will focus on just some of them: the procedural advantages of parties in the legislative process, mechanisms of appointments in the parliament and the status of parties in the parliament. In this regard, a key aspect is the official recognition of a group, which is followed by the allocation of special privileges and resources to that group. The Rules of Procedure valid since 1995 do not legally define the PPGs as bodies of the Chamber of Deputies; but in practice they are. The Rules of Procedure stipulate that MPs may associate in PPGs on the basis of their affiliation to political parties and to political movements on whose list they ran in the elections. This definition is stricter than in the previous Rules, which stipulated that MPs may associate in parliamentary party groups on the basis of their political opinions. The minimum number of MPs required to form and run a parliamentary party group is ten, which is double the number required before 1995. The internal workings of PPGs are not regulated in any way, except for the accounting of their expenditures [see also Šimíček 1996; Kolář, Pecháček and Syllová 2002].

The Rules of Procedure stipulate that MPs from one political party can create only one PPG. This is one of the provisions restricting the establishment of new PPGs. It is a safety mechanism against spin-off factions, which could then obtain contributions for their activities from the Chamber of Deputies and could present themselves under the same party name as the original PPG and as proponents of party policy.[4] The Rules of Procedure allow for the formation of new PPGs, which can be composed of MPs affiliated to a political party other than the party for which they were elected or of unaffiliated MPs. The new PPGs are not entitled to funds from the budget of the Chamber of Deputies to cover their costs.[5] However, they are

[4] The 1995 Rules of Procedure helped to resolve the issue of the fragmentation of PPGs. Between the first and second electoral term (1993–1996 and 1996–1998) inter-party mobility dropped significantly, and there was a further decline between the second and third terms [see also Linek and Rakušanová 2002; Linek 2001].

[5] The Chamber of Deputies approves the rules for the financial management of PPGs every year based on a proposal from the Organisation Committee. The rules of financial manage-

permitted to use the premises and facilities of the Chamber of Deputies. These new PPGs are not entitled to proportionate representation in the bodies of the Chamber of Deputies, i.e. in committees or commissions, unless the Chamber of Deputies decides otherwise. This last point puts limits on establishing new PPGs [see also Linek and Rakušanová 2002; Linek 2001; Mansfeldová 2002].

In addition to the status and related resources of PPGs, the procedural advantages that these groups enjoy in the legislative process also influence the unity of PPGs. On the other hand, granting procedural authority to individual MPs is a strong incentive for these MPs to adopt more independent positions. In addition, the cabinet and groups of MPs, individual MPs, the Senate and regional boards of representatives are also authorised to submit bills. The role of individual MPs in the legislative process is significant from another perspective, too: amendments to bills may be submitted by individual MPs, both in the plenary session and in committee sessions.

The legislative process strengthens the role of PPGs as the main generator of positions on proposed bills. There are three readings in the legislative process. After debating a bill in its first reading during the plenary session, it is debated in the committees. In its second reading, amendments to the debated bill are submitted by individual committees and MPs. In its third reading a vote is taken on the proposed amendments. The first reading is of crucial importance for the fate of each bill because it is at this point that individual parties present their positions on the bill and the debate becomes polarised into proponents and opponents of the bill. If the sequence of approval of bills were different, that is, first in the committees and then in the plenary session, there might be less polarisation between proponents and opponents. As a result, polarised political attitudes precede the potentially less politically polarised discussion of the bill in the committees. If the sequence of the approval of bills were different, that is, first in the committees and then in the plenary session, there might be less polarisation between proponents and opponents. The Rules of Procedure allow for 'an abbreviated debate of bills', wherein a bill may be adopted in its first reading. If two PPGs raise an objection, a bill cannot be passed in the first reading. PPGs also have the power to intervene in the debate, as the chair of a PPG chair has the right to demand the floor at any time and present the opinion of the PPG, or to request an interruption of a session for the purpose of consultation within the PPG.

There is another weighty privilege in the voting rules that may or may not contribute to party unity in parliament. In secret voting, unity may be relaxed, and this may be so even during key or negotiated votes because parties do not have the tools to impose discipline. On the other hand, open voting is an instrument that enables party whips to ensure unity. The Rules of Procedure lay out the methods and rules pertaining to voting in the Chamber of Deputies and they define two possible voting methods: open-public and secret. The method of voting to be used is proposed

ment specify the amount of funding and establish the conditions for obtaining, drawing on, accounting for, and auditing funds received. PPGs that are not in the government are entitled to 1.3 times the standard amount of funding [for more detailed information see Kunc 2001].

by the chair of the session. Secret voting is employed to elect the chair and deputy chairs of the Chamber of Deputies, and the chair and deputy chairs of committees. It may also be used in other cases when the chair of the Chamber proposes its use and the Chamber agrees. In secret voting, voting tickets are distributed to all MPs in attendance, who then write the name of their candidate on the ticket. The quorum is calculated according to the number of voting tickets issued. Open-public voting is held in all other cases and may take the form of an electronic vote or roll-call vote. In a roll-call vote, the names of MPs are read aloud in alphabetical order, starting with the letter drawn by the chair. MPs then indicate whether they abstain, are in favour of, or are against a proposal. In an electronic vote, MPs first register using the voting card and then vote for or against a proposal by pressing a button on the electronic voting device within a time period set by the chair.

PPGs also have considerable constitutive power when the bodies of the Chamber of Deputies are being established, i.e. in putting together the committees and commissions and in the appointment of the chair and deputy chairs of the Chamber, and in overseeing the organisation of the sessions of the Chamber of Deputies through the Organisational Committee. PPGs are the only bodies that can nominate candidates for the positions of the chair and deputy chairs of the Chamber and as members of committees and commissions. Committee positions are filled proportionately to the number of MPs in a PPG; MPs who are not members of any PPG cannot be nominated for any position unless they offer their mandate to a PPG, which then negotiates membership in a committee on behalf of the unaffiliated MP. If the number of members in a committee allocated to a given PPG is smaller than the PPG's list of nominees, the rank in which the members of the PPG were nominated decides their appointment. Nominations for chairs of committees and commissions may be submitted both by PPGs and individual MPs. Committees elect a chair from among their members, but the chair must be approved by a majority of the Chamber of Deputies. Generally, however, coalition agreements signed by political parties prior to the formation of a cabinet stipulate the number of members to be named to committees and as specific chairs. The chairs and deputy chairs of the Chamber of Deputies are elected in a secret vote, while the number of committee members and their chairs are decided in an open vote; committee members are confirmed in a vote at a session. A member may be recalled by means of a majority vote in the Chamber of Deputies.

From this overview of the legal status of PPGs it is clear that the ability of those who are not members of a PPG to have any impact on the workings of the Chamber of Deputies is very limited. Unless the Chamber decides otherwise, only PPGs established at the beginning of the electoral term and affiliated to a party elected to the Chamber of Deputies are entitled to be proportionately represented in the bodies of the Chamber of Deputies. If no PPG nominates an MP to sit in a committee, or if a PPG decides that the MP should not be a member of any committee, it may happen that the MP does not become a member of any committee. The fact that the votes are public makes it possible for the PPG leadership to draw

the attention of other party members and the public to the dissenting behaviour of individual PPG members against their PPG. For MPs who view their political career in a long-term perspective, any deviation from the position of the party or PPG leadership, and from the PPG's positions could well put an end to their political career or at least slow it down.

Why is there less unity among Czech PPGs?

Having dealt with the basic institutions of the electoral and parliamentary arena that can contribute to strengthening the unity of Czech PPGs, we can now proceed to the analysis of their unity, which is restricted to the most easily measured variables – the Rice Index of Party Cohesion and abstentions. This information is supplemented with findings from questionnaire surveys conducted among MPs. The validity of this approach is supported by the findings of Edward Crowe, who, using a questionnaire survey in the British House of Commons, defined votes against a party position and abstentions as the two most prominent manifestations of disunity [Crowe 1983]. Clearly there are also other ways of demonstrating disagreement, for example, by providing the media with critical texts and interviews, giving critical speeches inside or outside parliament, and expressing disagreement within a PPG, privately to the chair of the PPG, or to MP colleagues. The last two expressions of disagreement in particular are a regular part of the way PPGs operate, but their covert and non-public nature bars any systematic analysis of them. To use Erving Goffman's metaphor of the theatre – we will analyse the stage but not the backstage [Goffman 1999].

The data on unity and participation in voting based on analyses of all votes taken in the 1998–2002 electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies show the dominant voting pattern of Czech PPGs. The PPGs of the governing parties vote more in unison. In previous electoral terms, this pattern was disrupted only by the PPG of Republican Party (SPR-RSČ), which was ruled by an authoritarian party chair, and by the PPG of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), which has a strong sense of partyness and loyalty. A similar pattern can also be observed with respect to participation in voting (see Tables 2 and 3).

It is clear from the tables that PPGs are relatively united in voting. The average score of the Rice Index of Party Cohesion is around 80 points, which means that in a PPG of ten members only one MP on average votes differently from the rest of the PPG.[6] However, when compared to several Western European countries the val-

[6] The basic presumption of calculating the Rice Index is that in the case of a division of a PPG into equally numerous groups of MPs that stand against each other, the Index is 0, and in the case of absolute unity Index is 100. The index is calculated as the result of dividing the number of MPs in a PPG forming a majority in a given vote by the number of voting MPs. Then we take this figure and deduct 0.5 and multiply it by 2.
Formula: I = ((N majority / N whole PPG) – 0.5) * 2

Table 2. Party unity in the Chamber of Deputies (1994–2002) – Rice Index

Years (number of votes)	1994–1996 (5105 votes)	1996–1998 (4783 votes)	1998–2002 (13 594 votes)	Selected votes* (226 votes)
ČSSD	71.6	80.4	**82.5**	**89.2**
KDU-ČSL	**82.4**	**87.4**	78.4	87.2
KSČM	82.6	86.4	83.3	86.3
ODS	**85.0**	**85.8**	79.4	84.2
US-DEU	–	82.0	80.0	88.2
ODA	**81.4**	**85.8**	–	–
SPR-RSČ	93.4	97.4	–	–
Average**	82.7	86.5	80.7	87.0

Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic for the period 1998–2002; Kopecký, Hubáček and Plecitý [1996] for the period 1994–96; Linek [2002] for the period 1996–98.

* votes selected from the 7th, 8th and 9th session of Chamber of Deputies that concern amendment to the law or approval of the law [see Linek and Rakušanová 2002].

** non-weighted average; the ruling party is indicated in bold.

Table 3. Participation in voting in the Chamber of Deputies (1994–2002) (%)

Years (number of votes)	1994–1996 (5105 votes)	1996–1998 (4783 votes)	1998–2002 (13 594 votes)
ČSSD	64.2	87.0	**85.3**
KDU-ČSL	**75.2**	**85.8**	81.7
KSČM	76.0	90.6	86.1
ODS	**74.4**	**84.6**	85.4
US-DEU	–	75.4	76.3
ODA	**66.4**	**82.8**	–
SPR-RSČ	47.4	87.6	–
Average*	69.9	86.2	84.2

Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic for the period 1998–2002; Kopecký, Hubáček and Plecitý [1996] for the period 1994–6; Linek [2002] for the period 1996–1998.

* weighted average; the ruling party is indicated in bold.

ues of the Rice Index in the Czech Republic are relatively low (see Figure 2). We must however also bear in mind that there are pitfalls in making gross comparisons with other countries, as there are differences in the voting procedures and in the number and nature of analysed votes.

The relative disunity of Czech parliamentary party groups can also be illustrated from the answers MPs gave to the question of how they proceed in voting if

Figure 2. Comparison of the unity of PPGs in selected countries – Rice Index



Source: DePauw [2002], only for the Czech Republic. Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

Note: The dots represent the values of the Rice Index for each party in the parliament of a particular country. The dots above CR-S represent the Rice Index values for the Czech parties in selected votes (see Table 2) and the dots above CR represent the Rice Index values for Czech parties in all votes during the studied period.

they do not agree with the position of their parliamentary party group (see Table 4). MPs of ČSSD, followed by those of ODS, voted most frequently according to the decision of the PPG, while MPs of other PPGs voted more according to their own opinion. However, MPs' answers to the general question about how they vote if they disagree with their PPG must be interpreted with caution. In the responses relating to individual public policies, MPs more often responded that they voted in unity with the PPG. Nevertheless, the data suggest that MPs retain a sufficient amount of manoeuvring space in voting.

Higher Rice Index values are attained for Czech PPGs when only those votes that directly influenced the shape of public policies formulated through bills are selected (votes on bills as a whole and votes on amendments to bills). There were approximately 7000 such votes in the 1998–2002 electoral term, and only votes from three consecutive sessions were chosen for a detailed analysis (sessions 7, 8 and 9 in the year 1998 and 1999).[7] Nevertheless, these values are still below those of West-

[7] The analysis looked at votes from three sessions, and session no. 7 was randomly selected as the first one. For a detailed methodology of the selection of votes, see Linek and Rakušanová [2002: 62].

Table 4. How an MP usually votes in the case of disagreement with the PPG (%)

	ODS	US	KDU-ČSL	ČSSD	KSČM
General					
According to PPG	42.6	18.8	12.5	69.8	27.3
According to one's opinion	57.4	81.2	87.5	30.2	72.7
Constitutional bill					
According to PPG	64.8	52.9	56.2	90.8	90.5
According to one's opinion	35.2	47.1	43.8	9.2	9.5
Budget					
According to PPG	68.5	82.3	56.2	92.2	85.7
According to one's opinion	31.5	17.7	43.8	7.8	14.3
Other economic issues					
According to PPG	44.4	47.1	40.0	59.4	36.4
According to one's opinion	55.6	52.9	60.0	40.6	63.6
Social policy					
According to PPG	48.1	43.8	21.4	63.5	59.1
According to one's opinion	51.9	56.2	78.6	36.5	40.9
Foreign policy					
According to PPG	63.0	58.8	75.0	73.0	63.6
According to one's opinion	37.0	41.2	25.0	27.0	36.4
EU Accession					
According to PPG	54.6	35.3	53.3	82.5	54.6
According to one's opinion	45.4	64.7	46.7	17.5	45.4

Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Repubic, Survey of MPs in the year 2000.

Note: Answers to the question: 'A deputy may have a different opinion than his/her parliamentary party group; if so, how in your view should the deputy vote in general? And in other areas?'

ern European PPGs. The relatively low range of the Rice Index compared to Western European countries and the subjective perception of the manoeuvring space MPs have when voting on issues where they disagree with their PPG is especially striking considering the institutional drive toward unity and considering the number of tools that exist to enforce discipline among Czech MPs [see Linek and Rakušanová 2002: Chapter 3]. Moreover, these tools are not dramatically different from the tools available to parliamentary parties in Western Europe [see Bowler 2002; Heidar and Koole 2000a]. What are the reasons then behind the fact that PPGs in the Czech Republic are less united? And why do ruling parliamentary party groups not mind some disunity when voting on bills and on amendments to bills?

If neither the outlined institutional relationships nor the mechanisms in Czech parties are behind the lack of unity, the answer must be sought elsewhere. Less cohesion within PPGs[8] is not an explanation either, as the institutional rules and tools ought to be capable of ensuring party unity even when there is less cohesion.

In our opinion, the main reason lies in the nature of the coalition majorities that approve individual bills. Robert Golembiewski illustrated his concept of the power of political parties at the state level within the United States by showing that within parliament there is a strong relationship between the unity of political parties and the size of the majorities these parties have. According to Golembiewski [1958: 500–503], the larger the majority of a party, the less unity, and vice versa. Although Golembiewski used expert estimates of unity in individual state parliaments to measure unity, and indicators of political party power to measure the size of majorities (one of which is the number of seats the minority has in the parliament), his conclusions are persuasive and can be used here as a starting point to consider the relationships between unity and voting majorities in the Chamber of Deputies. If Golembiewski's argument is applied to a multi-party system with a coalition type of government, it is possible to hypothesise that the greater the coalition majority that approves bills, the less the unity within the parties comprising the coalition. In view of the only relative unity of Czech parliamentary party groups it is possible to expect that the relevant majorities that have approved bills have been large and not narrow.

The composition of the coalitions that approved individual bills in the course of the third electoral term (this calculation refers to the years 1998 to 2000 and the 304 bills debated during that period; see Table 5) reveals that the voting majorities were evenly balanced only in 15% of the cases (102:98). In the rest the majorities were so persuasive (no less than 113:87) that, in order to pass a bill, it was not necessary to enforce absolute party discipline among MPs. In the case of bills approved by the narrow margin of 102:98, nearly absolute unity is found in the PPGs. The hypothesis about the role of the size of majorities is further supported by the voting pattern in the previous electoral term (1996–1998). A right-of-centre coalition was in office for three quarters of that term, and at the beginning it had a minority of 99:101 and later a majority of 100 + 1 unaffiliated MP to 99. By comparing the voting unity in the periods 1996–1998 and 1998–2002 it becomes evident that during the period of the cabinet's narrow majority (1996–1998) the Rice Index was up 6 points (see Table 2).

The relationship between the unity of PPGs and the composition of the voting coalitions can be also considered from the opposite perspective.[9] Less unity in PPGs is not the only consequence of the existence of large majorities in voting; the pre-

[8] There is no data available on the attitudinal cohesion of PPGs (for example, from questionnaire surveys among MPs) that would allow for more exact claims to be made.

[9] Golembiewski also talked about the correlation between the unity of PPGs and the size of voting majorities, but not about a causal relationship.

Table 5. Winning and losing majorities in the Chamber of Deputies (1998–2000)

Winning voting coalition/losing voting coalition	Majority	%
ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM, ODS, US	200:0	33.3
ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS, US versus KSČM	176:24	20.0
KDU-ČSL, ODS, US versus ČSSD, KSČM	102:98	12.5
ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM, US versus ODS	137:63	11.0
KDU-ČSL, KSČM, ODS, US versus ČSSD	126:74	5.0
ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM versus ODS, US	118:82	5.0
ČSSD, ODS versus KDU-ČSL, KSČM, US	137:63	3.0
ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US versus KSČM, ODS	113:87	3.0
ČSSD, KSČM versus KDU-ČSL, ODS, US	98:102	2.6
ČSSD, KSČM, ODS versus KDU-ČSL, US	161:39	2.6

Source: Linek [2000].

Note: A total of 304 votes on all bills between 1998 and 2000 were analysed (these are votes that directly decided the existence of the bill – rejection of the act, passage of the act); for detailed methodology, see Linek [2000: 3]

dominance of large majority votes enabling the approval of bills may result from the fact that they involve lower transaction costs than the approval of bills by narrow margins. It is not easy for PPGs to secure absolute support for individual bills in each vote. Therefore, the leaders of PPGs may prefer votes with larger majorities. If a PPG leadership demands absolute support, it is clear that potential deviation from the party position should result in punishment (from the more lenient admonitions to the harshest punishment of expulsion from the party or a PPG). But punishment ultimately leads to a decrease in the number of PPG members, or at least to a decrease in the number of members willing to support a party, which is what political parties want least. The transaction costs associated with the narrow-margin approval of a bill lie in (1) ensuring unity, and, if unity has not been maintained, in (2) punishing those who deviated from the party position. Owing to the fact that PPGs are able to secure broader support for their proposals, they may insist on party unity only in cases that are of crucial importance for the party. Given that it is transactionally costly to vote by narrow margins in each vote, especially if there are thousands of votes each year, the leaderships of PPGs prefer the use of large majorities. This may be why most MPs are satisfied with the discipline in their PPG. In the survey, only the ruling party MPs (ČSSD) claimed that discipline should be greater (see Table 6).

In addition to lower transaction costs, there may be two other reasons why parties have taken advantage of large majorities to approve bills in the Chamber of Deputies. The first reason stems from the fact that some bills are considered technical bills. Political parties are able to pass some bills by a large majority because MPs

Table 6. MPs' evaluations of party discipline (%)

Party	Should be stronger	Should remain the same	Should be weaker
ČSSD	50.5	39.1	9.4
KDU-ČSL	23.5	70.6	5.9
KSČM	18.2	81.8	0
ODS	12.5	80.4	7.1
US	25.0	75.0	0

Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Survey of MPs in the year 2000.
Note: Answers to the question: 'In your opinion, what are the requirements for party discipline in your parliamentary faction?'

interpret them as technical bills or because they are unable to interpret the content of some bills in terms of socio-economic cleavages or divisions – the single most important type of cleavage that shapes political conflict in the Czech Republic. In the surveyed period, the Chamber of Deputies debated a large number of bills (781 bills). The bills were often related to the effort to harmonise Czech law with the directives and resolutions of the European Community. A large portion of these acts can be interpreted as technical in that no alternatives to them were possible, and in fact because the boundaries were established by the European directives and resolutions and by the agreed harmonisation deadlines. The bills were not related to party conflict as such, or rather, political parties did not regard them as political. The second reason is related to the mechanism of the 'Opposition Agreement' (explained above), which, in allowing the existence of a minority ČSSD cabinet and ensuring that it could not be recalled, also resulted in numerous majority approvals or rejections of bills. ČSSD was consequently able to selectively seek support for individual bills and build voting coalitions with different parties.[10]

Conclusion

This article attempted to address the question of what factors lie behind the low level of voting unity in the Czech Parliament. To this end the authors employed two methods to explain party unity, with one approach viewing the main source of unity in the voting arena, and the other approach interpreting unity as a consequence of the effect of institutional rules and the rules of procedure within parliament. The authors' initial assumption that institutional factors within the parliament and political parties result in more unity in PPGs in the Czech Republic was not fully confirmed. Even though the institutional incentives are similar to those in Western Eu-

[10] Čada, Hujer, Linek and Starý showed that between 1998 and 2002 different voting coalitions existed for individual sectors of public policy [Čada, Hujer, Linek and Starý 2002].

ropean countries, they do not secure the same level of voting unity within PPGs. In the end, the reason for the relatively low party unity (the Rice Index of Party Cohesion at the level of 80) was found to lie in the size of the voting coalitions that approved individual bills. Large majorities make it possible for PPGs not to act in absolute unity. Large majorities also result in lower transaction costs, which the parties would otherwise have to expend if they wanted to ensure the approval of bills by narrow-margin majorities. As the majority-margins attained in numerous votes indicate it is not a problem for Czech parties to secure absolute party unity. The problem is to ensure absolute unity when such a large number of votes are taking place.

A follow-up study of parliamentary politics in other electoral terms and a comparison of the results with other countries may reveal the extent to which the relatively low degree of unity of Czech PPGs between 1998 and 2002 was influenced by only temporary factors (the Opposition Agreement, the nature and number of debated bills) or by more permanent factors (the organisational structure of Czech parties and political institutions). In the introduction it was mentioned that party unity is assumed as a precondition for the functioning of the mechanisms of representation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. The question is whether the low degree of unity in voting in the Czech parliament in any way threatens the proper functioning of these mechanisms. Such a threat could occur were it found that the low level of voting unity stemmed from political institutions, that is, from functionally long-term factors. Observations thus far suggest that political institutions are more inclined to lead Czech parties toward a unified approach, and that it is the temporally limited factors (the number and nature of bills debated and the consequent use of large majorities) that reduce voting unity.

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Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgeting Process in the Czech Republic*

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Abstract: The budget is the government's key policy document. Negotiations on the budget can be taken as a case study to analyse the bargaining process in legislative institutions, reflecting the various clashes between political and partial interests in parliament and in parliamentary committees. The distribution of political power in parliament is a crucial factor: if a minority cabinet is in power, coalition-building is a key issue in budget bargaining. In this context, the Act on the State Budget (which in many ways is the basic law relating to the functioning of the state and especially the state and public administration) is an example of the efforts made to achieve a broad consensus and political compromises, not only among coalition cabinet partners but also between the government coalition and the opposition.
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Introduction

Accountability is a problem in every democracy and particularly in countries that are in the process of building a democratic system and establishing a market economy. Accountability is connected to the delegation of power, the existence of the usual democratic checks and balances, the potential abuse of power, and the existence of sanctions. The legislative foundation sets up the necessary framework for accountability, but this may differ from actual political practices as 'the rules of the game' are created gradually. Often the weaknesses of specific pieces of legislation only become evident after the legislation has come into effect. Accountability is re-

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lated to the institutionalisation of democratic structures, the establishment of democratic values, the acquisition of experience, the professionalisation of the elites, and, last but not least, external political and economic influences.

The concept of accountability, or the accountability of political power, is one possible theoretical framework that can be used to interpret the relations between the government and the parliament.[1] The term accountability "expresses an old issue of democracy, but an explicit effort to define the meaning of this term in the context of political science appeared only in mid-1990s" [Krause 2000: 19]. The concept of accountability is indeed somewhat speculative, but it provides a satisfactory interpretative framework for the host of relations and processes that take place between citizens (voters) and politicians, between politicians themselves, and between political institutions and the elite in general [Brokl et al. 2001]. The term 'accountability' is related in a number of ways to terms like 'representation', 'responsiveness', 'reliability', 'answerability', and 'sanction'. However, it is not the aim here to investigate these theoretical issues in depth.

This article draws on the generally accepted, basic differentiation between vertical and horizontal accountability introduced by O'Donell [O'Donell 1998], according to which vertical accountability "describes the relationships between unequal [actors]", including relationships between superiors and inferiors and between voters and their representatives. Electoral vertical accountability, which has frequently been the subject of study (see, for example, Przeworski, Strøm, Stokes, Mulgan), is the most powerful accountability mechanism. Horizontal accountability includes relationships between equals, i.e. between democratic institutions themselves [e.g. Schedler 1999]. Horizontal accountability depends on the existence of the classic system of 'checks and balances' and includes the executive, legislative and judiciary powers on one hand, and the institutions that supervise, control, interfere and impose sanctions in the case of illegal misconduct on the other [O'Donnell 1998]. In addition to vertical and horizontal accountability, a new dimension has appeared in connection with globalisation. The introduction of reforms from outside by a number of international and supranational organisations, and their definition of standards, to which new democratic states must adhere in order to be accepted by these supranational institutions, has an effect on accountability.

The main objective of this article is to describe the accountability that exists between parliament and the government, and the oversight function of parliament with respect to the state budget. Negotiations over the budget can be viewed as one example of the dynamic and multifaceted interaction that occurs between the executive and the legislature. The discussions over the state budget and financial matters form a distinct category of parliamentary activity that reflects the role of the parliament in its historical framework. Parliament initially was granted the authori-

[1] Horizontal accountability [Merkel 2002]: control of the executive branch by parliament, control by the executive branch and/or public authorities by the judicial branch, the independence of the judicial branch from the executive.

ty to oversee taxes, and it was only later that its legislative power derived from this function.

This article is the first study on the topic, and therefore, as well as being analytical, it is more descriptive than theoretical in character. The article is divided into four sections. The first section describes the legal framework that regulates the budget process; the second describes the discussion of the budget in parliament; the third deals with the roles of parliament from the point of view of MPs in general and with a special focus on the role of parliament with respect to the state budget; and the fourth examines the budget committee and its activity in the budgetary process.

The legal framework that regulates the budget process

The relationship between the legislative branch (parliament) and the government is defined in the Constitution. The relationship that exists in reality depends on how the links between parliament and the government are institutionalised [see Kopecký 2001]. The government is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, which has the ability to introduce a motion of no confidence against the government. Parliament also approves international treaties and makes major decisions concerning declarations of war and dispatching armed forces outside the Czech Republic. The relationship between the powers of the legislative and the executive as defined in the Constitution also indirectly defines the relationship between the two chambers of the parliament. According to the Constitution the government is responsible only to the Chamber of Deputies, which is the stronger of the two chambers.

The formal framework for parliamentary bargaining is also defined in the Constitution and in the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The Act on the State Budget is approved solely by the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of the Czech parliament.[2] The actual bargaining procedure has evolved as MPs have gained more experience with parliamentary work, as the relationship between the government and parliament has gradually taken shape, and as composition of political forces has changed.

The budget is a complex document with state financial data that enables the comparison of total expenditures and total income and the ranking of expenditures according to importance and makes it possible to influence the economic situation and improve parliamentary control [Syllová 1993:2]. The authorisation of taxes and public expenditures is a primary function of the legislature in any democratic system. In the budget process the government plays a primary role, which manifests itself especially in the preparatory phase. It is understandable that the government is the only institution that drafts the budget given the fact that the budget in reality is essentially the government's programme and action plan, which affects life and development in the country. Moreover, only the government has the relevant infor-

[2] For a more detailed analysis of the budget as a legal category, see Karfíková [2004].

mation required to draft the budget. The Ministry of Finance plays the most important role in drafting the budget and is also of key significance given that it defines income as well as expenditures. The budget is rendered legally binding by the parliament in a special law, from which no rights or obligations arise for citizens.

