The Notion of Social Class in Czech Political Discourse*

KAREL MUSÍLEK and TOMÁŠ KATRŇÁK**
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno

Abstract: The article studies the discourse on social class that emerged around the Czech parliamentary election of 2010. The authors look at Czech discourse from the perspective of the wider discussion about the role that the notion of class plays in post-communist societies. While some researchers argue that social class is absent as a category within post-communist political discourse, other researchers report the existence of derogatory discourse on the lower classes and even consistent symbolic boundaries between classes. This analysis contributes to the discussion by offering recent evidence of both the rejection and the use of class-based classification in the discourse. The authors argue that the rejection of the notion of class goes hand in hand with the symbolic division of society into class-like groups. They illustrate how these divisions are tied to the idea of a legitimate political subjectivity and conclude by noting similarities to contemporary ‘Western’ discourse on social class.

Keywords: social class, inequality, political discourse, post-socialism, Czech society

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Introduction

Discourse on social class is increasingly coming under scholarly scrutiny.1 As part of the cultural turn in sociology, we can observe a renewal of interest in the cultural dimension of class [Devine and Savage 2005]. This return to culture is in part characterised by attention to the issues of awareness and perceptions about class. The ways in which class is talked about, the manner in which various social classifications and class schemes are developed in public and political discussion, and the modes in which worth is differentially attributed to various social groups are understood to be an important object of cultural class analysis [Savage 2008; Skeggs 2004].

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** Direct all correspondence to: Karel Musílek or Tomáš Katrňák, Faculty of Social Studies MU, Joštova 10, Brno 60200, e-mail: musilekkarel@gmail.com; katrnak@fss.muni.cz.
1 We do not distinguish between class and social class in the text. We use the two terms interchangeably. Both terms concern groups of people and are connected to economic, cultural, and political differences between these groups [e.g. Devine and Savage 2005; Skeggs 2004; Wacquant 1991; Wright 1985].

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This article looks at discourse in the Czech Republic from the perspective of the wider discussion about the role that the notion of class plays in post-communist societies. Some researchers have highlighted the ways in which talk about class is silenced or outright rejected in the discourse of post-communist countries [Balockaitė 2009; Eglitis 2011; Ost 2000; Weiner 2007]. According to these authors, the leaders of transforming societies viewed class as a notion tied to the logic and ideology of state socialist regimes, and one that made no sense (or even posed a threat) in the newly attained conditions of freedom and democracy. Other researchers show that in post-communist societies there is a derogatory discourse on the lower classes or even that a consistent symbolic boundary is drawn between different social groups [Gąsior-Niemiec, Glasze, and Pütz 2009; Kideckel 2002].

Our study looks at the political discussion of class and inequality in the Czech Republic through a discourse analysis of texts published in the press during the 2010 parliamentary election. It aims to capture the ways in which the notion of class is both rejected and simultaneously employed within the discourse and thus to shed more light on the scholarly dilemma sketched above. Moreover, responding to the fact that most of the literature explicitly discussing political discourse on class has concentrated on the early years of post-communist transformation, this article seeks to present a more up-to-date picture of the political discourse on class in post-communist societies. Finally, it seeks to make a thematic contribution by capturing the way in which social classification is tied to the idea of a legitimate political subject.

Our analysis is guided by concepts drawn from the works of Foucault and Bourdieu, who both emphasised the role that discourse and symbolic order play in the construction of social entities and saw discursive categories and social classification as important sites of political struggle [Foucault 1981: 53; Bourdieu 1989: 20–21]. We use Foucault’s concept of discursive division and rejection to capture the ways in which the discourse on class is rejected in Czech political discussion. In addition, we use Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic power and symbolic violence to shed light on how society is symbolically divided into distinct groups and how these groups are evaluated within the discourse. Finally, we use Foucault’s notion of the constitution of the subject to show how these classifications are tied to the idea of a legitimate subject of politics.

The results of the analysis show that the rejection of the notion of class goes hand in hand with the simultaneous symbolic division of society into groups based on their economic position. Only a certain way of talking about class is being rejected, and that is the critical discourse that seeks to critique patterns of inequality and to highlight the differential impacts of certain policies on different groups. Distinct groups are further attributed different characteristics and these characteristics are ascribed different worth. The article concludes with the suggestion to think about discourse on class not through the perspective of the simple contradiction between the presence and the absence of the notion of class, but to focus on the strategy and the dynamics of the rejection and the use of the
notion in the discourse. It tentatively argues that the simultaneous absence and ubiquity of class in the analysed sample is analogous to contemporary ‘Western’ discourse in which ‘class is ubiquitous without being spoken’ [Skeggs 2004: 24]. We suggest that students of political discourse should, instead of emphasising the specific nature of post-communist societies, focus on the actual role the notion of class plays in various aspects of social debates and practices.

Social class and the discourse of post-communist transformation

As a brief outline of the literature shows, the discourse of the post-communist transformation period was dominated by several themes. First, the discourse of the new political leaders of Eastern Europe was based on a rejection of what was deemed a failure of the socialist utopia. Socialism was presented as a failed attempt to construct an artificial, unnatural society [Kumar 1992: 309]. Second, the rejection of communism was accompanied by an uncritical acceptance of capitalism, which was portrayed as a part of the normality to which the societies of Eastern Europe should return [Kennedy 2002: 9; Kennedy and Harsanyi 1994: 155; Kumar 1995: 334]. Third, the political dimension of the discourse of transformation was tied to the notion of civil society, which represented a newly opened political realm deemed to empower all citizens of post-communist societies equally [Kennedy 2002: 48; Kumar 1995: 131].

However, the dominant doctrinal mixture of post-communist societies seemed to be in an uneasy relationship with certain social and economic claims of parts of the post-communist populations. While the proponents of economic reform and civil society appointed themselves the interpreters of the needs of rapidly changing societies [Éyal, Szélényi and Townsley 2000; Eyal 2003], certain groups were less easily incorporated into the dominant discourse. The discourse of civil society, which assumed the position of the main frame of meaning for constructing collective identities in post-communist societies, made it more difficult to formulate claims on the basis of certain categories. Class identities, along with those based on gender and sexuality, were marginalised in this discourse [Kennedy 1994: 26].

