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Thematic Issue

Values, Modernisation and Social Change in Europe

Guest Editors

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GENDER A VÝZKUM
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Economy 4.0 — The Digitalization of Labour from a Gender Perspective

Guest Editors: Annette von Alemann, Julia Gruhlich, Ilona Horwath, Lena Weber

Like the First Industrial Revolution, digitalisation is profoundly shaking up the world of work and has been referred to as 'the Fourth Industrial Revolution' as well as 'Economy 4.0' or 'Industry 4.0'. The ever more rapid implementation of smart technologies, automation, robotics, cyber-physical systems, and digital labour (cloud- and crowd work) in many occupational areas, including the service sector and industry, has sparked dramatic transformations in the organisation of professions, work, working conditions, and the structure of the labour market. The widespread use of mobile phones, computers, and data clouds has challenged the traditional boundaries between private and professional life. Technological innovations have always been considered catalysts for social innovation.

The special issue presents current research on gender in/equality in the 'Economy 4.0'. It focuses on the interconnections of work, digital technologies, and gender relations in the emerging digital age and asks if technologically induced change in work will lead to a general change in the gender order and gender relations. The aim is to shed light on the multiple connections between the emerging Economy 4.0 and gender at the intersection of other categories of social inequality, such as race and class.

The issue is available online at: https://www.genderonline.cz

The journal is published biannually by the Gender & Sociology Department of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences. It is listed in the SCOPUS, ERIH PLUS, CEJSH, and other databases. It is an open access journal listed in the DOAJ.

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Introduction: Values, Modernisation and Social Change in Europe

This thematic issue deals with the subject of values and value change. The concept of 'value change' has come to be widely employed by sociologists interested in 'social change' and 'modernisation'. The idea introduced by Ronald Inglehart [1977] that our values are shifting in response to dynamic economic and social development has become a topic of research in many countries.

Inquiring into people's values, value priorities, and especially the role of values in social conduct has become an important part of the sociological endeavour to understand human behaviour and the functioning of human societies. Personal values and value priorities have been described as a 'dominating force in life' [Allport 1961: 543] because they direct all of a person's activity towards their pursuit. In Rokeach´s [1973] classic conceptualisation of values, they are the cognitive representations of human needs, and as such, they are the standards that rule and influence behaviour, attitudes, and assessments. The function of values – as *dispositions towards a certain behaviour or its cause* – has led many sociologists to view values as the crucial factor in understanding and predicting attitudinal and behavioural decisions and as the key to interpreting social, economic, and political change [e.g. Inglehart 1990, 1997].

In such a context, sociologists treat personal values as social facts that serve as a regulatory mechanism of people's behaviour, which implies a causal link. This determination of behaviour by values cannot be taken, however, in absolute terms, because sociologists are well aware of the fact that people's values are influenced by the social environment they live in, or, more specifically, by the culture and its norms, patterns, and rules. These cultural values are anchored in past social and historical evolution (they are path dependent) creating the framework of behavioural constraints and opportunities. From an analytical point of view, people's values can be treated as an independent variable, because of their potential to shape the political, economic, and institutional structures of society, but also as a dependent one, in that they in turn are shaped by the cultural and socioeconomic milieu. Cultural and personal values are not static entities. They evolve, develop, and change.

Whatever the direction of this causal link, one think is evident, which is that values are a crucial part of the lives of individuals and society. From a sociological perspective, they rank among the fundamental components of the social structure. Data on values and their knowledge – especially in longitudinal time series – can serve as important predictors of the behaviour of different social groups and sub-populations. Such knowledge is highly important, especially in the societies that experienced the transformation process from totalitarian communism to democracy. The success of their social change has depended heavily

not only on economic advancement, but also on a culture shift at both the societal and the individual levels.

Nowadays researchers studying value changes are lucky because they have an enormous amount of empirical data at their disposal. Thanks to the European Values Study (EVS), a unique international comparative project that started in 1981,[1] and its younger cousin, the World Values Survey (WVS)[2], researchers can analyse large data sets containing information from repeated cross-sectional surveys that are now conducted in dozens of countries and span a period of more than 36 years (the last wave of the EVS was carried out in 2017 in 35 European countries).

This thematic issue is an example of various approaches towards values and value change research. All six thematic papers are empirical analyses based on EVS data (one also uses the WVS data set) covering different periods of time[3] and comparing different countries. Unfortunately, at the time of writing (2019) not all the data from the countries that participated in the last EVS wave (2017) were available, but this fact should not detract from the importance and the quality of the results.[4]

The issue is structured as follows.

In the first paper entitled 'Value Modernisation in Central and Eastern European Countries: How Does Inglehart's Theory Work?', Beatrice Chromková Manea and Ladislav Rabušic study the effects of modernisation and intergenerational population change on value structures as outlined by Inglehart and other authors. They examine whether value shifts in Central and East European countries (CEE) reflect their dynamic modernisation path and whether these shifts have replicated the trends observed in Western European countries. In the first part, they explore whether the value shift has moved in the assumed direction and whether it has copied trends in Western European countries. They then look at different generations to determine whether the younger generations of CEE countries that grew up after 1989, in a time of rapid economic and political changes, show higher levels of post-materialist and post-modern values than the generations socialised and raised during the communist regime. They compare five CEE countries – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania – with four Western European countries – Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden – using the four waves of the EVS carried out between 1990/91 and

[1] The EVS is a quantitative project using surveys as the mode of data collection. It is repeated every nine years. Five waves have been carried out to date: 1981, 1990/1991, 1999, 2008, and 2017.

[2] See the EVS at https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/, and the WVS at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.

[3] Some authors could not use data from all the waves because some of the questionnaire items relevant for their analysis were not included in every wave.

[4] The integrated 2017 data set was fully released on 20 October 2020.

2017. The results are mixed. With respect to the effect of the intergenerational population change on cultural modernisation, they found differences in values between the generations: older generations have always been more traditional than younger ones, and not only in the CEE countries, as the same trend has been recorded in Western countries. The assumption that considerable differences in attitudes and values were found between East and West in 1991 was confirmed. On the other hand, the assumption that by 2017 the value differences between the Eastern and Western European countries would have decreased and that there would be some value convergence was not completely confirmed, although in the CEE countries a moderate increase in post-materialism was observed between 1991 and 2017, but it was still much lower than in the Western countries, where the trend in the proportion of post-materialists was unstable between 1991 and 2017 and the share of post-materialists – with the exception of the Netherlands – remained essentially the same. They conclude that even though the data analysed cover a quarter of a century, it seems that this is not a long enough period for the value structures of the former communist and the traditionally democratic countries to grow closer together.

The perspective of modernisation theory is also the background of the next paper, 'The Work Ethic and Social Change in the Czech Republic and Slovakia – a Modernisation Theory Perspective', by Michal Kozák. Using the last three waves of EVS data (1999–2017), the author compares trends in the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and examines to what extent the work ethic in those two culturally similar societies changed throughout the years of growing material prosperity. The study applies the linear decomposition technique together with multivariate statistical analysis. It has two goals. First, by means of exploratory analysis, it compares trends in the work ethic in the two societies and provides possible explanations for the observed differences. Second, it investigates whether the work ethic in the two countries has changed in line with the expectations of modernisation theory, that is whether it has declined proportionally to growing material prosperity and whether the decline has been driven primarily by the intergenerational replacement of the population. The results show that, even though the work ethic decreased in Czech Republic and increased in Slovakia, intergenerational population replacement contributed to its weakening in both countries. However, historical differences in socioeconomic development levels in conjunction with the different pace of population replacement were the main factors behind why population replacement dominated the overall trend in the Czech Republic but not in Slovakia. Finally, the author presents more comparative evidence in favour of modernisation theory, suggesting that population replacement universally contributed to a decrease in the work ethic in all European countries with comparable EVS data.

One aspect of modernisation theory, namely post-materialism, is at the centre of the third article, by Barbora Hubatková and Tomáš Doseděl, entitled 'The Expansion of Higher Education and Post-Materialistic Attitudes to Work in Eu-

rope: Evidence from the European Values Study'. Here the authors inquire into (i) whether there is an association between higher education and post-materialistic work-values if so how strong it is and (ii) to what extent this assumed link has been affected by the expansion of tertiary education. In this context they ask two research questions: first, whether higher-educated individuals – when compared to their lower-educated counterparts – ascribe less importance to the materialistic characteristics of jobs and greater importance to the non-materialistic characteristics; and second, whether this is still the case when the share of higher educated individuals in the labour market increases. For the purpose of their analysis they had to analyse the data on 28 countries from the 1990/91, 1999, and 2008 waves of the EVS in order to have a sufficient number of participating countries that included the battery of questions on job aspects in their surveys. The findings show that the link between higher education and post-materialism observed in other studies also applies to work values. Higher-educated Europeans were both more post-materialistic and less materialistic in their work orientations than their lower-educated counterparts. This means that they more often ascribed importance to those characteristics of work that can be described as intrinsic and, at the same time, assigned somewhat less importance to aspects of work such as pay, hours, or pressure. This association was, however, weakened by tertiary expansion. At the same time, work-related post-materialism declined with the increasing share of university-educated individuals in the working-age population. Nevertheless, so did work-related materialism, but only until the expansion of higher education reached 25%, after which point it gradually increased. The authors suggest that such development stems, at least partially, from the changing position of higher-educated workers in the labour market.

The fourth paper in this thematic collection, 'The Economy and Governance as Determinants of Political Trust in Europe: An Analysis of the European Values Study and World Values Survey, 1990–2019', by Marta Kołczyńska deals with one important aspect of the legitimacy of political systems, namely political trust. The author examines economic performance and the quality of governance as determinants of political trust in European countries. It uses not only EVS data, but also data from the World Values Survey, which cover 42 European countries. In terms of descriptive trends, the author finds that while political trust has remained relatively stable in much of Western Europe over the last 30 years, Central and Eastern European countries experienced greater volatility in political trust that included both substantial increases (e.g. in Estonia) and considerable declines (e.g. in Croatia). Linking political trust to economic performance and quality of governance, the paper addresses three research questions: (i) Is political trust associated with economic performance and quality of governance? (ii) Is this link due to cross-national differences or over-time changes in performance and governance? (iii) How do this link differ between European regions. The results provide evidence of links between economic performance – economic development and unemployment – and political trust in the expected directions.

Moreover, it seems that countries with less corruption tend to enjoy a higher level of political trust. However, the author warns that the effects on trust depend on the corruption indicator being used. Interestingly, the author finds a negative association between political trust and democracy in Central Europe, where trust declined while democracy was improving. On the other hand, among the non-EU countries, for example in Belarus and Russia, trust was increasing as democracy was deteriorating. These examples, according to the author, question the existence of an unconditional link between political trust and democratic legitimacy, with overall stability and a satisfactory economic situation being potential conditions in which the trust–democracy link may emerge.

In the next paper, 'Attitudes towards Life and Death in Europe: A Comparative Analysis', by Edurne Bartolome Peral and Lluís Coromina Soler, we turn to the questions of life and death. The authors analyse factors explaining citizens' attitudes towards in-vitro fertilisation, abortion, and euthanasia. The main aim of their study is to explore whether these attitudes towards what they call beginning- and end-of-life issues are comparable across countries as a meaningful construct, and how these attitudes evolve over time. The second aim is to analyse the effects of selected value orientations and sociodemographic determinants on latent-variable attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues, across countries and over time. The answers were sought in the EVS 2008 and 2017 datasets on Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Russia. The results indicate that in all the observed countries the degree of acceptance (tolerance) of these practices has been growing, although significant differences were found in the value orientation effects and respondents' background variables. After testing for measurement invariance and conducting multi-group confirmatory factor analyses across countries and across waves, the authors conclude that age and religiosity, alongside other sociodemographic variables, are important explanatory factors in attitudes towards life and death issues in all the countries examined. The effects of value orientations show relevant explanatory effects on such attitudes, although we find variations across societies.

In the last paper, 'Trends in Divorce Acceptance and Its Correlates across European Countries', Petr Fučík deals with the topic of divorce. He examines whether and to what extend the acceptance of divorce has changed in European countries in recent decades. First, the author explores the acceptance of divorce trends in various European societies between 1981 (1991) and 2017 and these trends are examined in relation to demographic divorce rates. Second, he analyses the correlates of divorce acceptance and its changes over time at the individual level. Third, he looks at the consistency of divorce acceptance with attitudes towards other types of social actions indicative of non-traditional family behaviour (homosexuality, abortion, casual sex, artificial insemination) and attitudes towards gender roles. The results show that: (i) divorce acceptance has been rising over time in all the countries studied with only a few exceptions. From a regional point of view, the increase in divorce acceptance is weakest in the

post-Soviet countries, modest in the post-communist countries, and strongest in other European countries. There is also a connection between divorce acceptance and a country's divorce rates, but it is stronger in Western countries than in the Eastern ones; (ii) divorce acceptance correlates on an individual level with the age, education, and religion, but surprisingly there is only small difference between men and women; (iii) a considerable level of consistency within the cluster of attitudes indicating non-traditional family behaviour was found, as well as a significant association between the prevalence of egalitarian gender-role attitudes and divorce acceptance.

Ladislav Rabušic
Beatrice Chromková Manea

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Value Modernisation in Central and Eastern European Countries: How Does Inglehart's Theory Work?*

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Abstract: An intergenerational shift from more pro-family norms to individual-choice norms has been taking place since the 1980s. Conditions of economic and social security positively contributed to this shift especially in high-income countries. In this paper, we study the modernisation change on value structures in selected Central and Eastern European countries and compare them with Western European ones and look at the generational differences. We first check whether the value shift is moving in the assumed direction and whether it is copying trends observed in Western European countries. We then look at different generations to determine whether the younger generations in CEE countries that grew up after 1989, in a time of rapid economic and political change, show higher levels of post-materialist and post-modern values than the generations socialised and raised during the communist regime. We use data collected by the international repeated cross-sectional European Values Study (EVS). The results are not clear-cut on whether socioeconomic modernisation has led to higher shares of post-materialism, more gender-egalitarian attitudes, and stronger support for individual-choice norms in CEE countries. In all the spheres of cultural modernisation analysed we found differences in values and attitudes between generations: the older generations were always more traditional than the younger generations. This was not just true in the CEE countries, as the same trend was recorded in the Western European countries.

Keywords: value modernisation, individual-choice norms, pro-family norms, gender equality
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Introduction

It has now been more than thirty years since the countries of Central and Eastern Europe experienced the fall of communism in 1989, an event that launched a profound political, economic, and social transformation. Many citizens of these countries expected, after the collapse of the totalitarian regime, that their 'backward' societies would quickly embark on a path of modernisation and undergo rapid social changes that would bring about, in a relatively short time, primarily an improvement in living standards, but also a whole range of opportunities for free individual development. They were somewhat naive in this expectation, as social change, unlike political and economic changes, happens over the long term, requiring decades. Indeed, social change is strongly conditioned by changing values and value preferences. These are known to have considerable inertia, as people's basic value structures and preferences are shaped during their formative years, approximately between the ages of 10 and 25. Once established, values and value preferences are part of a person's psychological structure and thus relatively resistant to change.

Nonetheless, the inertia of value structures does not mean that social (and cultural) change is not possible. It is possible, but it is mostly gradual, adaptive, and happens more 'through intergenerational population replacement than by the conversion of already socialized adults' [Inglehart 1997: 19]. Essential in this adaptation process is that new life strategies are more likely to be adopted by young population groups than by older ones [Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 23]. In this context, Abramson and Inglehart [1992] talk about generational replacement to describe how, in the process of modernisation, which generates feelings of relatively high economic and existential security, younger birth cohorts (generations)[1] experience different existential conditions from the ones that shaped the older generations. Therefore, the value preferences of older and younger generations usually differ.

According to Inglehart and Welzel's [2005] understanding of modernisation, a society's values are closely correlated with its level of economic development, but are also linked to its cultural legacy. Therefore, as Inglehart and Baker [2000] maintain, cultural change is path-dependent.[2] Although economic development

[1] The term 'cohort' denotes a set of individuals who experienced some crucial stages of life at approximately the same time, such as marriage, school graduation, war, economic shifts. They are approximately the same age and share similar ideas, problems, and attitudes. In other words, they share similar cultural experiences. Social science also uses the term 'generation' ('social generation') in this sense. Demography uses the more accurate term 'birth cohort', meaning people born in the same time interval (e.g. 1946-1950, 1951-1954).

[2] The same notion can be found elsewhere. For instance, Eisenstadt [2000: 2], in his analysis of the development of modernity, says that institutional and ideological patterns were in their development 'greatly influenced by specific cultural premises, traditions, and historical experiences'.

tends to bring pervasive cultural changes, the fact that society has been historically shaped by different cultural phenomena has enduring effects on its development. Cultural heritage and its norms continue to shape values, but because of generational replacement their impact may vary for different generations.

In Inglehart's conceptualisations [1971, 1977], one of the first recorded signs of a value change in the modernisation of advanced societies was a shift from materialist values, favouring economic and social security, to post-materialist values, favouring individual autonomy and self-expression. This culture shift in advanced industrial societies [Inglehart 1990] is, however, 'just one component of an even broader shift from traditional to secular-rational values and from survival values to self-expression values that is transforming prevailing norms concerning religion, gender, and tolerance of out groups' [Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart 2017: 1317]. It is manifested as a declining respect for authority, an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, increased sensitivity to environmental quality of life, greater choice in the areas of family arrangements and sexual norms, and increasing emphasis on gender equity.

In this paper, we study the effects of modernisation and intergenerational population change on value structures as outlined by Inglehart and his colleagues in selected countries in Europe. We focus first on materialist/post-materialist values; we then pursue values indicating gender equality; and finally we track individual-choice norms. We compare five Central and Eastern European countries (CEE countries – Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania) with four Western European countries (Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden). We first check whether the value shift goes in the assumed direction and whether it copies trends of Western European countries. We then look at whether there are any differences between generations. In other words, we shall check whether the younger generations of CEE countries that grew up after 1989, during times of rapid economic and political changes, show higher levels of post-materialist and post-modern values than the generations socialised and raised during the communist regime. In this endeavour, we make use of the data collected by the international repeated cross-sectional European Values Study (EVS). Our paper is descriptive and exploratory.[3]

[3] We are not aiming here to explicitly check whether possible generational differences are due to intergenerational replacement or historical period influence, as such an analysis (based on regression models) would require an integrated all-waves and countries dataset. There are two reasons why we do not explicitly explore generational differences. The first reason is that no such dataset had been released by the time of writing this paper. So far, there is a separate integrated data file for the 1991–2008, and an integrated data file for the 2017 wave (we worked with the 2nd release, selected countries). One can argue that we could have integrated these two data files for the purpose of our analysis. We decided not to do so as much would need to be done in order to harmonise the two datasets and errors and differences between our and the official version of the dataset could appear. However, we plan to run such an analysis for a future paper as soon as the integrated all-waves

The article is organised as follows. First, we briefly discuss theories dealing with issues of value modernisation/post-modernisation. Then, we explain the choice of countries that are compared in our analysis. We introduce our data and methods and then go on to present the main descriptive results for our variables and show how each analysed value indicator varies by generation and by country. We close with a discussion of the empirical results.

Theoretical background and past research

The focus of our paper is whether, in line with the theory of modernisation/post-modernisation, we find value shifts among CEE countries after 1990 that are more or less similar to those observed in Western European countries since the 1970s.

Post-materialism and individualisation

Ronald Inglehart introduced and expanded the concept of post-materialist values [see Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990, 1997, 2018]. He has discussed it in connection with cultural changes and reflexive modernisation. According to Inglehart, the ranking of human values reflects the socioeconomic conditions in which people have been raised; he terms this observation the 'scarcity hypothesis'.[4] People who grew up during the First World War or during the Great Depression were more concerned about materialistic values related to security and well-being. The generations that were socialised after the Second World War were more likely to emphasise post-materialist values in various aspects of the quality of life, such as social justice or social tolerance. This is the effect of the 'socialisation hypothesis'.[5]

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and countries dataset is released. That would allow us to better check the generational replacement assumption. Apart from data availability, we also had to take into account an analytical strategy that initially considered an APC analysis, which would allow us to simultaneously determine the effect of age, period and cohort. Aware of the pitfalls of using the APC analysis (as the effects of age, period, and cohort are linearly related) we considered working with an adjusted APC analysis model, like that proposed by Yang and Land [2008] – HAPC - that would partially eliminate the effect of the APC dependency. However, this method has a limitation that stems from the number of periods required for such an analysis. In our case, we have only four periods of measurement and it makes little sense to use HAPC with such a small number of periods.

[4] 'An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.' [Inglehart 1981: 881]

[5] 'The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved, for, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years.' [Inglehart 1981: 881]

When generation change occurs, post-materialist values are predicted to become the norm. Inglehart talks about the transformation of societies from 'traditional' to 'modern' (materialistic) and 'post-modern' (post-materialistic).

We are aware of the fact that Inglehart's post-materialist values and modernisation theory has generated criticism since it was introduced.[6] Critics of the theory can be grouped into two major categories: the first line of criticism concerns whether modernisation and value changes have really occurred and whether they have occurred at the same pace; the second thread is focused on methodological and measurement issues relating to the way in which values are operationalised and measured. Rokeach [1973] was one of the first to criticise Inglehart's work by pointing to the 'ahistorical' character of Inglehart's theory. He argues that ' … the equality-freedom orientation underlying the ideologies or political orientations selected for study here, it may be argued, can surely not be generalized to ideologies that prevailed a thousand years ago or to those that might prevail a thousand years hence' [ibid.: 186]. On the other hand, Flanagan [1980, 1982] and Flanagan and Lee [2003] focus their criticism on methodological and measurement issues. Flanagan uses various survey data and analytical strategies to show the drawbacks of modernisation theory as developed and tested by Inglehart. Inglehart [1982] has responded to this criticism and tried to refute Flanagan's arguments. Van Deth [1983] is another scholar who raises measurement issues in the discussion of Inglehart's theory, criticising Inglehart's choice of items and time unreliability in response. Also, Hadenius and Teorell [2005] claim that there is no clear-cut distinction between correlation and casual effects in Inglehart and Wetzel's model.

The role of socialisation in shaping values is one of the main elements of Inglehart's modernisation theory. This aspect did not escape the critics either. Duch and Taylor [1993, 1994] tried to prove that socialisation and economic hardship during the socialisation period do not play as great a role in shaping values as Inglehart argued in his theory. Education, in their opinion, is the main determinant of value change. Inglehart and his colleague Abramson [1994] has responded to this criticism by arguing that Duch and Taylor do not work with cohorts that were born before the Second World War or were socialised and lived close to or during that time and could have experienced economic and social hardship.

Savelyev [2016] confirmed some of Inglehart's assumptions relating to socialisation and economic and population development. He proved that 'the ob-

[6] One of the authors of this article published an article for Czech readers already in 2000, in which he criticised the method of measuring post-materialism and in which he summarised the fundamental methodological criticism of international scholars [see Rabušic 2000]. Datler, Jagodzinski and Schmidt [2013: 908], who tested the validity of Inglehart's theories, maintain as far as the post-materialist index is concerned that 'the discussion of the index would fill a whole methodological textbook of insightful criticism and intriguing counterarguments'.

served change in materialist values towards post-materialist in either West European or post-socialist societies is entirely due to demographic turnover with control for education was not confirmed' [ibid.: 283]. He also demonstrated that the spread and intensity of post-materialist and materialist values in Western and Central European European countries is determined by both cohort replacement and the within-cohort component effect.

Haller [2002: 152] points to three major critical issues relating to Inglehart's theory of modernisation: 'the relevance of theoretical assumptions; the problem of the definition and measurement of concepts; and the distinction between different levels of aggregation and analysis'. One of the main methodological problems he draws attention to is the misleading assumption that the aggregate-level effects are also found at the individual level.

Despite these criticisms, we have decided to reflect on Inglehart's work and to a certain extent use in our analyses the same procedures that Inglehart and his co-authors did in their work. We believe that results obtained in this way can have their own cognitive relevance and that they will allow us to assess whether the value trajectories that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have followed over the past 25 years and continue to follow are similar to those in Western Europe countries. Datler, Jagodzinski and Schmidt [2013: 922], after all, concluded at the end of their critical analysis of Inglehart's methodology that 'owing to Ronald Inglehart we have an important theory of value change which helps us to understand the ongoing changes in attitudes and behavior in the west and east. His theory makes relatively clear predictions about what will happen in countries like China or India if the economic growth should continue'.

Gender and gender roles

Modernisation theory assumes that the perception of gender roles will change in the process of modernisation. Inglehart and Norris [2003: 10] argue that 'human development brings changed cultural attitudes toward gender equality in virtually any society that experiences the various forms of modernization linked with economic development'. The causes are well known: the level of women's education in Western European countries increased significantly in the second half of the 20th century; women also became increasingly involved in the paid labour market. This made women more economically and socially independent, which had a profound impact on their identity and life goals: unlike previous generations, marriage and procreation are not key points in their adult life.[7] The

[7] In this context, demographers talk about a second demographic transition, which has manifested as increasing unmarried cohabitation, a deep drop in marriage and fertility rates, and a rise in divorce rates.

traditional family model has changed from male breadwinner to dual-earning model. In the sphere of values, a systematic shift from traditional values towards more egalitarian gender roles has been observed.

The modernisation process had a different effect on gender roles in the former communist countries than in the West. The role of women and their equal position were among the most important elements of communist ideology. Since the broadly-based economy and the development of its industries in these countries needed a sizeable labour force, women helped fill this need in the second half of the 20th century. The female employment rate was (and still is) relatively high. Women also studied in larger numbers at high schools, so the share of women with a complete secondary education gradually increased. Despite these structural modernisation factors, however, the roles of women in everyday life did not change much, and the male breadwinner model persisted: the man earned money, and the woman, in addition to having a full-time job, still took full care of the household and children; this has been called the women's double-shift model. Marriage was the predominant form of partnership. Thus, despite modernising structural factors at the societal level, the perception of gender roles remained traditional in the communist countries.

In the 1990s, following the political and economic changes and the expansion of tertiary education in CEE countries, the high levels of women's education and high employment rates started to change the gender climate. Feminist influences and patterns from Western countries significantly contributed to this. Women were more widely heard in society, and gender roles and gender equity increasingly became part of the media discourse.

Individual-choice norms

In the theory of modernisation, the modernisation process goes hand in hand with the lesser influence of various institutions on the formation of individual norms, attitudes, and values. Therefore, in a (post)modern society in which individual freedom and decision-making are highly appreciated values, the justification for a certain behaviour may differ from the traditional justification. Thus, according to the theory of modernisation, people in post-modern societies can decide for themselves – without any social pressure – whether they approve of, for instance, abortion, homosexuality, divorce, or casual sex. Further, Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart [2017: 1314] hypothesise that the members of high-income societies experience an intergenerational shift from 'pro-fertility norms' (emphasising traditional gender roles and stigmatising any sexual behaviour not connected with reproduction) to 'individual-choice norms' (supporting gender equality and tolerance of non-traditional behaviour such as homosexuality) – and that this shift is currently occurring with exceptional speed and transforming the politics of gender and sexual orientation in high-income societies.

Generations and generational differences in values

One of the main assumptions of modernisation theory is that the profound transformation of value structures and value preferences is a process in which important roles are played by the level of socioeconomic development and by a country's cultural legacy and its norms. Since every society is made up of a set of different generations that have been socialised in different socioeconomic conditions and different cultural milieus during their formative years, it is obvious that in times of dynamic social change the generational composition of the population will influence the perception of existing social norms and the attitudes towards these norms. As social change (modernisation) progresses, new value preferences – stemming from generational replacement – will prevail, while the original ones will fade away with the outgoing generations.

In the current literature, the contemporary living population is divided into four birth cohorts: veterans, baby boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y. These cohorts share a birth time as well as common traits that come from the significant life events that they have experienced in common and that shape their values. Individuals born between 1900 and 1945 are referred to as 'veterans'. The group of 'baby boomers' is defined as those born between 1946 and 1959. 'Generation X' are people born between 1960 and 1980. 'Generation Y' (also called Millennials) are people born between 1981 and 2000 [Hernaus and Pološki Vokić 2014].[8] It is assumed that the characteristics of members in each group influence the way they view the world – social relationships, the family, work ethic, and behaviour – as well as their motivations, communication preferences, and how they manage change [e.g. Kupperschmidt 2000; Domeyer 2006; Durkin 2007; Glass 2007; Cates 2010; Venus 2011].

Veterans (also known as the silent generation) were shaped by both world wars and the Great Depression in the 1930s. They were born between 1900 and 1945. The wars and crisis events formed their beliefs. They place great emphasis on family values and they tended to stay in one job throughout their working life [PrincetonOne 2013].

Baby boomers (born 1946 to 1959) are named after the period of new prosperity that followed the Second World War, when the worldwide baby boom occurred. Western baby boomers created the 'hippie' culture in which, among other things, new norms of partnership and sexuality were formed. This generation brought about the protests of 1968. Eastern European baby boomers were born in the time of radical political and economic change from capitalism and democracy to communism and totalitarianism, during which communists seized power and nationalised private enterprises and companies. Czechoslovakia, Poland, and

[8] The next generation is called 'Generation Z' (people born after year 2000). Since it is a value-evolving generation still in its formative period, we do not consider this generation in our paper.

Yugoslavia had protests, mainly against the lack of freedom of speech and the violation of civil rights.

Generation X is represented by those born between 1960 and 1980. They are also called the 'Divorce Generation' and the 'Slacker Generation' [e.g. Hernaus and Pološki Vokić 2014]. Its members have borne the full weight of the second demographic transition, characterised by a decrease in nuptiality and an increase in unmarried cohabitation, a decrease in fertility and an increase in divorce. In CEE countries, on the other hand, this generation brought about the collapse of the communist regimes [PrincetonOne 2013]. Members of this generation experienced in full the dismantling of communism and its economic system.

Generation Y (Millennials) is represented by people born between 1981 and 2000. Generations X and Y differ culturally and especially in the timing of different stages/phases of life. They seem to have very different priorities and needs [Hernaus and Pološki Vokić 2014]. Generation Y grew up in a time of globalisation and the internet and in CEE countries were also the first to grow up in a time of freedom compared to previous recent generations. So far, this generation is relatively the most educated and technically proficient. Its members were brought up as self-confident individuals who place high demands on themselves and others. This may have to do with their postponement of life events at the family level (childbearing, marriage/partnership) and a later entry into the labour market.

Country context

The main aim of our paper is to compare the development of value preferences in CEE countries in the context of the modernisation developments that took place after 1990. In order to have a more complete picture of the development of these values, we compare developments in CEE countries with those in Western countries. As our analysis is based on data from international quantitative research, at the time of writing this article we were somewhat limited in the country selection by data availability. We needed countries for which we had research data covering the required period, from 1991 to 2017.[9] For this reason, we chose the Czech Republic,, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania as the proxies for CEE countries. For the Western countries, we chose Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and Austria because we have the necessary data and because they represent two different types of welfare regimes as conceptualised by Esping-Andersen [1990].[10]

[9] The reasons we work with the period from 1991 to 2017 are explained in the next part of the text.

[10] Sweden is a proxy for the Nordic regime (or the social democratic welfare-state regime). In this type of welfare regime public benefits are instituted as social rights and thus social insurance is universal, egalitarian, and relatively generous. This system emphasises maximising labour force participation and promotes gender equality and a large degree of income redistribution. France, the Netherlands, and Austria are proxies for a conserva-

Table 1. GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars) in CEE and Western countries in 1991 and 2017 (countries sorted by GDP in 1991)

	1991	2017
Czech Rep.	11 592	38 489
Slovakia	7 163*	30 907
Poland	5 913	30 152
Hungary	8 310	29 529
Romania	4 786	27 191

	1991	2017
Netherlands	21 732	55 347
Austria	20 110	54 637
Sweden	20 694	52 739
France	18 304	44 826

Source: https://data.worldbank.org/.
Note: * Reference year = 1992.

Given the way we conducted our exploratory analyses, we decided to limit the number of countries being compared. The Western countries we chose represent economically and culturally advanced societies, in which the process of post-modernisation is at a high level.[11]

Since 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been going through an intensive process of modernisation and their level of economic development and the standard of living of their inhabitants have been gradually increasing. However, the selected CEE countries were quite varied at the beginning of their modernisation process (after 1990): not only did they differ in their level of socioeconomic development (especially in their industrialisation levels), they also varied by the pace of modernisation they experienced (for an illustration of this, see Tables 1 and 2).

tive corporatist regime. This model encourages family-based assistance; the main mode of social assistance is based on the principal of subsidiarity. Corporations play a decisive role in social assistance by means of their various social insurance funds (old-age pension, health, unemployment, accident insurance). Social insurance therefore excludes non-working spouses. Family benefits tend to encourage motherhood. One could ask why we have not worked with Germany as Germany is regarded as the typical example (according to Esping-Andersen) of a corporatist welfare regime. The answer would be that Germany is a country where the distinction between former West and East Germany is still in many aspects present. For the clarity of our analyses we would have to distinguish between the two, which would increase the number of countries. For the same reason we have omitted Italy and Spain, which have a conservative welfare regime (but are sometimes referred to having the Mediterranean regime). The third welfare regime, the liberal (or Anglo-Saxon) model, is typical for the United Kingdom. Given its specificity and proximity to our CEE countries, we decided to exclude the UK from our analysis.

[11] An anonymous reviewer asked us what the comparison would have been like if other countries had been chosen. This is, of course, a very good question and we hope we shall be able to answer it in a future paper based on a fully integrated dataset for all waves and countries.

Table 2. Human Development Index (rank in brackets) in CEE and Western countries in 1991 and 2017

	1991	2017
Slovakia	0.734 [34]	0.854 [37]
Czech Rep.	0.726 [40]	0.888 [27]
Poland	0.711 [45]	0.868 [33]
Hungary	0.702 [48]	0.841 [44]
Romania	0.686 [54]	0.813 [55]

	1991	2017
Netherlands	0.834 [5]	0.932 [10]
Sweden	0.818 [9]	0.935 [8]
Austria	0.799 [16]	0.912 [20]
France	0.790 [18]	0.890 [27]

Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#.

In 1991 Czechia had the highest economic performance among CEE countries, as measured here by GDP in PPP, followed by Hungary and Slovakia (see Table 1). Over the next 25 years the situation changed. The Czech Republic still had the highest level of economic performance in 2017, followed by Slovakia and Poland. Hungary and Romania had the slowest paces of economic development and also the lowest GDP among the countries analysed here. Although these countries increased their GDP from 1991 to 2017 several times over, they are still quite behind the selected Western countries.[12]

CEE countries also differed by level of human development (see Table 2). In 1991 Slovakia (43) and the Czech Republic (40) ranked highest on the Human Development Index among CEE countries; in 2018 the highest rank among CEE countries was occupied by the Czech Republic (which was on a level similar to France) and Poland.[13] The difference between CEE and Western countries is not as great for this indicator as it is for GDP.

CEE countries also differed culturally in 1991, especially in the rate of religiosity (the populations of Romania, Poland, and Slovakia were the most religious; the Czech and Hungarian populations were the least so). There were also differences in the rate of gender equality, although it was relatively high in the public sphere in all CEE countries: this is a legacy of the communist regimes, in which gender equality was one of the (ideological) goals. Women were highly integrated in the labour market and they had universal access to education.[14] On

[12] However, we should bear in mind that these countries are among the most developed ones in the world.

[13] The cut-off points are an HDI of less than 0.550 for *low* human development, 0.550–0.699 for *medium* human development, 0.700–0.799 for *high* human development, and 0.800 or greater for *very high* human development. From this point of view, the CEE countries in 1991 had *high* human development (except for Romania, which had low human development). In 2018, all the CEE countries had *very high* human development.

[14] According to some scholars, CEE countries 'were in some dimensions forerunners in

the other hand, it was still primarily women who were doing the child-rearing and household chores. Although gender equality was vehemently emphasised rhetorically, everyday reality was quite different.

Data and methods

The source of our data is the European Values Study (EVS), which is a large international comparative longitudinal survey that measures the indicators of value change/consistency in Europe.[15] It has been carried out four times in many European countries: in 1991, 1999, 2008, and 2017. The data are well suited to our purpose because the survey's time series runs from 1991 to 2017, so we are able to follow the progress of the modernisation process over that period. In the CEE countries, 1991 can be seen as a certain base line, as the attitudes and values captured in this EVS wave represent value structures that more or less correspond to the value climate of the preceding communist society. In the subsequent waves (1999, 2008, and 2017), the degree of modernisation should become more visible.

The EVS uses a standardised questionnaire that covers a wide variety of topics,[16] including perceptions of life, gender roles, the family, religion, politics and society, national identity, and the environment. Questionnaire items make it possible to follow indicators that, according to Inglehart [1997] and Inglehart and Welzel [2005], are at the core of the modernisation process. In each country, a random probability sample scheme is used, and the sample is representative of the population aged 18 and older.[17] The dataset was provided by the Data Archive for Social Sciences (DAS) of the GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences; *data for 2017 come from the second release.*

Our article is based on the central claim of Inglehart's modernisation theory that 'economic development is linked with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes in culture and social and political life' [Inglehart and Baker 2000: 21]. It is also based on results by Inglehart [1977, 1990, 1997] and Inglehart and Welzel [2005] that showed that 'high levels of economic and physical security

terms of promoting equality' (see https://freepolicybriefs.org/tag/gender-inequality-index/).

[15] For further details, see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/.

[16] The methodology of data collection and questionnaire formation are quite strict and standardised at the international and national levels so that the comparability among countries and between waves is ensured.

[17] As happens in surveys, despite our adherence to sampling procedures designed to ensure representativeness, the datasets in all waves were slightly biased; accordingly, we applied weighting schemes. We used post-stratification weights, based on the structure of the population with respect to age, gender, education, and region. The weighting of the samples was also undertaken in other participating countries in accordance with the EVS's centrally set methodological rules.

are conducive to a shift from materialist to post-materialist values – and that this shift tends to make people more favorable to important social changes' [Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart 2017: 1314]. Since CEE countries have been undergoing dynamic economic and human development since 1990, we are interested in determining whether in the cultural sphere, that is, in the field of value preferences, these 'predictable changes' have been taking place. We monitor whether values are changing from traditional to secular-rational and from survival to self-expression.

Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart [2017] work with both six- and three-item indexes of individual-choice norms, which include items measuring the acceptance of gender equality on the one hand and the acceptance of divorce, abortion, and homosexuality on the other.[18] Given the diversity of meaning among the items, we decided to work with two separate categories of indexes: one measuring gender roles at both the individual and the societal level and one measuring individual-choice norms. We argue that the gender role items used in the EVS questionnaire[19] measure attitudes towards gender roles and they do not reflect individual-choice norms.[20] These indexes were used separately in our analysis and we did not entirely follow Inglehart and his colleagues' analytical strategy – they used the six-item index in cross-sectional analyses and the three-item index in time-series analyses.

Results

Post-materialism

According to Inglehart and Welzel [2005], socioeconomic development is crucial, as it has an impact on people's existential conditions and their perception. They argue that socioeconomic development impacted modern societies in two phases: (1) industrialisation, which triggered cultural change by means of rationalisation, centralisation, bureaucratisation, and secularisation, and (2) post-industrialism, which led to an increasing emphasis on individualism, which is to say, an emphasis on individual freedom to make decisions about one's own life and about one's personal development. Post-materialist values are spreading, as is an emphasis on individual autonomy.

To track the evolution of post-materialism, we use Inglehart's operationalisation, which is based on two questions. Respondents are asked to choose the

[18] These three items (acceptance of divorce, abortion, and homosexuality) were used by Inglehart and his colleagues in their analysis [see Inglehart et al. 2017].

[19] These items are also used in other internationally recognised studies such as ESS, GGS or PPA.

[20] See, for example, Beere [1990] or M. van der Horst [2014] for more on gender roles and attitudes towards gender roles.

Figure 1. Share of post-materialists by country 1991–2017



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.

first and second most important aims for their countries within the next ten years: Maintaining order in the nation, Giving people more say in important government decisions, Fighting rising prices, and Protecting freedom of speech. Respondents who choose items 2 and 4 indicate are 'post-materialists'; those who choose 1 and 3 are 'materialists'. A 'mixed' group captures any other combination.

In accordance with modernisation theory, we assume that (1) the share of post-materialists will gradually increase from 1991 to 2017 in CEE countries and that (2) it will remain lower than in Western countries. However, the difference should become smaller, as the CEE countries analysed here have become members of the European Union and that membership should have an unmistakably positive economic and political effect. We can also expect that (3) based on the socialisation hypothesis we will observe generational differences in post-materialism in which the youngest generations will be more post-materialistic than the oldest one. The distribution of post-materialism is presented in Figure 1.

As expected, the proportion of post-materialists in the CEE countries was low in 1991 and ranged between 4% and 10%, with the lowest value in Hungary (4%) and the highest in Poland (10%). In the Western countries analysed, the share was higher, from 23% in Sweden to 33% in the Netherlands. However, by 2017 the curves considerably differed in the two groups of countries. In CEE countries (except Romania), in line with the modernisation theory, we see an increase in post-materialism: from a moderate level in Slovakia (from 6% to 10%) and in the Czech Republic (6% to 13%), to a considerable level in Hungary (17%) and especially high in Poland (to 26%). Interestingly, in the CEE countries, the share of 'mixed' people remained relatively stable (at 55%–60%) between 1991 and 2017, so the increase in post-materialism was at the expense of a reduction in materialism. This is also proved by Inglehart's Percentage Difference Index (PDI), which is calculated as the difference between the proportion of post-materialists and materialists. PDI values are shown in Table 3. The higher the value of this index, the higher the

Table 3. Percentage Difference Index in CEE countries (the share of post-materialists minus the share of materialists)

	1991	1999	2008	2017
Czech Rep.	–26.3%	–15.6%	–18.6%	–13.2%
Hungary	–43.5%	–48.1%	–25.7%	–10.9%
Poland	–25.1%	–29.3%	–30.1%	10.1%
Romania	–37.5%	–38.1%	–34.7%	–21.6%
Slovakia	–33.3%	–41.9%	–22.4%	–21.9%

Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.

growth of post-materialists at the expense of materialists. In all the countries the PDIs changed significantly between 1991 and 2017: for example, in the Czech Republic in 1991 the proportion of post-materialists was 26 percentage points lower than the proportion of materialists; in 2017 it was only 13%. In Poland we find that this index went from –25% to + 10%, which means that in 2017 the share of post-materialists outnumbered the share of materialists by 10 percentage points.

In the Western countries, the trend in the proportion of post-materialists was unstable. The main finding, however, is that in the 1991–2017 period the share of post-materialists – except in the Netherlands – remained essentially the same in these countries, but the trajectories of development were different and fluctuating. In France, Austria, and Sweden (but not in the Netherlands), the share of post-materialists dropped in 2008 as a consequence of an economic crisis that affected the developed world, during which economic performance fell and unemployment increased. The theory of post-materialism takes this fluctuation into account. Inglehart admits that strong short-term fluctuations in economic development (short-term crises) can influence materialistic/post-materialistic attitudes [Inglehart 1981]. In these three countries, after 2008, the share of post-materialists rebounded in 2017, but it reached only the level observed in 1991. The situation in the Netherlands is, surprisingly, completely different. There was a decrease in the share of post-materialists, from 33% in 1991 to 18% in 2017. Moreover, during the crisis in 2008, the proportion of post-materialists did not decrease but slightly increased. We do not yet have an explanation for this trend and neither do our Dutch colleagues.[21]

Interestingly, in the CEE countries the 2008 economic crisis did not de facto translate into a decrease in post-materialists (a slight decrease is observed, but it is in the standard error range). What is surprising is the big increase in the proportion of post-materialists in Poland between 2008 (7%) and 2017 (26%). In

[21] Personal communication by email with Loek Halman on 7 February 2020.

Figure 2a. Share of post-materialists by HDI in 1991



Figure 2b. Share of post-materialists by HDI in 2017



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. HDI from http://hdr.undp.org/en/data# (see our Table 2) and for the purpose of this model the HDI values were multiplied by 100.

this respect, Poland reached a level comparable with that of Western European countries, although its GDP was approximately three times lower in 2017. It is likely that the fact that Poles greatly profited from their EU membership, which led to an improved standard of living and an overall sense of economic security, translated into their post-materialist attitudes. In addition, economic development is visible even to the casual observer in Poland: the appearance of cities and landscapes has obviously improved since 1991, which might also contribute to post-materialist feelings. It is likely that similar processes took place in Hungary, where the share of post-materialists had also increased substantially by 2017.

Compared to Poland (and to some extent Hungary), the share of post-materialists in the Czech Republic and Slovakia is lower than might have been expected given their GDP and HDI levels. This most likely reflects the fact that Czechs and Slovaks had high expectations for a rapid increase in their standard of living after 1991. Although the standard of living has objectively increased, the reference framework for these two populations is the standard of living of their neighbouring countries, Germany and Austria (where it is very high). Czechs and Slovaks may therefore lean more towards materialism than post-materialism.

The theory of post-materialism assumes that with the overall humanistic development, the proportion of post-materialists in the population will also increase. We examined the data to see if this is the case. We use aggregated data from the Human Development Index (see Table 2) and the share of post-materialists in the population in 1991 and 2017. The results are shown in Figures 2a and 2b.

In 1991 there was a clear difference between the two groups of countries. The R-squared value (0.87) says that the linear model is a good approximation of

reality,[22] and the model says that as HDI increases the proportion of post-materialists also clearly increases. The parameters of the regression line say that with an increase in HDI by one unit, the proportion of post-materialists will increase by 1.9%.

In 2017 the strength of the HDI's influence on the share of post-materialists was lower. Over time, the trend in CEE countries has converged overall with that in Western countries and the linear trend is no longer so clear (the R-squared has fallen to 0.33). If we model the relationship between HDI and post-materialism with a regression line (which is doubtful in this case), then the linear model says that with an increase in HDI by one unit, the proportion of post-materialists will increase by 0.9% only.

Generally speaking, these results could suggest that the pace of post-materialist growth in the population might tend to slow down once a certain level of humanistic development is reached. However, according to Inglehart, we should observe the opposite: he predicted in 1990 that as a result of modernisation, 'other things being equal, we will witness a long term trend towards post-materialist values as one generation replaces another' [Inglehart 1990: 87]. However, Figure 1 shows that this is not the case, since the post-materialist rates in Western countries remained essentially the same between 1991 and 2017.

In accordance with Inglehart's socialisation hypothesis, are there different proportions of post-materialists in the generations defined above? In other words, how is the development of post-materialism reflected in generational change? In line with the previous delineation, we follow the development of post-materialism in four generations separately in each country. Figure 3 presents the cross-generational differences in post-materialism in each country.

In the CEE countries (except Poland), in accordance with the theory of socialisation, the youngest generation, Generation Y (1981–2000), had the highest proportion of post-materialists in 2017 among all the generations analysed. In Poland, it was Generation X (1960–1980). It is also true that in all CEE countries the oldest generation, the Veterans (born before 1945), had the lowest proportion of post-materialists. However, there are certain differences among CEE countries: in Hungary and Poland there was a steep increase in the rate of post-materialism in all generations after 1999. In Romania and Slovakia, there was a low and steady share of post-materialism in all generations, except Generation Y. In the Czech Republic, there was a downward trend in post-materialism in the oldest generation and a small (almost negligible) increase among baby boomers and Generation Y.

As in the CEE countries, in the Western countries the youngest generation, Generation Y, has the highest proportion of post-materialists (expect in the Netherlands), while the oldest generation (Veterans) has the lowest proportion.

[22] We are aware that nine cases (countries) are not an ideal number for a regression analysis. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain more data when we were writing this paper.

Figure 3. Post-materialists by generation 1991–2017 (%)—first part



Figure 3. Post-materialists by generation 1991–2017 (%)—second part



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. Difference to 100% are those who are materialists or mixed. Data for Generation Y only for 2008 and 2017 (no or low number of cases for 1991 and 1999).

However, the data for 1991–2017 do not show what Inglehart [1990: 87] suggested – namely, differences between the value priorities of individual generations and their relative stable positions. Moreover, the data do not reflect the trends that he predicted would result from the influence of the economic crisis: he argued that after an economic crisis, which leads to a decrease in the proportion of post-materialists in all generations, the trends return to their original path.[23] The only country in which post-materialism increased again after the 2008 crisis was Austria and – but only partly – France. Among CEE countries, this trend applies only to Poland and, to some extent, Hungary.

Summing up the above trends in the development of post-materialism in terms of modernisation theory, it can be stated that data from CEE countries partially confirm its validity:

(1) With the economic and social modernisation of these countries, the share of post-materialists gradually increased, so that the levels were higher in 2017 than in 1991. However, given the dynamic modernisation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as indicated by both GDP and HDI levels, we would expect much higher proportions of post-materialists than 13% and 10%, respectively, in 2017.

(2) In Western countries, despite the economic and humanistic development, the share of post-materialists did not increase significantly between 1991 and 2017, and the values in 2017 were close to those in 1991 (Sweden 23% : 24%, Austria 26% : 24%, France 25% : 23%); in the Netherlands it even decreased (33% : 18%). The share of post-materialists in CEE countries were on average as expected, generally lower than in the Western European countries. However, the difference gradually decreased. In 1991, the proportion of post-materialists was on average 7% in the CEE countries and 27% in the Western countries – a difference of 20 percentage points; in 2017, the shares were 15% in the CEE countries and 23% in the Western European countries – an 8 percentage point difference.

[23] Inglehart [1990] found this from data that included an economic crisis in the mid-1970s (caused by the 1973 oil crisis).

The big question here is whether measuring post-materialism with a 4-item battery does not mean that, from a certain level of economic and social/cultural development, the shares of post-materialists in the entire population will become saturated and stabilise at 25–30% and will never reach a higher level.