The budget negotiation process can be taken as a case study to analyse the bargaining process in legislative institutions, and it can also be viewed as an example of how the government is accountable to parliament. As Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson have shown, differences can be found according to the type of government: "legislatures in parliamentary systems have more oversight tools at their disposal than legislatures in either presidential or semi-presidential systems. The percentage of parliaments that approves and confirms the budget is according their findings remarkably higher in parliamentary systems" [Pelizzo et al 2004: 7–8]. The role of parliaments in the budget process is currently undergoing a re-evaluation in terms of putting greater stress on this role [*cf.* Santiso and Belgrano 2004]. With the growing number of democracies around the world there is a growing demand for transparency and accountability in the policy-making process, including the decision-making process within the parliament and the government. Understanding and describing this process is important for identifying its weak points, which could lead to a disruption of the balance between the executive power and legislative oversight and also has the potential to give rise to corruption. As Forestiere and Pelizzo have pointed out, in the parliamentary system legislatures have considerable power to influence and shape the budget. In reality, however, this power is remarkably less than what the list of formal powers suggests. Each parliament's ability to examine, amend, modify, confirm, and approve the budget is constrained by both institutional and political factors. On the institutional side, in many countries parliament's ability to alter the government's budget is subject to extensive procedural restrictions [Forestiere and Pelizzo 2005]. In the Czech case, parliament can modify the budget, but it must not violate any of the various laws that circumscribe its ability to do so. In reality parliament approves the government's budget proposal with only minor changes [Schick 2002: 36–38].

All the components in the budget are closely connected. As a whole the budget represents the government policy submitted to parliament. When the budget is being evaluated, the role of parliament is not to assess each detail, but rather to survey its characteristics as a policy instrument. The rights of MPs to intervene in the content of the budget are limited, so that no infringement occurs of the budget's basic premise (the amount of expenditures). When considering the rights of MPs and parliament to amend the budget it is necessary to bear in mind that the budget is a complex document that must be prepared well in advance but simultaneously with an understanding and respect for the current economic situation. This implies that parliament must voluntarily limit its power to change the budget. Nevertheless it retains the ability to examine the implementation of the budget through the government's accountability to parliament.

Debating the budget in the Chamber of Deputies

The procedure of approving the state budget differs from the general legislative process. The negotiations over the state budget are governed by rules laid out in the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies. The budget negotiation process[3] proceeds as follows: The cabinet submits a draft act on the state budget to the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies no later than three months prior to the start of a new fiscal year (by 30 September of the preceding year); the government's fiscal year corresponds to the calendar year, as is the case in the majority of countries.[4] Amendments to the draft act may be submitted up to 15 days before the session of the Chamber of Deputies in which the first reading is to take place. The speaker assigns the draft act on the state budget to the Budget Committee for discussion. There is no specialised budget research organisation attached to the legislature that conducts analyses of the budget. After the draft act is assigned to the Budget Committee, the first reading takes places at a session of the Chamber of Deputies. During the first reading, the Chamber of Deputies has a general parliamentary debate on the basic aspects of the budget, such as revenues and expenditures, the balance, settlement of the balance, the general relationship to the budgets of the higher territorial administrative units and municipalities, and the scope of powers assigned to executive bodies. If the draft act is not approved, the Chamber recommends that the cabinet redraft the bill, and sets a date for the new draft to be submitted. If the Chamber of Deputies approves the basic aspects of the budget it is not possible to change them later in the negotiations. The draft of the state budget is debated independently and it cannot be contingent upon a proposal for the adoption or amendment of another act [Kolář, Pecháček and Syllová 2002: 188].

If the Chamber of Deputies approves the basic information in the draft act on the state budget, individual chapters are then assigned to committees.[5] Committees are assigned a deadline (the minimum period is 30 days) and are obligated to discuss the individual chapters of the draft act on the state budget they have been given by that deadline. Committees may propose changes only to those chapters of the state budget they have been assigned to discuss.

The Budget Committee debates the committees' resolutions and opposing views on individual chapters of the draft bill in the presence of rapporteurs and it adopts a resolution. During the second reading, the government introduces the draft act on the state budget. The Budget Committee's rapporteur speaks after the submitting party. During the detailed parliamentary debate, amendments and oth-

[3] Rules of Procedure, Part Thirteen.

[4] According to the first OECD budgetary survey, in 77.7% of OECD countries the fiscal year is the calendar year. See See http://ocde.dyndns.org/Contentall.aspx

[5] The Ministry of Finance provides the design of the budget chapters; individual committees debate the internal contents of relevant chapters, and this is where deputies play a crucial role. Hypothetically, the potential impact of various interest groups may be expected at this point.

er proposals are submitted. From a political perspective, the review phase is the most important, because it is in this phase that individual MPs (who, for example, did not have a chance to directly participate in the preparation of the draft act) try to secure funds for their constituencies.

The third reading of the draft act on the state budget cannot start until 48 hours have elapsed since the conclusion of the second reading. During the parliamentary debate the only items that may be proposed are corrections of legislative mistakes, corrections of technical errors, corrections of grammatical mistakes, and proposals to repeat the second reading. At the conclusion of the third reading the Chamber of Deputies votes on the submitted amendments, and at the end the Chamber decides whether it will express agreement with the draft act.

In the first half of the 1990s, at the beginning of the transformation process, the procedure was somewhat different. Until the adoption of the new Rules of Procedure in mid-1995, the draft act (the whole budget) was discussed by the Budget Committee and also by a number of other committees, after which a joint report was submitted. This procedure offered more opportunity for lobbying, and it was easier for a lay opinion to defeat a professional opinion as each committee had only one vote and the special Budget and Economy Committees comprised a minority (of the usual 4–5 committees involved). An amendment to the Rules of Procedure resulted in the Budget Committee obtaining more competencies. Currently, it is very difficult for an MP to secure any funds for his/her own constituency because an MP is expected to specify how the proposed expenditure will be paid for, i.e. what other expenditures should be cut in order to obtain money for the specific purpose.

The most important stage of the bargaining process is the first reading, which is meant to give a clear outline of the total amount of the mandatory expenditures (i.e. expenditures explicitly required by law), the total expenditures and revenues, the balance of the state budget, and the budgets of municipalities. The Budget Committee must seek to preserve a balance between revenues and expenditures. After deducting the mandatory expenditures, about 15% of the total funds allocated for expenditures remain. It is then necessary to come to an agreement on which sphere (e.g. education, science, or healthcare) will be emphasised. This percentage is further reduced when account is taken of the ongoing investment projects of the government that cannot be abandoned and their unwritten international obligations (percentages that are given for certain chapters of the budget, such as for science or for defence). This means that all the media exposure given to budgetary issues actually concerns a small number of the items debated in the parliament. Any proposals for changes from the MPs cause the dilemma of public budgeting: while the costs are born by the general fund, benefits go to specific groups, sectors, or localities. It should be mentioned here that the first round of assembling particular expenditures takes place in the ministries. This is why the ministries seem to be in a much better position to advance particular interests, as this environment is much less transparent compared to the parliament, and the Chamber of Deputies is only the second step in lobbying.

The growing percentage of mandatory and quasi-mandatory expenditures and expenditure programmes that have already been launched limit the flexibility of the public budget expenditures in the short term.[6] The disproportionate increase in mandatory expenditures, which significantly exceeds the growth of tax income revenues, is a fundamental problem of cabinet fiscal policy today, and it has drawn harsh criticism from the opposition.

As already mentioned, the Act on the State Budget is approved by the Chamber of Deputies. The negotiation is ideologically divided from the very beginning of the process, and therefore the debate and the voting on the state budget are always key issues for parliamentary party groups. The vote on the budget is public, and official records on the vote are available. This means that, should the budget not be passed, political parties know who was responsible for the government's defeat. The Constitution stipulates that MPs shall exercise their office in their best conscience and in conformity with their oath, and that they shall not be bound by any instructions. Nevertheless, parties do have different mechanisms for securing party discipline. A parliamentary faction may vote in unity because its members agree on a party position (*party cohesion*), or it may be that they were made to act in such a way, even though their own preferences differed (*party discipline*) [Linek and Rakušanová 2002]. The vote on the budget requires considerable party discipline, and voting at variance with the decision adopted by a parliamentary party group may have very unpleasant consequences for individual MPs, especially if the cabinet has a very narrow margin in the Chamber of Deputies [Mansfeldová 2002]. Since 1996 this has been a major problem, as successive governments have continuously had to grapple with a narrow majority. The exception was the minority social democratic government, which managed to prevail as a result of the Opposition Agreement.[7] The reason for the relatively low degree of party unity is the size of the voting coalitions that approve individual bills: when there is a large majority the parliamentary party groups do not have to act with absolute unity [see Linek and Rakušanová 2002]. This results in lowering the transaction costs political parties would otherwise have to expend to ensure that their bills are approved by narrow-margin majorities. As an example, at the beginning of 1997, when the cabinet had a narrow majority, two MPs from ČSSD who did not vote according to the approved party line on the state budget were expelled from the party after the vote [Mansfeldová 2005]. One of them soon afterwards joined the rightwing party ODS.

[6] Act on the 2004 Budget, www.psp.cz/cgi.bin/win/docs/tisky/tmp/T0460y0.doc

[7] The Agreement on Creating a Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic, concluded between the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS).

The activities of parliament

There are four main stages in the budget process: formulation, approval, execution, and oversight and control. The role of parliament is crucial in the approval phase and the oversight and control phase. The approval of the budget is generally one of the key tasks of parliament, and, as can be gleaned from Table 1, which presents MPs responses to the question of the importance of individual activities of the Parliament, MPs consider it one of the most important activities. Alongside the explicitly formulated control of the cabinet, MPs still accorded the most importance to the adoption of the state budget, which is one of the means by which the cabinet can be indirectly controlled [Reytt 2000; Soltéz 1995]. In the survey MPs were asked to evaluate the importance of individual activities of parliament. The higher the score the greater importance accorded that particular activity.

When the scores for each activity are compared over time and in individual functional terms, it is found that MPs consistently rate the approval of the state budget as among the most important activities. While the scores for other activities tend to change over time, the trend for the approval of the state budget remains stable. This also concurs with the perception of the prestige and importance of the committees that is described below.

Voting on the budget is not only a special kind of vote of confidence in the government, but is also a litmus test of the unity of the factions and/or government coalition. An analysis of how MPs in the Chamber of Deputies have voted on state budgets also shows that the state budget vote is one of the key political issues that are usually decided strictly along party lines. Data on the vote on state budgets is only available back to 1995, as there are no records of the votes before that year. The

Table 1 The importance of individual activities of parliament between 1993 and 2003*

Activities	1993	1996	1998	2000	2003
Legislative activities	4.78	4.50	4.67	4.97	4.72
Control over the government	4.61	4.22	3.94	4.64	4.27
Consideration and evaluation of proposals submitted by various social groups	3.22	2.83	3.00	3.74	3.17
Approval of the state budget	4.78	4.72	4.72	4.95	4.80
Processing petitions and comments of citizens	3.39	1.56	3.22	3.86	3.37
Preparation for EU accession	– *	– *	4.22	4.61	4.06

1 = least important, 5 = most important.

Source: Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic.

* the data present the dates of the empirical research, and within this period there were four parliaments including the current one, whose terms concludes in 2006.

Table 2. Voting on the state budgets in the first electoral term (% of party members)

	ČMSS (ČMUS)	ČSSD	KDS	KDU-ČSL	KSČM	LB	LSNS	LSU	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ
1995	0	11	100	100	0	0	100	0	94	100	0
1996	31	0	100	100	0	0	100	-	100	98	0

Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.

Note: During the term the ruling coalition consisted of the following parties: ODS, KDS, KDU-ČSL, and ODA.

Table 3. Voting on the state budgets in the second electoral term (%)

	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	KSČM	ODA	ODS	SPR-RSČ
1997	3	100	0	100	99	0
1998	0	100	0	100	100	0

Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.

Table 4. Voting on the state budgets in the third electoral term (%)

	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	KSČM	ODS	US
1999	97	90	100	0	0
2000	100	0	0	88	0
2001	93	5	0	90	0
2002	96	0	0	98	0

Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.

data on these ten votes are presented in Tables 2 to 5, which show the percentage of each PPG that voted in favour of a submitted budget, abstained or did not participate (often allowing the budget to be adopted). The data indicate considerable party discipline in voting on the state budget.

During the second term of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, the ruling coalition was made up of the following parties: ODS, KDU-ČSL and ODA. When the cabinet resigned at the end of 1997, the 1998 budget had already been approved.

The third term of the Parliament of the Czech Republic featured a minority social democratic cabinet (ČSSD), which was able to stay in power thanks to the Opposition Agreement reached with the strongest opposition party, ODS. This agreement between the government and the opposition limited the executive's scope of

Table 5. Voting on the state budgets in the fourth electoral term (%)

	ČSSD	KDU-ČSL	KSČM	ODS	US-DEU
2003	100	100	0	0	90
2004	100	0	0	100	100

Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic.

action with respect to the budget and the staffing of economic and other strategic committees [UNRISD 2004: 3].

In the fourth (and current) term, a coalition cabinet (consisting of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and US) with a narrow, one-vote parliamentary majority is in power. Such a narrow majority requires strong party discipline because the budget and the fate of the government hang on a single vote.

It may happen that the budget is not passed at the first attempt, as was the case with the 2000 budget, which was only backed by the MPs in the minority government of the Social Democratic Party. Right-wing MPs voted against the budget, and the Communists abstained from voting. As a result, the government operated on a provisional budget. The budget had to be renegotiated again at the beginning of 2000, at which time the opposition parties reached an agreement and the budget was approved (this can be seen in Table 3).

The Budget Committee

In every parliament, legislative and supervisory activities are carried out in the parliamentary committees [Rakušanová 2001; Kopecký 2001; Olson and Crowther 2002; Mansfeldová et al. 2002], where major decisions are made on the majority of bills. With the exception of legislation, the most important task of the committees is to review the functioning of the cabinet. This task is the natural result of a system of government in which the administration is directly and continuously responsible to the parliament. Committees are the main practical working instruments through which these responsibilities are carried out.

The Budget Committee plays a crucial role in the negotiation of the budget. The budget is discussed as a bill, and before being presented at the plenary session the bill is sent first to the Budget Committee. In most countries, the Budget Committee has the highest authority in this matter and it submits the major report. The case is similar in the Czech Republic. While analysing the prestige of individual parliamentary committees, it was found that the Budget Committee is one of the most prestigious and busiest committees of the Chamber of Deputies, as indicated in Table 6.

A similar trend can be seen in how the committees are rated by prestige as is found in the ratings for the individual activities of parliament. With the exception

Table 6. Committees in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic ranked by MPs according to prestige (%)

Committee	1st term		2nd term	3rd term	4th term
	1993	1996	1998	2000	2003
Constitutional Committee	91.9	88.7	63.9	60.9	40.2
Budget Committee	61.0	89.4	84.1	89.4	91.1
Economic Committee	60.3	41.5	42.7	49.7	49.7
Foreign Affairs Committee	26.5	21.3	27.4	20.7	25.4
Committee for Defense and Security	11.8	16.3	28.0	25.1	17.2
Committee for Social Policy and Health Care	8.1	12.0	22.3	15.1	10.1
Committee for Science. Education. Culture, Youth, and Sports	5.1	7.0	4.5	2.8	5.9
Petition Committee	3.7	2.8	0.6	1.7	3.6
Agricultural Committee	2.9	7.7	9.6	5.0	11.8
Committee for Public Administration, Regional Development, and Environment	2.2	1.4	7.6	18.4	16.6
Committee for European Integration	*	*	*	5.0	4.1
Mandate and Immunity Committee	1.5	4.2	2.5	3.4	2.4
Election Committee	*	*	*	*	1.2

Source: Parliamentary DICe, Institute of Sociology, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic.

* in these years the committee did not exist.

of the first term, the Budget Committee is consistently perceived as having the most prestige. This is mirrored in the Budget Committee's composition, as there is a tendency to appoint MPs with high professional skills to the committee. The members of the Budget Committee also tend to have a high probability of re-election. In the case of re-election, they usually again join the Budget Committee. As for gender representation, it is worth noting that this committee is purely a 'men's issue'. During the period under observation not a single woman sat on the Committee.

The responsibilities of the Budget Committee extend far beyond just debating the state budget and the individual chapters of the budget. The Committee receives regular reports on the economic performance of the Czech Republic (quarterly, mid-year and a summary report for the whole year), the withdrawal of funds from the state budget, reports on monetary policy and the economic performance of the Czech National Bank (ČNB), reports on the results of activities and the utilisation of

budget funds in individual years, and reports on the country's economic performance issued by the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic.

The Budget Committee can establish sub-committees to perform its supervisory responsibilities, and these sub-committees focus on specific issues. The Budget Committee decides on the number and types of sub-committees it establishes. During almost every term of the Parliament of the Czech Republic there has been an audit sub-committee.

The Budget Committee debates any and all changes during the course of the year that occur with respect to events funded by the state budget and transfers of funds in the budget chapters for individual ministries etc. As the deficit of the state budget[8] is currently growing, MPs are striving to play a more active role even in the budget preparation phase. An example of this was the proposed balanced budget amendment to the constitutional act submitted by a group of MPs in September 1998. Though the bill was defeated in the first reading in January 1999, it did not end there. Changes in external prerequisites have put the question of a well-balanced budget back on the agenda. As Klik shows in his study on EU-15 states, as the EMU project was gradually being prepared over the course of the 1990s it became clear that it would be necessary to introduce a mechanism to prevent the uncontrolled fiscal expansion of national governments. It is difficult to harmonise a common monetary policy with autonomously implemented budget policies. It should also be pointed out that it is this combination of a jointly implemented monetary policy and only a co-ordinated fiscal policy that many economists see as the greatest threat to the EMU project [Klik 2002: 2].

If we examine the activities of the Budget Committee since 1990, it is possible to conclude that legislative activity relating to the state budget, especially in the legislative phase, is increasing (see Table 7).

The Budget Committee, as well as other committees, has been adopting a growing number of resolutions on the state budget that relate not only to drafting the budget but also to control over the budget. This situation has not changed much with regard to how much of an opportunity individual MPs have to influence the preparation of the budget: the MPs of the ruling parties have more opportunities to formally and informally influence the budget. Conversely, opposition MPs take greater advantage of parliamentary hearings. Furthermore, lobbyists tend to influence the process through the MPs of the ruling parties because it is a more efficient approach.

The cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies for meeting the state budget obligations. After the elapse of three months, the cabinet submits a quar-

[8] On 3 December 2003 the Chamber of Deputies passed a draft of the 2004 state budget with 98 votes from the coalition deputies. The budget is expected to have a deficit of CZK 115 billion, with revenues of CZK 754 billion and expenditures of CZK 869 billion. The state budget deficit continues to grow. In 2003, the government approved a three-year consolidation programme aimed at reducing the growing public budget deficit to no more than 4% of GDP by 2006.

Tab. 7. Work of the Budget Committee in five terms 1990–2004

Term	1990–1992	1992–1996	1996–1998	1998–2002	2002 till elections	From 7.7.2002	2003	2004
Number of members	17–18	17–20	20	21	21	21	21	21
Number of committee meetings	65	78	36	59	24	8	14	16
Number of adopted resolutions	398	627	318	560	324	116	196	176

Source: Archive of the Chamber of Deputies, Parliament of the Czech Republic

terly report, and after six months the cabinet submits a mid-year report to the Chamber of Deputies. The mid-year report provides information on economic development and a comprehensive update on the implementation of the budget, including an updated forecast on the budget outcome for that fiscal year. The Budget Committee plays a key role in this quarterly and semi-annual review process. The year-end report, the Government Financial Statement, is the government's key accountability document. The Budget Committee debates its individual chapters, and the Chamber of Deputies approves the Government Financial Statement.

Effective legislative oversight of the budget is generally connected to the level at which the rules in the new democratic parliaments have been institutionalised. As indicated above, the Budget Committee may establish various sub-committees to perform its supervisory functions. In the third term these were the Sub-committee for Capital and Financial Markets and the Audit Sub-committee; in the fourth term (2002 – present) the Sub-committee for the Financial Management of Regional Self-administration and for the Utilisation of European Funds was established in addition to the Audit Sub-committee.

During the process of decentralisation, which is part of the process of European integration (based on which a wide range of decision-making powers were transferred, in 2001, from the central to the district level), parliament strengthened its supervisory function. If the Audit Sub-committee is understood to be the control mechanism of parliament vis-à-vis the cabinet, then the Sub-committee for the Financial Management of Regional Self-Administration and for the Utilisation of Funds of the European Union is an attempt to partially control the financial flows between supranational (EU funds) and sub-national levels (districts) [Rakušanová 2003].

During the process of consolidating democracy in the Czech Republic, parliament has become functionally embedded in the constitutional system, while MPs have become more professional, there has been an improvement in the level of professional back-up, and the functions of parliament have become crystallised. Today, public finances are undergoing extensive structural reform, which involves more than just minor modifications and should result in the restructuring of the state budget and especially in changes to welfare, pension, tax and healthcare spending.

The main objective of the reform is to transform the state budget from a tool of fiscal policy into a public management tool, i.e. a performance-driven model based on defined goals and benchmarks, on negotiations, and on a system of contracts and agreements.

Conclusion

An analysis of parliamentary activities in relation to the state budget shows that during the process of transformation and the consolidation of democracy in the Czech Republic the functions of parliament in relation to the state budget have undergone a massive transformation. In this process, the professionalising of MPs in general and those in the Budget Committee in particular has been a crucial factor. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Budget Committee, like parliament as a whole, was composed of people without any previous experience in high politics. Only rarely did an MP have a background in economics. At the first meeting of the budget committee it was proposed that appointments take into account an MP's professional background. This proposal was rejected, and it was agreed to distribute posts in the committee among all political parties equally. Gradually, MPs have become more professional and have learned how to work with information, how to obtain it, and how to evaluate it critically. Today, the Budget Committee is considered the most prestigious and most influential parliamentary body.

The problem with the role of parliament in the budgeting process lies primarily in the need for large coalitions in voting, and in the large transaction costs associated with party cohesion, i.e. in the party-political landscape rather than in any institutional capacity. Generally, there has been an increase in party discipline in voting on the budget. On the other hand, the number of changes that are proposed by individual MPs has also grown.

Parliament is aware that its power may be eroded within the context of European integration, and therefore, to counter that threat, it is strengthening its auditing functions. This pertains also to the Budget Committee, which focuses on the sub-national and supranational levels, the management of territorial self-administrations and the utilisation of European Union funds. It may be expected that with the Czech Republic now a member of the EU (since May 2004) this type of activity will be given priority.

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Apendix 1.

Names of Political Parties in English and Czech and their Czech Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Party name in English	Party name in Czech
ČMSS/ ČMUS	Czech-Moravian Centre Party / Bohemian and Moravian Union of the Centre	Českomoravská strana středu/ Českomoravská unie středu
ČSSD	Czech Social Democratic Party	Česká strana sociálně demokratická
KDU – ČSL	Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party	Křesťansko demokratická unie/ Československá strana lidová
KDS	Christian Democratic Party	Křesťansko demokratická strana
KSČM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy
LB	Left Block	Levý blok
LSNS	National Socialist Liberal Party	Liberální strana národně sociální
LSU	Liberal-Social Union	Liberal-Social Union
ODA	Civic Democratic Alliance	Občanská demokratická aliance
ODS	Civic Democratic Party	Občanská demokratická strana
SPR – RSČ	Association for the Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia	Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa
US	Freedom Union	Unie svobody
US – DEU	Freedom Union – Democratic Union	Unie svobody – Demokratická unie

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

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Assessing Institutional Determinants of MP Behaviour: Survey Data from the Baltic States*

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Abstract: To what extent do electoral and legislative institutions affect the behaviour of parliamentarians in new democracies? This article examines this question on the basis of a wide-ranging survey of MPs in the Baltic states from January 2000. Given substantial differences in the types of institutions existing in the three states, the research tests whether these differences are reflected in MPs' responses to key questions about their relationship to and interaction with (1) parliamentary work, (2) their party and faction, (3) individual voters, (4) the interests of their district or constituency, and (5) interest groups. The results corroborate a number of existing theoretical postulates, while leaving unconfirmed others.
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In the consolidating democracies of Central and Eastern Europe it is a truism that one of the central dimensions of this process is the development of a healthy parliamentary democracy. More specifically, this question concerns the myriad roles parliamentary deputies are expected to fulfil in relation to voters, parties, interest groups, other state institutions, the media, foreign counterparts, etc. In some cases, these roles involve interest mediation, in other cases interest arbitration, and in others oversight and supervision. All of these roles take time to mature, not only on the part of the MPs, but also in the case of other players. The entire web of relations quickly becomes impossible to grasp all at once. Still, the steady consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s has generated clear proof that these relations exist and are to a considerable degree functioning. Although actual popular satisfaction with democracy may vary between countries, the minimum requirements of democratic constitutionalism and respect for fundamental liberties continue to be upheld, not least because of the role(s) played by MPs.

Existing studies on the role of parliamentarians in the new democracies of Cen-

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tral and Eastern Europe have focused on elite recruitment and circulation [Higley and Lengyel 2000; Higley, Pakulski and Wesolowski 1998; Frantzel-Zagorskia and Wasilewski 2000; Best and Cotta 2002] or on the institutionalisation of parliamentary institutions [Agh and Kurtan 1995] and in particular legislative committees [Olson and Crowther 2002]. These studies have been important either for creating a sociological portrait of the emerging political class in these countries or for examining how politicians come to develop and work within a specific institutional system such as parliamentary committees. Both of these aspects are significant for understanding how democracy works, either in terms of how the professional skills and experiences of actual MPs feed into the political process or how parliamentarians foster a culture of rules and begin to abide by them in order to co-operate and compete peacefully. Yet these studies fall short in two other important dimensions: (1) finding out how MPs actually perceive their own work and (2) exploring the matrix (or crossfire) of influences, which parliamentarians see themselves as having to navigate when doing their job.

This article will examine the state of these MP roles and relationships in three new EU member states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It will report some of the findings from a survey of MPs in the three countries. The survey, conducted in January 2000, contained over 130 questions relating to a wide range of political behaviours, including MPs' personal political histories, party relations, electoral strategies, parliamentary activities, and role interpretations. The survey represents only a snapshot in time (time series data are as yet unavailable) and the data bear the limitations of any survey of MPs, including the limited sample size, the political sensitivity of certain questions, the particularities of any given parliamentary cohort, environmental influences from exogenous political events, etc. Nevertheless, the data make it possible to establish a baseline of MP behaviour in the Baltic states as an example of the regional development of parliamentary democracy, but also with regard to certain institutional variables, which the Baltic states represent particularly well. With regard to the first goal, I argue that MP behaviour appears to be essentially party-centred in the sense that MPs are bound first and foremost to their party, and less so to voters, interest groups or other political actors. Second, I argue that institutional variables – and in particular electoral institutions – do not appear to have an immediate or unequivocal impact on MP behaviour. For example, more centralised (i.e. party-centred) electoral systems do not appear to promote more centralised political behaviour. On the contrary, in this survey, it was in Latvia, which has the most centralised electoral system, that MPs were the most concerned about addressing constituent and interest group concerns.

The article begins with a short methodological section outlining the parameters of this survey and the essential elements of each country's electoral and political system. This is followed by data on five different role situations that Baltic MPs encounter, i.e. their relationship to and interaction with (1) parliamentary work, (2) their party and faction, (3) individual voters, (4) the interests of their district or constituency, and (5) interest groups. It is not the aim of these sections to provide any extensive interpretation, which is instead contained in the analysis in the final section.

Methodological and institutional dimensions

The survey results reported in this paper are part of a broader research project examining the links between political institutions and party cohesion in consolidating democracies. Many of the hypotheses tested in the survey stem from previous work on these institutional frameworks done by Pettai and Kreuzer.[1] The questionnaire used in the survey was conceived in the tradition of a number of surveys that have been conducted among representatives in the US Congress and MPs in the British House of Commons. In many cases, questions were drawn directly from these surveys in order to facilitate future cross-national comparisons. The survey took place in most cases as an elite interview, although on occasion the parliamentarians preferred to fill out the questionnaires on their own. The fieldwork was carried out in January 2000 by three of the most reputable polling organisations[2] in the Baltic states, and the survey was coordinated with the help of legislative officials and local scholars in all three countries.[3]

The survey's representative sample was of particular value. In each parliament a minimum 70% response rate was set as the goal, and in each case this figure was achieved. In addition, the results were commensurate with the parties' strength in parliament (see Table 1). In terms of parliamentary cycles, Estonia's was the youngest group (elected in March 1999), followed by Latvia (October 1998) and Lithuania (October 1996). This factor played out differently in each country, as Estonian deputies were able to answer questions regarding electioneering strategies with the freshest experience, while Lithuanian deputies had the longest time-perspective with regard to legislative activity. Nonetheless, given that in each country a sizeable number of respondents (44.3%) were either second- or even third-term parliamentarians, the collective experience of deputies helped to counter some of these cyclical aspects.