Several authors have emphasised the absence of the notion of class in post-communist discourse. Ost notes, in his analysis of the discourse of elites, that in the early years of the Polish transformation, despite the abrupt changes impacting certain sectors of society, talk about class was ‘paradoxically’ absent [2009: 497]. The paradox lies in the fact that the Solidarity movement (to a large extent relying on the mobilisation of workers) refused to use the category of class in its political rhetoric, and instead employed the rhetoric of morality, ethnicity, and religion. Ost attributes the disregard for class as a category to its association with communist ideology, which is resolutely rejected [Bauman 1994; Mokrzycki 1994]. In another study, Ost [2000] claims that weak class consciousness, again in reaction
against the communist past, resulted in the weak position of workers’ unions in social negotiations. Similarly, Kubicek [1999, 2002] notes that trade unions were often seen as enemies by politicians introducing pro-market reforms. Paradoxically, changes launched under the watchword of ‘civil society’ are protected from the influence of civil society’s strongest (at least in terms of membership) organisations [Kubicek 2002: 603–604].

In an ethnographic study of class and gender relations in the Czech Republic, Weiner [2007] arrives at similar findings. The silence on issues of inequality and class, she claims, is related to the domination of the free market meta-narrative through which social relations are interpreted, both by managers and by workers. The free market economy is deemed to benefit all citizens equally by bringing about ‘capitalism’s promised bounty’ [ibid.: 5]. This rejection of class differences at the level of public discourse does not mean that issues of different social positions are not addressed by the respondents; however, they are interpreted through the free market meta-narrative. Inequalities are perceived as necessary (stemming from workers’ socialist upbringing) and transient: women in working-class positions believed, in agreement with the free-market meta-narrative, that the positions of their offspring would automatically improve with the success of economic reforms. In her study of Latvia, Eglitis [2011] contends that even though social hierarchy is apparent in the patterns of consumption and marketing, as a result of the communist past, class is rejected as a category of political discussion.

In contrast to studies that note the silence about class, different authors have demonstrated that in post-communist societies the issue of class is part of the social debate. In particular, the stress is on the ways in which ‘the lower classes’, ‘the poor’, or ‘workers’ are represented in public debate. Kideckel [2002, 2009] documents how the symbolic position of workers in Romania changed from elevation under the communist regime to denigration in the era of post-communist transformation. Similarly, Stenning [2005: 984] reports that workers’ communities in Poland were portrayed as sites of fear, violence, dependency, and passivity. In her analysis of examples from Lithuanian media and politics, Balockaite [2009] describes how the ‘lower classes’ are depicted in politics and the media as illiterate, ignorant, or a potential source of danger for society. A study by Gąsior-Niemiec, Glasze and Pütz [2009], which captures the discourse on social differentiation in Poland, offers more recent evidence on the use of the category of class in public discourse. Studying debates about gated communities, the authors capture the emergence of two distinct identities or ‘housing classes’ in the speaking positions of discussants. Reflecting the wider issues of Poland’s transformation, discussants draw a symbolic boundary resting on binary oppositions such as wealth versus poverty or success versus failure.

The discourse on inequality and class has also been addressed by several scholars writing about the Czech Republic. While quantitative class and stratification analysis is relatively well established within Czech academia [for an over-
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view, see Katriňák and Fučík 2010: 21], research on discourse seems to be less well established. In the early years of post-communist transformation, Alijevo[1994] noted the change in the role the working class has played in public discourse. As the economic status of workers was downgraded, the term ‘working class’ lost the political and social significance it had had in official state ideology and was narrowed to its purely occupational meaning. A much more recent study by Nedbálková [2012] focuses on the working class (and trade union organisations in particular) as reflected in media discourse, where she reports the working class is portrayed as irrational and obsolete. Nedbálková does not find any positive identification with the working class as a collective unit of political struggle or a distinct group with shared norms and values.

Considerable contributions have been made by several scholars working on collective research focusing on the discursive reproduction of inequalities in the Czech Republic [Šanderová and Šmídová 2009; Šanderová 2006, 2007a]. They focus on the ‘informal micro-political struggles’ in which social positions and their characteristics are negotiated in the discourse of various social groups [Šanderová 2007b: 20]. For example, Šmídová and Šafr [2009] focus on how landlords and tenants understand/view each other, noting how certain sections of low-income groups are portrayed as irresponsible and immoral and, therefore, at the discursive level, are excluded from access to social housing [see also Šafr 2007]. Vojtíšková [2008] focuses on individual perceptions of who ranks ‘high’ and who ‘low’ in the social hierarchy. Vojtíšková finds that income is considered the most important dimension of the perceived hierarchical structure in society. In addition, inequality is perceived as natural and necessary, rooted in the laws of social development.

From the perspective of this article, the most interesting contributions are by Kolářová [2008a, 2008b], because she focuses directly on the use of the category of class. In her analysis of lay discourse [Kolářová 2008b], she reports that respondents found the category of class to be either irrelevant (this was especially true amongst respondents with lower social status) or genuinely dangerous. Like the findings in the literature on the discourse of class in other Eastern European countries, the notion of class in the CR is seen as linked to the rejected ideology of the state-socialist regime. Respondents understand society as being hierarchical, but prefer to talk about different positions in terms of less rigid differences between different strata. Respondents most often identify with the ‘normal’ and ‘unproblematic’ middle and the contemporary level of inequality is perceived as natural and even desirable. Kolářová [2008a] also discusses the media discourse on class and finds, in contradiction to the other studies mentioned above, that as a category class, though rarely, nonetheless is indeed used in media discourse. More specifically, she identifies two ‘frames’ in which the term is used. The first one, present in the far-left press, uses class in what she calls an ‘ideological’ frame, where it is connected to a Marxist understanding of capitalism and class struggle. The second frame, present in mainstream newspapers, she labels ‘de-
scriptive’ or ‘analytical’. Here, class refers to groups with different demographic characteristics, but without sketching the political relationships between them. The understanding of the term class is not made explicit and there is no strict ideological framework in which the term is used.

This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the discourse of class in post-communist societies in three main ways. First, as is apparent from this brief overview, there exists mixed evidence on the role that the notion of class plays in post-communist discourse. On the one hand, some scholars, particularly those writing on the early years of the post-communist transformation, stress that the category of class and of class interests has been downplayed or outright rejected. On the other hand, other scholars report the presence of a discrediting discourse about the lower classes and even the functioning of coherent symbolic boundaries between the constructed social classes. Rather than implying that one set of research is simply incorrect, this contradiction can reflect the actual ambiguity of post-communist discourse on class itself. We therefore attempt to bring more evidence to the discussion by capturing both the rejection and the use of class-based classifications in political discourse.