(3) Our longitudinal CEE country data partially confirmed the assumption of intergenerational differences. We argue, however, that intergenerational differences may be due not only to the combination of population turnover but also to a period-contextual influence and a change in educational levels.[24] The oldest generations in CEE countries, born before 1945, had the lowest proportion of post-materialists (except Slovakia), and the proportion in these countries remained more or less constant in the 1991–2017 period (Poland is an exception). The youngest generation, born in 1981–2000, had the highest proportion of post-materialists (but not in Poland). Slovakia behaves differently: the share of post-materialists does not differ between generations and there was no increase in the share of post-materialists in the youngest generation between 2008 and 2017, but a decrease – from the relatively high level of 20% in the crisis year 2008 to 16% in 2017.

(4) The question we need to ask over our longitudinal data is whether Inglehart's optimism that the trend towards post-materialism in highly developed countries is universal, strong, and permanent is valid. Swedish, French, and Austrian EVS data show that even in the youngest generations the level of post-materialism did not reach above 36% (Sweden; France 30%) Moreover, Dutch data go against all modernisation assumptions, because the share of post-materialists in all the generations there has been gradually decreasing since 1991 and stabilised at approximately 20% in 2017. In 2017 post-materialists outnumbered materialists by a mere 5 percentage points in Austria, by 2.5 in France, and by 1.4 in the Netherlands. Only in Sweden was this difference noticeable – at 25 percentage points.

Attitudes towards gender roles

Modernisation theory asserts that human development is associated with cultural shifts, which include, among others, cultural attitudes towards gender roles and gender equality. In any society that goes through modernisation based on economic development, 'modernization brings systematic, predictable changes in gender roles' [Inglehart and Norris 2003: 10]. The perception of and attitudes towards appropriate male and female roles in the family and society have in re-

[24] The expansion of higher education in former communist countries, particularly between 1999 and 2017, was quite substantial. According to OECD data, the share of the population with tertiary education aged 25–34 years rose from 11–14% in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 1991 to 30–43% in 2017. In Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden the corresponding figures were 30–32% in 1999 and 40–48% in 2017. See https://data.oecd.org/eduatt/population-with-tertiary-education.htm.

Table 4. Gender Inequality Index in 2000 and 2017

	1995	2017		1995	2017
Slovakia	0.248	0.187	Sweden	0.090	0.043
Czech Rep.	0.252	0.133	Netherlands	0.114	0.044
Poland	0.258	0.128	Austria	0.186	0.078
Hungary	0.322	0.270	France	0.199	0.058
Romania	0.471	0.316			

Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data#.
Note: Countries are ranked according to rates in 1995. In 1995, the lowest value in the world was calculated for Sweden (0.090), while in 2017 it was for Switzerland (0.040).

cent decades changed in many countries to such an extent that we could be so bold as to talk about a gender revolution. These changes include decreasing support for a rigid division of labour between husbands and wives, rising acceptance of married women's work, and a certain social pressure for men to increase their involvement in tasks traditionally performed by women such as caring for children and housework [Kalmijn 2003]. In other words, modernisation has had an eroding effect on traditional norms and created space for emerging new ones.

The Gender Inequality Index (GII) maps the effect of new female roles at a macro level. As a composite index, it is used to quantify the loss of achievement within a country that results from gender inequality.[25] It ranges from 0 (no inequality in the included dimensions) to 1 (complete inequality) [Human Development Report 2010]. The GII is interpreted as a percentage and indicates the percentage of potential human development lost as a result of gender inequality.[26] The trends in GII between 1995 (the earliest data we have) and 2017 are presented in Table 4.

The table shows that the CEE countries had higher values on the Gender Inequality Index in both compared years than the Western countries did. Nevertheless, in all the countries gender inequality decreased between 1995 and 2017,

[25] The index was introduced in the Human Development Report 2010. It uses three dimensions to measure opportunity costs: reproductive health, empowerment, and labour market participation. The reproductive health dimension has two indicators: the maternal mortality ratio and the adolescent fertility rate, which measures early childbearing (teenage pregnancy). Empowerment is measured by two indicators: the share of parliamentary seats held by each sex and higher levels of educational attainment (secondary education and above). Labour market participation is measured by women's participation in the work force.

[26] For example, in 2017 the GII was 0.043 in Sweden – indicating a 4% loss in potential human development due to gender inequality.

Figure 4. Agreement with the statement 'women really want a home and children' by country 1991–2017 (%)



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and the EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. This question was not asked in Austria in 1999 and in Sweden in 1991.
Note: Original 4-point scale. Categories 'agree strongly' and 'agree' recoded into 'agree'. The difference to 100% represents those who answered 'disagree'. Results in percentages.

as envisaged by the modernisation theory. Given that economic development (measured by GDP), human development (measured by HDI), and Gender Inequality (GII) indicate (see Tables 1, 2, and 5) the clear-cut existence of modernisation trends in CEE countries, we can expect also to see modernisation shifts in the domain of gender roles in our survey data.

To track trends in attitudes towards gender roles, we will use several indicators by which this phenomenon is usually measured. The first indicators measure conflicting gender roles (traditional vs modern) and look at how these conflicts are assessed at the individual level – for example, conflicts that may arise between work (public sphere) and the family (private sphere). The items are as follows: (1) *A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children* and (2) *When a mother works for pay, the child suffers.*[27] They were measured in the questionnaire using a 4-point scale, where 1 means fully agree and 4 means completely disagree. Figures 4 and 5 present the agreement rate for the two items for all countries and waves.[28]

The trends in the CEE countries since 1991 went in the expected direction. In 1991, the vast majority of the population believed in the dichotomy of work versus family – there was a clear preference for the idea that a woman needs a family and children: the highest share of agreement was found in Poland (94%);

[27] This question was phrased as follows in 1991, 1999, and 2008 as follows: *A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works*;, while in 2017 it read: *A child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.*

[28] Not all items were included in all waves. To illustrate development over time, we present only those items that were part of all waves.

Figure 5. Agreement with the statement 'a (preschool) child suffers when mother works' by country 1991–2017 (%)



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. This question was not asked in Austria in 1999.
Note: Original 4-point scale. Categories 'agree strongly' and 'agree' recoded into 'agree'. Difference to 100% represents those who answered 'disagree'. Results in percentages.

the lowest was in Romania (58%). Until 2017, these shares linearly declined, except in Romania and Slovakia, where the decrease had a different trajectory but still reached a lower level in 2017 than in 1991. Compared to Western European countries, however, CEE shares were considerably higher and by 2017 had still de facto only reached the level observed in Western countries in 1991, which is somewhat surprising. The most unexpected result is in Poland, where the biggest decrease was observed, even though there is a strong political emphasis on the family there. It is evident here that in this respect the gender revolution in CEE countries still has rather a long way to go.[29]

On the other hand, when we look at agreement with the statement 'the child suffers when the mother works' (see Figure 5), trends in the CEE countries are following a path towards gender equality: we see that the relatively high agreement rates in 1991 noticeably (de facto linearly) had decreased by 2017 (except in Romania, where the decline was not so straightforward). The feeling that a child suffers when its mother works was thus substantially weaker in 2017 than it was in 1991 and it had grown closer to the levels in Western countries.[30] However, the

[29] We also looked at possible differences in agreement between men and women. For example, we found that in 2017, in four countries (Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, and Poland), women agreed less with this statement than men did. There are no significant differences between men and women in the other countries.
[30] Again, we checked for possible differences between men and women. The results in 2017 show that there are differences between men and women: in France or Hungary, women agree more than men do that a child suffers when the mother works; in Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia, men agree more than women do.

question here is to what extent the very fact that in the CEE countries, generally speaking, families need women to have paid employment in order to ensure a certain standard of living of the household is the cause of the recorded disagreement with the statement or whether respondents are really persuaded that female paid work and child rearing are compatible. The linear downward trend in Western European countries in Figure 5 is not surprising and is another indicator of the level of gender revolution.

As both items are part of a more general gender role indicator, we decided to combine these two items into an indicator that distinguishes those who adhere to 'traditional gender roles' from those who embrace 'modern gender roles' or have 'mixed attitudes'.[31] From a semantic point of view, this index reflects respondents' attitudes towards a woman's paid work in the labour market and her role in the household. Figure 6 presents the share of those who endorse traditional gender roles, which is to say, those who think that women should take care of the family and not work. In the CEE countries, the proportions of proponents of traditional roles were relatively high in 1991 (with a wide range of difference: between 83% in Poland and 48% in Romania) compared to the Western countries, but after 1991 there is an almost linear decline, with a slight slowdown in the trend between 2008 and 2017. The drop between 1991 and 2017 is quite considerable. The proportion of proponents of traditional roles in 2017, at 30–45%, approached the 2017 rates in the Western European countries, which ranged between 10% and 30%. An exception to this model is Romania, which started in 1991 at a relatively low level (at 48%, the lowest level), so the downward trend by 2017 was not so steep (34%). Voicu and Voicu [2002] and Voicu [2008] argue that the presence of women in the labour market was a common reality during the communist regime as the government encouraged women to enter into paid employment and provided support for families, and for women especially, by ensuring enough childcare facilities. Thanks to this, the gender attitudes of Romanians were close to some Western European countries at the beginning of the 1990s. The situation changed after the fall of the communist regime when the government encouraged the transfer of childcare responsibilities from the state to the family and the number of childcare facilities decreased during the transition period. Romania, like other CEE countries, still lacks measures that could enable women to combine paid employment and a family, such as access to affordable childcare facilities and flexible working arrangements. This lack might have led to the withdrawal of support for female participation in paid work.

On the other hand, Poland is an example of how socioeconomic modernisation is reflected in attitude and value changes. The decline of the traditional gen-

[31] The exact algorithm for building the indicator is as follows: all those who answered 'agree' to both items were recoded as having traditional gender role attitudes; all those who disagreed with both were recoded as having modern gender role attitudes; the rest (any combination of agree/disagree on these two items) were recoded as having mixed attitudes.

Figure 6. Index of traditional gender role attitudes by country 1991–2017 (%)



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. Some questions were not asked in Austria in 1999 or in Sweden in 1991.
Note: Indicator with 3 categories. The difference to 100% represents those who have modern and mixed gender role attitudes. Results in percentages.

der model in Poland between 1991 and 2017 is breath-taking (from 83% down to 45%). In Western countries, the differences between countries are also sizable and there has been a downward linear trend. In 2017, the share of respondents who adhered to the traditional gender role model was the lowest in Sweden (11%) and the Netherlands (15%). Austria, at 31%, was close to the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2017.[32]

As far as intergenerational differences in the index of gender roles are concerned (see Figure 7), we made several observations. (1) There are generational differences in all CEE countries. The generation born before 1945 has the most traditional views, while Generation Y (Millennials) has modern views on conflicting gender roles. (2) Czechs and Slovaks have similar generational trajectories between 1991 and 2008. In 2017, however, the attitudes of all generations in Slovakia grew closer; the intergenerational gap in the Czech Republic remained unchanged in 2017, but the linear decline stopped. (3) In Poland, there was a strong decline in traditional gender attitudes in all generations in the 1991–2008 period. After that, in the two oldest generations, traditional gender attitudes gained

[32] We also checked for differences between men and women. Generally speaking, they were relatively small in all the countries and were no greater than 10% [percentage points]. In 1991, men in the Czech Republic and France outnumbered women with traditional gender role responses by 9% (Czech Republic) and 7% (France). In 2017, the biggest differences between male and female respondents were in Austria (10%), Poland (9%), and Sweden (8%). In Sweden, the difference was between 15% of men agreeing and 7% of women; in Poland it was between 49% of men and 40% of women. The only country in which women held substantially more traditional attitudes in 2017 was Hungary, where women were more traditional by 7 percentage points (45%:38%).

Figure 7. Traditional gender role attitudes at the country level and by generation 1991–2017 (%)—first part



Figure 7. Traditional gender role attitudes at the country level and by generation 1991–2017 (%)—second part



Source: EVS integrated 1981–2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. Data for Austria 1999 and Sweden 1991 not collected. Data for Generation Y only for 2008 and 2017.

strength, possibly due to the powerful ideological rhetoric of the ruling Law and Justice Party, as it endorses moral values linked to Polish traditionalism and the Catholic Church, which vigorously promotes traditional family values and opposes abortion, registered same-sex partnerships, and euthanasia. However, the youngest Polish generations maintained the downward trend. A similar pattern is found in Hungary. (4) In Romania, in contrast to the other CEE countries, there is no clear pattern and all the generations in 2017 moved closer to reaching relatively low values for traditional gender role attitudes.

In the Western European countries, the older generations have the highest share of traditional gender role attitudes. The two younger generations, with a very low proportion of respondents endorsing traditional gender role attitudes, are very similar in the Netherlands, Sweden, and France, though not in Austria. These results can be understood as an indicator that the Western generations born after 1960 have already internalised modern gender role attitudes in employment and family. From this point of view, it seems they are completing the gender revolution. The fact that female participation rates in the labour market (measured as the share of the female population aged 15+) in the Western countries analysed were gradually increasing in the 1991–2017 period surely contributed to this trend – the female employment rate in 2017 ranged between 50% (France) and 61% (Sweden). In the CEE countries, the highest female employment rates in 2017 were in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both about 53%), and the lowest was in Romania (48%).

In addition to gender attitudes towards employment and family, we can also use a set of indicators capturing attitudes towards gender segregation (gender stereotyping) at the societal level. Four items in the questionnaire measure this: (1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do; (2) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl; (3) On the whole, men make better business executives than women do; and (4) When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women. As these items were included only in

Figure 8. Agreement with various statements on gender segregation on societal level in 2017 (%)



Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.
Note: Original 4- or 5-point scale. The columns represent summaries of the response categories 'agree strongly' and 'agree'. The higher the agreement, the more traditional the attitude.

the 2017 EVS survey, we cannot provide the long-term trends. Nevertheless, the 2017 snapshot is very interesting. Figure 8 shows the distributions.

Within all these items measuring gender segregation on a societal level, there is a clear-cut difference between the CEE and the Western European countries. The populations of CEE countries have a much higher level of traditional gender attitudes (even stereotypes) than the Western countries do. Slovakia and Romania appear to be the most traditional, while surprisingly the least traditional seems to be Poland. In the Western European countries, there is a very low share of agreement with all of these statements; the low numbers in Sweden are very surprising. The fact that a significant proportion of respondents in the CEE countries think that men make better political leaders than women, that men should be favoured for jobs in times of high unemployment, and that men are better executives than women indicates that at a societal level people's minds are still

bound to a gender-stereotype model. It reflects the fact that in these countries, there are still few women active in political life and as managers in top positions.

A much larger proportion of respondents in the CEE countries than in the Western European countries agree that men should have priority in getting a job when jobs are scarce, suggesting that the breadwinner family model is still preferred. The lowest share of agreement is found for the item concerning the importance of university education for boys and girls. This view, we think, partly reflects the educational expansion in former communist countries (see footnote 24). Women have begun to study in large numbers at universities and the share of women with higher education in the labour market has also increased. This indicator raises the question of the relationship between values/attitudes and behaviour. Is a relatively low level of agreement with the idea that university education is more important for boys than girls a result of many more women studying at a university, or is it because attitudes towards girls' education have positively changed within families so girls are motivated and supported to study at a university? The expansion of tertiary education that took place in all post-socialist countries with various intensity can be regarded as one of the social forces that shape values and attitudes.[33] Duch and Taylor [1993] point out that each generation's experience of education in their formative years impacts their life attitudes and values and can be taken as an alternative explanation for intergenerational differences in values and attitudes.

As these and previous analyses show that populations in CEE countries are still more conservative in their gender attitudes than populations in Western countries, we can assume that there will be a bigger gender gap in CEE countries than in Western countries. Our results confirm this assumption. Neither of the aforementioned indicators exceeded the 10% difference between men's and women's responses in Western countries, which can be interpreted to mean that, at least verbally, men and women do not differ in these populations. In CEE countries, the situation is different.

(1) For all indicators, Slovak men significantly more often than Slovak women (both in statistical and substantive terms) agreed with the above statements (the difference between them was in each case greater than 10 percentage points and ranged between 13% and 24%).

(2) Men in all the CEE countries (except Romania) were more likely than women to think that *men make better political leaders than women do* (the difference ranged between 11% and 24%). Likewise, in all the CEE countries (including Romania), men are more likely than women to believe that men *make better business executives than women do* (here the difference ranged between 12% and 21%).

[33] Mannheim [1952] advanced the social force perspective and argued that an individual's formative years form the background to his or her experience of life and the world and shape a person's attitudes and values.

Figure 9. Index of gender segregation at a societal level in 2017 (means)



Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.
Note: The index encompasses a range of values from 0 to 100, where 0 means no societal segregation and 100 means full societal segregation. The Cronbach alpha in all the countries was at least 0.7.

In all the countries, the indicator also points to clear differences in attitudes between the oldest and youngest generations (see Figure 10). The youngest generations (e.g. Millennials) expressed less support for societal segregation than the oldest ones (e.g. Veterans).

(3) The attitudes of men and women do not differ (except in Slovakia) – in both the Western and the CEE countries – on the *importance of a university education for boys and girls*. Similarly, there is no difference (again except in Slovakia) in the attitudes towards who should have priority in getting a job when there is unemployment. On the whole, in all the countries, men and women have the same attitudes about education and work for men and women. In contrast, the CEE countries differ from the Western countries on the role of men and women in policy and management. As Figure 8 shows, however, gender stereotypes are, even in 2017, still much stronger in the CEE countries than in the Western ones.

Figure 10. Index of gender segregation at a societal level by generation (means)



Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.
Note: The index takes values from 0 to 100, where 0 means no societal segregation and 100 means societal segregation.

Based on these four items, we created an index ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 means that a respondent has no gender stereotypes on a societal level while 100 indicates total gender stereotypes. As various indicators reveal, the highest values for this gender segregation index are among the respondents from the former state-socialist countries (and mainly in Slovakia – see Figure 9); in the Western European countries, the average value of the index is below 20, thus indicating very low level of gender segregation, and this is reflected in the Western respondents' responses to all the gender indicators.

Figure 11. Justification of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce



Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.
Note: The sum of responses indicating a scale value of 8 to 10, which means justification.

Individual-choice norms

In this section we deal with individual-choice norms. According to Inglehart, three items are indicators of these norms: abortion, homosexuality, and divorce.[34] Respondents in the EVS study are asked whether they find these behaviours can be justified (referred to as acceptance further in the text).[35] We will not present the complete results of each item separately owing to spatial constraints here, but we will briefly present the trends, comparing 1991 and 2017 (see Figures 11 and 12).

There are clear differences between countries with regard to the level of acceptance of some behaviours. People in Romania, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia show the lowest level of acceptance (and in a sense also tolerance) of homosexuality, abortion, and/or divorce both in 1991 and 2017. It suggests that they retain tra-

[34] One might argue that 'divorce' is no longer a relevant indicator of post-modernism in the context of partnership behaviour. This objection could be based on the fact that countries in Europe have been registering considerably high divorce rates since 1991. Moreover, marriage rates have declined over the past three decades and cohabitation has become an important form of partnership that frequently replaces marriage. However, we believe that in a semantic perspective 'divorce' still symbolises the disintegration of a partnership, whether married or cohabitating. Therefore, like Inglehart, we use it in our analysis.

[35] The question was phrased as follows: *Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.* The items were measured on a 10-point scale, where a value of 1 means never justifiable and 10 means always justifiable.

Table 5. Individual-choice norms in 1991–2017 (index means)

	1991	1999	2008	2017
Czech Rep.	4.7	5.6	5.4	6.4
Slovakia	4.2	4.9	4.9	5.6
Hungary	4.2	3.3	4.6	4.7
Poland	3.1	3.7	3.5	4.3
Romania	3.8	3.4	3.5	3.3
Sweden	5.4	7.6	8.0	8.5
Netherlands	6.2	6.7	6.5	7.8
France	4.9	5.8	6.1	6.9
Austria	4.0	5.3	5.3	6.8

Source: EVS integrated 1981-2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018. Index takes values from 1 to 10 – a value of 1 means no support for individual-choice norms (traditional view) and a value of 10 means support for individual-choice norms (modern view).

Note: Countries are ranked by means in 2017.

ditional attitudes on this dimension of modernity. In contrast, people in Sweden and the Netherlands have very high levels of acceptance, which indicates (post) modern individual-choice attitudes. The Czech Republic, the most tolerant of the CEE countries in its views on these behaviours, is similar to Austria and France. These three countries are somewhere in the middle, which indicates mild modern individual-choice attitudes.

For more a comprehensive picture, we created an index based on these three items. Its scale ranges from 1 to 10: value 1 means no support for individual-choice norms (traditional view) and 10 means support for and tolerance of

Figure 12. Regression of the Human Development Index and the index of individual-choice norms in 1991 (panel A) and 2017 (panel B)



Source: EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.

Figure 13. Individual-choice norms index – acceptance – at the country level and by generations in 1991–2017 (means)—first part



Figure 13. Individual-choice norms index—acceptance—at the country level and by generations in 1991–2017 (means)—second part



Source: EVS integrated 1981-2008 and EVS 2nd release EVS Cross-Sectional Data 2018.

Note: The index takes values from 1 to 10, where a 1 means no justification (traditional view) and 10 means full justification (modern view). Data for Generation Y only for 2008 and 2017.

individual-choice norms (modern view). The average values of this index in each country and by wave are presented in Table 5. As was the case for individual items, we can, logically, observe clear differences between CEE and Western European countries. People in the CEE countries endorse traditional views (Czechia is the exception), while people in the Western countries favour modern views. Sweden has the highest support for modern individual-choice norms, while Romania has the highest support for traditional views. Views in the Czech Republic are very close to those in Austria and France. Support for modern individual-choice norms – in accordance with modernisation theory – increased in all countries between 1991 and 2017 except Romania, where it slightly decreased.

Human development, as measured by the HDI, quite clearly intervenes in the overall acceptance / non-acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. As Figure 12 shows, at the aggregate level, a higher degree of human development is also associated with a higher acceptance of these phenomena. This is particularly noticeable in 2017, when with each HDI increase of one tenth of a point (on a scale from 0 to 1), the index of individual-choice norms increases by 0.4 points on a scale from 1 to 10 (in 1991 it was 0.2).

As far as the generational differences are concerned (see Figure 13), they follow the expected pattern. The older people are (i.e. being a member of an older generation), the more traditional the individual-choice norms they support. And vice versa: the younger people are, the more modern the attitudes they hold.

Conclusion and discussion

In this exploratory article, we inquired into the effects of modernisation and intergenerational population change on value structures. We based our research on Inglehart's (and his colleagues') ideas about the relationships between the economic and social modernisation of societies and the culture shift conceptu-

alised as profound changes in people's value structures. To make our inquiry manageable, we focused on three dimensions of cultural shift: the development of post-materialism, trends in attitudes towards gender equality, and trends in individual-choice norms. An important dimension of our research was also to track whether the assumed value changes were in accordance with Inglehart's socialisation hypothesis that in modernising societies the youngest generations are primarily the bearers of new value priorities. Thanks to the longitudinal character of our data, we were able to look at different generations and check whether the younger generations in CEE countries, who were socialised and grew up after 1989 in a time of rapid economic and political changes, show higher levels of post-modern values than the generations socialised during the communist regime.

Our basic assumption was that given that the selected CEE countries have made relatively rapid progress in political and economic development since 1990, by 2017 we should be able to find attitudes and value structures in these countries that are relatively similar to ones that have been observed in the Western part of Europe. To put it simply, we wanted to see whether the value shifts in CEE countries have followed the modernisation path and copied the trends observed in Western European countries, and to examine whether Inglehart's modernisation theory can be applied to the former communist countries that have been developing from totalitarian states and command economies into standard democratic capitalist societies.

Does Inglehart's theory work in CEE countries? The answer is yes and no. The affirmative answer covers the assumption of the effects of intergenerational population change. In every sphere of cultural modernisation we analysed, i.e. post-materialism, gender roles, and individual-choice norms, we found differences in values and attitudes among generations: the older generations were always more traditional in their answers to survey questions than the younger generations. This was not only true in the CEE countries; we recorded the same trend in the Western European countries. Thus, one important assumption of modernisation theory cannot be refuted, which is that as social change (modernisation) progresses, new value preferences – resulting from generational replacement – will prevail, while the original preferences will begin to fade away with the outgoing generations.

As for the assumption that with socioeconomic modernisation come higher shares of post-materialism, more gender-egalitarian attitudes, and stronger support for individual-choice norms, the results are not so clear-cut. We saw that in the CEE countries, in line with modernisation theory, there was only a moderate increase in post-materialism between 1991 and 2017 in Slovakia (from 6% to 10%) and in the Czech Republic (6% to 13%), a considerable increase in Hungary (from 4% to 17%), and a large increase in Poland (from 10% to 26%). The exception was Romania, where the share of post-materialists remained low (from 7% to 10%). Nevertheless, the shares of post-materialists in the CEE countries in 2017 were still much lower than the shares in the Western countries, where they ranged

between 18% and 24% in 2017. However, in the Western countries, the trend in the proportions of post-materialists was unstable between 1991 and 2017 and the key finding is that the shares of post-materialists – with the exception of the Netherlands – remained essentially the same. In the Netherlands, the data indicate that level of post-materialism even decreased in the studied period by almost a half (from 33% to 18%).

The results for the Western European countries present an interesting finding: although the Western countries we analysed are among the most developed in the world, the share of post-materialism in these countries has not increased over the last 25 years, even though the indicators of socioeconomic development point to improvement. This raises an important question: Is the way that post-materialism is measured valid? Does the method of measurement suggest that, after a certain level of socioeconomic development, higher levels of post-materialism are not identified and the relationship between socioeconomic development and post-materialism loosens and is no longer valid? Figure 2b would strongly support this conclusion.

In the CEE countries, we found the predicted trend in attitudes towards the issues indicating gender equality. From 1991 to 2017, the initially very high proportions of people found to express traditional and gender-stereotypical attitudes de facto linearly decreased towards gender equality attitudes. Here, therefore, socioeconomic and value developments are moving in the expected direction. However, even in 2017, the CEE countries were far from reaching the level of gender-equality attitudes recorded in Western countries. In the Western countries, there was a linear decline in traditional gender attitudes in the 1991–2017 period, but the starting point in 1991 was already much lower than in the CEE countries. With a little exaggeration, we could even say that in 2017 the CEE countries reached the point where the Western countries had set out from in 1991. It is evident that in the CEE countries the gender revolution is still in progress. From a generational point of view, the survey data indicate that Western generations born after 1960 have already internalised modern gender-role attitudes and have thus more or less completed the gender revolution.

Within individual-choice norms indicated by attitudes towards homosexuality, abortion, and divorce we found – as with gender attitudes – clear differences between the CEE and the Western European countries. Although the support for modern individual-choice norms increased in all the CEE countries between 1991 and 2017 (except in Romania, where it slightly decreased), we still find that people tend to endorse traditional views (the Czech Republic is the exception). Among the Western countries, Sweden had the highest support for modern individual-choice norms in 2017. In this sphere of modernity, there seems to be a clear pattern: the more advanced countries are in terms of human development, the more they support individual-choice norms.

How should we understand our overall results? When we started our analysis, we expected to find considerable differences in attitudes and values between

East and West in 1991. This was confirmed. We also assumed that by 2017 the value differences between the Eastern and Western European countries would decrease and that there would be some convergence. That did not happen. We must agree with Inglehart, Ponarin and Inglehart [2017: 1317] who warned that '…in short, when a society attains high levels of existential security and people grow up taking survival for granted, rapid cultural changes can occur—but this happens with a multi-decade time lag between when secure conditions emerge and new norms predominate'. Even though the EVS has data covering a quarter of a century, it seems that that is still not enough time for the value structures of the former communist and the traditional democratic countries to draw closer together. It is true, as we have confirmed, that there are cultural differences between generations in societies. But a substantive change requires enough time for the attitudes and values of new generations to prevail in society. We agree with Esmer's [2007: 86] assertion that modernisation has indeed had an impact on values 'in a predicted direction, but the magnitude and occasionally even the direction of the influence will depend on cultural heritage'. Cultural legacies change through both intergenerational replacement and historical period influence. Savelyev [2016] has demonstrated that the post-materialist values observed in CEE countries (and not only) are determined more by both cohort replacement and within-cohort effects. Whether in CEE countries this involves intergenerational replacement or historical period influence must yet be demonstrated in further analyses. We argue that it is a combination of both intergenerational replacement and historical period influence.

Inglehart and Bakker [2000] were aware of this, noting that modernisation does not necessarily mean the homogenisation and convergence of cultures because cultural legacies have a role in the process. It is also important to bear in mind the fact emphasised by Diez-Nicholas [2002], who claim that new values are usually supported by the elites much sooner than they are by the masses (measured, for example, by education). We deliberately did not take this phenomenon into account in our analysis because it would have enormously increased the length of the paper. However, in a different analysis of long-term trends in EVS data we did register the effect of education. For instance, Fučík, Chromková Manea and Rabušic [2019] studied the normative aspect of motherhood and found that the share of agreement with the need for a woman to have children within the Czech female population decreases with increasing levels of education in all waves: the higher the level of education, the lower the proportion of agreement with the need for women to have children. This trend goes hand in hand with the importance of education for women and the influence of education on the emancipation and life aspirations of women. For men, this the trend was noticeable only in 1991; it was irregular in other waves and the difference between educational categories was not very large (except for 2017). Matejková and Chromková Manea [2019] checked for differences in preferred work attributes (external and internal) by education level in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and

found that people with a university education (regardless of gender) are more likely to prefer internal work characteristics, such as the opportunity to use one's initiative at work, the possibility to achieve something, and responsible work. These internal work attributes and their preference in the population are typical for Western countries and suggest a post-materialist interpretation accompanied by economic, political, and social development.

In our paper, we found that the Western and Eastern European countries we compared still differ in their value preferences – in some cases less, in others more – even though they are all members of the EU and are part of a globalisation process that should contribute to value homogenisation. In this light it is necessary to ask an important question: Which of the two theses of modernisation will be fulfilled over time – the classical one, which presupposed the convergence of industrial societies, or the opposite one formulated by Shmuel Eisenstadt [2000], who claims that modernisation development is moving towards 'multiple modernities', i.e. modernities that 'do share some common characteristics but that at the same time they develop great differences between them – not just local variations, but indeed differences with respect to the core characteristics of modernity' [Eisenstadt 2006: 199]. We cannot provide a clear answer at present. However, our results offer partial support for the classical theory of increasing similarity between CEE and Western countries. At the same time, however, we believe that in 2026, when a new wave of EVS data will be collected, it will be possible to present empirical evidence showing the direction in which the modernisation of CEE countries has headed: whether towards the value convergence of the Eastern and Western parts of Europe and towards the efforts to build a common European Union identity, or towards multiple modernities, in which collective identities are continually reconstructed in relation to the new global context [Eisenstaddt 2000: 21].

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The Work Ethic and Social Change in the Czech Republic and Slovakia – A Modernisation Theory Perspective*

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Abstract: The article investigates long-term trends in the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia from the perspective of modernisation theory. In particular, it examines whether the work ethic in the two culturally similar societies decreased during the years of growing material prosperity and whether this trend originated in intergenerational population replacement. The study uses data from three pooled waves of the European Values Study (EVS) covering the period 1999–2017 to which it applies the linear decomposition technique and multivariate statistical analysis. The results show that, even though the work ethic decreased in the Czech Republic and increased in Slovakia, intergenerational population replacement contributed to its weakening in both countries. Furthermore, the results indicate that the reason this process dominated the overall trend in the Czech Republic but not that in Slovakia may be the historical differences in levels of socioeconomic development and the different paces of population replacement. Finally, tentative evidence in favour of modernisation theory is presented, indicating that population replacement universally contributed to a decrease in the work ethic in all the other European countries with comparable EVS data.

Keywords: work ethic, work orientations, modernisation theory, linear decomposition, European Values Study.

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Introduction

In recent decades, modernisation theory[1] has established itself as a prominent theoretical framework for the analysis of value change in advanced industrial societies. Despite its popularity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the implications of the post-materialist value shift in the realm of work. However, work values and the work ethic in particular play a crucial role in Inglehart's conception of social and cultural change. Modernisation theory asserts that the work ethic is an important cultural component in the first phase of the modernisation process, as it disrupts cultural norms concerning accumulation and opens the way for industrialisation and capitalism [Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005]. However, being essentially a system of materialistic values, the work ethic is expected to gradually weaken during the post-industrial phase of modernisation, as continuing material prosperity shifts the value preferences of newer cohorts in a post-materialist direction [Norris and Inglehart 2011]. The evidence as to whether such a trend is indeed taking place in advanced industrial societies remains rather inconclusive. So far, only a few studies have examined the implied negative relationship between the work ethic and development, and very few of these have done so from the dynamic perspective of social change [Dülmer 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Stam, Verbakel and De Graaf 2013].

This paper attempts to fill the gap in the empirical literature and offers an analysis of the time trend in relation to the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, two dynamically developing and culturally similar Central European countries. The study uses three pooled waves of EVS data covering a period of 18 years, from 1999 to 2017, and applies descriptive analysis together with linear decomposition and multivariate statistical analysis.

The study has two specific goals. First, the exploratory goal is to analyse trends in the work ethic in the two societies, compare them, and provide possible explanations for the observed differences. The second goal is to test a theory. The study seeks to determine the extent to which the work ethic in the two countries has changed in line with the expectations of modernisation theory, that is, whether it has declined proportionally to the growth in material prosperity, whether the decline has been primarily driven by the intergenerational replacement of the population, and to what extent observed patterns of change can be generalised to other European countries.

[1] More specifically, the study draws upon the theory of values modernization developed by Inglehart and his colleagues [Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005]. Despite various criticisms, the framework is widely recognized among the most prominent approaches to cultural modernization in present-day sociology and political science [Haller 2002]. Later in the text, the framework is simply referred to as modernization theory. However, modernization theory is a broad research field within the sociology of development, with a long history and a number of specific sub-fields and contributors [Marsh 2014].

The article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical premises of modernisation theory as it relates to the work ethic are outlined. Second, the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are examined and compared, mostly with respect to their standing in the modernisation process and socioeconomic development. Third, the hypotheses are formulated, after which the paper continues with a description of the data and the measures for the variables. The empirical analysis starts with an examination of how the work ethic changed between 1999 and 2017. It continues by identifying the proximate sources of the change through linear decomposition and multivariate statistical analysis, before ending by comparing the Czech and Slovak results with nine European countries. The paper concludes with a discussion of the similarities and differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia and of the relevance of the modernisation theory framework to work orientation research.

Theory

Modernisation theory and the work ethic

The basic premise of modernisation theory is that socioeconomic development brings about predictable and coherent patterns of change in political and cultural life, which unfold in two distinct phases [Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 25]. In the industrial phase, bureaucratisation and secularisation emphasise secular-rational values. Economic strategies are centred on the maximisation of material output, while individuals' value preferences underline physical and material security. Diminishing returns from economic growth mark the post-industrial phase of modernisation. At the level of economic strategies, a fundamental shift occurs towards a maximisation of well-being through lifestyle changes. In the cultural realm, this phase is characterised by the evolution of post-materialist values, which means a general shift in people's worldview towards an emphasis on autonomy, self-expression, and quality of life [Inglehart 1997: 28]. This value transformation is considered to proceed in accordance with two principles [Inglehart 1997: 33–36; Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 97–99]. First, the 'scarcity hypothesis' assumes that people are more likely to emphasise post-materialist values under conditions of prosperity, while conditions of scarcity are conducive to materialistic preferences. Although preferences such as autonomy and freedom are universal to all humans in all historical periods, they become goals of primary importance only insofar as material sustenance is achieved. Second, the 'socialisation hypothesis' stipulates that the relationship between prosperity and post-materialism requires a substantial time lag of 10–15 years to manifest. It occurs gradually through intergenerational population replacement as younger cohorts replace the older ones. This is because basic personality values are predominantly shaped by conditions and experiences from one's pre-adult formative years. While the intergenerational differences are supposed to reflect long-term socioeconomic changes rather than

life-cycle effects, their impact on cultural change can be temporarily swamped by short-term situational period effects [Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 94–99].

What role does the work ethic play in the value change process and how is it affected by the onset of post-materialism? According to Norris and Inglehart [2011], the work ethic is essentially a materialistic value system, which encourages economic accumulation as something heroic and laudable and is conducive to an emphasis on economic growth. Like other materialistic values, the work ethic is common to societies marked by material scarcity and is inclined to fade away in conditions of prosperity [Inglehart 1997: 218; Norris and Inglehart 2011: 161–162]. Whilst the work ethic contributed to the creation of a 'cultural-economic syndrome', which gave way to capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, the post-materialist value shift in some ways constitutes its decline [Inglehart 1997: 27–28]. When work is no longer perceived as an existential necessity, people turn to other opportunities for self-development [Norris and Inglehart 2011: 164]. In other words, modernisation theory expects post-materialism and the work ethic to be inversely related to socioeconomic development, and thus negatively related to one another. Therefore, just as prolonged periods of economic growth should be conducive to the spread of post-materialism, they should also result in a decline in the work ethic. At the same time, however, just as the relationship between post-materialism and development is not one of immediate adjustment, the decline in the work ethic should proceed gradually through intergenerational population replacement.[2]

The available empirical evidence for the negative relationship between development and the work ethic comes mostly from large-scale comparative studies. Comparing findings is complicated, not only because of differences in the way the countries in an analysis are selected, but also because of different definitions of the work ethic [see discussion in Cherrington 1980: 19–21]. Norris and Inglehart [2011: 159–169] tested the assumptions of modernisation theory using the World Value Survey (WVS) and EVS data for the period 1981-2001. At the macro level, they found the work ethic, measured as a duty towards society, to be weakened by levels of human development. At the individual level, the work ethic was found to decrease with education and income, which are indicators of one's economic security. Dülmer [2011] replicated Norris and Inglehart's study [2011] within a multilevel framework and demonstrated that the weakening of the work ethic commences in the earlier stages of modernisation and is not exclusive to its post-industrial phase. He showed that younger cohorts in all societies, irrespective of development, had a weaker work ethic, but the effect of education was dependent on a country's level of development: negative in advanced post-industrial societies and positive in modernising countries. Stam, Verbakel and De

[2] Modernization theory is not the only theoretical approach which predicts the erosion of the work ethic in developed societies. Other theories reach similar conclusions, but emphasize the importance of different factors [see the review in Furnham 1990: 201–211].

Graaf [2013] analysed data from the 2008 wave of EVS data for 44 counties and found modernisation to be negatively related to the work ethic, operationalised through the concept of the work ethos. Similar results were reported with respect to the effect of modernisation on work attitudes related to the work ethic. In their study of 26 countries using WVS data, Parboteeah and Cullen [2003] found that the degree of industrialisation is negatively related to work centrality. Analysing International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data from 25 countries, Parboteeah, Cullen and Paik [2013] showed that post-industrialisation is associated with a general decline in extrinsic and intrinsic work values.

The evidence for generational differences in the work ethic and work orientations in general is slightly less consistent. Here, the results also differ with respect to the use of a particular method. In her comprehensive review, Twenge [2010] concluded that most time-lag and cross-sectional studies confirm a consistent generational trend towards a weaker work ethic, lower work centrality, a higher valuation of leisure, and a stronger emphasis on freedom and work-life balance among more recent generations. However, studies using different models generally fail to find any differences in work values between cohorts. Analysing data from five waves of combined WVS and EVS data using a hierarchical age-period-cohort regression model, Hajdu and Sik [2018a] claimed that birth cohorts in European and Euro-Atlantic countries do not differ significantly with regard to their work centrality and work values and that they are more strongly correlated with age. The same authors [Hajdu and Sik 2018b] reported very similar results in their analysis of employment commitment using ISSP data from 30 countries: no significant differences between cohorts were found. However, the evidence did point to minor effects of period and age. Kalleberg and Marsden [2019] also applied hierarchical age-period-cohort logistic regression to disentangle changes in the values of American workers between 1973 and 2016. They showed that the most widespread differences in work values were related to the historical periods during which people live, rather than to the effects of ageing or cohort differences.

Socioeconomic development in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Inglehart argues that, even though the post-materialist value shift produced by development proceeds in a systematic fashion, it is also path-dependent and reflects the influence of a country's unique cultural and historical heritage [Inglehart and Welzel 2005: 18–22]. However, such differences are less relevant to the present study, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia are arguably two countries whose geographical, cultural, and historical proximity has been shaped by almost 70 years of common history within one state, as part of Czechoslovakia. It can be argued that, by focusing on a comparison of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the study resembles what is referred to as a 'most similar nations' design [Ragin 1987: 47–48], implying that any observed dissimilarities in value orientations between

the countries are more likely to stem from differences in socioeconomic development than to reflect their cultural, religious, or institutional specificities. Even in Inglehart and Welzel's own study [2005: 56–76], the two countries are categorised within the clusters of predominantly industrial, middle-income societies with a Catholic religious heritage and a communist past. Although the former communist states in Eastern Europe tend to be less post-materialist, previous studies have shown that the value shift has taken place there too, including in the Czech Republic and Slovakia [Rabušic 2000; Savelyev 2016].

However, the Czech Republic and Slovakia differ in their socioeconomic development and historical experiences of modernisation. The Czech Republic has always been the more developed of the two countries as well as being the first to industrialise. The beginning of industrialisation in the Czech Republic dates back to the pre-war period, when the country was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By contrast, the predominantly agrarian pre-war Slovakia only started to industrialise in the 1930s, when it was already part of Czechoslovakia. Extensive Soviet-type industrialisation took place in both parts of the republic under state socialism and resulted in the equalisation of social and cultural development towards the end of state-socialist rule and the dissolution of the joint state in 1993 [Krejčí and Machonin 1996: 235]. As Figure 1 shows, differences in the levels and pace of socioeconomic development are also detectable when available historical data on gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are analysed. The figure indicates that both societies experienced a continuous increase in GDP in the last three decades, and even though the Czech Republic remains the more developed of the two states, strong growth in Slovakia in recent years has substantially reduced the difference.

If viewed through the lens of modernisation theory, the data can be translated into a set of empirically testable hypotheses.[3] Given the historical differences in the development between the two societies, one would expect the average work ethic to be weaker in the relatively more affluent Czech society than in the comparatively less prosperous Slovakia (H1). Since both countries have experienced continuous increases in prosperity in the last few decades, a long-term negative trend in the work ethic is expected to be found in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia (H2). Given that these developments have been simultaneously reflected in a steady increase in economic security, intergenerational population replacement is suspected to have contributed to a decrease in the work ethic in both countries (H3). Since the formative experiences of Czech cohorts were presumably obtained under conditions of comparatively higher prosperity, both the

[3] Since intergenerational replacement is supposed to affect society's values with a lag of 10–15 years, the hypotheses are based on long-term historical trends rather than solely on dynamics of development during the analysed period. More recent developments are likely to affect value orientations of future cohorts which are not yet fully represented in the data.

Figure 1. GDP per capita (thousands of PPP-adjusted USD) in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 1992–2017



Countries:

— Czech Republic

···· Slovakia

Source: World Bank [2019].

overall negative trend and the contribution of intergenerational replacement are expected to be stronger in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia (H4). Finally, if changes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are two specific examples of a more general pattern of value change taking place in all advanced societies, similar trends should be found in other countries that also experienced economic development (H5).

Data

The paper employed three different sets of combined data from the 1999, 2008, and 2017 waves of the EVS [2015, 2019]. The first part of the analysis, devoted to describing and decomposing trends in the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, used sub-samples from the two countries. After list-wise deletion of the cases with missing values, there were 5414 individuals in the Czech sample and 4229 in the Slovak sample. The second part of the analysis, which used multivariate statistical methods, drew upon the same data but included a few additional predictors. Since this also meant an increase in missing data, the R package 'mice' [van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011] was used to minimise potential biases. Five data sets were imputed, and whilst all the predictors and the outcome were part of the imputation model, missing values were imputed only for the additional predictors. The third part of the analysis, which placed the Czech and Slovak results in a comparative context, used analogical sub-samples for another nine countries with comparable EVS data. These countries were (in alphabetical order): Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Spain.

Methods

The paper primarily relies on linear decomposition, a method designed for analysing sources of social change using repeated cross-sectional data [see Firebaugh 1989: 252–253; 1997: 25–29; 2010: 805–811]. The method is based on the following idea: shifts in public opinion over time may occur because individuals actually change their opinions and/or they may stem from changes in the composition of the population, where the attitudes of new cohorts differ from those of the cohorts being replaced. This method applies a cohort-by-period design and employs regression to disentangle the change in some aggregate attributes of society into the part of it that is due to the aggregated individual change that occur within cohorts over time (within- or intra-cohort change) and the part of it that is due to the effect of cohort replacement (cross- or inter-cohort change). There are three steps to this method.

In the first step, data from all cross-sections are pooled and the outcome variable is regressed on the survey year and the respondent's birth year, which

indicates cohort membership [Firebaugh 1989: 253]. The coefficient for year reflects the average annual change in the outcome variable *within* cohorts, while controlling for cohort differences. Analogously, the cohort coefficient captures the average difference in the outcome *between* subsequent cohorts, while keeping the year constant. In the second step, these coefficients are used to calculate the contribution each component makes to the overall social change. To obtain the total contribution of aggregated individual change, the year coefficient is weighted by the number of years that have passed between the first and last waves of the survey. The total contribution of the cross-cohort change is calculated in a similar way, multiplying the cohort coefficient by the difference between the average birth year of respondents in the first and the last cross-section. As the technique is based on the assumed linearity and additivity of the two components, the third step aims to check whether the assumptions hold by summing the two components and dividing them by the actual change observed in the data. Owing to non-linearities and interaction, the ratio rarely equals exactly one, but the discrepancies should not be large [Firebaugh 1997: 25].

It is important to note that the decomposition method does not resolve the identification problem of separating age, period, and cohort. These are perfectly correlated in any given data set and to discern them without a theoretical assumption is mechanically impossible [Bell 2020]. Nevertheless, the decomposition of trend data into two orthogonal components reflecting aggregated individual change (which may result from age and/or period) and cohort replacement (where cohort differences might be due to age and/or cohort) is feasible [Alwin and McCammon 2003: 33–34] and has been successfully performed in a number of studies on attitudinal change [Brewster and Padavic 2000; Kalleberg and Marsden 2013; Kraaykamp 2012; Savelyev 2016].

Some argue that decomposition is meaningful only when the effect of age on the dependent variable is absent [Glenn 2005: 36]. Where such an assumption holds, two components of change can be interpreted as reflecting the effects of cohort (inter-cohort trend) and period (intra-cohort trend) [Alwin and McCammon 2003: 34]. Even though decomposition is not dependent on this premise, it seems plausible that the effect of age does not substantially confound the results of the linear decomposition in this study. Along with the theoretical argument about intergenerational differences being resistant to changes over the life course, there is also tentative empirical evidence of this from longitudinal panel studies. These studies found no straightforward indication that age or maturation affects work attitudes such as job involvement [Wille et al. 2014] or work centrality [Sharabi and Harpaz 2007]. They showed that work values tend to stabilise with age and change as a function of job rewards [Johnson 2001].

Since the goal of linear decomposition is to approximate sources of social change, the method is supplemented with multivariate statistical analysis in an attempt to investigate the mechanisms behind the trends.

Variables

The dependent variable

Starting from the 1999 wave, the EVS includes a battery of five items that are supposed to capture the 'work ethos', which is defined[4] as the 'strength of the social norm that places a positive moral value on doing a good job' [EVS n.d.].

The EVS respondents are required to express the degree to which they agree with the following five statements:

1) To fully develop your talents, you need to have a job.
2) It is humiliating to receive money without having to work for it.
3) People who do not work become lazy.
4) Work is a duty to society.
5) Work should always come first, even if it means less spare time.

Responses, originally recorded on a 1–5 scale, are reverse-coded so that the scale increases in the direction of stronger agreement with a given statement and is anchored to the variants 'strongly disagree' (value 1) and 'strongly agree' (value 5).

Even though the EVS implicitly suggests that all the items constitute a one-dimensional scale, Norris and Inglehart [2011: 163] argue that attitudes towards work as a duty, which 'lie at the heart of ascetic forms of Protestantism', are best captured by items 2–4. Because of these conflicting opinions, the dimensional structure was inspected before the composite scale was constructed. Multiple conventional methods confirmed the one-dimensional structure to be optimal. The factor analysis subsequently conducted with principal axis factoring showed that all the items loaded sufficiently well on one factor. This explained 38% of the items' variance in the Slovak sample and 37% in the Czech sample[5] (see Table A1 in the appendix). The composite scale was thus constructed by aggregating scores across all five items[6] (an alpha reliability of 0.74 in the Czech sample

[4] The origin of the concept can be traced back to Weber [1958]. Weber understood the Protestant work ethic as a broad philosophy of life related to religious and economic activity, which contributed to the creation of a specific cultural ethos necessary for the establishment of capitalism as the dominant economic system in the Western world. However, most contemporary studies, including Inglehart's study and the study presented here, are based on a narrower definition of work ethic, conceptualized as a non-religious set of positive attitudes about work and its importance [Cherrington 1980: 19].

[5] Additionally, results from a series of multigroup confirmatory factor analysis models indicated the presence of strict factor invariance, thus rendering comparison of the construct in the Czech and the Slovak context possible.

[6] The scale was constructed for respondents who provided answers for at least three items. Scores were adjusted for the total number of answered items.

and 0.75 in the Slovak sample). To enhance interpretability, the scale was further transformed into a simple intensity index, ranging from 0 to 100. The scores can thus be interpreted in a more intuitive way, as percentages of a theoretically maximal work ethic score.