One drawback of the survey was the fact that limited financial resources prevented the project from interviewing any politicians other than parliamentary deputies. For questions regarding electoral career control and electioneering, a broader sample of electoral candidates, including those not necessarily elected to parliament, would have been better.[4] Table 1 shows the relevant data based on the survey's parliamentary sample.

The Baltic states represent an interesting testing ground for patterns of MP behaviour because their electoral and political institutions differ considerably.[5] Al-

[1] See Pettai [2000], Pettai and Kreuzer [1999; 2001], Kreuzer and Pettai [2004].

[2] In Estonia, Saar Poll; in Latvia, Baltic Data House; in Lithuania, the Social Information Centre.

[3] Artis Pabriks (Vidzeme University College) and Darious Zeruolis (Vilnius University) served as local liaisons in Latvia and Lithuania, respectively. The author coordinated work in Estonia.

[4] Work in this field regarding Estonian parties has been done by Kangur [2004].

[5] For a more detailed overview of these institutions, see Pettai and Kreuzer [1999], Mikkel and Pettai [2004].

Table 1. Survey sample data, N

Country Party	Representation in parliament based on the most recent election results prior to the survey	Number of deputies surveyed
1. Estonia		
Centre Party	28	20
Fatherland Union	18	11
Reform Party	18	11
Moderates	17	10
Coalition Party	7	5
People's Union	7	7
United People's Party	8	6
Not given		1
TOTAL	101	71
2. Latvia		
People's Party	24	18
Latvia's Way*	21	11
Fatherland and Freedom	17	14
Harmony Party	16	3
Socialist Party		4
Equal Rights Party		4
Russian Party		1
Social Democrats	14	13
New Party	8	3
TOTAL	100	71
3. Lithuania		
Homeland Union	70	52
Christian Democratic Party	16	11
Centre Union	14	13
Democratic Labour Party	12	12
Social Democrats	12	7
Union of Poles	2	1
Others	13	12**
Not given		5
TOTAL	139	113

* Includes one deputy who gave party affiliation as 'LW Ally'.

** Includes deputies who have broken away from their original parties since the 1996 election.

though all three countries regained their independence simultaneously from the Soviet Union in 1991 and all three shared the legacy of fifty years of Soviet rule, they each went on to adopt radically different institutional frameworks, which as a result provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of different institutions on political behaviour under relatively similar economic and social conditions. For example, Estonia has a relatively personalised PR electoral system, in which candidates run as individuals and can be elected directly from their district if they fulfil a minimum (Hare) vote quota. However, at the same time all candidates are also on a national list, which is used to allocate all remaining seats that are not won immediately at the district level.[6] Generally in Estonian elections, roughly half of the mandates are accorded at the district level, the other half at the national list level. As a result, Estonian politicians play a dual game, running in their districts as individual candidates, while at the national level they are bound to their ranking on the party list.[7] Constitutionally, Estonia has a parliamentary form of government. Although the system also includes a president, the office is largely ceremonial and the president is elected either by parliament or by an electoral college, not by popular vote.

Latvia's constitutional structure echoes Estonia's in that it, too, has a parliamentary form of government with a weak president chosen by parliament. At the same time, Latvia's electoral system is strictly PR, based on party lists nominated in each of the country's five electoral districts. As a result candidates are much more closely linked to their party's fortunes. Nevertheless, an element of uncertainty (or candidate opportunity) also exists, to the extent that Latvian voters are allowed a preference vote within the party list that they choose. Beside each candidate's name, voters can place either a '+' or '-' sign or leave it blank. In turn, any mandates that the list receives in the district are awarded to individual candidates based on their respective preference score. As a consequence, candidates have an opportunity for personalistic campaigning by encouraging voters to approbate their own names, while striking out fellow candidates on the party list. (Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a broad occurrence.)

Lithuania's electoral system is one of the few hybrid systems in the world.[8] Of the Seimas's 141 members 70 are elected through a single, nationwide multi-member district (MMD) based on party lists and proportional representation with a 5% voting threshold. The remaining seats are elected via 71 single-member districts (SMDs) based on two rounds of voting.[9] This creates another dual dynamic within the political system, given that, although candidates can run on both levels, single-

[6] A minimum 5% vote threshold also exists for parties to be eligible for seats at this third, national level of seat allocation.

[7] This would seem to make Estonia almost a mixed electoral system, but it is not, as voters only cast one ballot for an individual candidate at the district level. The catch is that these single votes are simply amalgamated differently at each respective level of mandate distribution.

[8] That said, the number of such systems is growing. See Shugart and Wattenberg [2001].

[9] For the October 2000 elections, the two-round system was dropped and a single-round 'first-past-the-post' system was adopted. In 2004, the two-round system was restored.

Table 2. 'When parliament is in session, how time-consuming would you rate the following activities?' Mean, (SD)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
1. Parliamentary activities				
a) attending parliamentary debates	1.7647	1.9155	1.9907	1.9069
	(.5496)	*(.7699)*	*(.7298)*	*(.7009)*
b) working in standing parliamentary committees	1.6901	1.5352	1.4685	1.5494
	(.5755)	*(.5300)*	*(.5692)*	*(.5657)*
c) government oversight (preparing for question-time, investigative committees)	2.6522	2.6197	2.2909	2.4840
	(.6603)	*(.8513)*	*(.7083)*	*(.7563)*
d) meeting informally with other MPs	2.8169	2.2535	2.6415	2.5806
	(.5427)	*(.7313)*	*(.6353)*	*(.6745)*
2. Party activities				
a) attending party meetings (e.g. faction, national board)	2.3662	2.2254	2.3458	2.3173
	(.5914)	*(.7010)*	*(.7282)*	*(.6837)*
b) attending local party meetings	2.8286	2.4000	2.3178	2.4858
	(.7014)	*(.6895)*	*(.6530)*	*(.7091)*
3. Voter concerns				
a) helping local voters solve personal problems in dealing with the government	2.4648	2.2958	1.7838	2.1186
	(.7138)	*(.7444)*	*(.6523)*	*(.7571)*
4. District activities				
a) holding constituency meetings	2.7571	2.2113	1.8649	2.2103
	(.7506)	*(.5585)*	*(.6535)*	*(.7518)*
5. Interest groups				
a) meeting with interest groups	2.7571	2.2676	2.5701	2.5363
	(.7310)	*(.6752)*	*(.7538)*	*(.7466)*

1 = Very time-consuming, 4 = No attention required.

member district campaigning tends to be much more personalistic.[10] In addition, once elected to parliament, party groups may be split between SMD and MMD deputies, as their electoral interests may not always coincide. Finally, Lithuania's constitutional system is semi-presidential, wherein a popularly elected president

[10] For a comparison of these different effects, see Moser [2004].

shares power with a parliament-appointed prime minister. Although the presidential and parliamentary elections are not concurrent, their dual existence adds yet another dimension to party politics.

In each of these three institutional profiles, it is possible to see cross-cutting institutional effects, which means that, on the whole, none of the countries represents an unambiguous type of institutional constellation. In terms of case selection and research design, this would seem to pose a problem given the apparent impossibility of clearly ranking the institutions in the three countries (as the independent variable) in order to juxtapose them with the survey results (the dependent variable). Nevertheless, the countries are very different in their institutional make-up and I would argue that some of the countervailing aspects of one or another system are not significant enough to override the general trend. In this respect, Lithuania could be best classified as the most personalistic electoral system (because of its SMD voting), Estonia semi-personalistic (because of its mix of district candidacies, but also national-level party lists where roughly half of all deputies have gained their seats) and Latvia least personalistic (because of its primary focus on party lists, wherein preference votes come into play only secondarily).[11] Certainly other research designs are possible; however, the lack of readily available data precludes making any such study for the time being.

Table 2 provides a general overview of how Baltic MPs assessed the structure of their activities as parliamentarians across different parliamentary roles. In response to the question "When parliament is in session, how time consuming would you rate the following activities?", deputies were given a list of nine activities, which were all related to work as an MP. The respondents' answers were based on a four-point scale, where 1 equals 'very time-consuming' and 4 equals 'no attention required at all'.[12]

As one might imagine, parliamentary activities took up the most time among Baltic MPs, and in particular work in parliamentary committees. General oversight was a less demanding parliamentary role, although in Lithuania (where a large number of investigative committees were created during the 1990s) this figure was relatively high, indeed surpassing that of party activities. Next among general categories was that of dealing directly with the personal problems of voters and with electoral constituencies as a whole. It is worth making a distinction between these two parliamentary roles since the first concerns engaging individually with citizens, while the second relates to monitoring the interests of an entire electoral district. In both of these areas, Lithuanian deputies were again ahead of their Baltic counterparts, and with respect to constituency care they outstripped Estonian MPs by al-

[11] These characterisations are based on a number of classic works on electoral systems, including Grofman and Lijphart [1986], Katz [1980], Lijphart [1994], LeDuc, Niemi and Norris [1996], and Cox [1997].

[12] All of the scale questions in the survey were structured so that 1 equaled the highest and 4 equaled the lowest. Therefore, for all these questions, the lower the mean is, the higher the respondent's agreement with the statement or degree of involvement in the given question category.

most a full point on the four-point scale. Thirdly, party activities also accounted for a significant share of MPs' time. This category includes attending both parliamentary caucus meetings as well as in many cases other party meetings. For example, a full 75.7% of the survey respondents reported also having held, at least once before, a formal position in their party (either at the national or the local level). Baltic deputies showed the least interest in interest groups, stating 40% of the time that dealing with these groups was not very time consuming. Nevertheless, this category ranked considerably higher among Latvian deputies.

Parliamentary activities

As noted above, MPs often stand at the nexus of a number of cross-cutting influences and intersecting levels of political power. One such competing level is involvement in local politics or civic organisations. In all three Baltic states parliamentary deputies are allowed to simultaneously hold office at both the national and the local legislative level. This French-style *cumul de mandats* means not only extra work, but often also conflicting party-political interests, when local coalitions differ from national ones. Estonia offers a particularly recent example, where an abrupt shift in the coalition governing the capital Tallinn in December 2001 eventually led to a collapse of the national government in favour of a similarly fashioned alternative coalition. The original centre-right coalition in Tallinn, involving mainly the nationalist Pro Patria Union, the liberal Reform Party and the centrist Moderates, broke up in December 2001, when the Reform Party decided to form a new majority with the leftish Centre Party. This sudden switch prompted the Pro Patria Union and the Moderates to review the three-party coalition at the national level, and eventually Prime Minister Mart Laar (from the Pro Patria Union) decided to resign in protest over the Reform Party's behaviour. The Reform Party then went on to form a national government with the Centre Party, thus completing the local-gone-national *bouleversement*. A major reason given by commentators for the political chain reaction (or short-circuit) was the fact that many members of the Tallinn City Council were also national MPs. As a result, once the capital's legislature suffered a collapse of confidence among its leading members, these strains had to reverberate at the national level too.

Within the framework of this research, it has not as yet been possible to compile precise data on the level of local office-holding among Baltic deputies. Nevertheless, as part of an attempt to build a sociological profile of Baltic deputies, the survey did include questions on whether MPs had previously held local office and to what extent they were also members of civic organisations.

In this regard it was apparent that Estonian deputies had much stronger links to local politics than their Latvian and Lithuanian colleagues. Nearly three-quarters of Estonian parliamentarians had had some level of local political experience. The involvement of deputies in civic organisations was similarly quite widespread. Of

Table 3. 'Have you ever also held local office?' (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
1. Yes	74.6	46.5	50.4	56.1
2. If yes, please indicate the type of post:				
a) Local council member	96.2	78.8	78.8	85.4
b) Mayor	0	9.1	17.3	8.8
c) Other	3.8	12.1	3.8	5.8

Table 4. 'Have you ever been a member of a professional association, labour union, church organisation or other group?' (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
1. Yes	69.0	77.5	73.5	73.3
2. If yes, did you at any time hold a formal position in that organisation?				
a) Yes	63.3	78.2	70.2	70.7

course, both of these factors were compounded by the fact that the three Baltic states are very small: together they total just 7.5 million people; roughly 1.4 million in Estonia, 2.4 million in Latvia and 3.5 million in Lithuania. Therefore, their politicians are likely to be active in numerous different ways given that the countries' elite bases are also small. Nevertheless, to the extent that such sociological givens were compounded by other political rules (such as dual office-holding), it is possible to clearly identify areas where institutional engineering was a factor in broader political processes.

Party pressures[13]

As legislators, MPs must operate within the political scope of their party faction while also adhering more broadly to the positions of their national party hierarchy. In most cases, MPs are therefore bound to the party in a number of ways, starting with electoral nomination, but also including committee appointments in parliament and factional membership where conflicts arise. This section presents an assessment of the roles of MPs based on answers to different survey questions.[14]

[13] This section draws on Pettai et. al. [2000].

[14] Again, from a methodological point of view it is impossible to fully assess candidate recruitment and selection patterns based on a survey sample of MPs, as the data are skewed to

The career of an MP invariably begins with his/her initial foray into the electoral competition. However, this process involves two important intermediary stages, both of which are influenced centrally by constraints set by the MPs' political party. MPs must first be *recruited*, and then suitably *ranked* on a party's electoral list in order to sustain a legislative career from term to term. In the survey we queried deputies about their particular experiences in this regard. In addition, in order to see who has control over an MP's appointment and removal from parliamentary committees this section also examines the legislative level. Here again the party may establish constraints on an MP's career and therefore influence his/her behaviour.

Governance arrangements regulating electoral and legislative careers fall roughly into three categories. They can either be:

- autocratic, by concentrating decision-making in the hands of national leaders,
- democratic, by devolving the decisions to formal, democratically constituted party organs, or
- pluralistic, if decisions result from an informal bargaining process among different constituent groups within a party.

As the following analysis shows, most Baltic deputies must reckon with party structures that can readily be described as autocratic. At the same time, exceptions exist in each Baltic country; thus autocratic party governance does not seem to be an inevitable constraint for MPs in consolidating democracies.

Tables 5 to 7 summarise the different electoral control patterns as described by our parliamentarian respondents. To simplify the analysis somewhat, the three governance categories are further delineated based on the spread of their means. In *autocratic parties*, national leaders dominate both the recruitment and the ranking of candidates. Moreover, the margin by which respondents judge the influence of national leaders to be greater than that of party conferences or local leaders must be at least 0.3 points greater. In *pluralistic parties*, national leaders either do not exert simultaneous control over recruitment and ranking or they do so by a very small margin (<0.3). In such parties, the fate of electoral career changes is determined through bargaining among national leaders, local party officials, and the party congress. Finally, in *democratic parties*, party conferences will be more important than national or local leaders in determining both electoral career stages.

The tables show that in most instances Baltic party leaders exert a disproportionate influence over both the recruitment and ranking of MPs as candidates.[15] Party congresses also have marginally more control than local party leaders especially when it comes to ranking. However, these general features also vary some-

the extent that they only include winners at the polls. Any such study would require a broader sample including all candidates for election. In this instance, however, the survey data are presented in order to describe the situation of those candidates who made it into parliament and how this background experience may influence their subsequent behavior as MPs.

[15] This agrees with other research done in Estonia by Kangur [2004].

Table 5. Electoral career governance in Estonia, Mean (N)

Governance type	Recruitment controlled by...		
Party	... national leaders	... party conference	... local leaders
1. Autocratic			
Coalition Party	1.5 (4)	3.5 (4)	1.8 (4)
United People's Party	1.6 (5)	2.3 (6)	2.8 (5)
Moderates	1.5 (8)	2.0 (7)	2.4 (7)
Reform Party	2.0 (11)	2.6 (9)	2.5 (11)
Sub-average (43.8%)	*1.7*	*2.5*	*2.4*
2. Pluralistic			
Centre Party	2.1 (20)	2.3 (18)	2.3 (19)
Sub-average (31.3%)	*2.1*	*2.3*	*2.3*
3. Democratic			
Fatherland Union	2.0 (11)	1.9 (11)	2.1 (11)
People's Union	2.0 (5)	1.5 (6)	2.0 (6)
Sub-average (25%)	*2.0*	*1.8*	*2.1*
Total:	**1.9 (64)**	**2.2 (61)**	**2.3 (63)**

Governance type	Ranking controlled by...		
Party	... national leaders	... party conference	... local leaders
1. Autocratic			
Coalition Party	1.3 (4)	3.0 (4)	2.5 (4)
United People's Party	1.2 (5)	2.7 (6)	2.8 (5)
Moderates	1.5 (8)	2.0 (6)	2.8 (5)
Reform Party	1.7 (11)	3.0 (10)	2.5 (11)
Sub-average (43.8%)	*1.5*	*2.7*	*2.6*
2. Pluralistic			
Centre Party	1.7 (18)	2.2 (19)	2.2 (20)
Sub-average (31.3%)	*1.7*	*2.2*	*2.2*
3. Democratic			
Fatherland Union	1.5 (11)	1.5 (11)	2.5 (11)
People's Union	2.0 (5)	1.7 (6)	2.0 (6)
Sub-average (25%)	*1.7*	*1.5*	*2.4*
Total:	**1.6 (62)**	**2.1 (62)**	**2.4 (62)**

Note: 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.

Table 6. Electoral career governance in Latvia, Mean (N)

Governance type	Recruitment controlled by...		
Party	... national leaders	... party conference	... local leaders
1. Autocratic			
Socialist Party	1.3 (4)	2.8 (4)	1.8 (4)
People's Party	1.9 (17)	2.6 (18)	2.5 (17)
Equal Rights	1.0 (4)	3.0 (4)	2.3 (4)
Social Democrats	2.1 (13)	2.6 (13)	2.5 (13)
Sub-average (54.3%)	*1.8*	*2.7*	*2.4*
2. Pluralistic			
Latvia's Way	1.9 (10)	2.0 (10)	2.2 (10)
Harmony Party	2.3 (3)	2.3 (3)	3.7 (3)
New Party	2.3 (3)	2.3 (3)	2.7 (3)
Sub-average (25.7%)	*2.1*	*2.3*	*2.5*
3. Democratic (20%)			
Fatherland and Freedom	2.3 (14)	2.1 (14)	2.7 (14)
Total	**2.0 (70)**	**2.5 (71)**	**2.5 (70)**

Governance type	Ranking controlled by...		
Party	... national leaders	... party conference	... local leaders
1. Autocratic			
Socialist Party	1.3 (4)	3.5 (4)	3.8 (4)
People's Party	1.9 (16)	3.6 (17)	2.9 (17)
Equal Rights	1.3 (4)	3.3 (4)	1.8 (4)
Social Democrats	2.5 (13)	3.0 (12)	2.6 (13)
Sub-average (54.3%)	*1.9*	*3.4*	*2.8*
2. Pluralistic			
Latvia's Way	2.1 (10)	2.9 (10)	2.4 (10)
Harmony Party	2.3 (3)	3.7 (3)	3.0 (3)
New Party	2.0 (3)	2.7 (3)	2.3 (3)
Sub-average (25.7%)	*2.2*	*3.1*	*2.6*
3. Democratic (20%)			
Fatherland and Freedom	2.7 (14)	2.6 (14)	3.0 (14)
Total	**2.2 (69)**	**3.1 (69)**	**2.8 (70)**

Note: Only parties with at least 3 respondents shown. Sub-averages, however, include all respondents. 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.

Table 7. Electoral career governance in Lithuania, Mean (N)

Governance type	Recruitment controlled by...		
Party	... national leaders	... party conference	... local leaders
1. Autocratic			
Homeland Union	1.7 (51)	2.8 (45)	2.4 (46)
Centre Union	1.7 (13)	2.8 (13)	2.5 (13)
Sub-average (61.3%)	*1.7*	*2.8*	*2.4*
2. Pluralistic			
Social Democrats	2.3 (7)	2.9 (7)	2.6 (7)
Dem. Labour Party	1.8 (11)	2.1 (11)	2.2 (11)
Sub-average (18.9%)	*2.0*	*2.4*	*2.3*
3. Democratic			
Christian Dem. Party	2.1 (11)	2.1 (10)	2.6 (11)
Sub-average (19.8%)	*2.1*	*2.1*	*2.4*
Total:	**1.9 (106)**	**2.4 (99)**	**2.3 (101)**

Governance type	Ranking controlled by...		
Party	... national leaders	... party conference	... local leaders
1. Autocratic			
Homeland Union	1.4 (51)	2.9 (46)	2.9 (46)
Centre Union	1.3 (12)	2.8 (12)	2.3 (12)
Sub-average (61.3%)	*1.4*	*2.9*	*2.7*
2. Pluralistic			
Social Democrats	2.6 (7)	2.1 (7)	2.7 (7)
Dem. Labour Party	1.9 (10)	1.9 (10)	2.6 (10)
Sub-average (18.9%)	*2.1*	*2.0*	*2.6*
3. Democratic			
Christian Dem. Party	1.9 (10)	1.9 (10)	2.9 (10)
Sub-average (19.8%)	*1.9*	*1.7*	*2.8*
Total:	**1.8 (102)**	**2.2 (98)**	**2.7 (97)**

Note: Only parties with at least 4 respondents shown. Sub-averages, however, include all respondents. 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.

what between the three countries. For instance, Lithuania could be characterised as the most autocratic party system, with 61.3% of respondents belonging to autocratic parties, compared to 54.3% in Latvia and 43.8% in Estonia. Lithuania also has the smallest percentage of respondents (19.8%) who belong to democratic parties, compared to 25.7% in Latvia and 25% in Estonia. Nonetheless, these national figures must be disaggregated, as they conceal what are in reality important cross-party differences. For instance, it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) or the communist successor party belong to the pluralistic category in Lithuania. Especially when compared to Latvia's successor parties (the Socialist Party and Equal Rights), the LDLP seems to have been quite successful in shedding any Leninist legacies inherited from Soviet times. Similarly counterintuitive is the inclusion of Estonia's Centre Party in the pluralistic camp, as its leader, Edgar Savisaar, is widely considered to be relatively autocratic.[16] Nonetheless, according to the party's 20 respondents, control over electoral careers is fairly evenly distributed among its different constituent groups. This may be a reflection of the fact that the party is also one of Estonia's largest (with roughly 7600 members), which may mean that broadly based participation (or at least a sense of such participation) is more likely. It is interesting to note also that in Latvia the strongly nationalist Fatherland and Freedom Party ultimately constitutes the country's only 'democratic' party. Here one explanation may be that the party began as a coalition of nationalist groups in 1993 and may have retained a consensual style of decision-making ever since. Finally, one important fact that is not reported in the tables is the marginal influence that interest groups have on electoral careers in all three countries. Respondents generally rated the influence of interest groups on recruitment and ranking somewhere between 'weak control' and 'no control'. Therefore, political parties in the Baltics do not appear to be vehicles for special interest groups. Whether this is to be taken as an indicator of the strength of party autonomy, or of the underdevelopment of interest groups, or both, is a question that must be studied further.

MPs' careers (and the constraints upon them) extend well beyond a successful electoral candidacy. In the legislative arena, committee appointments, promotions to legislative executive office and even selection to cabinet posts provide important advancement opportunities. Control over these opportunities therefore constitutes another key determinant in the behaviour of MPs. At the same time, electoral and legislative behavioural constraints differ in a number of respects. First, the actors in the legislative arena differ from those at the electoral career stage. Decisions about legislative careers are usually brokered between party leaders, faction chairs, and regular faction members. Local party leaders or party conferences rarely if ever are involved at this career stage. Second, legislative career control does not offer quite the same leverage as control over electoral careers because it involves making decisions about career *advances* rather than deciding whether or not a party member will

[16] Indeed, in 2004 a major rift in the party opened up when a total of eight MPs split from the party's faction in the Riigikogu, complaining specifically about Savisaar's leadership style.

Table 8. 'Based on your experience, please assess the influence that the following groups/individuals had on your committee appointment?' Mean, (SD)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
1. Faction	2.25	2.20	2.36	2.28
	(0.77)	*(0.92)*	*(0.93)*	*(0.89)*
2. Party board	2.58	2.76	2.87	2.76
	(0.91)	*(0.98)*	*(1.02)*	*(0.98)*
3. Faction chair	2.40	2.07	2.65	2.43
	(0.76)	*(0.83)*	*(0.84)*	*(0.85)*
4. Personal preference	1.86	1.54	1.95	1.81
	(0.77)	*(0.77)*	*(0.76)*	*(0.78)*

Note: 1 = Full control, 4 = No control.

actually have a career. Legislative career control thus constitutes a secondary, complementary type of leverage. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile examining, as it introduces an important additional facet of MP behaviour. Depending on given patterns of legislative career control we can draw inferences about whether the faction chair, the party board, or the faction itself controls committee appointments. In the survey deputies were asked to assess the influence that different actors (including themselves) have on their final committee appointment in parliament and express their answer on the same four-point scale used in the previous question (ranging from 1, 'full control', to 4, 'no control').

As Table 8 reveals, the legislative career patterns in all three countries differ notably from their electoral counterparts. First, a horizontal look at the rows shows few country-specific legislative control patterns, since faction chairs, party boards and factions themselves exert more or less the same level of influence in each country. Similarly, a vertical glance at the country columns reveals a fairly undifferentiated picture. For example, party boards are not surprisingly rated as having the least influence. In this respect, the Baltic countries differ little from most other democracies in which extra-parliamentary party organs usually have little control over legislative careers. However, what is surprising is the small difference between factions and faction chairs. Typically, one of the two has more control over committee appointments than the other. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, however, the two are rated as having virtually the same level of influence. Moreover, since the standard deviation for each individual party (not reported in this table) is very small, we can guess that this is perhaps even an institutional phenomenon.

The absence of any legislative control pattern is evident from the last row in Table 8 and from Table 9. In Table 8 we can see that ultimately the personal preference of deputies constituted the most important factor in determining committee appointments among the survey respondents. Legislative career choices would thus

Table 9. 'If on a frequent basis or on a crucial plenary or committee vote you were to defy your party's voting instructions, what would be the most likely sanction you would face? [Please tick all appropriate responses.]' (%) (N)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
a) Expulsion	0 (0)	6 (4)	14.8 (16)
b) No re-nomination	14.9 (10)	6 (4)	3.7 (4)
c) No promotion	3.0 (2)	9.0 (6)	26.9 (29)
d) Committee removal	1.5 (1)	0 (0)	5.6 (6)
e) Warning	62.7 (45)	64.2 (43)	42.6 (46)
f) Nothing	37.3 (25)	22.4 (15)	39.8 (43)

appear to be somewhat self-selective. Table 9 shows that when deputies were asked what would happen if they consistently voted against their faction's political position, an overwhelming majority of respondents in all three countries replied that (at least at the time of this survey) they would face only minor sanctions, if anything at all. This is on top of the fact that deputies had more than one option to choose from. Given that in most democracies defiance of party leaders in legislative votes is considered a serious offence and is likely to jeopardise a deputy's career prospects this finding is significant [Bowler, Farrel and Katz 1999]. Nevertheless, the most commonly reported sanction in the survey was a warning or a slap on the wrist. Only in Lithuania did deputies rate the likelihood of expulsion or a denial of promotions as significant; and in this particular case a cross-tabulation by party showed that many of these deputies were from the Homeland Union, which probably reflected the fact that HU deputies (Laima Andrikiene and Vidmantas Ziemelis) had been expelled from the party in 1999.

Voter assistance

Central to the efficacy of parliamentary government is not only the democratic election of legislators, but also the responsiveness of these legislators to citizen inputs and demands. Such links between MPs and their direct constituents have been extensively studied in Western democracies [Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987], but much less so in Central and Eastern European countries. In the given survey, five questions were particularly designed to assess the degree to which Baltic deputies come into regular contact with their voters and how much they pursue efforts to directly assist such citizens. Beginning with a simple question about how often MPs are asked to intervene on behalf of a constituent in some personal government manner (Table 10), it is readily apparent that deputy-voter relations are strongest in Lithuania.