The second contribution this article makes concerns its temporal focus. Most of the studies of political discourse on class in Eastern Europe focus on the early years of transformation. More recent works concentrate less on social classification in connection to politics and more on the social differentiation in areas such as consumption or housing. Our aim is therefore to focus on political discourse and capture its recent manifestation. In this way, we complement the literature that captures the political talk on class (or its absence) in the early years of post-communist transformation. By political discourse, we mean discourse not necessarily produced by politicians or within institutions of the state, but discourse which discusses and seeks to influence the political process—for example, an important political event—and whose aims and functions are primarily political [van Dijk 1997]. This work analyses newspaper commentary that discusses a recent political event—the Czech parliamentary elections of 2010—and can therefore capture the more recent nature of the discourse on class in post-communist politics. Third, we extend the theoretical focus of the discussion by showing how social classification is tied to the construction of a legitimate political subject of politics in post-communist societies.

**Conceptual framework and analytical strategy**

Our understanding of social class in this article falls into a category that Savage has labelled the ‘surface model’ of class [Savage 2008: 468]. This approach is different from the ‘depth model’ of thinking about class and culture. The depth model starts with theory-driven assumptions about the existence of certain class positions (usually derived from the structure of production) and proceeds to empiri-
cally explore their utility and relate them to certain class cultures (e.g. identities). Depth accounts are often grounded (explicitly or implicitly) in Marx’s metaphor of base and superstructure. According to Marx, the relations of production constitute an economic base of society, which determines social relations [e.g. Marx 1963]. Groups of people hold positions in the class structure of the society based on the relation they have with the means of production. The overriding class division of capitalist society is that between capitalists (the owners of the means of production) and workers (who sell their labour in exchange for a wage) [Marx and Engels 1958]. The two most prominent contemporary classificatory schemes of sociological class analysis fall under the rubric of the depth model. Wright’s class scheme [1985] distinguishes twelve classes based on different forms of ownership of productive assets. Similarly, Goldthorpe and his collaborators define eleven classes in relation to positions within the job market and the employment structure (see Erikson and Goldthorpe [1992]). Despite the differences in their approach (see the discussion in Kattrňák [2005]), both accounts start with a class scheme derived from theoretical discussion and then proceed to find whether it can be used to explain empirical differences between people (e.g. different life trajectories or different attitudes or identities).

Our understanding of class in this article falls into the rank of Savage’s surface model. This model of thinking about class, partly associated with the cultural turn in sociology, is heavily influenced by the work of Bourdieu. According to Savage, ‘[t]his approach emphasizes the fluidity of class forms, and emphasizes how processes of classification are themselves integral to the making of class relations’ [2008: 478]. We do not employ a particular class scheme with preconceived class positions that we expect to find within the data. On the contrary, we are interested in the names, categories, and classifications that social actors (in this case, newspaper commentators) use to name groups of people and portray them as different from (and sometimes even hostile to) each other. We therefore focus on the presence of classifications and attempts to divide people into distinctive groups in relation to their occupational, economic, and cultural situation. Rather than focusing on theoretically derived class positions and the identities (presumably) associated with them, we focus on classifications as they are employed in the text under analysis. Following Brubaker and Cooper [2000], we focus on attempts at identification rather than identities. In line with current trends in cultural class analysis, we direct attention to ‘categorisations of class’ as they themselves become stakes in symbolic struggles [Devine and Savage 2005; Savage 2008; Skeggs 2004, 2005].

We therefore do not proceed from a particular conception of class derived from an understanding of material and economic divisions. Instead, we seek to explore how economic and cultural differences are reflected (or not) in the text and therefore to see to what extent these divisions are employed in order to symbolically divide society into different groups. The attempt to classify—to produce classes through the use of symbolic power—is what we are interested in
[Bourdieu 1987; Wacquant 2013]. We understand class as having the ontological status that Wacquant describes in his review essay on the state of the sociology of the middle classes: ‘The middle class, like any other social group, does not exist ready-made in reality. It must be constituted through material and symbolic struggles ... it is a historically variable and reversible effect of these struggles.’ [Wacquant 1991: 57; emphasis added]

As indicated above, several commentators have reported that the notion of class is absent in post-communist discourse. We strive to make the silence surrounding the notion of class an object of our analysis. As Foucault noted, the study of discursive formations is connected to the principle of rarity, which is based on a seemingly ingenuous observation that ‘... everything is never said’ [Foucault 2002: 134]. In comparison to an imagined grouping of all the statements that are possible according to the rules of grammar, vocabulary, and logic, in any particular period there exists a relative rarity of statements actually made on any topic. Discourse analysis should therefore bring into focus the various mechanisms of control responsible for this relative paucity of statements.

One of the mechanisms through which the control of legitimate discourse operates is the principle of division and rejection [Foucault 1981: 53–54], which refers to the way in which certain discourses are denigrated and excluded, partly in order to maintain the integrity of the dominant discourse. Following Foucault, we may say that studies of discourse should make areas of silence or absence a focus of their analysis as much as the notions explicitly covered in texts [see also Gill 2000]. Moreover, rather than simply reporting absence, it should be a goal of discourse analysis to describe and make explicit attempts to control the discourse by distinguishing acceptable statements from statements that are seen as dangerous and are rejected and silenced. For these theoretical reasons, the analysis in this article focuses on instances of the rejection of class as a category of legitimate political discussion.

Bourdieu develops a systematic argument about the importance of discursive practices in bringing to life collective social entities, most importantly classes. Attempts to name and thus produce groups as entities separate from others rest on the use of symbolic power. Bourdieu describes this as ‘the performative power of designation, of naming, [which] brings into existence in an instituted, constituted form ... what existed up until then only as ... a collection of varied persons, a purely additive series of merely juxtaposed individuals’ [Bourdieu 1989: 23]. Elsewhere in his work, Bourdieu writes about ‘[t]he act of social magic which consists in trying to bring into existence the thing named ... ’ [Bourdieu 1991: 223].

Even though there may be an aggregate of individuals who share a certain disposition (e.g. their possession of social and cultural capital), these individuals do not form a distinct group or class whose existence they or other people would be aware of [Bourdieu 1987]. The emergence of collectives separated from others by symbolic boundaries is only possible by relating social position to a common symbolic denominator. Classes and social groups in general are there-
fore produced through symbolic acts in which they are named and differentiated from others. It is the attempt to use symbolic power in naming separate entities—classes—that we are looking for in our analysis.