The independent variables

Two different sets of predictors were used in the analysis: one set for the part of the analysis that uses linear decomposition, and another set for the part which corroborates the findings with multivariate methods.

In addition to the outcome variable, linear decomposition only required the predictors for survey year and birth year. The survey year variable was coded as the year when the survey was conducted, centred at the first EVS wave, in 1999. The birth year or cohort variable was obtained by subtracting the respondent's age from the year of the survey. This variable is centred at the birth year of the oldest cohort, 1911 in the Czech Republic and 1913 in Slovakia.

The models used in the part of the analysis intended to corroborate the findings estimated the work ethic in a stepwise fashion as a function of the survey year, cohort, and a set of additional predictors and controls. Since the direct effect of development measured at the country level cannot be reliably estimated within a given comparative design, the models controlled for individual-level characteristics known to be indirectly associated with socioeconomic development, together with controls for gender and marital and employment status. Economic resources, as the most tangible effect of development, were captured by a continuous variable for income, which was derived from the interval midpoints of the original EVS income variable. The values for both countries were converted to thousands of euros per month adjusted by purchasing power parity [Eurostat 2019]. Increasing educational attainment is considered another central component of modernisation. Since people from a more affluent background tend to have higher levels of education, this reflects people's cognitive autonomy and their material security during their formative years [Abramson and Inglehart 1996]. The predictor for education was measured as the age at which the respondent completed formal schooling. Gender was controlled for using a binary variable with a value of 1 assigned to women and a 0 to men. Marital status was captured with a set of dummies for married individuals, singles, people who are divorced or separated, and people who are widowed. Employment status was measured in a similar way, distinguishing between respondents who were employed, unemployed, retired, and students and others not active in the labour force. Importantly, the last two controls are related to some of the main age-related life-course transitions. Thus, their inclusion in the model can indicate to what extent the results are confounded by age. This could not be directly estimated within the decomposition framework (cf. with the approach in Kraaykamp [2012]).

Table 1. Change in average work ethic scores, 1999–2017

Country	Work ethic score (0–100)			
	1999	2008	2017	Δ 2017–1999
Czech Republic	67.59	64.84	65.26	–2.33
Slovakia	68.58	70.30	72.37	3.79

Results

Descriptive results

Table 1 presents the average scores for the work ethic index for each wave of EVS data. The last column shows the direction and magnitude of the change, calculated as the difference between the scores from the first and the last waves. The table suggests that, in spite of the similarities in cultural heritage and socioeconomic development, the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia changed in opposite directions. Whilst in the Czech Republic the work ethic weakened between 1999 and 2008 and remained approximately at the same level until 2017, it was continuously increasing over the same period in Slovakia. In absolute terms, the magnitude of the change was higher in Slovakia where the work ethic increased by 3.79%, whilst in the Czech Republic it decreased by 2.33%. With respect to the relative position of the two countries, Slovakia had a consistently stronger average work ethic than the Czech Republic in each of the three waves. However, diverging trends strengthened the initial difference, so that it was more than seven times larger in 2017 than in 1999.

Taken together, the findings provide a mixed picture with respect to the expectations derived from modernisation theory. Whilst a relatively weaker work ethic with a negative long-term trend, like that observed in the Czech Republic, appears to be fully in line with the theoretical logic (H1 and H2), the strengthening of the work ethic in Slovakia is rather puzzling. Still, the results do not necessarily contradict the key expectation of modernisation theory regarding the negative effect of intergenerational differences in the work ethic. It may be that population replacements contributed to a decrease in the work ethic in both countries, but the overall trends were shaped by country-specific situational effects that affected the attitudinal conversion of all individuals and temporarily pushed the trends in opposing directions.

Linear decomposition

A linear decomposition of work ethic trends was used to investigate how intergenerational replacement contributed to the observed changes in the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the first step, the work ethic in each coun-

Table 2. Estimated effects of year and cohort on the work ethic, 1999–2017

	Czech Republic	Slovakia
Year	0.09 *	0.31 ***
Cohort	–0.26 ***	–0.17 ***
Observations	5414	4229
R^2	0.067	0.028

Note: statistical significance = * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

try was regressed on survey year and cohort year predictors (see Table 2). The positive sign for the survey year coefficient (intra-cohort change) that was found in both countries shows that the work ethic of an average individual was, year by year, increasing in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, the negative signs for the cohort year coefficient (inter-cohort change) indicate that in both countries the work ethic of each successive birth cohort was weaker than that of its predecessor. When the magnitude of the two effects is assessed, one sees that the intra-cohort effect is the stronger of the two effects in Slovakia, while in the Czech Republic, the cohort replacement effect is stronger.

To quantify the relative contribution of the two sources, namely cohort replacement and intra-cohort change, to the overall change, the year coefficient was multiplied by the number of years that had elapsed from the first to the last survey wave, and the cohort coefficient was multiplied by the average difference in birth year means between the first and the last wave. The first of these two numbers was the same for both countries – 18 years had passed between 1999 and 2017. The pace of the cohort turnover was country-specific and amounted to 14.3 years in the Czech Republic and 10.6 years in Slovakia.

Table 3 displays the results of the linear decomposition of work ethic changes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It shows that the decline in the work ethic in the Czech Republic was primarily due to cohort replacement. If the overall trend was only shaped by a weakening work ethic among younger cohorts, the decline would have been even steeper at 3.79%. However, the effect was mitigated by ag-

Table 3. Decomposition of the change in the work ethic, 1999–2017

	Czech Republic	Slovakia
Change in the work ethic, 1999–2017	–2.33	3.79
a) Within-cohort change contribution	1.57	5.60
b) Cohort-replacement effect contribution	–3.79	–1.77
Predicted/observed change	0.95	1.01

gregated attitudinal change, which would alone have resulted in an increase in the work ethic by 1.57%. Since the latter component was only half the size of the former, the average work ethic in the Czech Republic declined. In Slovakia, the strengthening of the work ethic, generated by aggregated attitudinal change, outweighed the negative effect of the inter-cohort change. Whilst the within-cohort change alone would have resulted in an increase in the work ethic by 5.6%, cohort replacement would have led to a decrease of 1.77%. As the former component was much larger, the result was an overall increase in work ethic.[7] Finally, the last row of the table shows that the linear decomposition estimates are fairly precise and that the linear and additive effects explain most of the observed trends in both countries.

These results indicate that the difference in work ethic trends between the Czech Republic and Slovakia conceals a remarkable similarity in terms of the mechanism that generates them. The difference in work ethic trends stem primarily from the difference in the strength of the components of change, not from their different effects. As expected, intergenerational population replacement contributed to the decrease in the work ethic in both countries (H3) and its negative contribution was stronger in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia (H4). However, this is not entirely the result of intergenerational differences. At least part of its stronger contribution reflects a more dynamic pace of cohort turnover, which amplified the comparatively lower work ethic among more recent Czech cohorts. On the other hand, population replacement in Slovakia proceeded at a much slower pace and newer cohorts were unable to shape society's values to the same extent as they did in the Czech Republic. Moreover, intra-cohort attitudinal change contributed to an increase in the work ethic in both countries, but its contribution was much greater in Slovakia. One can only speculate about the extent to which this was a country-specific period effect.

In summary, the question as to why the work ethic increased in Slovakia and decreased in the Czech Republic can be reformulated into two specific questions: Why was there a much stronger positive intra-cohort trend in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic? Why is the work ethic of younger Czech cohorts so much weaker than that of their Slovak counterparts?

Multivariate analysis

In the last step, the work ethic was regressed on predictors of the intra- and inter-cohort component of the trend as well as on the other variables associated with positive effects of socioeconomic development and compositional controls (Ta-

[7] As a robustness check, each individual item of the disaggregated work ethic scale was decomposed in a similar fashion. The results showed that cohort replacement contributed to a decrease in the agreement with every single work ethic item in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Differences between the two countries resulted primarily from the differing effects of aggregated attitudinal change.

ble 4). This was done in a stepwise fashion for the Czech Republic and Slovakia separately. The models with an A prefix are the same as those used in the first step of the linear decomposition and serve as a baseline against which the effect of additional predictors is compared. The models with a B prefix add the predictors related to material security, education, and income. In the models with a C prefix, respondents' gender and marital and employment status are controlled for.

Looking first at the Czech results, Model 'B – CZ' shows that neither education nor income has an effect on the work ethic. The negative sign for the two coefficients suggests that, had there been any effect, it would have been in the expected direction and reduced the work ethic. The increase in the year coefficient in comparison with Model 'A – CZ' indicates that respondents in later EVS waves have higher educational attainment and better incomes. Were it not for increasing education and income, there would have been an even bigger increase in the work ethic of average individuals. Model 'C – CZ' shows that women have a comparatively stronger work ethic than men and that single and divorced respondents have a weaker work ethic than those that are married. With regard to employment status, it is only the unemployed and others not active in the labour force, whose work ethic is weaker than that of working respondents. When compositional differences are controlled for, the cohort coefficient decreases, suggesting that there is a higher prevalence of social categories with a lower work ethic among more recent cohorts (such as single respondents and/or those with weaker labour market attachment). Furthermore, once controls are included in the model, the negative effect of income increases and becomes significant.

The same models in Slovakia show slightly different results. Model 'B – SK' shows that material security is related to the work ethic in the opposite direction to what was expected: higher incomes and education are associated with a significantly stronger endorsement of the work ethic. When controlled for, the year coefficient drops by almost one-quarter of its initial size, suggesting that a sizeable part of the intra-cohort change is driven by an increase in material security. Interestingly, an increase in the magnitude of the cohort coefficient suggests that higher educational attainment and increasing incomes actually contributed to a decrease rather than an increase in inter-cohort differences. Finally, Model 'C – SK' indicates that women have a stronger work ethic than men and that the work ethic of married Slovaks is stronger than that of their single or widowed counterparts. Employment status plays a role, too, and the unemployed and other individuals outside the labour force have a significantly lower work ethic than the employed. Interestingly, controlling for gender, marital, and employment status explains away the effect of income and reverts back to a substantial amount of the intra-cohort effect explained in the previous step. The model seems to indicate that the part of the positive intra-cohort trend in Slovakia that is explained by higher incomes may actually be caused by compositional changes connected to the growth of employment and to a decrease in the number of respondents with a weaker labour market attachment. Like in the Czech case, compositional differences account for a small part of inter-cohort differences in Slovakia, too.

Table 4. Multivariate analysis of work ethic determinants, 1999–2017

	A - CZ	B - CZ	C - CZ	A - SK	B - SK	C - SK
Predictors	Estimates	Estimates	Estimates	Estimates	Estimates	Estimates
Year	0.09 *	0.11 **	0.11 *	0.31 ***	0.23 ***	0.28 ***
Cohort	–0.26 ***	–0.26 ***	–0.20 ***	–0.17 ***	–0.19 ***	–0.14 ***
Education		–0.06	–0.05		0.29 **	0.24 *
Income		–0.55	–1.25 **		1.52 *	–0.10
Woman			1.23 *			1.60 **
Marital status (ref. married)						
Single			–2.50 **			–2.40 *
Divorced/Separated			–1.88 *			–1.89
Widowed			–1.02			–3.06 **
Employment status (ref. working)						
Unemployed			–4.73 ***			–7.33 ***
Retired			0.24			–0.19
Student			–0.15			–1.87
Other – not in the labour force			–3.95 ***			–5.42 ***
Observations	5,414	5,414	5,414	4,229	4,229	4,229
R^2	0.067	0.068	0.075	0.028	0.032	0.048

Note: statistical significance = * $p<0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Ref. = reference category.

In summary, the models showed that the linear decomposition results are fairly robust and hold true when estimated together with predictors relating to some of the main effects of socioeconomic development and compositional controls. This is less surprising with respect to the inter-cohort component of the trend, since these generational differences are assumed to reflect people's economic security during their formative years rather than their current economic security. Such results further indicate that the work ethic of younger Czech cohorts is likely to be determined by historical differences in prosperity levels between the two countries, translated into differences in material security as experienced during pre-adult years (H4).

The intra-cohort trend turned out to be sensitive to the inclusion of development-related predictors, although differently in each country. Dülmer [2011] pointed out that increasing material security should contribute to a weakening of the work ethic only after societies enter the post-industrial stage of their development. In industrial societies, further development should be associated with a strengthening work ethic. Seen from this perspective, it is likely that Slovakia's historically lower level of economic development is translating recent gains from economic growth into strong positive intra-cohort trends. Such a process does not seem to be taking place in the comparatively more developed Czech society.

Last, but not least, the results showed that the work ethic is more consistently connected to a person's economic resources (i.e. having a job or not) and needs (i.e., having a partner or not) than to specific stages in the life course. Since the inclusion of such compositional controls made only a small difference to the decomposition results, it does not seem likely that they were substantially confounded by ageing or life cycle effects.

Cross-national comparison

The final step is to analyse the extent to which trends in the work ethic observed in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are representative of a more general pattern of work ethic change in the context of modernisation. Table 5 presents the results of a series of linear decompositions of the work ethic in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and another nine European countries with available EVS data for the period 1999 to 2017. The results are presented in ascending order according to the magnitude of overall change. It is important to keep in mind that the results are not directly comparable and should only be regarded as illustrative. This is because countries differ with respect to their cultural and historical heritage, and it is unclear how these differences affect overall trends or their components. Moreover, the uneven pace of cohort replacement and the differences in the degree to which the linearity and additivity assumptions behind linear decomposition are satisfied in each case, complicate the comparison even further. The table reveals that, between 1999 and 2017, the work ethic decreased in seven countries, while

Table 5. Decompositions of change in the work ethic in 11 European countries, 1999–2017

Country	Change in the work ethic, 1999–2017	Within-cohort change	Cohort-replacement effect	Predicted/observed change
Russia	–5.81	–1.42	–4.36	1.00
Poland	–5.38	0.24	–4.99	0.88
Slovenia	–3.68	0.25	–3.85	0.98
Czech Rep.	–2.33	1.57	–3.79	0.95
Spain	–1.81	1.20	–3.04	1.01
Croatia	–0.71	2.58	–2.76	0.24
Germany	–0.64	1.21	–2.94	2.69
Bulgaria	3.02	5.97	–3.35	0.87
Denmark	3.29	4.99	–1.54	1.05
Slovakia	3.79	5.60	–1.77	1.01
Netherlands	6.08	7.53	–2.53	0.82

four countries experienced an increase. Looking at sources of change, cohort replacement alone was a source of the work ethic weakening in virtually every country, irrespective of the direction of overall change. Similarly, the aggregate attitudinal change contributed to an increase in the work ethic in almost all the countries except for Russia. In countries where the work ethic decreased, it was always as a result of cohort replacement; where it increased, it was driven by within-cohort change. When compared to developments in other European countries, we see that the Czech Republic is a more typical example than Slovakia. The overall decrease in the work ethic driven by cohort replacement overshadowed the effect of aggregate individual change. This was also experienced in Russia, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Croatia, and Germany, and, as predicted by modernization theory, it seems to represent the typical pattern. An overall strengthening of the work ethic resulting from intra-cohort change is a scenario seen in Slovakia and also in Bulgaria, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, this does not seem to contradict the expectations of modernisation theory. The dominance of the intra-cohort component points to the potential influence of country-specific situational effects, acting as a temporal disturbance from a slower but more stable negative trend due to cohort replacement. We can thus conclude that, despite differences in the magnitude and the pace of change, the decline in the work ethic implied by modernisation theory is slowly taking place across Europe, including in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (H5).

Discussion and conclusion

The main aim of this paper was to investigate long-term work ethic trends in the Czech Republic and Slovakia from the perspective of modernisation theory. In particular, the study examined whether the work ethic in the two culturally similar societies decreased over the years of increasing material prosperity, and whether evidence can be found to confirm that this decrease originated primarily as a consequence of intergenerational population replacement. While most existing empirical studies have focused on cross-sectional aspects of the relationship between development and the work ethic, this study looked at the issue from the dynamic perspective of social change. The study applied the linear decomposition technique and multivariate statistical analysis to data from three pooled waves of the EVS covering a period of 18 years from 1999 to 2017.

A number of interesting findings can be reported. Despite similarities in cultural heritage and socioeconomic development, the work ethic increased in Slovakia and decreased in the Czech Republic. Results from the linear decomposition show that this divergence concealed a similarity in the sources from which change in both countries originated. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, there was a gradual weakening of the work ethic among younger cohorts (inter-cohort change), and this process alone contributed to the overall decrease in the work ethic. At the same time, this trend was countered by a strengthening of the work ethic among average Czechs and Slovaks (intra-cohort change), resulting from actual attitudinal change. The divergence of the overall trends reflects the fact that the weakening work ethic among younger Czech cohorts contributed more substantially to the overall trend than in the Slovak case, whilst the work ethic of average Slovaks increased more than that of Czechs. The decomposition and regression analysis results suggest that there are two main reasons why this is the case.

The first reason refers to the historical differences in development between the two societies. Czech society was historically the first to industrialise and modernise [Krejčí and Machonin 1996: 118–122] and is still the more affluent of the two. If these differences were translated into differential experiences of material security during the formative years of socialisation, it seems logical that Czech cohorts growing up in a more affluent context would become more post-materialist and therefore less concerned with work's normative importance. At the same time, these historical differences may have played a role in Slovaks' stronger attitudinal conversion, leading to a higher work ethic. Previous studies have presented tentative evidence that economic development and education might be linked to the work ethic in a curvilinear fashion: leading to a weaker work ethic in more developed, post-industrial societies, whilst being associated with a stronger work ethic in less developed societies [Dülmer 2011]. The multivariate results showed that this mechanism might be at play in the present study, where gains in material security were associated with a stronger work ethic in the comparatively less developed Slovakia. Here, such gains explained the substantial share

of the intra-cohort effect, while having no such effect in the more affluent Czech Republic.

The second explanation for the divergence in overall trends is the different pace of cohort turnover in Czech and Slovak society. Not only was the work ethic among younger cohorts in the Czech Republic much weaker than in Slovakia, but the cohort turnover process also proceeded much faster in the Czech Republic. This means that the composition of the Czech population changed more substantially and that the post-materialist attitudes of younger cohorts towards the importance of work shaped society's values to a greater extent.

The study also demonstrated that the population replacement contributed to a decrease in the work ethic in all the European countries for which comparable EVS data were available. Despite the observed differences in the direction of the work ethic trends, the theoretical logic of modernisation theory appears to operate universally: all countries experienced cohort turnover as a negative effect that contributed to a weakening of the work ethic, and, with the exception of Russia, intra-cohort attitudinal change as a positive effect contributing to a stronger endorsement of the work ethic. The discrepancies in overall trends show that an interval of 17 years might not be long enough to demonstrate the effect of slow and cumulative value change brought about by intergenerational population replacement. These results also suggest that the post-materialist value shift has important implications for value changes in the realm of work. Modernisation theory can therefore serve as a useful conceptual framework for the analysis of work orientation values and preferences, not only from a cross-national comparative perspective, but also from a dynamic perspective of social change.

However, the study is not without limitations. The first issue concerns the comparability of the results and stems directly from the use of the EVS's work ethos construct. While commonly used in empirical research to operationalise the work ethic [e.g. van Oorschot 2006; Stam, Verbakel and De Graaf 2013], it differs from Weber's broader notion of the Protestant work ethic [Cherrington 1980] and from the narrower conception of 'work as duty' used by Norris and Inglehart [2011]. These conceptual differences should be treated with caution when comparing results with other studies.

Second, the results have methodological limitations due to the nature of linear decomposition. Whilst it provides useful information as to whether social change is driven by the conversion of individuals' attitudes or by cohort replacement, it does not resolve the age-period-cohort problem and cannot determine where individual and cohort differences come from [Firebaugh 2010].

Future research is encouraged to corroborate the findings presented in this study. A decrease in the work ethic is supposedly only one of the manifestations of post-materialism in the realm of work and the process should be accompanied by a shift in job preferences from 'maximizing one's income and job security towards a growing insistence on interesting and meaningful work' [Inglehart 1997: 44]. Further investigations are required to determine whether this process is tak-

ing place and whether generational replacement is its primary source. Researchers could also replicate this study in a broader comparative setting using repeated cross-sectional data for a greater number of countries in order to predict the effect of socioeconomic development on the work ethic and its changes over time.

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Appendix

Table A1. Exploratory factor analysis of work ethic items from the EVS, 1999–2017

Items	Factor loadings	
	Czech Republic	Slovakia
Job needed to develop talents	0.59	0.55
People who do not work turn lazy	0.63	0.60
Work is a duty towards society	0.68	0.71
Humiliating – money without working	0.52	0.54
Work always comes first	0.59	0.67
Cronbach's α	*0.74*	*0.75*

Table A2. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables, the Czech Republic

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Range
Year	5541	2007.84	7.37	18 (1999–2017)
Cohort	5441	1958.70	18.60	88 (1911–1999)
Education	4650	19.08	4.11	63 (7–70)
Income	4590	1.25	0.72	4.01 (0.12–4.13)
Woman	5541	0.56	0.50	1 (0–1)
Married	5495	0.52	0.50	1 (0–1)
Marital status				
Single	5495	0.21	0.41	1 (0–1)
Divorced	5495	0.14	0.35	1 (0–1)
Widowed	5495	0.13	0.33	1 (0–1)
Employment status				
Working	5493	0.54	0.50	1 (0–1)
Unemployed	5493	0.04	0.19	1 (0–1)
Retired	5493	0.31	0.46	1 (0–1)
Student	5493	0.05	0.23	1 (0–1)
Other	5493	0.06	0.24	1 (0–1)

Note: An original uncentred metric for the Year and Cohort variables was used to calculate the reported means. Education is measured as the age at which respondents completed formal schooling. Income is measured in thousands of PPP-adjusted Euros.

Table A3. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables, Slovakia

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Range
Year	4275	2008.22	7.24	18 (1999–2017)
Cohort	4275	1958.74	17.58	88 (1911–1999)
Education	4219	18.52	2.96	41 (7–48)
Income	3384	0.99	0.67	3.55 (0.1–3.65)
Woman	4275	0.58	0.49	1 (0–1)
Marital status				
Married	4265	0.60	0.49	1 (0–1)
Single	4265	0.18	0.39	1 (0–1)
Divorced	4265	0.08	0.27	1 (0–1)
Widowed	4265	0.14	0.35	1 (0–1)
Employment status				
Working	4269	0.53	0.50	1 (0–1)
Unemployed	4269	0.08	0.27	1 (0–1)
Retired	4269	0.30	0.46	1 (0–1)
Student	4269	0.03	0.18	1 (0–1)
Other	4269	0.06	0.23	1 (0–1)

Note: An original uncentred metric for the Year and Cohort variables was used to calculate the reported means. Education is measured as the age which respondents completed formal schooling. Income is measured in thousands of PPP-adjusted Euros.

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

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The Expansion of Higher Education and Post-Materialistic Attitudes to Work in Europe: Evidence from the European Values Study*

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Abstract: The article focuses on the relationship between higher education and post-materialistic attitudes to work, and how it has changed following the recent expansion of systems of higher education in Europe. Using data from the European Values Study on 28 countries with the time frame between 1990 and 2008, the analysis shows that the previously observed link between higher education and post-materialism also applies to work values. Higher-educated Europeans were both more post-materialistic and less materialistic in their work orientations than their lower-educated counterparts. This association was, however, weakened by tertiary expansion. Work-related post-materialism declined with the increasing share of university-educated individuals in the working-age population. Interestingly, so, too, did work-related materialism, yet only until the expansion reached 25%, then it gradually increased. It is suggested that these developments, at least in part, stem from the changing position of higher-educated workers in the labour market.

Keywords: tertiary expansion, Bologna process, massification, post-materialism, European Values Study

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Introduction

Systems of higher education in Europe, as well as elsewhere around the globe, expanded for the better part of the 20th century [Brown 1995; Schofer and Meyer 2005; Boliver 2011; Haim and Shavit 2013] and continue to do so well into the new millennium, a trend that has been aided by multiple factors including international strategies such as the Bologna Process. Along with this expansion, and in order to accommodate the ever-growing demand it has produced, the tertiary level has also differentiated, giving rise to a greater variety of institutions, fields of study, and degrees [Teichler 1998; Štefánik 2014]. Moreover, the student population itself has become more heterogeneous, increasingly comprising women and minorities, individuals with different skill sets and motivations, and people from different socio-economic backgrounds [Terenzini et al. 1996; Zamfir et al. 2018; DiPrete and Buchman 2013].

While over the years these phenomena have been described in great detail, their broader implications are not yet entirely clear. On the one hand, higher levels of education have long been linked to many favourable outcomes – both economic and non-monetary [Vila 2000; Hout 2012; Dickson and Harmon 2011]. Higher education has also been observed to foster liberal, tolerant, and overall post-materialistic attitudes and values [Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007; Inglehart 1971]. It could be expected, therefore, that educational expansion (resulting in the massification of the tertiary level) would gradually enhance the well-being of individuals and societies – for example, by facilitating access to good jobs and good pay, while also cultivating healthy lifestyles and tolerant values among an increasingly larger share of the population.

On the other hand, massification is just as likely to weaken the link between higher education and its returns as the function, form, and content of education shifts [e.g. Trow 1973] or as the supply of graduates exceeds demand in the labour market, leaving many to accept lower-quality jobs and lower pay [Tomlinson 2008; Bourdieu 1996; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990]. The link may also be weakened by differentiation, which has been hypothesised to perpetuate inequalities in the education system and in the labour market alike [Raftery and Hout 1993; Lucas 2001].

This article aims to build on some of these themes by taking a closer look at the implications of tertiary expansion for work in Europe. However, rather than looking at economic returns such as income, it strives instead to address attitudes and values associated with work and how they have changed alongside the expansion of higher education systems linked to the Bologna Process. In particular, we focus on two issues: (1) the association between higher education and post-materialistic work values and (2) the extent to which this supposed link has been affected by tertiary expansion. Do higher-educated individuals – when compared to their lower-educated counterparts – ascribe less importance to the materialistic characteristics of jobs and more importance to the non-materialistic characteristics? Is this still the case when the share of higher-educated individu-

als in the labour market increases? To answer these questions, we employed data from three waves of the European Values Study, involving 28 European countries and 13 aspects of work summarised in two indexes. The article is organised as follows: First, we briefly outline the sources and outcomes of tertiary expansion in Europe after the year 2000. Next, we summarise some of the implications of these developments for labour market performance in general and for attitudes to work in particular. Lastly, we analyse the data and discuss the results.

Expansion and massification in the two decades after Bologna

Systems of tertiary education have been expanding globally since the mid-20th century [Schofer and Meyer 2005; Boliver 2011; Haim and Shavit 2013; Brown 1995]. While its original sources and drivers remain unclear[1] [Haim and Shavit 2013], tertiary expansion at the turn of the new century tends to be linked to the capacity of nation states to compete in the knowledge-driven global economy [Tomlinson 2008; Liu, Green and Pensiero 2016; Mount and Belanger 2004; Altbach et al. 2017]. Such a rationale is certainly present in the Bologna Declaration, a joint initiative of European countries that, arguably, not only encouraged further expansion after the year 2000 but where the tertiary level is concerned also systematised it in its outcomes. Signed in 1999, the declaration's stated aim was to more closely align European systems of higher education and create a single European higher education area (EHEA) in which national systems would be comparable and compatible [Bologna Declaration 1999; Keeling 2006]. This would be achieved by working toward common objectives, namely the adoption of two (later three – bachelor's, master's, and doctoral) main study cycles and the use of comparable degrees and a credit system [Bologna Declaration 1999].

Following these objectives, European systems of tertiary education opened themselves up to a larger number of entrants, thereby likely (at least in part) accelerating (but not introducing) the massification of (tertiary) education in Europe.[2] The key developments are summarised in Figure 1. We can see that in what used to be the EU-28, the gross tertiary enrolment rate rose from 48% in 1999 to 68% in 2017, although it is clear that the rate had already been rising before the Bologna process commenced. Figure 1 also shows an increase in the share

[1] Although factors such as governmental interventions or technological change have been named among possible explanations [Haim and Shavit 2013].

[2] Teichler [1998: 9] noted that '[t]he term "mass higher education" was traditionally employed to describe the growth of enrolment beyond the level of academic reproduction and training for a small number of occupations requiring this education for demanding professions and privileged social positions'. According to Trow [1973], higher education enters a mass stage with the enrolment of more than 15% of a given age cohort (and shifts to a universal stage with an enrolment of more than 50%).

Figure 1. Gross tertiary enrolment and tertiary attainment (in the population aged 15–64), European Union 28 and European Union 15, 1990–2017



Source: World Bank [2019] (enrolment), Eurostat [2019] (attainment), available data.
Note: Tertiary attainment is the share of university-educated individuals (in the population aged 15-64).
World Bank defines gross enrolment as 'the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education shown' (https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/school-enrollment-secondary-gross).

of individuals with tertiary attainment in the working-age population from 20% in 2002 to 32% in 2018 in the EU-28 (and from 18% in 1996 to 33% in 2017 in the EU-15). To accommodate growing demand, the tertiary level has also differentiated horizontally (although, as with massification, horizontal differentiation had already been underway before the EHEA initiative [e.g. Reimer and Jacob 2011]). New higher-education institutions (HEIs) have been established – both public and private (but oftentimes second-tier [Boliver 2011; Reimer and Jacob 2011]) – and new types of study fields, courses, and programmes have been introduced [Reimer and Jacob 2011; Altbach et al. 2017].

The implications of expansion within and outside higher education systems

While the changes outlined above have been far-reaching, their broader impacts – in areas such as equality of access, performance in the labour market, values transmission, or the form and function of the education system itself – have yet to be systematically documented, although several major theories offer some use-

ful suggestions. On the one hand, higher education has long been linked to a number of favourable outcomes for both individuals and societies, and the effect of expansion and massification ought therefore to be significantly positive. For example, people with tertiary attainment tend to be healthier, better at managing money, and better at decision-making [Vila 2000; Hout 2012]. They have also been observed to be more tolerant in their attitudes and less radical in their political views, which is said to enhance and strengthen democracy and social cohesion [Hannum and Buchmann 2005; Pascarella and Terenzini 1995; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007; Vila 2000]. Most typically, however, higher education has been understood to tie in with a more advantageous position in the labour market (e.g. better-quality jobs, higher incomes, higher job satisfaction, [Vila 2000]), usually as a result of the knowledge and skills people accumulate over the course of their study (in other words, human capital [Pascarella and Terenzini 1995; Bernardi and Ballarino 2016; Tomlinson 2008]), or as a result of the growing demand for a highly-educated workforce necessitated by continuing technological advances [Brown 1995; Boliver 2011; Card and Dinardo 2002; Bernardi and Ballarino 2014].

The evidence that exists to date, however, does not support many of these expectations. Hannum and Buchmann [2005] summarised that while more educated individuals and societies tend to be healthier, there is an absence of strong evidence about these educational effects on economic growth or democratisation. In line with expectations, access to higher education has indeed been granted to a greater variety of students, who have become a more diverse population not only in terms of their demographic characteristics (such as ethnicity or socio-economic background) but also in terms of their motivations, skills, knowledge, and requirements [Terenzini et al. 1996; Zamfir et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2016]. Inequalities nevertheless persist despite massification, with advantaged groups often overrepresented in elite institutions or in more selective, prestigious, or lucrative study fields[3] [Blossfeld et al. 2015; Boliver 2011; Haim and Shavit 2013; European Commission… 2018; DiPrete and Buchman 2013].

Likewise, the link between tertiary attainment and a person's performance in the labour market has not been clearly established. Perspectives such as credential inflation generally reject the expectation of universally high economic returns for all graduates by pointing out that the supply of individuals with tertiary degrees could exceed the actual demand [Elias and Purcell 2004; Tomlinson 2008; Collins 1979, 2002]. Increasingly, tertiary attainment has become a necessary yet insufficient precondition for obtaining a job as entry-level qualifications increase [Tomlinson 2008; Elias and Purcell 2004], yet employers – faced with an over-

[3] This is in line with the theory of 'effectively maintained inequality' (EMI), which predicts persistent inequality aided by institutional differentiation as members of the advantaged groups are better at navigating the educational system and harvesting its opportunities [Lucas 2001; Haim and Shavit 2013].

supply of graduates – put less emphasis on the formal degree *per se* and more on the type of degree, on the type of HEI that awarded the degree (e.g. its prestige), and on the field of study of their prospective employees [Tomlinson 2008; Liu et al. 2016]. Alternatively, employers may move away from formal credentials altogether, focusing instead on particular skills, personal characteristics, and extracurricular activities – characteristics oftentimes associated with a person's social origin [Tomlinson 2008; Bernardi and Ballarino 2016]. As a result, a segment of graduates are left to accept jobs of lower quality and lower pay for which they are over-qualified and over-educated [Kivinen and Ahola 1999; Morrison Paul and Siegel 2001]. This mismatch may then have a potentially detrimental effect, both short- and long-term, on the returns to education [Elias and Purcell 2004].

Education, expansion, and attitudes to work

All in all, while expansion seems to hold the promise of many an improvement to the conditions of individuals and societies, it may have consequences that leave people far from achieving this ideal – and ever further from it as student and graduate numbers increase. This might also be the case when it comes to attitudes and values. As briefly mentioned above, higher education is generally understood to foster a specific type of value orientation: 'the higher educated are more liberal on moral issues, more tolerant toward outgroups, less strongly attached to traditional religious values, and more postmaterialistic in their orientation than the lower educated' [Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007: 549]. While attitudes and values attached to work are not explicitly mentioned here, it seems reasonable to extrapolate that those, too, tend to be more post-materialistic; meaning that holders of tertiary degrees, when compared to their lower-educated counterparts, put more emphasis on the non-materialistic or intrinsic characteristics of a job (e.g. self-actualisation, usefulness) rather than the materialistic or extrinsic ones (e.g., security, pay) [cf. de Witte et al. 2004].

The mechanism by which education influences attitudes and values, however, is not clear [Brennan et al. 2015]. It might occur *directly*, as people are taught specific abstract skills (critical thinking, empathy) or as they are exposed to different groups and viewpoints during the course of their studies [Brennan et al. 2015; Pascarella and Terenzini 1995]. In this sense it occurs through the cultivation of a generalised, post-materialistic orientation, which then influences other areas of a person's life. The effect may also be *indirect*, wherein education affects specific factors in people's lives (such as income), which then affect their attitudes [Brennan et al. 2015; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007]. This explanation is especially informative where work values are concerned, and it fits well with the optic of the human capital theory [Tomlinson 2008] and the need/scarcity framework used by Inglehart (as summarised in de Witte et al. [2004]). It may be argued that tertiary-educated individuals favour the intrinsic aspects of work because they are largely freed from worrying about material aspects of jobs, as these are

'secured' for them from the start of their careers by virtue of the type of education they had achieved. Alternatively, specific values stem from *selection* rather than education – they pre-exist in the population of students because of a selection based on either cognitive skills or social class [Brennan et al. 2015; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007].

Whatever the case, the relationship between higher education and values may be changing because of expansion and massification. On the one hand, it may be reinforced as growing numbers of individuals are able to capitalise on favourable returns to tertiary attainment. On the other hand, and possibly more likely, the relationship may be gradually deteriorating. First, higher education is becoming increasingly practical rather than academic [Altbach et al. 2017: xii; Prokou 2008], a process generally encouraged by the need to cater to a wider variety of students of different aspirations (or 'clientele', as put by Liu, Green and Pensiero [2016; cf. Teichler 1998: 22; Altbach et al. 2017]), but also aided by the growing emphasis on student employability (used as a measure of HEI performance; [Mason, Williams and Cranmer 2009; Prokou 2008]), which is itself a result of EU-level strategies [Prokou 2008]. This development is particularly pertinent if values are transmitted directly over the course of one's education: if abstract academic knowledge takes a back seat to teaching practical, 'real-world' skills [cf. Mason, Williams and Cranmer 2009], the transmission of values becomes a marginal artefact within the educational process and student and graduate populations may become, on average, less post-materialistic [cf. Trow 1973].

Second, the link between higher education and post-materialistic work attitudes may also deteriorate if the association is indirect, via a disconnect between a person's degree and a person's performance in the labour market. The school-to-work transition has in general, over the years, become less smooth and more diverse, it takes longer and is often characterised by spells of unemployment, mismatch and over-education, precarious employment, or taking 'time out'[4] [Müller and Gangl 2003; Zamfir et al. 2018], and tertiary graduates have not been immune to these developments [Kuron et al. 2015]. While expansion and differentiation have allowed for greater intake, they have also produced greater output that, arguably [e.g. Tomlinson 2008], makes it less likely that all graduates will find a 'good' job (well-matched, stable, good-quality, well-paid, etc.). Indeed, according to Liu, Green and Pensiero [2016: 258], '[m]ounting evidence shows that many graduates with higher education degrees are trapped in low-paid, low-skilled jobs'. Facing such uncertainty with respect to one's career path may then make work values more materialistic, meaning that one's emphasis shifts toward job characteristics such as pay, hours, or security, as these are at the same time both highly important and not granted 'by default' (that is, if we are following the logic of the Maslowian pyramid used by Inglehart [1971], where higher-order

[4] And was further damaged in the recent recession [e.g. Hadjivassiliou et al. 2016; Liu, Green and Pensiero 2016].

needs and values are only addressed after lower-order needs have been secured and satisfied). The fact that the nature of the school-to-work transition may affect work values and attitudes has previously been noted [Kuron et al. 2015].

Lastly, the association between higher education and post-materialistic (work) attitudes may also deteriorate if it is rooted in selection. As already mentioned, over the course of tertiary expansion, the student (and, by extension, graduate) population has diversified and increasingly comprises individuals of various backgrounds and with various skill sets, motivations, and, importantly, attitudes and values [Brennan et al. 2013; Mount and Belanger 2004; Zamfir et al. 2018; Terenzini et al. 1996; Altbach et al. 2017]. If post-materialistic values are mainly the characteristic of elite or better-off groups and if the education system, as a whole, becomes less selective (and more inclusive of non-elite groups), then it could be argued that values, on average, will shift away from post-materialism and towards materialism (assuming that non-elite groups are more materialistic in their orientations – for example, first-generation students from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds [cf. Inglehart 1971]) because of the change in the composition of the student and graduate bodies.

Aims

To summarise, while higher education tends to be linked to an overall post-materialistic value orientation, this link – for a variety of reasons – could grow weaker as systems of higher education expand and massify. Elaborating on existing arguments and suggestions, the aim of the present study is twofold. First, it aims to take a closer look at the association between higher education and work values, which have been somewhat overlooked in the literature to date. We are mainly interested in whether higher-educated Europeans (when compared to their lower-educated counterparts) are indeed less materialistic and more post-materialistic in their attitudes toward various aspects of work.

Materialistic (extrinsic) aspects of work (or work values) are typically external to the individual worker [Twenge et al. 2010] and denote factors such as pay, hours worked, or work security [Kuron et al. 2015; Jin and Rounds 2012; Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss 1999]. Post-materialistic (intrinsic) characteristics of work, on the other hand, relate to self-actualisation and psychological satisfaction, covering aspects such as whether or not a job is interesting, challenging, useful, or fulfilling [Kuron et al. 2015; Jin and Rounds 2012; Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss 1999]. Reporting on survey results, Inglehart and Abramson [1999] summarised that materialistic respondents tended to favour extrinsic work values, while post-materialistic respondents more frequently prioritized intrinsic aspects.

Second, the study aims to determine whether the relationship between higher education and post-materialistic work values has been affected by tertiary expansion. In particular, we aim to explore whether this relationship has become

weaker as European systems of higher education have continued to expand since the year 2000, and as tertiary education has (presumably) become more heterogeneous, at times less academic, and, importantly, less of a guarantee of a 'good job' upon entering the labour market.

Data, variables, and methods

The analysis was undertaken using the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is an international, repeated, cross-sectional survey that aims to 'empirically uncover basic values, attitudes, and preferences of the European population and to explore the similarities, differences, and changes in these orientations' [Halman 2001: 1]. The EVS focuses on various thematic areas such as family, politics, national identity, religiosity, and work. The study is fielded every nine years in over 30 European countries, many of which take part repeatedly. It is this repeated participation as well as the (more or less) stable content of the questionnaire that make the survey's data well suited for use in analyses of changing trends in attitudes and values over time.

At the time of writing, five waves of the EVS had been conducted (1981, 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017). We used three of these waves in our analysis (waves 2–4), which cover the periods both before and during the Bologna process (1990–2008). We chose to omit both the first and the last wave because of an insufficient number of participating countries (in wave 1) and the small number of items in the 'important job aspects' battery[5] (in wave 5). The analysis was further limited to the countries that took part in all three of these waves[6] (28 countries in total) and to the working-age population (defined here in line with the literature on social stratification as people between the ages of 25 and 64 [cf. Breen 2004; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992]). This resulted in a sample of N = 64 119 observations. As such, the data had a hierarchical structure: the 64 119 respondents were nested in 28 countries, and these in turn are nested within three EVS waves. Usually, such a constellation would require three-level modelling, yet the number of groups at the second and third levels was too small (28 and 3) and the value of the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) unjustifiable [Bryan and Jenkins 2015]. For the materialistic model, the original two-level ICC was 12.44%. When testing the feasibility of the three-level approach, the ICC decreased to 6.22% for individuals nested in the countries level and slightly increased to 13.15 % for countries nested in

[5] For the entirety of its run, the EVS contained a detailed battery on aspects of work that was consistently made up of 13 items. However, in 2017, about half of these items had been dropped (including job security, pressure at work, or interesting work).

[6] With the exception of Greece, Croatia, and Luxembourg (which did not participate in wave 2) and Norway (which did not participate in wave 3). Data for the United Kingdom, originally divided into Great Britain and Northern Ireland, were merged.

the waves level. We found similar changes when checking the post-materialistic model. The original ICC was 10.22%, which decreased to 1.89% for the first level and increased to 10.32% for the second level. Therefore, we assumed that the differences between countries are greater than the differences between individuals within countries. We considered essential to control for individual characteristics on level 1, but adding a third level would improve ICC very slightly (by 0.71 of a percentage point for the materialistic model and 0.1 of a percentage point for the post-materialistic model). Therefore, 67 country-wave[7] contexts were created, allowing for the use of the more statistically correct two-level models.[8] All the analyses were performed using Stata SE 15.1.

Dependent variables

For the purposes of the analysis – and based on the variables available in the combined dataset – we opted to use not one but two dependent variables. In this instance, these were two summary indexes of both post-materialistic and materialistic work orientations.[9] These indexes were constructed in two steps. When the EVS was conducted, respondents were given a list of 13 'aspects of a job that people say are important' and were asked to select those which they personally deemed to be so (items were coded 1 if selected and 0 if they were not). In the first step, these 13 items were classified as either extrinsic (materialistic) or intrinsic (non- or post-materialistic). This classification was guided by the available literature [Kuron et al. 2015; Jin and Rounds 2012; Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss 1999; Twenge et al. 2010] and supported by the result of a factor analysis (not shown).[10] The 'extrinsic' group comprised five items: good pay, not too much pressure, good job security,

[7] The 28 countries nested in 3 waves produced 84 country-wave combinations, but 3 countries were missing in wave 2 and 1 country was missing in wave 3, as mentioned above. In five cases, information concerning educational expansion was missing; in 7 cases, information about age-specific unemployment was missing; therefore, only 67 country-wave contexts were used in all the models.

[8] When we tried to perform (statistically incorrect) three-level models, however, the results were almost the same, which shows that our approach is valid.

[9] The literature tends to distinguish between work values and work attitudes. Work values often relate to desirable traits of jobs or their outcomes [Kuron et al. 2015; Ros et al. 1999], while work attitudes have been defined in somewhat vague terms as evaluations of – or feelings about – one's job [Georgel and Jones 1997]. Throughout this paper, these two terms are, nevertheless, used interchangeably to mean general views on specific aspects of work.

[10] Our grouping also converged with the categorisation created by de Witte et al. [2004: 265], who used principal component analysis in wave 3 of the EVS. By means of subtraction the authors then created a single index, indicating a 'dominant' work orientation for each respondent. We decided, however, to use both measures separately, treating them as two complementary sources of information. The two indexes were moderately correlated (0.493).

good hours, and generous holidays. The 'intrinsic' group included the remaining eight items: an opportunity to use initiative, the opportunity to achieve something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, a job that meets one's abilities, pleasant people to work with, a useful job for society, and meeting people. Two indexes were then constructed by adding up responses across items in both groups. The index of work materialism ranged from 0 to 5 (the higher the number, the higher a person's materialistic orientation); the index of work post-materialism ranged from 0 to 8 (the higher the number, the higher one's post-materialistic orientation). Cronbach's alpha was used to validate both indexes (yielding alphas of 0.6685 and 0.7855 for materialism and post-materialism, respectively).

Independent and control variables

As the aim of the analysis is twofold, we used two main independent variables: educational attainment and educational expansion. Educational attainment is one's highest level of education categorised as (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3) tertiary.[11] Because wave 2 did not collect data on people's formal level of education, we approximated it using information on the respondents' age when they completed their education, with (arbitrary) cutting points set at 17 and 21 years of age (the result of this approximation was validated using information available for several countries on the known share of their tertiary-educated population). For the purposes of our analysis, educational expansion was defined as the share of tertiary-educated individuals within the working-age population (i.e. the population aged 25–64). Given that deriving this information from EVS data could produce an inaccurate estimate, we extracted it instead from the European Union Labour Force Survey (LFS), a more precise data source.[12] The LFS was also used to obtain information about age-specific unemployment (the share of unem-

[11] We opted for this categorisation in order to gain a more detailed understanding of the observed phenomenon.

[12] The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is a household sample survey conducted quarterly in the 28 Member States of the European Union and 7 non-EU countries. The Labour Force Surveys are conducted by national statistical institutes across Europe (in some countries since 1983). In 2018, the LFS sample size across the EU was about 1.5 million individuals. Because most countries became involved in the EU-LFS survey later than they were involved in the EVS, the tertiary-educated share for wave 2 had to be modelled as follows. Instead of EU-LFS data for the year 1990, which in most cases does not exist, data for 2000 were used. This means that instead of people in the 25–64 age range, we had to use respondents ten years older in the 35–74 age range. The correctness of our approach can be justified by comparing our results with the official statistical information available for eight countries. With the exception of the United Kingdom and Portugal, where the difference between our values and the official ones were 7.23 and 5.40 percentage points, respectively, the differences for other countries ranged from 0.16 to 1.73 percentage points, with a mean of 1.06 percentage points.

Table 1. Distribution of dependent variables by selected control variables

		Post-materialistic index		Materialistic index	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Gender	Male	4.288	2.478	2.522	1.518
	Female	4.282	2.459	2.566	1.544
Education	Primary	4.067	2.536	2.263	1.529
	Secondary	4.291	2.453	2.593	1.519
	Tertiary	4.713	2.291	2.309	1.526
Total		4.285	2.468	2.546	1.532

Table 2. Summary overview of variables used in the analysis

Variable	Description	Values
Individual level		
Index of post-materialistic work values	Summary index consisting of eight important-in-job aspects	Range 0–8
Index of materialistic work values	Summary index consisting of five important-in-job aspects	Range 0–5
Gender	Sex of the respondent	1 = male (46.02%), 2 = female (53.98%)
Education	The highest level attained recoded into three categories. Imputed into wave 2	1 = primary (45.26%) 2 = secondary (31.59%) 3 = tertiary (23.15%)
Age	–	Range 25–64
Contextual level		
Wave × Country	3 EVS waves (1991, 1999, 2007) and 28 EU countries (AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK)	80 wave-country contexts
Age-specific unemployment	Proportion of people aged 25–34 who are currently unemployed	Range 1.99–16.44
Educational expansion	Proportion of people with tertiary education (ISCED 2011 levels 5–8) in age group 25–64 in respective country and respective year (calculated from EU-LFS data)	Range 5.36–41.80

ployed in the 25–34 age group) – a variable we used as a proxy for the openness of national labour markets to recent graduates (in order to account, albeit in a limited way, for the work-related macro-level context).

For the remaining control variables, we used gender, age, and wave (at the contextual level). We decided not to add more macro-level controls because of the limited availability of information for the year 1990 (the whole of wave 2 would have had to be dropped, which would have seriously limited the scope of the analysis). Table 2 presents a detailed description of the variables used at both levels of the model (including the coding). Table 1 shows the distribution (mean, standard deviation) of dependent variables in relation to the control variables.

Analytical strategy

Two identical sets of four multi-level mixed regression models were estimated, one for each independent variable. Within the analysis, both indexes were considered continuous variables, although one had nine and the other six categories. While such simplification comes with limitations, it enables the use of computably faster and interpretably cleaner linear regression models instead of multilevel ordered logistic models. In each set, the zero-order model showed the mean of the dependent variable. Model 1 (PM-1 for the post-materialistic index, M-1 for the materialistic index) then added the level of education; Model 2 (PM-2, M-2) further included selected controls (gender, age). Model 3 (PM-3, M-3) addressed the effect of educational expansion by adding the share of tertiary-educated respondents in the 25–64 age group, the interaction between expansion and attainment (to see whether individuals of different education levels had been affected differently by the tertiary expansion), and the age-specific unemployment rate (to control for the openness of national labour market). Lastly, to introduce non-linearity, Model 4 (PM-4, M-4) used tertiary expansion in a categorised rather than continuous form (one group for each increment of 5 percentage points, i.e., 5, 10, 15, etc.). The results for Models 1 to 3 are summarised in Table 3 (the index of post-materialistic work values) and Table 4 (the index of materialistic work values). The results for Models PM-4 and M-4 are summarised in Figures 2 and 3.