Not only do Lithuanian deputies seem to be comparatively inundated with voter requests, but they also appear in many cases to have factored this into their fu-

Table 10. 'In an average month, how often are you asked by a district voter to intervene on his or her behalf in a governmental agency?' (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
a) Rarely	38.0	16.9	4.4	17.3
b) 1-4 times	46.5	49.3	24.8	37.6
c) 5-10 times	14.1	16.9	21.2	18.0
d) 10+ times	4.5	16.9	49.6	27.1

Table 11. 'If you provide individual voters with bureaucratic assistance, do you intend to remind them at election time of your help?' (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
a) Yes	9.9	14.9	32.7	21.1
b) No	90.1	85.1	68.3	78.9

Table 12. 'Could you tell us whether you agree or disagree with the following statements about the work of members of parliament?' Mean, (SD)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
a) Solving voters' problems is one of the most worthwhile parts of my job.	2.35	2.00	2.20	2.18
	(0.60)	(0.70)	(0.73)	(0.70)
b) An MP who actively looks after voter interests can increase his/her chances of being re-elected.	2.02	1.66	1.87	1.85
	(0.57)	(0.48)	(0.64)	(0.59)
c) Members spend too much time looking after the interests of their voters, thereby neglecting national interests or problems.	3.00	2.91	2.71	2.85
	(0.59)	(0.72)	(0.72)	(0.69)
d) MPs are elected to serve national interest rather than to resolve voters' problems.	1.99	2.33	2.40	2.25
	(0.83)	(0.93)	(0.77)	(0.83)

1 = Strongly agree, 4 = Strongly disagree.

ture electoral strategy. At the same time, when asked how often they act on a voter request, an average of 56% of all Baltic deputies answered 'always' and 40% 'sometimes'.

In this respect, it is worth looking at the same issue in a more direct manner. In the survey, Baltic MPs were asked to express their opinion regarding four interrelated statements about the need to deal with voter problems. As Table 12 shows, it is to be expected that the first two statements exhibit lower means in order to reflect the agreement with the statement (1 = fully agree). The other two statements represent the converse attitude, signifying a higher mean. The results again show Lithuanian deputies are slightly more inclined to pay attention to voter affairs, although Latvian MPs also demonstrate a ready belief in the merits of such action (Row b).

District interests

Although MPs may often be careful to address the constituent concerns that reach them directly, a more effective way of winning votes comes from assisting an entire district or region. In this regard the survey asked to what extent MPs strive to provide collective goods to their constituencies, either through budgetary allocations ('pork') or legislative amendments. Naturally, it may be somewhat fanciful to try and apply the US models of 'home-style' politics to post-communist countries. Moreover, as will be discussed in the final section, this particular phenomenon of district representation is closely linked to the type of electoral system and the specific use of plurality voting. Nonetheless, as presumably rational actors, Central and Eastern European MPs map also be expected to care for certain kinds of regional or district interests.

Indeed, as the results indicate, Baltic MPs are by no means indifferent to their constituencies and their well-being. A solid majority felt that benefiting their constituency is part of their job. At the same time, when it comes to actually acting upon such duties, most deputies admit that they are able to deal with such things only occasionally or rarely. A comparison of the Baltic states in this regard shows that it is now the Latvian MPs who lead the pack, with a considerably higher sense of responsibility to get pork for their districts. Their mean score of 1.7 in Table 13 repre-

Table 13. 'During the annual debate over the state budget (or supplementary state budgets), how much do you feel it is your responsibility to try and get aid and/or government projects allocated that specifically benefit your district?' Mean, (SD)

Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
2.34	1.70	2.29	2.13
(0.57)	*(0.60)*	*(0.59)*	*(0.65)*

1 = Very often, 4 = Never.

Table 14. 'During the process of adopting the state budget (or a supplementary state budget), how often do you attempt to influence the process in order to provide projects or money for your district?' Mean, (SD)

Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
2.83	2.67	3.17	2.92
(0.76)	*(0.72)*	*(0.73)*	*(0.76)*

1 = Very often, 4 = Never.

Table 15. 'During an average parliamentary session, how often do you seek to alter *other legislative acts* in order to benefit your district?' Mean, (SD)

Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
3.13	3.06	3.48	3.25
(0.68)	*(0.63)*	*(0.61)*	*(0.68)*

1 = Very often, 4 = Never.

Table 16. 'How many times per month do you go back to your district?' (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
a) 1-3 times	23.2	35.2	63.8	43.2
b) 4-6 times	31.9	40.8	24.5	31.6
c) 7+	44.9	23.9	11.7	25.2

Table 17. 'How do you keep in touch with your constituency? (Please tick all appropriate responses.)' (%)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
a) I hold regular constituency meetings.	21.0	64.8	61.1
b) I use my party's legislative staffers to respond to constituent problems.	42.3	63.4	63.7
c) I attend local events (fairs, gatherings, concerts).	80.3	70.4	62.8
d) I write articles in the local newspaper.	54.9	71.8	46.9
e) I appear on local TV and radio.	33.8	70.4	37.2
f) I have too little time to maintain contact with my constituency.	5.6	0.0	3.5

sents a significant number of deputies (36.6%) who felt that such behaviour was a 'very important' responsibility of theirs. Similarly, Latvian concern for district interests is reflected in the significant number of trips deputies make back to the district (see Table 16). Latvian MPs also professed a broader range of ways in which they maintain public contact with their district (see Table 17). Not a single Latvian deputy in the survey claimed that they had too little time to keep in touch with their district.

Interest group politics

As already noted in the discussion of party activities and the ranking of electoral candidates, the direct influence of interest groups appears to be small in Baltic politics. Naturally, this does not mean that particularistic interests do not find their way into political processes or that their influence is not felt in other ways. Moreover, it would be naïve to think that an MP survey such as this could reveal reliably or openly the extent of such influence. The following assessment of the survey questions that dealt with these issues should therefore be taken with a grain of salt – especially as it pertains to the absolute level of interest influences. In the survey Baltic MPs generally responded that during an average legislative period they only 'occasionally' or even 'rarely' help businesses, interest groups or campaign sponsors in various of governmental affairs (Table 18).

While this correlates with the responses to the question in Table 2 about the amount of time MPs spend meeting with interest groups, it raises questions about how policy is then really made. Are Baltic parliaments procedurally more regulated so that interest groups are only able to meaningfully influence policy decisions through the executive branch or at the level of parliamentary committee chairs (who decide the passage of bills)? Obviously a great deal of policy is decided at the level of decrees and regulations prepared by ministerial officials. However, in each of the Baltic states deputies also have the right to submit private members' bills and amendments, which should provide some inroads for interest groups to influence legislation.

Another indication of how limited the scope of interest group influence on Baltic MPs may be is given in Table 19. When asked to cite some of the ways in which they have helped interest groups, deputies did not appear to give preference to any particular form, whether it was contacting a ministerial official or taking direct legislative action. Again it is possible that interest groups themselves have not yet had extensive access to average deputies. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that amendments and ministerial contacts may be more prevalent.[17]

[17] For example, in February 2002, Estonia's Minister for Social Affairs, Siiri Oviir, came under heavy media scrutiny when it turned out that a series of legislative amendments that she had previously sponsored as a private MP coincided word-for-word with a draft proposed by an interest group representing the pharmaceutical industry. Oviir claimed initially that the

Table 18. 'During an average legislative period, how often do you help businesses, interest groups or campaign sponsors in a variety of governmental matters?' Mean, (SD)

Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
2.99	2.76	2.75	2.92
(0.27)	*(0.71)*	*(0.79)*	*(0.67)*

Table 19. 'How often do you help such groups in the following ways?' Mean, (SD)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Baltic average
a) I sponsor an amendment to the national budget.	3.20	3.01	3.11	3.12
	(0.70)	*(0.68)*	*(0.72)*	*(0.70)*
b) I sponsor an amendment to an existing law.	3.01	2.76	2.87	2.88
	(0.58)	*(0.78)*	*(0.74)*	*(0.72)*
c) I submit a request for information to a minister during Question Time.	2.79	2.80	2.66	2.74
	(0.56)	*(0.86)*	*(0.79)*	*(0.75)*
d) I contact a minister or a ministerial official personally on behalf of the group or its problem.	2.66	2.68	2.55	2.62
	(0.56)	*(0.69)*	*(0.77)*	*(0.69)*
e) I speak to other parliamentary colleagues on behalf of the groups or its problem.	2.52	2.37	2.61	2.51
	(0.55)	*(0.74)*	*(0.75)*	*(0.70)*

1 = Very often, 4 = Never.

text was a coincidence, but the incident showed that interest group politics may flow precisely through such channels. Indeed, the incident also says something about MPs: they may be incapable or may have insufficient time to formulate such amendments themselves, and therefore ask interest groups to prepare 'drafts', which are then put into use without much examination.

General analysis

A number of hypotheses and questions arise when the data are analysed through the prism of institutional and electoral theory. Given the fact that the three Baltic electoral systems are so different, one is tempted to ask to what extent cross-country variations in the survey can be explained through institutional variables? In this concluding discussion, the presumable consequences for MP behaviour based on each of the electoral systems in the Baltic states will be posited and then compared with the actual data presented above.

Of the three Baltic countries, Lithuania has the most voter-centred electoral system, with 71 of the 141 members of the Seimas elected in single-member districts that have a first-past-the-post balloting system. This means that at least half of Lithuania's MPs exhibit at least some of the district-centred behavioural tendencies typical of the US Congress or the UK House of Commons – for example, caring more actively for voter and district needs, developing more independent relations from their parties. Indeed, in some respects, the survey's sample size is even larger, as the vast majority of Lithuanian deputies run in both an SMD and an MMD. This means that even if in the previous election an MP was elected from the countrywide MMD, he/she may still maintain close ties with a single-mandate district in the hopes of retaining a mandate at the next election via an SMD victory. Nevertheless, it is clear that only directly elected SMD deputies have an official status in relation to their local constituencies, which MMD deputies can only imitate.

In the survey the sample was slightly skewed in favour of MMD deputies (58) over SMD deputies (46). The range nonetheless allows us to make some correlative analyses. To reiterate the point that was raised in the introduction to this article, the SMD-MMD institutional distinction in Lithuania was not evident with regard to all the variables where it may have been expected. For example, no statistically significant correlation could be discovered between district type and the 'sense of responsibility to get pork for one's district'. Similarly there appears to be no relationship between district type and the four general statements on voter versus national interest, which were presented in Table 12. Lithuanian deputies were the least frequent visitors to their electoral districts (Table 16). Still, robust coefficients of 0.352 and 0.365 existed between the electoral district and how much time a deputy spent at local meetings and on voter problems, respectively. In addition, SMD deputies are more likely (by a coefficient of 0.310) to agree that 'providing voter assistance improves electoral chances' or that 'providing voter assistance improves independence in parliament' (0.259). SMD deputies also appear to receive many more voter requests; thus it would seem that Lithuanian voters are also learning to distinguish who is worth talking to with regard to political issues.

Voter care would seem to be a likely preoccupation also for Estonian MPs, since based on Estonian electoral law they too run in fairly small districts, of which there are relatively many (11 or 12, depending on the year). Indeed, this could be one interpretation for why the Estonian MPs we interviewed tended to visit their dis-

tricts more than their Latvian or Lithuanian counterparts. Yet in our survey these visits seemed to consist mostly of attending local events (Table 17), and less so constituency meetings or using staffers to respond to voter needs. With regard to the latter issue, it is true that Estonian MPs also have fewer staff resources as allocated by parliamentary rules. However, a second institutional factor deterring constituency ties comes into play through the electoral system: because Estonian MPs can also be elected off of a national list (if they fail to gain the minimum amount of votes in their district in order to be elected directly), they may frequently be more beholden to the party than to their voters during their subsequent parliamentary term. In addition, previous research has shown that of those candidates eventually elected off of a national list, a disproportionate share ran their original campaigns in the main cities of Tallinn and Tartu. Thus rural representation is diminished[18] [Pettai and Kreuzer 2001]. Also, Estonian voters seem to be equally complacent, as, given the fact that about half of the seats during each election are allocated at the national level, most voters cannot clearly point to any MP as being their district representative. This phenomenon is reflected in the low number of voter requests that the survey indicated Estonian deputies receive. Finally, Estonian MPs in general showed a less particularistic and more 'nationally-oriented' attitude in relation to the four statements on voter versus national interest in Table 12.

Latvian MPs stood out in the survey for their greater-than-expected attention to district 'pork' and interest group politics. This is counterintuitive since the Latvian electoral system (based on party-lists and five large electoral districts) should make Latvian MPs more dependent on their party and should therefore detract from overly particularistic behaviour. Certainly the fact that electoral candidates have to fight for citizens' preference votes in order to be actually elected may increase their incentive to pay attention to constituent affairs. By the same token, because Latvian electoral candidates are allowed to run in more than one district at once (i.e. they may simultaneously be on their party's list in several districts), and most top politicians follow this practice, they may never be sure about which district they may end up being elected from, and therefore, as MPs, they may also not have a clear connection to their ultimate 'electoral district'. If a candidate is originally from one part of Latvia, but ends up being elected from another district (because of the vagaries of party-list totals or individual preference votes), he/she may not even be in a position to actually serve the interests of that district.

The Latvian case could draw our attention to the procedural rules that relate to making budgetary and legislative amendments. For example, it may be that it is easier for Latvian MPs to submit such bills in parliament, and that is why they report engaging in this activity more. At the same time, the parliamentary rules in the

[18] Moreover, looking at a cross-tabulation of the geographic type of district (rural vs. urban) and the number of times an MP returns home to his/her district, urban-district MPs were much more likely to have returned home 7+ times. This means that in the case of MPs who considered their district the capital, 'returning home' was no problem whatsoever. In other words, the data regarding district visitations are skewed by these capital-based deputies.

Baltic states actually give the best hand to Estonian deputies, who are able to submit bills and amendments on their own and without to have more than one sponsor. In Latvia, by contrast, bills need to be sponsored by a minimum of five deputies. This variable therefore remains a puzzle.

Conclusion

In legislative studies, there are a number of competing conceptual frameworks that are used to make sense of parliamentary behaviour. In the context of consolidating democracies, it is clear that factors related to historical legacies or inherited political culture may have a lot to do with how parliamentarians act. For example, faced with the task of strengthening embryonic democratic institutions, politicians may commit themselves to more collective, national interests, rather than behaving in opportunistic, self-interested ways, even if the institutions otherwise enable such behaviour. Similarly, politicians may only slowly come to understand the incentives embedded in the institutions or rules that they have chosen for their system, for there is clearly a process of learning that goes on no matter how much politicians may think they know what to expect from the rules they put in place. Indeed, at the very least there will always be MPs who were not professional politicians when they entered politics. These people may arrive with entirely different perceptions of life, of society and of politics itself. So at least for an initial period of learning these deputies will exhibit different types of behaviour than those who could more readily be classified as professional politicians.

All of these more distal variables (however difficult they may be to delineate) require us therefore to take with some caution the effects that more proximate institutional variables might have on MP behaviour. The objective of this article was to test (at least in a provisional manner) some of the hypotheses that institutional-electoral theory provides us with on how MPs should behave based on certain types of institutional-electoral rules. The results are somewhat inconclusive. Some of the starkest differences between the three Baltic states in terms of electoral institutions (e.g. Latvia's simple PR system versus Lithuania's mixed system) do pan out with respect to certain aspects of parliamentarians' self-reported behaviour and attitudes. Others, however, do not. Returning to the argument about political learning, it is possible that over time these remaining hypotheses may also be corroborated as deputies simply learn what 'rational behaviour' means for them under the particular rules they work in. For that kind of definitive test, however, a data time-series would be necessary. Consequently, the examination and explanation of different patterns of parliamentarian behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe as yet remains an emerging research area.

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Surveys of MPs and Senators in the Parliament of the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2005

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Abstract: The article provides an overview of the surveys conducted among MPs of the Czech parliament between 1993 and 2005. It describes seven surveys conducted among MPs in the Chamber of Deputies and one survey among members of the Senate. Particularly in the early 1990s such surveys were conducted or at least run and financed by researchers from outside the Czech Republic. These surveys are characterised from the perspective of the content of the observed variables and from the perspective of representativeness, which is demonstrated by the percentage of MPs taking part in the survey. The article also contains references to texts that have made use of the data provided by these MP surveys.
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Questionnaire surveys focusing on the opinions and behaviour of MPs have in recent years become an important source of information for considerations and reflections on the development and style of democracy in individual countries. This trend has also surfaced in the Czech Republic, where, particularly during the first electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies, a number of questionnaire surveys were carried out among MPs. These surveys were usually conducted as a part of projects aimed at examining the institutionalisation of democracy, or specifically the institutionalisation of parliament as one of the fundamental political institutions in the newly established democratic states. The aim of the following text is to present the surveys conducted among MPs and senators that involved systematic questioning, where the survey population was made up of all the members of the targeted chamber. Consequently, the summary does not cover those surveys that concerned, for example, only members of particular committees or parliamentary party groups. Also, this summary of surveys is not the intended to be exhaustive; there may be other questionnaire surveys of MPs, but the author has no information on them and consequently they are not included here.

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From 1993 to 1996: Studies on the Czech parliament by Western European experts

During the first electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic four surveys were conducted, only one of which was also accompanied by a parallel survey of attitudes among the general population using almost identical variables, and two of which were part of comparative studies organised abroad. The first survey of MPs was organised by the Sociology of Politics Department at the Institute of Sociology AS CR, headed by Lubomír Brokl and in co-operation with Prof. Kees Niemöeler from the Centre for Electoral Studies in the Department of Statistics and Methodology PSCW of the University of Amsterdam. Data was collected with the support of a research grant from the Research Support Scheme of the Central European University (grant title: 'The Party System and Parliament in the 1992 Election Year') and the University of Amsterdam. This research was carried out simultaneously in the Slovak National Council. The fieldwork was conducted in March 1993 by Factum (a marketing and market research company). A total of 136 deputies took part in the research (i.e. 68% of the total number of 200 deputies). A relatively higher number of deputies in left-wing parties took part in the research, while conversely only a few deputies from the parliamentary party groups of extremist and nationalistic parties participated (see Table 1).

The basis for the first comprehensive questionnaire was the research on German and Dutch parliaments carried out at the end of the 1980s and in the early

Table 1. The party structure of the Institute of Sociology survey sample in 1993

Party membership at the time of interview	No. of interviews	Percentage of total interviews
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	52	38.2
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	33	24.3
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	16	11.8
Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	8	5.9
Movement for Self-governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia (HSDMS)	8	5.9
Christian Democratic Party (KDS)	7	5.1
Association for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSČ)	4	2.9
Czechoslovak Socialist Party (ČSS)	2	1.5
Agricultural Party (ZS)	2	1.5
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)	1	0.7
Moravian Party (MS)	1	0.7
No party affiliation	2	2.2
Total	136	100.0

Source: Data from a survey of MPs in the Parliament of the Czech Republic in 1993 [Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 1993]; author's calculations.

1990s. The questionnaire was modified to suit the Czech context and contained a total of 86 questions. The subjects studied in the research included the structure of MPs' activities, how demanding the activities were on their time, the form and frequency of contacts MPs had with voters and interest groups, the importance of the individual activities MPs engaged in, the functions of parliament and an evaluation of its performance, and information sources. The survey also included questions on the role of political parties in decision-making and the voting of PPGs and MPs, on the role of party leaders and parliamentary groups in parliament, and on contacts with the government, means of influence, and on MPs' ambitions. An important part of the survey was asking MPs to position themselves and position the voters of all the relevant parties on the left-right political scale.

In 1993 MPs were presented with a questionnaire survey that was conducted as part of a comparative project on 'The Institutionalisation of Parliamentary Democracy in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia'. This research was organised by the Department of Political Science of Leiden University. Data col-

Table 2. The party structure of the Kopecký survey sample in 1993

Political Party	Elected as		Belongs to	
	No. of interviews	Percentage of total interviews	No. of interviews	Percentage of total interviews
ODS-KDS	60	35.7	–	–
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	–	–	52	31.0
Christian Democratic Party (KDS)	–	–	8	4.8
Left Block (LB)	35	20.8	35	20.8
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	13	7.7	14	8.3
Association for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSČ)	13	7.7	8	4.8
Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	12	7.1	12	7.1
Liberal Social Union (LSU)	12	7.1	9	5.4
Movement for Self-governing Democracy – Association for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS)	12	7.1	7	4.2
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)	11	6.5	11	6.5
Liberal Social National Party (LSNS)	–	–	4	2.4
Movement for Self-governing Democracy of Moravia and Silesia (HSDMS)	–	–	7	4.2
No party affiliation	–	–	1	0.6
Total	168	100.0	168	100.0

Source: Data file from the study 'The Institutionalisation of Parliamentary Democracy in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 1993' [Kopecký 1993]; author's calculations.

lection took place between September and December 1993 and was again organised by Factum. A total of 168 MPs took part in the research. In comparison with the survey headed by Lubomír Brokl in 1993, this survey managed to attract more MPs from ODA and KDU-ČSL.

The questionnaire contained 108 questions, which focused primarily on the procedural content of politics and were not designed to determine political attitudes towards the content of politics (state regulation, social policy, etc.). The survey therefore reveals MPs' viewpoints on the electoral system, the President, the functions of parliament, the organisation of parliamentary clubs, the existence of party factions, the method of voting, the capacity of MPs to influence the positions and politics of the government, and the avenues whereby various interest groups may be able to shape laws. Other sets of questions addressed the roles of MPs, their relationship to voters, and their workload. Petr Kopecký used the results of this survey for what is to date the most comprehensive publication on the institutionalisation of parliament, the links between individual political institutions, and party competition in the Czech Republic [Kopecký 2001].

Table 3. The party structure of the Miller – White – Heywood survey sample in 1994

Political Party	Elected as		Belongs to	
	No. of interviews	Percentage of total interviews	No. of interviews	Percentage of total interviews
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	49	36.6	48	35.8
LB / KSČM	25	18.7	–	–
Left Block (LB)	–	–	18	13.4
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	–	–	7	5.2
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	13	9.7	15	11.2
Liberal Social Union (LSU)	11	8.2	4	3.0
Movement for Self-governing Democracy – Association for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS)	9	6.7	–	–
Czech-Moravian Party of Center (ČMSS)			3	2.2
Association for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSČ)	8	6.0	5	3.7
Christian Democratic Party (KDS)	7	5.2	7	5.2
Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	6	4.5	7	5.2
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)	6	4.5	8	6.0
Liberal Social National Party (LSNS)	–	–	4	3.0
No party affiliation	–	–	8	6.0
Total	134	100.0	134	100.0

Source: Data file from the project 'Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe' [Miller, White and Heywood 2000]; author's calculations.

In 1994 another survey was conducted among MPs, which was part of a large comparative study on political values in post-communist countries, encompassing the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, and Russia. This research was sponsored by the British Economic and Social Research Council, which provided support to William L. Miller, Stephen White and Paul Heywood for a survey on the attitudes of the public and elites in these five states (grant no. R000233538: 'Values and Political Change in Post-Communist Europe'). A book on attitudes in post-communist societies was published in 1998 [Miller, White and Heywood 1998]. In the Czech parliament the survey was organised by the Prague-based company Opinion Window and conducted in the autumn of 1994 (11 October – 3 November 1994). A total of 134 out of 200 MPs took part in the survey.

The questions in this questionnaire almost exclusively concerned the four different groups of political attitudes among MPs. First, the research examined MPs' views on democracy, elections, the size of the party system, government accountability, the banning of some political parties and trust in political and social institutions. Second, the research ascertained MPs' attitudes on the regulation of the economy, preferences for state or market regulation of different sectors of the economy and services, attitudes on unemployment, and the responsibility of the state for the provision of social services. Third, the authors examined feelings of nationalism among MPs, and fourth it questioned MPs on their views about the degree of preferred freedom and the state restriction of rights.

Among the main findings in the research was that at the time of the survey there was less support for socialist ideas among MPs than among the public. Socialism was approximately 30% more popular among the public in four countries surveyed than among MPs (the least difference was in the Czech Republic at 23%; 28% of MPs in the Czech Republic endorsed socialist values). MPs in post-communist parliaments much more strongly supported the market economy than did the public and they were more optimistic about government reforms and the future [Miller, White and Heywood 1998: 177–190]. With regard to the future development of state funding for political parties in the Czech Republic it is no surprise to find that there was considerably more support for this method of funding among MPs (78% among MPs and only 22% among the public) [Miller, White and Heywood 1998: 189].

In 1996 the Sociology of Politics Department at the Institute of Sociology AS CR, headed by Lubomír Brokl, conducted a second survey of MPs from the first electoral term. The research was supported by a grant from the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (grant no. 403/96/0388 on 'Representatives in the Parliament of the Czech Republic 1996. The Second Stage of Research'), and the survey was conducted in co-operation with the East Carolina University in Greenville and with Charles University. The research was carried out between February and April 1996, at the end of the first electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies. Factum conducted the fieldwork. There were 146 respondents (i.e. 73% of the total of 200 MPs) and in comparison with the previous survey conducted by the department the individual parliamentary groups were more equally represented in the research.

Table 4. The party structure of the Institute of Sociology survey sample in 1996

Parliamentary party group (PPG)	No. of MPs in the PPG	No. of interviews (% of PPG)	Percentage of total interviews
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	72	45 (63%)	30.8
Left Block (LB)	23	22 (96%)	15.1
Christian-Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	24	20 (83%)	13.7
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	22	19 (86%)	13.0
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)	16	11 (69%)	7.5
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	10	8 (80%)	5.5
Czech-Moravian Union of Centre (ČMUS)	15	8 (53%)	5.5
Civic National Movement (ONAH)	6	6 (100%)	4.1
Association for the Republic - Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSČ)	5	1 (20%)	0.7
No party affiliation	7	6 (86%)	4.1
Total	200	146 (73%)	100.0

Source: Data from the Survey of MPs of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in 1996 [Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 1996]; author's calculations.

In comparison with the 1993 questionnaire the version of the questionnaire used in 1996 featured some significant changes. The research team, headed by Lubomír Brokl, was nonetheless able to compare the data from 1993 and 1996 and the team made the following observations. According to the researchers, the MPs elected in 1992 represented a standard selection of political parties and various levels of political power and public life. In the exercise of their mandates MPs primarily saw themselves as the representatives of the voters of their party. MPs considered political parties to be the dominant actors in the articulation of democracy and the mediation of citizens' interests. Although they considered the initiatives submitted by various social groups to be important, they also felt that their practical significance in parliamentary work had declined [see Kroupa 1996; Brokl, Mansfeldová and Kroupa 1998].

From 1996 to 2004: Studies on the Chamber of Deputies by Lubomír Brokl's research team

In 1998 the Sociology of Politics Department at the Institute of Sociology conducted their third survey of MPs, again headed by Lubomír Brokl. This survey of deputies was financially supported by the Institute of Sociology and was carried out in the spring of 1998, before the early elections of that year, so the data of the second term of the Chamber of Deputies were not lost. Interviewers from Sofres-Fac-

Table 5. The party structure of the Institute of Sociology survey sample in 1998

Parliamentary party group (PPG)	No. of MPs in the PPG	No. of interviews (% of PPG)	Percentage of total interviews
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	58	55 (95%)	34.2
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	38	36 (95%)	22.4
Union of Freedom (US)	29	24 (83%)	14.9
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	22	21 (95%)	13.0
Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	19	15 (79%)	9.3
Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA)	12	6 (50%)	3.7
Association for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSČ)	18	0 (0%)	0.0
No party affiliation	4	4 (100%)	2.5
Total	200	161 (81%)	100.0

Source: Data from the Survey of MPs of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in 1998 [Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 1998]; author's calculations.

Table 6. The party structure of the Institute of Sociology survey sample in 2000

Parliamentary party group (PPG)	No. of MPs in the PPG	No. of interviews (% of PPG)	Percentage of total interviews
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	74	65 (88%)	37
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	63	56 (89%)	31.5
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	24	22 (92%)	12
Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	20	18 (90%)	10
Union of Freedom (US)	18	17 (94%)	9
No party affiliation	1	1 (100%)	0.5
Total	200	179 (90%)	100

Source: Data from the Survey of MPs and Senators of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in 2000 [Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 2000]; author's calculations.

tum interviewed MPs during the 24th meeting of the Chamber of Deputies; the final interviews even took place as late as May 1998. A total of 161 interviews were carried out (i.e. 80.5% of the 200 MPs). The entire parliamentary party group of SPR-RSČ refused to take part in the research [see Seidlová 1999]. Since 1996 the questionnaire used by the Institute of Sociology's research team has been approximately 90% comparable with subsequent versions.