It is not simply the naming of groups that matters in symbolic struggles. It is important to look into how constructed groups are positioned within the wider symbolic economy [Skeggs 2004: 15–19]. The notion of symbolic power is linked with a larger vision of symbolic violence [Bourdieu 1990]. An actor committing an act of symbolic violence uses symbolic categories to portray unequal relations as inevitable, rooted in the natural order, and thus renders them legitimate [Bourdieu 1990: 133]. Various ‘visions of division’ of the social body are not neutral. Certain groups, their various cultural traits, and social practices, are ascribed different worth in the symbolic hierarchy. There exist ‘culturally arbitrary’ classificatory schemes of evaluation of these traits and practices [Bourdieu and Passeron 1990: 5]. Certain qualities, which are variably distributed among groups in different socio-economic positions, are arbitrarily presented as more valuable, more worthy than others, and these evaluative schemes are protected against various attempts to introduce ‘heterodoxic’ schemes by potential contenders [Bourdieu 1984: 475–476].

Part of the analysis presented in this article focuses on what is constituted as the ‘proper’ political subject (i.e. an actor of politics, e.g. a voter) in Czech discourse and how this idea is applied to the classification schemes identified in the text. Here, we make use of Foucault’s notion of the formation of subject in discourse [Foucault 2001b: 326–327]. The question for analysis might be posited as what the subject must be, what conditions she must fulfil, and what status she must have to become a legitimate subject of discourse and various practices [Foucault 2000: 459]. Again, the principle of division and rejection plays its role in the constitution of individuals as subjects. As Foucault put it [2001b: 326]: ‘The subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others. This process objectivises him. Examples are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the “good boys”.’

Some individuals are denied the status of the legitimate subject of certain practices because of their condition, for example, for being mad or dangerous. Another important point is that the rejection of certain individuals or a certain threat has an effect on constituting the ‘legitimate’ subjectivity for individuals who are deemed to be (or strive to be seen as) normal. Subjectivities sanctioned by discourse are therefore ‘indirectly constituted’ through the exclusion of others [Foucault 2001a: 403–404]. Various authors have paid attention to the problem of the constitution of the political subject with a particular emphasis on liberal political theory and the rationalities of government in advanced liberal societies [Clifford 2001; Hindess 1996; Rose 1999: 40–47]. In our analysis, we intend to show how the notion of the legitimate political subject is constituted and how certain social groups are denied the status of autonomous agents of politics in Czech political discourse.
Methods and data

Our analysis looks at how the notion of class is used or rejected and how various groups are constructed in the text. This aim corresponds with the principle of discourse analysis that advocates studying discourse ‘in its own right’. In other words, it does not treat text as a way of learning about some external reality, but considers text itself to be an object of interest [Potter and Wetherell 2001: 200; Silverman 2000: 826]. Discourse analysis looks at how objects and subjects are constructed within texts [Wood and Kroger 2000: 21]. In particular, inquiry into how people are differentiated, how these people are differentially evaluated, and how the representation itself becomes an object of the discursive struggle is an important feature of discourse analysis [Fairclough 2001: 237; Taylor 2001: 7; Wetherell 2001: 25].

The focus of this study is on the use of the notion of class in public discussion about politics. Therefore, we chose to focus on the discourse around an important and regular political activity—elections. Specifically, the texts analysed were published within a few days before and after the election to the lower chamber of the Czech Parliament in 2010. Rather than producing data for the purpose of analysis (e.g. through interviews), we decided to collect texts published independently of our research. The advantage to the use of this kind of unobtrusive method of data collection is that the analysis is then able to capture the way in which the analysed issue is conveyed independently of the researcher’s interest and is preferred for the purposes of discourse analysis [Wood and Kroger 2000: 57].

Bauer and Aarts [2000] argue that for qualitative research, representative sampling is not appropriate because the variety of meanings of interest and the proper ‘population’ for the research cannot be decided prior to the analysis. Instead, a purposive construction of the sample controlled by the researcher is more suitable. The researcher should begin by selecting sources, analyse them for their various meanings, and then extend the corpus of data. They suggest three criteria for corpus design: (1) relevance—materials should be relevant to the research topic; (2) homogeneity—the corpus should be consistent and focused on one type of material only; (3) synchronicity—materials should be chosen from one time period [ibid.: 31].

Our analysis started with three articles (19, 20 and 26—the numbers refer to the order in which the texts analysed are listed in Appendix 1), in the opinion editorial genre, discovered by reading Czech newspapers and magazines daily. All three concerned themselves with the 2010 election and commented upon the issue of class and its use in political struggles. We therefore decided to systematically focus on the genre of opinions and editorials as the next step of data collection. We surveyed the four most widely read, nationwide daily broadsheets and the two most widely read magazines focusing on politics. The resulting sample included four daily newspapers and two weekly magazines (see Appendix 2 for descriptions). In the case of the newspapers, we focused on the period five days around the election (two days before the election, the two days of the election,
and one day after the election). With respect to the magazines, we examined one issue prior to and one after the election. Reading every opinion article, we chose 45 texts related to the notion of class for further analysis.

The sample we constructed met the criteria noted above: (1) Relevancy was ensured by our reading all articles in detail and selecting those relevant to the research topic. (2) Homogeneity was guaranteed in that we selected the same type of material (text) from a particular genre [Silverman 2000: 828]. (3) The texts were synchronous in that they were all published in the same period of time and commented on a single political event.

After obtaining the selected texts in electronic format, we analysed the articles using Vivo 8 software. As the first step of the analysis, we coded parts of the text with shared meaning into broad categories (for this recommendation, see Gill [2000], Parker [2004]). As a second step, we focused more narrowly on selected parts of the text and divided them into categories determined by the theoretical framework presented above. Aligning the analysis with the concepts given by the chosen theoretical framework is a standard way of proceeding in discourse analysis [Howarth 2000: 141; Taylor 2001: 39; Wood and Kroger 2000: 105]. Parts of the text were coded into four overlapping categories: (1) rejection—where the notion of class was explicitly rejected; (2) division—where individuals were divided into groups and these groups were named; (3) evaluations—where certain groups were ascribed certain characteristics and evaluated; (4) political subject—where the standards for evaluation of political actors and their political behaviour were mentioned.

Analysis and findings

The election addressed in the selected texts took place on 28 and 29 May 2010. The main competitors were the two leading parties: the Czech Social Democratic Party on the left and the Civic Democratic Party on the right (abbreviated hereinafter in the text as ČSSD and ODS, respectively). As the election was held at a time when the economic conditions in Europe were deteriorating (most notably just after the onset of the fiscal crisis in Greece), issues of fiscal restrictions were among those most discussed. Other topics included free health care, taxes, and the redistribution of wealth. After the elections, two right-wing and one centre party formed a coalition government with a programme characterised by an emphasis on fiscal restrictions.