Results

The results from Models 1 and 2 show that higher education was indeed tied to a preference for the intrinsic aspects of paid work. People with tertiary attainment scored both higher on the post-materialistic index (by 0.789 points in Model PM-2; Table 3) and lower on the materialistic index (by 0.295 points in Model M-2; Table 4) than their counterparts with primary education. The results from Model 3 then indicate that this association was affected by tertiary expansion.

Table 3. Estimated coefficients for models PM-0 to PM-3 (post-materialistic work values)

	Model PM-0	Model PM-1	Model PM-2	Model PM-3
Individual level				
Education				
Primary		ref.	ref.	ref.
Secondary		0.393 ***	0.367 ***	0.212 ***
Tertiary		0.816 ***	0.789 ***	0.554 ***
Gender				
Male			ref.	ref.
Female			0.018	0.016
Age			–0.006 ***	–0.006 ***
Constant	4.347 ***	4.024 ***	4.285 ***	5.510 ***
Contextual level				
Educ. expansion				–0.026 **
Unemployment				–0.090 ***
Variance constant	0.848	0.863	0.863	0.782
Interaction				
Expansion*attainment				
Primary				ref.
Secondary				0.008 *
Tertiary				0.010 ***
Model characteristics				
N obs.	64 119	64 119	64 119	64 119
N groups	67	67	67	67
ICC	11.75%	12.31%	12.32%	10.34%
LL	–145 207.2	–144 644.9	–144 619.3	–144 606.2
BIC	290 447.5	289 345.1	289 316.0	289 334.2

Significance level: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Table 4. Estimated coefficients for models M-0 to M-3 (materialistic work values)

	Model M-0	Model M-1	Model M-2	Model M-3
Individual level				
Education				
Primary		ref.	ref.	ref.
Secondary		–0.088 ***	–0.121 ***	–0.293 ***
Tertiary		–0.260 ***	–0.295 ***	–0.558 ***
Gender				
Male			ref.	ref.
Female			0.015	0.012
Age			–0.008 ***	–0.008 ***
Constant	2.565 ***	2.657 ***	2.997 ***	3.324 ***
Contextual level				
Educ. expansion				–0.020 *
Unemployment				0.014
Variance constant	0.590	0.585	0.587	0.574
Interaction				
Expansion*attainment				
Primary				ref.
Secondary				0.008 ***
Tertiary				0.012 ***
Model characteristics				
N obs.	64 266	64 266	64 266	64 266
N groups	67	67	67	67
ICC	14.77%	14.61%	14.74%	14.20%
LL	–113 803	–113 652	–113 540.5	–113 517.9
BIC	227 639.2	227 359.4	227 158.4	227 157.5

Significance level: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$

Figure 2. Average work post-materialism by the level of tertiary expansion, estimated results from model PM-4



Controlling for expansion, the estimated coefficient for university education in the 'PM set' changed from 0.789 in PM-2 to 0.554 in PM-3. Thus, while individuals with tertiary attainment still scored higher on post-materialism than their lower-educated counterparts, the difference was slightly smaller when expansion was accounted for. In other words, tertiary expansion weakened the relationship between education and work-related post-materialism. In a similar fashion – and somewhat curiously – the effect of education on a person's materialistic work orientation also weakened once expansion was added to model M-3. All else being equal, individuals with tertiary attainment scored even lower on materialism in M-3 than in M-2 (the estimated coefficient changed from –0.325 to –0.558). Educational expansion itself was negatively associated with both dependent variables.

Additional information is provided by the results of Models PM-4 and M-4. Figure 2 further illustrates the weakening effect that expansion had on the link between education and post-materialism in that it shows a decline in the average post-materialistic work orientation as the proportion of university-educated individuals in the labour market rises. Figure 3 then sheds some more light on the findings concerning materialism. We see that the index for materialistic work orientation did indeed decline with expansion, but it started to increase once

Figure 3. Average work materialism by the level of tertiary expansion, estimated results from model M-4



the share of university-educated individuals in the working-age population exceeded 25%. It is worth noting that in both instances the distance between the estimated marginal effects for each education level changed in different ways, which means that the impact of educational expansion differed according to the education level (this is also shown by the estimated coefficient for the interaction between attainment and expansion in the third model in both sets).

Where the remaining control variables are concerned, women were very slightly (perhaps negligibly) more materialistic in their work orientations that men (though the gender difference bordered on statistical significance in Model M-3), but there was no statistically significant difference in the level of post-materialism. Interestingly, we found a negative association between age and both dependent variables, meaning that with advancing age individuals became simultaneously less post-materialistic and less materialistic. This could mean that as they age people become less clear in their work values. Models PM-3 and M-3 also showed that over time (i.e. across the three EVS waves), Europeans have become both more post-materialistic and more materialistic in their views about important job characteristics, indicating that between 1990 and 2008 European populations gradually became polarised in their work values.

Discussion and conclusion

The existing literature adopts the general view that higher education is associated with a specific kind of post-materialistic orientation in multiple areas of social life, including attitudes towards religion, morals, or politics [Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2007]. In this paper, we have shown that the same applies to the sphere of work, an area that is not mentioned as frequently in this context. Taking a closer look at the situation in the 28 European countries participating in the EVS, we found that individuals with tertiary attainment – when compared to their less-educated counterparts – were both more post-materialistic and less materialistic in their attitudes towards work. This means that they more frequently saw as important those characteristics of work that may be described as intrinsic and, at the same time, ascribed somewhat less importance to aspects such as pay, hours, or pressure [cf. de Witte et al. 2004].

While education may affect attitudes and values in several ways, it could be argued that, in this particular instance (i.e. where attitudes to work are concerned), its effect has been mainly indirect, realised through the advantage higher education tends to secure in the labour market for those who have attained it [de Witte et al. 2004]. [13] Having obtained a 'good job' (well-paid, secure, with reasonable hours) merely by virtue of one's education – or, to borrow from Inglehart and Maslow [Inglehart 1971], having one's elementary (material) needs satisfied upon entering the labour market – leaves room to consider higher-order needs, that is, the aspects of a job that are less material in nature, such as satisfaction, responsibility, or usefulness. As we observed, it appears that this is still true even in the context of tertiary expansion, which has been hypothesised to cause the 'over-production' of graduates, thereby (in theory) dissolving the link between higher education and high-quality employment [Tomlinson 2008; Bourdieu 1996; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990] and – by extrapolation – between education and (work) post-materialism.

This being said, the association between higher education and work-related post-materialism, though not dissolved altogether, has clearly been weakened by the expansion of tertiary education that is taking place as part of the Bologna process. As was shown in the analysis above, when expansion was controlled for, individuals with tertiary attainment were still more post-materialistic than their less-educated counterparts, yet the difference shrank from approximately 0.8 to 0.6 points on the 9-point scale of the summary index. Figure 2 illustrates that higher-educated individuals did indeed become progressively less post-materialistic with advancing expansion. This also hints at international differences, indicating that in countries with a higher share of university-educated individu-

[13] Interestingly, the age-specific unemployment rate did not account for the education-values relationship, which suggests that different controls (such as mismatch) may be used to test the indirect effect (as the key issue might not be 'job x no job' but 'good job x bad job').

als (such as Finland or Norway – 37% and 35%, respectively), individuals with tertiary attainment tend to be less post-materialistic in their work attitudes than their counterparts in countries where educational expansion has not been so pronounced (such as Romania or Portugal – 13% in both countries), regardless of time or cohort effects.

Interestingly, we did not find a clear-cut rise in materialism, an intuitive conclusion of such findings. We saw that when used in a continuous form expansion did in fact further weaken the link between higher education and materialism: higher-educated individuals were systematically less materialistic than their lower-educated counterparts, and the difference widened when controlling for expansion. However, when the measure was categorised, materialism among the tertiary-educated declined with educational expansion, yet (unlike post-materialism) only did so until the share of university-educated persons in the working-age population reached 25%. After this, materialism started to increase (in all education groups; Figure 3).

Once again, if education is understood to affect work attitudes indirectly via labour-market performance, then these findings may provide some support for theories such as credential inflation, implying that tertiary expansion does indeed affect the chances of obtaining a 'good job' and hinting at a threshold at which the demand for higher educated workers becomes saturated. However, more testing is clearly needed (e.g. using relevant macro-level controls), especially as there exist vast international differences. Moreover, these results in themselves do not invalidate either of the other two main explanations of the effect of education, as they may also illustrate both a shift in the function of higher education (away from values transmission) and waning selection (i.e. a change in the composition of the higher-educated population). Lastly, when it comes to post-materialism, there is a possibility that – along with expansion – the (tertiary-educated) working-age population has gradually been shifting in its preferences, attitudes, and work values towards aspects not covered by the EVS questionnaire, hence the observed decline.

At this point, several limitations of the analysis should be discussed. First and foremost, the analysis would benefit from using a greater variety of control variables, both at the individual and at the macro level. For example, it would make sense to control for one's social background, namely parental education, yet this information was not collected in the EVS before wave 5. Similarly, it would be useful to use more measures relating to the labour market at selected points in time (e.g. over-education), but this type of information is mostly unavailable for the early 1990s. Second, though the decision not to use wave 5 (because of changes to the 'job-aspects battery') did help to construct two dependent variables of reasonable length, it probably limited the results by making them less 'up-to-date'. Future analyses might also want to focus more closely on changes over time by estimating identical series of models for all EVS waves, experiment with different potential measures of work (post)materialism, make use of more

detailed measure of higher education (e.g. distinguish between bachelor's, master's, and PhD degrees once the right datasets appear), suggest and test various explanations of the weakening relationship, and focus more closely on the association between education and post-materialism in individual countries and under specific circumstances of tertiary expansion.

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The Economy and Governance as Determinants of Political Trust in Europe: An Analysis of the European Values Study and World Values Survey, 1990–2019*[1]

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Abstract: Trust in state institutions is essential for the stability and legitimacy of political regimes. Understood in evaluative terms, political trust has often been linked to the performance of the state and its institutions. The macro-level sources of trust, however, are not well understood owing to the scarcity of empirical tests beyond cross-sectional analyses. This paper examines economic performance and the quality of governance as determinants of political trust in Europe. The analysis relies on data from the European Values Study and the World Values Survey between 1990 and 2019, covering 42 European countries surveyed at least twice. The modelling strategy explicitly distinguishes between-country variation from within-country variation in macro-level characteristics, enabling the examination of cross-national and longitudinal effects. The results provide evidence of associations between economic performance – economic development and unemployment – and political trust in the expected directions, with some differences across European regions. Further, countries with less corruption tend to enjoy higher political trust, but the effects of changes in the level of corruption on trust depend on the corruption indicator used. Finally, improvements in the quality of electoral democracy are associated with declines in political trust.

Keywords: political trust, public opinion, institutional performance, economic development, unemployment, democracy, corruption, cross-national research
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[1] Replication materials are available at https://osf.io/cqvg8/.

Introduction

Trust in political institutions refers to the belief of citizens that these institutions will perform their duties even if exposed to little supervision or scrutiny [Easton 1965]. Political trust features prominently in the sociological and political science literatures, owing much of this interest to the theorised link between political trust and state legitimacy [Brehm and Rahn 1997; Easton 1965, 1975; Klingemann 1999; Norris 2002; Seligson 2002]. Declines in political trust have been lamented as threatening the stability of democratic regimes [Dalton 2004], depleting the reservoir of support for institutions and authorities, lowering compliance with government regulations and civic duty [Letki 2007; Oksanen et al. 2020; Salmon et al. 2009; Tyler 1990, 1998], increasing opposition to government programmes [Davis and Silver 2004], and also raising concerns about a greater acceptance of illegal behaviour [Marien and Hooghe 2011]. Examining the correlates of political trust, numerous studies have shown that trust is higher in countries with better institutional performance [Miller 1974; Mishler and Rose 2001a], higher economic development, and lower unemployment [Lewis-Beck 1988; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; McAllister 1999; Mishler and Rose 1997]. However, since most of these studies rely on cross-country comparisons, it remains unclear whether the associations observed between countries hold when changes are examined over time. Indeed, the scarcity of empirical tests beyond cross-sectional analyses has been identified as a major weakness of this research area [Dalton 2004; Marien and Hooghe 2011; van der Meer and Zmerli 2017].

This paper examines trends in political trust and its associations with economic performance and quality of governance in 42 European countries between 1990 and 2019. The analysis relies on cross-national repeated cross-sectional data collection combining the European Values Study and the World Values Survey, taking advantage of the projects' Europe-wide coverage and long timespan. The modelling strategy enables the distinction between cross-country and over-time effects of performance on trust. According to the results, while political trust has remained relatively stable in much of Western Europe over the last 30 years, Central and Eastern Europe – the 'new' European Union and the non-EU countries – saw greater volatility in political trust, including substantial increases (e.g. Estonia) and considerable declines (e.g. Croatia). The analysis also shows that economic performance is positively associated with political trust, with some differences between regions. At the same time, countries with less corruption tend to enjoy higher political trust, but the effects of within-country changes in corruption depend on the choice of the corruption indicator. Finally, the results point to a negative association of within-country changes in the quality of democracy and political trust.

The paper is structured as follows. I begin by reviewing the literature on the evaluative nature of political trust, as well as on trust's associations with economic performance and the quality of governance. Second, I describe the individual- and macro-level data used in the analysis as well as the modelling strategy,

followed by an overview of the trends in political trust in Europe in the last three decades. Next, I turn to the results, and then I conclude with a discussion of the study's theoretical and methodological implications.

Political trust and its sources

Trust can be defined as a 'rational or affective belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of another party' [Norris 2011: 19]. The assessment of trustworthiness depends on the characteristics of the trustor, the trustee, and the issue at stake, making trust a relational concept [Hardin 2002]. Within the levels of system support, political trust occupies mid-range positions on the spectrum of specific to diffuse support, located closer to the most specific approval of incumbents than to the most diffuse endorsement of regime values and core principles [Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999, 2011]. As such, political trust is considered more volatile than, for example, support for democratic values, and is tied to perceptions about the functioning of state institutions.

While multiple studies have analysed individual attributes of the trustors, including socio-demographic characteristics and subjective evaluations of institutional performance, the focus of this paper is on the object of trust, i.e. the state and its institutions. Conceptual frameworks for evaluating characteristics of the trustee generally make a distinction between the result or outcome of the interaction, and of the process, with the latter conceptualised differently in different models depending on the context of application. With regard to trust in organizations, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman [1995; cf. also Schoorman, Mayer and Davis 2007] proposed a scheme in which the assessment of trustworthiness depends on the trustee's ability, benevolence, and integrity. Ability refers to competence, skills, and expertise in the relevant domain of activity. Benevolence indicates that the trustee cares about the trustor's interests and thus has to do with the trustee's intentions and motives. We can speak of integrity when the values that the trustee represents are acceptable to the trustor, a concept similar to value congruence defined as 'the compatibility of an employee's beliefs and values with the organization's cultural values' [Sitkin and Roth 1993: 368] or 'the beliefs citizens hold about the normative appropriateness of government structures, officials, and processes' [Sacks, Tyler and Levi 2009: 354].

Others have developed alternative schemas of the characteristics of trustee that increase trustworthiness. Barber [1983] argued about the role of competence and fiduciary responsibility, while Kasperson at al. [1992] defined trust as an evaluation of social relations in four dimensions: commitment, competence, caring, and predictability. With regard to the determinants of support for democracy, Bratton and Mattes [2001] distinguish between intrinsic performance evaluation, referring to the essential features of democratic systems, and instrumental evaluations, pertaining for example, to material living standards. Despite

the differences, all these approaches distinguish between competence or ability and arguably more subjective characteristics referring to integrity, benevolence, or value congruence. This distinction is particularly relevant when analysing the sources of trust in state institutions.

The ability of the political system can be best judged on the basis of economic performance. While macroeconomic conditions are not entirely shaped by state institutions, especially in the current state of globalisation of the economy, research has shown that citizens evaluate state institutions through economic performance, for which they hold the state responsible [Lewis-Beck 1988; Mishler and Rose 1997]. Trust has been shown to be associated with GDP per capita, an indicator of the standard of living and economic well-being and the most common measure of economic performance, as well as with unemployment [Morlino and Quaranta 2014; Muro and Vidal 2017]. The link between unemployment and political trust may operate on two levels. On the macro level, high unemployment creates unfavourable conditions for employees and increases labour market insecurity, which has a negative effect on political trust [Wroe 2014]. On the individual level, unemployment reduces well-being, life satisfaction, and self-esteem, and is associated with negative perceptions of the political system, which is blamed for an individual's misfortunes [Bauer 2018].

The lack of corruption and adherence to democratic values and principles is frequently interpreted in terms of benevolence and integrity. Public sector corruption entails betraying the public interest in favour of individual gains, and the associated partiality and abuse of discretionary powers not only objectively weaken institutions but also hurt the image of institutions in society [Rothstein and Teorell 2008]. Immunity to corruption may be understood as a matter of individual integrity or as a property of institutions and institutional arrangements, including procedures, mechanisms, and entities whose purpose is to assure compliance of actors [Miller 2017], which brings it closer to an issue of institutional performance. The quality of governance also includes guaranteeing civil rights and individual freedoms and ensuring and maintaining the rule of law and respect for democratic principles [Mishler and Rose 1997]. These properties make the state predictable for the citizens, which is an important aspect of trustworthiness.

While the theoretical connection between economic performance, quality of governance, and political trust seems straightforward, empirical research in this area has yielded mixed results. In cross-national analyses, the most consistent predictor of political trust is corruption [Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012; della Porta 2000; You 2018]. Some studies have also found an effect of macroeconomic indicators on political trust, but these effects seems to depend on whether corruption is included as a control variable [van der Meer 2017].

Examining cross-national associations between levels of political trust and state performance is informative in descriptive terms. Yet, if the relationship is causal, changes in performance over time should be associated with changes in

political trust independent of cross-country associations. Only a few studies have examined the effects of economic performance on trust in a longitudinal perspective. Van Erkel and van der Meer [2016] analysed Eurobarometer data between 1999 and 2011 from 15 'old' European Union Member States and found economic growth to have a positive effect and corruption to have a negative effect on political trust, controlling for a number of other macro-level characteristics. Kroknes, Jakobsen and Grønning [2015] used data from rounds 2–5 of the European Social Survey covering 25 countries between 2002 and 2010, and found that increases in the growth rate of GDP per capita and changes in GDP per capita were associated with increases in political trust. However, these models did not distinguish between- from within-country effects, so they cannot be interpreted in longitudinal terms. Bargsted, Somma and Castillo [2017] examined the same phenomenon in 17 Latin American countries with data from the Latinobarometer between 2002 and 2011 and found a positive effect of economic development on within-country changes of political trust.

The present study contributes an analysis of Europe over the last 30 years. This research is exploratory and does not specify a priori hypotheses for formal testing. Rather, the study aims to describe the associations between political trust, economic performance, and the quality of governance to enable addressing the following questions. First, is political trust associated with economic performance and quality of governance? Second, are the associations due to cross-national differences or over-time changes in performance? Theories of the determinants of political trust make causal claims, and while empirical studies on the topic tend to rely on cross-national differences, making inferences about longitudinal relationships based on between-country associations is not straightforward. Thus, identifying the effects of within-country changes in macro-level characteristics constitutes a stronger test of the causal association and a more direct way of studying social change.

The final question deals with the presence and character of differences with regard to the above associations between European regions. Prior research has repeatedly found systematic differences in the levels of trust in Europe, where trust is higher in Western Europe than in Central-Eastern Europe, and attributed them to cultural or historical legacies [Torcal and Montero 2006] and institutional characteristics, including those of the electoral and party systems [Criado and Herreros 2007; van der Meer 2010]. Beyond the variation in the level of trust, we know little about the differences in the determinants of trust across European regions. Overall, much of the research on political engagement deals with Western Europe, while there is reason to expect that the same associations do not hold universally.

In post-communist countries, attitudes towards the state are likely to be shaped by the legacy of communist rule [Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011; Rose-Ackerman 2001], the ongoing experience with state institutions [Mishler and Rose 2001b], and expectations and aspirations formed on the basis of comparisons with Western democracies. These factors, in addition to the 'post-honeymoon ef-

fect' [Catterberg and Moreno 2006], when the initial optimism with the new institutions had faded, serve as explanations of the generally low levels of political trust in Central and Eastern Europe.

Among post-communist countries in Europe, the dividing line is between countries that pursued the path of democratic consolidation and economic reform and subsequently became members of the European Union in the 2000s and those that remain outside the EU. This distinction is associated with the success of the post-communist transition traced back to pre-communist mass schooling and its nationalist content [Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006], as well as historical legacies and experiences of democratic governance, and overlaps with contemporary differences in economic performance and democratic consolidation. Hence, if political trust is primarily driven by the performance and integrity of state institutions, it should be higher among the new EU Member States than in the non-EU Eastern European countries. It is also possible, however, that the overall lower level of economic development in these countries changes the relative importance of economic and governance-related aspects of institutional functioning, so that aspects associated with security are preferred to aspects associated with opportunities, corresponding to the 'utility ladder of freedoms' [Welzel 2013]. At the same time, non-EU Eastern Europeans are generally assessed as not fully free or democratic [Freedom House 2020], where trust may be driven from other characteristics of state institutions and their performance than in full democracies. These differences are reflected, among others, in the association between education and trust, which is positive in consolidated democracies and negative in non-democracies [Kołczyńska 2020]. Overall, examining differences in the determinants of political trust in these three regions may illuminate the mechanisms that shape trust in different political, social, and economic contexts.

Data and methods

Data come from the European Values Study [European Values Study 2015; Gedeshi et al. 2020] and World Values Survey [Inglehart et al. 2014], limited to surveys from European countries. After eliminating surveys that do not contain one or more of the necessary variables and samples from countries surveyed only once, the final dataset contains 169 surveys from 42 countries from EVS 2–5, and WVS 2, 3, 5, 6.[2] I excluded records with missing values on any of the variables. Since the focus of the analysis is on adults, data from respondents below the age of 18 have been removed. The list of countries, years, and project rounds in the final sample is available in the Appendix, Table A1.

[2] The question about trust in the justice system was not asked in WVS/4. The survey documentation provides definitions of target populations, information about the sampling design, survey mode, non-response, and other aspects of the fieldwork process.

Variables

Political trust

Survey questions on political trust are generally of two types. The first is the trust in government scale from the American National Election Survey, which asks respondents (a) how often the government can be trusted to do what is right, (b) whether the government is run by a few big interests, (c) whether people in the government are wasteful or (d) crooked. While this scale better fits into the 'willingness to accept vulnerability' concept of trust [cf. Hamm, Smidt and Mayer 2019; Poznyak et al. 2014], it has been argued that it measures trust in the incumbent government [Craig, Niemi and Silver 1990], rather than a diffuse system support in the sense used by Easton [1965].

The second measurement approach, which dominates cross-national studies, relies on questions about trust in different institutions. Some analyses rely on single indicators, most often on trust in parliament [Catterberg 2013; Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon 2010; Závecz 2017]. Others use multi-indicator measures consisting of different configurations of institutions [Breustedt 2017], with decisions guided by both theoretical considerations and availability. Since the theoretical literature tends to discuss political trust as a diffuse attitude towards regime institutions, and because of reliability concerns, measures that include trust in different institutions are preferred over single items. Given that empirical analyses point to the unidimensional structure of judgements of trustworthiness regarding different state institutions[3] [Hooghe 2011], I follow the multi-indictor approach, and measure trust in state institutions with three items referring to trust in the national parliament, the justice system, and the civil service – three basic institutions to democratic states.[4]

The three trust items are coded on a four-point descending scale, with only small differences in question wording between the two survey projects.[5] The political trust index is constructed as the sum of the values on the three trust variables, reversed – to have higher values correspond to more trust – and rescaled into the 0–10 range for ease of interpretation.

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[3] Multi-group factor analysis with the alignment method [Asparouhov and Muthén 2014] shows that this three-item political trust scale meets the requirements for approximate scalar invariance, which enables inter-group comparisons of both correlations and means. The results of these analyses are available in the Appendix, Table A4.

[4] Frequently political parties are also included in the political trust index [e.g. McAllister 1999; Miller and Listhaug 1999; Morlino and Quaranta 2014; Zmerli and Castillo 2015]; however, this variable is not available in all EVS waves.

[5] In the EVS Round 5 questionnaire [European Values Study 2018] the question read: *Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?* In the WVS Round 6 master questionnaire [World Values Survey 2012] the question read: *I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?*

Economic performance and governance indicators

Macro-level data include indicators of economic performance and quality of governance from different sources. Data on gross domestic product per capita [World Development Indicators 2020a] refer to the standard of living, and are represented in 10 000 USD to facilitate computation. It is worth noting that within-country changes in GDP per capita indicate economic performance, while between-country differences rather reflect differences in economic development. The unemployment rate is defined as the proportion of the unemployed in the total labour force [World Development Indicators 2020b].

To measure corruption I use two indicators: First, the public sector corruption index from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which combines the ratings on public sector bribery and embezzlement by country experts [Coppedge et al. 2020]. The second one is the Bayesian Corruption Indicator created from a variety of data sources, including population surveys and expert assessments, that refer to public perceptions of corruption and are available in the Quality of Government Institute Dataset [Dahlberg et al. 2020; Standaert 2015].[6]. The values of the QOG indicator, originally ranging from 0 to 100, were divided by 100 to facilitate comparability with the V-Dem indicators measured on a 0–1 scale.

Interestingly, while the correlation between both indicators for the sample included in the analysis equals 0.79, this is almost entirely due to the correlation between country means of country-year values (r = 0.82) and not deviations from these means (r = 0.02). Similar but smaller differences have been noticed in Standaert's [2015] comparison of the Bayesian Corruption Indicator with the Corruption Perceptions Index and Worldwide Governance Indicator's Control of Corruption measure. These discrepancies are consequential for the model results and this will be discussed below.[7]

Finally, I use V-Dem's electoral democracy index to measure the quality of democracy. The index assesses the extent to which the country's elections are free and fair, and – also between elections – the functioning of freedom of expression and independent media representing diverse viewpoints [Coppedge et al. 2019: 39].

[6] Other international indicators of corruption, such as the Control of Corruption component of the Worldwide Governance Indicators [Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010] and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, are only available as of the mid-1990s, which makes them not applicable in the present analysis, while CPI additionally has limited comparability over time [Transparency International 2020: 26].

[7] The two corruption indicators use different source data (expert surveys in the case of the V-Dem Public sector corruption index and a host of different data sources on corruption perception in the case of the Bayesian Corruption Indicator) and estimation procedures (both indicators are model-based, but the models differ with regard to, among others, the modeling of time). A closer examination of both elements could identify the sources of the observed differences. Discrepancies in indicators of governance and regime change are also discussed by Lueders and Lust [2018] and Kołczyńska and Bürkner [2020].

Regions

To examine differences in the effects of macro-level characteristics on political trust, I divide European countries into three groups depending on their democratic history and current status. The first group includes non-EU countries from Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, and the Caucasus: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Russia, and Ukraine. The second group includes 'new' EU member states, i.e. countries that joined the EU in or after 2004: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The third group comprises established Western European democracies, i.e. countries that were members of the European Union or the European Free Trade Association before 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In descriptive analyses the latter group – the 'old' EU countries – is additionally divided into Northern Europe and Western Europe to improve the presentation of the results.

Control variables

The analysis also adjusts for a number of individual-level characteristics that potentially affect political trust: age, sex, education, and economic status. Age and sex tend to be weakly associated with political trust and are included for comparative purposes. To facilitate estimation, age in years is divided by 10. Education is measured as the number of years of schooling the respondent has completed, derived from the age upon completion of full-time education. To avoid extreme values, the number of years of schooling was top-coded at 20, which corresponds to an advanced degree. The relationship between education and trust is known to depend on the country's level of democracy [Kołczyńska 2020] and corruption [Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012]. Since exploring the relative importance of country characteristics as moderators of the education-trust association is beyond the scope of this analysis, education is interacted with the region identifier to account for the differences in the direction of the effects across countries.

I include household income as a measure of economic status expecting that the well-off may be more supportive of the system that enabled them to achieve their privileged position. Despite some differences in the design of household income variables in WVS [Donnelly and Pop-Eleches 2018], the variable is ordinal in all national surveys, which satisfies the requirements of the present analysis. To improve comparability, the income scale was standardized within national surveys. Table A2 in the Appendix presents summary statistics for all variables.

Models

The analysis consists of three-level linear regression models with individuals nested in country-years, nested in countries. The first set of models estimates the effects of macro-level indicators on political trust of individual *i* in country *j* and year *k* without distinguishing between- and within-country variation:

$$trust_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 newEU_j + \beta_2 oldEU_j + \beta_3 macro\ indicator_{jk} + \beta_4 year_{jk} + \beta_x controls_{ijk} + \\ + e_{ijk} + r_{0jk} + u_{00k}$$

where β_0 is the overall intercept, and the β-coefficients correspond to the fixed effects, β_1 and β_2, distinguishing between the 'new' and 'old' EU countries and the non-EU countries (reference category), while β_3 is the coefficient for the macro-level indicator, β_4 captures the effect of time, and β_x represents coefficients for the individual-level control variables. Finally, e_{ijk}, r_{0jk}, and u_{00k} correspond to error terms at different levels. Because of the relatively strong correlations between the macro-level variables, they are entered into models separately. Next, each macro-level measure is interacted with the country group dummies to see whether their effects vary between non-EU, 'new' EU, and 'old' EU countries.

In the second part of the analysis, the models distinguish the effects of between-country differences and within-country changes in macro-level characteristics by decomposing them into the time-invariant country means x_j, and the time-varying deviations from the mean x_{jk}, [Fairbrother 2014; Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016]. The resulting model has the following form:

$$trust_{ijk} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 newEU_j + \beta_2 oldEU_j + \beta_3 \Delta macro\ indicator_{jk} + \beta_4 \overline{macro\ indicator_j} + \\ + \beta_5 year_{jk} + \beta_x controls_{ijk} + e_{ijk} + r_{0jk} + u_{00k}$$

where β_3 is the coefficient for the time-varying component of macro-level characteristics β_4, is the coefficient for the time-invariant components, and the remainder of the model is unchanged.

The analyses use case weights as provided in the EVS and WVS datasets. Rounds 1–4 of EVS and 1–6 of WVS provided a single weighting variable, while in the EVS/5 the 'calibration weight' was used. In cases where sub-national samples and corresponding weights are available in the EVS (Bosnia-Hercegovina and United Kingdom), weights have been modified to reflect the population proportions between two sub-national samples.

To estimate the models I used the lmer command in the lme4 package [Bates et al. 2015] in R [R Core Team 2020], the emmeans package [Lenth 2019] to probe interactions, and the stargazer package [Hlavac 2018] for the tables.[8] Given the ex-

[8] Many other R packages were used in the analysis: sirt [Robitzsch 2019] for the approximate invariance models, rio [Chan et al. 2018] to import and export data sets, tidyverse [Wickham et al. 2019] to clean and transform the data, vdem [Marquez 2019], WDI [Ar-

ploratory character of the study, significance levels are interpreted in descriptive terms as the amount of uncertainty around point estimates rather than suggesting any binary decision about the presence or lack of a given effect.

Results

Trends in Political Trust in Europe, 1990–2019

Before presenting model results, I describe the trajectories of political trust in the period 1990–2019. Figure 1 presents the mean levels of the political trust index in countries included in the analysis in four groups: countries that are not (at the time of writing) members of the European Union, the 'new' EU Member States who joined in or after 2004, the 'old' EU/EFTA Member States, which are additionally differentiated into Western Europe and Northern Europe. For legibility, the plots only include means without the uncertainty around them. The graphs show considerable variation in the level of political trust, which – measured on a scale from 0 to 10 – varies between 2.5 in Bulgaria (2008) and Croatia (2017), and around 6.3 in Norway (2018), and Denmark (2008). Overall, political trust is the highest in Northern Europe, where it ranges from just above 4.5 to over 6 points. While individual countries have different trajectories, in the period between 1990 and 2019 this region generally saw an increase in political trust, with the exception of Iceland, which saw a decline in trust from close to 6 in 1999 to around 5 in 2017.

In Western Europe trust has also been relatively solid and stable and has generally remained in the range between 3.5 and 6. The lowest trust levels have been noted in Greece and Italy, and the highest in Luxembourg and Switzerland.

Among the group of the 'new' EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, each country tells a different story. Poland, for example, had a mean trust level of 5.3 in 1990,[9] which then fell to 4.2 in 1999 and since then has stabilised at levels slightly above 3.5. In Estonia, trust increased from around 4 in 1999 to just above 5 in 2019. Bulgaria and Hungary started in 1990 with similar levels of trust at just below 5, but after an initial decline trust in Hungary returned to its early levels, while in Bulgaria trust continued to decline and reached around 3 in 2017. In terms of overall tendencies, the region saw an increase in the dispersion of political trust, with the range increasing from between 4.1 and 5.3 in 1990 to between 2.5 and 5.1.

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el-Bundock 2019] to download democracy and economic indicators, and countrycode [Arel-Bundock, Enevoldsen, and Yetman 2018] to switch between country names and codes.

[9] According to the WVS/2 survey, the mean trust level in Poland in 1989 was higher than 6, but this national survey was excluded due to the lack of GDP per capita data. Additionally, such high trust likely reflected hope and optimism about the future rather than any assessment of institutional performance thus far.

Figure 1. Changes in political trust between 1990 and 2019



Note: AL = Albania, AM = Armenia, AT = Austria, AZ = Azerbaijan, BA = Bosnia-Herzegovina, BE = Belgium, BG = Bulgaria, BY = Belarus, CH = Switzerland, CZ = Czech Republic, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, EE = Estonia, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB = United Kingdom, GE = Georgia, GR = Greece, HR = Croatia, HU = Hungary, IE = Ireland, IS = Iceland, IT = Italy, LT = Lithuania, LU = Luxembourg, LV = Latvia, MD = Moldova, ME = Montenegro, MK = North Macedonia, MT = Malta, NL = the Netherlands, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, RO = Romania, RS = Serbia, RU = Russia, SE = Sweden, SI = Slovenia, SK = Slovakia, UA = Ukraine.

A similarly dynamic picture emerges from the examination of the trust trends among non-EU countries from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Most of these countries did not participate in the earlier rounds of EVS or WVS in the 1990s, with the exception of Belarus and Russia, for which data are available starting from 1990, and Ukraine, which joined in 1999. The highest levels of trust have been noted in Azerbaijan, just over 6 in 2018, a level similar to that in Northern Europe. In the remaining non-EU countries, average trust levels and their volatility make them similar to the 'new' EU countries.

Trust, economic performance, and quality of governance: total effects

Before presenting the results of the conditional multi-level linear regression models, a few words about variance decomposition are in order. As Table A3 shows, between-country differences account for some 10% of the total variation in political trust, differences between surveys carried out in the same country in different years account for just over 4% of the total variation, and the remaining 86% is between individuals.[10] It is worth realising that macro-level characteristics address just 14% of trust's total variation. A high proportion of individual-level variance is typical for analyses of political attitudes. A study of attitudes towards immigration in Europe [Meuleman, Davidov and Billiet 2018] using the European Social Survey 2002–2012 found 7.5% and 12.5% of between-country variance to be attributable to economic and cultural threat, respectively and only 2% and 0.9% between country-years. Compared to this, political trust is more volatile, as indicated by the higher share of variance between country-years.

Conditional models regress political trust on measures of institutional functioning, with separate models per macro-level variable. The first set of models includes an overall effect of each macro-level characteristic, while the second set of models adds interactions between each macro-level characteristic and regional identifiers. Table 1 presents the estimated effects for the entire set of countries, and for non-EU, 'new' EU, and 'old' EU countries separately. The full model results are presented in the Appendix (Tables A5 and A6).

According to the results in Table 1 for Europe as a whole (Models 1.1–1.5), political trust is positively associated with GDP per capita and negatively with corruption and unemployment. These results are consistent with the expectation that political trust constitutes a reward for good performance. At the same time, contrary to expectations, higher electoral democracy scores are associated with lower political trust.

To determine whether these average effects of macro-level characteristics

[10] The share of between-country variance has been steadily increasing in consecutive waves of the EVS, from 5% in EVS/2, to 10% in EVS/3, 14% in EVS/4, and 19% in EVS/5, as country means have become more dispersed, particularly in Central and Eastern European countries, which we can see in Figure 1.

Table 1. Political trust and macro-level indicators for all of Europe and by region

	Models 1.1–1.5	Models 2.1–2.5		
Macro-level indicator	All countries	Non–EU	'New' EU	'Old' EU
GDP per capita (10 000 USD)	0.276*	0.756*	0.082	0.299*
	(0.07)	(0.234)	(0.122)	(0.073)
Unemployment	–3.122*	–1.96	–1.51	–5.83*
	(1.183)	(1.78)	(2.35)	(2.01)
Public sector corruption (V-Dem)	–0.757*	–0.288	–0.614	–4.355*
	(0.42)	(0.573)	(0.603)	(1.307)
Bayesian Corruption Indicator (QOG)	–3.684*	–2.98	–3.84*	–3.83*
	(0.668)	(1.565)	(1.39)	(0.887)
Democracy (V-Dem)	–2.291*	–2.752*	–1.949*	–0.534
	(0.524)	(0.776)	(0.742)	(2.883)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. Data source: European Values Study waves 2–5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government Institute.

hold across Europe or are primarily driven by a group of countries, Models 2.1–2.5 add interactions between country groups and the macro-level variables. The results show that the overall association between trust and GDP per capita is primarily driven by non-EU countries and the 'old' EU, while in the 'new' EU countries the association is negligible. On the other hand, unemployment exhibits the largest effect on trust in the 'old' EU, where an increase in unemployment by 10 percentage points is associated with a drop in trust by around 0.6. In the other regions the effects are weaker but also negative.

Public sector corruption (V-Dem) also reveals the strongest link to trust in the 'old' EU countries, where a one-unit change in corruption (corresponding to the theoretical range of the variable) is associated with a decline in trust by almost 4.5 units on the 0–10 trust scale. In the 'new' EU and non-EU countries the association between trust and corruption is also negative, but several times weaker. The results are different when looking at the QOG Bayesian Corruption Indicator. Here, the association between corruption and trust is similarly strong in the 'new' and 'old' EU, and somewhat weaker in the non-EU countries. Finally, political trust turns out to be negatively associated with the level of democracy in all regions, with the effect much stronger in the 'new' and non-EU countries compared to the 'old' EU.

Overall, these results reveal differences in the effects of macro-level characteristics indicators between European regions, but these differences are in the magnitude and noisiness of the effect, not in the direction, which in all cases except the democracy scores is in line with theoretical expectations.

Trust, economic performance, and quality of governance: between- and within-country effects

The next part of the analysis distinguishes between time-invariant components (the mean within countries) and time-varying components (deviation from that mean) of economic performance and the quality of governance. As in the previous part, Table 2 presents only the coefficients of interest, while the full model results are available in the Appendix (Tables A7 and A8).

The first column in Table 2 (Models 3.1–3.5) presents results for all countries together. They show that the positive effect of GDP per capita on trust observed earlier is both due to between-country and within-country variation in development. In other words, countries that on average have higher GDP per capita enjoy higher political trust, but also as GDP per capita increases, trust – on average – goes up as well. The situation is similar for unemployment, where both the within- and between-country coefficients have negative signs.

The situation with corruption is less straightforward. When comparing between countries, those with more corruption tend to have less trusting citizens, as theory would predict. This result is the same for both measures of corruption. However, the association of within-country changes in corruption and political trust yields different results depending on the corruption indicator. When relying on the V-Dem measure, the association is positive, which would mean that, on average, as countries become more corrupt, the level of political trust increases. According to the QOG corruption indicator, the longitudinal association remains negative, but weaker than the coefficient for between-country corruption.

Regarding the quality of democracy, both the within- and the between-country coefficients are negative, indicating that as democracy improves, trust declines, and that, on average, less democratic countries see higher political trust. The between-country coefficient is much smaller than the within-country coefficient.

The remaining columns of Table 2 present estimated effects of state functioning in three European regions, based on Models 4.1–4.5 (Table A8 in the Appendix). According to these results, the between-country effect of GDP per capita is similarly strong in all regions, but with different amounts of uncertainty. The within-country effect of changes in GDP per capita are the strongest in the non-EU countries, weaker in the 'old' EU countries, and weak in the 'new' EU countries. Thus, according to the model, a unit increase (i.e. by 10 000 USD, observed, for example, between 2009 and 2019 in Poland), in GDP per capita is associated with an increase in political trust by 0.17 in the 'new' EU countries, by 0.47 in the 'old' EU countries, and in the non-EU countries by more than 1 unit on the 0–10 trust scale. Unemployment also has consistent effects across all regions, in a negative direction, and this observed in the case of both between- and within-country differences, with the strongest effects seen in the 'old' EU member states.

The negative between-country associations between corruption and trust

Table 2. Political trust and macro-level indicators of within- and between-country effects for all of Europe and by region

Macro-level indicator	Models 3.1–3.5	Models 4.1–4.5		
	All countries	Non–EU	'New' EU	'Old' EU
GDP per capita: time-invariant	0.252*	0.416	0.381	0.239*
	(0.080)	(0.394	(0.344)	(0.086)
GDP per capita: time-varying	0.346*	1.054*	0.173	0.47*
	(0.134)	(0.301	(0.152)	(0.138)
Unemployment: time-invariant	–4.557*	–3.040	–1.720	–9.4*
	(2.033)	(2.590	(6.060)	(4.060)
Unemployment: time-varying	–2.427*	–1.200	–1.180	–4.590
	(1.456)	(2.480	(2.530)	(2.350)
Corruption (V-Dem): time-invariant	–1.268*	0.322	–1.644*	–4.267*
	(0.510)	(0.741	(0.694)	(1.311)
Corruption (V-Dem): time-varying	0.340	–1.460	1.760	–5.250
	(0.774)	(1.110	(1.050)	(5.410)
Corruption (QOG): time-invariant	–3.960*	–3.510	–3.76*	–4.13*
	(0.748)	(2.057	(1.693)	(0.955)
Corruption (QOG): time-varying	–2.490	–1.980	–3.960	–1.610
	(1.590)	(2.810	(2.690)	(2.610)
Democracy: time-invariant	–0.841	–4.08*	3.36*	8.190
	(1.180)	(1.360	(1.630)	(6.390)
Democracy: time-varying	–2.746*	–2.27*	–2.9*	–2.150
	(0.591)	(0.943	(0.795)	(3.145)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$. Data source: European Values Study waves 2–5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government Institute.

are the strongest in the 'old' EU,[11] according to both corruption indicators, and are also negative and sizeable in the 'new' EU. In the non-EU countries, the between-country effect of corruption is found to be weakly positive when we use

[11] Compared to the non-EU and the 'new' EU countries, in the 'old' EU changes in both V-Dem indicators capturing corruption and democracy are very small, and the effects are in fact driven by a small number of countries that saw greater changes.

the V-Dem measure and negative when employing the QOG indicator. Regarding the within-country effects of corruption, the coefficients are negative for both corruption indicators, with the exception of the strong positive coefficient in the 'new' EU countries that is observed when the V-Dem Public Corruption Index is used.[12]

Democracy is another case where the between- and within-country effects are different. When comparing between countries, the association with trust is positive in the 'new' and 'old' EU countries and negative in the non-EU group. The within-country effects of democracy are negative in all regions.

Summary and conclusion

The association between economic performance and the quality of governance with political trust may seem straightforward. According to theory, insofar as trust is understood as an evaluation of the political system and its institutions, higher levels of ability and integrity would be associated with more trust in state institutions among citizens. In this paper I analysed the association between political trust and different dimensions of state functioning in 42 European countries between 1990 and 2019. The results overall point to associations between the economic aspects of state performance – GDP per capita and employment – and trust in the expected directions, with some variation in the magnitude of the effects across regions and generally the strongest and clearest associations in the 'old' EU, i.e. in the established democracies in Western Europe.

The puzzling result deals with the role of corruption and democracy, i.e. the integrity- and benevolence-related dimensions of state functioning. In the case of public sector corruption, measured with the V-Dem index, between-country associations with political trust are negative in the 'old' and the 'new' EU member states and are weakly positive among non-EU countries. When looking at the within-country effect, the 'new' EU countries stand out for the strong positive association that is found there between corruption and trust.

Interestingly, when using the QOG Bayesian Corruption Indicator, the patterns of associations are more consistent with the theoretical performance-trust link, and the associations between corruption and trust are always negative. To the extent that the BCI measures public perceptions of corruption contrasted with expert assessments used to construct the V-Dem indicator, it seems to be the more appropriate measure of corruption in the present analysis. However, the discrepancies between the two corruption indicators are surprisingly large, and a more

[12] QOG Corruption scores are not available for some Central and Eastern European countries for 1990 and 1991. However, even after eliminating surveys without QOG scores from the models with the V-Dem corruption indicator, the same anomalous corruption-trust association persists.

thorough analysis of their source data and estimation methods could shed light on the reasons for the differences in the trust–corruption association, both in substantive and methodological terms.

At the same time, in all regions the association between within-country changes in the quality of electoral democracy and trust is negative. In Central Europe, the negative association between political trust and democracy could be interpreted as stemming from the 'post-honeymoon' and transition fatigue in the 1990s, at a time when democracy was improving. More recently, trust increased in Hungary in the 2010s as the country was taking an illiberal turn under Victor Orbán. Among the non-EU countries, in Belarus and Russia, for example, trust was increasing as democracy was deteriorating, possibly in reaction to the improved stability and predictability of the state under authoritarian rule. These examples question the presence of an unconditional link between political trust and democratic legitimacy, with overall stability and satisfactory economic conditions being likely conditions for the trust–democracy link to emerge. In the 'old' EU, the observed negative association between trust and democracy likely stems from the overall small changes in the quality of democracy as measured by the V-Dem indicator, which makes the coefficient unstable, as indicated by the large standard error.

The links between state performance and governance and political trust warrant further research in several directions. First, it is possible that the functional form of the relationship between macro-level performance and political trust in a longitudinal perspective is much more complex than the linear associations assumed in the models. Trust may be shaped by the experience of a state's performance accumulated over extended periods of time, it may exhibit threshold effects, or it may react differently to positive and to negative performance changes. Second, when forming an assessment of state trustworthiness different people may assign a different weight to various aspects of performance, and systematic comparisons across societal groups may elucidate these processes.

Further, if citizens respond to performance and governance by adjusting their political trust, there may be a disconnect between perceptions and reality. Empirical studies are quite unanimous with regard to the positive association between subjective performance evaluations and political trust, where sociotropic evaluations of the economy matter more for political trust than evaluations of one's own economic situation do [van der Meer 2017]. Some of the disconnect between objective and perceived performance and governance may be due to limited or unequal access to information about macro-level performance if, for instance, there is selective media coverage of only certain events. For example, research suggests that what matters the most for political trust is the perceived responsiveness of the state [Torcal 2014], which macro-level indicators may not capture well.

Another issue deals with the measurement of trust. This article relied on a unidimensional conceptualisation of trust in institutions and focused on the mean

level of trust, while researchers are increasingly interested in the type or content of political trust. For example, Wu and Wilkes [2018] distinguish between 'critical trusters', who demonstrate different levels of trust in different institutions, 'compliants' who exhibit high trust in all institutions, and 'cynics', who distrust all. Their study found, among others, that the proportion of critical trusters is the highest in full democracies compared to flawed democracies and hybrid regimes and is the lowest in authoritarian regimes. Such approaches may solve some of the puzzles surrounding the links between trust, performance, and governance.

In terms of data limitations, while the combined EVS and WVS data set provides repeated measurements in most European countries over the last three decades, the surveys are only carried out approximately every 9 years. Given that political trust tends to be rather volatile and may react to short-term fluctuations in performance and its perceptions, surveys with such long intervals are not ideally suited for studying it. For example, data from the EVS in 2008 and in 2018 may have missed the decline in political trust following the global financial crisis [cf. Kołczyńska et al. 2020]. Further, with few measurements for each country, if even a few surveys have poor data quality, resulting in biased mean estimates of political trust, the analysis may be compromised. The ex-post harmonisation of data from different survey project can mitigate this issue, but requires that the complications that arise from jointly analysing survey data of varying quality collected using different methodologies first be addressed. By highlighting the sensitivity of the results depending on the choice of the corruption indicator, this study also points to the challenges associated with constructing macro-level indicators suitable for longitudinal comparisons.

At least one finding of this study is unambiguously reassuring. Despite the widespread concern with the future of democracy following the decline in political trust in the United States and Western Europe that began in the 1960s, in the last three decades political trust in most European countries has been fluctuating without a clear trend. No consistent erosion of this form of political support has been observed in established democracies in particular [Norris 2011]. At the same time, many of the post-communist and now 'new' EU countries have experienced a substantial decline in political trust since the 1990s, and it is unclear if the next years will bring a correction to this tendency.