The survey in 2000 was organised by a research team from the Sociology of Politics Department under the direction of Lubomír Brokl. Data collection was conducted with the financial support of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (grant no. 407/00/0747 'Deputies and Senators of the Parliament CR in the Third Term') and the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (grant no. S7028003 'Documentary Centre for Parliamentary Research'). The survey was unique in that for the first time it encompassed both senators and MPs. The research in the Chamber of Deputies took place during its 26th meeting (27 June 2000 – 11 July 2000). A total of 179 interviews were conducted (89.5% of the total number of 200 deputies), including the deputy chair, three political party chairs, and ten chairs and forty-five deputy chairs of parliamentary committees. In 2000 the research group carried out the survey itself (for more on the research see Seidlová [2001a] and Seidlová [2001b]).

The fieldwork in the Senate took place on 19 October at a meeting of the Senate from 19 to 26 October 2000, and 73 interviews were carried out (i.e. 90.1% out of the total of 81 senators), and among the respondents were chairs, four deputy chairs, one chair of a political party, five chairs and twenty-five deputy chairs of Senate committees, nine chairs of Senate sub-committees and four chairs of delegations.

In this phase of research new subjects were added relating to the mutual relationship between MPs and senators, the position of the Senate in the Czech constitutional system, the position and powers of the President, and the newly created self-governing regions. The questionnaires used for MPs and senators are almost fully comparable. The main findings in these studies were published in two volumes containing the proceedings of conferences held in the Chamber of Deputies [Brokl 2001] and the Senate [Mansfeldová 2001]. The data were also used in a study dealing with parliamentary party group voting [Linek and Rakušanová 2002; Linek and Rakušanová 2004], the role of parliamentary committees and how they function [Mansfeldová, Syllová, Rakušanová and Kolář 2003; Rakušanová 2001], the accountability of MPs [Brokl, Mansfeldová and Seidlová 2001], asserting agricultural interests in the Czech Republic [Rakušanová 2002b] and generally the role of par-

Table 7. Party structure of the Institute of Sociology survey sample in 2000

Parliamentary party group (PPG)	No. of MPs in the PPG	No. of interviews (% of PPG)	Percentage of total interviews
ODS	24	24 (100%)	29.6
ČSSD	23	16 (70%)	28.4
KDU-ČSL	17	16 (94%)	21.0
US-ODA	11	11 (100%)	13.6
No party affiliation	6	6 (100%)	7.4
Total	81	73 (90%)	100.0

Source: Data from Survey of MPs and Senators of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in 2000 [Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 2000]; author's calculations.

Table 8. The party structure of the Institute of Sociology survey sample in 2003

Parliamentary party group (PPG)	No. of MPs in the PPG	No. of interviews (% of PPG)	Percentage of total interviews
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	70	57 (81%)	33.7
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	58	47 (81%)	27.8
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	41	38 (93%)	22.5
Christian-Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	21	17 (81%)	10.1
Union of Freedom – Democratic Union (US-DEU)	10	10 (100%)	5.9
Total	200	169 (85%)	100.0

Source: Data from the Survey of MPs of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in 2003 [Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic 2003]; author's calculations.

ties in the political system of the Czech Republic [Mansfeldová 2002a, 2002b; Rakušanová 2002a].

The last survey to date on MPs' attitudes was conducted in October 2003. The data in this survey were collected by a research team at the Institute of Sociology headed by Lubomír Brokl. The survey was conducted with the support of the Grant Agency of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (grant no. S7028003 'Documentary Centre for Parliamentary Research'). A total of 169 MPs responded to the questionnaire survey, and all of the parliamentary parties were relatively equally represented. The content of the questionnaire was slightly changed from the versions used in previous years. The main innovation was the inclusion of fifteen questions on attitudes relating to serious issues of public policy (social policy, the level of taxation, individual accountability, the role of the church and morality in society, relationship to the environment, etc.). The data were applied in a study on state budget preparations in the Czech Republic [Mansfeldová and Rakušanová 2005].

Conclusion

Since 1993 a total of eight questionnaire surveys have been conducted in the Czech parliament, seven of which targeted MPs and only one focused on senators. The data that were gathered in the research comprise a large database that can be used both in research on the evolution of Czech parliamentarism and the establishment of political institutions and party competition and in international comparative studies. They have already served as a source for numerous important studies on parliamentarism, the party competition, how the political parties operate in parliament, and the relationship between political institutions in the Czech Republic.

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Converging Representative Elites in Europe? An Introduction to the EurElite Project

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Abstract: This article provides an overview of the aims, the research design and the activities of the EurElite project, a project devoted to the comparative study of representative elites across Europe. Through investigating long-term trends in the composition of parliaments and member recruitment, the scholars involved in the EurElite activities attempt to identify the degree and patterns of convergence among national deputies on the continent. With the inclusion of democratically elected legislators from about a dozen post-communist countries, a new dimension has been added to the question of convergence: elite integration across Europe, i.e. between the elites in the new democracies and those in Western Europe. The scope of the research also encompasses the study of the European Parliament as the site of the possible emergence of a supra-national elite in Europe. The article also provides information on the structure and variables of the (key) data set and its regional/temporal coverage.
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As early as in the mid-1960s the seminal works of Stein Rokkan highlighted the need for comparative research not only on national building but also on elite recruitment and formation in (at the time primarily Western) Europe. In the two decades that followed impressive progress was made in fields like electoral studies and party system development leading to a number of genuinely comparative studies. While some major data collection also took place in many countries, elites remained a white spot on the Rokkanian map of comparative research. It was that observation which spurred the imagination of some leading European scholars from in the fields of both sociology and political science. Using the initiative of an ECPR meeting in Rimini in the late 1980s, Heinrich Best (Germany), Maurizio Cotta (Italy), Kjell Eliassen (Norway) and Mogens Pedersen (Denmark) started working on an integrated database on representative elites in (Western) Europe.

With organisational help from the ECPR and with the support of an Exploratory Grant (1996–99), later the fully-fledged Network (2001–4) of the European Science Foundation, this group of researchers made every effort to collect existing national da-

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ta sets, to integrate them in a single database, and then to go beyond the scope of descriptive and case studies in their analyses of parliamentary representatives in Europe. Many more scholars have joined these efforts over the years, thereby paving the way for a virtually European database that covers almost a dozen Western European and – over the course of EurElite's 'Eastern enlargement' – a growing number of Central and Eastern European countries. Like other social scientists this group of researchers is standing on the back of giants: Mattei Dogan, Erwin K. Scheuch, Lewis J. Edinger, Giovanni Sartori, Moshe Czudnowski, Robert D. Putnam are just some of the scholars whose works have been sources of inspiration and orientation.

While the funding of network activities came to an end in the autumn of 2004, the scholars involved in the EurElite project have agreed to continue in their joint effort and even to extend research activities to new areas (see Section III). This text introduction to EurElite is intended to provide a brief overview of the basic goals of the project (Section I), the structure of the integrated database (Section II), and selected activities (Section IV).

Research design: comparative – interdisciplinary – inter-temporal

The goal of the EurElite project is to bring together, in a joint research effort, political scientists, sociologists and historians who from an empirical perspective have studied the patterns of transformation of the political elites of European nation states. It is the researchers' belief that the comparative study of similarities and differences in the personal characteristics and in the recruitment and career patterns of European representative elites will provide powerful tools for obtaining a better understanding of the processes of political mobilisation, institutionalisation and democratisation taking place within European nation states. At the same time it will offer an opportunity to evaluate to what extent the process of European integration is able to rely on the convergence of diversities.

The basic goal of the EurElite project has been to pool existing datasets, improve them where they are deficient, and develop a series of comparative studies on the long-term transformational trends of representation and leadership in Europe. This database, though still limited in its regional scope and incomplete with regard to some important indicators, has been used successfully to increase our understanding of the variations in the processes of democratisation and political professionalisation. It became clear that beyond country variations there were also important elements of convergence across Europe.

The project focuses on parliamentary representation, which forms "the intersection point of two sets of relations: on the one side, relations with society (the input side), on the other side, the decision-making processes of democracy and their outcomes (the output side)"[1] [Best and Cotta 2000: 9]. The characteristics of legisla-

[1] Best, H. and M. Cotta. 2000. *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*. Oxford: OUP.

tors are viewed as traces of complex and multi-layered recruitment processes involving selectorates, electorates and contenders, with their respective norms, values, interests and opportunities. The approach adopted by the researchers adopted is structural: they look at patterns of embeddedness and interconnectedness that link legislators with certain sectors of society and polity, while leaving out the immediate records of legislators' attitudes and behaviour. These latter aspects, however, are indirectly present in the study, in that positions in society are structural parameters reflecting past and directing future political action.

The research is embedded in a conceptual framework for studying legislative recruitment, which combines a supply and demand model of the recruitment process with assumptions about fundamental changes in the parameters that have determined the 'recruitment-function' since the middle of the 19th century. The key concepts used in this dynamic model are the inherently contradictory processes of 'democratisation' and 'professionalisation'. They are contradictory because, while democratisation refers to opening up the channels for political participation and legislative recruitment to more social groups (or rather political groups, as in the case of CEE countries), professionalisation refers to the process whereby those recruited tend to establish area-specific standards and routines, which increase the insider-outsider differential. In this research project the assumption is that increasing levels of both democratisation and professionalisation will be found in all the countries studied.

The project aims to improve the level of understanding of the complex interrelations between change in society, changes in the formal structures of opportunity for parliamentary recruitment (like electoral laws), patterns of parliamentary representation, and systemic policy outcomes (including regime discontinuities). The focus on European polities, West and East, limits the study to a historical and geopolitical context, which, notwithstanding the deep divisions that have existed during most of the second half of the 20th century, has been deeply intertwined and is now heading for political integration. On the other hand, a degree of diversity has developed that past research would have perceived as 'abnormalities'. The project's inter-temporal and international comparisons should make it possible to identify the sources of this variety and to explain why the diverse paths of development of European polities are now converging. The research focuses on:

1. The variations and convergence in patterns of elite recruitment and careers in Europe and the relationship they bear to the democratisation of political systems and the modernisation of societies.
2. The formation of democratic representative elites after extended periods of authoritarian and totalitarian rule, wherein the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe will be compared to that of Western and Southern European countries, such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain.
3. The changes to political elites in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century, when the challenges to democratic legitimacy are growing, the impact of the media is increasing, and transnational influences are becoming more important.

4. The extent of similarities in the composition of European political elites and the persistence of distinctiveness after almost fifty years of European integration.

The structure of the data set: the cube's three dimensions

A major part of the work by the EurElite network during the past couple of years has been devoted to producing a comprehensive and integrated database on the personal features, recruitment, and career patterns of members of national parliaments across Europe for the purpose of comparative analysis. These efforts have resulted in what the research team refers to as the DataCube (an SPSS data set), where the sides of the cube are organised along three dimensions: time, countries/party families, and a bunch of variables. It is comprised of percentages that are broken down into main party families. For example, a typical entry into the DataCube would be the percentage of female members of the Socialist Parliamentary Party in the French *Assemblée Nationale* of 2002. As illustrated in Figure 1, the DataCube allows for the

Figure 1: The EurElite DataCube and its three dimensions



Source: Best and Cotta [2000: 19][2].

[2] Ibid.

analyses of the variables (b) over time, and (a) by country and/or party families. For the variables, two other dimensions (time and countries/party families) can also be observed (c) simultaneously, and (d) as indicated along the axis for time-series analyses.

Time (T)

The EurElite project extends the established methods of social and political background research on political elites by pursuing comprehensive inter-temporal comparisons, providing, for the first time, a continuous time-series running from the 19th century to the present day, and offering a set of identical or at least equivalent indicators. For many Western European countries, the first available data date from the middle of the 19th century, with Norwegian data covering a record period of almost two centuries (Figure 2). The Central and Eastern European countries represent a somewhat different case, as few of them have a record of competitively elected parliaments before the *annus mirabilis* of 1989. Therefore, the long-term perspective on the composition and recruitment of representatives is, almost by definition, missing for the new democracies in post-communist Europe. Hungary, whose parliamentary experiments prior to the communist period are documented in the Data Cube, is an exception, and in Lithuania some data collection on the inter-war parliaments is also under way.

Countries and party families (N)

The DataCube covers eleven Western European states, including the four big countries: Germany, UK, France and Italy (Figure 2). From the fifteen pre-2004 EU members states only five smaller parliaments are missing, while the Norwegian *Storting* represents the only parliament in the Cube with a long history that is from outside the EU borders. For some parliaments, like the Spanish *Congreso de los Diputados*, it was not possible to cover all the legislative terms, and in the case of the Austrian *Nationalrat* data coding stopped in the middle of the 1990s. But for the majority of Western European parliaments the data coverage is both relatively complete and updated to include even the most recent general elections.

With the extension of the project to Central and Eastern Europe data are now also available on the democratically elected parliaments in many post-communist countries. The historic changes in the region provide us with an unprecedented chance to compare the new democracies with the more consolidated ones in Western Europe and also with countries from the 'early days' of the third wave of democratisation in the south of the continent. The coverage is equal to that for Western Europe, with five out of eight EU accession countries from the region already included in the DataCube, and data processing underway for the other three (Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia). Furthermore, the EurElite network was able to integrate data from two accession candi-

Figure 2: EurElite regional and temporal coverage of national parliaments (as of 12/2004)*



* Recently, data coding was completed also for Croatia and Latvia.

date parliaments, the Croatian *Sabor* and the Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, and even from the Russian *Duma*, as a particular interesting post-communist legislature.[3]

The DataCube contains data provided by the national experts for both the entire parliament and for party families. The concept of party families, frequently used in comparative political science, enables the analysis of patterns of recruitment not only across parliaments but also within parliaments and on a party by nation basis. The classification of parties or parliamentary party groups into party families follows the typology suggested by Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair in their book *Representative Government in Modern Europe*.[4] Based on the three criteria

[3] The authors would like to thank the following scholars from CEE (and the respective research teams) for their substantial contributions to EurElite research on MPs in post-communist legislatures: Goran Čular (Croatia), Oxana Gaman-Golutvina (Russia), Gabriella Ilonszki (Hungary), Mindaugas Kuklys (Latvia), Zdenka Mansfeldová (Czech Republic), Irmina Matonyte (Lithuania), Laurenţiu Ştefan (Romania), Jacek Wasilewski (Poland) as well as Béla Keszegh (Slovakia), Jüri Ruus (Estonia) and Uroš Pinterič (Slovenia).

[4] Gallagher, M., M. Laver and P. Mair. 2001. *Representative Government in Modern Europe*. 3rd Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.

of shared ideology/policies, 'genetic origin', and membership in international party federations, their classification was developed against a Western European backdrop. Its application to the somewhat different Central and East European party landscapes therefore required some modifications. The most important changes include the introduction of two new types of party families, which are specific to all or some of the post-communist polities: the anti-communist umbrella movements (as crucial actors, for example, in the Baltic republics during the early stages of the change in regime) and the pro-presidential parties (figuring prominently in Russia). The Gallagher-Laver-Mair typology only runs up against difficulties in a few cases, for example, when nationalist parties need to be qualified either as conservative or as extreme right. For most of the communist successor parties (like the Hungarian MSZP, the Polish SLD and even the Romanian PSD) their platforms and policies and their European party affiliation leave little doubt that they belong to the socialist or social democratic party family.

Variables (V)

Altogether the DataCube encompasses roughly fifty variables related to the social and political background of MPs. Beyond some basic socio-demographic variables like education there is also information on parliamentarians' linkage to politics, the economy and other spheres of society (Table 1). Particular attention is given to the pre-parliamentary political experience of MPs including positions in local politics, leading party functions, and membership in the cabinet. In addition the DataCube covers some structural variables indicative of the formation of the representative elite, such as the percentage of newcomers (turnover).

For the post-communist parliaments the scope of the analysis was broadened to include another fifteen variables. Half of these additional variables are meant to capture the issue of elite reproduction after regime change. Examples include membership in the Communist Party, positions in the nomenklatura, or dissident activities during the former regime. Beyond this, the structural aspects of parliament's composition are covered more comprehensively, providing information on the percentages of substitutes, longstanding MPs, and the mobility between party families during the term. The moderate extension of the sets of variables makes it possible to discuss, for example the professionalisation of representative elites in CEE countries, using a broader empirical basis.

Table 1. Sets of variables covered by the EurElite project

Set of variables	Social background & composition	Linkage to politics & political experience	Linkage to other spheres of society	Formation of the representative elite
Examples	• Education • Type of university degree • Mean age	• Local political experience • Position in government • Political party employee	• Gender • Occupation • Religious denomination	• Turnover • Mean number of legislative terms • Longstanding MPs

The extension of the original cube: research on MEPs and on ministers

The MEP task force (or *CubeMEPs*) 'kicked off' its work only recently at a special meeting in Strasbourg at the end of 2003. Comprised of a small group of younger researchers and some leading scholars in the field of political elite research, the task force aims to study a somewhat specific brand of politicians in Europe: the members of the European Parliament since its first direct election in 1979. The study of European or EU parliamentarians provides the opportunity to add a new dimension to elite convergence in Europe, as it touches upon the possible formation of a European 'political class'. The core of this kind of devotedly European political elite may be expected to develop in the Strasbourg/Brussels parliament as the sole representative European body elected directly by the people.

By analysing the political background and careers of MEPs, the research goes beyond the national borders of policy-making, leading to a more comprehensive comparison of representative elites in an enlarged Europe. CubeMEPs allows for a diachronic analysis of the European Parliament over six legislative terms, covering a quarter of a century in a parliament that, despite a substantial increase in competences, is still a representative body *sui generis*. From a synchronic perspective the similarities and differences between the MEPs from the EU-15 countries and the new members from the ten (mostly post-communist) accession countries can provide indications of the extent to which a European political class is in the making. Beyond this the research design allows for a systematic comparison of MEPs with national parliamentarians in many of the EU member states.

The EP task force has developed a codebook that covers a broad set of variables including all of the DataCube for the national MPs, plus variables directly related to European politics and to career moves in a European multi-level setting. While applying almost the same methodological and theoretical tools already used in the original DataCube, the MEP task force opted for a different kind of data set. Rather than using aggregate data the task force decided to collect individual data, which allow for the application of a broader range of methods of data analysis. The codebook provides for the collection of basic biographical and career data for all six terms of the European Parliament, while considerably broadening the research scope for the 1999 and the 2004 periods in particular. Data collection has been completed for the new MEPs from the CEE accession countries and for those from Austria, Germany and the three Scandinavian countries, and for most of the time span the Italian deputies in Strasbourg/Brussels are also covered. In the case of France data are available for the 2004 elections.

In the immediate future the task force will focus on the following empirical goals:

- completing data selection for the sixth term of the European Parliament and then extending the data collection back to earlier periods;
- transforming the disaggregate data in an aggregate table based on national/party clusters of MEPs in order to reach a direct line of comparison between CubeMEPs and the DataCube;

- developing a specific analytic grid on parliamentary elites in office after the 2004 term, which is considered to be a crucial one in the development of the European Parliament; this should include a broader survey on the recruitment of European representatives, including new qualitative variables on candidate selection, media coverage and the domestic impact of the European election campaign.

The working group on ministers, or 'EuroMin', has been involved in the study of European cabinet members for a longer period of time and it is working closely with a number of international and national research projects. There are at least three main sources of data on ministerial recruitment. The first is an archive on ministers after the First World War, developed by Jean Blondel. This source is connected with the second source, which is an ongoing project led by Ferdinand Müller-Rommel that focuses mainly on the new ministerial elites in the post-communist systems of Central and Eastern Europe. A third project, under the direction of Antonio Costa Pinto and Pedro Tavares de Almeida, is directed at collecting data on ministerial elites in Southern Europe from 1850 to the present.

The EuroMin meetings have been mainly devoted to assessing the level of research in this field. The standardisation of existing codebooks was established at a preliminary meeting (Pontignano/Siena, November 2002). More substantive reflections were developed at subsequent meetings, and the ambitious task of standardising and upgrading the data sets is still in progress. In the meantime, a comprehensive study of the long-term transformation of ministerial elites in Southern Europe[5] has been published, and an impressive work on cabinet structure in Central and Eastern Europe has also been completed.[6]

Selected activities and publications in English

Since the mid-1990s the EurElite project has initiated more than a dozen international conferences, bringing together a broad range of European and also some American scholars to present and discuss findings on comparative political elite research. In recent years a number of smaller conferences and meetings have been devoted to the formation of representative elites in Central and Eastern Europe. Beginning with a conference in Budapest (June 2002), hosted by Gabriella Ilonszki, a group of experts from post-communist societies combined their efforts to collect data on parliamentarians in their home countries and to standardise existing national data sets. Subsequent conferences in Jena (December 2002), Bucharest (September 2003) and Vilnius (May 2004) contributed further by including additional

[5] Tavares de Almeida, Pedro, António Costa Pinto and Nancy Bermeo (eds.) 2003. *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000.* London: Frank Cass.

[6] Müller Rommel, Ferdinand, Katja Fettelschoss and Philipp Harfst. 2004. "Party Government in Central Eastern European Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 869–894.

countries and launching comparative analyses. During 2005 the EurElite network and some of its members will actively take part in Section 15 of the 3rd ECPR Conference in Budapest (September) and in the international conference 'From Local Politics to Europe: Political Careers on Different Levels. Challenges of Professionalisation, Legitimacy, and Career Moves in Comparison', which is to be held in Jena and Dornburg (October).

The first outcome of the project is the publication of a collection of conference papers.[7] This volume of conference proceedings, which will contain up to twelve country chapters and the first comparative analyses, edited by Heinrich Best, is currently being prepared and will go to press at the end of 2005. Among the major publications in English resulting from the research activities of the EurElite project are the following:

Best, Heinrich and Maurizio Cotta. 2000. *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe 1848–2000. Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries.* Oxford: OUP.

Best, Heinrich, Valerie Cromwell and Christopher Hausmann. 2001. "The Transformation of Legislative Elites. The Cases of Britain and Germany since the 1860s." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 7 (2): 65–91.

Cotta, Maurizio and Heinrich Best (eds.) 2005. *The European Representative.* (forthcoming)

Ilonszki, Gabriella. 1998. "Representation Deficit in a New Democracy: Theoretical Considerations and the Hungarian Case." *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 31: 157–170.

Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, Katja Fettelschoss and Philipp Harfst. 2004. "Party Government in Central Eastern European Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 869–894.

Ştefan, Laurenţiu. 2004. *Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania.* Bucharest: Editura Ziua.

Tavares de Almeida, Pedro, António Costa Pinto and Nancy Bermeo (eds.) 2003. *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000.* London: Frank Cass.

Verzichelli, Luca and Michael Edinger. 2005. "A Critical Juncture? The 2004 European Elections and the Making of a Supranational Political Elite." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 11 (2): 1–21 (forthcoming).

[7] Best, Heinrich and Michael Edinger. (eds.) 2003. *Representative Elites in Post-Communist Settings* (= SFB 580 Mitteilungen, No. 8), Jena.

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Petr Kolář – Štěpán Pecháček – Jindřiška Syllová: *Parlament České republiky 1993–2001 (The Parliament of the Czech Republic 1993–2001)*
Prague 2002: Linde, 296 pp.

The short list of works by Czech authors on parliamentarism and parliaments grew three years ago with the publication of the book, *Parlament České republiky 1993–2001 (The Parliament of the Czech Republic 1993–2001)*, co-authored by three employees of the Parliamentary Institute, an institute that provides service to the Parliament of the Czech Republic. Two of the authors – Jindřiška Syllová and Petr Kolář – are also university lecturers specialising in this subject.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first part, the book's 'General Introduction', the authors acquaint readers with the evolution of parliamentarism in the Czech Republic and with the basic variables that affect its composition and the representative function of parliament, i.e. political parties, the political party system and its legal regulation, and the electoral system. In the second part, 'MPs, Senators, and Parliament', the authors immediately proceed to the book's core interest and focus their attention on the legal provisions that refer to the political mandates of MPs and senators (the creation of a mandate, immunity, salary) and the organisation of parliament (rules of procedure, parliamentary bodies, committees, subcommittees, commissions, parliamentary clubs, and the bureau of parliament). In the third part, 'The Function of Parliament', the authors describe parliament's legislative function (in a detailed account of the legislative process), along with other functions of parliament, especially its creative function in relation to the government and the president. The text is supplemented with a large number of tables and graphs that illustrate the legislative function and the composition of parliament. The descriptions here are comprehensive and thorough and are definitely worth studying. But although the authors put forth some interesting and thought-provoking interpretations, they are unfortunately rarely substantiated or discussed (see, for example, MP activism and the sources of activism, voting unity, extension of law-making activities).

The book's title and the authors' aspirations seemed to promise that this publication would contribute a scholarly social-scientific study to the growing number of textbooks on constitutional law and parliamentarism, as opposed to a legal treatment of the subject, and however much one must welcome the publication of this work, some critical points must be made. After finishing the book, readers would be excused for concluding that the study has not fulfilled the expectations and assumptions of quality. The reason for this is most likely that the team of authors, comprised of two lawyers and one political sociologist, were unable to go beyond the limits of their institutional affiliation. As employees of the Parliamentary Institute, they seem to have found it difficult to comment openly on some aspects of how parliamentarism works in the Czech Republic, and they have endeavoured instead to maintain a relatively neutral viewpoint. Perhaps for this reason also they focus more on surface descriptions of laws rather than going deeper to describe how the legislation works, whom laws give power to, how actors use these provisions to influence decisions, etc. The style in which the book was written, more a description of legal provisions than it is an analytical text, seems even itself to reflect a tilt in the team of authors toward the side of the lawyers.

The book consequently suffers from several flaws, which detract from its readability and its total value. A main problem is that the work oscillates between being an independently authored work presenting a critical examination of particular social phenomena and a text issued by the very institution it refers to. While the book is indeed an independent piece of work that was published by a publisher with no ties to the Parliament

of the Czech Republic, this reviewer cannot shake the impression that the authors were also trying to impress their home institution. That is why there are passages in the text that have no informational value beyond the brief descriptions of specific situations they provide, the sole aim of which is to uphold the level of complexity of the information provided, and the effort to offer the most comprehensive amount of information possible wins out over any interest in presenting a persuasive indication of the position of the Czech parliament in Czech politics.

The second flaw is related to this, and it can be described simply as the absence of the topic the authors were supposed to address. In the introductory chapter the authors indicate that, 'to determine the real position of parliament in the system, its dominance or submissiveness in relation to the other branches of state power, it is necessary to specify the fields in which the activities of parliament are to be examined'. Though some fields of inquiry or description are specified further on, in the next sections of the book, the introductory objective of examining the position of parliament in Czech politics remains essentially unfulfilled. That the authors actually abandoned their work of analysis and summary is also evident in the fact that the book has no conclusion, where the authors ought normally to have presented their summary of the position of parliament in Czech politics and any other goals of the research. The authors have thus indirectly assigned the book a textbook status, reinforced moreover by their legalistic way of thinking. And this despite the fact that the more than decade-long evolution of parliamentarism in the Czech Republic calls for the description and interpretation of the clear trends in its work and its cast of politicians – e.g. the increasingly stable pool of MPs, the growing support for government bills, greater voting unity in the parliamentary clubs, etc. Trends are also appearing that are rendering the Czech parliament much more comparable to the parliaments in western European countries.

The third flaw relates to inaccuracies in the data presented in the text. Jan Kysela has already drawn attention elsewhere [2002] to the relatively large number of errors in the text and in the tables, usually related to details, and it is worth noting that these inaccuracies are primarily in reference to the Senate and senators. It is as though the authors were mainly concentrating on the Chamber of Deputies, where there descriptions are much more precise, and the Senate was consequently somewhat eclipsed, perhaps even because the information they had on the Senate was not that accurate. Despite these reservations, this reviewer considers the book to be a successful introduction to Czech parliamentarism. It may be hoped that the authors honour their informal commitment to continue to publish summary work of this kind after the next electoral term, and that next time they perform this task in a much more analytical manner.

Lukáš Linek

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Kysela, Jan. 2002. "Recenze na Petr Kolář, Štěpán Pecháček, Jindřiška Syllová: Parlament České republiky 1993–2001. Praha: Linde." (A Review of Petr Kolář, Štěpán Pecháček, Jindřiška Syllová: The Parliament of the Czech Republic 1993–2001. Prague: Linde) *Politologický časopis* 9 (3): 341–346.

Laurenţiu Ştefan: *Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania*
Bucharest 2004: Editora ZIUA, 279 pp.