Rejection

As Foucault reminds us, in every moment, there is an effort to draw a line between what can be said and what must be rejected. Discourse is given shape by designation of the proper way of talking about some topics and the exclusion of
what is seen as illegitimate, potentially dangerous speech. In the analysed texts, the description of social relations in terms of class (e.g. as a conflict between the poor and the rich) is often explicitly rejected: We identified this feature in fourteen out of forty-five articles. The reasons for the renunciation (if they are given) differ slightly; however, the rejection is usually connected with the perception of a threat to society as a whole. In some cases, texts connect the notion of class with the danger of an oppressive regime and even directly with the memory of the communist dictatorship. In other instances, the evocation of class is likened to the spread of class hatred. In one instance, the talk about class differences is considered nonsensical in a post-communist country.

The author of the following excerpt explicitly rejects the portrayal of politics as a conflict between the rich and the poor found in a different article. The words themselves are attributed great power—the use of the notion of class is likened to ‘letting the genie out of the bottle’. The rhetoric of class is dangerous because it may lend support to the rise of a repressive type of regime:

Václav Bělohradský [the author of the article on which this author comments], like many of his predecessors, lets the genie out of the bottle when he depicts politics as a clash of the rich and the weak. It begins as an intellectual game that has helped the dark forces to rise up many times before. These forces were parasitic on the poor. Mostly, they threw them into even worse poverty and, what is more, into oppression. Isn’t it possible to talk about the equality of opportunity without boasting about class struggle? It is possible, but only if one’s aim is to solve problems, not to capitalise on problems. [20]

Most of the cases of explicit rejection address a statement by Jiří Paroubek, who at the time of the election was the leader of ČSSD. In the pre-election debates, Paroubek portrayed his party as representing ‘ordinary people’. Moreover, he claimed that the only negative impact of progressive taxation (part of his party’s programme) would be that some people could afford ‘less caviar and smaller cars’ [Viktora 2010]. This statement was widely criticised in the commentaries on it we analysed. The author of one article described it as the most important factor in deciding her vote:

I understand that just as many young people worry about their future; many elderly people worry about the present. But those words about ordinary people and caviar, they are not a question of solidarity, a question of a left-wing or right-wing point of view on the order of things ... This is different. This is a play on envy, which breeds hatred. Class hatred. And that is what I am scared of. [31]

2 Numbers in brackets refer to the article the excerpt is quoted from according to the list of articles presented in Appendix 1.
Another text compares this rhetoric to the rhetoric of the communist regime:

The former regime fancied the word ‘workers’. One president even invented the term ‘petty people’. This was in the times when the election results were known in advance. Today’s election is real. Nevertheless, the pre-election language of politicians resembles that of old. The use of the old vocabulary is perhaps motivated by politicians’ fears of their competitors’ success. It is enough to replace the term ‘workers’ or ‘petty people’ with ‘ordinary people’ and you have won. (35)

One commentator makes it explicit that, in a post-communist country, it is nonsense to talk about class in relation to politics. The class-based interpretation of the elections by Communist Party members, he claims, offered a rare opportunity for laughter during the pre-election period:

Like when Pavel Kováčik [an elected MP representing the Communist Party] stated that workers, pensioners, and mothers … have lost. The workers, of course, had already lost in 1948, when Mister Kováčik’s party seized the government in an armed coup. As a result of forty years of economic devastation, today’s workers have half the wages of their comrades to the west of our borders. [45]

Division and evaluation

Even though, as the above examples show, talk of class is often rejected, in the texts we analysed there are equally numerous attempts to introduce various ‘visions of division’, whereby the population is divided by means of imposing a symbolic boundary. Various groups in society are designated and ascribed different qualities. In some instances, these designations are explicitly linked to class position (e.g. occupational or related to the distribution of economic capital)—for example, people are described as managers or entrepreneurs [26], as opposed to welfare recipients [21]. In other cases, the terms used are vaguer, but nonetheless have economic connotations, such as ‘successful’ [41] or refer to people who ‘are unable to stand on their own feet’ [26]. In other instances, a boundary is erected between the young and the old.

As Bourdieu suggests, classificatory schemes are not neutral. They contain explicit or implicit evaluation of the named groups. Symbolic visions ascribe certain characteristics to the groups. In addition, they accentuate certain traits while diverting attention from others. In the analysed texts, managers and entrepreneurs are connected with characteristics such as responsibility for the economic productivity of society, success, and international mobility. The potential for success and mobility is also attributed to the young. In contrast, other groups are portrayed as dependent, ill-equipped for competition in the global economy, or even as a threat to the well-being of society. The old are depicted as living in the past and valuing certainty more than opportunity.
The following excerpt from an article indicatively titled ‘The Manifesto against High Taxes and the Spread of Class Hatred’ presents a telling example of the rejection of a certain discourse on class and the simultaneous symbolic division of society into classes. The authors warn against left-wing politicians who take advantage of the poorer circumstances of their voters and create an atmosphere of class hatred. On the other hand, the authors designate themselves as speaking on behalf of entrepreneurs and managers:

The left does not hide its aim to introduce higher taxes, namely to those who work intensively and bear responsibility for the performance of companies… Reflex [the name of a magazine] looked at tax increases through their eyes and attempted to formulate their stance on this matter.

Left-wing politicians take advantage of the poorer circumstances of their voters and lead them in their campaign to battle against the so-called rich. The catchphrase ‘the rich should pay for the crisis’ creates an atmosphere of class hatred. [26]

Managers and entrepreneurs are assessed as being responsible for the well-being of society as a whole and are regarded as a group worthy of protection against taxation. This group is also connected with agency and potential mobility:

People who have acquired their wealth by building functioning companies have contributed to society as a whole. They deserve recognition. People who, thanks to their efforts, have managed to stand on their own two feet already pay higher taxes and therefore contribute considerably to those who, for various reasons, are unable to stand on their own feet … Middle- and high-ranking managers are the engine of economic success … People who bear responsibility for [economic] performance do not have to invest their talent and their work into a society that does not appreciate their skills and intends to punish them in the form of progressive taxation … [26]

In another text, similar characteristics are associated with the young. The young are active, oriented towards the future, and internationally mobile. The author, who claims to speak for the younger generations (the article is titled ‘We, the Young Generation’), explains why young people voted for right-wing parties in the election.