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Appendix

Table A1. Country and year coverage—first part

Country	WVS2	EVS2	WVS3	EVS3	WVS5	EVS4	WVS6	EVS5
Albania						2008		2018
Armenia						2008	2011	2018
Austria		1990		1999		2008		2018
Azerbaijan							2011	2018
Belarus	1990			2000		2008	2011	2018
Belgium		1990		1999		2009		
Bosnia & Herzegovina						2008		2019
Bulgaria		1991		1999	2006	2008		2017
Croatia				1999		2008		2017
Czech Rep.	1991	1991		1999		2008		2017
Denmark		1990		1999		2008		2017
Estonia				1999		2008	2011	2018
Finland		1990	1996	2000	2005	2009		2017
France		1990		1999	2006	2008		2018
Georgia					2009	2008	2014	2018
Germany		1990		1999	2006	2008	2013	2017
Greece				1999		2008		
Hungary		1991		1999	2009	2008		2018
Iceland		1990		1999		2009		2017
Ireland		1990		1999		2008		
Italy		1990		1999	2005	2009		2018
Latvia				1999		2008		
Lithuania				1999		2008		2018
Luxembourg				1999		2008		
Macedonia						2008		2019
Malta		1991		1999		2008		
Moldova					2006	2008		
Montenegro						2008		2019
Netherlands		1990		1999	2006	2008	2012	2017

Table A1. Country and year coverage—second part

Country	WVS2	EVS2	WVS3	EVS3	WVS5	EVS4	WVS6	EVS5
Norway		1990	1996		2007	2008		2018
Poland		1990		1999	2005	2008	2012	2017
Portugal		1990		1999		2008		
Romania		1993		1999	2005	2008	2012	2018
Russia	1990			1999	2006	2008	2011	2017
Serbia					2006	2008		2018
Slovakia				1999		2008		2017
Slovenia		1992		1999	2005	2008	2011	2017
Spain	1990	1990	1995	1999	2007	2008	2011	2017
Sweden			1996	1999	2006	2009	2011	2017
Switzerland			1996		2007	2008		2017
Ukraine				1999	2006	2008	2011	
United Kingdom		1990		1999	2005	2009		2018

Table A2. Summary statistics

Variable name	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Individual-level variables (N = 183 391)				
Trust in institutions	4.471	2.235	0	10
Age	46.8	17.078	18	108
Female	0.531		0	1
Education, years	13.069	4.083	0	20
Income scale	0.03	0.998	–3.093	5.735
Country-year-level variables (N = 169)				
GDP per capita, 10 000 USD	3.189	1.686	0.675	11.192
Public sector corruption (V-Dem)	0.244	0.277	0.005	0.952
Bayesian Corruption Indicator (QOG)	0.357	0.165	0.078	0.662
Electoral democracy (V-Dem)	0.755	0.192	0.205	0.924
Unemployment	0.087	0.05	0.006	0.338

Source: Data from the European Values Study waves 2-5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government.

Table A3. Political trust: variance decomposition

Political trust	Empty model
Constant	4423***
	(0.114)
Fit statistics	
Log Likelihood	–404 498.9
Akaike Inf. Crit.	809 005.8
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	809 046.3
Variance components	
Country	0.483
Survey	0.220
Individual	4.333
N individuals	183 391
N surveys	169
N countries	42

Table A4. Political trust: approximate invariance test

Items: trust in parliament, trust in justice system, trust in civil service.
N surveys: 169
N individuals: 183 391

Multi-Group Factor Analysis Alignment with the sirt package [Robitzsch 2019]:
Alignment Power Values = 0.25 0.25
Alignment Scale Values = 1 1
Epsilon Value = 0.001

Alignment Results Lambda Parameters

Parameter tolerance value = 1
Total number of items = 507
Number of unique item parameters = 3
Percentage of non-invariant item parameters = 0%

Joint item parameters
Trust in parliament: 0.575
Trust in civil service: 0.544
Trust in justice system: 0.463

Alignment Results Nu Parameters

Joint item parameters
Trust in parliament: 2.175
Trust in civil service: 2.327
Trust in justice system: 2.395

Table A5. Conditional models 1.1–1.5: Total effects—first part

	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3	Model 1.4	Model 1.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemployment
GDP per capita (10 000 USD)	0.276***				
	(0.07)				
Unemployment		–3.122***			
		(1.183)			
Public sector corruption (V-Dem)			–0.757*		
			(0.42)		
Bayesian Corruption Indicator (QOG)				–3.684***	
				(0.668)	
Democracy					–2.291***
					(0.524)
'New' EU	–0.753***	–0.580**	–0.670**	–0.651***	0.297
	(0.237)	(0.241)	(0.274)	(0.200)	(0.298)
'Old' EU	–1.057***	–0.232	–0.464	–1.105***	0.908***
	(0.327)	(0.227)	(0.317)	(0.266)	(0.314)
Control variables					
Age	–0.272***	–0.259***	–0.272***	–0.275***	–0.259***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.036***	0.035***	0.036***	0.037***	0.035***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex (1 = female)	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***	0.113***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education, years	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.035***	–0.039***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
'New' EU * Education, years	0.028***	0.029***	0.028***	0.025***	0.029***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
'Old' EU * Education, years	0.072***	0.071***	0.072***	0.068***	0.071***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income scale	0.113***	0.117***	0.113***	0.121***	0.117***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)

Table A5. Conditional models 1.1–1.5: Total effects—second part

	Model 1.1	Model 1.2	Model 1.3	Model 1.4	Model 1.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemployment
Year	–0.017***	–0.003	–0.001	–0.001	0.0003
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	4.851***	5.314***	5.355***	6.812***	5.918***
	(0.187)	(0.263)	(0.334)	(0.400)	(0.317)
Variance components					
Country	0.205	0.230	0.140	0.292	0.241
Survey	0.214	0.227	0.201	0.188	0.215
Individual	4.285	4.285	4.242	4.274	4.274
Fit statistics					
Log Likelihood	–403 507.9	–393 809.6	–403 511.9	–382 944.1	–393 804.8
Akaike Inf. Crit.	807 045.7	787 649.1	807 053.7	765 918.2	787 639.5
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	807 197.5	787 800.9	807 205.5	766 069.2	787 791.3
N individuals	183 391	183 391	183 391	174 324	183 391
N surveys	169	169	169	161	169
N countries	42	42	42	42	42

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Data source: European Values Study waves 2-5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government.

Table A6. Conditional models 2.1–2.5: Total effects and region interactions—first part

	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Model 2.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemploy-ment
GDP per capita (10 000 USD)	0.756***				
	(0.234)				
Unemployment		–1.957			
		(1.783)			
Public sector corruption (V-Dem)			–0.288		
			(0.573)		
Bayesian Corruption Indicator (QOG)				–2.983*	
				(1.565)	
Democracy					–2.752***
					(0.776)
'New' EU	0.372	–0.565	–0.422	–0.215	–0.187
	(0.451)	(0.378)	(0.445)	(1.053)	(0.727)
'Old' EU	–0.493	0.114	0.060	–0.709	–0.851
	(0.476)	(0.344)	(0.415)	(0.853)	(2.571)
'New' EU: GDP per capita (10 000 USD)	–0.674***				
	(0.241)				
'Old' EU: GDP per capita (10 000 USD)	–0.457**				
	(0.230)				
'New' EU: Unemployment		0.446			
		(2.937)			
'Old' EU: Unemployment		–3.872			
		(2.680)			
'New' EU: Public sector corruption (V-Dem)			–0.326		
			(0.831)		
'Old' EU: Public sector corruption (V-Dem)			–4.067***		
			(1.426)		
'New' EU: Bayesian Corruption Indicator (QOG)				–0.859	
				(2.084)	
'Old' EU: Bayesian Corruption Indicator (QOG)				–0.850	
				(1.792)	

Table A6. Conditional models 2.1–2.5: Total effects and region interactions—second part

	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Model 2.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemploy-ment
'New' EU: Democracy					0.803
					(1.075)
'Old' EU: Democracy					2.218
					(2.990)
Control variables					
Age	–0.272***	–0.259***	–0.272***	–0.275***	–0.259***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.036***	0.035***	0.036***	0.037***	0.035***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex (1 = female)	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***	0.113***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education, years	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.035***	–0.039***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
'New' EU * Education, years	0.028***	0.029***	0.028***	0.025***	0.029***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
'Old' EU * Education, years	0.072***	0.071***	0.072***	0.068***	0.071***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income scale	0.113***	0.117***	0.113***	0.121***	0.117***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year	–0.016**	–0.003	–0.002	–0.001	–0.0001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	4.163***	5.162***	5.075***	6.450***	6.142***
	(0.348)	(0.306)	(0.402)	(0.836)	(0.418)
Variance components					
Country	0.223	0.236	0.190	0.149	0.274
Survey	0.200	0.214	0.227	0.202	0.193
Individual	4.285	4.274	4.285	4.242	4.274

Table A6. Conditional models 2.1–2.5: Total effects and region interactions—third part

	Model 2.1	Model 2.2	Model 2.3	Model 2.4	Model 2.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemploy-ment
Fit statistics					
Log Likelihood	–403 505.4	–393 804.4	–403 505.9	–382 941.1	–393 801.4
Akaike Inf. Crit.	807 044.8	787 642.7	807 045.9	765 916.2	787 636.7
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	807 216.8	787 814.7	807 217.9	766 087.4	787 808.7
N individuals	183 391	183 391	183 391	174 324	183 391
N surveys	169	169	169	161	169
N countries	42	42	42	42	42

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Data source: European Values Study waves 2-5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government.

Table A7. Conditional models 3.1–3.5: between- and within-country effects—first part

Political trust	Model 3.1 GDP pc	Model 3.2 Corruption (V-Dem)	Model 3.3 Corruption (QOG)	Model 3.4 Democracy	Model 3.5 Unemployment
GDP per capita: time-invariant	0.252***				
	(0.080)				
GDP per capita: time-varying	0.346***				
	(0.134)				
Unemployment: time-invariant		–4.557**			
		(2.033)			
Unemployment: time-varying		–2.427*			
		(1.456)			
Public sector corruption: time-invariant			–1.268**		
			(0.510)		
Public sector corruption: time-varying			0.340		
			(0.774)		
Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-invariant				–3.960***	
				(0.748)	
Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-varying				–2.490	
				(1.590)	
Democracy: time-invariant					–0.841
					(1.180)
Democracy: time-varying					–2.746***
					(0.591)
'New' EU	–0.752***	–0.622**	–0.851***	–0.664***	–0.134
	(0.238)	(0.249)	(0.290)	(0.201)	(0.441)
'Old' EU	–0.994***	–0.327	–0.766**	–1.183***	0.293
	(0.344)	(0.247)	(0.358)	(0.282)	(0.541)
Control variables					
Age	–0.272***	–0.272***	–0.272***	–0.275***	–0.272***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***	0.037***	0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

Table A7. Conditional models 3.1–3.5: between- and within-country effects—second part

Political trust	Model 3.1 GDP pc	Model 3.2 Corruption (V-Dem)	Model 3.3 Corruption (QOG)	Model 3.4 Democracy	Model 3.5 Unemployment
Sex (1 = female)	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***	0.113***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education, years	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.035***	–0.039***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
'New' EU * Education, years	0.028***	0.028***	0.028***	0.025***	0.028***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
'Old' EU * Education, years	0.072***	0.072***	0.072***	0.068***	0.072***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income scale	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.121***	0.113***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year	–0.022**	–0.002	0.0003	0.0003	–0.0001
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	4.960***	5.509***	5.671***	6.940***	5.271***
	(0.259)	(0.333)	(0.377)	(0.430)	(0.577)
Variance components					
Country	0.207	0.232	0.220	0.141	0.270
Survey	0.214	0.221	0.226	0.202	0.192
Individual	4.285	4.285	4.285	4.242	4.285
Fit statistics					
Log Likelihood	–403 508.6	–403 506.8	–403 509.6	–382 942.3	–403 501.5
Akaike Inf. Crit.	807 049.2	807 045.5	807 051.2	765 916.5	807 035.1
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	807 211.2	807 207.4	807 213.1	766 077.6	807 197.0
N individuals	183 391	183 391	183 391	174 324	183 391
N surveys	169	169	169	161	169
N countries	42	42	42	42	42

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Data source: European Values Study waves 2-5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government.

Table A8. Conditional models 4.1–4.5: between- and within-country effects and region interactions—first part

	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 4.3	Model 4.4	Model 4.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemploy-ment
GDP per capita: time-invariant	0.416				
	(0.394)				
GDP per capita: time-varying	1.054***				
	(0.301)				
Unemployment: time-invariant		–3.038			
		(2.586)			
Unemployment: time-varying		–1.198			
		(2.477)			
Public sector corruption: time-invariant			0.322		
			(0.741)		
Public sector corruption: time-varying			–1.460		
			(1.110)		
Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-invariant				–3.515*	
				(2.057)	
Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-varying				–1.985	
				(2.808)	
Democracy: time-invariant					–4.085***
					(1.357)
Democracy: time-varying					–2.270**
					(0.943)
'New' EU	–0.713	–0.670	0.318	–0.531	–4.860***
	(0.923)	(0.679)	(0.556)	(1.350)	(1.420)
'Old' EU	–0.652	0.217	0.477	–0.915	–9.117
	(0.664)	(0.500)	(0.520)	(1.108)	(5.643)
'New' EU * GDP per capita: time-invariant	–0.035				
	(0.523)				
'Old' EU * GDP per capita: time-invariant	–0.177				
	(0.404)				
'New' EU * GDP per capita: time-varying	–0.881***				
	(0.278)				

Table A8. Conditional models 4.1–4.5: between- and within-country effects and region interactions—second part

	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 4.3	Model 4.4	Model 4.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemployment
'Old' EU * GDP per capita: time-varying	–0.584**				
	(0.271)				
'New' EU * Unemployment: time-invariant		1.315			
		(6.590)			
'Old' EU * Unemployment: time-invariant		–6.366			
		(4.817)			
'New' EU * Unemployment: time-varying		0.022			
		(3.481)			
'Old' EU * Unemployment: time-varying		–3.388			
		(3.383)			
'New' EU * Public sector corruption: time-invariant			–1.966*		
			(1.015)		
'Old' EU * Public sector corruption: time-invariant			–4.589***		
			(1.506)		
'New' EU * Public sector corruption: time-varying			3.217**		
			(1.519)		
'Old' EU * Public sector corruption: time-varying			–3.789		
			(5.508)		
'New' EU * Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-invariant				–0.245	
				(2.664)	
'Old' EU * Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-invariant				–0.612	
				(2.267)	
'New' EU * Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-varying				–1.979	
				(3.838)	
'Old' EU * Bayesian Corruption Indicator: time-varying				0.371	
				(3.785)	
'New' EU * Democracy: time-invariant					7.444***
					(2.122)
'Old' EU * Democracy: time-invariant					12.278*
					(6.528)

Table A8. Conditional models 4.1–4.5: between- and within-country effects and region interactions—third part

	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	Model 4.3	Model 4.4	Model 4.5
Political trust	GDP pc	Corruption (V-Dem)	Corruption (QOG)	Democracy	Unemployment
'New' EU * Democracy: time-varying					–0.631
					(1.236)
'Old' EU * Democracy: time-varying					0.116
					(3.291)
Control variables					
Age	–0.272***	–0.272***	–0.272***	–0.275***	–0.272***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Age squared	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***	0.037***	0.036***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex (1 = female)	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.112***	0.113***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education, years	–0.039***	–0.039***	–0.038***	–0.035***	–0.038***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
'New' EU * Education, years	0.028***	0.028***	0.028***	0.025***	0.028***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
'Old' EU * Education, years	0.072***	0.072***	0.072***	0.068***	0.072***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Income scale	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***	0.121***	0.113***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Year	–0.026***	–0.002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0005
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Constant	4.733***	5.314***	4.626***	6.713***	6.744***
	(0.544)	(0.396)	(0.509)	(1.086)	(0.646)
Variance components					
Country	0.222	0.237	0.179	0.152	0.188
Survey	0.198	0.221	0.219	0.204	0.195
Individual	4.285	4.285	4.285	4.242	4.285

Table A8. Conditional models 4.1–4.5: between- and within-country effects and region interactions—fourth part

Political trust	Model 4.1 GDP pc	Model 4.2 Corruption (V-Dem)	Model 4.3 Corruption (QOG)	Model 4.4 Democracy	Model 4.5 Unemployment
Fit statistics					
Log Likelihood	–403 504.2	–403 495.7	–403 496.3	–382 934.4	–403 487.4
Akaike Inf. Crit.	807 048.5	807 031.4	807 032.7	765 908.8	807 014.8
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	807 250.8	807 233.7	807 235.1	766 110.1	807 217.2
N individuals	183 391	183 391	183 391	174 324	183 391
N surveys	169	169	169	161	169
N countries	42	42	42	42	42

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
Data source: European Values Study waves 2-5, World Values Survey waves 2, 3, 5, 6, World Bank, Varieties of Democracy, Quality of Government.

Figure A1. Trends in political trust and economic performance and quality of governance: Albania – Ireland



Note: Variables rescaled to a 0–1 range, such that 1 corresponds to the maximum realised value across all countries in the dataset. All available values of the macro-variables between 1990 and 2019 are plotted. Points in the political trust series indicate survey measurements, while the black line connecting them is provided to facilitate reading of the graph.

Figure A2. Trends in political trust and economic performance and quality of governance: Italy – United Kingdom



Note: Variables rescaled to a 0–1 range, such that 1 corresponds to the maximum realised value across all countries in the dataset. All available values of the macro-variables between 1990 and 2019 are plotted. Points in the political trust series indicate survey measurements, while the black line connecting them is provided to facilitate reading of the graph.

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Attitudes towards Life and Death in Europe: A Comparative Analysis*

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Abstract: Fundamental aspects of human existence such as birth and death are at the core of our values and profoundly sensitive to our religious beliefs, our ideals as a society, and our opinions on the extent to which individuals may interfere in these basic life issues. This article analyses the factors that explain people's attitudes towards key beginning- and end-of-life issues. To do this, we first tracked variations across two points in time, and then looked at the effects of value orientations and socio-demographic factors in comparative perspective across countries. Based on previous literature, we consider justification for euthanasia, abortion, and in vitro fertilisation as a latent variable using European Value Study data from the 2008 and 2017 waves. Five European societies were analysed: Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Russia. All the countries observed showed growing levels of justification for these practices, although significant differences were found in the value orientation effects and respondents´ background variables on attitudes towards life and death issues. In order to properly address comparability, multi-group confirmatory factor analyses across countries and across waves were conducted, and measurement invariance tested. From our analyses, we can conclude that age and religiosity, alongside other sociodemographic variables, are important explanatory factors in the justification of life and death issues in all the countries examined; however, value orientations show less conclusive effects on such attitudes.

Keywords: life and death issues, euthanasia, abortion, in-vitro fertilisation, values

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Introduction

In recent decades, science and technology have advanced in seemingly unstoppable ways. Advances in medicine have enabled us to challenge important human limitations or extend our lifespan. Life's beginning and end mark the human condition and are at the core of universal, existential reflections on the meaning of human life. Birth and death are socially embedded events and therefore subject to social norms, value orientations, and moral views on what a good birth and a good death mean [Dworkin 1993; Emanuel and Emanuel 1998; Long 2001]. Moreover, given that an individual's views on life and death often depend on their religious beliefs, this progress challenges our deepest moral and religious values. According to Lizza [2009: 546], '[j]ust as we can now live in ways that were previously impossible, we can now die in new ways that are made possible by medical technology'.

Beginning- and end-of-life issues have traditionally been a focus of interest for disciplines such as philosophy, ethics, theology, and law. From a social science perspective, the approach has focused more on researching individual attitudes towards boundary situations, and how these crucial situations related to birth and death are articulated and justified, both on a personal level and across social groups. In the literature [Hendry et al. 2013; Howe 2011: 173; Lizza 2009], beginning- and end-of-life issues have been understood as those aspects that theoretically and empirically address the so-called 'present problems of great importance awaiting solution'. From this perspective, beginning and end-of-life issues [Kaufman and Morgan 2005] raise questions about the situation of the unborn and the dying, and about how social contexts make sense of these situations by analysing the actors involved, people's attitudes, government policies, and developments [James 2000; Malpas et al. 2014] in these boundary questions on birth and death (assisted reproduction, abortion, euthanasia). The issues represent a value domain in which citizens feel particularly sensitive about interference in the natural and/or sacred processes of birth and death [Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018], and attitudes vary significantly across religious denominations and national welfare systems. Western societies are showing a growing interest in beginning- and end-of life issues, mainly due to significant shifts in demographic trends linked to increasing life expectancy and postponement of parenthood. Therefore, 'beginning- and end-of-life issues' refer to all moral considerations, value orientations, and norms that exist within social and cultural contexts and are linked to the general public's social and moral attitudes towards fundamental issues surrounding birth and death.

Topics such as euthanasia, abortion, and fertility can be the source of deep controversy among citizens, and regulations on these practices have monopolised intense discussions in the political arena [Fink 2008]. This is an area that relates to our deepest moral codes and values [Ekland-Olson 2014] and one in which the value of autonomy is contrasted with a vision of God's absolute control over life and death [Burdette, Hill and Moulton 2005: 80]. Following from previous defini-

tions of life and death issues, we consider these three practices to be at the core of our concept and analysis. This article contributes to the literature by empirically analysing issues that have been addressed separately to date.

Science and technology have made significant advances in extending life, reducing suffering, and assisting infertility. Common important life processes that relate to life, birth control, ageing, and death (in which humans have traditionally had little or no capacity to intervene) have been medicalised [Conrad 2007]; this, however, may clash with people's deepest value codes.

These attitudes vary across European societies [Halman and Van Ingen 2015; van Herk and Poortinga 2012; Finke and Adamczyk 2008] and are firmly tied to religious and moral values. Processes such as secularisation and modernisation are at the core of transformations in people's positions on value domains [Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005] and are of particular relevance in research on attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues. Secularisation is a highly controversial process of societal change [Halman and Van Ingen 2015], and the consensus on the connection between religion and morality has also been theoretically contested. Many of our moral standards come from religious doctrine; thus, institutionalised religions teach and share moral messages [Uslaner 1999]. The moral compass that religious doctrine provides means that people who are devout tend to be more reluctant to accept practices such as abortion or euthanasia.

However, according to these authors, religious practice has experienced a fundamental shift. If religion provides a normative framework of personal positions on moral questions, as a consequence of secularisation, then moral issues increasingly become a subject of personal choice, rather than being mandated by religious or secular authorities. Declining levels of religiosity as a result of secularisation may therefore have far-reaching consequences for the moral order within societies [Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018]. Knowing that Europeans are increasingly permissive on moral issues such as homosexuality, abortion, and euthanasia, it could be argued that this increasing permissiveness in people's moral attitudes is linked to the decline in the role of churches in secularised societies, where religious doctrine and moral guidelines are less respected [Halman and Van Ingen 2015].

Value change on fundamental moral issues that relate to life and death also occur as a result of processes of modernisation and post-modernisation [Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005]. During the modernisation process, the normative role of morality imposed by traditional religious confessions declined, leading to extensive criticism of religious statements and doctrine and more liberal views on morality issues. As a consequence of modernisation and secularisation, a value change towards secular-rational values has taken place, and religious authorities and doctrine are no longer the only regulator of life and death issues [Halman and Van Ingen 2015]. As a consequence of post-modernisation, values have moved towards self-expression and a growing

Table 1. Average score and standard error of justification for abortion, euthanasia, and IVF

	Abortion		Euthanasia		In-vitro fertilisation	
	2008	2017	2008	2017	2008	2017
	Mean (s.e)	Mean (s.e)	Mean (s.e)	Mean (s.e)	Mean (s.e)	Mean (s.e)
Czech Republic	5.23 (.071)	6.21 (.075)	5.24 (.072)	6.48 (.077)	6.83 (.075)	7.99 (.068)
Germany	4.83 (.062)	5.89 (.075)	4.80 (.066)	7.32 (.077)	5.80 (.072)	7.10 (.079)
The Netherlands	5.28 (.076)	6.95 (.106)	6.66 (.071)	7.60 (.099)	7.28 (.063)	7.99 (.094)
Russia	4.20 (.073)	4.93 (.072)	4.50 (.085)	5.03 (.078)	5.96 (.087)	7.08 (.070)
Spain	5.05 (.086)	6.21 (.095)	6.00 (.088)	6.23 (.097)	7.24 (.072)	7.53 (.084)

emphasis on personal autonomy and well-being. In relation to euthanasia, Rudnev and Savelkaeva [2018] point out that the improvement of existential security in recent decades has led to more significance being given to the values of autonomy and personal well-being. Regarding end-of-life issues, this improvement in material conditions has triggered a shift in the way we see and understand life, and the emphasis on 'quantity' of life has moved towards 'quality' of life. This change is rooted in autonomy and personal well-being.

The first aim of this study was to analyse attitudes towards key beginning- and end-of-life issues by tracking relevant differences across countries and different time periods. For this purpose, a latent variable, namely 'attitudes to beginning- and end-of-life issues', was created to reflect the rationale behind attitudes towards euthanasia, abortion, and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). The main aim of the study was to explore whether attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues are comparable across countries as a meaningful construct, and how these attitudes evolve over time. The second aim of this research was to analyse the effects of key value orientations and sociodemographic determinants on latent variable attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues, across countries and over time. The data used are from the 2008 and 2017 waves of the European Value Study for five European countries: Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Russia. For the purpose of the analyses, multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) was conducted across countries and waves, and measurement invariance was tested.

Table 1 shows the average scores for the countries analysed in the last two European Values Study waves, namely 2008 and 2017. Only these two rounds were used in the analysis as earlier waves did not contain all three variables for comparison. These data were used to describe the trend for the single variables on abortion, euthanasia, and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). These variables are measured on a continuous 10-point scale ranging from 1 (never justified) to 10 (always justified). The data show a uniform rise in the level of justification for abortion, euthanasia, and IVF in all five countries, although there are visible cross-country differences.

This article is structured as follows. First, we present the major contextual factors and transformations affecting personal positions on euthanasia, abortion, and IVF. Second, a revision and explanation of personal-level factors from the literature is set out alongside descriptions of citizens' positions on these issues, and we outline our working hypotheses. Third, we outline the data and methods we used, followed by the data analysis and a discussion of the results. Finally, we present the main conclusions.

What contextual factors shape personal attitudes towards life and death issues?

A considerable body of literature exists on the attitudes and determinants of justification for abortion, euthanasia, and IVF [Burdette, Hill and Moulton 2005; Cicirelli 1997; Cohen 2004; Cohen et al. 2006a, 2006b; Cohen et al. 2014; Dierickx et al. 2020; Fink 2008; Gray 2017; Halman and Van Ingen 2015; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Kemmelmeier et al. 2002; Köneke 2014; Lee 2014; Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018; Sigillo, Miller and Weiser 2012; Soini et al. 2006; Turner 1997; Verbakel and Jaspers 2010]. These studies have analysed the determinants of attitudes towards life and death issues and have offered concurring views on several contextual explanations for personal attitudes. Religious tradition and welfare provisions are found at the core of these attitudes [Cohen et al. 2006a, 2006b, 2014; Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996; Halman and Van Ingen 2015; van Herk and Poortinga 2012]. Halman and Van Ingen [2015] highlighted that the process of secularisation is at the core of transformations in attitudes, while Cohen et al. [2006a, 2006b, 2014] and van Herk and Poortinga [2012] point out the influence of religious traditions. The importance of religious denominations on attitudes to moral issues has been widely addressed in the literature. Regarding attitudes towards euthanasia, Cohen et al. [2006a, 2006b] claim that although the influence of religion is highly country-dependent, religious denomination still has a relevant impact on morality issues. Evidence shows that, in general terms, Protestants appear to support euthanasia more than Catholics, the Orthodox Church, or Muslims [Cohen et al. 2014: 150]. These authors support this difference by highlighting that Protestant institutions and communities have failed to uniformly define euthanasia as sinful (in contrast to other denominations). Some faith communities in Protestant Christianity may support this way of dying in specific cases where one of their immediate community is suffering from a terminal illness [Cohen et al. 2006a: 752]. Verbakel and Jaspers [2010] also provide evidence that people who are religious are more opposed to euthanasia. Regarding the effect of denominations, they claim that despite the difference between liberal and evangelical Protestants, they still constitute the most permissive religious group.

With respect to attitudes towards abortion, Lee [2014], and Jelen and Wilcox [2003] have also found evidence that Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants are well-known to be against abortion. Regarding attitudes towards in vitro fertilisation, similar evidence has been found. Sigillo et al. [2012: 251] provide evidence on the relationship between religious belief and attitudes towards IVF. According to their research, the Catholic Church's position on IVF is that life begins at conception and embryos have the same dignity as any other human being. It therefore condemns these practices, believing that it is a laboratory intervening in life issues that only God, and not a scientist, should control. Like previous research on the impact of denomination on morality issues, the Catholic Church concludes that conservative Protestants are more aligned with Catholics and that liberal Protestants are more willing to accept IVF. Orthodoxy has been described as being consistent with the vision of the Catholic Church [Randolph-Seng et al. 2008].

Dierickx et al. [2020] and Cohen [2006a, 2014] have stressed the relevance of the existing legal status of these practices. According to Dierickx et al. (2020), euthanasia is legal in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, some states in the USA, and some provinces in Canada, and the legal framework is a clear determinant of what position people take on these issues. Arguing that welfare systems and provisions affect personal orientations, Soini et al. [2006] moreover linked welfare provisions to health-care institutions and institutional trust.

Hyne [2015] emphasises the relevance of policy diffusion and its effect on the formation of attitudes through the socialisation of such practices in daily life. Conversely, health-care institutions in some countries are controlled by religious organisations which determine the actual practices and influence attitudes. Halman and Van Ingen [2015] and van Herk and Poortinga [2012] also provide explanations for differences in attitudes across regions in Europe, such as the prevailing values in these regions, the effect of secularisation, or the influence the communist legacy has on forming beliefs and attitudes.

Individual factors influencing attitudes towards euthanasia, abortion, and IVF

Contextual aspects such as secularisation, welfare provisions, and legal frameworks are seen as important factors in explaining people's attitudes towards life and death issues. However, the extant literature identifies highly relevant individual-level factors in shaping attitudes. While a number of these factors influence life and death issues separately, namely determinants of attitudes towards euthanasia, abortion, and IVF, we can nonetheless identify common underlying elements that theoretically explain what factors affect life and death issues.

One of the principal factors alluded to in the literature is that of religious denomination and religiosity. According to Jelen and Wilcox [2003], Sigillo, Miller and Weiser [2012], and Cohen [2014], among others, denomination is an important predictor of attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues. As mentioned above, Catholic values, as well as those of the Orthodox Church and Islam, are more unaccepting of issues such as euthanasia and abortion. In contrast, the Protestant religion is generally more permissive [Burdette, Hill and Moulton 2005; Cohen et al. 2014; Sigillo, Miller and Weiser 2012]. More strongly than denomination, it is the level of religiosity that shapes attitudes. Halman and Van Ingen [2015] reflected on the impact of secularisation and the declining importance of religion and church attendance on attitudes towards euthanasia, abortion, and IVF. Higher levels of religiosity are associated with more traditional positions on moral issues, and favour religious arguments over scientific ones regarding beginning- and end-of-life issues [Hyne 2015; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Lee 2014; Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018; Sigillo, Miller and Weiser 2012]. Individuals hold profound beliefs about where religious and moral decisions on crucial issues should be made.

Values are also an important determinant of attitudes to life and death issues. According to Rudnev and Savelkaeva [2018: 304], modernisation has brought about a decline in the relevance of traditional religiosity, while other values have increased in prominence alongside the growing importance of individual choice and self-expression. Personal choice, therefore, has come to take precedence over religious authority or mandates [Kemmelmeier et al. 2002]. In this regard, stronger post-materialist and secular-rational values are a major influence on the growing permissiveness towards life and death issues, in part because of the higher value placed on autonomy over life decisions [Turner 1997]. Rudnev and Savalkaeva [2018: 309] refer to the 'slippery slope hypothesis', understood as those cognitive and material resources which foster feelings of control and decrease feelings of vulnerability when confronted with the system. These include interpersonal trust, and feeling in control over one's life or education [Keown 1992; Verbakel and Jaspers 2010]. Verbakel and Jaspers [2010: 118], also link 'the feeling that one has no real control ... or has complete freedom of choice and control over the way his or her life turns out' to the slippery slope argument, which for their particular study on euthanasia predicts that 'people from nonvulnerable groups are less likely to fear potential abuse of euthanasia, and therefore, have more favourable attitudes toward it'. Therefore, feeling in control of one's life a relevant factor that shapes people's views on life and death issues, in that people believe individuals have complete control over their lives and, ultimately, it is their decision to act on such matters. Conversely, others believe that only God or fate can make decisions at the deepest level of life domains, and that individual decisions should be dependent on the will of a higher power.

Social and institutional trust are also relevant in explaining attitudes towards life and death [Salloch et al. 2015]. Regarding attitudes towards euthanasia, Köneke [2014] and Keown [1992] also associate trust with the 'slippery slope' argument. What this refers to is that individuals who feel vulnerable within institutions and government systems tend to justify euthanasia less. This means that those with higher levels of social and institutional trust in health-care systems have less fear of institutional abuse and malpractice. As Verbakel and Jaspers [2010] state, those who believe in the system's responsiveness also tend to have more positive attitudes towards euthanasia. Here, the 'slippery slope' argument means that accepting euthanasia, even if it could at times be positive or beneficial, may also lead to unwanted and unacceptable consequences.

Age is another important individual factor that can operate in favour of the 'slippery slope' argument in that older people who were socialised at a time when material and medical conditions were poor tend to feel more vulnerable and distrusting; therefore, they may be more fearful of euthanasia [Verbakel and Jaspers 2010]. Age and its effects are widely used to analyse the formation of attitudes to life and death issues [Cicirelli 1997; Cohen et al. 2006a, 2006b, 2014; Dobewall, Tormos and Vauclair 2017; Hyne 2015; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; van Herk and Poortinga 2012]. When analysing the changing effect of values or symbolic attitudes over time, it is important to disentangle the effects that time

period, age, and cohorts may have, which often appear intertwined in the data, even though they are easily distinguished, both conceptually and in terms of their theoretical implications [Tormos 2019: 83]. Various studies have used age cohorts to measure the extent to which members of a given age group who share common features and characteristics have different attitudes towards morality issues, even though they have similar socialisation patterns or experienced the same specific socio-historical events during their 'formative years' [Dobewall, Tormos and Vauclair 2017; Inglehart and Welzel 2005]. Age effects are also highly significant. They can be linked to changes in the life course, the ageing process, the acquisition of personal experiences, and in people's roles and status over their lifetime. The consequent loss of physical and adaptive capacities linked with ageing is a relevant factor for attitudes towards end of life, and so are decisions about delaying parenthood in the light of economic, occupational, and career circumstances. Several authors, such as Cohen et al. [2006b, 2006a, 2014], Sigillo, Miller and Weiser [2012], and Cicirelli [1997], among others, have alluded to age as being a major correlate for attitudes towards end-of-life issues. Regarding IVF and fertility issues, studies on how age impacts individual attitudes towards IVF are scarce, although some studies on attitudes towards embryonic research and embryo transfer exist [Sigillo, Miller and Weiser 2012]. Despite the mixed evidence that has been found on attitudes to embryonic stem cell research, it appears that younger cohorts are more disapproving of this [Sullivan 1993], and Sigillo et al. [2012] have found that younger women may be more disapproving of IVF practices than older women.

Education is also deemed a relevant factor as it acts as a proxy for autonomy and cognitive mobilisation [Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Lee 2014; Verbakel and Jaspers 2010] and is seen as a crucial explanatory factor in attitudes towards abortion and IVF. Other important factors affecting attitudes towards life and death issues are social status and income. Income (a proxy for social status) is particularly relevant when explaining attitudes towards euthanasia [Cicirelli 1997; Cohen et al. 2006a, 2006b, 2014] as it weakens the 'slippery slope' and perceptions of vulnerability [Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018]. The sex of respondents participating in the study has been included as a control variable.

Several European countries were selected for our analysis. As Verbakel and Jaspers [2010: 111] note, 'despite the huge differences amongst countries ..., existing literature has largely neglected a country-comparative perspective, focusing mainly on individual difference'. Regarding policy stances and the role of religion, Fink [2008] claims that legislation on IVF is stricter in Catholic societies and that the Catholic Church is an influential player. Countries with strong Christian democratic parties also have more restrictive embryo research policies. The levels of permissiveness and availability of resources regarding artificial reproduction techniques vary across countries. For instance, Spain and the Czech Republic are both Catholic countries and important destinations for couples searching for affordable fertility treatment [Dostál 2011; Pennings 2004]. The Netherlands (mixed Catholic and Protestant) also shows high levels of permissiveness, whereas Germany, which is also mixed, has more restrictive views [Busardò et al. 2014; Ory

et al. 2013]. In terms of levels of permissiveness towards euthanasia, we also find significant variations across Europe. According to EVS data, the general level of permissiveness towards euthanasia among the public is high in the Netherlands and Spain, but levels in Germany and the Russian Federation are lower. This suggests that other country-level factors might be operating beyond the influence of religion [de Moor 1995]. According to Cohen et al. [2014], people living in societies where a person's right to self-determination is accepted at a societal level are more willing to accept these practices regardless of their religion. It is also important to capture the East-West divide [Hildebrandt 2015; Hyne 2015]. The polarisation between Western and Eastern Europe may exist because of drastic socio-economic and political changes after 1989. Mishler and Rose [2007] found that lifelong learning is important for post-communist societies because they have had to adapt to a new world. Countries belonging to geographical regions with similar socio-economic and political histories should therefore show similar trajectories [Dobewall, Tormos and Vauclair 2017].

Cohen et al. [2006a: 747] suggest that the selection of countries should be based on their religious cultural backgrounds, history, and patterns of secularisation. In addition, welfare tradition and provisions and social spending are relevant factors to take into consideration (Bleiklie, Goggin and Rothmayr 2004; Ekland-Olson 2014; Knill, Adam and Hurka 2015; Steck et al. 2013]. Five countries were selected for the analyses. These represent the large range of different religious-historical backgrounds, communist and non-communist legacies, and differing government policies and welfare provisions in Europe. The countries in the sample are: the Czech Republic, an example of a Central-Eastern secularised country with a Catholic tradition and a generous and well-developed welfare system; Germany and the Netherlands, representing Western, pluralistic, secularised countries, but ones that have different welfare state systems and different levels of social and legal permissiveness and offer coverage of both euthanasia and assisted reproduction techniques. Russia represents an Eastern-orthodox country with lower levels of permissiveness towards abortion, euthanasia, and IVF, and it serves as an interesting case to compare with Europe in terms of the differences and similarities in their values. The last country included in the analysis is Spain, a Roman-Catholic Southern European society with a typical Latin welfare system [Cohen et al. 2006a]. This selection of countries covers the different European regions and the main religious traditions, policy stances, and types of welfare state provisions and regulations, particularly regarding all three practices included in the latent dependent variable. As the analyses require measurement invariance, a selection of countries is needed in order to obtain comparable results. However, only a limited number of units can be included, as widening the selection to encompass more countries could lead to non-invariance in some groups, which would have to be excluded from the analyses because of the lack of comparability. The decision to select a small number of countries for the study was made following the theoretical arguments explained above.

Hypotheses

Based on a systematic analysis of the theory and literature on the trends and factors that influence views on beginning- and end-of-life issues, we formulate the following hypotheses:

H1: Differences are expected across the five European societies in different years and levels of justification for these practices. In this respect, the level of secularisation, the given religious tradition, and the effect of modernisation in the country are expected to present variations in attitudes towards life and death issues over time due to the lasting effects of these factors.

H2: We expect age effects on attitudes towards birth and death due to the ageing process and life-cycle effects. As mentioned, the effect of age on attitudes is due to the 'slippery slope' argument and to the effects of ageing and alterations of the physical and adaptive capacities linked with ageing. Therefore, it is expected that older generations will be less permissive towards beginning- and end-of-life decisions.

H3: The level of religiosity and the importance of religion will have an important impact on attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues. Religiosity and the importance of religion in influencing people's views towards intervention in life and death matters is a widely shared finding in the literature. A higher level of religiosity is associated with more conservative, traditional views regarding the role individuals play in making crucial decisions related to beginning- and end-of-life issues.

H4: We expect that factors such as level of education and income will also have significant effects on beginning- and end-of-life attitudes. It is expected that a higher education level and higher economic status will be associated with more permissive views towards beginning- and end-of-life issues. Education and economic status are expected to increase perception and autonomy and, therefore, weaken the 'slippery slope' and vulnerability arguments. Moreover, feelings of control over life would also tend to weaken the 'slippery slope' and vulnerability.

H5: Secular-rational vs traditional values are expected to have a strong effect on the justification of these practices [Inglehart 1997]. Modernisation and post-modernisation and the consequent change in values they produced have triggered a process whereby beliefs are individualised, reducing the power of a traditional authority to dictate individual choices. Higher levels of security and stability result in more emphasis on autonomy and choice. The present study, therefore, considers post-materialism as a proxy for values of autonomy [Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018; Verbakel and Jaspers 2010].

Table 2. Sample size for each country and period

	2008	2017
Czech Republic	1785	1759
Germany	2070	1489
The Netherlands	1552	684
Russia	1473	1799
Spain	1487	1201

Data and methods

Data

Table 2 shows the size of the samples of the five countries studied (Czech Republic, Germany, The Netherlands, Russia. and Spain) in 2008 and 2017. The total sample comprises 15 299 cases and uses data from the European Values Study for both periods.

By using two waves, we aim to capture the evolution of attitudes over time and to provide deeper insights into the influence of age cohorts on these attitudes, thus offering a wider perspective of the effect of socialisation and changes in values. The method allows us to compare the countries and waves and split ages into cohorts to obtain a more detailed picture of the effect each age group has on attitudes over time.

Method

The study measures 'attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life' as a latent factor (η_j), with three reflective indicators, using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Brown [2015] showed a generalised path diagram (Figure 1), where 'κ' represents the latent mean for the construct; y_1 = abortion, y_2 = euthanasia, y_3 = in-vitro fertilisation; λ_{1j}, λ_{2j}, and λ_{3j} are the factor loadings on the items y_1, y_2, and y_3 (see Figure 2 for the variables used).

The three indicators obtained from the European Values Study were measured using responses to a question on a 10-point scale: 'Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between'. The specific justifications analysed are 'euthanasia', 'abortion', and 'in vitro fertilisation'.

The CFA model was analysed for the different countries and years, and multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) was used to compare the different groups. Using MGCFA [Bollen 1989; Byrne 2012; Davidov et al. 2014] not

Figure 1. Composition of the latent variable



Figure 2. Theoretical CFA model used



only ensures that the results will be accurate, it also introduces flexibility into the estimation models, thus producing more accurate estimates of the relationships between the theoretically related variables and the latent factor of interest, while taking measurement error into account. MGCFA is generally used for cross-cultural comparisons when testing whether a latent variable or construct of interest is comparable across groups.

Measurement invariance is needed to make comparisons between groups and to explain meaningful comparisons. Since one of the objectives of the study was to detect the effect of predictor variables on the model, invariance ensured that meaning and scaling would be equal across groups. Depending on the level of invariance, different typologies of comparison can be carried out. Generally, three hierarchical levels of measurement invariance are tested: configural, met-

ric, and scalar [Davidov et al. 2014; Milfont and Fischer 2010]. Configural invariance is the least strict of the three, followed by metric and scalar invariance, the most restrictive, where it is required that metric and scalar invariance be tested. It requires the same path diagram among groups, while the values for the loadings and intercepts can differ between the groups. Thus, if this invariance holds, it enables comparisons of the model structure, but not comparisons of relationships between variables or latent means across groups. Metric invariance requires equal loadings for each group; if the invariance holds, it permits relationship comparisons. Scalar invariance, which requires equal loadings and intercepts among groups, is stricter than metric invariance; if the scalar invariance holds, the comparisons of latent means between groups are meaningful [Ariely and Davidov 2012; Davidov et al. 2014].

Finally, the effect of the theoretically studied factors on the latent variable 'attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life' was examined, and multiple group structural equation modelling (MGSEM) was carried out in order to identify significant predictive variables on the latent variable in the different countries (Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia and Spain) in two time periods (2008 and 2017).

Measurement of the variables

The operationalisation of the predictive variables was presented and grouped according to theoretical dimensions presented in the literature. All the variables were taken from the 2008 and 2017 waves of the European Values Study.

The level of religiosity was measured through the self-assessment variable on the level of religiosity and trust in the church as an institution, as stated below.

- *Religious*. 'Are you a religious person?' Measurement: Coded as 1 for a religious person and 0 for a person who is not religious or an atheist.
- *Confidence in the church*. 'Please look at this card and for each item listed tell me how much confidence you have in the church.' The measurement was reversed from the original scale to be a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2), and none at all (1).

As identified in the literature, trust was measured through both of its dimensions: social trust and institutional trust. The variable confidence in the healthcare system was used as a measure of institutional trust and a proxy for the 'slippery slope' argument. Another measure for the 'slippery slope' hypothesis was the variable 'control over one's life', reflecting individuals' perception of how much control they feel they have over important decisions and life happenings [Rudnev and Savelkaeva 2018; Verbakel and Jaspers 2010].

- *Social trust*: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?' Measurement: Yes / No.

- Confidence in the *health-care system*. 'How much confidence do you have in the health-care system?' Measurement: reversed from the original scale to a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2), and none at all (1).
- *Control over life*. 'Some people feel that they have complete freedom of choice and control over their lives, while others feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. How much freedom of choice and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?' Measurement: from 'no choice at all' (1) to a great deal of choice' (10).

The impact of values was measured through the post-materialism index provided by the European Values Study questionnaire and data.

- *Materialism – post-materialism*. 'People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. This card lists some of the goals different people give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you consider to be the most important: maintaining order in the nation; more say in important government decisions; fighting rising prices; protect freedom of speech.' Measurement: Materialism (maintaining order in nation and fighting rising prices) is coded as 0 and post-materialism (more say in important government decisions and protect freedom of speech) coded as 1.

The socio-demographic and control measures provided are the scale of income, measured measured by a person's self-ranking in a decile table of incomes as a proxy for status. Education was included in the analysis with a measure in nine categories, and four age cohorts were included to capture the generational effects at both moments in time. The respondent's sex was also included as a control variable.

- *Scale of income*. 'On this card, we would like to know the income group your household belongs to. Please specify the figure, including all wages, salaries, pensions and other income.' Measurement: from the 'lowest income decile' (1) to the 'highest income decile' (10).
- *Level of education*. 'What is the highest level of educational attainment?' Measurement: from 'no formal education' (1) to 'tertiary education' (9).
- *Age*. Age, in years.
- *Respondent's sex*. Measurement: 0 = female and 1 = male.

Results

This section presents the results for the fit of the models, the scores for the latent means, and the effect of the predictor variables on the latent variable in order to identify its importance for the different countries and its trend over time. In order to test comparability among countries and over time, MGCFA was carried out and the model fit and measurement invariance evaluated. To address comparability for the latent means, scalar invariance is required, and metric invariance

Table 3. Fit measures for measurement invariance for beginning- and end-of-life

	λ^2	df.	P	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	ΔCFI	ΔRMSEA	ΔSRMR
M1. Invariance 2008										
P. Metric	82.543	7	.000	.976	.948	.080	.047			
P. Scalar	131.748	12	.000	.961	.952	.077	.050	.015	.003	.003
M2. Invariance 2017										
Metric	36.878	8	.000	.988	.977	.051	.038			
P. Scalar	88.561	13	.000	.969	.964	.064	.036	.019	.013	.002
M3. Invariance CZ 2008–2017										
Metric	2.094	2	.351	1.00	1.00	.005	.010			
P. Scalar	8.358	3	.039	.997	.995	.032	.019	.003	.027	.009
M4. Invariance DE 2008–2017										
Metric	15.178	2	.000	.991	.973	.061	.027			
P. Scalar	36.101	3	.000	.977	.954	.079	.040	.014	.018	.013
M5. Invariance NL 2008–2017										
Metric	1.054	2	.590	1.00	1.00	.000	.014			
P. Scalar	4.121	3	.239	.999	.998	.019	.011	.001	.019	.003
M6. Invariance RU 2008–2017										
Metric	12.883	2	.000	.983	.950	.058	.026			
P. Scalar	17.224	3	.000	.978	.957	.054	.028	.005	.004	.002
M7. Invariance ES 2008–2017										
Metric	12.769	2	.002	.991	.973	.063	.032			
P. Scalar	15.532	3	.001	.989	.979	.056	.029	.002	.007	.003

is needed to ensure the comparability of the effects of the predictor variables on the latent variable. Models to evaluate the temporal measurement invariance are assessed using five models within each country, while country invariance is assessed using two models in all countries within each year.

In order to evaluate the model fit, different fit measures were used. The first two criteria used were the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) measures. SRMR values of 0.08 or lower [Hu and Bentler 1999] and RMSEA values of 0.06 or lower indicate acceptable fit [Chen 2007]. In addition, incremental fit indices, the comparative fit index (CFI), and the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) were used to calculate improvements in the competing models. Values higher than 0.90 for these two indices indicate an acceptable model fit [Chen 2007]. Some criteria for measurement invariance have been used. Chen [2007] recommended that scalar non-invariance is evidenced by a change in CFI greater than 0.01, supplemented by a change in RMSEA greater than 0.015 or a change in SRMR greater than 0.01 compared with the metric invariance model.

The model fit displayed in Table 3 shows a satisfactory goodness of fit for the different models.

Metric invariance is found for the different models (except M1 for Germany, which required partial invariance). Partial scalar measurement invariance holds, since some intercepts have been unconstrained in the models (four intercepts for M1, three intercepts for M2, and one intercept for the models M3 to M7). The different model fit indices CFI, TLI, RMSEA, and SRMR are adequate. Model fit indices for the scalar non-invariance show that in the models at least two requirements (ΔCFI, ΔRMSEA, ΔSRMR) are fulfilled, and the remaining ones are close to the cut-off values. Additionally, when scalar invariance does not hold, alternative tests of partial invariance based on modification indices (MI) can be used [Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén 1989]. After estimating the models and taking into account the modification indices (MI), the expected parameter change (EPC), and the power of the test [Saris, Satorra and van der Veld 2009], no misspecifications were found in the models.

Table 4 shows the latent variables for the different groups. The latent means were not estimated in absolute scores, but rather as an arbitrary 'a-dimensional' factor mean, reflecting average differences in the level of the latent factor across the groups. The latent means in Table 4 were obtained for the different countries in 2008 (model M1) in order to compare them across countries, and then the variation for each country was obtained by estimating models M3 to M7.