Laurenţiu Ştefan represents the young and upcoming generation of Romanian political scientists, and he has written the book, *Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania*, which examines the structure and changes in the composition of political elite in post-communist Romania, devoting special attention to the routes they have taken to reach the peak party posts and the top positions in the executive and into parliament. As in the other post-communist

countries, in Romania political elites played a key role during the period that followed the collapse of communism and during the transformation of the political system, and this has led among other things to a renewed interest in political elites and in the study of them since 1989. Despite this interest no comprehensive study of post-communist political elites in Romania has yet been published, and even the summary studies on elites in Central and Eastern Europe and related research published in the 1990s [e.g. Best and Becker 1997] or the cross-national comparative study of elites coordinated in the early 1990s by Iván Szelényi and David Treiman do not cover Romania. Therefore, Ştefan's book is genuinely the first piece of work that in terms of the scope and depth of its analyses comes near to the already well-known studies on political elites in Central and Eastern Europe. The author notes, however, that the work is not just intended as a replica of the studies and analyses already conducted in the majority of countries in the CEE region. The author comes out with some critical comments about the theory of political recruitment, which he nonetheless attempts to surmount in an effort to find a more suitable interpretative framework.

The book is divided into two parts. The theoretical framework of the study is presented in the first part, while the second part is devoted to a thorough and systematic analysis of the data on political elites.

Theories of Political Elite Recruitment is the title of the first part of the book and it opens with an inventory of basic terms, such as 'political recruitment', 'recruitment', and 'selection', and how they are used in current theoretical concepts. From there the author proceeds to a discussion of the relevant theoretical concepts, starting with the classics, such as Mosca and Pareto, through to the contemporary concepts, and he attempts to provide a critical assessment of the key works. Although a rich selection of literature on political recruitment has emerged over the past forty years, the author expresses some disappointment with his findings. Despite the mass of knowledge the accumulated works contain, the models they propose lack in diversity and are somewhat dominated by the unidimensional approach to political recruitment. They observe political recruitment as a dependent variable only and focus on the factors that determine recruitment. Ştefan, on the other hand, is more interested in the effects or consequences of the recruitment process. He inquires into what kind of expectations the people who have attained a high public function have in terms of party career, what kind of function represents a genuine party career leap, whether success at the lower echelon of the party hierarchy automatically signifies a greater chance of advancing through the party hierarchy, and what other career goals those who occupy positions are after. Ştefan clearly attributes political parties with occupying the primary role in the recruitment process.

The second part of the publication, *Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania*, begins with a brief historical excursion through notable studies and informative resources on Romanian political elites, starting in 1866, which, as the author points out, was the key moment in the development of Romanian statehood. This introductory chapter to the second part is not a search for historical parallels. It simply documents the attention that has been devoted to national political elites in the past and has no direct connection with the rest of the book.

The essential core of the work is the analysis of political recruitment. This analysis draws on data from the ROMELITE database of Romanian MPs, the development of which was led by the author himself. This dataset contains information about the political, socio-demographic, and occupational background of the 1561 members of parliament who sat between May 1990 and May 2003 in the Romanian parliament. During the development of ROMELITE it became part of the comparative international project EURELITE – European Political Elites in Comparison: The Long Road to Convergence, a project conducted as part of the European

Science Foundation – Networks programme. The author thus constructed and elaborated a database that matches the European standard and which in the future will facilitate international comparisons and consequently contribute to advancing the level of knowledge about national elites. The data from the ROMELITE database are combined with self-perceptions about the most valuable qualities for candidate selection and election success. For this purpose questionnaire research and in-depth interviews were conducted among the MPs.

In the introduction to the analysis of political recruitment the author looks at the beginnings of the political career and how MPs start out. He goes back into the communist era in an attempt to discover to what degree a reproduction of elites occurred in the Romanian case. In the following chapters he focuses on the factors that influence an MP's path into parliament, whether this refers to a career in the party, prior parliamentary experience, or experience in public institutions. He looks particularly at the influence of the following factors: the length of party career, leadership position within the party structures, incumbency, previous experience in local and central administration, local background (residence, local visibility, leadership in the local party, experience in local institutions), type of party support (local organisation or central leadership), mechanism of recruitment (elections, decision of the local leadership, decision of the central leadership), perception of party democracy, types of career preferences.

The situation in Romania corresponds to the developments that have taken place in other post-communist countries (including the Czech Republic), where new political parties arose mainly in the period around 1990–92 and the people who were being voted into parliament had only recently become members of their particular party. That changed quickly, and the profile of MPs changed with it. In comparison with the Czech studies on this topic it is evident that in Romania there is more accessible data on deputies than in the Czech Republic, for example, about their place of birth and place of residence, which has allowed him to study the MPs ties to the region, the interconnections between the MP's place of birth, place of residence, and the constituency they represent, and this also allows him to examine the issue of representativeness. It may only be a slight overstatement to say that the author may be envied the opportunity he had to gain data of this type, though it is a demanding process to acquire such data and he used a combination of various resources, as nothing like the Lists of MPs common in Western European and a number of post-communist countries exist in Romania. On the basis of his empirical findings Ştefan concludes that, "gradually, more and more constituencies are represented by politicians with national career and residence in Bucharest. Parliamentary activities become more and more a matter within the practical reach of central elite of the parties and less accessible to the genuine representatives of the constituencies" (p. 236). This is also owing to the fact that the number of MPs willing to divide their time between their constituency and the Chamber of Deputies in Bucharest is declining, as this double life does little to enhance a person's political career. The author expresses the concern that the parliament will soon cease to be a representative institution. It is moreover essentially closed to any candidates without a party affiliation.

The analysis deals not only with recruitment of MPs but also (and this is less common) with their substitutes, who are not elected, but who are next on the list and get a representative's seat in parliament if the MP is required to forfeit the position for some reason, usually owing to incompatibility of function. In the Romanian parliament this situation occurs with relative frequency because there is a large radius of positions there deemed incompatible with the parliamentary mandate (e.g. in the Czech Republic the range of incompatible positions is

very small and ministers often also hold a parliamentary mandate). Here Ştefan questions how much these substitutes differ from MPs given that in the elections they are placed by the party at a less eligible position on the party lists and inquires into whether they are viewed somehow as second-class MPs. What he concludes from his observations is that the substitutes are people with briefer political experience, they are somewhat younger than MPs, and they have less of an influence in the party or in their constituency, and he finds that only few of them later reach the peak of the party hierarchy.

Another topic that is usually studied in most analyses of parliaments is parliamentary mobility, crossing the floor from one party to another. This inter-party mobility was relatively common in the post-communist countries in the early 1990s and then gradually declined, and in this Romania was no different. It is a pity that the author did not devote more attention to a specifying the shifts between political parties in terms of the parties' positions on the political spectrum or to details on shifts between or even within political camps defined otherwise. Readers unfamiliar with the Romanian political scene would certainly welcome greater insight into what has occurred there. Ştefan's examination of parliamentary mobility even includes shifts from one constituency to another or from one parliamentary chamber to another. The notion of the move from one constituency to another as a type of parliamentary mobility is certainly interesting, and it may be based on the fact that, according to the author, there are two separate types of political career in Romania – local careers and national careers. There are few politicians who are capable of crossing the boundaries between these levels and it occurs only exceptionally.

In the final chapter the author looks at the recruitment pattern of ministers, prime ministers and presidential candidates, the relationship between a minister and the political party, the influence position in the party hierarchy has on managing to secure a top position in the executive and on being named a minister. Here he presents a number of specific examples, but he is working with a limited amount of data here and he is therefore cautious in his conclusions.

In the concluding chapter of the book the author attempts to reveal general and party-specific patterns of recruitment on the example of relevant political parties, and he concludes that the actual contribution of individual parties to the general pattern of recruitment varies. On the basis of empirical findings he is also able to formulate a conclusion about the party-specific pattern of recruitment as being the outcome of many years of internal party practices. At this point one might regret that the author limited himself to Romanian data, because it is cannot be determined whether this is actually something specific to particular Romanian political parties or a specificity of particular party families. In order to make such conclusions, however, the necessary international comparison is lacking.

The book represents a significant contribution to the knowledge about Romanian post-communist elites and it fills in the blank spot Romania previously represented on the map of research into this issue in post-communist Europe. But the book offers more than this. The author warrants praise for his solid theoretical interpretation of the issue, his good knowledge of the subject, and his ability to identify key problems and to grasp them empirically.

Zdenka Mansfeldová

Michael D. Kennedy: ***Cultural Formations of Post-Communism: Emancipation, Transition, Nation and War***
Minneapolis and London 2002: University of Minnesota Press, 369 pp.

That transition studies is still a valid and vibrant field is evident from the recent appearance of a number of interesting studies

in sociology, political science, and cultural studies, studies which not only make us understand that the transition from authoritarian, centrally planned systems to – what by most experts is believed to result in – democratic and capitalist societies has proved to be much more intricate than assumed in the early 1990s, but which also indicate a more significant diversity in these trajectories than originally accounted for. In particular with regard to diversity in transition, but also in terms of its intricacies Michael Kennedy's *Cultural Formations of Post-Communism: Emancipation, Transition, Nation and War* is an original and rich contribution, even if it does not fully live up to its self-imposed standard of elaborating a critical theory of transition and enhancing its emancipatory potential.

In the book, Kennedy seeks to critically confront the change in global culture after 1989, that is, the virtual disappearance of a counterculture to capitalism, and its consequences for the imagination of social change in Eastern Europe. Even if he sees 'transition culture' as hegemonic and dominating the understanding of transition from the plan to the market and from dictatorship to democracy, he holds that the emancipatory potentials of transition are not exhausted by transition culture. He defines transition culture as 'a mobilizing culture organized around certain logical and normative oppositions, valuations of expertise, and interpretations of history that provides a basic framework through which actors undertake strategic action to realize their needs and wishes' (p. 9). In this, Kennedy's proposal for a 'critical transition culture' seeks to achieve a deepening of the emancipatory potential of transition. Kennedy notes that the direction of social change that has been captured in the concept of 'transition' is a highly specific and, in important ways, a-historical, reading of social change. If 1989 was about the emancipation of Eastern Europe from the heteronomy of Soviet imperialism and the ubiquitous dictatorship of communist rule, the revolutions of 1989 should be understood as veritable national liberations, even if these moments of emancipation were quickly captured by 'transition culture'. The almost exclusive focus of the latter on the creation of market economies (and democratic pluralism as its side-effect) meant a closure of the emancipatory moment. It also meant the effective exclusion of forms of nationalism (in particular, the radical nationalisms that emerged in former Yugoslavia) and socialist legacies from, or their portrayal as detrimental to, the narrative of transition culture.

Kennedy's innovation to understand the discursive formation that dominates the post-1989 understandings of social change as a cultural formation is significant in a number of ways. Transition as a cultural formation conveys its constructed, and therefore also its restricted, understanding of social change in post-communist Europe. This analytical move, therefore, historicises transition culture (articulating particular positions and understandings, against other possible imaginations of the post-communist future) and explicates the particular context in which it arises. Furthermore, it underlines that transition culture is something shared by many (policy-makers, advisers and experts, the academic community), while its ultimate understanding can differ significantly from one social actor to the other. Understanding the discursive formation of transition as a cultural formation reveals its uniqueness and one-sidedness and how it functions as a set of meanings and understandings towards the world, but also ultimately its multi-interpretability and therefore its surplus of meaning. Kennedy sets out to devise a critical sociology of transition that seeks 'to fix the object of [its] inquiry with [its] research, and to enhance capacities to understand the rules and resources that influence capacities to intervene in the world, or in scholarship' (p. 16). He constructs such a critical theory by explicitly engaging some of the most important statements in transition studies, and by revealing their inability to transcend their ultimately affirmative stance towards transition

culture, thereby reproducing the hegemony of (a particular kind of) liberalism in the theory and practice of transition. Critical contributions to the transition debate in the form of institutionalism (Kennedy reviews, among others, those of Bunce, Elster, Offe, and Preuss, and Stark and Bruszt) have acknowledged the normative closure of transition culture, and have moved away from the teleological premises of mainstream transition theory by underlining the dynamics rather than the destination of transition (p. 21). They have further inserted a sensitivity to historical legacies and diversity in transition trajectories. However, as Kennedy shows, they ultimately do not deviate from the mainstream consensus that the transition is about 'to figure out how capitalism and/or democracy can be built' (p. 22). In this they focus exclusively on the 'designers' of the post-communist transition. From the more extraneous position of marxists, the positive qualities of 'designer capitalism' are more radically questioned, while other, less well-off actors than the designers enter the analysis. However, marxists tend to miss the idiosyncracies of post-communist social change as they include the transition in a general tale of capitalism, thereby sticking to their own normative agenda. A fully critical and historical account of the transition would, therefore, need to learn from both the historical sensitivity of the institutionalist approaches and the critical insights of the marxists. In order to bring out the constructed nature of the transition and to challenge the understanding of it as a 'necessary course' (p. 35), Kennedy proposes to confront the contingency of transition by focusing on the eventfulness and alternativeness immanent in transition itself. Throughout the book, he confronts a number of sites – the Polish and Hungarian Round Table negotiations, poverty, cultural encounters between international and local managers, nationalism, loss, and war – to draw out the eventfulness and contingency of transition and to explicate transition culture's blind spots.

Kennedy holds that 1989 is normally discussed and analysed from *within* transition culture. It is not so much the genesis and construction of the framework within which transition is perceived that is the object of analysis, but rather the negotiations and pacts that led to the dismantling of socialism and the inauguration of the transition as a natural alternative and pathway for the future. Kennedy proposes to move away from the specific attention to negotiating elites and offers instead a broader historical account of the construction of civil society in Poland and Hungary, as an alternative, and much more contingent and eventful narrative of 1989. He argues that, even if the civil societies of Hungary and Poland were highly diverse (the former purely intellectual, the latter consisting of intellectuals embedded in an enormous mass movement), the outcome of their struggles went into a similar direction, while they managed to avoid (violent) conflict (Poland).

Instead of the huge promise of emancipation and freedom, as pursued by those that sought to reconstruct civil society, the primary focus of transition culture is the making of the market. Transition culture points at the solution of societal problems at the market to the detriment of the state, at the firm as organisational unit, and at entrepeneurs as the most dynamic actors in civil society, able to diffuse transition culture throughout society at large. Even if transition culture endorses pluralism and independence in civil society, its focus is ultimately on those actors that reproduce the West and not on a plurality of actors and opinions per se. Transition culture focuses on the most successful cases of transition (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia) and portrays these cases as examples of good governance for the remainder of the transition countries. Different starting positions and highly diverse historical trajectories are then relegated to a marginal position in the analysis and institutional design of post-communist societies. Kennedy shows this convincingly by means

of a semiotic analysis of two reports of highly involved but mostly extraneous actors in the transition, the World Bank and the UNDP, in which the World Bank strongly equates good governance with policies that reflect its advices and its portrayal of Western institutional orders (market-making), thereby minimising societal diversity and ignoring different legacies, while the UNDP's focus is on poverty and the social losses that the transition brought about. The latter's recipe for steered social change might resemble quite some elements of the World Bank program, without however echoing its determinism and evolutionary understanding of the transition.

In a similar way, Kennedy argues against a simplistic, one-sided view of the cultural encounters between American business advisers and East European managers. Kennedy acknowledges the impact of a universal, hegemonic transition culture, which cannot, however, work fully without the active collaboration of local managers. Kennedy regards these encounters therefore as struggles over forms of competence, that is, the mastering of an objective and universally valid business language that is presumed to work in any context, and a knowledge of local habits, mentality, and traditions, which is necessary to penetrate any local market in the first place. Kennedy here importantly underlines the momentum of resistance and empowerment that exists within this context of the transposition of a seemingly placeless knowledge of business practices, and its necessary grounding in a local context to be effective. Local culture can be both an obstruction to transition but also its vehicle and catalyst.

Indeed, transition is not only about the market, but also about a 'new subjectivity around freedom and responsibility' (p. 150), thus it is as much about the creation of independent institutions as about as fundamental cultural transformation. If transition is about emancipation, then surely transition culture's emphasis on the universal benefits of the market is a particular reading of emancipation. At the same time, though, transition culture situates the effectuation of emancipation through the market explicitly in a national context: "[a]lthough the practice of transition culture might minimize the significance of national difference in the fusion of horizons within the multinational firm, the structure of transition culture remains founded on the organization of national differences" (p. 152). Transition culture not only proposes the direction of change, but also seeks to mobilize society around its goals (p. 161). The invocation of the nation may however take different shapes in different places (p. 151). Nationalism is not merely an obstacle to transition coming about, as normally claimed by transition culture, it is itself deeply entangled in the transition (p. 151).

Nevertheless, transition is not only about emancipation, freedom, and new opportunities, but also substantially about loss. The opportunities that transition culture offers in terms of marketisation and political participation have clearly varied meanings across the post-communist region. Where initial conditions allowed for a relatively rapid redirection of trade patterns and economic activities, transition culture made more sense than in those regions that have of old been peripheral to major economic centres. In the latter case, transition culture can easily be perceived as undermining newly recovered independence and sovereignty.

Kennedy's book is most original when he confronts the peaceful narrative of transition with the occurrence of war. Kennedy suggests to read the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent civil wars from *within* the framework of transition culture. In mainstream transition studies, these wars have been safely ignored while ex-Yugoslavia has been treated between parentheses, that is, as an alternative, pathological path breaking with communism, but leading to a violent and ultra-nationalist future through the re-emergence of anachronistic ethnic nationalism, rather than to the radiant future promised by

transition culture. Kennedy introduces differing views of the Yugoslav wars, in which the responsibility is either attributed to the nationalism of the Serbs or to the international community for either its instigation of nationalism and secession or its inertia. By explicitly linking transition with nationalism, Kennedy makes a convincing case for how the Yugoslav violent trajectory should be understood as part of the transition story, rather than being completely externalised. The importance of the national framework for transition culture, exemplified by constitutional nationalism, could be seen as at the heart of the Yugoslav wars, therefore involving transition culture more than has been admitted.

Kennedy's attempt in the book has been to devise a *critical* transition culture, rather than a transcendence of transition culture altogether, one which goes beyond narrating the success story of the winners of transition by explicitly including inequality and poverty, loss, the fragility and contingency of peace, and multiple forms of freedom. In this, he emphasises the fact that an emancipatory potential exists in any of the post-communist societies, thereby criticising the allegedly universalistic and disembedded/placeless foundations of transition culture. Here, he points to the differing but overlapping roles nationalism, socialism and liberalism have played in the transition's making and the way in which transition culture has been *de facto* embedded in different contexts. Kennedy's quest for a critical transition theory is necessary and courageous. However, even if important elements for a critical and inclusive approach have been outlined, the rather diverse nature of the cases studied and the methodologies used, as well as the rather inconclusive statements in the conclusions, make that a critical transition culture remains in itself rather sketchy and unfinished. For those sympathetic to Kennedy's approach the book likely provides a strong stimulus for further research and theorisation. However, for sceptics (which one would expect to be the greater part of mainstream transition studies), the eventual theory-building that is offered might prove to be too thin.

Paul Blokker

Parliamentary Research at the Institute of Sociology AS CR

Lubomír Brokl (ed.): *Deputies, Senators and the Integration of the Czech Republic into the European Union*. Workshop Proceedings. Prague 2001: Institute of Sociology, 72 pp.

Zdenka Mansfeldová (ed.): *The Relationship of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate*. Workshop Proceedings. Prague 2001: Institute of Sociology, 42 pp.

Lukáš Linek – Petra Šalamounová (eds.): *The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–1998: Factbook*. Prague 2001: Institute of Sociology, 95 pp.

MPs, senators, and the Parliament of the Czech Republic have long been the object of research for researchers at the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Studies have been centred on the results of large questionnaire surveys, which were conducted in 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2000, and the research findings have usually been presented at workshops and conferences, in the academic press, or as independent publications. This review looks at three publications written by researchers at the Institute of Sociology AS CR, which were published in quick succession during 2001.

The first two books are volumes that contain the proceedings from workshops of the same name that were organised on the premises of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. These publications are based mostly on research that was conducted in 2000, and each book has been published as a bilingual Czech-English edition.

In the introduction to *Deputies, Senators and the Integration of the Czech Republic into the European Union*, Lubomír Brokl reflects

on the context of the debates that surrounded the Czech Republic's accession to the European Union, especially after the Nice summit in 2000. He argues that the precondition for a functioning democratic political system is the balance of its legitimacy in inputs and outputs. The EU's democratic deficit leads to the absence of the legitimacy of the political system in inputs, where the space usually filled by political parties is instead occupied by various national and global corporations. With respect to exits, the legitimacy of the EU is manifested as the consensus on increasing the standard of living, and less so as a feedback check on power. The current nature of European integration precludes the possibility of basing it exclusively on the majority principle or the number of inhabitants, which otherwise, within the circumstances of individual states, is certainly the democratic principle.

In one chapter in the volume, titled 'Preparation for EU Accession in the Context of Parliament's Activities', Zdenka Mansfeldová analyses how parliamentarians view and rate the significance of their work and individual activities. Preparation for EU accession, legislative tasks, and approving the state budget are the activities MPs ascribe with the highest importance. But in this reviewer's opinion, these activities do not constitute fully commensurable categories, as it is through the approximation of laws that preparation for EU accession is manifested in the parliamentary agenda. The data indicate that members in both chambers evaluate their performances in this field best among comparable activities. The text also presents interesting data on the degree to which MPs and senators feel bound to adhere to the position on issues advocated by their clubs and on how they perceive this obligation. For example, more than 40% of senators do not feel bound by their club's position on an issue at all, and 32% feel so in only less than one-tenth of cases. For MPs the respective figures are 8% and 44%. According to 88% of senators and 54% of MPs, when the club's position clashes with their own opinion on an issue, the latter takes priority. However, the degree to which this assertion applies varies according to the particular issue (constitutional laws, state budget, social policy, etc.). Parliamentarians are most influenced in their decision-making by the chair of the club and by colleagues with professional specialisations in particular fields. Decisions relating to EU integration in particular are significantly influenced by national interests as defined according to party affiliation, professional opinions, and the compatibility of proposed legislation with European law.

Martin Vyšín and Adéla Seidlová provide a more detailed analysis of some of these data in their chapter on 'MPs and Senators in the Decision-Making Process on Issues of the Czech Republic's Accession to the European Union'. When parliamentarians make decisions, they do so in a particular environment and under the influence of specific information and certain pressures. The degree to which they identify with their club's positions need not just be an indication of strict party discipline, as it also says something about how much consensus exists over points in the party programme. The authors distinguish between the procedural imperative, i.e. binding recommendations from the club, the moral imperative, which is the personal preserve of autonomous decision-making, and the professional imperative, where decisions are made primarily on the basis of a professional evaluation of the issue. With respect to EU accession, the dominant guiding principle is the position of the club, which is formulated on the basis of input from internal experts, chairs, and the club leadership (the particular significance of each varies according to individual factions or parliamentary groups). The role that experts play considerably depends on the prestige of the committee they belong to and from which they derive their professional authority. MPs and senators generally feel that they are equipped with a sufficient amount of 'European' information, and they acquire

this information from their interactions with the executive, from the delegation to the European Commission, and from academic institutions, etc. The authors also observe that the contacts between MPs and senators are relatively weak.

In the chapter on 'The Committees for European Integration Set Up by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and Their Professional Background in the Process of Harmonising Czech Law with EC/EU Law', Štěpán Pecháček looks at the activities of the bodies that were established by each chamber in 1998 for specialising in the European agenda. Here more attention is devoted to the Chamber of Deputies, which is unquestionably the stronger of the two chambers. The committees' activities focus on reviewing the compatibility of proposed legislation with European law, and they also take part in the procedures of preliminary consultation with the Chamber of Deputies. The continued existence of the committees requires that some thought be given to integrating them into the discussions on normative acts produced by European bodies, and to this end the author recommends establishing them as one joint committee. The committees' professional background is in the Parliamentary Institute, which drafts opinions on compatibility regarding private members bills or amendments approved by the Chamber of Deputies. To complete the picture it must be noted that, as the legislative department also drafts opinions, the information put forth by the Parliamentary Institute is not the only source of official materials on the compatibility of bills passed to the Senate.

In the chapter titled 'MPs and Senators after EU Accession' Jan Kysela draws attention to the openings or possibilities for national parliaments to take an active role in EU affairs. In practical terms this means reducing the democratic deficit, while in normative terms it relates to the constitutions of some EU member states and to European documents. A concise analysis is given of the constitutional foundation behind the cooperation between Parliament and the government in the period after accession to the EU, and an indication is given of its rendering in the Act on Relations between the two Chambers and their respective Rules of Procedure (on what the parliamentary chambers are to address and how they are to proceed).

In the next chapter, Markéta Rulíková examines 'The Attitudes of Czech MPs towards EU Accession'. In the Czech Republic the pre-accession debate was generally limited to matters concerned with the approximation of law. It is therefore useful to round out the body of statistical information with reflections provided by politicians in open interviews focusing on a complex examination of their viewpoints. The responses indicate that while politicians view EU membership as unquestionable, it is perceived more as a 'marriage of reason'. Concerns over a loss of sovereignty appear not to be very strong, but a somewhat different evaluation is made with regard to 'national interests', where a greater sense of euroskepticism can be traced, albeit in a moderate form.

In the next chapter Marie Chatardová provides information on 'The Communication Policy of the Czech Republic before EU Accession', a document approved in 1997 and later reworked. As part of this policy thirteen regional information centres were set up, approximately five hundred local libraries served as contact points, and numerous information materials were produced and issued.

In 'The European Union in the Media – The Role of MPs and Senators', Jiří Česal provides statistical evidence about the minor role that Parliament and its members play in providing information about the EU, basing his observations mainly on an analysis of the frequency with which it is mentioned or cited as such a source.

In the final chapter, Jitka Sýkorová looks at 'Evaluations of How Prepared the Public in the Czech Republic and in the Other Candi-

date Countries Are for EU Accession'. Slovenians feel the most prepared, while Turks and Lithuanians lie at the opposite end of the scale. Also worth noting is the relatively strong self-confidence of the Bulgarians, exceeding that observed among the Czechs or the Estonians.

The second of the edited volumes, *The Relationship of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate*, begins with a chapter by Eva Broklová on 'The Senate – Three Instances in the History of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic', in which she focuses on discussions dating from three periods: 1920, 1945–1947, and 1994. Among early French theorists of democracy in particular the bicameral system was considered incompatible with the indivisible sovereignty of the people, and for this reason bicameralism only became firmly established in 1875. Similar arguments were used in 1920 also in Czechoslovakia. At that time such views clashed with demands for the differentiation of chambers secured through distinct methods of composition or at least through the indissolubility of the second chamber. The main reason for the less prominent function of the Senate was the nearly identical political composition of the two chambers. After 1945 the prevailing opinion sought a different form of institutional solution to Czech-Slovak relations than that offered by the establishment of two chambers, which moreover posed as a possible and undesirable barrier to the overall radicalisation of public life and by extension also to the power ambitions of the communists. With regard to the current Senate, the author considers it more appropriate to define it in positive rather than negative terms (i.e. as a democratic safeguard). In the author's opinion the majority electoral system does not prevent the rise of extremists, and partial elections may represent an obstacle to conceptual work. Two other points should also be noted: 1) single-mandate electoral districts are not compatible with the proportional electoral system; 2) a two-round majority system generates compromise and produces candidates that are more generally acceptable, and in this way it is not conducive to the rise of extremists.

Lubomír Brokl analyses 'Arguments For and Against the Senate in the Light of Empirical Research'. Supporters of the Senate employ a number of logical and well-structured arguments in its favour, but they have difficulty demonstrating them empirically: for example, the closer connection between senators and voters, channels of communication beyond those just within party means, fewer internal party divisions, partial elections allowing for continuous conceptual work, and the ability of the Senate to direct its attention to the upholding of rules, etc. The data reveal that the Senate's biggest advantages and disadvantages are considered to be, respectively, its role as 'democratic and legislative safeguard', and the fact that it slows down the legislative process (MPs' views) and has only limited powers (senators' views). Interestingly, only one-quarter of MPs consider the Senate unnecessary. An examination of the activities of senators and deputies in electoral districts and regions reveals that senators are slightly more engaged in and in more frequent contact with the third sector. Senators also much more strongly identify themselves as representatives of their electoral district (68% compared to 25% of MPs). The author concludes by pointing out that the position of parliament, including the second chamber, "evokes criticism and aversion on the very principle of its democratic function".

In the third chapter, Jan Kysela looks at 'The Relationship between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the Proposed Act on Relations between the two Chambers'. It is incorrect to view the safeguard that exists within the framework of legislative power as lying solely in the second chamber, as it is the collaboration between the two chambers that actually serves as a democratic safeguard. It depends, however, on how these relations are specifically defined and demarcated, not only in the constitution, but also

in both chambers' Rules of Procedure. A key place in this should be occupied by the 'Act on Relations between the two Chambers'. As yet no such act exists in the Czech Republic, but two proposals for the act (MP and senatorial) are discussed in the analysis.