The main reason for the young population’s electoral protest was their fears for their future. In Jiří Paroubek [the chair of the main left-wing party], young people saw isolation, idleness, proletarianism, and debt. This is in sharp contrast to what the young want: freedom, to get to know the world, to freely fulfil their wishes, and to live their American dreams. [24]
Often, the representation of other groups stands in sharp contrast to the qualities and visions entrepreneurs and young people are portrayed as having. Other groups are characterised as lacking agency and the skills needed to succeed in a modern economy and as being dependent on others. The following excerpt is taken from an article that describes the electoral contest in one region of the Czech Republic:

The Moravian-Silesian region is exotic. Thanks to its socio-economic composition, which is more suited to the late 19 century than to the global battle of brains, it has one of the highest unemployment rates and has the most people dependent on state pittance. In other words: more than half of welfare benefits go here. As regards politics, things are not much better … The situation is logically reflected in electoral preferences. According to a survey by Czech Television, spendthrift ČSSD is ahead of ODS. [22]

In another text, the theme of dependency is also highlighted, but with added emphasis on how the situation of the others who are productive is worsening:

We need to remember that the collective plunder of public money does not lead more to the common good … And also that fulfilling the demands of all those claimants of welfare benefits paralyses the power and motivation of others who generate the wealth of society [emphasis added]. [21]

Similar traits are identified in the wishes and habits of older generations. In contrast to yearning for freedom and mobility and being concerned with the future, they are portrayed as worried about the present or yearning for the certainty of the past, without the courage to make innovative choices. References are made to the habits developed under communism:

The cultivated lifestyle of living from day to day, the most exciting prospect being that of saving up to buy an ‘embéčko’ or a vacation in Bulgaria,3 plays a role … They do not long for the untrodden path that you have to hack out yourself, or, conversely, for luxurious highways with no speed limits. What they like is to travel along a local road at a fair speed with the certainty of occasional, cheap stops for snacks. Above all, no risk. [28]

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3 The term ‘embéčko’ refers to a type of car that was widely available in communist times. Owing to restrictions on travel, Bulgaria was almost the only place where citizens in the Soviet bloc could spend a holiday at a seaside resort.
Political subject

The symbolic division of the population into various classes and the evaluation of those groups are often in the analysed texts found in connection with an attempt to establish which political subjects are legitimate and with judgements about who fulfils the desired norm. As we have argued, the discourse lays out a set of rules as to which subjects are the right ones, their status, and what constitutes acceptable behaviour on their part.

Within the sample, the idea of a political subject is constructed in relation to the threat of populism. Legitimate political subjects are defined as individuals who are rational and immune to populist manipulation. Different groups are portrayed as being susceptible to the influence of demagoguery to different degrees. The principle of division and rejection works to establish which one political subject is the legitimate one through the discursive exclusion of groups portrayed as lacking political sophistication, driven by habits and emotions instead of reason, and whose political preferences may constitute a threat to democratic society. This lack of political sophistication is deemed to spring from two main sources. The first is the legacy of the communist regime. According to various texts, there are groups in the population who emerged from the communist past damaged. The communist regime, it is argued, influenced their habits, ideology and most importantly, their ability to function as autonomous political subjects in a free society. The second concerns the social conditions of voters. Voters on the left are portrayed as manipulated by populist politicians, who take advantage of their lower socio-economic position.

The connection between populism and the norm of a legitimate political subject is perhaps most clearly expressed in the following excerpt:

Europe deals with similar problems: we spend more than we earn, through welfare benefits, states reward convenience more than diligence and industriousness. The growing influence of populism was and still is a historical sign of the approaching decline of civilisation. Under the influence of creeping populism, the European Union went into severe financial and political crisis. Even in spite of strikes and demonstrations, politicians are starting to realise the scope of this danger. Will Czechs demonstrate with their votes that this does not apply to them? [6]

The author portrays redistributive welfare arrangements as a manifestation of a damaging populism that could eventually lead to the decline of civilisation. This populism is responsible for the fiscal and political crisis and needs to be resisted by politicians even against protests from sections of the citizenry. Citizens are suspected of being potentially vulnerable to the populist spell and they should demonstrate that the danger of populism does not apply to them by voting against populist programmes.

Another article connects aspects of populism, the economy, and the norm of proper citizenship into a consistent pattern and shows how they are connected. It
was written by the owner of the newspaper and published on the first day of the election. It starts by emphasising the need to create a functioning democracy in the Czech Republic:

I want to help to create conditions for the development of non-governmental organisations of the think-tank type, on whose basis there can be room for a public discussion about essential topics. I am interested in a shift in society as a whole towards the traditional values of Western democracy, towards the development of and compliance with these norms. [4]

This vision assumes a particular construct of the political subject of democratic politics. Interestingly, this notion is pitched against the image of ‘ordinary people’, which was elsewhere rejected as a manifestation of class hatred. Moreover, the proper subject of politics is identified as interested in the world in a manner reminiscent of the value of mobility identified above. Again, a legitimate political subject is constituted in opposition to populism:

The left appeals to ordinary people. I’d rather believe in extraordinary people. People who are fearless, proud, brave, independent, responsible, industrious. People who are creative and inventive, who are not afraid of new challenges. I believe that such people form the majority in the Czech Republic …

[This newspaper] wants the Czech Republic to be a society of educated people, people who take an interest in the world and not a country of people dependent on the state and populist promises.

This newspaper will not remain indifferent when some political parties wish to turn citizens into state-dependent, non-self-reliant, and easily manipulated masses. [4]

In other passages, the manipulation of citizens is connected to the programme of welfare benefits, while the ideal of an independent and free citizen is tied to restricted state intervention and low taxes:

Parties on the left appeal to untenable certainties, an expensive and overgrown state, they take advantage of low and despicable instincts such as envy, and they misuse people’s fear.

This newspaper builds on values that it considers central to the development of this country. It wants a modern and cost-saving state that does not limit the freedom and activities of its citizens. It wants simple, transparent rules and simple, low, and fair taxes. (4) [emphasis added]

Another article follows the same general pattern. Democracy is something that ‘we’re not good at’ and that citizens yet need to learn. Moreover, left-wing parties threaten to undermine democracy by using populist tactics. In addition
to this classificatory pattern, the text bases its premise on the idea that a section
the population is damaged, and they are portrayed as an obstacle to the advance-
ment of civilisation:

As the elections approach, it strikes me that we know how to play ice hockey, but we
are no good at democracy … The main left-wing party unleashed a whole arsenal of
negative emotions, such as envy and hatred, and by attacking so-called capitalism it
undermines the very basis of free competition …

In a country where two forces of occupation almost succeeded at destroying the
elites, more and more new figures are bred who rise to the top. The past is an ex-
traordinary burden and is the source of backwardness and the moral deficit in a section of
the population. Nevertheless, in a longer-term perspective, Czechs have a chance for
continued civilisational progress. [21]

The perception that parts of the population have been damaged by the com-
munist regime and are therefore unable to act as autonomous democratic citizens
is emphasised in various texts. In the following excerpt, a different author ties this
assumption of damage to the older generations. Again, this group is character-
ised by dependency and the absence of self-reliance:

Older people got used to the regular, modest, but assured rations of provisions paid
for with total subordination. This subordination most likely infected their very souls
and became their nature.