Partial measurement invariance may allow appropriate across group comparison under certain circumstances, which is when measurement invariance does not hold [[Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén 1989; Milfont and Fischer 2010], and metric partial invariance or scalar partial invariance holds, but only if the parameters freed across groups are a minority in the model, and the theoretical and empirical bases are also necessary [Vandenberg and Lance 2000]. In that case

Table 4. Latent factor means and standard errors for tolerant attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues

	Latent means and s.e.		
	2008	2017	Variation
Czech Republic	0	0.480	+0.480
Germany	–0.315	0.293	+0.608
	(0.042)	(0.046)	
The Netherlands	0.415	0.820	+0.405
	(0.055)	(0.051)	
Russia	–0.410	–0.127	+0.263
	(0.041)	(0.047)	
Spain	0.348	0.390	+0.042
	(0.047)	(0.048)	

the comparisons are meaningful but must be taken with caution [Whisman and Judd 2016; Zercher et al. 2015].

Table 4 shows that the means of the latent variable 'attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life' increased in all five countries between 2008 and 2017. A clear positive difference can be observed between 2008 and 2017, except in Spain, which showed almost no difference between periods. The Netherlands and Spain had the highest value in 2008, while in 2017 the Netherlands clearly had the highest value, as Spain showed no significant increase.

Thus, the latent means in Table 4 and Figure 3 show an increase in the justification of attitudes towards life and death issues in all five countries; larger increases could be observed in Germany, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands and smaller increases for Russia, with Spain recording the most marginal increase in attitudes towards of beginning- and end-of-life issues between 2008 and 2017.

Data for 2017 show that citizens in the Netherlands show the highest levels of justification for these issues, followed by the Czech Republic, Spain, Germany, and Russia, where levels remained the lowest. The trend of the latent means and the different levels of justification in the countries prove the first hypothesis on rising levels of justification and permissiveness towards life and death issues in European societies.

In relation to the explanatory analysis, we present the MGSEM results, where the significant predictive variables have an effect on the latent variable 'attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life'. It is therefore possible to determine the effect of the influential variables on the latent variable. Tables 5a and 5b show the effects of the variables on the dependent latent variable of life and death is-

Figure 3. Justification of beginning- and end-of-life issues (latent factor means)



Source: Authors based on EVS 2008 and 2017.

sues identified in the literature. Religiosity is observed to have a negative impact on attitudes towards life and death issues in all the countries and in all years, which is consistent with the theory. The self-assessed level of religiosity had a significant negative effect in all the countries, except in the Czech Republic in both years and in Russia in 2008, while the strongest impact was found in the Netherlands. Religiosity, measured through confidence in the church, has a significantly negative impact in all the countries and periods examined.

The feeling of having control over one's life is a measure that is relevant for the 'slippery slope argument'. This variable had a systematic, positive effect in the Netherlands and Spain in 2008, and in Russia and Czech Republic in 2017; while in Germany the coefficient was negative in 2008 and non-significant in 2017.

The trust variables, however, present mixed results. Interpersonal or social trust has a positive and significant effect on beginning- and end-of-life in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, while the Czech Republic had a negative coefficient in 2008 and non-significant effect in 2017, while Russia does not appear to be significantly affected by social trust. Institutional trust, which is measured as confidence in the health-care system, also shows mixed results. As expected, the effects of institutional trust are significant and positive in Spain, while significant negative effects are found in Germany. The effect of institutional trust on the dependent variable in the rest of the countries is non-significant (5% signifi-

Table 5a. Regression estimates and standard errors for the Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands

	CZ 2008	CZ 2017	DE 2008	DE 2017	NL 2008	NL 2017
Religious	0.073	–0.042	–0.407***	–0.572***	–0.590***	–0.719***
	(0.107)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.115)
Confidence in Church	–0.473***	–0.401***	–0.358***	–0.357***	–0.510***	–0.390***
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.068)
Control over life	0.022	0.031*	–0.037**	0.013	0.089***	0.049
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.035)
Social trust	–0.182**	–0.082	0.002	0.271***	0.147**	0.274***
	(0.080)	(0.099)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.109)
Trust in health care	–0.039	0.031	0.049	–0.165***	–0.008	–0.087
	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.051)	0.069)
Post-Materialism	0.358***	0.129	0.298***	0.369***	0.173**	0.291***
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.110)
Sex (male)	–0.066	–0.070	–0.237***	–0.197***	–0.182**	–0.205**
	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.102)
Income	0.053	0.006	0.035*	0.052***	0.043**	0.046**
	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Level of education	0.099	0.141*	0.226***	0.255***	0.263***	0.180**
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.052)	(0.074)
Age	–0.009***	–0.004	–0.011***	–0.009***	–0.007**	–0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
R^2	0.25	0.14	0.26	0.31	0.43	0.36

Note: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 5b: Regression estimates and standard error for Russia and Spain

	RU 2008	RU 2017	ES 2008	ES 2017
Religious	0.126	–0.212*	–0.448***	–0.414***
	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.124)
Confidence in Church	–0.128**	–0.178***	–0.547***	–0.498***
	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.063)
Control over life	0.022	0.039*	0.066***	0.026
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.028)
Social trust	–0.049	0.036	0.202***	0.202**
	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Post-Materialism	–0.058	–0.009	0.273***	0.316***
	(0.119)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.097)
Trust in health care	0.009	0.085*	–0.077	0.210***
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.062)
Sex (male)	–0.115	–0.316***	–0.331***	–0.053
	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.095)
Income	0.152***	0.084***	0.049***	0.030
	(0.054)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Level of education	0.008	0.095	0.070	0.106
	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Age	–0.014***	–0.008***	–0.013***	–0.010***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
R^2	0.10	0.16	0.46	0.40

Note: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

cance). A possible explanation for these mixed effects relating to trust in health care could be the cross-country differences in welfare provision and individuals' expectations regarding the role they believe health-care institutions should play in life and death issues.

Our analysis also showed mixed results regarding the influence of materialism and post-materialism. Strong positive effects were found in all countries except Russia in both years and in the Czech Republic in 2017, where there were no significant effects. The fact that positive significant effects are stronger in this [2017] wave suggests that the value transformation became more visible in some countries in recent years. The evolution of the effects of materialist and post-ma-

terialist values on attitudes towards life and death issues across European regions could be a fruitful topic for further research in terms of observing the presence of systematic effects. Other effects, such measuring values in the model show significant effects, such as social and institutional trust, or control over one's life, measuring the slippery slope argument and level of education, as a proxy for cognitive mobilisation and autonomy.

On examining the impact of socio-demographic variables on attitudes towards life and death issues, income, which is used as a measure of status, proved to have a positive systematic effect in the different countries except for Czech Republic, with no significant effects. This confirms the hypothesis that those who are better off tend to be more permissive of the practices analysed. The same effect can be observed for education, which has a positive, quasi-systematic effect in the countries examined except for Spain and Russia. As regards the sex of respondents, we find that males appear to be less permissive than females.

The results show that ageing has a clear negative effect on attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life, but this effect is slightly weaker in the Netherlands. The evidence suggests that older people are less permissive when it comes to justifying issues surrounding life and death. According to the theory and the 'slippery slope' argument, less permissive attitudes are associated with a higher perception of vulnerability. We have also observed that age affects attitudes towards life and death more strongly in the 2008 wave. This may indicate socialisation effects, where people socialised in more difficult conditions during the Second World War and in the post-war period tend to have less permissive views than older cohorts socialised in an earlier period. Moreover, this might also suggest time period effects, also called effects of 'the times', which reflect the influence of historical contexts irrespective of people's age [Tormos 2019: 83].

Our analyses of attitudes towards life and death issues, which are taken together as a latent variable, reveal significant cross-country differences and increased permissibility over time, as set out in Hypothesis 1. Older cohorts tend to be less permissive when it comes to justifications of life and death issues, which confirms Hypothesis 2. Higher levels of religiosity were still a strong predictor of restrictive attitudes, as suggested by Hypothesis 3. The effect of education and income was also confirmed by Hypothesis 4 in the majority of the countries studied. For Hypothesis 5, the values related to post-materialism were systematic, although with some exceptions; and in the case of trust, our expectations were only partially confirmed, as we found mixed effects in the countries studied.

Conclusion

This study examined attitudes towards beginning- and end-of-life issues in a comparative perspective in five European societies. Issues relating to fundamental aspects of life and death such as euthanasia, abortion, and fertility are contro-

versial and the subject of intense debate within societies and in current political discussions [Fink 2008], as our deepest moral codes and religious and political values influence our judgement of and attitudes towards the extent to which individuals should or should not be able to intervene in life and death. Unlike other studies on the same topics, we took attitudes towards euthanasia, abortion, and IVF as the latent construct and analysed this as the dependent variable. Measurement invariance tests were conducted to address comparability across the countries analysed. Even if our three outcome variables (justification for euthanasia, IVF, and abortion) are seen as being different in nature, and in some contexts respond to similar contextual and personal factors, we addressed attitudes towards these issues as a unique factor. Moreover, we observed that the overall level of permissiveness clearly rose, although cross-country differences were observed in the levels of acceptance and the effect of the independent variables.

Our analysis shows that religiosity and age explained attitudes towards life and death issues most consistently. Other factors such as income or education also had clear effects, but exceptions were observed. From our observation of these effects on our dependent latent variable across the countries examined, we can say that attitudes towards life and death issues are dependent on background variables such as religion, education, age, and income. Values had a clear effect, although the effect was not monolithic over time in the countries analysed. Although there was a clearly positive pattern to the effect of values such as social trust or control over one's life, they were not significant in every country; the effect of post-materialism on the latent variable shows, however, more systematic effects.

This lack of uniformity in the effect values has on attitudes opens up interesting new avenues for further research to find possible explanations. One such explanation is that the attitudes measured in the dependent variable, given their nature, are slowly becoming sensitive to the effect of post-materialist and emancipatory values. Another possible explanation could be the effects of country-level factors that were not contemplated in our analysis. Finally, the composition of our dependent latent variable, even if it clearly constitutes a meaningful theoretical construct, may show some relevant cross-country differences in terms of the effects of the independent variables.

From our analysis of attitudes towards life and death, taken as a latent construct, we found that in the five countries examined the justification for such practices appears to be influenced by background factors such as religiosity, age, education, and income, as they show uniform effects in all the countries analysed. Other factors such as post-materialist values, autonomy-related values and trust are important predictors of attitudes towards life and death; however, the effects they have in the countries examined remain unclear.

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Trends in Divorce Acceptance and Its Correlates across European Countries*

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Abstract: This study examines how the public acceptance of divorce has changed in European countries in recent decades. Taking advantage of the large-scale, comparative, and long-run measurement of value orientations in the European Values Study 1981–2017 it focuses on value change connected with divorce in a macro perspective. The article explores the acceptance of divorce in three aspects: 1) it measures and compares the trends in the acceptance of divorce in various European societies between 1981(1991) and 2017 and contrasts these trends with the data on divorce rates in these countries; (2) it explores the consistency/correlation between divorce attitudes and the affinitive value orientations associated in the broader set of values connected with the concept of the deinstitutionalisation of marriage; (3) it looks for the correlates of divorce acceptance and the changes in acceptance over time at the individual level (sex, education, cohort, family background, religiosity). Because of the descriptive nature of the research, no hypotheses are tested. The results show that divorce acceptance is rising over time in all EVS countries, and the acceptance is connected to divorce levels in given societies. Attitudes towards divorce form a consistent set of values together with other marriage deinstitutionalisation indicators. The acceptance of divorce correlates on an individual level with age, education, and religion, but surprisingly there is only weak difference between men and women.

Keywords: divorce, divorce acceptance, attitudes towards divorce, European Values Study, social norms

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Introduction

Divorce is a phenomenon that has broad sociological relevance. The dynamics of the divorce rate the general societal trends of individualisation, secularisation, the transformation of intimacy, changing gender roles, and an increasing welfare state. These societal trends are partly the result of structural changes in the economic, political, and religious frameworks of societies. The structural transformations go hand in hand with the changing attitudes of social actors towards divorce. Sociological theory understands the fragility of postmodern partnerships as the flip side of the development of individual freedom of choice [Coontz 2007, 2015; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2005], the emphasis on romantic intimate relationships [Giddens 1993; Baumann 2003], the adherence to post-materialist values [Inglehart and Welzel 2005], and the decrease in the traditional stigmatisation of social action outside the rigorously constructed social institution of the family [Cherlin 2004; Smyth 2016]. All of these ideational changes represent important shifts in the value orientations that concern family life, resulting in changes in the acceptance of divorce.

Throughout this study we understand the acceptance of divorce in two senses: (1) individual acceptance, which is part of a personal value system and has causes, such as socialisation and individual experiences, and consequences, such as openness to one's own divorce or the divorces of others; and (2) societal acceptance, which is part of the cultural and value systems of society and is connected to the processes of the deinstitutionalisation of marriage and the family, the destigmatisation of non-traditional family behaviour, and changing gender roles. These concepts certainly overlap at the empirical level, and for our purposes, respecting the limits of the data, we indicate the latter one by the aggregating of the indicator of the former one.

Our research has three descriptive aims: (1) to measure and compare trends in the acceptance of divorce in various European societies in the last four decades and to confront these trends with the data on divorce rates in these countries; (2) to contextualise the acceptance of divorce by exploring how much the acceptance of divorce is aligned with certain affinitive value orientations relating to the deinstitutionalisation of marriage (acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, extramarital sex, and artificial insemination) and attitudes towards gender roles, and we also compare the consistency of these value sets among European countries; and (3) to search for the correlates of the acceptance of divorce and its changes over time at the individual level (sex, education, age, religion, and the prevalence of divorce in a given country). For these tasks we use data from five rounds of the European Values Study collected around the years 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017. Our analysis will particularly focus on the the specific factors shaping divorce acceptance in the eastern part of Europe. The reason for this particular attention stems from number of divergences between the political, social, and demographic development of these regions during the 20th century. Even 30 years after the fall of the 'iron curtain' the traces of different social systems are still

clearly visible, and we expect to find it also in the case of value orientations relating to family behaviour. Our motivations can be divided into theoretical and empirical ones. The most influential theoretical frames of the changes in family values and behaviour are mostly rooted in the interpretations of the development in the western part of Europe or the North American region (c.f. the theory of the second demographic transition [van de Kaa 1987, Lesthaege 20014], the marriage deinstitutionalisation thesis [Cherlin 2004, 2020; Smyth 2016], transformation of intimacy [Giddens 1993], and the risk/institutionalisation theory [Beck and Beck Gernsheim 2005], etc.) There is growing discussion about the applicability and the accuracy of these frameworks (particularly SDT) in the case of Eastern-European societies [c.f. Sobotka 2008]. Historically these societies are part of the western cultural sphere, sharing the tradition of Christianity and secularisation, modernisation, and rationalisation, but one can argue either for the deep divergences in these processes compared to the western part of Europe. Divergences and convergences can also be discussed in reference to demographic indicators: the 'Hajnal line' was one of the first concepts to visualise these differences and it does not seem to have lost any of its relevancy even today [Hajnal 1965].

The theoretical aspects of attitudes towards divorce

In this part of the study I will present an overview of the basic theoretical approaches to understanding divorce acceptance that are of relevance here. The general concept of the social acceptance of divorce considers attitudes towards divorce to be part of the cultural and normative systems of a society that shape the norms about marriage, define the reasons for ending a marriage, and determine what sanctions and stigma the actors in a divorce will experience. Various authors have conceptualised the attitudes towards divorce as the source of a 'divorce culture' that has spread across different parts of society and has even influenced groups that are not direct actors in a divorce [Whitehead 1997; Hackstaff 1999; Yodanis 2005]. Simply speaking, divorce culture contrasts with marriage culture. 'A marriage culture includes the belief, assumption, and practice that marriage is a given and forever. A divorce culture, in comparison, is a set of beliefs and practices that define marriage as optional and conditional, with divorce being an option if the marriage does not work.' [Yodanis 2005: 645] Sociological research has repeatedly shown the relevance of this cultural shift for shaping the individual causes and consequences of divorce [Afifi et. al. 2013; Schovanec and Lee 2001; Toth and Kemmelmeier 2009].

For this reason, we understand attitudes towards divorce as an important part of the causal loops connected to the phenomenon of divorce. Without detailed knowledge about the attitudes towards divorce in a given society, it is possible to overlook the factors that influence, modify, and shape two pivotal elements of interest to scholars, professionals, and social services – the causes and consequences of divorce. General attitudes towards divorce shape the milieu in which people

who may wish to seek a divorce make decisions act and can therefore significantly alter the legitimate causes and the expectable costs or consequences of divorce.

The research on divorce has mostly focused on the causes and consequences of divorce on the individual level. Both individual and societal causal relationships can be significantly modified by the societal milieu in which a divorce takes place. If a society is strictly opposed to divorce, the causes and consequences on the individual level would be influenced and shifted towards different means of social action. The individual decision to divorce can be influenced by a person's sense that the sanctions or stigma connected to divorce are low in a given context [Hiller and Recoules 2010; Furtado, Marcén and Sevilla 2011]. Conversely, the negative consequences of divorce can be exacerbated if there is a strong stigma attached to and negative attitudes towards divorce because of the higher cost of social action outside its institutionalised forms. This explanation of part of the negative consequences of divorce is labelled as the 'stigmatisation hypothesis' in the literature; evidence for this pattern in western European countries was provided by Kalmijn and Uunk [2009]. The stigmatisation hypothesis is especially important for debating the broader societal consequences of rising divorce rates: from a conventional point of view, the societal cumulation of the negative consequences of divorce rise in direct proportion to the rise of the incidence of divorce in the society. The insertion of a changing normative environment in this formula opens different perspectives. If a rise in divorce rates is accompanied by a rise in the acceptance of divorce and the destigmatisation of behaviours associated with being divorced (step-families, shared custody, single parenting, etc.), then it is possible to expect a decrease in the particular consequences of divorce that were previously caused by the higher costs of this social action within a stigmatising normative environment [Kalmijn and Uunk 2009]. Simply speaking, the stigmatisation hypothesis discusses the consequences of divorce that are caused by stigmatisation processes and not by the divorce process itself. It argues that these kinds of consequences decrease with the increased acceptance of divorce in society. The higher level of acceptance is here linked to the greater prevalence of divorce.

Some of the theoretical work on attitudes towards divorce focuses on the connection between the shifts in value orientations and divorce rates. Do the value changes follow the rise of divorce, or do the rising divorce rates reflect trends in value orientations? This question is continuously debated; it seems to resemble the 'chicken or the egg' dilemma. Even if the question cannot be resolved, it is useful to theoretically state the mechanisms that represent the two sides of the circular relationship.

On one side there is the role that experience plays in changing individual attitudes. Cherlin [1981] stated that the rise of divorce rates in the United States preceded the change in attitudes but also noted that changing attitudes increase divorce rates. According to Cherlin, the rising acceptance of divorce can be seen as a part of the deinstitutionalisation of the family. One of the hypothetical mechanisms behind this trend is the increasing experience with divorce in the social environment – the more divorce there are in a person's social network, the more

that person is confronted with the possibility of considering that it is the result of an intelligible and justifiable decision.

On the other side, there is a notion that the normative environment affects the repertoires of social action and that value change precedes demographic behaviour. As the stigma and sanctions connected to divorce weaken, the costs of the decision to divorce decrease and more people decide to act on their wishes to get divorced. This has also been identified as a factor in the theory of the second demographic transition, the authors of which argue that post-materialistic values and the importance of self-expression changed family behaviour in the last third of 20th century [van de Kaa 1987; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Lesthaege 2014]. Particularly interesting and relevant for this study is the discussion about how applicable the second demographic transition (SDT) framework is to eastern European, post-communist societies [Sobotka 2008].

The changing societal attitudes towards divorce do not have gender-neutral consequences, nor does divorce itself. Hackstaff argued that a divorce culture strengthens the position of women in negotiations about family life, because the availability of divorce forces both partners to consider the demands of the other. Her reasoning is based on qualitative research on successive cohorts of American married couples [Hackstaff 1999]. Inspired by Hackstaff, Yodanis [2005] tested the hypothesis that the availability of divorce enhances the position of women in relationships, known as the enhanced equality hypothesis. Her results, based on International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) data from 22 countries, show that 'in countries where divorce is accepted and practiced, the distribution of work between women and men in marriage is more equal' [Yodanis 2005: 644]. At the same time, it is necessary to be very cautious about causal inferences because the relationships can be stated in either direction or even in a circular manner.

Research on the societal acceptance of divorce

Now we will focus on empirical studies that have explored the trends in divorce acceptance and the correlates of divorce acceptance at the individual and societal level. During the second half of the 20th century, divorce in western societies 'was being removed from the realm of the morally absolute with people increasingly willing to consider the circumstances of the specific situation instead of imposing an absolute rule against divorce' [Thornton 1985: 857]. A similar situation, at least in terms of divorce rates, can be seen in the eastern part of Europe. This would suggest that the change in divorce rates and the acceptance of divorce are largely rooted in modernity itself, regardless of the particular and temporal political circumstances [cf. Amato and Irving 2005]. The studies based on survey data show significant shifts in the public acceptance of divorce in the later 20th century in various countries [Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001].

Gerstel [1987] suggested that despite changing public attitudes towards divorce, the stigmatisation has only in a limited sense disappeared. There is a gap

between the decline in public disapproval of divorce and the continuing disapproval of divorced individuals. According to her qualitative interviews with 52 women and 52 men, people who have divorced suffer informal relational sanctions [Gerstel 1987: 173]. Almost thirty years later, Konstam et al. [2016] conducted another set of interviews and found similar stigmatisation experiences among young adult women who were divorced. Although the studies show that there is still a stigma attached to divorce, it is important to take into account its unprecedented dynamics over the 20th century. In many contexts, divorce was simply unthinkable even fifty years ago. The gendered nature of the stigma is also vanishing together with the decline of the norms attached to gender-specific roles in marriage and in the maintenance of the intimate relationships [Emery 2013].

Empirical research on attitudes towards divorce focuses mostly on the social groups that are considered to be at risk through the personal experience of marriage dissolution. The logic behind this focus is to understand attitudes as the predictors of divorce. The research has shown that the individual factors affecting attitudes towards divorce are significantly structured by religion and gender [Kapinus and Flowers 2008], age [Brown and Wright 2019], and education [Martin and Parshar 2006].

Family background, especially the experience of a parental divorce, is a similarly significant factor affecting divorce attitudes [Amato 1988, Amato & Booth 1991, Sieben & Verbakel 2013]. This link represents the part of the causal chain between parental divorce and the higher divorce risks of their offspring called the 'divorce cycle' [Wolfinger 2005]. Sieben and Verbakel [2013] used some of the same data (EVS 2008) to examine the influence of divorce experiences in three social contexts – parental divorce, divorce in the kin network, and the level of divorce at the national level. Their results show that divorce experiences in closer social contexts shape pro-divorce attitudes, but the broader national level of divorce does not have an effect [Sieben and Verbakel 2013: 1186].

Based on the theoretical arguments and the empirical findings concerning various aspects of the concept of divorce acceptance, I have formulated four hypotheses to test in this analysis:

H1 Divorce acceptance will be rising in all European societies, but the dynamic of the rise will be different in different geographical contexts. The expectation here that divorce acceptance will rise is based on theoretical arguments about the decreasing stigmatisation of divorce that are shared by various conceptual frameworks such as the second demographic transition theory [van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaege 20014], the family deinstitutionalisation thesis [Cherlin 2004, 2020; Smyth 2016], the transformation of intimacy [Giddens 1993], and the risk/institutionalisation theory [Beck and Beck Gernsheim 2005], etc. In the second part of this hypothesis, the focus is mainly on the differences between countries with a shared post-Soviet and post-communist historical experience. Although I will compare data from all countries available in the EVS data, I believe that insufficient attention has been paid to

the specific geographical and historical context of this region. The expectation of distinctions is based on Sobotka's [2008] arguments about the different nature of SDT within central and eastern Europe.

H2 Divorce acceptance at the societal level will be consistent with the prevalence of divorce in a given society. Here the crude divorce rate will be used as an indicator of divorce prevalence, and the relationship between the two will be measured on the aggregated level. This assumption is derived from Cherlin's thesis about the circular relationship between the more widespread experience of divorce within a societal context and attitudes towards divorce.

H3 Divorce acceptance is a part of a broader consistent set of values concerning family deinstitutionalisation. This hypothesis will be tested by focusing on the consistency of divorce acceptance with attitudes towards homosexuality, abortion, casual sex, in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), and gender attitudes. This hypothesis is designed to test another aspect shared by various theoretical frameworks of SDT, deinstitutionalisation, and individualisation/destigmatisation: the consistency of the shift towards the acceptance of formerly stigmatised forms of social action connected to the institution of the family (particularly partnership and parenthood). If this is true, we should be able to identify a high degree of similarity between the trends in these value orientations in a given society. Gender attitudes are expected to be relevant in light of the theoretically and empirically demonstrated relationship between the historical trends in gender equality and the possibility of divorce [cf. Becker 1981; Gerstel 1988; Cooke et. al. 2013].

H4 Individual divorce acceptance will be affected by gender, age, education, religion, and the divorce rate in a country. Only the few basic and theoretically demonstrated individual correlates that are available across all waves of the EVS survey are used in the analysis here. Although many other factors are theoretically relevant (at least the experience of parental divorce would be very beneficial), they are unavailable in a consistent way for the whole time series of the EVS survey. The presumed relevance of *gender* for divorce attitudes is based on the broad set of empirically founded mechanisms that are partially rooted in the historical dynamics of the transformation of gender roles and are partially based on the different consequences of divorce for men and women. Given that the historical dynamics of divorce acceptance is the subject of the first hypothesis, the examination of the *age differences* allows us to deepen the understanding of temporal dynamics by distinguishing between age effect and period effect. The relevance of age is given by the different socialisation of various cohorts and different life experiences, which could alter value orientations. Controlling for the *educational gradient* of divorce attitudes is necessary from at least two points of view. First, it will provide us with indirect information about the social stratification of divorce acceptance, which, according to the SDT and the individualisation theory, is the domain of the more educated segments of society. Second, the educational

gradient of divorce attitudes can be contrasted with the educational gradient of divorce itself in given societies, which is outside the scope of this paper, but it is the part of the puzzle of the stratification of marital instability [c.f. Härkönen and Dronkers 2006; Matysiak, Styrc and Vignoli 2014], Although the obligatory effect of religious doctrine on family behaviour falls under secularisation processes, the importance of *individual religious identity* as a factor that shapes value orientations is growing. In contrast to the relative homogeneity of traditional religious societies, secularisation introduces heterogeneity and sharper distinctions between religious and non-religious people. Given that the family is one of the one of the main issues at the centre of these cleavages, I expect that divorce attitudes will differ according to individual religiosity [Wilkins 2016]. The last hypothesised correlate of divorce acceptance is the country's divorce rate. Here the logic is different from the individual-level factors discussed above, because I combine the aggregated level indicator with the individual level divorce acceptance. The reason for this combination is to provide another way of testing the second hypothesis that is formulated strictly at the aggregate level. Examining the relationship at this level will to enhance the interpretation of the causal links between the general societal experience with divorce and individual divorce attitudes.

Data and methods

To analyse trends in the social acceptance of divorce, I used data from the European Values Study (EVS), one of the largest cross-national, repeated, cross-sectional survey research programmes in the world. Five rounds are currently available: 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017. The number of countries involved in the survey rose from 16 in 1981 to 46 in 2008. The survey in each country consists of a representative random sample of the adult population (18+). The country-level sample size ranges between 304 observations (Northern Ireland, 1981) and 5407 observations (Germany, 2017). The average sample size increased from 1211 cases in 1981 to 1879 cases in 2017. The total number of observations available in the five integrated international data files is 221 365. Detailed information about the methodology and sampling procedures is available at the website of the project and through the documentation at the GESIS data archive [Gadeshi et.al. 2015]. The data from the first round of EVS is rather specific, because at that time only 14 countries from the western part of Europe along with the US and Canada participated in the survey, which selectively limits the possibility of a time series comparison.[1] The 2017 integrated dataset was moreover incomplete when this article was being written (fall 2019); when the dataset is completed it will contain other countries and more observations. Despite these facts, I decided to use even these rounds of the EVS to offer the longest possible comparison, where the data

[1] The data for the US and Canada were dropped from this analysis; although a comparison with Europe could be beneficial, it would be possible only for the 1981 wave.

were available, but it should be noted that most of the time comparisons make sense in the period between 1990 and 2017 (2008). Similarly, we decided to use as many country data as possible to get at least one measurement of divorce acceptance in surveyed countries. Therefore, I did not exclude countries that participated in only one round of the EVS, because aside from the time dimension of the comparison I am also interested in geographical differences.

As the core indicator of the social acceptance of divorce, we used the item that focused on divorce within the set of questions measuring the justification of different kinds of social action. The set was introduced by the question: *Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.* The responses were coded on a 10-point scale, where 1 = never and 10= always. The logic of the battery, the initial question, and the scale of the response remained unchanged in all waves of the EVS, but there is slight variability in the number of items included in the battery. The item *divorce* was primarily used in the analysis as it was present in all EVS waves. To analyse consistency with the different dimensions of the destigmatisation of non-traditional family behaviour, the items *homosexuality* and *abortion* were also used, as they are present in the master questionnaire, along with the items *married men/women having an affair* and *artificial insemination / IVF*, which are present in the main questionnaire in only some EVS rounds (since 1999 and 2008, respectively). Although the lexical meaning of justification and acceptance is different, we use answers to the given questions as an indicator of acceptance. We believe that the more justifications (for a behaviour that) are available and tolerable in a society, the more accepted the behaviour is. When the answers shift towards the 'always' side of the scale, the justifications turn to be universal, because the given social action is 'always' justified. Conversely, when the answers tend to be on the 'never' side of the scale, no justification is tolerable, therefore the given action is not accepted. This is the reason I use the term 'social acceptance' of divorce instead of justification.

Most of the analysis used an exploratory strategy that drew on basic descriptive statistics. I have decided to provide and present more descriptive results here at the expense of reducing the strategy of regression model testing to a minimum. This decision was primarily motivated by an interest in thoroughly describing the trends and differences in divorce acceptance in all the countries surveyed and ensuring the simplicity and comprehensiveness of the analysis. In practical terms the decision is influenced by two facts: (1) it is difficult to find an identical set of explanatory variables for all five EVS waves, therefore the available indicators in each round were used instead to map their effect on divorce acceptance even if they are not available in all survey years; and (2) the modelling strategy always has to focus on the relatively narrow goal set out by a specific hypothesis and by the logic of the model building. In contrast to this strategy, the five EVS waves provide rather complex sets of relevant factors affecting divorce acceptance in various conceptual connections and complex relational logic. Descriptive statistics are used in the analysis in order to provide the reader with information

about the various factors of divorce acceptance at the country-level, while the regression models summarise information at the level of clusters of countries. The clustering could formally be done using a cluster analysis, but here an informal interpretation of the results of the exploratory descriptive statistics and the set of regression models is offered instead.

General societal trends in the rising acceptance of divorce and the connection with rising divorce rates

The basic descriptive results comparing the mean values[2] on the 10-point scales of the social acceptance of divorce clearly show that divorce acceptance has been increasing significantly in the last three or four decades in all the countries surveyed in which time series data are available (see Figure 1). There are only a few exceptions: Albania, Georgia, Latvia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine (not counting the countries that have only one point in time). Comparing the data on the social acceptance of divorce shows the lowest acceptance in Malta and Kosovo, which are the outliers compared to the other countries.[3] There are relatively lower levels of divorce acceptance in the eastern part of Europe, particularly in the post-Soviet countries, and also specifically in Ireland and Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Northern Cyprus – countries in which religious cleavages are extremely relevant. The level of divorce acceptance is moderate in the post-communist countries and is relatively high in the rest of the Europe, with the highest levels traditionally found in the northern countries.

Sorting the countries according to the absolute difference between the initial and final values yields similar results: there are three clusters of countries.[4]

[2] The distribution of the variable is far from normal – there are peaks at the values 1, 5, and 10 and lows between them. What changes over time is the proportion of responses in the corner positions and in the middle. In 1981, the most frequent categories were the middle position and the corner value of 1 (never). In 2017, the modal value is 10 (always), with a smaller peak again at the value 5. For this reason, the mean values cannot be understood as a good measure of a central tendency (the standard deviation is too high), but its use was considered in order to enable an instant comparison. The mean values are useful for measuring changes in the distribution and mostly illustrate the proportion of the above-mentioned peaks, but it would be a mistake to take them as indicating the attitude held by the majority of the given (sub)population. Inferential statistics are not used for any of the descriptive results. In relatively large samples significance testing makes it possible to reject the null hypothesis even in cases where there are tiny substantial differences. Simply put, if the difference in the sample is substantially significant, it is well above the critical value of the significance test.

[3] Divorce has been legal in Malta since 2011. The change in the law was initiated by a divorce referendum in which 53 % of voters approved the proposal to allow divorce.

[4] Only the countries that participated in at least three waves of the EVS are used in this analysis.

Figure 1. Trends in the mean scores of divorce acceptance across European countries, EVS 1981–2017

The first is the cluster of post-Soviet societies (with the exception of Lithuania), where the shift in the social acceptance of divorce is relatively small (mostly about a 1-point difference on the 10-point scale).[5] The second cluster represents the countries where the change is modest or average (up to a 2-point difference on the 10-point scale) – mostly the post-communist societies. The countries included in the third cluster experienced the most dramatic changes in the social acceptance of divorce (up to a 2.8-point difference). This cluster includes mostly the countries of western Europe and relatively the biggest increase in acceptance is among the northern countries or the societies predominantly characterised by a Protestant religion. The sharpest rise in both the second and third clusters is seen between the 2008 and 2017 rounds. This is particularly interesting in the light of the fact that in most countries divorce rates stagnated or even dropped after 2010 [Eurostat 2020a].

The crude divorce rate was used in the analysis to determine the relationship between the social acceptance of divorce and the incidence of divorce at the aggregate level.[6] At the initial stage of the analysis, we measured the correlation between divorce acceptance and the crude divorce rate within the set of countries for each EVS wave.[7] In the first wave, data are available for only eleven countries and the R-squared reaches 0.230. In 1990, several new countries joined the survey and the R-squared dropped to 0.061. A similar situation was seen in the next waves, where the correlation is relatively low. The low correlation between divorce acceptance and divorce rates on the aggregate level is caused by the heterogeneity among the clusters of countries. A thorough analysis of the scatterplot of the countries reveals the former post-Soviet countries[8] systematically form a cluster that is remote from the general linear relationship because of the relatively high divorce rates and relatively lower divorce acceptance in these countries. Conversely, in western and northern European countries, there is a clearly visible relationship between higher divorce rates and higher divorce acceptance. Separating the post-Soviet countries from the file, the R-squared measured in 2008 increases to 0.19 and the R-squared measured in 2017 increases to 0.37. Another pattern is clearly visible on the scatterplot in 2008, when the participation of post-

[5] This is partly due to the fact, that the post-Soviet countries did not participate in as many waves of the EVS survey, but if the relative shifts between individual rounds are compared, the trends in these societies remain the least dynamic ones.

[6] The crude divorce rate denotes the proportion of divorces per 1000 members of a population in a given year. As such, it indicates the prevalence of divorce in a society and reflects the possibility of experiencing divorce in different social contexts. In contrast to a similar analysis by Sieben and Verbakel [2013], the decision was made not to use the marriage-to-divorce ratio here (divorces per 100 marriages in a given year) because this indicator can be significantly distorted by trends in marriage rates.

[7] Eurostat data for 1981, 1990, 1999, 2008, and 2017 are used. For some countries in some years the crude divorce rate is not available, in which case they were dropped from the analysis for the given year [Eurostat 2020a].

[8] Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, and the Russian Federation.

Figure 2. Association between divorce rate and divorce acceptance in 2008*







* note the different scale of crude divorce rate for the post-Soviet figure

Soviet and post-communist countries peaked (see Figure 2). Inserting a regression line on the aggregated data, the countries of the former western (capitalist) part of Europe in most cases lie above the line[9] and the post-communist countries are below the line.[10] This is because the acceptance of divorce is generally lower in the post-communist countries, but the linear relationship between acceptance and prevalence is very similar to the rest of the Europe.

The crude divorce rate rose until 2008 in all the surveyed countries, as did the acceptance of divorce; there is an unsurprising observable correlation between these two indicators. The clustering of the shape of this relationship is more interesting and it provides the next argument for distinguishing two groups of countries within the former eastern bloc. Like in the previous analysis we see three clusters: (1) post-Soviet countries, where the social acceptance of divorce is lowest and divorce rates are relatively high – here the connection between the divorce rate and the divorce acceptance is the weakest; (2) post-communist countries, where the acceptance of divorce is relatively lower than in western Europe, but the contingency between the rise of divorce and its acceptance is clearly visible and its correlation is moderate; and (3) the countries of the former western part of Europe, where the acceptance of divorce is the highest and the relationship between acceptance and the divorce rate is affected by whether there is a Catholic or Protestant tradition in the country. It is also of course possible to observe others forms of heterogeneity within the clusters, but we believe this is clearly understandable with respect to the characteristics of given outlier countries compared to the rest of the cluster.

These results support the argument that the mutual relationship between attitudes and divorce rates is significant, contradicting the conclusion of Sieben and Verbakel [2013] that experience with divorce at the societal level has no effect. These correlations on the aggregated data are still far from an estimation of an individual effect of the social context of divorce prevalence on individual attitudes towards divorce. Therefore, national-level divorce rates were used as a contextual variable in the regression models estimating the factors shaping individual divorce acceptance (see the section 'Summarising divorce acceptance correlates in the regression model').

Searching for value clusters – divorce, other non-traditional types of social action, and gender roles

To examine the consistency between attitudes towards divorce and other attitudes that could lead to the stigmatisation of non-traditional family patterns, another four indicators from the battery of items measuring the acceptance of various types of behaviour were examined: homosexuality, abortion, casual sex, and arti-

[9] With the exception of Belgium in 2008.
[10] With the exception of Slovenia in 2008 and 2017.

ficial insemination (or IVF). All of these items are tightly correlated, representing a presumed value cluster (see Table 1). Considering the internal structure of this set of attitudes, the strongest is the association between the acceptance of divorce and the acceptance of abortion (total R is about 0.7). The acceptance of divorce also correlates strongly with the acceptance of homosexuality. There is a relatively weaker correlation between this attitude and the acceptance of casual sex (but the R is still above 0.5) and the weakest correlation is with the acceptance of artificial insemination (total R is 0.4). However, our interest is in the different levels of correlation between the acceptance of divorce and other attitudes within countries across the five waves of the EVS. The relatively high correlations with the other attitudes remain stable over the almost forty years of the survey. The consistency of the value clusters is relatively weaker in eastern European countries than in western Europe, particularly in the case of the acceptance of homosexuality, the consistency of which remains relatively weak over the three decades in the post-Soviet countries but rises over time in the post-communist countries.

Given that the work of maintaining a relationship and a stronger obligation to stay in a marriage even if it is unsatisfactory have been traditionally required of women, attitudes towards gender equality share a theoretically justified consistency with divorce acceptance [Martin and Parshar 2006; Kapinus Flowers 2008]. To test this assumption, only data from the 2008 wave are used, because of the availability of the broadest set of countries and the battery of questions measuring attitudes towards gender roles. The comparative temporal trend will not be explored here because the composition of the gender-attitudes battery changed over time, which would make the comparison unreliable. The index of attitudes towards gender roles[11] is used as the individual-level correlate for divorce accept-

[11] The wording of the questions used for the index was:

1. *A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work*
2. *A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works*
3. *A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children*
4. *Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay*
5. *Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person*
6. *Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income*
7. *In general, fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers*
8. *Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children.*

All of the items were rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale of agreement/disagreement. The index has the same range of values (1-4), where the higher value indicates egalitarian attitudes. Several items (1 and 5 to 8) have been reversed in order to get the same meaning. The gender index has some known problems [Lomazzi 2017] as it does not reach the recommended level of reliability (measured by Cronbach alpha = 0.586 and splitting into three dimensions in factor analysis. Despite these known issues, it is an instrument frequently used to indicate gender attitudes. The mean value of the index ranges from 2.62 in Turkey to 3.32 in Norway. The overall mean is 2.87, which indicates a higher preference for egalitarian attitudes.

Table 1. Pearson's correlation coefficients for the association between the acceptance of divorce and other non-traditional types of family behavior

		homo-sexuality	abortion	casual sex	artificial insemination (and IVF)	gender equality attitudes	measure of consistency (Cronbach alpha)
post-soviet	1991	0.206	0.688	–	–	–	–
	1999	0.357	0.634	0.382	–	–	–
	2008	0.292	0.599	0.399	0.454	0.092	0.715 (0.741)*
	2017	0.353	0.633	0.428	0.446	–	0.760
post-communist	1991	0.302	0.687	–	–	–	–
	1999	0.488	0.701	0.402	–	–	–
	2008	0.434	0.681	0.389	0.478	0.169	0.756 (0.782)*
	2017	0.515	0.710	0.465	0.497	–	0.818
other european	1981	0.515	0.677	–	–	–	–
	1991	0.507	0.649	–	–	–	–
	1999	0.587	0.682	0.447	–	–	–
	2008	0.592	0.663	0.450	0.505	0.342	0.805 (0.827)*
	2017	0.581	0.674	0.464	0.468	–	0.825

Note: * values including and excluding the gender equality index are presented here.

Figure 3. Association between the index of gender role attitudes and the divorce acceptance in aggregated data



ance and the aggregated index at the country level is used as the measure for a macrostructural correlate of societal acceptance of divorce. The analysis shows that the mutual contingency of these two concepts at the individual level is consistently positive in all countries but varies significantly between the clusters (see Table 1). The weakest correlation is seen in the post-Soviet countries (R about 0.09) and Turkey. A slightly stronger association can be seen in the post-communist set of countries (R about 0.17) and the strongest correlation is found in the countries of western Europe (R about 0.34). The contingency between these two concepts is clearly visible at the national level and indicates that more open divorce attitudes are found in countries where gender attitudes are prevailingly egalitarian (See Figure 3). For the last two waves in which the structure of indicators used is comparable, a measure of internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) was used that helps to summarise the interdependency of the given set of value indicators.

Individual correlates of the acceptance of divorce

In the latest waves of the EVS, the acceptance of divorce is almost the same among men and women, with slightly more positive attitudes towards divorce among women in nearly all countries. The acceptance of divorce is found to be considerably higher among women than men only in Serbia, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland, where the difference on the 10-point scale exceeds 0.4 points. This picture was different in the 1981 and 1990 rounds. In these data, we found a reversed pattern: a slight but systematically higher level of divorce acceptance among men. In the 1981 data, this could have been due to the smaller and more homogeneous set of participating countries, but the same figure is found in the 1990 survey, when the number of countries involved in EVS almost doubled. The tiny pattern of gender difference reversed around the beginning of the 21st century.

As the acceptance of divorce in the public discourse represents a decline in traditional family values, it is no surprise that these attitudes are considerably structured by the age of respondents. Across all the EVS waves and countries, there is a pattern of a negative age gradient of divorce acceptance (See Figure 4). This pattern has changed considerably over time as the differences across the age categories have been slowly decreasing during the forty years of the EVS.

Generally, the age differences were never as large as might be expected on the basis of knowledge about the trend of growing divorce acceptance during the EVS wave. This means that the shift in the general societal acceptance of divorce cannot simply be explained by the generational exchange. The international data in a longitudinal perspective show the mean values of about 5.6 for the two youngest cohorts (15–24, 25–34) in 1981. During the 1990s, the averages shifted towards 5.8 for the same cohorts (25–44 in the 1990 wave and 35–54 in the 1999 wave). In the last wave, the average was between 6 and 6.5 for the two oldest cohorts.

Looking at the data cross-sectionally, the sharpest generational differences were during the 1980s and 1990s, when younger respondents showed a much higher level of divorce acceptance than older respondents (a difference of about 1.9 points on the 10-point scale).[12] In 2017, the differences between the oldest and youngest age groups in most countries are well below one point on the 10-point scale. The shift in the mean scores from rounds 1/2 to round 5 was about two points in general, and the time span between 1981/1991 to 2017 it corresponds to movement between the stage in the life course that a person is at around age 20/30 to the one a person is in at around age 60.

Categorised education levels are only available in the integrated datasets beginning from the 1999 wave. Earlier integrated files only contain information on the age at which respondents completed their education; this information is available for all EVS waves. Therefore, the analysis first worked with the cardinal

[12] These results are limited only to the narrow group of western European countries that participated in the initial EVS wave.

Figure 4. Age differences in the divorce acceptance across European countries 1990–2017



* Indicates countries in which data from 2008 round used

Note: The vertical lines in the figure depict the range between the average values of the youngest (15-25) and the oldest (65+) age categories in a given country and year. The position of particular age categories is not shown in order to keep the figure readable. In most countries the differences in mean values form an almost linear sequence.



Figure 5: Educational differences in the mean divorce acceptance across European countries 1990–2017

variable of the length of education in order to be able to compare trends in the association over the longest possible window of time, and then using the categories available for the 1999–2017 data in order to compare divorce acceptance across the categories of education level. Both analyses provide consistent results.

The correlation between years of schooling and divorce acceptance, as measured by Spearman's correlation coefficient, is positive in all the countries in all waves of the EVS. These results indicate a positive educational gradient of divorce acceptance, which means more educated respondents are more open to accepting divorce. The same conclusion can be reached by comparing the mean values of the scale of divorce acceptance across the three education categories available in the rounds 1999, 2008, 2017 (see Figure 5). The general pattern of a higher acceptance of divorce among more educated people holds across Europe, but its strength is very heterogeneous. Ranking the countries according to the relative difference in the mean level of divorce acceptance across educational categories shows a cumulation of former post-Soviet countries in the bottom part of the ladder, which means education levels have a weak effect on divorce acceptance in these countries (and divorce acceptance is generally lower here). In almost all of the countries that were not in the past part of the Soviet Union, the effect of education on divorce acceptance was found to be stronger.[13] Compared to the previous demographic indicators examined, education level seems to have more persistent consequences for a person's attitude towards divorce: there was no general or systematic narrowing of the gap between the attitudes of different educational categories. This would be particularly interesting to compare with the weakening of the positive education gradient of divorce or its reversal in some European countries [Harkonen and Dronkers 2006; Matysyak, Styrc and Vignoli 2014], suggesting a discrepancy between the lower openness of the low-educated to divorce and the average or higher risk of divorce in these categories.

As family law was the domain of Christian doctrine for over a millennium, it is clear that acceptance of divorce will be affected by religion at a personal level, as well as by the proportion of religious people in the society, indicating the societal relevance of religion. We attempted to compare the differences in the influence of religion on divorce acceptance across European countries and across time. Starting at the individual level, the question on personal religion[14] is used in a dichotomous way to compare the acceptance of divorce between self-defined religious and non-religious respondents (see Figure 6). The differences are relatively smaller in the former post-Soviet countries, spanning from zero to 0.6 points on the scale. This is the only distinguishable cluster; the rest of the countries are mixed according to historical experience, economic level, or the pre-

[13] The only exceptions were Finland and Northern Ireland.

[14] *Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are? – a religious person/ not a religious person/a confirmed atheist.* Because of the small number of confirmed atheists in some countries, the latter two categories were merged.



Figure 6. Religious differences in the mean divorce acceptance across European countries 1990–2017

dominant religious denomination. Among the countries that participated in at least three EVS waves, the trend in the gap between religious and non-religious respondents was examined, but the results are not convincing.

Summarising the divorce acceptance correlates in the regression model

For a comprehensive model estimating individual attitudes towards divorce, a linear regression model was used that contained variables on respondents' characteristics – sex, age, education[15], religion – and the year of data collection, and two contextual variables – country type (with three categories: post-Soviet, post-communist, and other) and the crude divorce rate.[16] The dependent variable is the 10-point scale on the justification of divorce.

The model was built in two times three variants with identical variables, but selectively for three clusters of countries – post-Soviet, post-communist, and other.[17] For each cluster the main effects of the variables were modelled and then the interactions of all of them with the EVS wave were added. The aim in doing so is to explore the trends in the effects of the explanatory variables across three decades in the case of the eastern countries and four decades in the case of most of the western countries. The geographical variance is explored by the modelling inside these clusters, but in order to keep the models comprehensible a country variable was not included, as here we are only interested in the distinctions between given clusters. Although the other countries cluster is rather heterogeneous and and across the various geopolitical criteria some other division might exist, I decided to focus on a comparison between the two sets of countries with a communist history on the one hand and the rest of the Europe with mostly similar democratic post-war development in the second half of the 20th century on the other.

Three models estimating the main effects of given variables (marked as the 'A' models in Table 2) on divorce acceptance show the effects of gender to be relatively small, with men holding slightly more reserved attitudes towards divorce across all the country clusters. The models reveal that religion is of relatively high importance for personal attitude towards divorce and the effect of religion

[15] Because of the unavailability of categorised education in five EVS waves, we used the age at which school attendance was completed.

[16] The crude divorce rate was obtained from the Eurostat database for the particular years in which EVS data collection took place in the given countries. In several exceptions where the data were not available from Eurostat, data were sought in the national statistical offices. If a country had no divorce records in a given year, it was dropped from the analysis of this model.