Martin Vyšín examines the 'Differences between the Decisions of MPs and Senators'. In addition to the points that have already been mentioned above, there are a number of other differences between senators and MPs worth noting. For example, MPs assign substantially greater weight to the information they gain from their political parties; MPs and senators perceive their mandates differently (40% of MPs but only just over 5% of senators feel they represent the voters of their political party); they differ with regard to how much they tow the party line (approx. 26% of MPs compared to 7% of senators) and with regard to their independence from decisions made by the club (54% of MPs compared to 88% of senators). The author is able to confirm the theory that senators are more independent of their political parties, but he also points out that, owing to the weaker position of the Senate, senators are also in a position to allow themselves greater independence.

The volume closes with the chapter by Adéla Seidlová, 'Do MPs and Senators Differ as Representatives of Voters?'. The chapter presents a detailed analysis of the indicators of the frequency of contact between MPs and senators on the one hand and voters on the other, the structure of issues MPs and senators discuss with voters, and the degree of independence they have in decision-making according to individual parliamentary factions (the highest index of autonomy in decision-making belongs to the MPs and senator club of KDU-ČSL), which is usually lower than it is for government parties.

The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–1998: Factbook, the third publication reviewed here, is not a volume but rather a collective work co-authored by three young scholars from the Institute of Sociology. It mainly offers a detailed commentary on an abundance of statistical data, preceded by an introductory chapter providing a brief background summary to the Czech Republic in the years between 1993 and 1998 (*The Czech Republic, 1993–1998: The Context*), written by Lukáš Linek.

An important aspect of parliamentary research is the context in which the Parliament operates and at the same time influences. For this reason the author begins by presenting the results of the elections to the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council in 1992 and describes the two constitutional debates that occurred in that year (on the dissolution of the federation and the preparation of the constitution for the Czech Republic as an independent state). The outcome of both debates was the seizure of legislative power by the Czech National Council, which transformed itself into the Chamber of Deputies while refusing to set up an Interim Senate. The deferral of the establishment of the Senate was caused by the absence of agreement over the form of electoral law; this was compounded by attempts to abolish the Senate and by disagreement over the date of the first elections. The first electoral term was dominated by a government coalition (it began with 105 MPs and ended with 112), but the elections in 1996 signified a change in the distribution of power, as the coalition gained only 99 mandates (later the distribution of power was 100 + 1 + 1 + 98). Conversely, the first Senate elections were a considerable success for right-wing parties. Even so, the government coalition in 1997 fell apart, and the second electoral term ended prematurely.

In the next part of the text a description is given of the legislative process (regular laws, constitutional acts, and acts pursuant to Article 40 of the Constitution), which in theory should be directed by the government, not only as the sponsor of the majority of bills, but rather also as it holds the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies, which in turn should therefore support the govern-

ment's legislative programme. While the Constitution defines the political regime, the electoral system, and the powers and authority of each of the chambers, other rules of their proceedings are outlined in the rules of procedure and, in unwritten form, as precedential decisions. In the period under observation there are two relevant Rules of Procedure: that of the Czech National Council from 1989 and that of the Chamber of Deputies from 1995, which, in amended form, was also used in the Senate until 1999. The author compares both Rules of Procedure and points out their main differences (the system of multiple readings, the somewhat different standing of the clubs, etc.).

Lukáš Linek is also the author of the second chapter on 'The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–1998: Characterising Its Activity'. The Czech bicameral system is founded on the principle of unequal bicameralism, where the stronger position of the Chamber of Deputies derives mainly from its position in relation to the government and from the function of approving the state budget, but to a significant degree is nonetheless also manifested in the legislative process. The author examines separately the influence of the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, and the President on the legislative process. Up until 1996 the Chamber of Deputies was not constrained by the function of the Senate. Statistics show, for example, that the majority of legislative initiatives originated in the government, the readings of international treaties were non-political and rather more formal in character, and that by comparison the number of days spent deliberating bills and the length of the sessions increased during the second term. The length of sessions and number of days spent on deliberation are considerably shorter and fewer in the Senate. Here the government tends to be more successful at defending its bills, which is also connected with the fact that private members bills tend to be of poorer quality. During the Senate's first term it sent back or rejected 20% of the bills passed to it for deliberation; returned or amended bills were more successful than rejected bills when submitted to further votes in the Chamber of Deputies. The influence of the President of the Republic is relatively limited: in 1993–98 the president vetoed eleven laws, wherein in six cases the Chamber of Deputies overrode that decision and pushed the bill through anyway.

In the third chapter Petra Šalamounová presents the 'Demographic and Social Characteristics of Members of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (1993–1998)'. These characteristics show that the education and prior political experience of MPs and senators have an unquestionable effect on the work of Parliament. Other data on the composition of Parliament show that the percentage of women in Parliament fell after 1989, though it began to rise slightly as the new elites became stabilised. In 1997 on average senators were ten years older than MPs. In 1996–1997 the proportion of university-educated members of both chambers hovered around 75%. Also, a significant proportion of senators, almost one-half, enter parliament directly from communal politics.

The fourth chapter, 'Parliamentary Bodies: Committees and Factions', is co-authored by Lukáš Linek and Petra Rakušanová. The activities of Parliament's chambers are shaped by the committees, sub-committees, commissions, and clubs. Of key importance for the legislative process are the committees, specialised bodies, the professional qualifications or specialisations of the parliamentarians, the clubs, and the platforms for political cooperation and agreement. The chapter describes the committees and the way in which members are appointed to sit on committees, which has changed somewhat between individual electoral terms: for example, in the first electoral term the officials from the Chamber of Deputies and the chairs of the committees were exclusively coalition members, while in the second electoral term this was no longer the case. Parliamentary clubs are an important link between

Parliament and political parties, and one aspect of this link is funding. In 1990–1992 the clubs experienced a fragmentation with the break up of Civic Forum. In 1992–1996 this process continued on the side of the opposition, as an extraordinary number of individual transfers occurred between clubs and as these clubs continued to fragment and rename themselves. In the government benches, the transformation of the political spectrum affected the Christian Democratic Party (KDS). A more important change in the second electoral term was the break up of the MP club of ODS, while its senator club remained stable. In the first functional term the senator clubs were stable on the whole (with only the transfer of three ODS senators to the ODA club as the newly formed US-ODA), though the chairs of the clubs were changed more frequently.

Despite some minor inaccuracies and questionable points relating to how the authors have interpreted the data from the tables and figures that the text is meant to be based on, the three authors of this volume have managed nonetheless to accurately depict many of the fundamental features of Parliament's activities without succumbing to the perspective of just one of the two chambers.

In this reviewer's opinion the three publications represent an important contribution to research in this field, not only owing to the large amount of interesting, summarily interpreted and well-commented data and information they present on the activities of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, but also and especially for their accessibility to readers and researchers outside the Czech language community. They may therefore help to facilitate the inclusion of analyses of Czech constitutional and political institutions as regular components in international comparative studies, which is no small accomplishment.

Jan Kysela

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The Research Committee of Legislative Specialists and East-West Research on Post-Communist Parliaments: A Decade-Long Relationship

The sudden collapse of communism in Central Europe, soon followed by the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, opened unimaginable opportunities for both the development of new democratic legislatures and for the disciplined study of those legislatures.

Scholarship on both sides of the Iron Curtain was equally unprepared. No body of empirical research on communist legislatures existed in the communist states, with the notable but also unique Polish exceptions in the fields of sociology and law. The prevailing attitude among legislative specialists in the West was, 'why bother to study communist legislatures when there is nothing there'?

With the sudden collapse of communist rule, there was much we needed to know about immediately, but for which no knowledge was obtainable. This 'we' refers to both the position of scholarship that existed in the west and the potential and aspiring scholarship in Central Europe.

The Research Committee of Legislative Specialists (RCLS) of the International Political Science Association quickly became an organisational medium through which social scientists from both the East and the West could find each other and begin to work and think together about a very new, but immediately also very large and important subject matter – the legislatures of post-communist states.

The RCLS effort was publicised through conferences and publications. A series of RCLS conferences in Paris (1993), Budapest and Ljubljana (1996), and Budapest and Ljubljana (1998) resulted in a 'Working Paper' series with participants and materials from around the world, but with a special emphasis on observing the unfolding drama in the early stages of the new democratic political systems.

Participants in the RCLS came from many of the post-communist states, including the post-Soviet states. One of the hopes of the organisers of each conference was that the new social scientists of former communist countries and those from the West would find common topics and projects transcending the boundaries of the former Iron Curtain. An example of both cross-border sponsorship and active intellectual cooperation was the editorial body behind the Working Paper series, which was comprised of Prof. Lawrence Longley from the United States, Prof. Attila Agh from Hungary, and Prof. Drago Zajc from Slovenia. The conferences themselves yielded papers that were subsequently published as articles in the *Journal of Legislative Studies* and then also as books, under the general editorship of Prof. Philip Norton from the United Kingdom.

Two books resulted from special RCLS projects and conferences, and a third is currently under preparation. The first book, which was prepared and edited by Prof. Norton and Prof. David M. Olson (1996), is a monograph on the new post-communist parliaments. The second book focuses on legislative committees and was prepared and edited by Prof. Olson and Prof. William Crowther, both from the United States (2003). Each book was a multi-national collaborative effort. The third volume in this RCLS series will summarise the first decade of post-communist parliamentary life. Both the first and the third book in this series are initially published as special issues of the *Journal of Legislative Studies*.

RCLS is also the proud co-sponsor of a conference that was held in Prague in 2003, organised by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, devoted to the topic of 'Central European Parliaments: The First Decade of Democratic Experience and Future Prospects'. As in all previous RCLS conferences and publications, participants were invited from Europe, both East and West, and from the United States and Canada.

RCLS activities are part of a much larger effort for cooperation between the universities and research institutes of established democracies and those of the new post-communist states. Researchers from both sides of the former 'divide' now increasingly cooperate with one another on research and analysis of political institutions and political behaviour – in this case focusing on the representative institution of democratic political systems.

One current example of international cooperation across old boundaries is this essay, written in America, which is happily included in this special issue of the *Czech Sociological Review* to be read around the world.

David M. Olson

The Internationalisation of Parliaments – The Role of National Parliaments in the EU
Ljubljana, Slovenia, 7–9 April 2005

'The Internationalisation of Parliaments – The Role of National Parliaments in the EU', was a conference held on 7–9 April 2005 in Ljubljana, Slovenia. The conference provided an opportunity to examine the functions of modern parliaments in the era of globalisation. It was the second such conference organised by the Research Committee of Legislative Specialists since the IPSA World Congress in Durban in 2003 (the first was in Quebec City in autumn 2004). On this occasion papers were presented by eighteen participants from Germany, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey, United States, and Slovenia.

The conference was opened by Mr. France Cukjati, speaker of the Slovenian National Assembly, and Mr. Anton Kokalj, chair of the Assembly's Committee on European Affairs. The conference was held in the facilities of the National Assembly.

Several aspects of the internationalisation of national parliaments were examined at the conference. One of the main considerations was the process of European integration and its obvious effects throughout the region. As the example of the parliaments of a number of new member states (Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) shows, increasing internationalisation was experienced early in the process of pre-accession, when vast amounts of national legislation were being harmonised to match that of the EU. Some countries (Turkey) are undergoing similar forms of (legislative or policy-making) internationalisation, while non-members like Norway reveal examples of extremely active internationalisation (e.g. an increasing share of the MPs have positions in committees dealing with EU or international matters).

In its examination of the role of national parliaments in supranational organisations, the conference drew attention to the need for active democratisation projects in underdeveloped countries, such as Indonesia, and for international assistance to democratic parliamentary institutions in post-conflict societies, like Bosnia and Kosovo.

The parliaments of both old and new EU member countries have new opportunities to monitor and influence the process of EU decision-making and its outcomes. There are positive signs that the parliaments of the new EU member states will play an active role, drawing on the example of the Scandinavian member states. With special laws on the coordination of national parliaments and the government in some of these new member countries, and also with the changed Rules of Procedure, national parliaments will be able to exert control over their governments to greatly enhance the process of internationalising domestic affairs. Strong national mechanisms of oversight may be a requisite for increasing citizens' trust in the legitimacy of EU decisions and also for increasing the ability of national ministers and governments to successfully negotiate.

In addition to the 'institutional' capacity of parliaments, the conference devoted some attention also to the 'cultural' capacity of MPs. Greater involvement of MPs is always

expected when the population at large is to be affected by EU regulations. The conference also explored possibilities for further development of the EU on the basis of Canadian and American examples. Critical views warned against too much optimism – attempts to strengthen the impact of national parliaments on the EU could lead to an impasse. A shift from 'post-parliamentarism' to 'neo-parliamentarism' would require national parliaments to make room for a supranational EU parliamentary institution.

The papers also explored the implications that the internationalisation of parliaments holds for party systems, the formation of parliamentary elites, etc. Specific forms of internationalisation were presented and discussed, such as parliamentary assistance through EU twinning projects, and developing wider access to basic information on the functioning of parliaments through websites.

The final discussion pointed to the absence of any comprehensive cross-national survey of the impact of globalisation and internationalisation on national parliaments. A similar lack of joint research on the legislatures in the EU and their actual potential for development has led to a gap in the conceptualisation of domestic assemblies in the larger EU project.

As one paper on Norway and Slovenia demonstrated, the level of internationalisation of individual parliaments can be compared using specific indicators for cross-national comparisons. Now is the time to begin this research effort.

Drago Zajc, David M. Olson

Europeisation – A New Topic in Political Science Research, Brno, 14–15 April 2005

A two-day conference titled *Europeisation – A New Topic in Political Science Research* was held in Brno on 14 and 15 April 2005. The conference was organised by the International Political Science Institute of Masaryk University in Brno. The organisers attracted many Czech experts in the field of political science from various universities (Brno, Prague, Olomouc, Plzeň) and research institutions (the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, the Institute of International Relations in Prague), and also from various other fields dealing with the issue of europeisation (political science, international relations, sociology, regional studies). The conference was also attended by speakers from Slovakia and Poland, which broadened the context of the discussion beyond the dimension of just European-Czech interaction.

In the discourse of political science the process of europeisation is discussed primarily in terms of the influence of European integration on national policies and especially on party competition and the capacity of the executive to make decisions and implement policy. It is presumed that europeisation should have a similar effect on all the countries it occurs in. Consequently, it is a somewhat neglected fact that the process of europeisation provides individual actors with multiple opportunities, of which they may or may not necessarily take advantage. The impact of europeisation on national politics may therefore be heterogeneous. In the discourse of political science europeisation is also discussed in terms of the creation of a European, i.e. unified and supranational, policy. This stream of political science studies the factors that lead some areas to be unified while others are not and examines the consequences of adopting European policy. The primary interest of the conference organisers was to study the impact of European integration, and their thematic focuses are evident in the eight panel topics to which speakers were invited to contribute:

1. European Political Parties
2. The European Dimension of Central European Politics
3. EU Countries and Communal Politics
4. Europeisation and Political Parties

5. European Integration Trends after EU Enlargement
6. Euro-scepticism as a Research Topic
7. The European Elections and EP Election Research
8. Regions in a European Context

Four panels were held each day in two simultaneous sessions in the morning and afternoon. It was therefore not possible to attend and take part in the discussion of all papers presented. This author participated in the panels relating to europeisation and political parties (panels 1, 4, 6 and 7), so the information presented here deals with this portion of the conference and selected papers only.

The panel on *European Political Parties* was opened by Jan Rovný, who is an assistant professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. He presented a paper from a neo-institutional perspective pointing to the increasing role of political parties in the behaviour and attitudes of the European Parliament (EP). Parliamentary party groups in the EP form 'political units' that supervise the activities of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in committees and in the plenary session. According to Rovný, this is a new element in European policy; up to now unity in attitudes and voting in parliamentary party groups had not been strictly required, as the diversity of nationalities of MEPs had served as strongly counteractive to unity. Rovný also pointed out that the larger role of political parties does not yet concern legislative issues and refers only to EP resolutions that are not of a legislative nature (for example, the rejection of an Italian candidate nominated to the European Commission). Rovný concluded his presentation with the question of whether the larger role of political parties in the EP could be reflected in an increase in competition between institutions (the European Parliament versus the European Commission), as party competition in the EP should not be allowed to lead to antagonism between the two main parties, the European People's Party (EPP) and the European Socialists (PES), which together promote further European integration.

An interesting paper in this panel was presented by Ladislav Mrklas from the Institute of Political Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and from CEVRO in Prague (Liberal Conservative Academy). Mrklas focused on the influence of European integration on the inner workings of Czech political parties. He took the analytical framework developed by Robert Ladrech as a starting point (it is interesting to note that Ladrech's popularity in the Czech Republic came as a surprise to Jan Rovný, who is Ladrech's assistant at the College of Europe) and with it described some organisational changes that have taken place in Czech political parties. Mrklas talked about the attitude of the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) toward European integration and the European Constitution, and the political clash within ODS over the party's position on European integration. He pointed out that the anti-European attitudes of ODS are advocated by county- and regional-level cadres, a portion of MPs, by President Václav Klaus, who is the party's Honorary Chairman, and by the party-affiliated Centre for Economics and Politics (CEP), an educational and promotional organisation, while, conversely, pro-European or at least conciliatory attitudes toward the EU are maintained by another portion of MPs, senators, the ODS chair, and, especially, by ODS members and voters. The attitudes toward European integration in ODS are an exact reflection of a vertical classification developed by John May (who discussed attitudinal structure in political parties and developed the law of inequality in political parties). Middle-ranking party cadres maintain the most extreme position and promote a policy that may lead toward a loss of voters. The party leadership and the party's voters, i.e. the party's top and bottom ranks, occupy a much more centrist position.

Another panel, *Europeisation and Political Parties*, primarily looked at the changes in

party competition and programmatics in political parties in Slovenia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. An inspiring presentation came from Ondřej Císař, who specialises in interest representation (lobbying) in transnational networks at national and European levels. Last year he published *Transnational Political Networks – How International Institutions Influence the Activities of Non-Governmental Organisations* (in Czech). In his paper Císař presented his theoretical model of the interaction between non-governmental actors and governmental political institutions at the national and the European level. The model is built on the distinction between the political opportunities that institutions provide to non-governmental actors and the resources these actors have at their disposal, and Císař used this model to show that the European level offers opportunities for those non-governmental actors who are not successful at the national level or require pan-European regulation. Císař's paper was the most theoretically developed at the conference, though his distinction between political opportunities and resources merited a deeper discussion. Political opportunities may exist in theory (i.e. in writing or as legal provisions), but they cannot exist in reality if the actors who are meant to take advantage of them do not have enough resources to able to do so.

The morning programme on Friday was dedicated to research on Euro-scepticism and the audience had a chance to hear contributions from speakers about Euro-sceptic parties in Sweden and Denmark or about the sources of Euro-scepticism in Poland. Marek Rybář, from the Department of Political Science at the Philosophical Faculty in Bratislava, presented a paper describing the change in the attitude of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) toward European integration, migrating from a position where they rejected Slovakia's accession to the EU to one of the most pro-integration positions among Slovak parties. In Rybář's view this shift in HZDS' position was caused by the party's effort to obtain acceptance in the eyes of its partners at the national and the European level. HZDS is aiming to be included in the cabinet in the next election term, and this requires that the party maintain at least a conciliatory attitude toward European integration; the party is otherwise unacceptable to the other coalition partners. Conversely, Čarnogurský's Christian Democratic Movement (*Krestiansko-demokratické hnutí*) has, according to Rybář, gradually changed its position on European integration and is becoming increasingly more critical. Generally Catholicism is a source of Euro-scepticism both in Slovakia and in Poland, and, according to electoral behaviour surveys, also in the Czech Republic.

The Friday programme closed with the panel on *European Elections and Their Research* and an interesting paper by Tomáš Lebeda, from the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, on the stability of regional electoral support for individual political parties in the Czech Republic between the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2002 and the EP elections in 2004. Lebeda drew on studies by Tomáš Kostelecký (Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic) on the regional stability of electoral support in the Czech Republic in the 1990s and made a correlation analysis of the electoral support for individual parties in the counties of the Czech Republic in two elections. His paper was accompanied by a discussion on the appropriateness of using the correlation analysis of electoral support for individual parties to analyse electoral behaviour; the discussants agreed that the correlation analysis of electoral support in counties only makes it possible to analyse the regional stability of party support, but cannot serve as means of predicting the voting behaviour of individuals. Lebeda's conclusions about the correlation between electoral support for ODS and for the Independents movement (NEZ) and their negative attitude toward European integration (measured using the vote against accession to the EU in 2003) are quite obvious-

ly at odds with the analysis of the electoral behaviour of these groups of voters.

The conference was accompanied by a good social programme, so it was possible to discuss informally with other participants after the conclusion of the official programme. The only weakness of the conference was the unwillingness or the inability of some speakers to modify and prepare their presentation in order to meet the required 15–20 minute limit. This author finds the repeated use of sentences such as 'I will skip this, you will have to read this in the proceedings' to be insulting. This kind of approach suggests that for the speaker the audience is not worth the effort of modifying the paper (otherwise prepared for a printed version) so as to include the key ideas of the text and to maintain an interesting account. In view of the fact that the organising institution intends to continue organising two-day conferences of this kind, there will still be a chance next year to see to what extent the ability of Czech political scientists to make public presentations improves. According to Vít Hloušek, the editor of the conferences proceedings, the volume of papers should be published in the summer and it will contain some additional papers that were not presented at the conference. Judging by the quality of the papers that were presented, there is certainly much to look forward to.

Lukáš Linek

Mutual Perceptions and Cross-Border Experiences – Czechs and Germans as Neighbours

A one-day conference organised by the Centre for Applied Science in Munich and the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Ústí nad Labem, Munich, 3 February 2005

The current stage in Czech-German relations may be described as calm. The political debates relating to the points of historical conflict between the countries in the 20th century have subsided, and senior politicians in the Czech Republic and Germany have nothing but praise for the current 'conciliatory' relations and openly proclaim that any points of contention have been overcome. In November 2004, at the Marion Dönhoff Awards, the German Chancellor made a reference to Gesine Schwan, the German Social Democratic Party's (SPD) unsuccessful presidential candidate, and to the need to pursue 'politics of conciliation' with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; but he noted that this was 'especially' true with regard to Poland. The Czech Republic appeared not to be the focus of attention in German's conciliatory efforts. It is indeed hard to say how far Czech and German leaders have really succeeded in settling past conflicts and thus also the future potential for conflict in the relations between the two countries. It must also be wondered to what extent the Czech Republic appears to Germans as a country of relatively minor significance in comparison with its Polish neighbour. It is as though it the Czech Republic was or has become the neighbouring country in which the German public is not interested.

In the interior of Germany there is a clear lack of interest in the Czech Republic, but not only there, and even in the border regions of Bavaria this is the prevailing attitude. This point was confirmed in the presentations that were made in a one-day conference 'How Czechs and Germans Define Themselves and Perceive One Another as Neighbours', which was held on 3 February 2005 in the Centre for Applied Sciences (CAP) at the University of Ludwig Maximilian in Munich, and organised by CAP and the Czech Border Regions Department of the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. The conference was devoted to a discussion of some of the results of the joint Czech-German project titled 'Historical Milestones in Border-Region Identities in Western Bohemia – Bavaria (How Czechs and Germans Define Themselves and Perceive One Another as Immediate Neigh-

bours) (supported by the Volkswagen Stiftung Foundation) and it involved the participation of researchers involved in the project from both research centres: PhDr. Václav Houžvička, PhD., the coordinator of the project, Mgr. Lukáš Novotný, M.A., a researcher in the project, both from the Institute of Sociology, and Dr. Michael Weigl, from the Centre for Applied Science, along with a number of other speakers.

One of the conclusions presented by Lukáš Novotný and Michael Weigl in their paper on 'The Significance of "the Other" for Regional Identity in the Czech-German Border Region', which was based on historical analyses and qualitative analyses of interviews conducted on both sides of the border, was that a relatively large proportion of Czechs and Bavarians view their neighbour with disinterest and indifference. Novotný and Weigl argued that only a small group of the population actually take part in any active cross-border dialogue, and on the Czech side more so than the Bavarian those that are involved are generally from the ranks of the regional elites. But the majority of the population on both sides of the border maintain a position of remoteness and scepticism towards their neighbour and towards activities that may draw them into contact with each other. Those Czechs and Bavarians who predominantly exhibit behaviour patterns of 'indifference' and 'remoteness' toward their neighbour, tend to construct their local and regional identity without any awareness of the local and regional historical and traditional background. Conversely, behaviour patterns of 'accommodation' considerably more often coincide with a person's historical and regional awareness. On the Czech side, historical awareness has been undergoing a transformation since 1989, in an effort to rid itself of the influence of communist-period propaganda and the Cold War image of the German neighbour and to re-evaluate and depict regional history without tendentiousness or bias. On the Bavarian side – and it should be noted that here too all sorts of negative constructs about Czechs evolved out of the confrontation between the West and the East – the more Bavarians' historical awareness is linked to the notion of integration in a unified Europe, the more positive their view of and identification with Czechs. For example, in this context references are made to the past and the shared medieval trade routes between Bohemia and Bavaria (e.g. the Golden Path).

The paper presented by Melanie Hoffrath, from the Technical University in Kaiserlautern, which focused on the relationships between the neighbouring border communities of Strážný and Philippsreuth, also confirmed that behaviour patterns of 'accommodation' are found only among a minority of the population on both sides of the border, while among the majority there is a clear lack of interest in the neighbouring country. Hoffrath argued that it is not possible to speak of any mediation space between these two communities, as, despite their geographical proximity, there is practically no communication between the two communities and their citizens, and on both sides there is a predominant lack of knowledge and interest about the other community. It is primarily the inhabitants of Philipsreuth who visit Strážný, more so than the other way around, but the purpose of such visits is almost always shopping tourism, as the German visitors go to Strážný to shop at the cheap Vietnamese markets located there. Each community has a distinct identity and specific cultural standards, and this, along with the language barrier, make the situation between the communities and their members even more complicated. According to Hoffrath, if the space between the two communities is to become a real mediation space, it will requires more than just cross-border activities conducted on an official basis. To succeed in this it will first be necessary to awaken a sense of interest among the populations in their neighbour and foster the potential for contacts between the two sides.

Markéta Hahn, an advisor to firms operating in the Czech-German environment, presented a paper titled 'History, Politics, Society: The Specifics of Czech-German Economic Experience', and pointed out that the limited amount of interest each side has in the neighbouring country complicates cross-border cooperation. In the area of economic cooperation she notes that often top managers from Germany who are sent to the Czech Republic are well aware of the relatively rapid career advancement this signifies for them, but they are much less aware of what to expect in the other country and what kind of differences they must be prepared to encounter in the way of thinking of local inhabitants. Czech mentality is foreign to them, and they consequently often come up against a lack of understanding and willingness in the Czech community. Therefore, Hahn particularly emphasised the need to devote sufficient time and attention to developing inter-cultural skills in general and developing an awareness of the other country's cultural standards. German managers need also to realise that the tough company rules and matter-of-fact approach they are accustomed to in German firms tend to run up against a lack of understanding on the part of their Czech colleagues.

An important historical milestone in Czech history was the year of the revolution in 1989. Claudia Beier, a fresh graduate of the CAP, presented a paper titled after a well-known quotation from the German writer Christa Wolf, '"Every Revolution also Frees the Tongue" The Connection between Language and Politics Based on the Velvet Revolution'. The paper dealt with the specifics in the style of communication between Czechs and Germans in the periods before and after 1989. Beier used caricatures and illustrated jokes as examples of Czech linguistic humour typical for the period prior to 1989. In the post-1989 she pointed out the more frequent occurrence of English expressions in Czech humour and presented examples of witty remarks by top Czech politicians, especially Miloš Zeman, to demonstrate that even after 1989 language continues to be an important political tool.

Although it was Miloš Zeman who in 2002 referred to the Sudeten Germans as Hitler's 'Fifth Column', resulting in a deterioration in Czech-German relations and prompting Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to cancel his scheduled visit to the Czech Republic at that time, Birgit Vierling from the University in Regensburg stated that the relations between the two countries between 1998 and 2002 were nonetheless regarded as smooth and normal. She noted that the Sudeten German issue and the Temelín nuclear power plant both became contentious issues in connection with the Czech Republic's accession to the European Union, but the German and Czech governments managed to successfully handle both. Current relations between the governments are considered good, though their are prevailing disagreements, such as over the planned European Centre against Expulsions, which the Czech side views with reservations (while part of the political leadership in Germany even backs establishing a 'national' version of such a centre, without the involvement of the other countries), or over how the Sudeten German issue is viewed from Prague and Munich.