In short, the older generations do not yearn for freedom. They do not know what
it is. They cannot handle it. On the contrary, they are frightened by it, because it
requires independent behaviour that they are not able to adopt. Older generations
have an imprint in their personality codes that people are directed and the one who
does the directing regularly serves them a bowl of food … [28]

This argumentation targets older generations and depicts them as unable to op-
erate in an environment of freedom. Moreover, as the authors suggest, they are
more prone to following others than to making independent choices. Similar
characteristics are in some instances attributed to voters on the left. They are por-
trayed as a group whose disadvantaged position and emotions can be misused
by populist politicians, rather than as individuals who can make autonomous
choices. Their depiction as an object to be acted upon by politicians, rather than
as an autonomous subject of politics, is a recurrent feature in the discourse:

Left-wing politicians take advantage of the poorer circumstances of their voters and lead
them in their campaign to battle against the so-called rich. [26]

The Czech left appeals to low instincts and fear. People’s fear of changes, fear of the
new. [4]

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4 Shortly before the elections, the Czech team won the world hockey championship.
**Alternative perspective**

So far, we have described the patterns prevalent in the analysed corpus. However, we found an important and obvious exception to the patterns described above. The texts published in the newspaper *Právo* reveal a discourse on class that is very different from the one described above. In this part of the corpus, the talk about class rejected in the above-cited texts is often accepted, and the evaluation of the groups portrayed above is reversed.

The following excerpt presents an example of the confirmatory use of the term ‘ordinary people’, which was vehemently rejected in the pattern identified above:

> Our wish—the wish of ‘ordinary people’—is ordinary: to have relative security in a decent job, where they don’t feel like passing out in bed right after their shift. And [to have] an income that reaches the common standard. [15]

In another article, the main left-wing party is portrayed not as an agent inflicting class hatred or taking advantage of the poor circumstances of less successful voters, but as a representative of the interests of working people:

> ČSSD is standing again—as many times before—at a crossroads in its programme and personnel. Its role in society, to protect the interests of the people who work for their living and don’t make an exorbitant income, cannot be denied or substituted. [9]

The following excerpt provides the best illustration of the reversal of the dominant classificatory pattern described above. The election is portrayed as a class struggle of the rich against the weak and the poor.

> Yes, the most alarming feature of the May elections was that they took place under the sign of a class struggle in reverse—a struggle of the rich against the poor and the weak, against state benefits for mothers, against workers … The electoral campaign was approached as a class struggle in which the rich, organised in a Leninist way as a class, won over the poor, who were ashamed to defend their interests … I use the word poor, but I simply mean workers. [19]

The presence of an alternative perspective suggests that the categories used in the dominant pattern of political discourse and their subsequent evaluations are contested in another part of the discourse. Rather than silence, the analysis documents a struggle over the representation of classes. Rejection seems more a part of this struggle than a characteristic of the discourse as a whole.
Results and discussion

The rejection of the notion of social class is present in the corpus; however, it assumes a quite specific and limited form. What is rejected is critical discourse on class aiming at a critique of patterns of inequality and signalling the different impacts of certain policies on different groups in society. In most of the corpus, such speech is portrayed as belonging to the communist past and as making no sense in the post-communist present. Moreover, this way of speaking about class is deemed dangerous for its capacity to incite ‘class hatred’ or even the return of an oppressive regime.

However, this rejection goes hand in hand with a symbolic division of society into groups based on their economic position. Groups such as ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘managers’ are acclaimed as the ones responsible for the well-being of society as a whole. Together with young people, they are ascribed characteristics such as success, responsibility for economic productivity, knowledge of the world, and international mobility. Other groups are mentioned in referred to in terms of passivity and dependency and portrayed as irrationally sticking to old certainties. These attributes are portrayed as being in conflict with both a free, democratic society and the goal of prosperity in the contemporary economic environment.

A similar division operates as a constitutive element in the construction of a legitimate political subject. The norm of the discursively sanctioned subject is constructed in opposition to the looming danger of populism and it works as a division between those seen as responsible in their political behaviour and those who can be manipulated by populist politicians. Groups referred to as the ‘older generations’ or people in ‘poorer circumstances’ are portrayed as potentially dangerous objects in the hands of others rather than as autonomous subjects of politics.

Notably, in a smaller portion of the corpus, an alternative or even contrary perspective on the matters of class is present. Categories such as ‘ordinary people’ or ‘workers’, which were rejected in the dominant pattern are identified in this scheme. Moreover, this alternative scheme takes a positive view of values such as job security and a decent income. This finding suggests that the dominant scheme is challenged, and classifications and evaluations are at stake in the symbolic struggle.

In reference to Kolářová’s [2008b] arguments, we would like to raise a small but important objection. We do not see the ‘mainstream’ newspaper’s discourse on class (at least in our sample) using the category of class as simply a descriptive, analytical category. We have found that the naming of different groups within society is connected with their differential evaluation. The alternative discourse on class, which affirmatively uses the categories of workers and ordinary people, was only found in the newspaper Právo. We found no examples of such discourse in the other media. Právo is the only newspaper identified as left-leaning, while all the others (Mladá fronta, Hospodářské noviny, Lidové noviny) are identified as a right-leaning [see Hvíždala 2003: 221; also Klusáková 2010]. This observation
suggests that the different forms of social classification and evaluation are differentiated along the left-right political axis. We might suggest that the different ‘visions of divisions’ are part of the wider political struggle.

In relation to the existing literature on the discourse on class in post-communist societies, our analysis suggests that the contention of the ‘absence’ [Ost 2009] of talk about class does not capture the current reality of Czech political discourse. The rejection of certain talk about class is present and, as the literature claims, it is strongly associated with the negative perception of the legacy of communism. However, this rejection forms only one feature of the discourse and does not characterise the corpus as a whole. Rejection operates together with a division of society into classes and an evaluation of these classes. Moreover, the dominant scheme of classification and evaluation is challenged in an important part of the analysed material.