[17] All the available valid data for each cluster were used: the 1991-2017 waves for the post-Soviet countries, N valid = 26 397, the 1991-2017 waves for the post-communist countries, N valid = 45 807, and the 1981 – 2017 waves for the other countries, N valid = 101 473.

is very similar across the country clusters. The effect of education is more important outside the post-Soviet cluster. [18] The most pronounced difference is in the temporal variable representing the EVS waves, because the rise of divorce acceptance is very diverse in these three clusters of countries. Because the crude divorce rate is the only macro-level variable used across the models, it is included in the individual-level modelling to keep the regression as simple as possible. Therefore, only the individual level effect is captured here, without the country-level variance (the country-level variance was analysed through the scatterplots – see Figure 2). The crude divorce rate is the second strongest effect in the model and it is slightly stronger in the countries outside the post-Soviet or post-communist cluster.

The models using interactions add the information about the temporal variations in the effects of the explanatory variables (marked as the 'B' models in Table 2). Adding the interactions into the models substantially changed the model fit criteria[19] and the parameters for the main effects. The importance of religiosity increased in the post-Soviet and post-communist cluster and the differentiated effect of the divorce rate was even more magnified.

The temporal trends the models captured suggest almost no changes in the effect of gender, except the narrowing of the difference between men and women in the western countries. The effect of religiosity declines over time in the post-Soviet cluster, but the changes are only subtle in the other parts of Europe. The effect of age decreases in all countries, but only negligible trends can be observed in the effect of education. The reverse pattern is found in the case of the crude divorce rate's effect, which decreases over time in the post-Soviet cluster, shows no change in the group of post-communist countries, and increases in the group of other countries.

Discussion and conclusion

The acceptance of divorce is increasing in all the European countries that participate in the EVS, with only a few exceptions. Nonetheless, behind this general figure there are considerable differences in the distinctive clusters of countries. These clusters can be defined by the political history of the regions, which can be categorised as post-Soviet, post-communist, and other countries. The rise in divorce acceptance is weakest in the post-Soviet countries, modest in the post-

[18] When comparing the levels of parameters, it is necessary to consider the much higher range of the scales of age and years of schooling compared to gender, religiosity, and crude divorce rate.

[19] Comparing the AIC according to the formula $\exp((AIC_{min} - AIC_i)/2)$, the models containing interactions provide a fairly better estimation despite the expense of the higher number of parameters.

Table 2. Regression coefficients for the model of linear regression—first part

	Post-Soviet						post-communist						Other European					
	A			B			A			B			A			B		
Parameter	b	s.e.		b	s.e.		b	s.e.		b	s.e.		b	s.e.		b	s.e.	
(Intercept)	4.536	0.10	*	4.996	0.19	*	5.832	0.09	*	6.268	0.21	*	7.292	0.05	*	5.945	0.12	*
Men	–0.268	0.03	*	–0.200	0.06	*	–0.262	0.03	*	–0.376	0.05	*	–0.267	0.02	*	–0.338	0.03	*
Women(ref.)																		
Religious	–1.041	0.04	*	–1.836	0.07	*	–1.233	0.03	*	–1.462	0.06	*	–1.271	0.02	*	–1.123	0.03	*
Non-religious/ath.(ref.)																		
Age	–0.015	0.00	*	–0.012	0.00	*	–0.016	0.00	*	–0.015	0.00	*	–0.020	0.00	*	–0.014	0.00	*
Education (yrs)	0.036	0.00	*	0.038	0.01	*	0.057	0.00	*	0.055	0.00	*	0.069	0.00	*	0.042	0.00	*
Crude divorce rate	0.335	0.02	*	0.301	0.04	*	0.281	0.02	*	0.113	0.09	*	0.392	0.01	*	1.182	0.05	*
Wave 1981				(no data)						(no data)			–2.109	0.03	*	–1.160	0.21	*
Wave 1990	–0.360	0.07	*	–8.243	0.95	*	–0.724	0.04	*	–0.811	0.30	*	–1.983	0.03	*	0.585	0.16	*
Wave 1999	0.074	0.05		–1.233	0.40	*	–0.448	0.04	*	–0.385	0.30	*	–1.519	0.03	*	–0.685	0.16	*
Wave 2008	–0.091	0.04	*	–0.722	0.24	*	–0.690	0.03	*	–1.388	0.25	*	–1.437	0.02	*	–1.458	0.15	*
Wave 2017\(ref.)																		
1981*men				(no data)						(no data)						0.278	0.06	*
1990*men				–0.064	0.13					0.260	0.09	*				0.201	0.05	*
1999*men				0.043	0.10					0.178	0.08	*				0.025	0.05	
2008*men				–0.102	0.08					0.110	0.07					–0.066	0.05	
2017(ref.)																		

Table 2. Regression coefficients for the model of linear regression—second part

	Post-Soviet					post-communist					Other European				
	A		B			A		B			A		B		
Parameter	b	s.e.	b	s.e.		b	s.e.	b	s.e.		b	s.e.	b	s.e.	
1981*religious			(no data)					(no data)					–0.136	0.06	*
1990*religious			1.353	0.14	*			0.622	0.10	*			–0.305	0.05	*
1999*religious			1.129	0.12	*			0.209	0.09	*			0.021	0.05	
2008*religious			1.091	0.09	*			0.244	0.08	*			–0.266	0.05	*
2017(ref.)															
1981*age			(no data)					(no data)					–0.017	0.00	*
1990*age			–0.016	0.00	*			–0.007	0.00	*			–0.014	0.00	*
1999*age			–0.013	0.00	*			–0.009	0.00	*			–0.009	0.00	*
2008*age			0.000	0.00				0.001	0.00				0.004	0.00	*
2017(ref.)															
1981*education			(no data)					(no data)					0.086	0.01	*
1990*education			–0.024	0.01				0.003	0.01				0.023	0.00	*
1999*education			0.003	0.01				0.012	0.01				0.046	0.00	*
2008*education			–0.004	0.01				–0.005	0.01				0.044	0.00	*
2017(ref.)															
1981*div. rate			(no data)					(no data)					–0.951	0.06	*
1990*div. rate			2.268	0.25	*			–0.075	0.10				–1.233	0.06	*
1999*div. rate			0.315	0.08	*			–0.060	0.10				–0.697	0.06	*
2008*div. rate			–0.010	0.05				0.344	0.09	*			–0.448	0.06	*
2017(ref.)															

Table 2. Regression coefficients for the model of linear regression—third part

	Post-Soviet				post-communist				Other European			
	A		B		A		B		A		B	
Parameter	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.	b	s.e.
Log Likelihood		–63 227		–63 058		–113 760		–113 663		–242 135		–241 404
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)		126 473		126 165		227 541		227 376		484 292		482 870
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)		126 555		126 370		227 628		227 594		484 396		483 165

* The parameter is significant at least at the 0.05 level.

communist countries, and strongest in other European countries. These results are in line with our first hypothetical assumption, that divorce acceptance is rising, but there are different dynamics behind the increase in different geographical contexts. Despite of the fact that we tested several hypotheses about the relationship between divorce acceptance and the other concepts, the distinction of the clusters is the result of the inductive process of the data exploration, which reveals consistent patterns of dissimilarity between the three sets of countries. The clusters differ by the general levels and trends in divorce acceptance, but the most sociologically relevant differences were found in the role played by factors that correspond to divorce acceptance. This was also the main reason for the distinction between the post-Soviet and the post-communist countries. Even though the countries share a similar historical experience, the patterns of internal consistency between value orientations concerning family behaviour and its interdependencies with external factors are different. These dissimilarities could be the result of the different status of countries during the communist era (whether a country was a part of the Soviet Union vs a satellite of the union) or the result of different paths of societal development after the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet countries mostly experienced more turbulent economic and social changes than the former satellite states.

The connection between divorce acceptance and divorce rates, tested in our second hypothesis, has an uneven shape on the aggregated level. Therefore, the relationship between divorce acceptance and divorce prevalence varies considerably between societies: Among the post-Soviet countries, the relatively low level of divorce acceptance is at odds with their relatively high divorce rates. Among the post-communist countries, divorce acceptance rises with divorce prevalence, but the acceptance is lower than in the western part of Europe. It is technically possible to consider two regression lines with a different slope and a lower intercept in the post-communist countries. The effect of the relative shift in divorce prevalence is smaller, and given the lower starting points in divorce acceptance it leads to relatively lower results in divorce acceptance in post-communist countries. Summarising these results, our second hypothesis cannot be rejected, but the empirical evidence for it is stronger among the western European societies.

Our third hypothesis focused on the consistency between divorce acceptance and attitudes towards other types of social action indicating non-traditional family behaviour (homosexuality, abortion, casual sex, artificial insemination) and attitudes towards gender roles. The analysis revealed a considerable level of consistency within this cluster of attitudes on the individual level. On the aggregated level the influence of gender attitudes was tested as well and the results show a significant correlation between the prevalence of egalitarian gender role attitudes and divorce acceptance.

The factors affecting divorce acceptance on an individual level have different effects in the different country clusters. Although the results showed divorce acceptance to be substantially structured by religion, education, and age (which

fits with our fourth hypothesis), these effects are relatively weaker in the post-Soviet and post-communist countries. The temporal persistence of the effects of religion and education is rather constant, but the negative effect of age weakens over time. Only weak empirical support was found for the influence of gender. When the effect of the aggregate measure of the divorce rate on individual divorce acceptance was tested, some very distinctive patterns were revealed: in the post-Soviet cluster the effect of the divorce rate weakened over time, no substantially important trend is observed in the post-communist countries, and the effect of the divorce rate increased over time in the other European countries.

The analysis is partly limited by data availability and partly by the necessary reduction of the complexity of the explored relationships. The available data map divorce acceptance on the subjective scale, which can be affected by social desirability in different ways in different societies – if public opinion tends towards openness, respondents may feel it unpleasant to go against the majority and vice versa. This effect can slightly homogenise the data. Furthermore, the data provide only a limited possibility to compare the trends in divorce acceptance in central and eastern Europe before 1999; therefore, we cannot consider the early stages of the (post-communist) transformation of society or the initial stage before the fall of the communist regimes. This could be the reason why the dynamics of divorce acceptance seem modest here throughout the surveyed period (although the same time intervals were compared, we cannot rule out the possibility that major changes may have occurred earlier on, outside the surveyed period). The need to reduce complexity led to an exploratory strategy being preferred that was based on descriptive statistics and only limited use of regression modelling. As the focus is mainly on comparisons between larger geo-political units defined by different political histories in the second half of the 20th century, a multilevel approach was omitted and the focus was placed on the models comparing three clusters of countries identified from an interpretation of compared descriptive statistics. Variability within the clusters is still present and cannot be ignored when interpreting the results, but the clustering helps to describe the general patterns in the data.

Thirty years after the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the traces of those times are still present in the different normative and value systems in society. The communist regimes invested considerable effort in constructing a propagandistic image of a happy and healthy family.[20] The revival of traditionalist family values that occurred in almost all western societies after the Second World World War was prolonged by the communist regime until it collapsed. After the late 1960s, the rest of Europe slowly changed the cultural frame of the institution of the family. Demographic profiles converged rapidly during the 1990s, when the traditional image of the family changed at a slower

[20] The concept of 'push into the family' depicts the consequences of this effort: if there is an offer of a relatively stable family life, involvement in the public sphere will be weaker.

tempo or remained unchanged in the eastern part of Europe. The acceptance of divorce represents only one aspect of this consistent cluster of values. The analysis here showed that the acceptance of divorce is consistent with the acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, and artificial insemination as well as with traditional gender role assignment on the societal level. This traditional value system would be functional if the reality of demographic behaviour matched the image of a traditional family, but the opposite is true. Many post-communist and post-Soviet societies face the high prevalence of divorce, non-marital births and decreasing marriage rates as well as the other European countries, even more in some cases [Eurostat 2020a, 2020b, 2020c]. This is a particularly important message for the discussion on the conceptual frame of the second demographic transition in the post-Soviet and post-communist contexts. Although the analyses do not allow for causal explanations, a logical interpretation of the results seems to support the argument against SDT: value changes did not precede changes in demographic behaviour in these geopolitical regions. The conjunction of postmodern demographic behaviour and lingering traditional family values creates a field of social conflict that yields specific dimensions of pathology connected to non-traditional types of behaviour. The post-Soviet context is also characterised by a connection between the traditional-family discourse with the agenda of the Orthodox Church. If the societal image of divorce is associated with sin, failure, child deprivation, infidelity, or even violence, these cultural meanings will to some extent shape the experience of people who have divorced and the social environment's attitudes towards them. These mechanisms can constitute difficulties in individuals' ability to recover from divorce and can also complicate court proceedings and negotiations on post-divorce arrangements. As demographic figures tend to converge (at least when it comes to generally high divorce rates and unstable informal relationships), we may also expect a convergence of value systems in the future. On the other side, family change in the post-communist and post-Soviet context is partially framed as a western cultural import (with the example of gender-related or LGBTI issues being a prominent topic of fake news on western decadence). One of the implications for further research is to capture the cultural context of the expected convergence between demographic behaviour and value systems.

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JANA VOBECKÁ

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

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1920 – A Caesura in Social Theory?*

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Abstract: The centenary of Max Weber's death raises the question of the wider significance of 1920 as marking a break in the history of social theory. This essay focuses on Germany and Austria, where the political break with the past was particularly sharp and the discontinuities in the social and intellectual configuration of the social sciences were most obvious. Three trends are particularly striking: the development of neo-Marxist social theory with György Lukács and Karl Korsch and the later emergence of critical theory, the polarisation between neo-positivism and interpretive sociology, and the consolidation of the sociology of knowledge.

Keywords: Max Weber, Germany, social theory, generations
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Introduction

The centenary of the death of Max Weber suggests some reflections on whether that year has a wider significance in the history of 20th-century social theory. As for Weber himself, it is worth recalling that his brother Alfred, only four years younger, survived until 1958. He resigned from his chair at Heidelberg in 1933 and went into internal emigration, helping to re-establish the university after 1945. In 1954 he was unsuccessful in his candidacy against the incumbent, Theodor Heuss, for the federal presidency. We can only speculate what Max Weber might have done if he had seen more of the 20th century.[1] Less close to socialism than Alfred (who joined the SPD after the Second World War) but more outspoken, we may assume that he would have had to choose emigration. And there was sadly only one of the Weber brothers for most of the Weimar Republic.

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[1] As one of his biographers, Joachim Radkau [2008: 335], wrote in a bad-tempered reply to a review symposium, 'Just as the pious Christian asks "What would Jesus say?", the Weberian cannot help asking "What would Max Weber say?"'.

The coming of the republic, formally inaugurated less than a year before Max Weber's death,[2] was however a sharp caesura in Germany. Oskar Schlemmer, admittedly not the soberest of commentators, declared in a 1923 retrospective: 'The crisis of the time was also a crisis of the mind. A cult of the unconscious, the uninterpretable, an inclination to mysticism and sectarianism arose from the search for ultimate facts, which threatened to lose their meaning in a world of doubt and division.'[3] This suggests that we might look in Germany rather than, say, France (where the Durkheimian tradition persisted) or the US for an impact on social theory.[4]

Although the consequences for science in Germany were far less dramatic than in 1933, 1945, or 1990, there was a substantial generational shift among sociologists,[5] with Alfred Weber's generation of those born around the middle of the previous century, the generation of Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) and Werner Sombart (1863–1941), replenished by a new generation from the later part of the century, the 'war generation' [Peukert 1991: 16]: figures such as Karl Mannheim (1893–1947), Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Hans Freyer (1887–1969), Emil Lederer (1882–1939), and Alfred Schütz in Austria (1899–1959). Dirk Käsler [1984: 43] provides a fuller list of names for the period 1909–1934, with a 'core' made up of Franz Oppenheimer, Sombart, Tönnies, Max Weber, and Leopold von Wiese, an 'inner circle' including Max Adler, Hans Freyer, Hans Kelsen, Mannheim, Max Scheler, Georg Simmel, Othmar Spann, Ernst Troeltsch, Alfred Vierkandt, and Alfred Weber, an 'outer circle' including Carl Grünberg, the founding Director of the Institut für Sozialforschung, and Robert Michels, as well as a number of less socialist-inclined figures, and, on the 'periphery', Theodor Geiger, Max Horkheimer, and a number of others.

This generational divide was cut across by a more political one between conservative or, in Fritz Ringer's terminology, 'orthodox' mandarins, who saw the regime change in national and academic politics as a defeat, and those he terms 'modernist' or, more cautiously, 'accommodationist' – those who accepted the new republican institutions, at least conditionally. These 'Vernunftrepublikaner', as one of their number, the historian Friedrich Meinecke, called them, republicans of the head rather than the heart [Ringer 1969: 203], included Tönnies,

[2] Weber participated very actively in the last two years of his life and the first two of the post-imperial era, both in active political discussions and in his writing. He died just a week after the election ending the 'Weimar Coalition' of DDP and SPD, which is sometimes held to mark the beginning of the end, or of the Republic's slide to the right.

[3] 'Manifest zur Bauhaus-Ausstellung 1923', cited in Ulrich Linse [2019: 20, n.13]. An article on the crisis in sociology by Kurt Singer [1920] is however rather silent about the social context.

[4] The new state of Czechoslovakia would of course be another place to look; here, the political success of Tomáš G. Masaryk and Edvard Beneš removed them from active work in sociology. For a characteristically illuminating and judicious reflection on national traditions in sociology, see Wagner [2004].

[5] On the earlier generational divide in the early 1870s, see Turner [1986: 3–5].

Alfred Weber, and the legal scholar Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949).[6] Sombart, professor since 1917 in Berlin, was already beginning his trajectory from socialism to what became national socialism. Carl Schmitt's critique of Weimar constitutionalism [Schmitt (1922) 2005, (1923) 1985, (1927) 2014, (1928) 2008] gradually developed into a full-blown defence of dictatorship. In the liberal camp, the theologian and historian of religion Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) traced the emergence of this counter-current to the revolution, which was one element of the polarisation of Weimar: 'The academic class…has become more and more conservative, monarchistic, and nationalistic…' (*Spektator-Briefe*, p. 90; quoted by Ringer [1969: 206]). The liberal-conservative sociologist René König, who was a student in the late 1920s, contrasted the quiet provincial milieu of the pre-war academic with the hectic and chaotic twenties: 'Whereas before the 1914 war a scholar could work off [abreagieren] his distaste for modernity thoroughly and comprehensively in the peace of academic provincialism, in 1918 he found himself suddenly plunged in a witches' cauldron in which there were no longer any provincial refuges, in which inflation remorselessly ate away his last financial reserves, while there broke out spontaneously around him an almost raging lust for life.' [König 1971: 22]

Austin Harrington [2016] has convincingly argued that Ringer, Jürgen Habermas [1987], Wolf Lepenies [2006], and others have overstated the pathologies of Weimar's intellectual political culture. As Klaus Eder [1985] had pointed out in relation to the earlier period, the problem was not so much the *weakness* of German liberalism but the *strength* of its competitors and opponents.

Where Ringer suggests the possibility that the language of 'idealism' had something to do with this, a more obvious explanation might be that, as Mannheim brilliantly documented in *Das konservative Denken* (1925) and *Ideologie und Utopie* [(1929a) 1936], social polarisation is conducive to totalising explanations of ideology and other social processes.[7] Harrington [2016: 2] concludes that 'by the close of the nineteenth century through to the revolutionary years of the Weimar Republic, intellectual life in Germany sees the genesis of movements with an unparalleled alertness to facts of the relativity, contingency and fragility of knowledge-claims in European world-pictures.' Ringer [1969: 240] had indeed remarked: 'It has always struck me as particularly interesting that so many of the great debunking analysts of modern culture have been German or Austrian, not English or French'. At the same time, however, Harrington [2016: 70] suggests that 'a shortcoming of Ringer's, Habermas's and Lepenies's narratives…was to infer too much from the preceding fifty years of German history and unduly to downplay the impact of the caesura of the war and its consequences'.

[6] The term however understates the republican commitment of some of these figures [Harrington 2016: 94].

[7] Mannheim's habilitation in Heidelberg in 1925 was opposed by the literary scholar Ernst Robert Curtius; Harrington [2016: 130] suggests that he may have felt threatened by Mannheim's analysis of conservatism. There was also strong opposition to Mannheim's appointment to his Frankfurt chair in 1930.

Sociology benefited from political support in the new state, with Carl Heinrich Becker seeing it as a valuable resource for extending interdisciplinary research and teaching.[8] Although other educational reforms rather fizzled out over the years, sociology was able to consolidate its position, notably in the newly founded universities of Frankfurt, Cologne, and Hamburg. To outline the extent and nature of the intellectual break represented by 1918 and the years which followed would require a much fuller study than I can attempt in this brief essay. As well as the *Kölner Zeitschrift*, founded in 1921 by von Wiese [Moebius 2017], other relevant sources in the academic and publicistic literature would be *Die Gesellschaft*, edited by the Marxist socialist Rudolf Hilferding, and the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, edited by the Austro-Marxist Lederer.[9] The *Archiv* included in the early 1920s Walter Benjamin on violence (Gewalt), two articles by Lederer on the labour movement and his pioneering work on white-collar workers, several essays by Michels, and one each by Tönnies (on the concept of progress), Geiger, the jurist Schmitt and Mannheim (on historicism). Other topics covered included Bolshevism, German nationalism, US imperialism, and the rise of fascism in Italy.

How far there was a change of direction, reflecting the change of regime and a new political culture, is hard to assess from a limited range of such material, but Harrington [Harrington 2016: 89] cites a number of references in the period to an 'axial' turn. Spengler's 1918 book, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, enjoyed enormous success after the war and Karl Kraus in Vienna wrote ironically of 'Untergangster'. In the history of philosophy Herbert Schnädelbach [1983: 15–16] also confidently describes the Weimar period as a new epoch. 'Under the Weimar Republic many things came to an end and there was a change of direction, recognizable even in philosophy, in that the great controversies which provide the framework for our current discussions all go back to those years.' It can however also be argued that the changes of the 1920s were already underway before the First World War, and that they merely became more obvious after it [König 1971: 14; see also Lepsius 1987].

Three trends in social theory

In social theory, one can, I think, identify three main trends: the emergence of neo-Marxism, the polarisation between empiricist and interpretive approaches, and the sociology of knowledge. In all three cases, Schnädelbach's image of path-

[8] A liberal-oriented *Hochschule für Politik* to match those of the socialist and conservative parties was also established in 1920, with Meinecke, Sombart (not yet on the hard right, despite his highly ambiguous attitude to Jews) and Troeltsch teaching in its first year. [Lehnert 1989: 445]

[9] There are historical accounts of the *Archiv* by Factor [1988] and Lenger [2018].

setting is appropriate, since, as with Nietzsche a generation earlier, their main impact was not felt until near the end of their leading protagonists' lives: 1947 for Mannheim, 1959 for Schütz, and 1971 for the Hungarian Marxist György Lukács. There was a similar lag in the reputation of the historical sociologist and theorist of 'figurational sociology', Norbert Elias (1897–1990), who had been Mannheim's assistant in Frankfurt and whose importance was only properly recognised after the publication in English in 1969 of the first volume of his major work, *The Civilising Process*, which had first been published in 1939. Elias's longevity enabled him to enjoy two decades of prominence after his retirement from Leicester University in 1962.

Already in 1929, Mannheim argued that the institutional recognition of sociology in the 1920s was a belated response to the achievements of the previous generation, and in particular to the work of 'Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch and Max Scheler (to name here only those already dead) …' This work, taken as a whole, 'surpasses at a stroke the level of Western sociology' and provides a legacy to be developed further.[10] Mannheim [(1929b) 433 n.3] stressed in a footnote his own indebtedness to these figures. Lukács also clearly saw himself as developing an approach originating with Marx and Hegel, which was later strikingly illustrated in the discovery of Marx's Paris Manuscripts of 1844, as well as inspiring critical theory.

Lukács, in exile since the fall in 1919 of the short-lived communist government in Hungary, published in 1920 the first of the essays which make up his *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* of 1923. In Perry Anderson's terms, this was unquestionably the source of what he called 'Western Marxism', with its base more in the academy than in the 'unity of theory and practice' typical of the earlier generation of Marxist activist theorists. Lukács is an anomalous figure in this contrast, since it was only the force of circumstances which excluded him, for most of his life, from a more active role. His essays published in 1920 attracted criticism from his Heidelberg friend Max Weber, though his mediation between Marx and Weber in his concept of reification shaped a whole current of neo-Marxist and even post-Marxist thought.[11] *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* was also unwelcome to communist orthodoxy. As Kostas Axelos wrote in his 1959 preface to the French translation, the book was for a long time excluded from both history and class consciousness: '*Histoire et conscience de classe*, une des pièces maîtresses de la pensée marxiste du XXe siècle, se faisait expulser de l'histoire et de la conscience,

[10] Mannheim, 'Zur Problematik der Soziologie in Deutschland', reprinted in Meja and Stehr [1982: 427].

[11] See, for example, Rose [1978]. Gillian Rose's Oxford PhD dissertation [Rose 1976] was on the concept of reification, arguably the central concept of western Marxism. In a striking instance of Popperian falsification she demolished the widespread misconception that Marx had used the term: it appears once, but only in the posthumously edited volume 3 of *Capital.*

sans avoir aucune prise sur la classe (prolétarienne).'[12] Korsch, whose *Marxismus und Philosophie* [1923] was published in the same year as *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*, was expelled from the communist party in 1926 but very active in German politics until 1933.

For Schütz, an academic career was a remote prospect for 'racial' as well as personal reasons. Richard Grathoff [1995: 19n.] cites a letter from J. Herbert Furth pointing out that, of a large number of subsequently famous young scholars from Vienna, all the non-Jews attained academic posts and all the Jews (including Schütz, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Machlup, the Indologist Moriz Winternitz and the historian Friedrich Engel-Janosi) had to work in other spheres. Some time later, Schütz, who was already planning his emigration to the United States, turned down an offer from Edmund Husserl in 1937 to become his assistant [Grathoff 1995: 22; see also Fleck 2011: 141].

Schütz's earlier and initially unpublished work, of which the most substantial is the 1927 text 'Lebensformen[13] und Sinnstrukturen', drew largely on Bergson; it was not until the publication of Husserl's *Vorlesungen über das innere Zeitbewusstsein* that he realised his importance for his own work [Grathoff 1995: 20–21]. Already in these early sketches, however, one can see the main direction of his intellectual project. In an outline that the editor of Schütz's Bergsonian manuscripts, Ilja Šrubař, labelled as Entwurf C, Schütz wrote that 'philosophy in the last half century has done nothing for the human sciences' (Geisteswissenschaften).[14] Distancing himself from neo-Kantian and Husserlian approaches and from the attempt to apply natural scientific methods to the social world, Schütz refers to Bergson, Scheler, and Max Weber and calls for the examination of 'pre-scientific material of life as a totality' [Schütz 1981: 326][15] Another text, written in 1925, provides a fuller account. One possible approach aims to produce observational sentences, but another, wholly distinct approach is 'to bring a series of phenomena into an intelligible (verstehbare) connection', which interprets the world as an experience (Erlebnis) and can also justifiably 'claim to be a science' [Schütz 1981: 209].

It was Schütz's radicalisation of Max Weber's conception of interpretive sociology which came much later to mark one pole of the emergence of 'two sociologies' [Dawe 1970, 1978][16]. The other pole was the incorporation of the logi-

[12] http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Lukacs_gyorgy_bis/histoire_conscience_de_classe/histoire_conscience_de_classe_preface.html

[13] The term Lebensform, now often associated with the Ludwig Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, posthumously published in 1953, was in fact introduced much earlier, in 1914, by the philosopher and psychologist Eduard Spranger in his very popular book *Lebensformen* [1919] (translated as *Types of Men*, by M. Niemeyer in 1928). There is however no relation between the meanings given by him and Schütz to the term.

[14] Ludwig Gumplowicz [1905: 355] had been similarly negative about philosophy.

[15] Schütz was impressed by reports of Weber's lectures in Vienna when he returned there from military service [Wagner 1983: 14].

[16] Dawe, writing before the English-language publication of Schütz's *The Phenomenology*

cal empiricism of the Vienna Circle and its equivalent in Berlin into a model of positivist social research and theory, with the verification principle modulating into a broader conception of the formation and testing of hypotheses. From this perspective, as Otto Neurath (1882–1945) put it, Verstehen might be useful for the social scientist, but no more so than a good cup of coffee [Neurath and Cohen 1973: 357]. This approach became the dominant one in social science, with German-language logical empiricism blending with related approaches already present in America.

The third major strand, Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, also emerged around 1920. In 1918 Mannheim was already lecturing on the topic of his doctoral dissertation and what became his 'structural analysis of epistemology'; the paper with that title was published in Hungarian in 1918 and in German in 1922. Here, although the reference points feeding into epistemology are internal to philosophy (psychological, logical, and ontological), one can already see the focus on presuppositions and perspectives which is central to his sociology of knowledge. In a 1924 essay on 'Historicism' he refers to philosophies 'being constantly constructed anew from still more *comprehensive new centres* in such a way that the old insights are incorporated in the new and invested with new significance' [Mannheim (1923) 1952: 90]. His essays on Weltanschauung (1923), Historicism (1924) and on the sociology of knowledge (1925) were followed by his habilitation dissertation on conservative thought (1927) and his major work *Ideology and Utopia* [Mannheim (1929a) 1936]. Max Scheler was working simultaneously in the same area, with an essay on Weltanschauung of 1922 and *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft* in 1926.[17] Mannheim was, however, keen to stress the difference between his approach and Scheler's, writing rather dismissively of his 'grandiose systematic sketch, full of profound intuitions but lacking in a clear, practicable method of investigation suited to a sociologically oriented, cultural science.'[18] The sociology of knowledge was not new: Wilhelm Jerusalem had addressed the topic in 1909 [Jerusalem 1909] and was in contact with another strand of the sociology of knowledge which was initiated by Émile Durkheim, who established a section of the *Année sociologique* on 'the social conditions of knowledge' in response to Jerusalem's article [Huebner 2013: 441; see also Lukes 1973; Schmaus 1994]. It was, however, Mannheim's version which defined the developing field and attracted a good proportion of the hostility attaching to sociol-

of the Social World, framed the question slightly differently as the opposition between a sociology of social control and one of social action. Max Weber of course anticipated this theme in his reference, in his 'Objectivity' essay, to two versions of economics: 'as a despairing Viennese examination candidate complained'. Sombart went one better with his 1930 book *Die drei Nationalökonomien*, and Ralf Dahrendorf [1960] referred to 'three sociologies' in a review of Helmut Schelsky's *Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie* [Schelsky 1959].

[17] Scheler is also of course an important figure in philosophical anthropology [see also Plessner 1928; Honneth and Joas 1988].

[18] 'The Sociology of Knowledge', reprinted in Mannheim [(1929a) 1936: 279].

ogy more generally in Weimar Germany [Meja and Stehr 1990; see also Meja and Stehr 1982]. We can only guess how this would have played out in the absence of the catastrophe of 1933. As Mannheim put it prophetically in 1929, 'For the moment we do not wish to be martyrs' [Mannheim (1929b) 433].

The years around 1920, then, in the German-speaking world, can be seen to have set up a number of theoretical currents which eventually shaped the social theory of the last third of the 20th century, often blending together into new forms, as well as sharpening oppositions between them.[19] The revival of interest in Marxism in the West led to a corresponding rediscovery of classical sociological theory and the canonisation of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim (and eventually Simmel) as founding fathers. While the Weber and Durkheim industries developed independently of each other, there were also synthetic moves by Giddens [1971] and others to bring out their interrelations. This diverse Western Marxism blended with system theory, emerging out of the functionalism of the 1920s, both in West Germany and in North America, and later with the economistic strand of rational choice theory. Schütz's approach, enduringly (mis)labelled phenomenological sociology, blended for many sociologists with Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, despite substantial conflicts between their more partisan supporters, and fed into the critical theory of Karl-Otto Apel and Habermas (1967) and the contemporaneous presentation by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) of their Schützian theory of social construction as a sociology of (everyday) knowledge.

All this suggests some conclusions about the temporalities of social theory. In the mid-20th century, the dominant features were the delay caused by the war and, much more importantly, the contribution of the intellectual diaspora from fascist Europe [Fleck 2011]. European thinkers who had established their careers in the 1920s had to re-establish or even reinvent themselves in alien environments. Theodor W. Adorno, for example, described his difficulty in dumbing down ('zurückschrauben') his work on Husserl into terms intelligible to his Oxford colleagues, who however appreciated his piano-playing and his taste in wine [Müller-Doohm 2005: 193].

Mannheim's evolution is one of the most striking. Securing his Frankfurt chair over substantial opposition in 1930, mostly from a conservative direction (though his approach was also criticised by the critical theorists), he was rapidly forced to flee (along with a third of Frankfurt faculty) into a second exile, without even time to return his borrowed library books [Woldring 1986: 37]. On his arrival in England, having proposed an ambitious research project to the Rockefeller Foundation (which may also have been designed to support colleagues who had also found refuge there), he seems to have reoriented his work in more practical and applied directions, while remaining committed to broader theoretical and

[19] A similar argument can be made for philosophy [see Eilenberger 2018].

historical perspectives. He wrote in 1943 to the director of the Institute of Education at the University of London, Frederick Clarke, of the danger that 'there will be only ad-hoc sociologies' [Woldring 1986: 54].

Perry Anderson, in an article in *New Left Review*, suggested that, of the English-speaking countries, the United States received the more progressive exiles and the United Kingdom those who were less so.

> A process of natural selection occurred, in which those intellectuals with an elective affinity to English modes of thought and political outlook gravitated here. Those refugees who did not, went elsewhere…It is perhaps significant that no important Germans did so, with the brief exception of Mannheim who had little impact. The German emigration…avoided this island. The Frankfurt School of Marxists, Marcuse, Adorno, Benjamin, Horkheimer, and Fromm went to France and then to the USA. Neumann and Reich (initially to Norway) followed. Lukács went to Russia. Brecht went to Scandinavia and then to America, followed by Mann. This was a 'Red' emigration, utterly unlike that which arrived here. It did not opt for England, because of a basic cultural and political incompatibility. [Anderson 1968: 18]

This provocative claim was undoubtedly overstated, and Thomas Mann would be surprised to find himself described as part of a red wave, but it remains true that the diversity of academic and other opportunities in the United States made it a promising site for the exiles.

What, we may ask, would have happened to European sociology in the absence of the twin catastrophes of 1933 in Germany and 1938 in Austria and Czechoslovakia? One of the boldest suggestions was that made by Wolf Lepenies, following Käsler [1984] and König [1971]:

> Looking back on the 1920s and the early years of the 1930s, we cannot today be in any doubt that with Karl Mannheim there opened up in Germany the hope of a new orientation and stabilization for sociology that was brought to nothing by the victory of National Socialism. Dirk Käsler and René König have convincingly demonstrated that Mannheim appeared to be called to overcome the stagnation which the discipline was caught in and to become the 'social "leader" of a sociology oriented towards social science'. [Lepenies 2006: 320–321]

Even in England, *pace* Anderson, Mannheim was beginning to have quite an impact on intellectual life by the time of his early death [Lepenies 2006: 328–333]. For Käsler [1984: 41–42], the importance of Mannheim was that, like Max Weber, he represented a 'specifically social scientific sociology' in the face of a polarisation of German sociology between a natural scientific model on the one hand, and a culturalistic approach on the other, the latter often tending towards 'ideological elements with a potential for political misuse'. Käsler [1984: 12] argues that German sociology, though institutionally quite robust, suffered from a 'search for

respectability' which meant that the response of its leading representatives to the rise to power of national socialism was 'theoretical and practical hopelessness or even susceptibility'.[20] One must probably also recognise that the Weimar period did not produce any work of comparable importance to that of the previous generation, though I think that Helmut Schelsky [1959] and Uta Gerhardt [2001] are rather too negative. Schelsky [1959: 37] notoriously claimed that by 1933 the main themes of German sociology were already played out, while skating over his own role as a young Nazi scholar. Gerhardt [2001: 394], in a later generation, also argues that '[t]he decline of sociological reflection in the Weimar period – compared with the life work of Simmel and Weber – was evident'. Heinz-Jürgen Dahme and Otthein Rammstedt [1984], by contrast, merely accentuate the positive legacy of the German and French classics.

Conclusion

This brief sketch suggests some reflections on the temporalities of social theory and of scholarship more generally. I referred earlier to the delayed impact of the work of many, perhaps the majority, of the thinkers discussed here. Marx and Nietzsche, the two thinkers whom Max Weber cited as major influences, are early examples. Marx in his lifetime was not seen, except in limited circles, as a major *theorist*; Nietzsche's reputation soared only during his period of incapacity and after his death. 'Reinventing the wheel' is also frequent: a theory is reinvented or rediscovered after a significant lapse of time. The sociology of knowledge is one example, with Wilhelm Jerusalem's work taken up more than a decade afterwards; the idea of the social construction of reality, formulated by Berger and Luckmann [1966], really took off much later with the vogue of postmodernism and was reinvented by John Searle [1995]. It was in fact Jerusalem who formulated the idea of what he called soziale Verdichtung (social condensation), the gradual reinforcement of beliefs and memories [Huebner 2013: 436]. There is a parallel with the phenomenon of scandal, in which, typically, something which

[20] See also Lukács [1946]. König, who emigrated to Switzerland and the UK, was similarly negative: 'Some decided in favour of national socialism, others against it, and history passed by all of them.' [König 1971: 33]. On the reinsertion of former Nazi sociologists such as Schelsky and Freyer, see, for example, Kruse [1994]. It is perhaps worth recalling that Geiger, appointed to a chair at Braunschweig in 1928, successfully blocked a proposal to appoint Hitler to a chair in 'organic social theory and politics' in one of many attempts to secure his naturalisation in Germany. (See, for example, his draft contract http://www.vernetztes-gedaechtnis.de/dienstver.htm and a cartoon depicting Hitler's 'inaugural lecture' from the socialist paper *Vorwärts*: http://www.vernetztes-gedaechtnis.de/karika.htm) A social democrat, Geiger emigrated to Denmark in 1933 and saw out the war in Sweden, representing Scandinavia in the founding of the International Sociological Association [Möbius 2017: 13].

has long been known to exist, such as police violence against ethnic minorities or the abuse of a dominant position in sexual abuse, comes to be thematised and addressed, as in Black Lives Matter and #metoo. Max Weber wrote of the way in which all scholars must know that their work will be superseded; the other side of the coin is that parts of it, like his, may be rediscovered and constantly re-evaluated in the further development of social and political theory.

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SPECIAL REVIEW ESSAY SECTION

Ryan D. Enos: ***The Space between Us: Social Geography and Politics***, Cambridge 2017: Cambridge University Press, 314 pp.

Reinventing the Wheel of Social Geography?

Researchers in urban sociology and urban economics have long been interested in investigating the role of the spatial dimension on several outcomes. For example, many scholars focusing on the determinants of inequality have investigated the role of the spatial dimension on the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Under different perspectives, the relationship between residential location and individual characteristics has frequently been addressed to see how these two key elements interact. Less attention has been paid, however, to the channels through which the physical space of *where* we live has a relevant role on *how* we live and *with* whom. This is the principal aim of this very ambitious and wide-ranging book. It is a disappointment then to see all the expectations falling apart page after page. *The Space between Us: Social Geography and Politics* turns out to be quite prolix, US-biased, apt to self-indulgence, and permeated by a sort of disturbing vein of white superiority. Some interesting experiments and stories from a bunch of American cities plus Jerusalem make up the best part of the 250 pages.

In the first part, Enos sets out the theoretical foundation of his work. More than theory, this proves to be an extraordinary exercise of inductivism, i.e. the research approach based on proposing a general law to generalise observed patterns. But while it is cute to recall the experience of social diversity at lake Yosemite when the author was a kid (p. 18), it becomes a bit stretched to pretend to generate ground-breaking theories with ourselves at the centre. For example, on page 51 Enos writes: 'Despite all my best intentions as a liberal – *one married to a Muslim woman, no less* – that simple blue scarf turned my mind to every negative stereotype about the danger of Muslims on planes.' (emphasis added) The paragraph continues by seemingly legitimising the racist stereotype that just because we are what we are and we are born where we are born, even people married with Muslim women may remain racist. Clearly, there are serious dangers when one derives a general pattern from a very peculiar perception of one individual.

Enos tries to demonstrate that: (i) the geographic space structures social cognition and thus our political behaviour; (ii) social geography consequently affects our behaviours and institutions; and (iii) this effect on behaviours is channelled through our perceptions. While the first two contributions seem very similar and have been extensively treated in the literature, the third one would be interesting. However, rather than abstracting from his own perceptions, Enos builds a theory based on his own perceptions and he is absolutely convincing in proving that this theory holds for him.

All the papers analysing the Moving to Opportunity project in the United States, the great work done by Robert Sampson [2004], Ray Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren [2016, 2018], among others, have created a great literature analysing the role of space for the development of inequalities, especially and at least in the United States. Many of these works have usefully deter-

mined almost -causal relationships between the space where people live and their happiness, life satisfaction, labour market success, and a plethora of different outcomes. Many of these papers have been innovative, provocative, and counterintuitive. These characteristics are not obviously a requisite for a good book. However, this book's introduction, after more than 40 pages of dozens of 'as I will describe later', 'as I presented above', 'as I will show' arguments and harsh critiques of previous literature (e.g. p. 49), concludes with 'I am striving for a general argument. I want to explain the effects of space on the salience of social groups and I want to show how this affects behaviours.' Therefore, the reader could expect something more than:

- '…segregation appears to improve the accuracy [in determining the connection of people and place]; where Latinos or Blacks were more segregated from whites, white people were more accurate in finding them on the map.' (p. 85)
- '…the psychological space between us increases when the geographic space between us decreases.' (p. 114)
- 'Social geography – the space between groups – can make a real difference in our politics and can affect voting behaviour in magnitudes unrevealed by political campaigns.' (p. 163)

In the first example, Enos asks 1909 individuals during a lab experiment to locate ethnic minorities in their own area. In the second one, over 30 people with clear immigrant traits (language mainly) spent their summer on Boston trains to investigate commuter reactions. In the last example, to make short a (very) long story, Enos analyses how white voters living close to blacks voted less for Obama in 2008. While the reader must really respect the effort, technological progress, and time spent on these questions, at the same time she might remain disappointed by the lack of novelty in the main content across these pages.

The book, in fact, for large parts, rather than providing new explanations that add value and shedding new light on existing ones, seems very much about reinventing the wheel. The comparative experiments in Boston, Chicago, Jerusalem, Los Angeles, and Phoenix are interesting but frequently difficult to follow because they are too much diluted by personal biographical anecdotes and efforts to demonstrate common impressions. The methodological choice of conducting real-life experiments to confirm that the feelings of a 'Wasp' individual are shared by many other 'Wasp' individuals can be interesting, too. However, overall, the content of the book does not seem to add much to the existing literature.

The book is also ambiguous about who it is targeting. It is difficult to consider this a book for a general readership, but at the same time the academic reader is left without anything with which to evaluate the author's research findings. There are no tables or coefficients, not even in the appendix. Even if available online with the data, not reporting a single relevant table is a major weakness of the book. Enos asks for a great deal of trust about his results. Sometimes it is difficult to grant him this, since frequently the results seem to be stretched towards the desired conclusion. To provide one example, in an analysis of Boston, a set of graphs on page 125 is supposed to demonstrate that the greater the percentage of Spanish-speaking commuters, the greater the perception of immigration is on Boston trains. However, the 95% confidence intervals seem to overlap here, and the results do not seem very robust.

On page 193 Enos writes: 'When scholars only test one single location, it is difficult to know how representative of the country it is'. This is true without a doubt, but it is perhaps confusing to mix external validity and causality. Indeed, while comparing more cities and presenting more examples may increase external validity and

the descriptive power of the analysis, it does not have anything to do with causality. It is therefore difficult to understand why Enos, just 40 pages later, claims: 'Establishing a causal effect of social geography has long been difficult for research on context, with selection casting doubt on many findings, but with the accumulated evidence of this book, the causal effect of social geography seems clear.' (p. 230). Accumulated evidence unfortunately does not imply causality. To conclude, while the interesting descriptive evidence could have been summarised in one or two papers, overall this book does not advance the literature about social geography.

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The Spaces We Occupy and the Divides We Create

As European countries are experiencing the increasing ethnic diversification of their societies, ethnic segregation and its causes and consequences are becoming issues of concern not only at the domestic but increasingly also at the EU level. In the search to understand this complex phenomenon, Enos's timely book provides a fresh view relevant to both scholars and policy practitioners by convincingly arguing that the spaces we occupy dramatically impact the construction of racial and ethnic divides. The book's nine chapters develop the evidence in three steps. First, the theoretical scaffolding is built, with an elaboration of the main concepts and their interlinkages. Then the author takes the reader to laboratories, where a set of experiments disentangle the causal effects of space on attitudes and behaviours. The last step is a set of real-life experiments – real, existing situations that the researcher exploits to illustrate that the links observed in the lab experiments do exist in everyday situations and encounters.

In so proceeding, Enos makes a major contribution to the study of the impact of segregation. Many past studies, while providing important insights, suffered from a common problem: they were not able to demonstrate that the correlations they observed between segregation and socio-political outcomes were in fact evidence for causal relationships. Enos's research strategy of relying on ingenious *experiments* – the gold standard in research – more convincingly proves that the way individuals are occupying and experiencing space has an impact on how they perceive others, on the biases they develop, and on how they act.

The book's theoretical foundations build on social sciences and psychology theories. The starting point is the argument that we humans are hard-wired to classify ourselves by group membership. In the process, attributing positive characteristics to some groups ('us') and negative characteristics to other groups ('them') maintains group classifications and builds group identities. Humans use space as a heuristic device to make decisions about the individuals (and groups) inhabiting certain areas. However, Enos argues, it is not simply 'space', but rather how people occupy space that matters (size, proximity, and the degree of segregation) in increasing the salience of a group category. The increased salience has further consequenc-

es for the group-bias that will be elicited from other members of the community, which in turn will have political consequences (for example, party preferences).

Pulling in strands of research in social psychology, public opinion, human geography, urban politics and policies, and ethnic studies, the author creates a dialogue between scholarly domains that do not regularly speak to each other, although they may deal with the same or adjacent social phenomena. In so doing, the book makes a significant contribution to opening a cross-disciplinary dialogue. The author also has the ambition of formulating a general theory of the role of geographical space on political behaviours. The evidence he collects through lab and natural experiments, via a variety of designs and in different locations, is congruent and supports the claim to generality. In Enos's own words, 'the reaction to outgroups, across human societies, is often the same and these reactions are shaped by social geography, so that when people see differences across groups, these differences become distorted and amplified' (p. 179).

The book leaves several issues open. For example, although proximity plays an important role in explaining the emergence of group salience, and thereby group-bias, the author does not elaborate how close is close. In fact, it seems that the proximity effect on political behaviour varies significantly even across the real-world cases the book analyses, from less than 1 km in the case of Chicago housing projects (p. 152) to ca. 20 km in the case of Los Angeles-Latino areas (p. 219). A second issue is the absence of policy suggestions. One could argue that the series of studies in the book were never intended to amount to an empirical case for certain policy proposals in the first place. This would be a fair argument. However, this book starts with the observation that 'countries such as the United States, in which various religions, races and ethnicities all live but are segregated into different parts of the country, simply do not function as well as less diverse and less segregated countries. They are less likely to solve the collective action problems that need to be solved for a decent quality of life […]' (p.4). So Enos cues the reader to expect some policy proposals. The author suggests that any public policy that can claim some success at solving the issues uncovered by this study should be aimed at increasing social harmony (p. 249). However, what that means and how it can be done remains an open issue. The third issue concerns the conceptual framework. The author makes a considerable effort to elaborate the approach, the method, the theory, and the conceptual tools for the benefit of the lay reader. However, some conceptual inconsistencies remain, which will leave readers with a social science background in need of more clarity. For example, a core concept that anchors the theoretical argument (and subsequent analyses) is '*local* environment'. But when segregation is defined, the term '*social* environment' is used – with no clarification as to whether the two terms overlap. The term segregation is defined as 'the extent to which individuals of different groups occupy *or* experience different social environments' (p. 22). As Goertz [2006] has argued, the use of 'or' in definitions to connect the characteristics of a phenomenon results in an increase in the circle of empirical referents of a concept. In this case, it means that the empirical instances of segregation are those characterised by the individuals occupying social environments *and* those characterised by individuals experiencing social environments. It is not a stretch of the imagination to argue that location-based segregation is different from experience-based segregation. For example, a person may not live in a segregated area, but she may nevertheless experience segregation from her social environment. The implication is that location-based segregation and experience-based segregation may have different impacts on attitude formation –

but this distinction is not fully elaborated upon.

A book is valuable when it challenges its readers. And without a doubt, *The Space Between Us* does exactly that. It does so through the intelligent setting of the lab experiments and through the innovative use of natural experiments, which show the reader that keen observation allows the researcher to identify places outside the lab where, with minimal intervention experimental settings can be created. But it does so also by inciting readers to think further, to raise questions for themselves and to develop her own innovative research designs. The book is well written and a pleasure to read. The clever use of personal histories is not simply a plot device to enhance the communication with readers but is also evidence of the keen eye of a scholar who looks at societal interactions and sees puzzles. The scene at Lake Yosemite (p. 17) is illustrative of this.

In addition to the fascinating insights, read from a European perspective, the book prompts students of urban studies, integration, and ethnic diversity to ask themselves to what extent the intergroup relations in Europe are marked by similar dynamics. Europe differs significantly from the United States with respect to its immigration history. At the same time, Musterd [2005] has already shown that certain ethnic groups experience high levels of segregation in many European cities. In this, Europe's largest cities are no different from the United States' major cities. To the best of my knowledge, although segregation in European cities has received plenty of attention, there has yet to be any research exploring the consequences of ethnic segregation on political behaviour in Europe along the lines of Enos's argument. The consequences of how spaces are shared or not can have dramatic political consequences, as Brexit has shown – many Brexit supporters pointed at the recent arrival of Eastern European immigrants to the United Kingdom as the trigger for the feeling that the familiar spaces did not belong to them anymore. Understanding the connection between Europeans' perceptions of space and their perceptions of 'others' would help to elucidate the mechanisms beneath such political preferences and behaviours. At the same time, they would allow a better evaluation of the policies that are in place to deal with segregation. Denmark has been in the limelight with its 2019 plan to physically dismantle its ghettoes and relocate their inhabitants, but this is only one (albeit the most extreme) of the policies that European governments have used to deal with segregation (see, for example, the 2009 special issue of the *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* (volume 24), or the 2019 volume *Ethnic Spatial Segregation in European Cities* (Hans Skifter Andersen, Routledge). Enos's work should inspire a new lens through which these policies are evaluated in terms of their ability to create spaces where the distances between people are not emphasised or exacerbated.

To sum up, *The Space Between Us* is a must read for anyone interested in interethnic relations, social psychology, and urban policies. Policy practitioners will also find gems in this book, as it will remind keen readers that current urban segregation and public transportation networks are the result of previous policy decisions and will thereby prompt an acknowledgement that decisions taken today may have dramatic negative effects in the (not too distant) future.

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The Blank Spaces between Us: What about the Sources of Discrimination, Segregation and Exclusion?

This is an ambitious book that seeks to describe how the space in which we live – the city in which we work, the neighbourhood in which we live – influences our mental habitus. This diversity of spaces in our life in many cases coincides with a variety of people with different social characteristics, those characteristics that configure prejudices, fears, and cognitive biases about who is 'different' – not least when thinking of immigrants or people who are variously identifiable as such. As Enos writes in the preface, reasoning about the effects of social geography 'can help to answer why "us versus them" seems increasingly to coincide with "here versus there", a phrase that efficiently summarises his work based on the assumption that the location of people in city spaces affects our mutual perceptions. Enos offers numerous theoretical elaborations to support these theses and tries to bring them into dialogue with a series of specific considerations relating to some American and non-American cities. Reflections on the effects of social geography on our behaviour concern both individual psychological issues and macro-social and political issues. The ambition is to unite the individual part of the reaction to diversity, to the foreigner, with the political and social part of everyday life: 'In this book, I explore these and other relationships that demonstrate the powerful impact of social geography on our individual behaviour and on the well-being of society. [...] geography penetrates our psychology [...] and with these changes in perception, it affects our behaviour' (p. 4).

Yet the feeling of this reviewer is that the cause and effect of the dynamics of exclusion and the propagation of prejudice are treated rather uncritically here. Enos does not deny the negative impact on the life of those who suffer, but nor does he criticise the structural reasons from which they arise. The author decides to dwell on the differences rather than the inequalities. The multiple experiments he describes in his essay (for example, the proposition of classifying ten faces as 'white' or 'black' according to the different gradations from white to black skin colour) seem to focus on the psychological component of the perception of 'whiteness' or 'blackness'. This, however, does not solve the primarily political problem of prejudice and racism and does not consider the historical and cultural significance of the problem as explained, for example, by Roediger [1999] or, before that, by the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies [see Hall 1980]. In the history of the United States, the very concept of whiteness was put in crisis by the arrival of Irish and Italians, to mention only two groups of migrants in America. In the analysis of the problems variously indicated as 'prejudice' or 'group-based bias', Enos ignores the numerous counter-colonial studies that speak of racism as a factor necessarily linked to the capitalist mode of production and to the concept of racialisation as a result of a hierarchically connoted representation of differences.

The assumption that '[...] we use space to psychologically organize our social world and this affects our political behaviour' (p. 5) seems to clarify the whole setting of the book, which tends to be a revival of known schemes, without making the status quo the subject of discussion. It is clear that the author himself does not have this ambition, since the social experiments he is talking about are based on the intention to describe phenomena related to the biases that characterise us both as individuals and as groups. However, the risk of this type of approach is to re-propose at an academic level the distortions that are inherent in a certain way of looking at the world and that reside in what, in the second chapter, is defined as 'the liberal di-

lemma': 'We often support diversity out of a genuine ideological commitment and because we rightly perceive that diversity can improve the performance of many organizations, such as universities and businesses' (p. 46). This is certainly a liberal vision of the world that leaves power relations unchanged. What Enos does not question is the relationship of subordination, taken for granted, of people unrelated to the liberal paradigm in which this book moves. The benefits of the diversity he mentions imply that it is 'whites' who benefit from 'contamination' with the foreigner (academically and in business, the author writes). In doing so, it proposes a structure of power relations that is unchanged, weakening its theses of a possible force that truly reforms the present condition.

Enos asks on page 51: 'Why does social geography affect our behaviour? Why can it lead to group-based bias? Why is it so powerful that it can overcome the forces of the modern world that work to close the space between us?' Enos's reasoning seems to involuntarily refer to the 'space' between academic studies on prejudices, bias, and discrimination and everyday life. The author's approach of discussing the experiments he carried out with the noble intention of breaking down some of the cognitive errors into which we fall does nothing but reproduce the separation between 'us' and 'them', thereby keeping all the consequences of this alive.

On page 81, the author explains that '[a] key aspect of scientific inference is separating the signal from the noise. The signal, for me, is the impact of social geography on group-based bias. But, of course, there is so much noise - all the other things, besides social geography, affecting city dwellers at any given time - that this signal can be hard to detect'. And, in his view, the solution to this interference is: 'Going into the laboratory allows me to isolate the signal of social geography from the noise of the social world.' (p. 81) This really seems to represent the reverse of a work that talks about the impact of social geography but does not offer a real critique of the society in which this research is carried out. This also applies to specific case studies. As Enos explains: 'This book is about how politics is shaped by experiences like those of the 'L' riders in Chicago' (p. 2), since the reflections that led to the writing arose in the period of his life in which he took the 'L' (an elevated railway) line to work every day. On this crowded line, the different populations that were travelling up and down at the different stops were clearly visible, even to an inexperienced observed, making the separation between the black and white populations evident. The reflections on Chicago do not seem to add much to considerations already available elsewhere in the literature about the distribution of people within a city and the implications that this could have. In the first decades of the 1900s the 'Chicago school' [Park, Burgess and McKenzie 1967] studied Chicago's great development (and the consequent influx of migrants looking for work), and did so always in relation to the places where wealthy people and workers settled, evaluating the impact of the development of city transport.

Enos, for obvious reasons, deals with very different psycho-social aspects and yet offers a reading of the world around him that tries, through micro-observations, to reach wide-ranging conclusions. This approach somewhat sacrifices the complexity of analysis that would better help to understand, first of all, the power relationships that characterise the world we live in. Information obtained from the considerations that arise from the daily life of the author and his experiments is inevitably interesting. However, the possibilities for then widening the discourse and relating it to different variables are limited. Enos chooses a methodological approach that oscillates between personal experience and detecting behaviours from surveys and experiments

with groups. However, neither of the two methods result in a convincing attempt to move from the particular to the general, even though this method does have the merit of making it an academic text accessible to non-specialist audiences.

The last part of the book, dedicated to specific case studies, is interesting and a pleasure to read. Nonetheless, these parts are not exempt from the points of criticism highlighted above. The author's first-person experiences remain an incomplete attempt to relate a dense theoretical formulation to the direct experience of the writer. The application of an ethnographic approach within a city or a neighbourhood [e.g. Bourgois 2003] would probably have been more appropriate. In the part of the book dedicated to Jerusalem (chapter 7), Enos seems to focus in a somewhat claustrophobic way on social geography, which is immediately visible in a city delimited by a real wall. Even in a work focused on social geography the historical events that led to this socio-political situation should not just be mentioned as though they were of secondary importance. The complexity of this situation deserved greater attention in a work of a different nature like this. Similarly, when discussing Los Angeles (chapter 8), the categories to which Enos refers (politics, segregation, inter-ethnic tensions) reflect a narrow reading of the situation: the reduction to the problem of the vote expressed by the various social groups trivialises the problem of a city that has been affected for decades by different ideas about development and the management of diversity [see, e.g., Davis 1990]. In sum, this is a book that, in some ways, occupies the middle ground between psychology and sociology, but seems unable to open up a field of research in its own right because it neglects some important elements of analysis.

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Space as a Determinant Not Just of Geography But Also of Social and Political Life

What happens when different groups of people share towns, cities, and countries and yet they remain physically and psychologically apart? In *The Space between Us: Social Geography and Politics* Ryan Enos, in an innovative way, challenges the traditional definition of distance and argues that the space between us affects the way we think and behave, and it structures our politics (p. 5). He addresses one of the most discussed political trends of the moment: the increasing electoral support for political parties that oppose immigration. His aim is to understand '... why this xenophobia takes hold' (p. 4). He suggests that when an outgroup is large and close enough to be noticeable, but remains separated in segregated neighbourhoods, it widens the psychological distance between groups.

Enos puts forward his own theory of socio-geographic impact (pp. 11–12), which he summarises in chapter 1. He theorises that: (a) categorising people into groups (including oneself) is a basic cognitive process, and one that deeply affects behaviour and attitudes; (b) the salience of group categories is influenced by human geography; (c) three geographic conditions in particular alter the salience of groups: the size, proximity, and segregation of outgroups; (d) when the salience of an outgroup in-

creases, so does outgroup bias; (e) and this has political consequences.

The psychological mechanisms that explain how and why individuals categorise people into groups are mainly described in chapter 3. Drawing upon studies from psychology, Enos starts by asserting that the process of categorising is essential for human survival. It enables our mind to recognise signs of danger and to understand our surroundings. The process of categorising is parallel to stereotyping: we categorise oranges as fruit and stereotype fruit as sweet and edible (p. 53). It follows that when humans categorise themselves and others into groups, they simultaneously attribute stereotypes to the members of that group (p. 56). The salience of each of these categories, Enos argues, is affected by social geography and by three geographic factors in particular: size, proximity, and segregation. His argument is supported by self-categorisation theory, which postulates that accessibility and comparative fit increase the salience of a category. In Enos's theory, segregation increases the comparative fit of a group category (whatever characteristic makes that outgroup look homogeneous becomes more salient) and size and proximity increase the category's accessibility (make it noticeable).

The author refers to studies in psychology to support his final claim that the salience of the group's category is positively related to outgroup bias, because it increases the perception of intergroup difference (which he calls psychological distance). In the author's ingenious and eloquent figure of speech: 'Space ... [is] a demagogue whispering in our ear about what is important and how different Us is from Them. This demagogue – in our mind's eye – drives Us and Them further apart.' (p. 72)

Even though these psychological processes are only parsimoniously explained (which the author also acknowledges), the oversimplification of some of the arguments is an advantage rather than a weakness. This makes the book accessible to many audiences and it gives the arguments an intuitive appeal. Furthermore, the rare schematic scientific explanations are offset by the author's meticulous empirical work. Enos supports every single aspect of his theory with empirical evidence on different scales and across multiple locations. He uses a multitude of methods to examine different dimensions of the same phenomenon, each aiming to overcome the weaknesses of the other.

In chapter 2, the author compares the effect of social geography across various locations in the United States in order to demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between the number and segregation of Black residents and outgroup bias. Looking across locations with varying levels of segregation, he examines the effect of social geography on outgroup bias (describing African Americans as lazy or unintelligent and searching for the word 'nigger') and voting behaviour (support for Obama and voter turnout).

To examine the micro-processes of the socio-geographic impact, the author conducts a series of laboratory experiments (chapter 4). In total, he conducts 7 laboratory experiments, each in order to explore a different psychological mechanism: the human capacity of associating groups with space, the effect of segregation on categorisation, ingroup exclusion, outgroup bias, and costly behaviour. Some of the laboratory experiments are variations of well-established experiments in the social sciences such as the Dictator game and Tajfel's experiments. Others are truly original. Among these, an experiment that particularly stands out is the one Enos conducted with Celaya, in which they mimicked segregated neighbourhoods at a '...nineteenth-century brick classroom building at Harvard' to observe the effect on the psychological distance of participants.

To understand how social geography works in real-life scenarios, Enos conducts

a field-randomised experiment (chapter 5) and a natural experiment (chapter 6). These are the most ingenious and original designs in the book. The field-randomised experiment takes place in homogeneous Anglo-White communities in the suburbs of Boston. Enos hires two Spanish-speaking confederates to ride randomly selected commuter trains for a period of days. The commuters on those trains were invited to complete a web survey about exclusionary policies towards immigrants before and after being exposed to the new Spanish-speaking passengers. Enos finds that exposure to the confederates led to a significant shift towards exclusionary attitudes. The findings are staggering, but their generalisability is nonetheless limited because of the localised and short-term nature of the experiment. These weaknesses are immediately addressed in the following chapter, which presents the findings of a natural experiment conducted in Chicago. Between 2000 and 2004, 12 housing projects were demolished in Chicago, most of which had housed African-American families. Several of these buildings were near white neighbourhoods. Unlike the white commuters in Boston, these white residents were exposed to a large and segregated Black community for a long time. Enos takes advantage of this unique situation to observe the effect of the displacement of Black Americans on the political behaviour of their white neighbours – which was that their voter turnout decreased and they were more likely to vote Democrat.

Throughout the book, the author's ambition is clear: he claims that his theory is universal and applicable to different places and on different scales. Even though most of his research is set in the United States, chapter 7 is dedicated to Israel. Here, Enos presents the observational study he conducted with Noam Gidron in Israel. The study consists of lab-in-the-field experiments (in non-randomised contexts) that assess the effect of social geography on the willingness to cooperate between Orthodox and Secular Jews in Tel Aviv (where there is low segregation and a small proportion of the outgroup) and Jerusalem (where there is high segregation and a high proportion of outgroups). He finds the same patterns he had observed in the United States – that the proximity of a largely segregated outgroup increases outgroup bias – and concludes that his theory applies everywhere.

In chapter 8, the author drives us to Los Angeles, where he observes the impact of social geography in the relationship between Blacks and Latinos. Enos remarks that social geography might affect low-status groups differently. When he finds similar patterns in the voting behaviour and outgroup bias of low-status communities, he concludes, once again, that his theory is universal.

The book ends with predictions for the future of American cities. Enos takes us to the last destination – Phoenix, 'a city that, by many indications, represents the future of social-geographic growth and change in the United States' (p. 229). It is also a city marked by anti-immigrant politics, where Anglo-Whites and an increasing number of Latinos live near each other yet are profoundly separated, And a polycentric car-based city, where intergroup contact is reduced. The author asks, 'As Americans, both natives and immigrants, move to Phoenix and other such cities and as Latinos spread into more and more of the United States, will the space between us shrink, grow, or remain static?' (p. 229) The last pages offer one policy recommendation: only policies that reduce residential segregation can diminish the space between us!

This book makes an original contribution to the currently heated debates on immigration and right-wing politics. The relationship between immigration and anti-immigrant politics has been established in the literature, but in this book, Enos takes a step further and attempts to explain why

this connection exists. The author suggests that the culprit is not immigration *per se*, but the residential patterns that result from it. Negative attitudes and behaviours are fostered by the combination of the size-proximity-segregation of the outgroup. The theory of socio-geographic impact contributes to advancing knowledge in political sociology, human geography, and psychology. Enos often refers to Allport [1954] and Key [1949], whose theories are often presented as contradictory (p. 48). Allport theorised that, under optimal conditions, intergroup contact reduces bias, and Key found that, in 1948, white voters were more likely to support segregationist politicians in areas where there was a higher proportion of Blacks. Enos theory builds a bridge between the two theories, by arguing that intergroup contact will only reduce bias if segregation does not exist. When segregation is in place, the presence of a large group will, as Key demonstrated, have the opposite effect.

Space and distance are central concepts in this book, which gain a much broader meaning. In Enos's framework, space refers to more than geography – it can also be social, political, and psychological. Despite its complexity, Enos's new conceptual framework is easy to grasp because his words make it intuitive. As he writes, '... spatial metaphors infuse our language so that non-spatial relationships are structured using the same spatial logic: friends and allies are judged as "close" or not; political ideologies are aligned "left" to "right"; our feelings and attentions can be "distant"' (p. 63). Each chapter brings the reader to a new destination, where she is pressed to reflect on different aspects of her own social context. The examples offered by Enos are so ordinary that they push the readers to verify the author's theory based on their own experience.

Enos's research designs (in particular his experiments in Boston and Chicago) are remarkably well-crafted; yet he is cautious not to make absolutist arguments. Each chapter explores a different method and a different city and scale. They are each pieces of a complex puzzle that, put together, unveil a theory that is meant to apply universally. The only potential weakness of the book concerns this last point. Even though I am convinced by Enos's arguments, I believe that conducting studies in the United States and Israel is not enough to assert its universality, especially since Israel and the United States share many characteristics – they are both rich countries, with liberal welfare states and a long history of immigration. Would it apply to countries with different political regimes, welfare states, or resources? Evidence from the United States and Israel is not enough to answer this question.

Nevertheless, this is a book fit for many audiences. It is a must-read for those interested in urban politics, migration studies, and public policy. Some passages of the book will be of particular interest to young social scientists, since Enos shares research tips, introduces the fundamental problem of causal inference, and discusses the weaknesses and strengths of different methods. The book is enriched with Enos's personal experiences and thoughts. The author shares with readers the context in which he grew up, the events that triggered these puzzles, and even how enthusiastic he was to find answers that no one had before. His excitement and passion for his work are clear on every page of this book, and the reader cannot help but be infused with the author's enthusiasm.

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REGULAR REVIEWS

Jerry Z. Muller: ***The Tyranny of Metrics***
Princeton, NJ, 2018: Princeton University Press, 245 pp.

If you accept as true that it is possible as well as desirable to replace judgement based on experience with numerical indicators of comparative performance (metrics), that making such metrics public will ensure that organisations carry out their intended purposes, and that the best way to motivate people within these organisations is by attaching rewards and penalties to their measured performance, then you may perhaps suffer from 'metric fixation'. In that case you should most definitely read this book by Jerry Z. Muller, an emeritus professor of history at the Catholic University of America. If you do not accept the above as true, you should also read the book, because it will tell you when and how metrics can in fact be used to good purpose.

The notion of metrics as a measure to evaluate performance became popular in the 1980s in the world of business management. An important propagator was the invention and rapid adoption of the spreadsheet and the resulting ease of tabulating data. At the same time, principal-agent theory taught that the interests of principals and agents diverge, and metrics would efficiently convey to principals how well agents are carrying out the principals' goals. This thinking, which was soon superimposed on a variety of other activities and institutions, from hospitals and education to the military, became the call to arms of advocates of what became known as New Public Management. These advocates wanted public institutions to be run more like businesses. Metrics would measure performance, monetary incentives would direct performance, and public availability of metrics would optimise performance by making public institutions compete.

As Muller points out, herein lies an interesting paradox. Fredrich Hayek – who built partly on the insights of Ludwig von Mises – chastised socialists for trying to engineer economic life. Central planners do not know all the relevant inputs and outputs that make up life in a complex organisation such as society. Not only is decentralised information unavailable, but a planned economy also prohibits entrepreneurial discovery. In a truly competitive market, entrepreneurs not only use their knowledge of local conditions to their advantage, but they also discover new and more efficient uses for existing resources, and they come up with new products and services previously unknown and unsuspected. Despite its aim to replicate the conditions of competition, metric fixation reproduces many of the errors of planning. In a planned economy, planners set quantitative targets for each productive unit to fulfil. Today, bureaucrats also set measurable performance targets for public institutions to fulfil. And just like Soviet managers would meet targets by producing inferior goods, so do today's public managers, argues Muller.

Having a background as a university administrator, Muller provides many insights into how this dynamic has impacted universities. When universities are measured and rewarded in part based on graduation rates, the predictable consequence is a lower standard demanded for graduation. When departments are evaluated by the number of publications, the predictable consequence is more publications, not better ones. When individual researchers are rewarded for measured performance,

the predictable consequence is an erosion of the sense of common purpose and of the social relationships that enable corporation. And when university management is measured and rewarded according to international rankings, the predictable consequence is that universities become more like what the rankings measure.

Muller concludes by arguing that there is nothing intrinsically pernicious about metrics. They can contribute to improved performance, but only if they are designed to function in alliance with professional judgement: judgement about whether to measure, what to measure, how to evaluate, whether to attach rewards and penalties to measurements, and to whom to make results available. Measurement without such judgement provides us with distorted knowledge, and it may ultimately draw attention away from what we really care about.

As Muller acknowledges, these arguments are not new. Yet this does not make the book any less important. Indeed, there are good reasons to think that the allure of metrics will not fade any time soon. Those at the top of organisations must make decisions despite having limited time and ability to deal with ever increasing information overload. In such an environment, the temptation to resort to metrics is hard to resist. Moreover, the erosion of societal trust is likely to fortify the demand for metrics. As Muller notes, metrics are a safe bet for those disposed to doubt their own judgement. In sum, I can think of no better way for decision-makers to become acquainted with the pros and cons of metrics than to read Muller's book.

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David Epstein: ***Range: Why Generalists Triumph in a Specialized World***
New York 2019: Riverhead Books, 352 pp.

'Jack of all trades, master of none' is a saying often used to refer to someone who has good skills in several domains but lacks a deeper expertise in a specific field. Here Epstein praises these 'Jacks of all trades' and the ways in which they can thrive. The book reads like a novel focusing on specific aspects of the generalist mindset supported by a narrative exposing how it helped several individuals to attain success. All in all, the main argument can be grasped in the first few chapters, with the rest of the book adding some nuance with the help of interesting anecdotes that sustain readers' curiosity.

The book opens with the stories of two successful athletes, Roger Federer and Tiger Woods. The latter had been trained by his father to play golf since his childhood and achieved an incredible professional golf career, inspiring mothers and fathers all over the world to train their children in the same way, teaching them a specific skill from childhood in order to raise a champion. Conversely, Roger Federer achieved success in his discipline following a different pathway, taking the generalist turn, practising several sports to then settle on tennis later in life and become the best at it. Tiger Woods embraced deliberate practice from childhood onward, and through repetitive training coupled with continuous feedback this permitted him to steadily improve and become a top athlete. This type of practice is well described by Malcolm Gladwell in the book *Outliers: The Story of Success* and is manifested as the '10 000 hours rule' by which anyone can become an expert in a skill by investing 10 000 hours in practice. On the other hand, Federer started with a 'sampling period' that permitted him to develop a broad range of motor skills that then later in his life he applied to the game of tennis. Delib-

erate practice has been adopted by both athletes – on a narrow set of skills for Woods and on a wide spectrum of abilities for Federer. Seemingly, 10 000 hours of practice may not to expertise not only if applied to the training of one specific skill but also to learning broadly through different activities.

From Federer's role model it can be deduced that late starters have still the chances to reach the peak in their new enterprise, possibly, doing even better than the early starters. Arguably, this is true as late starters manage to develop several skills practising widely, that they manage to apply in new domains using a flexible and interdisciplinary mindset. Moreover, range can be a unique asset in the labour market that might permit individuals to effectively contend with the automation of jobs. Technologies such as computers and artificial intelligence are effective in specialised, repetitive types of work that are easily replaced by robots. Conversely, humans seem to be unique in the pursuit of different tasks, managing to connect knowledge from different disciplines better than any machine could currently do.

Epstein puts great emphasis on learning and on how range can be developed through practice. In this regard, self-learning through practice is considered to be crucial for allowing individuals to try different solutions to a problem and expand the set of skills they have. However, learning should be a slow and painful process. Epstein presents several examples on how short-term, easy acquisition of knowledge is ineffective in the long run. Conversely, slow and painful learning better crystallises know-how that can be easily retrieved also in future instances.

Epstein praises the generalist mindset from different perspectives, focusing at great length on the enumeration of its key characteristics. First, the 'Jack of all trades' should be able to draw analogies between different domains finding solutions to problems by retrieving expertise from areas that are not strictly related to the one at hand. Therefore, creativity and innovation are a strong asset for a generalist mindset. Second, Epstein describes the "outsider's advantage" when exposing how an inexperienced individual might have an advantage in finding solutions compared to an insider. This seems to be especially true, when the two types are facing an unexpected problem. In such cases, the novice has an advantage in applying innovative problem- solving that a specialist would not have if s/he is mired in knowledge acquired in the past. Third, the generalist benefits from a flexible mindset that enables him/her to update beliefs in the face of new events. To strengthen this argument, Epstein exposes the findings of Philipp Tetlock and Dan Gardner's 'Superforecasters' focused on the characteristics that make individuals a top forecaster of future events. One of these is the ability to update sedimented beliefs. In addition, generalists benefit from the use of different tools to solve problems, combining different approaches to the issue at hand by showing flexibility and creativity.

Overall, the argument and the empirical evidence presented in praise of the generalist mindset highlight the importance of detachment from one's work. Detachment is alleged to help one to more easily find solutions by seeing the broad picture with an objective point of view, instead of being blinded by a passionate subjective perspective. Relatedly, grit is underlined as crucial to the attainment of a goal, but too much grit is revealed to be counterproductive as that might lead to the pursuit of targets that are not anymore worth reaching. Therefore, short term planning is suggested instead of long-term planning, acknowledging that the path to success is disordered. For this reason, the difference between two approaches – 'test and learn' and 'plan and implement' – are also discussed. The former makes it possible to try

things, to learn by doing; the latter presumes a period of planning followed by the implementation of the project designed beforehand. Epstein considers the test and learn approach to be inherent to a generalist mindset and to be the most effective in the long run, as it enables flexibility and adjusting to the situation at hand, compared to the plan and implement approach, which suffers from rigidity and the flaws of long-term planning.

Epstein's main arguments in support of the generalist mindset are interesting to read and at first easy to agree with. However, there are major weaknesses. First, the evidence supporting his claims too often sound like they have been cherry-picked to reinforce the argumentation. Second, it is difficult to draw a causal link between range and success. Factors other than a generalist mindset could be at play. For example, detachment from one's passions might be more relevant than range in achieving success. An alternative argument to 'range versus specialisation' could be 'attachment versus detachment'. Third, Epstein does not discuss much how a generalist or specialist mindset comes about. The emphasis is placed on learning and practice and how these can help develop range. However, it might be that a generalist or specialist mindset are strongly related to a certain combination of intelligence and personality traits. For example, openness to new experiences might enhance the likelihood of an individual adopting the generalist mindset. If this is so, how much range can be learned? Can one shift from a generalist to a specialist mindset during life?

Overall, 'range' is like an airport book, with a nice cover, a catchy title, and a good argument well supported by the overall narrative that makes it pleasurable to read. Moreover, in a time in which hyper-specialisation seems to be the rule and repetitive jobs are being automated by artificial intelligence, some thoughts on the merits of range and how it might be a safety net to robotisation are welcome. Therefore, the book makes for a good read in order to better grasp how a mindset based on range is constructed and how compared to hyper-specialisation it might grant some critical advantages in contemporary society. As the full saying goes: 'Jack of all trades, master of none, but oftentimes better than master of one.' There seems to be some truth in this that is worth exploring.

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Julia Moses: ***The First Modern Risk: Workplace Accidents and the Origins of European Social States***
Cambridge 2018: Cambridge University Press, 332 pp.

Trying to unpack the umbrella concept of the 'welfare state', an increasingly voluminous scholarship looks at the historically gradual accumulation of policies responding to national grievances. Picking up the gauntlet, Julia Moses delves into the history of compensation for workplace accidents, which formed 'an essential yet often neglected foundation of the subsequent history of European statehood' (p. 4). The depth of the research is impressive. Above and beyond process tracing in three complex cases, namely Britain, Germany, and Italy, the book also takes into account emerging transnational discourses, epistemic communities and diffusion (p. 12). Though the central emphasis is on the 'historical role of government in managing social risk' (p. 3), the author's ultimate aim is to transcend conventional modernisation theory by looking at the co-constitutive relationship of agency, structure, and contingency.

Unlike the logic of industrialism or power resource models of various types, which offer cross-country comparisons to

test the causal strength of isolated variables, Moses's book provides a comparative window into experiences of grappling with modernity (p. 14). The central point is that rather than assuming a specific type of targeted intervention, materialised or not across multiple cases, the author's comparison is grounded on the implications of thinking in terms of 'risk' (p. 17). Thus, from the outset Moses argues that the interventionist stance of modernising states in the late 19th-early 20th century is not merely a corollary of modernisation (as argued by Flora and Heidenheimer (eds), [1990]). Rather, Moses highlights that governments proactively worked together with a wide range of actors trying to pinpoint the boundaries between workplace obligations, individual risk, and social risk (p. 8). This opens up analytical space to dissect across similar instances of dealing with the fallout of industrialisation, the way(s) in which legal-normative standards of 'social problems' arose and were debated. It is precisely in this line of thought that the author argues for a type of cultural sensitivity to policy making wherein 'the creation of Europe's social states *paralleled* the birth of its nation-states' (pp. 8–9).

Chapters 1 and 2 map the start of policy drift, as Britain, Germany, and Italy all begin from relying primarily on civil law, but change their institutional outlook from the 1870s (pp. 22–23). Quite clearly, up to a certain degree, the logic of industrialism does have its merit, since Britain's comparatively earlier responsiveness to workplace accidents is a consequence of its earlier industrialisation (p. 28). At the same time, however, the author is careful in delineating her argument, because despite consistent early efforts towards reform, Britain displays huge variations in terms of the application of the new laws (p. 30). Nevertheless, the reforms did open up multiple avenues for injured British workers who, in the mid-19th century, could now seek recourse not only through civil law or the old poor boards but also through the new area of accident law (p. 33). By contrast, Germany's more indirect response was linked to a specific developmental vision of modernity – railways were the first source of debates owing to their central place in the economic imaginary in the early 19th century (p. 36). This was maintained and even bolstered in post-unification Germany, setting the scene for a *national liability law* in the 1880s (p. 38). Italian debates on work accidents also started from the issue of protecting workers in what seemed to be a particularly dangerous facet of modernisation [p. 41]. Yet, unlike in Germany, where statistics were only gathered ex post, Italian state- and nation-builders, like their British counterparts, started gathering data as part of the initial debate (p. 51).

The book's dialogue is with conventional modernisation theory, as Moses makes a strong case against the functionalism of most arguments on welfare state development. Immediately visible from the first chapter, though essentially present throughout the entire book, is the argument that in *unsettled times,* elites – governments, parliaments, or bureaucracies (the latter holding a particularly central place in Moses's argumentation (p. 8)) – do not simply provide benefits for at-risk groups. Rather, elites proactively chose particular distributions of winners and losers [Vanhuysse 2006, 2007]. This is why a strong point of Moses's analysis is that all three cases involved a complex debate wherein the emerging social policy relied on ideas about the right social order stemming from other social spheres [Kaufmann 2013; Vanhuysse 2009]. The most noteworthy case presented in the book is the impact of the discovery of the second law of thermodynamics (entropy), which became a key pillar of physical understanding of work. This replaced the idea of accidents being a result of human agency and free will with a view of risk that relates to the process of work itself (p. 56). In addition, focusing on

the role of elites acknowledges that international communities have from their very first emergence greatly influenced national political canvases. For accident insurance, emerging transnational communities of statisticians and practitioners greatly contributed to the late-19th-century ideational shift that impacted Europe in its entirety (p. 53).

Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the simultaneity of dilemmas unleashed by modernisation. By the late 19th century, while most Western countries were dealing with the fallout of industrialisation, new problems were also becoming visible such as the gap between early and late industrialisers, or the fraught relationship between national unification and the socio-economic fragmentation caused by industrial capitalism. This is why German social insurance was conceived in national, cultural, and often competitive terms (p. 62). The government essentially latched on to a specific understanding of the state-society relationship, one which both diluted the allure of revolutionary social democracy (p. 63) and was also a 'uniquely German method for addressing occupational risk' (p. 71). Furthermore, sharing risks across the country between various occupations held the unique potential to foment a feeling of national belonging (p. 94). For Italian state-makers, troubled with the underdevelopment of their country, social insurance would not only solve the discrete issue of the accident question, but via state-building, it would in fact 'solve' late development itself (p. 83). This seems to have been the staple of the Italian debate – what industries to cover (p. 94) – because of overarching anxieties vis-à-vis the *national economy* (p. 95). Observers in Britain pointed to German legislation as the epitome of modernity, thus raising public anxiety about a type of late development in social policy terms (pp. 72–73). At the same time, however, particularly because of Britain's early industrialisation and thus pre-existing attempts at dealing with its fallout, the British Workmen's Compensation Act from 1897 was ultimately a more market-based solution that blended common law, classical liberalism, the tradition of friendly societies, and other voluntary arrangements (p. 78)

The author's fine point is that commentators from that era used modernisation questions to define what made their time a unique stage of history [Case 2016]. To achieve such a dynamic understanding, Moses relies on a plethora of sources that range from governmental documents, to the 'grey literature of bureaucrats', to parliamentary debates and trade union archives (pp. 18–19). The breadth of sources allows the author to fully grasp the depth of the debates around modernity, industrialisation, and social policy. Perhaps the only lingering issue that permeates the book is that while the modernity-social policy nexus is seen as multipolar, nationalism and nation-building, which feature quite prominently, are mostly seen through a state-building lens. Though it is beyond doubt that social policy was a key component of nation-state building, nationalism is a much more fluid and contested ideational construction [see Brubaker 1996]. Therefore, the contribution of nationalism qua political ideology to the conceptual canvas of social policy is not so easily pinned down [Beland and Petersen (eds.) 2014]. While pre-existing forms of solidarity offer a solid basis for the implementation of a state-wide welfare net, social policies also proactively create new identities that are then top-down defined as 'national' by actors who constantly remould the polity. This does not, however, take much away from the impressive dynamism of Moses's analysis. Rather, it further highlights the book's central argument that modernisation unfolded though an open, multifaceted series of debates.

Chapter 5 analyses the social questions in the early 20th century in a context of global migration, imperial expansion, and

increased movement towards international norms (p. 164). As industrialisation deepened and capitalism internationalised in the early 20th century, boundaries between nationals and foreigners were thus increasingly difficult to juggle, which lead to changes both in terms of policy coverage and institutional administration (p. 211). These new challenges effectively tested the borders of the previously agreed upon developments of social policies on multiple levels. In the German case, while new technologies galvanised the expansion of professions covered, the relatively unchanging overarching consensus was that not all workers should be placed in the same insurance scheme because life courses fundamentally differed (p. 172). The increased internationalisation of German economy also raised awareness that above and beyond protecting the vulnerable, the task of the emerging social state may in fact be to manage the *national economy* (pp. 185–186). This matched the British approach, which, though imperial in terms of its geographical spread, in fact covered *only* British citizens abroad, and foreign workers only *within Britain itself* (p. 193). By contrast, Italian policy seemed prima facie much more inclusive, covering all emigrant workers but also colonial subjects (p. 187). On a deeper level, however, inclusion was less clear as ideas about race, religion, and modernity effectively shut out certain minorities (pp. 190–191).

Chapter 6 maps the complex changes that occurred during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. Obviously not every facets of these profound changes could be included, so the author dwells on the major debates between risk pertaining to work and risks pertaining to the war. In a context of total war, whom to include and why is perhaps even more intricate than in 'conventional' unsettled times. New technologies such as automobiles resurfaced the older dilemma on the role of agency and fault. In addition, war veterans were an immediately pressing problem, which most governments tried to tackle through their previous experience with accident compensation (p. 238). The common denominator was that military and economic mobilisation essentially eroded the divide between spheres of work and daily life (p. 248). According to Moses this represents an undeniable cornerstone of the change in the immediate post-war period, wherein the consequences of *occupational risk* became *social risks* that should be distributed across the national community and governed by the overarching nation-state (p. 252).

On the whole, Julia Moses's book impresses with its analytical clarity and in-depth historical narrative. By analysing the co-constitutive relationship of agency, structure, and process, the author offers a finely tuned analysis of the relationship between modernisation and social policy development focused on the level of accident compensation. In addition to contributing to an otherwise poorly explored area of welfare state history, the book's dialogue with conventional modernisation literature sends out the strong message that there is far more to welfare states than just an underlying social-democratic thinking [Kaufmann 2012].

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Lukas Sustala: *Zu spät zur Party: Warum eine ganze Generation den Anschluss den verpasst*
Salzburg 2020: Ecowin Verlag, 168 pp.

In this book (the title of which translates as 'too late for the party'), the Austrian economist and journalist Lukas Sustala offers a differentiated view on inequalities between generations and the consequences for intergenerational justice. He illustrates why many people in Western societies no longer buy into the idea that their children will have it better than they did and elaborates on specific indicators in which millennials and younger cohorts are worse off than their parents or grandparents. Sustala supports his arguments with evidence on the effects of the Great Recession, which takes a central place in his narrative. In addition, he touches briefly on the European debt crisis, high debt levels, stagnating real wages, the climate crisis, and continued low growth rates and offers readers an insight into a long list of economic and social developments and does so in a language that is inviting even for those who may not have spent much time studying the issues at hand. This book offers a balanced analysis of the state of Western societies and the equality between generations.

The book has nine chapters. Chapter one deals with the Great Recession as well as the debt crisis in Europe and its consequences for the welfare and the labour market prospects of young adults and their employment biographies. Opening with an anecdote about the new labour market conditions after the Great Recession, the author sets the stage for his analysis. Sustala points out that this recession is not on its own responsible for the malaise, but he argues that high unemployment and bad working conditions during the early and formative years of adult life can lead to smaller life-time earnings. Referring also to low economic growth, Sustala shows that the circumstances at the beginning of working life were comparatively bad for the generations born after 1980 (p. 17), so that for many entry into the labour market was delayed and then only temporary jobs with small benefits and little employment protection were on offer.

In the next two chapters, Sustala addresses the rationale for distinguishing between generations, the demographic change of ageing societies, and redistributive concerns between the generations. He argues that the generation category has scientific value because it is possible to distinguish with relative clarity how generations will fare in different phases of life – for example, in terms of how hard the competition will be on the labour market – relying on demographic data and on the economic situation [see also Vanhuysse and Goerres 2012]. Sustala points to two issues that he sees as connected to the phenomenon of ageing societies. He explains how the bigger size and higher voting turnout of older generations and the accumulation of national debt that is only rarely taken up to finance investments into the future are cause and symptom of an imbalance in politics between younger and older generations. He further argues that the generational contract – redistributing resources between different generations on a run-

ning basis – is only a gentleman's agreement and that society is lacking investment policies that can ensure enough payments to the coming elderly generations, while the old-age dependency ratio is continuously rising, which creates the risk of overburdening the current and future working age population [see also Gal, Vanhuysse and Vargha 2018].

In chapters 4, 5, and 6 Sustala depicts the problems on the housing market, the increasing prevalence of precarious jobs for university graduates, and the chances and pitfalls of migration, especially in the context of demographic change. His first argument is that policies designed to ameliorate inequality in the housing market – like rent breaks or ceilings – are actually aggravating the situation for younger people who are then facing a narrow housing market with fewer landlords willing to rent out. Second, Sustala points to the new phenomenon of a precarious educational elite, filled with people who completed higher education but cannot find good jobs. He furthermore claims that the wage premium for higher education has fallen. In chapter 6, Sustala argues that migration can help to relieve welfare states, but that there is no guarantee, if the state does not invest enough in the education of newcomers.

In the remaining chapters, he raises the pressing issue of climate change and its connection to intergenerational inequality and connects the Great Recession and increasing economic stress to mental health and family formation. Sustala states that the problem behind the failure to tackle climate change lies in the different interests of generations and special interests. He argues that while the boomer generation will only see minor impacts of climate change, the younger generations will experience harsh consequences, providing an incentive for the younger generations to work against it, but not for the older generations. Drawing on data on fertility rates and mean ages at birth, Sustala points out that weak economic conditions, unemployment, and other detrimental factors make starting a family harder, especially during what he calls the 'rush hour of life' (p. 80), a period that is defined by longer education, worse conditions for entering the labour market, and high stress levels. Sustala ends his book by summarising the aforementioned developments and adds policy recommendations on how to achieve greater equality between generations.

The special relevance of Sustala's work derives from the societal notion that parents want their children to live a better life. Sustala tests this notion and describes how many times the situation has stagnated or gotten worse. It is those observations that serve as evidence for his conclusions that the generation of millennials came too late to the party and have to live through economic, social, and environmental struggles that were mainly caused by the previous generations, undermining the hope that children will have things better than their parents. While Sustala offers a very approachable analysis of the topic, not going into too much detail on each of the issues and refraining from unnecessarily technical discussions, there are a number of issues with his analysis that ought to be addressed. Specifically, the analysis is in part oversimplified and leads to questionable generalisations.

The first is Sustala's discussion of the electoral plurality of elderly voters. The conclusion in the book is that this electoral power, for example, translates into better pensions for elderly generations and higher contributions from younger generations. And while a case for the electoral power of elderly people in relation to climate change can be made more easily, other research [Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009, 2012] suggests that demographic change has overall not – yet – translated into significantly better pensions for the elderly, but into higher total pension expenditures (macro) with less generous benefits (mi-

cro). Admittedly, however, there is agreement that the electoral power of the elderly could and has already become visible through 'grandfathering clauses', pushing the cuts to pensions into the future, so that the current generations of pensioners do not feel the impact [Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009: 23; 2012]. And more generally, Europeans do appear to live in welfare states that are biased towards the elderly and embedded within societies of strongly child-oriented families (Gal, Vanhuysse and Vargha 2018).

This leads to another topic: linking the pension age to life expectancy. While he correctly states that the lobby against an increase in pension ages is particularly strong, Sustala presents the solution to automatically link the pension age to life expectancy as a simple fix. However, researchers are not in agreement on whether the strong increases in life expectancy – suggesting a rising pension age– are also accompanied by similarly strong increases in healthy life expectancy – facilitating a longer work life [Rigshospitalet 2015]. Therefore, the analysis could profit from a closer look into the scientific debates around healthy life expectancy and what this means for people's ability to extend their working life.

In chapter 5, Sustala makes important points about the role of education. However, while he mentions the increasing precarity of labour conditions even for people with higher education and mentions the increasing importance of lifelong learning, Sustala makes a questionable statement about the earnings premium to higher education – namely, that the premium has decreased over the last decades. On the contrary, studies in OECD countries not only show that the wage premium for skills in 2012 was still substantial, but also that it has been increasing since the 1970s [Autor 2014; Hanushek et al. 2015]. Furthermore, it is unclear whether a decrease in skill premiums should be classified as a negative development in the first place, considering that a greater skill premium also hints at higher inequality.

In chapter 8, Sustala addresses the important issue of low fertility rates. It is often asked whether decreases in total fertility rates are due to changes in the mean age at birth (tempo effect – a higher mean age at birth leading to a (temporary) decrease in the total fertility rate) or to the decision to have fewer children in total (quantum effect). With long-term data from 1950 to 2015 Sustala shows that this decrease is not just a tempo effect. Even though he fails to mention the link between the mean age at birth and the total fertility rate, Sustala presents valuable arguments for why fertility rates have been falling, like later entry into the labour market due to longer education or bad labour market conditions during the years of early adulthood.

The last chapter tries to offer a balanced conclusion and policy advice to address the problems. However, the reader can find some inconsistencies or oversimplified statements that can lead to confusion. The first issue is Sustala's assessment of the climate crisis and the tools necessary to tackle it. He commends the young protesters for their action but states that criticising private businesses, markets, and the concept of private property would be a mistake (p. 90). However, not only is there a growing body of literature reporting that climate change is heavily tied to the current political and economic system and that continuous growth drives up emissions [Klein 2014; Teixido-Figueras and Duro 2015], but it is also possible to make a very clear case on how corruption and lobbying from private businesses prevent climate legislation from being put into place. Sustala himself brings up corporate interests as an obstacle to an effective climate policy (p. 75). And while deep-lying problems in the economic and political system could help to explain the lack of action against the looming environmental crisis,

a seemingly simple fix like carbon taxes is presented as the best solution to start tackling climate change. Therefore, the main critique here is not necessarily about different policy ideas, but about leaving out the problems with political and economic institutions, such as the vulnerability of the current political system to big corporate interests and corruption [Przeworski 2018] and too strong a focus on economic growth.

Another issue lies in Sustala's assessment of suitable education strategies. The author fittingly advocates for more spending on early childhood education and points towards other worrisome developments, such as large ethnic differences in educational attainment and large numbers of children leaving schools without having mastered important reading, writing, and math skills. But he criticises the fact that many people are pursuing degrees that are not in high demand on the market. While it is not fully clear to which degrees he is referring, he categorises teaching and IT jobs as valuable because of the high demand for them in the labour market (p. 91). However, scholars from the human development school and other disciplines have long advocated for the pursuit of the humanities – degrees that are often in lower demand on the labour market – claiming that they are essential to human life and to the survival of democracies [Nussbaum 2010]. It therefore remains questionable how a move away from the humanities and towards seemingly more economically valuable subjects (i.e. more market-oriented jobs) can help society in the long run.

Concluding, Sustala's book offers a good overview of the issues affecting inequality between generations and takes a specific look at the situation of millennials. And while the book contains some oversimplifications or misinterpretations – mostly talking points that require more clarification and detail – it has great value for its interdisciplinary approach and for the way Sustala takes different perspectives into consideration in order to deliver a balanced analysis.

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Ranking objective and perceived inequality. A comparison of the Czech Republic in the European context

Jiří Večerník and Martina Mysíková



In Czech public and professional discourse there is strong rhetoric about the rooted egalitarianism of Czech society and its extremely low socio-economic inequality. This study thus traces various objective and subjective dimensions of inequality in an attempt to examine the validity of this rhetoric. The study uses various sources of data on the levels and trends in earnings, household income, and living conditions in the Czech Republic and compares them to other European countries. It appears that although the country ranks among societies with a low level of social inequality, Czechs are not particularly 'exceptional' when it comes to objective economic equality, nor are they remarkably egalitarian in their attitudes.

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Available online: https://www.soc.cas.cz/en/publication/ranking-objective-and-perceived-inequality

Institute of Sociology
Czech Academy of Sciences

Ageing Populations in Post-Industrial Democracies

Comparative Studies of Policies and Politics

Edited by **Pieter Vanhuysse,** European Centre for Social Welfare Policy & Research, Vienna, and **Achim Goerres,** University of Duisburg-Essen

Chapter Contributors: Séan Hanley; Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba; Martin Hering; Mehmet F. Aysan; Markus Tepe; Juan Fernandez; Jonas Edlund; Stefan Svallfors; Andrej Kokkonen; Robert B. Hudson

Most advanced democracies are currently experiencing accelerated population ageing, which fundamentally changes not just their demographic composition; it can also be expected to have far-reaching political and policy consequences.

This volume brings together an expert set of scholars from Europe and North America to investigate generational politics and public policies within an approach explicitly focusing on comparative political science. This theoretically unified text examines changing electoral policy demands due to demographic ageing, and features analysis of USA, UK, Japan, Germany, Italy and all major EU countries. As the first sustained political science analysis of population ageing, this monograph examines both sides of the debate. It examines the actions of the state against the interests of a growing elderly voting bloc to safeguard fiscal viability, and looks at highly-topical responses such as pension cuts and increasing retirement age. It also examines the rise of 'grey parties', and asks what, if anything, makes such pensioner parties persist over time, in the first ever analysis of the emergence of pensioner parties in Europe. *Ageing Populations in Post-Industrial Democracies* will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, and to those studying electoral and social policy reform.

'The process of population aging has been compared to a seismic shift which has profound consequences on all aspects of our societies but is too slow to make headlines or matter in daily politics. This book makes a major contribution to spelling out its manifold political consequences and providing a scientific basis for enhancing the public discussion.'
- *Wolfgang Lutz, Founding Director of the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, Vienna Institute of Demography, WU-Vienna)*

'Ageing Populations in Post-industrial Democracies **is an indispensable guide to the current state of play in ageing societies. The essays in this volume are wide-ranging, covering pension politics, pensioners' parties, political behavior, intergenerational justice, and family policy. The systematically comparative approach means this collection adds up to considerably more than the sum of its very smart parts.'**
- Julia Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

'This is a terrific collection of essays on demographic change and generational politics. The carefully-researched chapters in this volume present findings that are sometimes surprising and always thought-provoking. For scholars and policymakers seeking to understand where the study of aging polities is headed over the next decade, this volume is a great place to start.'
- Kent R. Weaver, Distinguished Professor of Public Policy, Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.

October 2011
HB: 978-0-415-60382-9

New from the Institute of Sociology
of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Democracy Under Stress. Changing Perspectives on Democracy, Governance and Their Measurement

Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová (eds)

Democracy, defined as liberal pluralism, is under stress worldwide. Pluralistic democratic institutions such as: a free press, civil society, and the rule of law all seem to be under attack. Democracies are being hollowed out from within while preserving the fundamental facade of elections.



The strength of this book is in providing a range of perspectives on the study of democracy under stress. The authors, renowned scholars of democratic theory and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, highlight the potential of different approaches – from comparative meta-assessment using indices and survey data, to case studies focused on understanding context and causal processes – for obtaining a better grasp of the loci of the stress.

Together, we offer the reader the opportunity to assess different conceptual frameworks and approaches, to reflect on their strengths and weaknesses, and to advance the study of democracy in the future. This volume is also an invitation for scholars to redirect their attention to Central and Eastern Europe, which offers an opportunity to deepen our understanding of democracy.

We see democracy in Central and Eastern Europe under stress but avoid general labels such as the crisis of democracy and deconsolidation. Instead, we argue that to understand the contemporary situation in the CEE region, we need to move beyond assessing institutional frameworks and to include citizens in our understanding and measurement of democracy.

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The book is not for sale. Print versions are available on request (contact the Press and Publications Department at the Institute of Sociology: prodej@soc.cas.cz).

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