In her paper on the integration of the Czech Republic into the European Union, Anne Sophie Kross of the University of Göttingen discussed the ideas of František Palacký, who described Czech history as remarkable for the way in which it had significantly shaped European history, but noted that the country's history had often been negatively influenced by Germany. Kross supported Palacký's observation with historical evidence, but also cited the very recent example of the accession process of the Czech Republic to the EU, in which Germany played an important role in many respects, but in this case also became the source of the Czech scepticism towards the two-tier unification of Europe, where large

countries can take advantage of their strong position to the disadvantage of small countries.

The conference confirmed the influence of historical awareness on the formation of national, regional, and micro-regional identity. The historical dimension influences the way Czechs and Bavarians see one another and their cross-border cooperation, which is a reflection of more than just the 20th-century past. Often other historical events from much earlier periods appear as illustrative of the contacts between Czechs and Germans as neighbours, examples such as the interlinking network of medieval trade routes and numerous religious connections. The further back in time these historical events are (however much they may have had a clearly negative effect on the relationship at the time, e.g. the Hussite movement), the less a source of conflict in the co-existence of the two countries they represent, and the more potential there is to inscribe them with positive content. Building neighbourly relations on the basis of these historical references to harmonious links represents a great challenge for how Czechs and German perceive one another. It is one of the paths toward closer understanding and toward fulfilling the goals of friendly and active neighbourly relations.

Lukáš Novotný

Information on the Volume – *Central European Parliaments: The First Decade of Democratic Experience and Future Prospects*, edited by Zdenka Mansfeldová, David M. Olson, and Petra Rakušanová. Prague 2004: Institute of Sociology AS CR

Edited volume entitled *Central European Parliaments: The First Decade of Democratic Experience and Future Prospects* is an edited volume of conference proceedings containing papers from an international workshop held in Prague in November 2003. The workshop of the same title brought together researchers from eight Central and Eastern European countries, and from Germany, Canada and the United States, who specialise in parliamentary studies dealing with Central and Eastern Europe. Its main aim was to summarise and assess the decade of parliamentary research conducted by the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, and by other scientific institutions in Central and Eastern European countries, and to define research priorities for the next decade in view of EU enlargement and the changing parliamentary agenda. Participants proposed a future research agenda that would go beyond the isolated form of research on national parliaments and their actors, which dominated the past decade of research, by launching international cooperative investigations during the next decade and assessing priorities in parliamentary research for the coming years. Based on current trends in the Czech parliament and on existing research, attention was primarily paid to the role of the parliaments of new EU member states in the context of changes in the parliamentary agenda, the role of individual parliaments in general, and the possible links between national parliaments and the European Parliament.

The papers in the volume of proceedings have been substantially re-worked by the authors in cooperation with the editors, and the content consequently goes beyond the scope of presentations made at the workshop. The volume is divided into four sections. The first section, *The Parliamentary Research Agenda*, presents current findings in empirical research studies on parliaments and parliamentarians in Central Europe and Germany. Bernhard Wessels presents the results of a longitudinal comparative study of German members of the parliament and German members of the European Parliament. Zdenka Mansfeldová concentrates on a description and analysis of the institutional framework and policy relations between the Czech Parliament and the government.

The second section, *Parliaments and the Processes of Globalisation and Europeanisation,* concentrates on the changing role and position of national parliaments in the twin processes of transformation and globalisation. Petr Kolář and Jindriška Syllová describe the role played by parliaments in the candidate countries during the process of EU enlargement. Drago Zajc presents a comparative analysis of the changing functions of national parliaments after the accession to the EU and the implications of enlargement for the development of Central and Eastern European parliaments in the near future. Edward Schneier offers a look at possible comparisons of the scope of legislative powers in post-communist parliaments and in parliaments with similar experience outside the CEE region.

The third section, *The Role of Political Parties in the Parliaments,* concentrates on re-establishing research on political parties and their role in parliaments. David M. Olson provides an overview of the role of political parties in the organisation of parliaments with special attention paid to the relationship between parliamentary party groups and committees in Central and Eastern European parliaments. Petra Rakušanová and Lukáš Linek introduce a case study of Czech parliamentary party groups with respect to party unity and party cohesion. Csaba Nikolenyi examines coalition stability in new democracies using rational choice theory. Werner J. Patzelt elaborates an explanatory model of party discipline in German parliaments and analyses its application to international comparative studies.

The last section, *Legislative Recruitment,* concentrates on changes in legislative recruitment and career patterns. William Crowther presents the results of his analysis of legislative recruitment in Romania and Moldova. Adéla Seidlová examines recruitment patterns among parliamentary elites in the Czech Republic over the course of the 1990s. Laurentiu Stefan presents the results of a survey on Romanian MPs, analysing their career patterns and their career preferences. András Schwarz looks at experienced MPs in the Hungarian parliament and describes the core of the Hungarian parliament.

The concluding paper by D. M. Olson, titled 'Possibilities for the Cooperation and Coordination of Comparative Research' summarises the ideas and results of the round table, suggesting future priorities, and directions and strategies of parliamentary research in the coming years.

Petra Rakušanová

Polish Parliamentary Research – Bibliographical Information

Introductory suggestions

For those interested in Polish parliamentary research probably the best place to start is Biblioteka Sejmowa (Sejm Library). It fulfils the combined role of a regular public library, a national archive, and a parliamentary museum. The main part of the collection contains nearly 500 000 volumes. The library's catalogue is available on-line at: http://bib.sejm.gov.pl – next to CATALOGUES. It can also be accessed through Sejm's main page – www.sejm.gov.pl – under 'Kancelaria Sejmu'. Regretfully, the library's catalogue is not very user friendly. There is an English menu on the main page, but the other pages and the entries are in Polish only.

Another of the Sejm's useful institutions is Biuro Studiów i Ekspertyz (Bureau of Research): http://biurose.sejm.gov.pl. The website is in Polish and English. By clicking on 'Bureau's Publications' the user is led to list of links for research reports and analyses and related materials, many of them available on-line in portable document format.

Wydawnictwo Sejmowe (Sejm Publishing) specialises in parliamentary history, legal analyses and information booklets with recent legislation and MPs' biographies. Its

catalogue of publications in Polish is available at: http://wydawnictwo.sejm.gov.pl.

The Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – CBOS) is a leading polling institution in Poland. On its user-friendly website (www.cbos.pl) it publishes (in Polish, with titles translated into English) several reports each month, including survey findings on public attitudes towards parliament and MPs. The website also provides access to the *Polish Public Opinion Bulletin*, a monthly publication in English that summarises the most important reports of the month.

Selected bibliography

Below is a list of selected academic work in the field of Polish parliamentary research and published in Poland. Legal analyses and electoral studies are not included.

The bibliography is divided into three parts. The first is a list of books (authored and edited collections of papers) devoted entirely to the subject of parliament and MPs. The titles are translated here into English. Most of them present empirical findings, usually dealing with attitudes and values of parliamentarians. In most cases these are qualitative analyses. The second part shows a list of articles published in journals and chapters from scholarly books. The third part presents a list of books and articles that are partially or indirectly related to parliamentary research. In most cases theses analyses focus on politicians, political elites, or the political class, and parliamentarians represent a part of the sample studied in the research.

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Barbara Post

The Spring School of Science Studies – Prague, March 2005

In March 2005 the National Contact Centre – Women in Science organised the Spring School of Science Studies, a working colloquium that took strides towards fostering reflection on science and scientific enterprise as a social phenomenon in the Czech Republic. The National Contact Centre – Women in Science invited researchers from several departments and fields at the University of Lancaster (sociology, women's studies and social studies of science), all of whom are also engaged in the of field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). This field is relatively new to the Czech Republic, so for the Czech academic community the event provided an excellent opportunity to become acquainted with critical approaches aimed at examining the social dimensions of the position, function, and impacts of science and the interaction between science and society. The event was organised by Alice Červinková and Kateřina Šaldová, both researchers at the Institute of Sociology AS CR. They invited researchers with a background ranging from doctoral student to full professor, which meant that participants had an opportunity not only to learn about concepts and completed studies in this field, but also to observe examples of STS doctoral work at an early stage of investigation, and to contribute to the discussions that inform and shape this work. The Spring School was organised under the auspices and with the financial support of the British Council.

Science and Technology Studies draws on and combines various methods and ideas from post-structuralism, the feminist critique of Foucauldian genealogy, material semiotics and other theoretical perspectives. This approach is not limited to reflecting on scientific paradigms in purely methodological terms, but instead also devotes attention to studying specific and everyday manifestations of concrete and localised scientific or technological praxis. The aim is to question and dis-

rupt the dichotomies of the social/scientific, semiotic/real, human/technological, material/immaterial, constructed/natural, etc. From the perspective of STS, what we encounter as real is the embodiment of materialisation, permeation, the knotting of ideas and concepts, social and discursive frameworks and technological practices, none of which can be reduced to any single one of these aspects. Reality is woven from various heterogeneous elements, processes and practices. It is chaotic in nature, and only temporarily related and coherent, not absolutely so through some unifying 'grand narrative'. STS emphasises monitoring and examining how concrete, situated materialisation occurs, and how the indivisible interlink between ideological potential, social and discursive categories, and technological practices comes into being. In a long-term perspective, STS explores the processuality, heterogeneity, and multiplicity of concrete, socially and materially localised, everyday scientific and technological practices. Next to the linguistic turn, according to which reality is constructed and delimited through language and linguistic categories, it is possible to speak also of the practical turn, observing how phenomena are further constructed at the point where the discursive, the social, the material and the technological intersect. Another important aspect of the STS approach is the shift from 'impartial' criticism to productive interference and intervention and the active search for and provision of alternatives.

The speakers' presentations addressed various issues and aspects of STS. Professor John Law (Sociology Department, Lancaster University) took the example of the epidemic of foot and mouth disease in the UK to demonstrate some inherent aspects and impacts of globalisation. In order to describe complex and heterogeneous processes that involve many links, like the global trade in agricultural products (in this case meat), he employed the metaphor of 'flow'. (This is a reference to the questionable if not actually counterproductive impact of the Mississippi River flow regulation, which in 1993 was the cause of massive and unprecedented flooding.) Law cautioned that, in the face of the complexity of the processes involved, attempts to control the 'winding flow' of the global trade in livestock are bound to fail (of the 1.4 million containers of livestock imported annually to Britain as few as 100 000 are inspected, and the trade in livestock within the UK is extremely mobile). Tightly linked, complex, heterogeneous formations, such as the globalised market in agricultural products, are, according to Law, inherently unstable and inevitably doomed. (It is not the speed with which events unfold that determine the tightness of the links in a formation, but rather the relationship between the development of an event and the possibility to intervene in and gain control over it.) From this perspective the foot and mouth disease epidemic is not a case of an exceptional catastrophe but rather the kind of 'normal accident' that necessarily accompanies the functioning of a system. By analysing these processes, STS should help to create a situation where instead of attempting to gain control over unmanageable, unpredictable, closely linked, heterogeneous systems with numerous links, priority is given to fostering systems in which the risk of unmanageability is not that high. In practical terms this means shifting to local production, reduced livestock mobility, locally procured feed, and in general terms a significantly more sceptical view of the 'advantages' of globalisation (itself a phenomenon that cannot be modelled or predicted).

Using the case of the Prague Malešice Incineration Plant, Zdeněk Konopásek (Centre for Theoretical Study, Prague) discussed the issue of citizens' participation in cases advocated primarily by environmental activists. The case of the Malešice Incinerator was publicly presented primarily as a dispute over dioxin emissions, which – despite the unquestionable urgency of this aspect of communal waste disposal – pushed other issues and negative aspects of the incineration

plant into the background. By framing the problem in this way the illusion was created that, were the issue of dioxins to be resolved, waste incineration would be a fully justified means of addressing the problem of communal waste disposal. Alternative forms of waste disposal, and the question of whether the production of huge amounts of waste is acceptable in the first place, were completely ignored. Konopásek also analysed the reasons that led the environmental activists to abandon the case of the incinerator as a lost cause: a single-handed reduction of the problem to the issue of dioxins, only limited participation of the local community, the nature of the communication between the environmental activists and the local community and the Malešice Incinerator management.

Professor Maureen McNeil (Institute for Women's Studies, Lancaster University) has for many years been examining how popular, personal and pressing stories about reproductive problems and new reproductive technologies form women's expectations and ideas about reproduction. What is striking about these stories is the absence of the woman as a subject (the protagonists are the team of reproductive technology experts and the fact of conception itself). The stories create just a model of some sort of seemingly universal, neutral woman (who, if not entirely absent, figures in the narratives as a completely passive element), and they are constructed from the position of a white, heterosexual woman of middle or upper-middle class background. However, new reproductive technologies have opened the discursive space to other subjects, such as lesbian mothers, homosexual parenting couples, and post-menopausal mothers, and as a result heterosexual women have been swept from their hegemonic position as the sole type of actor in these stories. In her research, McNeil strives to burst open and refute the seeming universality and commonplaceness of these narratives of personal suffering, which owing to the well-established discourse of intimate personal experience have been made to appear unquestionable. The proliferation of stories of personal suffering and the 'redemptive' power of new technologies has led to a significant shift in how assisted reproduction is perceived; it is now beginning to be portrayed and viewed in increasingly neutral terms as a natural method of reproduction and it is in growing demand. As these stories circulate and the use of new reproductive technologies spreads, other important aspects in this field are pushed to the background, such as child poverty in developing countries, the issue of adoption, and the broader social aspects of reproductive issues, for instance, changes in gender roles and identities, and the economic aspects of having a family. Finally, the stories about new reproductive technologies generate an atmosphere of increasing anxiety around the issue of reproduction.

Vicky Singleton (Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University) focused on the variety and diversity of methods used to implement a governmental health-care programme aimed at training citizens to provide first aid even in cases of complicated cardiovascular accidents (training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation, heart massage, the use of a defibrillator). Singleton underscored the multifaceted aspects of this long-term process of education toward independence and self-reliability in the provision of first aid (interactions within the community, information campaigns, etc.).

The Spring School of Science Studies closed with a public lecture and discussion on 25 March 2005 at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, Charles University. At this meeting, chaired by Jiřina Šmejkalová from the University of Lincoln, briefer accounts of the lectures of John Law, Maureen McNeil and Vicky Singleton were presented. Jiří Loudín, from the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, spoke on the topic of innovation and 'catching up' with the level of science in the advanced countries of Western Europe. He focused on justifying this need to 'catch up' with Western Europe, the dialectical rela-

tionship between innovation and preserving original qualities, and the issue and strategies of imitation, which require originality and autonomous approaches. Loudín sees the Czech Republic's originality and contribution in its 'civilisation capital', and especially in the education of the Czech population, and he reflected on the possible means of mobilising this capital, or, in other words, on the issue of how to produce educated elites. In the discussion that followed, the idea of 'catching up' and competition in technological progress was called into question, and arguments were raised to the effect that this is not a static, straightforward and unproblematic idea.

The colloquium was well organised. The well-conceived and well-structured three-day programme made it possible for the speakers' presentations to be followed by insightful debate. This was mainly achieved by the adequate order and spacing of presentations and follow-up discussions, the valuable feedback from discussants, and the final summaries on each of the sessions provided by the chairs.

The Spring School of Science Studies provided a number of stimuli for thought within the Czech environment. These are not only the emphasis on studying science in its social context and incorporating the observations and findings of post-structuralist and (post)feminist thought and criticism, but also the emphasis on the detailed observation of concretely localised scientific and technological practices in a long-term perspective. The practices adopted by STS challenge us not to descend into embracing a simplified concept of critique or making gross generalisations, and to be careful not to apply exceedingly vague conceptual metaphors that veil the multifaceted nature, processuality, and complexity of scientific and social practices. STS strives to think through the position of the researcher from the point of view of their situatedness and their responsibility for criticism, and contemplates the impact of the tension between the involvement and detachment of the researcher. In the context of Czech science what may be the most important contribution of STS is the stress on the self-reflection of the researcher over their own situatedness and the situatedness of 'power'.

Jan Matonoha

Parliaments in Germany and East Central Europe

The information below is intended to supplement the information provided by individual authors in this issue of *Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review* and to provide a fuller picture of parliamentary research in Central and Eastern Europe and in Germany. This information has been compiled with the kind assistance of Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften/GESIS, Service Agency Eastern Europe in Berlin (*http://www.gesis.org/GESIS_Aussenstelle/index.htm*) and from data provided by the FORIS and SOLIS databases for the period between 2001 and 2004. The data were compiled and prepared in abbreviated form by Zdenka Mansfeldová.

First some concise information should be provided on the FORIS and SOLIS databases:

FORIS (Forschungsinformationssystem Sozialwissenschaften) contains a survey of social science research projects in the Federal Republic of Germany. It gives detailed information on all work with a theoretical and/or empirical orientation – commissioned research, expert reports, institute projects, self-financed or funded research, habilitations, and dissertations, which scientists are currently working on, planning, or have already completed.

SOLIS (Sozialwissenschaftlichen Literaturinformationssystem) contains lists of scholarly work published in German – monographs, articles, papers in volumes, 'grey literature', accompanied by bibliographic information and abstracts.

Research projects in the FORIS database

1. Title: *Die Abgeordneten im Bundestag und in den Landtagen. Einschätzungen und Meinungen*

Author: Wenzel, Florian
Supervision: Güllner, Manfred, Prof.
Contact: Institution (Tel. 030-62882-0, Fax: 030-62882-400, e-mail: info@forsa.de)
Institution: forsa – Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analysen mbH
(Max-Beer-Str. 2, D-10119 Berlin; http://www.forsa.de/)
Start: 2004-02
End: 2004-03

2. Title: *Politische Karrieren Thüringer Parlamentarier und Parlamentarierinnen (1990–2002)*
(Teilprojekt 1 im Rahmen des Gesamtprojekts 'Geschlechter-Politiken')
Author: Hochheiser, Katrin, Dipl.-Soz.
Supervision: Wobbe, Theresa, Prof. Dr.
Contact: Hochheiser, Katrin, Dipl.-Soz.
(Tel. 0361-737-4925, e-mail: katrin.hochheiser@uni-erfurt.de)
Institution: Universität Erfurt, Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Lehrstuhl für Soziologie, insb. Geschlechtersoziologie (Nordhäuser Str. 63, D-99089 Erfurt; http://www.uni-erfurt.de/geschlechtersoziologie/)
Start: 2003-07
End: 2005-05

3. Title: *Wandel demokratischer Legitimation durch Internationalisierung und eparlamentarisierung* (Teilprojekt B1)
Author: Hurrelmann, Achim, Dr.; Schneider, Steffen, Dr.; Krell-Laluhova, Zuzana; Pritzlaff, Tanja; Wiesner, Achim
Supervision: Nullmeier, Frank, Prof. Dr.; Lhotta, Roland, Prof. Dr.
Contact: Nullmeier, Frank, Prof. Dr. (e-mail: nullmeier@zes.uni-bremen.de)
Institution: Universität Bremen, SFB 597 Staatlichkeit im Wandel (Postfach 330440, D-28334 Bremen; http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de/)
Start: 2003-01
End: 2014-12

4. Title: *Vom Protest zum Parlamentsmandat. Zum Amtsverständnis der Abgeordneten der Schill-Partei in der Hamburgischen Bürgerschaft*
Author: Gessenharter, Wolfgang, Prof. Dr.; Blumenthal, Julia von, Dr.
Contact: Blumenthal, Julia von, Dr.
(Tel. 040-6541-3377, e-mail: vonblume@unibw-hamburg.de)
Institution: Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, FB Wirtschafts- und Organisationswissenschaften, Institut für Politikwissenschaft Professur für Politikwissenschaft, insb. Politische Theorie (Holstenhofweg 85, D-22043 Hamburg;
http://www.unibw-hamburg.de/WWEB/soz/gessenharter/homepage.html)
Start: 2002-04
End: 2004-11

5. Title: *Konstitutionalisierungsprozesse in der Europäischen Union. Parlamentarisierung und Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte auf europäischer Ebene*
Author: Bürgin, Alexander; Schwellnus, Guido
Supervision: Rittberger, Berthold; Schimmelfennig, Frank, PD Dr.
Contact: Schimmelfennig, Frank, Dr. (Tel. 0621-181-2813, Fax: 0621-181-2845, e-mail: Frank.Schimmelfennig@mzes.uni-mannheim.de)
Institution: Universität Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung - MZES - Arbeitsbereich B Die politischen Systeme Europas und ihre Integration (D-68131 Mannheim; http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/)
Start: 2003-01
End: 2006-12

6. Title: *Expertenkommissionen der Bundesregierung. Notwendiger Sachverstand oder Entmachtung des Parlaments?*
Author: Siefken, Sven, Dipl.-Pol.
Supervision: Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S., Prof. Dr.
Contact: Secretariat (Tel. 0345-552-4221, e-mail: dost@politik.uni-halle.de)
Institution: Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Philosophische Fakultät, Institut für Politikwissenschaft Lehrbereich Regierungslehre und Policyforschung (D-06099 Halle; http://www.politik.uni-halle.de/schuettemeyer/)
Start: 2001-10
End: 2004-10

7. Title: *Europäisierung der Arbeit nationaler Parlamente (Teilprojekt im Rahmen des DFG-Schwerpunktprogrammes 'Regieren in der Europäischen Union')*
Author: Auel, Katrin, Dr.
Supervision: Benz, Arthur, Prof. Dr.
Contact: Benz, Arthur, Prof. Dr.
(Tel. 02331-987-2160, e-mail: arthur.benz@fernuni-hagen.de)
Institution: Fernuniversität Hagen, FB Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften, Institut für Politikwissenschaft Lehrgebiet Politikwissenschaft I Staat und Regieren (Universitätsstr. 41, D-58084 Hagen; http://www.fernuni-hagen.de/POLALLG/index.htm)
Start: 2001-08
End: 2003-10

8. Title: *Steuerung des Regierungs- und Verwaltungshandelns durch Parlamente*
Author: not given
Supervision: Hill, Hermann, Univ.-Prof. Dr.
Contact: Hill, Hermann, Univ.-Prof. Dr.
(Tel. 06232-654-328, e-mail: hill@dhv-speyer.de)
Institution: Forschungsinstitut für Öffentliche Verwaltung bei der Deutschen Hochschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer Sektion 01 Modernisierung in Staat und Verwaltung (Postfach 1409, D-67324 Speyer; http://foev.dhv-speyer.de/Ueberuns/Sektionen/sektion1index.htm)
Start: 2003-01
End: 2004-12

9. Title: *Langzeit- und Querschnittsfragen in europäischen Regierungen und Parlamenten – eine Analyse von Institutionen und Verfahren in ausgewählten Ländern* (zweite Projektphase)
Author: Thio, Sie Liong; Steinmüller, Karlheinz, Dr.; Höppner, Ulrike
Supervision: Göll, Edgar, Dr.
Contact: Göll, Edgar, Dr. (Tel. 030-803088-44, e-mail: E.Goell@izt.de)
Institution: Institut für Zukunftsstudien und Technologiebewertung gGmbH (Schopenhauerstr. 26, D-14129 Berlin; http://www.izt.de/)
Start: 2001-07
End: 2002-07

10. Title: *Delegationseliten nach dem Systemumbruch. Rekrutierung, Zirkulation und Orientierungen der parlamentarischen Führungsgruppen Ostdeutschlands im Vergleich* (Teilprojekt A3)
Author: Edinger, Michael, Dr.; Jahr, Stefan, Dipl.-Soz.
Supervision: Best, Heinrich, Prof. Dr.; Schmitt, Karl, Prof. Dr.
Contact: Edinger, Michael, Dr.
(Tel. 03641-945055, e-mail: s6edmi@nds.rz.uni-jena.de)
Institution: Universität Jena, Fak. für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften, SFB 580 Gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen nach dem Systemumbruch – Diskontinuität, Tradition und Strukturbildung (Carl-Zeiss-Str. 2, D-07743 Jena; http://www.sfb580.uni-jena.de/); Universität Jena, Fak. für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften, Institut für Politikwissenschaft (Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, D-07740 Jena; http://www2.uni-jena.de/svw/powi/)
Start: 2001-07
End: 2008-06

11. Title: *Abgeordnetenbefragung 2003: Einstellungen und Orientierungen von Bundestagabgeordnetten.*
Author: Weßels, Bernhard, Priv. Doz., Dr.
Contact: Weßels, Bernhard, Priv. Doz., Dr.
(Tel. 030-25491-315, Fax: 030-25491-345, e-mail: wessels@wz-berlin.de)
Institution: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH FSP Zivilgesellschaft, Konflikte und Demokratie Abt. Demokratie – Strukturen, Leistungsprofil und Herausforderungen (Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin; http://www.wz-berlin.de/zkd/dsl/)
Content: Das Projekt erfolgte in Kooperation mit den Universitäten Twente (Niederlande) und Göteborg (Schweden).
Zeitraum: 2003
Start: 2003-04
End: 2004-03

12. Title: *Die estnische Riigikogu: Entstehung eines modernen Parlaments (Arbeitstitel) (The Estonian Riigikogu – Emergence of a Modern Parliament)*
Author: Gicquel, Catherine
Contact: Gicquel, Catherine
(e-mail: gicquel.katty@caramail.com, catherine.gicquel@sh.se)
Institution: Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät II, Nordeuropa-Institut
(Unter den Linden 6, D-10099 Berlin; http://www2.hu-berlin.de/skan/index.html)
Type of research: Dissertation

Literature from the SOLIS database

Author: Antic, Milica G.
Title: *Women in Politics in Slovenia's New Democracy: Why So Few (Frauen in der Politik in Sloweniens neuer Demokratie: warum so wenige)*
Source: Slovenia between Continuity and Change, 1990-1997: Analyses, Documents and Data, Niko Tos, Vlado Miheljak (eds.), Berlin: Ed. Sigma, p. 88–102, 4 Tab., 2002 REIHE: Founding Elections in Eastern Europe

Author: Kraatz, Susanne; Steinsdorff, Silvia von Hrsg.
Title: *Parlamente und Systemtransformation im postsozialistischen Europa (Parliaments and System Transformation in Post-Socialist Europe)*
Source: Opladen: Leske u. Budrich, 340 pp., Tab., 2002

Author: Beichelt, Timm

Title: *Muster parlamentarischer Entscheidungsproduktion in Mitteleuropa (Patterns of the Production of Parliamentary Decisions in Eastern Europe)*

Source: Gelegenheit und Entscheidung: Policies und Politics erfolgreicher Transformationssteuerung, Helmut Wiesenthal (eds.), Opladen: Westdt. Verl., p. 32–92, 17 Tab., 2001

Author: Harfst, Philipp

Title: *Regierungsstabilität in Osteuropa – der Einfluss von Parlamenten und Parteien (Government Stability in Eastern Europe – The Influence of Parliaments and Political Parties)*

Source: Berlin: 38 pp., 10 Tab., 3 Abb., Anh., 2001

REIHE: Veröffentlichung / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Sozialer Wandel, Institutionen und Vermittlungsprozesse, Abteilung Institutionen und sozialer Wandel, 01-204 Forschungsberichtsnr.: FS III 01-204

Author: Fuchs, Gesine; Hoecker, Beate

Title: *Ohne Frauen nur eine halbe Demokratie – politische Partizipation von Frauen in den osteuropäischen Beitrittsstaaten (Only Half a Democracy without Women – The Political Participation of Women in the Eastern European Accession States)*

Institution: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e.V. Abt. Internationaler Dialog Herausgeber Hiroshimastr. 17, D-10785 Berlin

Source: Berlin, 17 pp., 7 Tab., 6 Abb., 2004

REIHE: Europäische Politik / Eurokolleg, 49

Author: Bos, Ellen; Mommsen, Margareta; Steinsdorff, Silvia von (eds.)

Title: *Das russische Parlament – Schule der Demokratie (The Russian Parliament – School of Democracy)*

Source: Opladen: Leske u. Budrich, 295 pp., Tab., 2003

Author: Wiest, Margarete

Title: *Russlands schwacher Föderalismus und Parlamentarismus der Föderationsrat (Russia's Weak Federalism and Parliamentarism – the Federation Council)*

Source: Münster: Lit Verl., 376 pp., 2003 REIHE: Münchener Universitätsschriften: Osteuropa-Studien, Bd. 4 Teilw. zugl. München, Univ., Diss., 2002

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