It is necessary to remember the fact that most of the literature reporting the absence of the notion of class in post-communist discourse focuses on the early years of the transformation [Bauman 1994; Mokrzycki 1994; Ost 2000, 2009] capturing a situation in which the newly emerging political and ideological formations were still relatively unsettled and the gains of the wave of revolutions were still perceived as fragile and potentially reversible. Kumar [1995: 124] stresses that leaders of post-communist societies often expressed their fear that the social claims emerging as a consequence of rapid economic change could derail the political achievements of the transformation. Indeed, Ost [2009: 513–515] envisions the potential for the rehabilitation of the term ‘class’ in the post-communist environment, particularly in connection with the maturing of a new generation that does not see the term as negatively connected to the past. More recent writings on class discourse [Eglitis 2011; Gąsior-Niemiec et al. 2009], though not focused on class in the discussion of politics, suggest that how the notion of class is understood in the discourse may be changing. Our analysis focuses on a single moment in time and, therefore, cannot make strong claims about the historical development of the discourse. We may, however, guess that the discourse itself is changing and that the discussion of issues of class and inequality is more common now than it was in the early years of the transformation. In addition, because we focused on the discourse surrounding a recent political event, we can argue that in the Czech case the presence of the notion of class is not limited to areas such as lifestyle or housing; for instance, Eglitis [2011] claims that in Latvia class is denied in political discourse but is apparent in patterns of consumption and in the hierarchy of lifestyles. Gąsior-Niemiec and her collaborators [2009] document the emergence of class identities in Polish discourse on housing, with a focus on the issue of gated communities. Our analysis suggests that in the Czech case, discourse on class is part of the political struggle and an important aspect concerns judgements about the political behaviour of citizens.

Interestingly, the combination of the rejection of the notion of social class and the simultaneous use of class-like division identified in our analysis bears a
striking resemblance to Skeggs’ [2004] description of the political rhetoric about class in Western societies. Skeggs argues (focusing on Britain and the United States) that in ‘the West’ too there exists a strong tendency to reject class as an appropriate category of political debate, while at the same time the classifying discourse is widespread and there are differential attributions of worth to different social groups. In part, certain groups are depicted as ‘unmodern’, backward, and as an obstacle to national prosperity under the conditions of a global competitive economy [2004: 80]. This feature resembles the part of the discourse analysed in this work that depicted sections of the population as having old habits and being unable to cope with life and politics in an environment characterised by freedom and competition.

The evidence analysed in this work is necessarily limited. It focuses on one society, one point in time, and one type of document. Therefore, claims must be made with a great deal of caution. However, the affinities identified above suggest that the political rhetoric about class in the Czech Republic is approaching the form this rhetoric takes in Western societies. Rather than starting from the premise of difference between post-communist discourse and its Western counterpart and taking the absence of class as a point of departure, scholars should pay attention to the ways in which use of the notion of class is changing, how the symbolic struggles around the notion of class are unfolding within political discourse, and what the implications these transformations have for the wider political struggle in post-communist societies.

Conclusion

Our analysis reveals that the notion of social class is simultaneously rejected and employed in Czech political discourse. In the dominant interpretative framework, rejection concerns the talk that combines class categories with a critique of inequality or the differential impact of certain policies on various groups. However, an equally strong tendency to symbolically divide society into distinct socioeconomic groups was found. A similar classification and evaluation was present in the judgements about the political behaviour of the citizenry. The groups identified as the ‘older generations’ or those in ‘poorer circumstances’ were denied the status of a political subject and instead were portrayed as objects potentially at risk of manipulation. However, the analysis also revealed the presence of an alternative perspective, in which categories rejected in the dominant framework were confirmed and tied to different values. These findings suggest that the notion of class is not absent in Czech political discourse and that the role it plays is not negligible. The categories used to depict social groups and evaluations of these groups are objects of symbolic struggle. The rejection of a certain discourse on class is only one part of this struggle.

A reading of these results, together with arguments about the discourse on class in Western societies, suggests that the combination of a partial rejection of
the notion of class and its simultaneous use might not be a distinctive feature of Czech (or perhaps post-communist) political discourse. Rather than assuming the absence of class or focusing exclusively on the difference between post-communist societies and the rest of the world, scholars of class should reflect on the way in which the discourse on class is changing and how the symbolic struggles around issues of inequality and class are unfolding in post-communist societies.

Future text-oriented research on the notion of social class in Czech political discourse may concentrate on other types of documents, such as political parties’ programmes or policy proposals, to reveal whether similar patterns of rejection and classification are used also in other discursive domains. Moreover, our analysis is limited to inquiry into the sphere of the production of discourse in the media. Prospective research may investigate whether the identified patterns are accepted or rejected by the individuals about whom these judgements are made or alternatively whether and how social classification is employed in everyday social and political practices.

KAREL MUSÍLEK studied political science at Masaryk University and the University of Toronto and sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research interests are the sociology of work, social theory, and theories of power, with an emphasis on recent post-structuralist problematisations of power in the conditions of advanced liberalism.

TOMÁŠ KATRŇÁK is an associate professor at the Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University. He specialises in social stratification, social statistics, and data-processing methods. He has authored several books, most recently A Return to Social Origins: Social Stratification Development in Czech Society from 1989 to 2009 (in Czech, with Petr Fučík). He has also published work in journals such as Sociologický časopis/Czech Sociological Review, International Sociology, Sociological Theory and Methods and the European Sociological Review.

References


Appendix 1—A list of the texts used in the analysis

24. Slechta, Ondřej. ‘My, mladá generace.’ (We, the Young Generation) Reflex, 3 June, p. 24.
29. Steigerwald, Karel. 2010. ‘Chcete ho?’ (Do You Want Him?) Mladá fronta dnes, 28 May, p. 16.
30. Čerman, Jaroslav. 2010. ‘Co nás rozčiluje na volební kampani aneb kdo jsou obyčejní lidé?’ (What Upsets Us about the Electoral Campaign or Who Are the Ordinary People?) Mladá fronta dnes, 28 May, p. 18.
36. Čermák, Miloš. 2010. ‘Nepodléhejme kultu preference.’ (We Shall Not Surrender to the Cult of Polls) Lidové noviny, 27 May, p. 15.
39. Bratinka, Pavel. 2010. ‘Zase pochlebujeme králi’ (We Are Flattering the King Again), Lidové noviny, 28 May, p. 13.
## Appendix 2—A list of periodicals

### Daily newspapers:

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<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Estimated readership as of 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mladá fronta Dnes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Právo</td>
<td>419 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidové noviny</td>
<td>213 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospodářské noviny</td>
<td>187 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Weekly magazines:

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>90 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflex</td>
<td>277 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data were obtained from the yearbook of the Union of Publishers. Data are publicly available at the following webpage: